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2015 TIANJIN EXPLOSIONS

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April 11th-12th, 2016

2015 TIANJIN EXPLOSIONS

XU Sen1, LIU Dabin1 Klaus-Dieter Wehrstedt2 and Holger Krebs2
1Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Xiao Ling Wei 200, Nanjing,
Jiangsu, China

2Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung (BAM)

Department 2 „Chemical Safety Engineering“
Unter den Eichen 87, 12205 Berlin, Germany

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not
necessarily be taken to be those of the Nanjing University and BAM.
Introduction

• A series of explosions that killed over one hundred people and

injured hundreds of others occurred at a container storage
station at the Port of Tianjin on Wednesday, 12 August 2015.
The first two explosions occurred within 30 seconds of each
other at the facility, which is located in the Binhai New Area of
Tianjin, China. The second explosion was far larger and
involved the detonation of about 800 tons of ammonium
nitrate. Fires caused by the initial explosions continued to burn
uncontrolled throughout the weekend, repeatedly causing
secondary explosions, with eight additional explosions
occurring on Saturday, 15 August.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Tianjin_explosions

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 2
Introduction

• The cause of the explosions was not immediately known at

first, but an investigation concluded in February 2016 that
an overheated container of dry nitrocellulose was the cause
of the initial explosion.

• As of 12 September 2015, the official casualty report was

173 deaths, 8 missing, and 797 non-fatal injuries.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Tianjin_explosions

• 304 buildings, 12,428 cars and 7,533 containers were badly

destroyed.

• Environment damage: 320.6 tons of sodium cyanide and a

large amount of other chemicals were dispersed.

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 3
 Beijing

Tianjin

Ruihai Logistics

Tianjin port
© Nanjing University
 Figure 2. Accident site

Earth-quake distance
North: 13.3km

Accident center

Blast affected area

West: 8.3km

East: 8.5km

South:8.0km
© Nanjing University
Scenes of destruction

Explosion crater (the diameter is more than 100m)

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 6
Scenes of destruction

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 7
Scenes of destruction

Satellite picture before the blast

Tianjin Dongjiang Port Area

Ruihai International Logistics

© Nanjing University

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 8
Scenes of destruction

Satellite picture after the blast

© Nanjing University

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 9
Scenes of destruction

Only framework left in

this five floors building

Less than 400 m

Explosion
source

Damage to structures around the explosion source -1

© Nanjing University

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 10
Scenes of destruction

Damage to structures around the explosion source - 2

The glasses were shattered and the

security doors were badly destroyed

© Nanjing University
Explosion source

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 11
 Accident Analysis
• August 12, 22:51:46: fire, 23:34:06 (~45 min later): the first
explosion, 23:34:37 (~30 sec later): the second explosion.
August 14, 16:40: the fire was extinguished.

• According to the on-site staffs, the video, the trace evidences,

and the destruction and displacement characteristics of the
containers, the central area of the dangerous goods container
storage station was identified as the initial fire point.

• No electrical equipment at the fire site; cable, lighthouse (road

lamp) and video surveillance are normally. So we can rule out
the possibility of electrical lines and equipment factors causing
the fire.

• Meanwhile, no lightning weather; no vehicles. So we can

exclude the fire legacy, lightning, vehicles and other external
factors.

• The Ministry of Public Security: no terroristic attack.

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 12
 Accident Analysis

There were 72 different dangerous goods in the warehouse,

including Classes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and other common goods.

1） Class 2: 2 kinds of gases, non-combustible;

2） Class 3: 10 liquids, no spontaneous combustion or self-heating
characteristics;
3） Class 5: 5 oxidizing substances: no spontaneous combustion
or self-heating characteristics;
4） Class 6: 12 toxic substances;
5） Class 8: 8 kinds of corrosive substances,
6) 27 kinds of common goods, no spontaneous combustion or
self-heating characteristics;
7） Class 4: 8 dangerous goods, and the dry
nitrocellulose have spontaneous combustion characteristics.

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 13
Accident Analysis

Lists of the goods in the warehouse (selection)

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 14
Accident Analysis

Lists of the goods in the warehouse (selection)

Σ NC 48.17 tons (11.1 t NC, wetted,
15.2 t NC solution, 21.87 t NC chips -
not in the list and not specified!) NC
chips normally phlegmatized with 20 %
plasticizer. The difference between NC
and NC-Chips is the type of phlegmatizer
used (alcohol or plasticizer).

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 15
 Accident Analysis – Nitrocellulose (NC)

Information and data of the Chinese co-authors

Production process (Hengshui Neweastern Chemical Industry Co.,Ltd.):
Alcohol was used as wetting agent, and the NC (N ≤ 12.3 %) was
packed in plastic bags. The bags were sealed only by a packing rope,
loaded inside fiber drums.
According to the employees of Ruihai Company, there exist the rough
operation in loading or unloading, the packing of the nitrocellulose was
destroyed, and the nitrocellulose scattered (what really happens
Over and over again).

The experimental data indicated that: A) if the packing was destroyed,

the wetting agent (alcohol) will volatilize in 2 hours under 50°C, and
the dry NC decomposes at 40 °C, a serious reaction and mass loss at
174 °C, spontaneous combustion and releasing lots of heat; B) under
adiabatic condition, an exothermic reaction happened at 35 °C, and a
violent combustion at 150 °C;
On the day, the highest temperature was 36 °C, an experiment showed
that the temperature in a container is up to 65 °C when the ambient
temperature is 35 °C.
Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 16
 Accident Analysis – Nitrocellulose (NC)

Information and data of the Chinese co-authors

Production process (Hengshui Neweastern Chemical Industry Co.,Ltd.):
Alcohol was used as wetting agent, and the NC (N ≤ 12.3 %) was
packed in plastic bags. The bags were sealed only by a packing rope,
loaded inside fiber drums.
According to the employees of Ruihai Company, there exist the rough
operation in loading or unloading, the packing of the nitrocellulose was
destroyed, and the nitrocellulose scattered (what really happens
Over and over again).

The experimental data indicated that: A) if the packing was destroyed,

the wetting agent (alcohol) will volatilize in 2 hours under 50°C, and
the dry NC decomposes at BAM:
40 °C,Under these
a serious conditions
reaction and the
massalcohol
loss at
evaporates
174 °C, spontaneous combustion and an explosive
and releasing atmosphere
lots of heat; B) under
exists which
adiabatic condition, an exothermic may lead
reaction to an explosion
happened if ana
at 35 °C, and
ignition
violent combustion at 150 °C; source is present or a self-ignition may
occur. This scenario
On the day, the highest temperature could
was 36 °C, anbe the start of
experiment the
showed
that the temperature in a container explosion
is up to 65disaster
°C when the ambient
(?).
temperature is 35 °C.
Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 17
 Accident Analysis – Nitrocellulose (NC)

At the same time, there were 48.17 tons of NC, NC chips and NC

Pictures sent by Chinese colleagues.

solutions in accident region (about 5-6 containers - 2 with chips,
1 with solution, 2-3 with NC, wetted). Thus, the NC was identified as
the initial ignition substance.

One typical
sample of NC.

© Nanjing University

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 18
 Accident Analysis – Nitrocellulose (NC)

Pictures sent by Chinese colleagues.

NC in bags
and fibre
drums.

© Nanjing University

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 19
 Accident Analysis – Nitrocellulose (NC)

Pictures sent by Chinese colleagues.

Drums in a
container.

© Nanjing University

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 20
Accident Analysis – Ammonium nitrate (AN)

© Nanjing University

Pictures sent by Chinese colleagues.

The small packaging(25kg/bag) of AN in container. There are about 23,000 kg
AN in a 20-foot container
Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 21
Accident Analysis – Ammonium nitrate (AN)

Pictures sent by Chinese colleagues.

© Nanjing University

The large packages (1,000kg/bag) of AN in a container. There are about

20,000kg AN in a 20-foot container.
Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 22
 Accident Analysis – Possible Process of
the Accident

• A large storage area was involved in fire (45 min before first explosion,
height of flame > 100 m), containers stood at close quarters (about
20 m between NC and AN).
• Volatilization of alcohol led to dry NC.
• An exothermic reaction and spontaneous combustion happened under
high temperature condition (the temperature of NC containers
> 60 °C, heating by sunshine, or higher by the above-mentioned fire).
• The flame spread and a possible deflagration-to-detonation transition to
neighboring ammonium nitrate (pure, 800 tons) containers (40!), which
stood close to other containers and led to two large blasts.

• According to the simulation result of the State Key Laboratory of

Explosion Science and Technology, the first explosion energy was
equivalent to about 15 tons of TNT, the second explosion was equivalent
to about 430 tons of TNT. Consideration many small-scale explosions,
the total energy was equivalent to about 450 tons of TNT.

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 23
 Accident Analysis – First Assumption

• The time lag between detonations of NC and AN should be assumed to

be
- in case of thermal impact (flame, fire engulfment, radiation) > 20 min,
- in case of propagation (explosion, detonation) by fragments, shock
pressure, fireball, etc., a few seconds.
This agrees formally with the described time lag of 30 seconds between the
two major explosions (detonations).

• The assumed TNT equivalent for 15 tons (first explosion) correlates well
with detonation of about 15 tons NC (TNT equivalent of 1 if all NCs have
a mass explosive hazard). The TNT equivalent for the second explosion
(450 tons AN) correlates with the 800 tons of AN provided an efficiency
of about 50 % in case of a high impact detonation (from NC). This would
confirm the involved masses and the order of events.

• The fire before the explosions could be the reason for the accelerate
evaporation of alcohol and decomposition of NC as well as for the
thermal sensitization of AN.
Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 24
 Accident Analysis – Second Assumption

• The fire led to decomposition and burning (and partial explosions of NC)
in containers.
• Both effects have influenced the stability of a smaller amount of AN. A
deflagration started leading to a deflagration-to-detonation transition
(first explosion/detonation, 15 tons TNT equivalent).
• The detonation of one (?) AN container led to a second more severe
detonation of the larger amount of AN (430 to 450 tons TNT equivalent).

Currently no evidence exists for these assumptions. After intensive

discussions the authors rather favor the second assumption/theory.

The IGUS EOS colleagues are invited to give comments and/or to

review the argumentation.

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 25
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© Washington Post

We sympathize with firefighters and others

who died in the Tianjin explosion!

Wehrstedt et al. 2015 Tianjin Explosions IGUS EOS Meeting, April 11th - 12th, 2016, Basle, Switzerland 26