PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC v.
PEOPLE (SERAPIO) employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its
April 14, 2004 | Panganiban, J. | Criminal Appeals: Offended Party
PETITIONER: Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines
RESPONDENTS: People of the Philippines
SUMMARY: On July 27, 1994, Napoleon Macadangdang, a bus driver employed
at Philippine Bus Rabbit was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting into
triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property. He was
sentenced to imprisonment of more than 4 years and was made to pay damages to
the heirs of the victims or to those that were injured with a provision that in the
event of insolvency of the accused, Philippine Rabbit will also be made civilly
liable. This judgment became final and executory since the notice of appeal filed
by his counsel on his behalf was dismissed for the reason that he jumped bail.
However, on August 6, 1994, Philippine Rabbit filed a notice of appeal from the
judgment of the court which was admitted by the trial court. On the other hand,
the CA dismissed the appeal and ruled that that to allow an employer to dispute
independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-
employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Philippine Rabbit
now assails this ruling via a Petition for Review under Rule 45 on the ground that
since it was able to seasonably file a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, then
the judgment against accused-employee did not attain finality.
W/N an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused? -
NO
While both the prosecution and the accused may appeal a criminal case, the
prosecution may only do so if the accused won’t be placed in double jeopardy. As
to the civil liability, both the accused and the offended party may appeal the said
award. However, it is also well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate
court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its
pendency if the accused jumps bail. This is because a person who jumps bail
either during the trial or during the appeal is deemed to lose their standing in court
and to have withdrawn their appeal when they abscond. They can only appeal if
they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested
within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them. Since the accused-
employee here jumped bail, then the judgment against him became final and
executory.
As to the argument of the Philippine Rabbit that, as an employer, it is a party to
the case, that it is bound thereof and thus, it must be given the right to pursue the
appeal, has no merit. Civil liability ex delicto is deemed instituted with the
criminal action and their subsidiary liability stems from it. Undisputedly,
petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely against
its employee. Just because it participated in the defense of its accused-
liability remains subsidiary. Although in substance and in effect, they have an
interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability.
While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter's
lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own
behalf, but can only defend the accused. The decision convicting an employee
in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with
regard to the former's civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The
liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.
Moreover, an appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of
the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole
case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to
render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to
the appellant. They have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of
the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.
DOCTRINE: The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent
on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of
the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
former's subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Just
because it participated in the defense of its accused- employee does not mean
that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary.
FACTS:
1. On July 27, 1994, Napoleon Macadangdang, a bus driver employed at
Philippine Bus Rabbit was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting into
triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property.
2. He was sentenced to imprisonment of more than 4 years and was made to pay
damages to the heirs of the victims or to those that were injured with a
provision that in the event of insolvency of the accused, Philippine Rabbit
will also be made civilly liable.
3. This judgment became final and executory since the notice of appeal filed by
his counsel on his behalf was dismissed for the reason that he jumped bail.
4. However, on August 6, 1994, Philippine Rabbit filed a notice of appeal from
the judgment of the court which was admitted by the trial court.
5. On the other hand, the CA dismissed the appeal and ruled that that to allow
an employer to dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal
case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a
final judgment.
6. Philippine Rabbit now assails this ruling via a Petition for Review under Rule
45 on the ground that since it was able to seasonably file a notice of appeal
from the RTC Decision, then the judgment against accused-employee did not
attain finality.
ISSUE: W/N an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused? -NO
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
1. Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC
Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the
accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal
stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped
bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the
accused-employee.
Nature of liability of employers: only subsidiary
Appeals in Criminal Cases
1. Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states
thus: "Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy."
2. Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal
case, but the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby
be placed in double jeopardy. Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal
on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty.
3. On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with
respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the
judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to
appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.
Appeal by the Accused who Jumps Bail
1. Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court
may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if
the accused jumps bail, pursuant to Sec. 8, Rule 124 of 2000 Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure.
2. This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court
when they abscond.
3. Unless they surrender or submit to the court's jurisdiction, they are deemed
to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.
4. Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during
the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial.
5. The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days
from notice of the judgment against them.
6. While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to
have waived the appeal.
Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case
1. As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section
7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote: "A
judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set
aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where
the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final
a. after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal,
b. or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served,
c. or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal
d. or has applied for probation."
2. In this case, since the accused-employee jumped bail and is deemed to have
waived his appeal, the decision as to his liability became final.
1. Arts 102-103 of the RPC lays down the person who are subsidiary liable in
default of an accused and one of them is the employer.
2. Rule 111 provides that a civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted with
the criminal action. Here are the implications of this rule:
a. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code
need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not
deemed included therein.
b. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil
action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right
to bring such action.
c. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more
than once for the same act or omission.
3. Petitioner argument that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the
criminal case, is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof, and must be
accorded the right to appeal, has no merit.
4. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this
fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they
may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter's lawyers,
as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own
behalf, but can only defend the accused.
5. To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would
enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court.
6. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former's civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.
7. Before the employers' subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be
adequate evidence establishing that
a. they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees.
b. that the former is engaged in some kind of industry.
 c. that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of
their duties; and
d. that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to
insolvency.
8. The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But
the determination must be based on the evidence that the offended party and
the employer may fully and freely present.
9. Such determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the
employee's liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced, and in a hearing
set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the
proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
10. Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-
employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its
liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary
liability.
11. The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the
pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of
the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
former's subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable.
12. Lastly, right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is
merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing
such exercise. Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly complied with.
13. After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning
party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of the case.