Baltic Security Net Assessment

BALTIC SECURITY
NET ASSESSMENT
by
Dr. Phillip A. Petersen

and
Nicholas Myers
with
ƌ͘:ĈŶŝƐĤƌǌŝŶƐ
Edmund Bitinas
Dr. Phillip A. Karber
Wojciech Zalewski
/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶďǇ͗ƌ͘ŚĂď͘ĚǌŝƐųĂǁ_ůŝǁĂ
Tartu, January, 2018

The Baltic Security Net Assessment
By: Dr. Phillip A. Petersen and Nicholas Myers
tŝƚŚ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ͗ ƌ͘ :ĈŶŝƐ ĤƌǌŝŶƐ͖ ƌ͘ WŚŝůůŝƉ ͘ <ĂƌďĞƌ͖ ĚŵƵŶĚ
ŝƚŝŶĂƐ͖tŽũĐŝĞĐŚĂůĞǁƐŬŝ
/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶďǇ: Dr. hab. ĚǌŝƐųĂǁ_ůŝǁĂ
Published by: the Potomac Foundation and the Baltic Defence College
Second edition
First edition ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρďǇƚŚĞWŽƚŽŵĂĐ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĞĨĞŶĐĞŽůůĞŐĞ
© dŚĞWŽƚŽŵĂĐ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐŐƌĂŶƚĞĚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĞĨĞŶƐĞŽůůĞŐĞ
ƉĞƌŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƵƐĞĂŶĚƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶǁŚŽůĞŽƌŝŶƉĂƌƚƐ
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐŽůĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƉƌŽƉĞƌĐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ͘
Cover page: ZĂŝĚŽ^ĂĂƌ͕ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĞĨĞŶĐĞŽůůĞŐĞ
Language editing: ƌŝĂŶŶĂůŝƐĞWĞƚĞƌƐĞŶĂŶĚ:͘d͘tĂůƵŶĂƐ
Printed by: Ecoprint AS

sĂďƌŝŬƵλ͕sĂŚŝŬƺůĂ
πκονξdĂƌƚƵŵĂĂƐƚŽŶŝĂ
-ŵĂŝů͗ŝŶĨŽΛĞĐŽƉƌŝŶƚ͘ĞĞ
ISBN 978-9949-88-322-6 (pdf)

dŚŝƐ^ĞĐŽŶĚĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞBaltic Security Net Assessment ǀŽůƵŵĞŝƐƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ
ďǇƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĞĨĞŶƐĞŽůůĞŐĞŝŶĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚdŚĞWŽƚŽŵĂĐ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ͘
dŚĞǀŝĞǁ͕ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ͕ĂŶĚŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂƌĞƚŚŽƐĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐĂŶĚĚŽŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇƌĞĨůĞĐƚƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŽƌƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂ͕>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĞĨĞŶƐĞŽůůĞŐĞ͘
dŚĞWŽƚŽŵĂĐ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐŐƌĂŶƚĞĚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĞĨĞŶƐĞŽůůĞŐĞƉĞƌŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŽ
ƵƐĞĂŶĚƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶǁŚŽůĞŽƌŝŶƉĂƌƚƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐŽůĞ
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƉƌŽƉĞƌĐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ͘
dŚĞĂůƚŝĐEĞǁƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŝƐĂŶĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚũŽŝŶƚůǇďǇdŚĞWŽƚŽŵĂĐ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĞĨĞŶƐĞŽůůĞŐĞŝŶdĂƌƚƵ͕ƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ-ĂƐƐŝƐƚĞĚ
ƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚŝŶμκλπ͘/ƚŝƐŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚĨŽƌĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
ŽĨƚŚĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĞĨĞŶƐĞŽůůĞŐĞďǇĨĂĐƵůƚǇĂŶĚƐƚƵĚĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ŽůůĞŐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶŵŽĚƵůĞƐĂŶĚĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŝŶĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĂŶĚĐŽŵŝŶŐĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐǇĞĂƌƐ͘
dŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝůůďĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚƚŽŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐƚĂĨĨƐĂŶĚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
^ƚĂƚĞƐĂƐĂŶĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚĂŶĚďŽŽŬ͘
&ŝƌƐƚĚŝƚŝŽŶ: KĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ
^ĞĐŽŶĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ: January 2018

Dedication
&ƌĂŶǌ-:ŽƐĞƉŚ^ĐŚƵůǌĞ;λς^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌλσλς– νλ:ĂŶƵĂƌǇμκκοͿ͕ĨŽƌŵĞƌŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ-in-
ŚŝĞĨ͕ůůŝĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐƵƌŽƉĞ͕ƚŽŽŬƌƐ͘WŚŝůůŝƉ͘<ĂƌďĞƌ ĂŶĚWŚŝůůŝƉ͘WĞƚĞƌƐĞŶǁŚĞŶ
ƚŚĞǇƐƚŝůůǁŽƌĞǇŽƵŶŐŵĞŶ͛ƐĐůŽƚŚĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂůĚĞƐŬƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚ͘ƚƚŚĞ
ŚĞŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ͕ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂƚŽƚŚĞƵƐƚƌŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌ͕ƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚǁŚĂƚĂŶĂǆŝƐŽĨĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŽŶĂŵĂƉůŽŽŬĞĚůŝŬĞǁŚĞŶƉůĂĐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂů
ƚĞƌƌĂŝŶƚŚĞŵĂƉƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ͘KƵƚŽĨĚĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ĐŚƵůǌĞ͕<ĂƌďĞƌĂŶĚ
WĞƚĞƌƐĞŶǁĞƌĞďƌŝĞĨĞĚĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞĨĞŶĐĞĚĞŵĂƌĐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞůŝŶĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
ŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶǌŽŶĞŝŶƚŚĞĞĂƐƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ&ĞĚĞƌĂůZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇďǇƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐ
ŽĨƚŚŽƐĞEdKĨŽƌĐĞƐĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŽŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ^ŽǀŝĞƚĂŶĚtĂƌƐĂǁWĂĐƚĨŽƌĐĞƐŽŶƚŚĞĞĂƐƚ
ƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞ/ƌŽŶƵƌƚŝŶĂŶĚ͕ŝĨĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞĨĂŝůĞĚ͕ĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ&ĞĚĞƌĂů
ZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͘dŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĨŽƌĞǀĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞĚŚŽǁ<ĂƌďĞƌĂŶĚWĞƚĞƌƐĞŶ
ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚĂďŽƵƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌƚ͕ĂŶĚŵĂĚĞƚŚĞŵƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŚŽǁƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨĂŶǇƉŝĞĐĞŽĨƚĞƌƌĂŝŶďĞŐŝŶƐǁŝƚŚǁĂůŬŝŶŐŝƚ͘WŚǇƐŝĐĂůůǇŬŶŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶƚŽ
ďĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĞĚ– ŝŶĂůůƐĞĂƐŽŶƐ– ďĞĐĂŵĞĂůŝĨĞƚŝŵĞŽďƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĂůĞƐƐŽŶƚŽďĞ
ƉĂƐƐĞĚŽŶƚŽĞǀĞƌǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚůůŝĞĚƐƚƵĚĞŶƚŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘<ĂƌďĞƌŚĂƐǀŝƐŝƚĞĚŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ
ďŽƌĚĞƌƐŽĨhŬƌĂŝŶĞĂŶĚWĞƚĞƌƐĞŶĂůůŽĨƚŚĞƐƚŽŶŝĂŶ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂŶ͕>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶĂŶĚWŽůŝƐŚ
ďŽƌĚĞƌƐǁŝƚŚZƵƐƐŝĂĂŶĚĞůĂƌƵƐ͘EĞǆƚǇĞĂƌ͕ŽŶƚŚĞŽŶĞ-ŚƵŶĚƌĞĚƚŚĂŶŶŝǀĞƌƐĂƌǇŽĨ
'ĞŶĞƌĂů&ƌĂŶǌ-:ŽƐĞƉŚ^ĐŚƵůǌĞ͛ƐďŝƌƚŚ͕ƚŚŝƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůůĞŐĂĐǇǁŝůůĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽ
ďĞƉĂƐƐĞĚŽŶƚŽǇĞƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƚƵĚĞŶƚƐŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽŵŽƌĞ
ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƉůĂĐĞƚŽĚĂǇƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ĐŚƵůǌĞ͛ƐůĞŐĂĐǇƚŚĂŶĂƚƚŚĞĂůƚŝc
ĞĨĞŶƐĞŽůůĞŐĞ͘
German General Franz-Joseph Schulze (center left) and Dr. Phillip A. Karber (adjusting
his glasses) being briefed on terrain and defense plans along the inner-German border.
Acknowledgements
dŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƐĞŶĂŵĞƐĂƉƉĞĂƌŽŶƚŚĞĨƌŽŶƚĐŽǀĞƌŽĨƚŚŝƐĞĚŝƚŝŽŶĂƌĞŶŽƚƚŚĞ
ŽŶůǇĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŽƌƐƚŽƚŚŝƐǀŽůƵŵĞ. &ŝƌƐƚŽĨĂůů͕/ƐĂǇĞĚŝƚŝŽŶďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞ
ƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŶĞŝƚŚĞƌƉĞƌĨĞĐƚ͕ŶŽƌĞǀĞŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ͘/ƚŝƐďƵƚƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ
ŽĨƚŚĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚƚŽďĞĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨ
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐƌĞŐŝŽŶĨƌŽŵĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶŬŝŶĞƚŝĐĂƚƚĂĐŬ
ĂŶĚ͕ƚŚĞƌĞďǇ͕ĚĞƚĞƌDŽƐĐŽǁĨƌŽŵĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶŐŝƚƐǁĂƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŵŽĚĞƌŶ
ƵƌŽƉĞ͘tĞƐƚŽƉƉĞĚǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚŝƐĞĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽƚŚĂƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉůĂŶŶĞƌƐĐŽƵůĚďĞŶĞĨŝƚĨƌŽŵǁŚĂƚŚĂƐĂůƌĞĂĚy
ďĞĞŶĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĞĚ͘tĞŚŽƉĞƚŽƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇƉƵďůŝƐŚĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚĂŶĚ
ƌĞĨŝŶĞĚĞĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨBaltic Net Assessment ƐŽůŽŶŐĂƐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŵƉĞƌŝĂů
ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĞǆŝƐƚƐ͘
dŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƐĞŶĂŵĞƐĂƉƉĞĂƌŽŶƚŚĞĨƌŽŶƚĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĚƚŚĞĞĨĨŽƌƚŶŽǁ
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĐŽǀĞƌƐ͕ďƵƚŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐŽƚŚĞƌƐŵĂĚĞůĂƌŐĞ
ĂŶĚƐŵĂůůĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ. /ŶĨĂĐƚ͕ŚĂĚƌ͘EĂĚŝĂ^ŚĂĚůŽǁŶŽƚĐŽŵĞƵƉ
ĂĨƚĞƌĂƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŽDĂũŽƌ'ĞŶĞƌĂů,͘Z͘DĐDĂƐƚĞƌ;ƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶ
ŚĂƉƚĞƌμͿĂŶĚƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĂŶĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƉƌĞůŝŵŝŶĂƌǇǁŽƌŬŽŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ͕ŝƚŝƐƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĂƚĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶ͞ƉƉĞŶĚŝǆ//͗dŚĞ/ŵƉĂĐƚŽĨdĞƌƌĂŝŶŽŶ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇKƉƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐZĞŐŝŽŶ͟ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ
ĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĞĚ͘
ŚĂƉƚĞƌοŽŶůǇĞǆŝƐƚƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞƌ͘:ŽƐĞƉŚs͘ƌĂĚĚŽĐŬƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
ƐĞǀĞƌĂůĨĂŝůĞĚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ͞h͘^͘DŝůŝƚĂƌǇKƉƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĂŶĐƚŝŽŶ
WůĂŶĨŽƌEdK͟ĂŶĚĞǆƚƌĂĐƚĞĚƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƚŽƐŚĂƉĞǁŚĂƚďĞĐĂŵĞ
ƚŚĞĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ͛ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ͘
ŚĂƌůŝĞ>ŽŶŐƐƉĞŶƚŵĂŶǇĚĂǇƐĚŽŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĞĚŽŝŶŐŐƌĂƉŚŝĐƐƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞǇ
ĐŽŶǀĞǇĞĚƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ͘EĂƚĂůǇĂŶĨŝůŽĨǇĞǀĂůĂďŽƌĞĚŚĂƌĚ
ĂŶĚůŽŶŐƚŽĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŵŽƌĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĂďůĞƚĞǆƚ͕ĂŶĚ
ƌŝĂŶŶĂůŝƐĞWĞƚĞƌƐĞŶĂŶĚ:͘d͘tĂůƵŶĂƐƉƌŽŽĨĞĚƚŚĞƚĞǆƚƚŽĨŝŶĚĞƌƌŽƌƐ
ƚŚĂƚĞƐĐĂƉĞĚĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇďǇĂƵƚŚŽƌƐƌĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞǆƚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ
ďƌĂŝŶƐĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĂƚŽŶƚŚĞƉĂŐĞ͘
BALTIC SECURITY NET ASSESSMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
Chapter 1: Assessment at the Operational Level of Opposing Forces….. 1
Summary of Regional Military Assets………………………..…….……….…… 2
States on the Baltic Sea………………………………….…………….…. 3
1. Russian Federation………………….…………………. 3
2. Denmark………………………………………………….. 16
3. Estonia…..………………………………………………… 18
4. Finland……………………………………………………..20
5. Germany………………………………………………….. 22
6. Latvia…………………….…………………………….….. 24
7. Lithuania………………………………..……………….. 25
8. Poland…………………………………………………….. 27
9. Sweden……………………………………………………. 30
Relevant Non-Baltic Sea States………………………………….…… 32
1. Belarus…………………………………………………….. 32
2. Norway……………………………………………………. 35
3. United
Kingdom………………………………….………………. 36
4. United
States…………………………….………………………... 39
Quantitative and Qualitative Weapons Systems……………………………. 40
Logistics and Sustainability………………………….……………………………… 41
NATO Resupply…………………………………………………………………………. 45
Mitigation of Options………………………………………..…………………..…… 45
The Threat Perspective………………………………………..…………………….. 46
Chapter 2: Operational Assessment…………………………..………………..… 48
Definitions………………………………………………………………………………… 50
Military Doctrine …………….……………………………….………….. 50

Strategy………………………………………….……………………………. 52
Operational Art……………………….………………….………………… 53
Tactics…………………………………………………………………………. 53
The Conceptual Framework Applied……………………………………………. 54
The System of Strategic Leadership……………….………………………….... 57
Post-Soviet Operational-Strategic Planning and Exercises………….…. 63
Ethnic and Religious Divisions………………………………….…... 67
Transformation to Highly Mobile
and Rapidly Reconfigurable Forces………………………………... 78
4th Generation Nuclear Weapons……………………………………. 85
Asymmetries in Opposing Operational Concepts……….….... 90
Zapad-1999……………………….…………………………………………. 93
Zapad-2009……………………………………..……………………….. 100
Zapad-2013………………………………….………….……………….... 110
Snap Exercises…………………..……………………………………….. 115
NATO and Partner Exercises………………….…………………….…………... 116
Information Warfare Scenarios……………………………………………….... 117
Chapter 3: Assessment of the Range of Threat Contingencies…....…….. 122

2
The Theoretical Development of Russian New Generation Warfare. 132
Asymmetric Warfare……………………………………………….….. 139
Low-Intensity Conflict………………………….…….….…………… 141
6th Generation Warfare…………………………………….………….. 145
Network Centric Warfare………………………………………….…. 146
Reflexive Control…………………………………………….……..….. 149
The Initial Stage of War: Context as the Key…………………………….... 154
Evaluation of the Threat Relative to Local Force Capabilities
and Terrain Limitations……………………………………………………………. 157
Terrain as the Context…………………………………………………. 159
Maneuver by Fires…………………………………….………………… 165
Areas Where US Military Aid is Critical……..…………..…………………… 166

Chapter 4: Campaign Assessment……………………………………………….……………..… 168
NATO Operations in a Russian Coalitional Warfare Context………… 168
Establishing a Favorable Socio-Economic
and Political Environment………………………………………………………… 170
Special Operations to Misdirect Elites…………………….………………….. 172
Intimidation, Fraud, and Bribery……………………………………………….. 174
Destabilization Operations and
Organization of Militant Opposition…………………………………………… 175
Introduction of Armed Insurgents………………………….………………….. 175
Clandestine Military Intervention……………………………………………… 176
Use of Electronic Warfare and Reconnaissance Assets………………... 177
Overt Military Intervention and Occupation……………..………………… 178
Nuclear Threats…………………………………………………….……………….… 178
Joint vs. Combined-Arms Planning and Operational Approaches.… 180
Joint Operational Approach………………………………………………………. 181
Combined Arms Operational Approach…………………….……………..... 182
Clash of Joint and Combined Arms Operational Approaches……..… 185
Observations from Baltic Campaign Simulations………………………… 186
The Russian Threat…………………………..…………………………. 187
Belarus Threat…………..………………………………………...…….. 188
Baltic Defense……………..……………………………………………… 188
The Contributions Provided by Poland………………………………….……. 189
Tactical Nuclear Weapons…………………………………………………………. 189
Conclusions on the Tactical and
Technological Needs for a Credible Defense…………………..…………… 190
Tactical Needs………………………….…………………………………. 190
Technology Needs………….…………….……………………………… 191

Chapter 5: U.S. Military Options and an Action Plan for NATO…………………. 193
Recognizing the Threat and Reaffirming Liberal Values………...……. 194
Perceptions and Misperceptions in a Baltic Net Assessment……….... 197
Importance of Terrain…………………….………………………………………… 201
Drawing upon Experience……………….………………………………………… 210
Appendix 1: Data Base of Forces…………………………………….…………………….…. 213
Belarus………………………………………………………..………………………….. 213
Denmark……….……………………………….……………………………………….. 215
Estonia……………………………………….…………………….…………………….. 216
Finland…………………………………….…………………………………………….. 217
Germany…………………………………..…………………………………………….. 219
Latvia……………………………………………….…………………………………….. 221
Lithuania………………………………………….……………………………..……… 222
Norway……………………………………………..………………………………….… 224
Poland…………………………………………….…………….………………………… 225
Russian Federation……………………….………….………….……………..…... 229
Sweden……………………………………………….….………………………………. 236
United Kingdom………………………………….…………..………………………. 238
United States…………………………………………………………………………… 241
Appendix 2: Detailed Terrain Assessment of Strategic Regions
and Operational Axes………………………………………………………….. 243
The Initial Operational-Strategic Objective….…………………………… 245
The Probable Initial Main Operational Direction………….……………. 246
Tactical Axes in Latgale………………………………………………….………… 249
Initial Tactical Axis: Pskov – 5ŋ]HNQH««««««««««. 249
Initial Tactical Axis: Moscow – 5ŋ]HNQH««««……………. 252
Initial Tactical Axis: Minsk – Daugavpils…………………..…. 255
6XEVHTXHQW7DFWLFDO$[LV5ŋ]HNQH– 5ŝJD…………….…..…. 257
The Probable Subsequent Main Operational Direction…….…………. 263

Operational-Strategic Regions of Estonia…..…………….……………….. 273
Tallinn…………………………………………………………………….… 273
Saaremaa……………………………………………………………….…. 275
Other Operational Directions in the Baltic States…….…………………. 285
The Narva – Tallinn Operational Direction…………………… 285
The Pskov – 5ŝga Operational Direction….……………………. 288
The Daugavpils – 5ŝga Operational Direction…….…………. 309
The Vilnius – Kaunas AxiVDQGWKH6XZDáNL*DS««««« 329
Strategic Offensive War-Termination Operation…………………….…… 331
The Western (Vistula) Arm of Encirclement………….………. 333
The Eastern (Bug) Arm of Encirclement……………………….. 350
The Iron Triangle – Holding Warsaw Hostage………………. 361
A Preliminary Operational-Strategic Assessment……………………….. 364
The Russian Invasion of Poland in 1920…………………..…… 365
Russian Air Operations……………………………………………………………. 371

The Baltic Security Net Assessment. Introduction
dŚĞǁĂƌƐŽĨƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůĂŐŐƌĂŶĚŝǌĞŵĞŶƚĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞWƵƚŝŶ
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ'ĞŽƌŐŝĂĂŶĚhŬƌĂŝŶĞǁĞƌĞĂĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ
ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŽĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ
ĂŶĚEdK͘ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƚŚĞ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƚŚƌĞĂƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚďǇŵŽĚĞƌŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĞƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ
ĨĞƵĚĂůŝƐƚĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŵŽĚĞůĂŶĚŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ͘
ŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐƚŽŽůƐƚŽĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝƐĞƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵďǇĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐŵĞƌŝĐĂ͛ƐĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞĂƐĂŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉŽǁĞƌ͕
sůĂĚŝŵŝƌWƵƚŝŶĂŝŵƐƚŽƌĞƐƚŽƌĞZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŚŽůĚƵƌŽƉĞŚŽƐƚĂŐĞƚŽ
ĂŶǇŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƵƌĂƐŝĂŶ
ůĂŶĚŵĂƐƐ͘The epicentre of Russia’s effort is Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and Poland. dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŚƌĞĞŶĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
hŶŝŽŶ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƚƌŽůƚŽDŽƐĐŽǁǁŽƵůĚƚƵƌŶƚŚĞ
ĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂďĂĐŬŝŶƚŽĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶůĂŬĞ͘ƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂŐĞŽƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƐŚŝĨƚĂƐ
ƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚďĞ͕WŽůĂŶĚŝƐƚŚĞƚƌƵĞƉƌŝǌĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞ͕ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŝƚ͕EdKƌĞƚƵƌŶƐ
ƚŽďĞŝŶŐĂŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞĂůůŝĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚĂďĞĂĐŚŚĞĂĚ͕ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĂ
ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂůƉŽǁĞƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƐŚŝĨƚŝƚƐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐǀŝĂƐĞĐƵƌĞƐĞĂ
ůĂŶĞƐ͘tŚĞŶǀŝĞǁĞĚĂƐĂĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂůƉŽǁĞƌ͕WŽůĂŶĚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů
ůĂŶĚďƌŝĚŐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐEdKƐƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĞĂƐƚĞƌŶƐŚŽƌĞƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂ͘ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ͕ǁŚĞŶƐĞĞŶĨƌŽŵDŽƐĐŽǁ͛ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ͕the
four states constitute one integrated operational-strategic offensive
challenge. tŚĞŶƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĞƌ͛ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ͕ƚŚĞĨŽƵƌ
ƐƚĂƚĞƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂƐŝŶŐůĞĂƌĞĂŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐůŝŶŬĞĚďǇa narroǁƉŝĞĐĞŽĨ
ůĂŶĚĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ^ƵǁĂųŬŝ'ĂƉ͘
ƐĂŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞ^ĐŚĞŶŐĞŶdƌĞĂƚǇ͕ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŵŽƌĞ
ŽƉĞŶ͕ĞŶĂďůŝŶŐƵŶĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůƚŚƌĞĂƚƐƚŽƌŝƐĞƵƐŝŶŐƐƵĐŚŽƉƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ
ƵŶĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ͕ĨůŽǁŽĨǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂŶĚƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƐ͕ŵŽƌĞ
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇĨŽƌŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚĐƌŝŵĞĂŶĚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ͚ůŝƚƚůĞŐƌĞĞŶ
ŵĞŶ͛͘ůůŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞƉĂƌƚŽĨĂ͚ŚǇďƌŝĚ͛ĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ͕ǁŚŝĐŚ
ĐŽƵůĚďĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚWŽůĂŶĚ͘
i
dŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂĐůĂƌŝŽŶĐĂůůƚŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ
ŵŽĚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐĂŶĚEŽƌƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐƚŚĂƚ͞ŶĞǀĞƌĂŐĂŝŶ͟ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ
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ĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐZĞŐŝŽŶďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚĂďŽĚǇŽĨǁĂƚĞƌ
ĞĂƐŝůǇĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐŽĨĂŶŝŶŝŵŝĐĂůƉŽǁĞƌůŝĞƐĂƚŝƚƐ
ĐĞŶƚƌĞ͘dŚƵƐ͕ǁŚĂƚŝŶƚŝŵĞƐŽĨƉĞĂĐĞƵŶŝƚĞƐƚŚĞŵĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůůǇ͕ŝŶƚŝŵĞ
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ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐZĞŐŝŽŶ͘dŚĞůĂŶĚĚŽŵĂŝŶŝƐ
ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^ƵǁĂųŬŝ'ĂƉĂƐƚŚĞůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐůŝŶŬƉĂƐƐŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
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ďŽƌĚĞƌ͘/ƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ͕ŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƐƵĐŚĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͕ŶŽƚ
ŽŶůǇƚŚĞ^ƵǁĂųŬŝ'ĂƉǁŽƵůĚďĞƐĞŝǌĞĚ1͘WĂƌƚŽĨWŽůŝƐŚƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇƚŽǁĂƌĚ
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ĚĞĞƉ͕ǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽďĂďůǇďĞŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚƌŽŽƉƐ͛ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨ
ŵĂŶŽĞƵǀƌĞ͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŽƉƵƐŚEdK͛ƐůŽŶŐ-ƌĂŶŐĞǁĞĂƉŽŶƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŽƵƚ
ƚŽĚĞŶǇĞŶĚĂŶŐĞƌŝŶŐ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƵŶŝƚƐ͛ĂƐƐĞŵďůǇĂƌĞĂƐ͘
dŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨƐĞǀĞƌŝŶŐEdK͛Ɛ ƐŽƵƚŚ-to-norƚŚůŝŶĞŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
;>KͿĨƌŽŵWŽůĂŶĚƚŽ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂƚŽ>ĂƚǀŝĂƚŽƐƚŽŶŝĂĐŽƵůĚďƵǇƚŝŵĞĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶƚŽƐĞŝǌĞƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŽƌĞďƵŝůĚŝƚƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ^ŽǀŝĞƚ-
ĞƌĂŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŝŶƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ĐŽŶƋƵĞƐƚĨƌŽŵEdKůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͘ƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ͕EdK͛ƐĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇĂƐ
ĂƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂůůŝĂŶĐĞǁŽƵůĚĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌƐŚŽƵůĚŝƚƐƉƵďůŝĐƐƌĞĨƵƐĞƚŽƐŚŽƵůĚĞƌ
ƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇďƵƌĚĞŶĂŶĚĞƐĐĂůĂƚŽƌǇƌŝƐŬƐŽĨĂĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-ŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞƚŽ
ůŝďĞƌĂƚĞƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘dŚĞĞǀĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚďĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƉŽŝŐŶĂŶƚĨŽƌ
WŽůĂŶĚ͕ŐŝǀĞŶŝƚƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨŝƐŽůĂƚŝŽŶŝŶλσνσĂŶĚ͕ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ͕
ĂďĂŶĚŽŶŵĞŶƚŝŶλσξο͘/ƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚĞůĂƌƵƐŝƐĂŵĞŵďĞƌ
ŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂ-ůĞĚŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇdƌĞĂƚǇKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ
1ZĞĂĚ͗͘^ůŝǁĂ͕>͘ůĂŬ͕The Suwalki Gap – NATO’S fragile hot spot, dŚĞ^ĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐYƵĂƌƚĞƌůǇEŽμ

sŽů͘λκν͕dŚĞtĂƌ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ͕tĂƌƐĂǁ͘
ii
ĐŽŵƉĞůůĞĚƚŽĐŚŽŽƐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶďĞŝŶŐƉĂƌƚǇƚŽDŽƐĐŽǁ͛ƐĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚ
ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͘
ŶĂƌƚŝĐůĞŝŶƚŚĞWall Street Journal ĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ^ƵǁĂůŬŝ'ĂƉ͞ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ
ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƐƉŽƚŝŶƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ͟ 2 ŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐŝŶ
that
EdKĨŽƌĐĞƐǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽƚƌĂŶƐŝƚƚŚĞ͚<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌ͕͛
a 110- to 150-Ŭŵ-ǁŝĚĞƐƚƌĞƚĐŚŽĨƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĞŶĐůĂǀĞĂŶĚĞůĂƌƵƐƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚďĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽůŽŶŐ-
ƌĂŶŐĞĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇĂŶĚĨůĂŶŬĂƚƚĂĐŬƐĨƌŽŵďŽƚŚ ƐŝĚĞƐĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚ
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĂĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ;ƐĐĂƌĐĞͿEdKĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞ͘ 3
/ĨŝƚǁĞƌĞƚŽďĞĐůŽƐĞĚďǇƚƌŽŽƉƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚOblast ĂŶĚ
ĞůĂƌƵƐ͕ƐŽƚŚĂƚEdKǁĂƐƵŶĂďůĞƚŽƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞEdKĚĞĨĞŶĚĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞ
ŶŽƌƚŚŽĨƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚďŽƌĚĞƌ͕ŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚďǇƐŽŵĞ͕ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌƐŵŝŐŚƚďĞĂďůĞƚŽ͞ƌĞĂĐŚƚŚĞŽƵƚƐŬŝƌƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƐƚŽŶŝĂŶĂŶĚͬŽƌ
>ĂƚǀŝĂŶĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐŽĨdĂůůŝŶŶĂŶĚZţŐĂ͕ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ͕ŝŶπκŚŽƵƌƐ͘͟ 4
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽh͘^͘ƉůĂŶŶĞƌƐ͕͞ƚŚĞĂůůŝĞƐĐŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĂƐůŝƚƚůĞĂƐ ρμŚŽƵƌƐƚŽ
ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĞ^ƵǁĂųŬŝ'ĂƉďĞĨŽƌĞDŽƐĐŽǁǁŽƵůĚďĞĂďůĞƚŽĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ
ďůŽĐŬĂĐĐĞƐƐ͘͟ 5 dŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚ͚ůŽƐŝŶŐEdK͛ƐĂůƚŝĐ'ĂƉ͕͛ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚďǇ
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚƌĞƚŝƌĞĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ͕ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶŶƚŝ-
ĐĐĞƐƐͬƌĞĂĞŶŝĂů;μͬͿĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŵŝŐŚƚŵĞĂŶ ͞ZƵƐƐŝĂǁŽƵůĚďĞ
ĐĂƉĂďůĞŶŽƚũƵƐƚŽĨƐĞĂůŝŶŐŽĨĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐƐƚĂƚĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ͚ďƵďďůĞ͛ƚŚĂƚĐŽǀĞƌƐ
Ăŝƌ͕ƐĞĂĂŶĚůĂŶĚĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ͕ďƵƚĂůƐŽŽĨĨŝĞƌĐĞůǇĐŽŶƚĞƐƚŝŶŐŽƚŚĞƌƐƉĂĐĞƐ
ŽĨĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞƚŽŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ—ŝŶƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚƌŽŵĂŐŶĞƚŝĐ
ƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵ͕ĐǇďĞƌƐƉĂĐĞ͕ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶŽƵƚĞƌƐƉĂĐĞ;ďǇƵƐŝŶŐĂŶƚŝ-ƐĂƚĞůůŝƚĞ
ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐͿ͘͟ 6 ƐŝŵŝůĂƌŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŝƐƐŚĂƌĞĚďǇ'ĞŶĞƌĂů;ƌĞƚ͘Ϳ^ŝƌZŝĐŚĂƌĚ
ĂƌƌŽŶƐǁŚŽĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂĐŽƵůĚďĞƌĞĂĚǇĨŽƌĂĐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶξς
2 :͘ĂƌŶĞƐ͕Closing the Gap: NATO Moves to Protect Weak Link in Defenses Against Russia͕tĂůů
^ƚƌĞĞƚ:ŽƵƌŶĂů͕EĞǁzŽƌŬλρ :ƵŶĞμκλπ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ǁƐũ͘ĐŽŵͬĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐͬĐůŽƐŝŶŐ-ƚŚĞ-ŐĂƉ-nato-
ŵŽǀĞƐ-to-ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ-ǁĞĂŬ-ůŝŶŬ-in-ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐ-ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂ-1466205268 ;ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ͗λμ͘λμ͘μκλπͿ͘
3 ͘͘^ŚůĂƉĂŬ͕D͘t͘:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ͕Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank. Wargaming the
Defence of the Baltics, ZEŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ͕^ĂŶƚĂDŽŶŝĐĂμκλπ͕Ɖ͘ξ͘

4 Ibid.͕Ɖ͘λ͘
5 :͘ĂƌŶĞƐ͕Closing the Gap: NATO Moves to Protect Weak Link in Defenses Against Russia, op.
cit.
6 t͘ůĂƌŬ͕:͘>ƵŝŬ͕͘ZĂŵŵƐ͕Z͘^ŚŝƌƌĞĨĨ͕Closing NATO’s Baltic Gap͕/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞŶƚƌĞ for
ĞĨĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕dĂůůŝŶŶμκλπ͕Ɖ͘λν͘
iii
ŚŽƵƌƐĂŶĚ͞ƐŽŵĞůĂŶĚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨĂŝƌƐƉĂĐĞĂŶĚƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůǁĂƚĞƌƐ
ĐŽƵůĚďĞůŽƐƚďĞĨŽƌĞEdK͛ƐμςŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐŚĂĚĞǀĞŶĂŐƌĞĞĚŚŽǁƚŽ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ͘͟ ρ
EdKĨŝŶĚƐŝƚƐĞůĨƉůĂǇŝŶŐĐĂƚĐŚ-ƵƉďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĂƌŶŝŶŐƐďǇƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ
ǁĞƌĞ ŝŐŶŽƌĞĚ͘tŚŝůĞƚŚĞďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶƐƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞtĂƌƐĂǁ^ƵŵŵŝƚĂƌĞ
ĂƐƚĞƉŝŶƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞǇǁŝůů ƐƚŝůůůĂĐŬƚŚĞĂŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĂŶĚĨŝƌĞ-
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƚƚĂĐŬ͘
,ŽƉŝŶŐƚŽĚĞƚĞƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶďǇƉƵƚƚŝŶŐǇŽƵŶŐƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐŝŶŚĂƌŵ͛Ɛ
ǁĂǇ͕ƚŚĞƐĞ ďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶƐ ŚĂǀĞŶŽƌĞĂůĨŝƌĞƉŽǁĞƌƚŽďĂĐŬƚŚĞŵƵƉ͘dŚŝƐ
ŶĂŝǀĞƚĠ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ͕͞DĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞŚĂǀĞůŽƐƚƐŝŐŚƚŽĨǁŚĂƚĂĐƌĞĚŝďůĞ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĨŽƌĐĞŝƐĂŶĚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ͘dŚĞǇƚŚŝŶŬĂůŝƚƚůĞƉŽƐƚƵƌŝŶŐŽƌĂůŝŐŚƚĨŽƌĐĞ
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĞŶŽƵŐŚďƵƚŝƚŝƐŶ͛ƚ͘͟ 8 tŽƌƐĞƐƚŝůů͕ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐμκλξDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ŽĐƚƌŝŶĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐEdK͛ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂƐĂƚŚƌĞĂƚ
ĐĂůůŝŶŐĨŽƌĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŽŶůǇĂĚĚŝŶŐƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
ůĂƵŶĐŚŝƚƐĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶǁŝƚŚůŝƚƚůĞǁĂƌŶŝŶŐƚŝŵĞĨŽƌEdKƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞůŝƚĞƐƚŽ
ĂŐƌĞĞŽŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ͘
ƐŵƵĐŚĂƐĂŶǇƐŽůĚŝĞƌǁŽƵůĚŚŽƉĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨǁĂƌĂŶĚ͕ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ
ĞǀĞŶŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĂƌ͕ǁŽƵůĚĚĞƚĞƌĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͕ŶŽƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽŝƐƚŽďĞ
ĞǆĐůƵĚĞĚ͘ σ hŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇ͕ĂƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚďǇƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞŶƚƌĞĨŽƌ
ĞĨĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ͕͞ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŚĂƐƐŚŽǁŶƚŚĂƚDŽƐĐŽǁŝƐ
ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƚĂŬĞǀĞƌǇůĂƌŐĞƌŝƐŬƐ͕ƌĞůǇŝŶŐ ŽŶďƌŝŶŬŵĂŶƐŚŝƉĂŶĚ
ĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŽŶ͘͟ 10 dŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶ͛ƐEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ
ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚďǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶŚŝĞĨŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨsĂůĞƌǇ'ĞƌĂƐŝŵŽǀ 11
ρ ͘,ĂǇŶĞƐ͕Nato has no plan if Russia invades, warns ex-general, The Times͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌλσ͕

2016, ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƐ͘ĐŽ͘ƵŬͬĂƌƚŝĐůĞͬĚŚ-nato-κŶǆƐƐŶκƌƌ ;ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ͗μλ͘λμ͘μκλπͿ͘
8Ibid.
σ ʦ̨̨̡̛̖̦̦̯̬̦̌́̔̌ˀ̨̡̨̛̭̭̜̭̜ˇ̶̛̛̖̖̬͕̔̌DŽƐĐŽǁμο ĞĐĞŵďĞƌμκλξ͕tĞďƐŝƚĞŽĨƚŚĞ͗
ˁ̨̖̯̏ʥ̨̨̛̖̪̭̦̭̯̌̚ˀ̨̡̨̛̭̭̜̭̜ˇ̶̛̛̖̖̬͕̔̌dŚĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͕ƉĂƌĂλμĂ-Ě͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƐĐƌĨ͘ŐŽǀ͘ƌƵͬĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐͬλςͬλμσ͘Śƚŵů ;ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ͗λξ͘λμ͘μκλπͿ͘
10 ,͘WƌĂŬƐ͕Hybrid or Not: Deterring and Defeating Russia’s Ways of Warfare in the Baltics – the
Case of Estonia, ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚWĂƉĞƌ EŽλμξ͕EdKĞĨĞŶĐĞŽůůĞŐĞZŽŵĞĞĐĞŵďĞƌμκλο͕Ɖ͘μ͘

11 ďŽƵƚ'ĞŶĞƌĂůsĂůĞƌǇGerasimov ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƌĞĂĚ͗ʦ͘ʧ̨̛̖̬̭̥͕̌̏ˉ̨̖̦̦̭̯̽ʻ̡̛̱̌
̏ʿ̛̛̛̬̖̖̦̔̏̔͘ʻ̴̨̨̨̨̨̨̛̛̼̖̼̼̯̬̖̱̯̪̖̬̖̭̥̼̭̣̯̬̥̼̭̪̭̼̏̏̏̍̀̽̍̚
̵̨̛̛̖̖̦̖̼̖̜̭̯̜̏̔́̍̏̔̏, ʦ̨̨̖̦̦-̨̡̪̬̥̼̹̣̖̦̦̼̜̱̬̖̬͕̽EŽς;ξρπͿ͕
DŽƐĐŽǁμρ&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇμκλν͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ǀƉŬ-ŶĞǁƐ͘ƌƵͬĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐͬλξπνμ ;ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ͗
λμ͘λμ͘μκλπͿĂŶĚĂůƐŽŝŶdŝŵdŚŽŵĂƐ͕ Thinking Like A Russian Officer: Basic
Factors And Contemporary Thinking On The Nature of War͕dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
^ƚƵĚŝĞƐKĨĨŝĐĞ;&D^KͿ͕&Žƌƚ>ĞĂǀĞŶǁŽƌƚŚƉƌŝůμκλπ͕Ɖ͘λπ-λσ͘
iv
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĂǁŝĚĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚƵŶĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůƚŽŽůƐƚŚĂƚ
ĐĂŶďĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚWŽůĂŶĚ͘dŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞtĂƌƐĂǁ^Ƶŵŵŝƚ͕ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͛ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶZĞĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ͕
ƚŚĞdƌĂŶƐĂƚůĂŶƚŝĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇŶŚĂŶĐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚdƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ͕h͘<͘-
&ƌĂŶĐĞŽŵďŝŶĞĚ:ŽŝŶƚǆƉĞĚŝƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ&ŽƌĐĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚĂŶĚƚŚĞsŝƐĞŐƌĂĚ
'ƌŽƵƉĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞĂƌŽƚĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ŵƵƐƚďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŽ
ďĞŶŽŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĞĂƌůǇ ƐƚĞƉƐŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ
ƉŽƐƚƵƌĞƚĂŬĞŶƵƉŝŶĂůůǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƉŽƐƚ-^ŽǀŝĞƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞĂĚŽƉƚĞĚ
ďǇDŽƐĐŽǁ͘ 12
Since deterrence is in the eye of the beholder, it is now imperative to
perceive the military-technical requirements for offensive operations
against the Baltic States and Poland as they are seen – and studied –
by the Russian General Staff.
dŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐŶĞƚĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇĂŶ
ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉůĂŶƐĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ͕ďƵƚĂůƐŽ
ĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚƚĞƌƌĂŝŶĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ͘/ŶĨĂĐƚ͕ƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐŽĨƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇǁĞƌĞŝŶ
ƐŽƵƚŚ-ĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ ƐƚŽŶŝĂĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶĂƚŶĞĂƌůǇƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞĂƐa
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚĞĂŵ ǁĂƐĚŽŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ͘dŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚĞƚĞƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĚĞƉĞŶĚƐƵƉŽŶƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚĞĨĞĂƚƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨƉůĂŶ͕
ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚƚŚĂƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐǁŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂ
ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚŝĨŝƚƐĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĞƐĐĂůĂƚĞƐƚŽĂƌŵĞĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͘
DĂŬŝŶŐĐůĞĂƌƚŽƚŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚĐĂŶŶŽƚĞƐĐĂƉĞĚĞĨĞĂƚďǇĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐ
ƚŚĞŽŶůǇƚƌƵĞƉĂƚŚƚŽĂǀŽŝĚŝŶŐǁĂƌ.
dŚŝƐǀŽůƵŵĞŝƐďĂƐĞĚŶŽƚŽŶůǇŽŶƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐ
ĨƌŽŵĂŵƵůƚŝ-ǇĞĂƌŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶŝƚƐĂƵƚŚŽƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĞĨĞŶĐĞ
ŽůůĞŐĞ^ƚĂĨĨ͕ďƵƚĂůƐŽon ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐĨŝĞůĚƐƚƵĚŝĞƐďǇƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐŝŶƚŚĞ
ĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚWŽůĂŶĚĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐŬĞǇƚĞƌƌĂŝŶĂŶĚĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ
ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞŽĨĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞĨŽƌĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŝŶ
ƚŚŝƐƚŚĞĂƚƌĞŽĨƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŵŝůitary action͘dŚĞŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚƚƌŝƉƐĂƌĞ
ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ŝŶĂŶŶĞǆĞƐĂƐƚĞƌƌĂŝŶƉŚŽƚŽƐ͕ĂŶĚ ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐŽŶ
ŵĂũŽƌĂǀĞŶƵĞƐŽĨĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂŶĚŵŽďŝůŝƚǇĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌĚZţŐĂ͕
12 Warsaw Summit Communiqué͕tĂƌƐĂǁκσ:ƵůǇ2016, ƉĂƌĂ͘ρς͕

ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ŶĂƚŽ͘ŝŶƚͬĐƉƐͬĞŶͬŶĂƚŽŚƋͬŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůͺƚĞǆƚƐͺλννλπσ͘Śƚŵ ;ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ͗μλ͘λμ͘μκλπ)
v
dĂůůŝŶŶ͕sŝůŶŝƵƐ͕ƚŚĞ^ƵǁĂųŬŝ'ĂƉĂŶĚĚĞĞƉŝŶƚŽWŽůĂŶĚĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞsŝƐƚƵůĂ
ĂŶĚƵŐZŝǀĞƌƐĂƐĚĞĞƉĂƐtĂƌƐĂǁŝƚƐĞůĨ͘
TŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚŚĂƐƵŶĚĞƌŐŽŶĞĐĂƌĞĨƵů
ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ĚƵƌŝŶŐĂĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ-ĂƐƐŝƐƚĞĚĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚũŽŝŶƚůǇďǇ
ƚŚĞƐƚĂĨĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨdŚĞWŽƚŽŵĂĐ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĞĨĞŶĐĞ
ŽůůĞŐĞŝŶdĂƌƚƵĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉĂƌƚŽĨμκλπ͘dŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐǁĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ
ƚŽŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐĨƌŽŵĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚ
ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚ͘
dŚĞĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐ
ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĚďǇǀŝƐƵĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶĂŶŶĞǆĞƐĐƌĞĂƚĞƐĂǀĂůƵĂďůĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ
ƚŽŽůĨŽƌďŽƚŚĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ͘tŚŝůĞƚŚŝƐŶĞƚĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŝƐ
ŶŽƚƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝǀĞ– ŶŽƌĚŽĞƐŝƚƉƌĞƚĞŶĚƚŽďĞƉƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ– ŝƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂŶ
ŝŶǀĂůƵĂďůĞƉƌŝŵĞƌĨŽƌƚŚŽƐĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŵĂƚƚĞƌƐƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽ
ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚWŽůĂŶĚ͘dŚŝƐμκλρĞĚŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ
ƚŽďĞĂ͞ƐŶĂƉƐŚŽƚ͟ŽĨĂŶŽŶŐŽŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ͕ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚǁŝůůŬĞĞƉƉĂĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĂŶĚďĞƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ
ĞĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ͘
DR. ,. /^>t^>/t
12
Dr.hab. Zdzislaw Sliwa[1][1] is the Dean of the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia. He is also
professor of the University of Lower Silesia in Wroclaw.
vi
CHAPTER I
Assessment at the Operational Level of Opposing Forces
Nicholas Myers with Edmund Bitinas
ŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂƉŽƐĞĚĂůƵĐƌĂƚŝǀĞƉƌŝǌĞĨŽƌƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůƉŽǁĞƌƐĨŽƌ
ĐĞŶƚƵƌŝĞƐ͕ŝŶƐƉŝƌŝŶŐĐĞŶƚƵƌŝĞƐŽĨĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶλ͕οκκŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐĚĞĞƉĨƌŽŵ
ƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ͘dŚĞƉƌĞĚĞĐĞƐƐŽƌŽĨďŽƚŚƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŶĚhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶƐƚĂƚĞƐ— ZƵƐ— ǁĂƐĨŽƵŶĚĞĚďǇ^ǁĞĚŝƐŚsŝŬŝŶŐƐ
ůŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĂŶĚůĂĐŬ^ĞĂďĂƐŝŶƐĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌƐŽĨĂƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞ͘
/ŶƚŚĞ>ĂƚĞDŝĚĚůĞŐĞƐ͕ƚŚĞ,ĂŶƐĞĂƚŝĐ>ĞĂŐƵĞĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞ
ƚƌĂĚĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐŽůůƵƐŝŽŶ͘ƐƌŝǀĂůƌŝĞƐĞƐĐĂůĂƚĞĚ͕ƉŽůŝƚŝĞƐ
ƌĞƐŽƌƚĞĚƚŽĨŽƌĐĞƚŽƌĞƚĂŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌŽƵƚĞƐ͘dŚŝƐ
ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶĂŐƌĞĂƚƉŽǁĞƌĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂƌůǇDŽĚĞƌŶƌĂ͕
ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇ^ǁĞĚĞŶ͕ƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚ->ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵƉŝƌĞ͘ǇƚŚĞŵŝĚ-ĞŝŐŚƚĞĞŶƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵƉŝƌĞŚĂĚ
ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚƚƌŝƵŵƉŚĂŶƚ͕ƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚǁĂƐƐƚŝůůĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ,
&ƌĞŶĐŚ͕ ĂŶĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ͘dŚĞĂƌĞĂ͛ƐƉƌŝŵĂĐǇĂƐĂĨŽƌƵŵĨŽƌŐĞŽƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ƌĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚĨĂĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŶŝŶĞƚĞĞŶƚŚĂŶĚƚŚĞƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚ
ĐĞŶƚƵƌŝĞƐ͖ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĐŽůůĂƉƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ͕ŝƚŚĂƐĞŶũŽǇĞĚĂƉĞƌŝŽĚ
ŽĨŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƉĞĂĐĞĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞ
ĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂ.
Today, a militarily resurgent Russia bent on reclaiming its status as a
global great power has once again brought the region back into the
strategic spotlight. ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌƐĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂĨĞĞů
ĐŽŵƉĞůůĞĚƚŽƌĞǁŽƌŬƚŚĞŝƌƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ƉŽƐƚƵƌĞƐƚŽĚŝƐĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ
ĂŶĚĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƌĞĐĂƌŝŽƵƐůǇůŽǁĨŽƌĐĞ-to-ƐƉĂĐĞ ratio. ZƵƐƐŝĂ͕
ŵĞĂŶǁŚŝůĞ͕ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐƚŽĂƵŐŵĞŶƚŝƚƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƉƌŽũĞĐƚƉŽǁĞƌĂůŽŶŐŝƚƐ
ǁĞƐƚĞƌŶĨƌŽŶƚŝĞƌ͘ The current military balance in the region, therefore,
ŝƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝǌĞĚ by an extraordinary dynamism— a fact that must be
heeded by any observer.
1
SUMMARY OF REGIONAL MILITARY ASSETS
dŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂŝƐƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚĞĚďǇ ŶŝŶĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ13͕ƐŝǆŽĨ
ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞEdKŵĞŵďĞƌƐ͕ĞŝŐŚƚ—ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ͕ĂŶĚ
ŽŶůǇŽŶĞ—ZƵƐƐŝĂ— ƉŽƐĞƐĂŵĂũŽƌĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌŝŶŐƌŝƐŬƚŽƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͗
NATO & E.U. NON-NATO E.U. MEMBERS NON-NATO/
MEMBERS NON-E.U.
ĞŶŵĂƌŬ &ŝŶůĂŶĚ ZƵƐƐŝĂ
ƐƚŽŶŝĂ ^ǁĞĚĞŶ
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ
>ĂƚǀŝĂ
>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ
WŽůĂŶĚ
Table 1. Baltic Countries
/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŶŝŶĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͕ĨŽƵƌŽƚŚĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐĨŝŐƵƌĞ
ƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚůǇŝŶƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐ͗ĞůĂƌƵƐ͕EŽƌǁĂǇ͕ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ
<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘KĨƚŚĞƐĞ͕ƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌƚŚƌĞĞĂƌĞEdK
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ͕ƚŚĞh͘<͘ǁŝůůƌĞŵĂŝŶĂŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ ͘h͘ƵŶƚŝůĂƚůĞĂƐƚμκλσ,
ĂŶĚonly Belarus has the potential of serving as Russia’s ally in a Baltic
regional conflict.
dŚĞĞǆĐůĂǀĞŽĨ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚKďůĂƐƚ;ĞƌƐƚǁŚŝůĞWƌƵƐƐŝĂͿǁĂƐƵŶŝůĂƚĞƌĂůůǇ
ĂŶŶĞǆĞĚďǇƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚZĞŝĐŚŝŶλσξο͘ĨƚĞƌƚŚĞ
^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶƐƉůŝƚŝŶƚŽŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƐƚĂƚĞƐĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞ
^ŽǀŝĞƚ^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚZĞƉƵďůŝĐƐ14 ŝŶλσσλ͕<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚOblast ;ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇ
ďĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ^ŽǀŝĞƚ&ĞĚĞƌĂů^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚZĞƉƵďůŝĐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ŽůĚtĂƌͿŚĂƐƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͘/ƚďŽƌĚĞƌƐ
>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂƚŽƚŚĞŶŽƌƚŚ͕WŽůĂŶĚƚŽƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂƚŽƚŚĞ
ǁĞƐƚ͘
13 dŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽŶŝŶĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂ^ƚĂƚĞƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌǁĂƌǇĞĂƌƐ͘dŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚ
ĂŶĚĚĞĨĂĐƚŽĂŶŶĞǆĞĚƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂ͕ĂŶĚ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͘dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŶĞǀĞƌ
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚƚŚĞůĞŐĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚŝƐĂŶŶĞǆĂƚŝŽŶ;ĂŶĚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚOblast
ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐŝŶĂůĞŐĂůŐƌĞǇĂƌĞĂ͕ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůǇƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ͕ďƵƚŶĞǀĞƌĨŽƌŵĂůůǇ
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚͿ͕ĂĚĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƐƚĂƚƵƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶλσξο-λσσλ͘
14 tŝƚŚǀĞƌǇĨĞǁĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ͕ƚŚĞŵŽĚĞƌŶďŽƌĚĞƌƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĐŽŶĨŽƌŵƚŽƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
ĚĞůŝŶĞĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚZĞƉƵďůŝĐƐ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞǇĚŽŶŽƚŵĂƚĐŚƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƌĞƉƵďůŝĐƐŽĨƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌǁĂƌĞƌĂ͘dŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞǁŝůůďĞĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚ͘
2
dŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͕<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚKďůĂƐƚǁĂƐĂŵĂũŽƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĐĞŶƚĞƌ͘dŽĚĂǇŝƚŚŽƐƚƐƌŽƵŐŚůǇƚǁŽ-ƚŚŝƌĚƐŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂůƚŝĐ&ůĞĞƚ;Ăƚ
ĂůƚŝǇƐŬͿĂŶĚĂůĂƌŐĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂƚĞĨŽƌŝƚƐ
ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůƐŝǌĞĂŶĚƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ15.
The security risk of Kaliningrad – a militarily significant location with a
struggling economy 16 and perceived vulnerability to Western attempts
at ‘color revolution’– forms the crux of Russian operational thinking in
the Baltic region.
STATES ON THE BALTIC SEA

1. Russian Federation
dŚĞĂŝŵŽĨƚŚŝƐƌĞƉŽƌƚŝƐƚŽĂƐƐĞƐƐZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛoptions for conducting a
conventional military operation in the Baltic region ƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŝƚƐ
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĂŶĚͬŽƌĚĞĞƐĐĂůĂƚĞƚŚĞůŝŬĞůǇůĂƌŐĞƌĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ͘dŚŝƐƌĞƉŽƌƚ
ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞƚŚĞƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇŽƌůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚŽĨƐƵĐŚan
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƚĂŬŝŶŐƉůĂĐĞ͘
tŚŝůĞZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂƐĂƐƚƌŽŶŐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƌĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐƋƵŽŝŶƚŚĞ
ĂůƚŝĐƌĞŐŝŽŶ͕ŝƚǁŽƵůĚƉƌĞĨĞƌŶŽƚƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶĂ conventional ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĚŽƐŽ͘/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ͕ĂĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ďǇƚŚĞ
'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨĂƐŝŶƐƵƌĂŶĐĞŝŶĐĂƐĞŽĨĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶEĞǁ
'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ;E'tͿƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ. λρ
dŚĞŽŶŐŽŝŶŐZƵƐƐŽ-hŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶtĂƌŽĨĨĞƌƐĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ
E't ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŽƵƚǁŝƚŚŵĂƐƐŝŶŐŽĨĨŽƌĐĞƐ;ĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶ
ďŽƌĚĞƌͿƐĞƌǀŝŶŐĂƐĂĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůďĂĐŬƵƉ͘dŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƵƉŚŽůĚƐƚŚĞ
^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĂůƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶǁŚĞƌĞĞĂĐŚ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨƉůĂŶǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞ
ǀĂƌŝĂŶƚƐ;ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͕ĂƉƵƌĞůǇĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŽƉƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂŶ
ŽƉƚŝŽŶŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐͿ͘dŽĚĂǇ, ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
15 dŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚOblast͕ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚĂƐƚŚĞλλth ƌŵǇŽƌƉƐ͕
ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞƐƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚĂƐƚŚĂƚĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞ&ŝŶŶŝƐŚ
ďŽƌĚĞƌ͕ĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐ^ƚ͘WĞƚĞƌƐďƵƌŐ͘
16 <ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚƉƌŽĨŝůĞ—KǀĞƌǀŝĞǁ͕͕DĂƌĐŚλμ͕μκλο͕ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂƚ
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ďďĐ͘ĐŽŵͬŶĞǁƐͬǁŽƌůĚ-ĞƵƌŽƉĞ-18284828
λρ ĞƌǌŝŶƐ͕:ĂŶŝƐ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͗/ŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞ͕͟ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉEĞƚǁŽƌŬ͕KĐƚŽďĞƌλξ͕μκλξ͕ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂƚ
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ͘ŽƌŐͬƌƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ŶĞǁ-ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ-ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ-ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ-
for-ĞƵƌŽƉĞͺμκκπ͘Śƚŵů
3
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶƐŵƵƐƚďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŽŶ ĂŶĞǀĞŶǁŝĚĞƌƌĂŶŐĞŽĨ
ǀĂƌŝĂŶƚƐƚŽƚĂŬĞŝŶƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ E't ĚŽ
ŶŽƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞŽǀĞƌƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶ.
dŚĞ,ŝŐŚŽŵŵĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ dŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐƚŝŽŶ ;dsͿ 18 ǁŽƵůĚĚŝƌĞĐƚƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂƐƐĞƚƐŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌĂŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘dŚĞ
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĚƌĂǁƐŝƚƐĨŽƌĐĞƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ͕
ƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚĐĂŶĂůƐŽĚƌĂǁƵƉŽŶĨŽƌĐĞƐĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŝƐƚrictƐ ĂƐĂ
ǁĞůů. ZĞĐĞŶƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐŚĂǀĞĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞĚƚŚĞĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ
ĚĞƉůŽǇŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶĐŽŶĐĞƌƚĂĐƌŽƐƐZƵƐƐŝĂƚŽĨĂĐĞĂŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇĨƌŽŵĂŶǇŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ͘ λσ
18 ͞dŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐDŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐƚŝŽŶ͟ŝƐĂƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚĞƌŵTeatr Voennykh
Deystviy ;˃̵̨̛̛̖̯̬̖̦̦̼̖̜̭̯̜̌̔̏Ϳ͘dŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌǁŝůůƵƐĞƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂĐƌŽŶǇŵĨŽƌƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ͘
^ĞĞThe Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the General Staff Academy Volume I: Issues of
Soviet Military Strategy͕ĞĚ͘'ŚƵůĂŵĂƐƚĂŐŝƌtĂƌĚĂŬ͕'ƌĂŚĂŵ,ĂůůdƵƌďŝǀŝůůĞ͕:ƌ͕͘Ğƚ͘Ăů͕͘
EĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨĞŶƐĞhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇWƌĞƐƐ͕tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ͕λσςσ͘
λσ ^ƉĞĐŝĂůĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽĨůĂƚĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶƉůĂĐĞĚƵƉŽŶƌĂƉŝĚĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚ
^ƉĞĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ͘ŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ͗͞Voennosluzhashchie v Samarskoy oblasti otrabotali

osmotr transportnyx sredstv na mirotvorcheskom postu͕͟Russian Ministry of Defense͕ρ
KĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǆŶ--ĚλĂĐĂǇŬŐǀĚĨκŚĞλĂ͘ǆŶ--σκĂŶůĨďĞďĂƌπŝ͘ǆŶ--
ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξοκσμΛĞŐEĞǁƐ ;ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ͗ρEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρͿ͘Ŷ
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ͗͞V dvukh regionakh Povolzh’ya nachalis’ ucheniya spetsnaza͕͟Russian
Ministry of Defense͕ξKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǆŶ--ĚλĂĐĂǇŬŐǀĚĨκŚĞλĂ͘ǆŶ--σκĂŶůĨďĞďĂƌπŝ͘ǆŶ--
ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξξοςνΛĞŐEĞǁƐ ;ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ͗ρEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρͿ͘
4
Figure 1. Russia’s Military Districts and High Commands.
hŶůŝŬĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝĞƐŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚŝŶũŽŝŶƚƚĂƐŬĨŽƌĐĞƐĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĂůĂƌŐĞƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĞŶĚ-ƐƚĂƚĞ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ,ŝŐŚ
ŽŵŵĂŶĚƐĚƌĂǁƐ ĂƐƐĞƚƐĨƌŽŵĂůůĂƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŽĨŝŐŚƚĂƐŝŶŐůĞ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĨƵůůǇĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚŝnŐƚŚĞĞŶĚ-ƐƚĂƚĞ͘dŚŝƐƌĞĚƵĐĞƐ
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶƉƌĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐ ŝŶĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨŚŝŐŚ-ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇ
ƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ͘/ŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͕ƚŚĞŚĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ
Žƌŝƌ-^ƉĂĐĞĞĨĞŶƐĞ &ŽƌĐĞĚŽŶŽƚĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌŵĂŶĂŐĞ
ƚŚĞǀĂƐƚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐĂůĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ŽĨƐƵƐƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĐŽŵďĂƚ
ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞǀĂƐƚĞǆƉĂŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ.
KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐŝƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨ
ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ͕ ŝŶƐŽŵĞĐĂƐĞƐ͕ŝƚŝƐĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƐƚĂĨĨƐǁŝƚŚ
ƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ. 20 dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂůƐŽƐŽŵĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů,ŝŐŚŽŵŵĂŶĚƐĂƌĞŶŽǁĐŚĂƌŐĞĚŝŶĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶƐ͘ 21
20 &ŽƌĂŶŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁŽĨĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ͕ƐĞĞ^ƵǀŽƌŽǀ͕sŝĐƚŽƌ͕Inside the Soviet Army,

^ĐƌŝďŶĞƌ͕Ez͕λσςν͘
21 tŝƚŶĞƐƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝc-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐƚŽƵŶŝƚƐĨƌŽŵƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐ͕Ğ͘Ő͘ƚŚĞZapad-2017 ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƐĂƚŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ǁĂƌǀƐƉĞĂĐĞ͘ŽƌŐͬƌĞŐƵůĂƌ-
ŵĂƉƐͬμκλρͬλκͬλνͬǌĂƉĂĚ-μκλρ-ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƐ͘
5
dŚƵƐ͕a Russian military operation in the Baltic region could have
unfettered access to all forces allotted from these military districts and
potentially more placed at the disposal of the High Command.
'ĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŶĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽƌĚĞƌŽĨďĂƚƚůĞŝƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƚŽ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŝƚƐĨŽƌĐĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ͘EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ͕ŝŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͕^ǇƌŝĂĂŶĚ
ĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ͕ĂŶĚƵŶƚŝůZƵƐƐŝĂƐƵĐĐĞĞĚƐŝŶďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŽĨƵůů
ŵĂŶŶŝŶŐ͕ 22 ĂŶǇƐƵĐŚŽƌĚĞƌƐŚŽƵůĚďĞǀŝĞǁĞĚŵŽƌĞĂƐĂƚĂďůĞŽĨ
ƉƌĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĞĚĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ͘
Figure 2. Russian Maneuver Units as of 2017. ůůĂƐƐĞƚƐĨŽƌŵĂůůǇ

ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞŝŶĞĂĐŚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ: 23
/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƵŶŝƚƐ͕ĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐĂƌĞŚĞůĚďǇƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů
^ƚĂĨĨĂƐĂƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐ͘dŚŝƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐZƵƐƐŝĂŶ>ŽŶŐZĂŶŐĞ
ǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐZŽĐŬĞƚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĞĨĞŶƐĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ
22 WĂƌŬ͕^ƵŶŐƚĂĞ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ^ƚƌƵŐŐůĞƐƚŽZĞĨŽƌŵŝƚƐDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͕͟International Affairs Review͕'ĞŽƌŐĞ

tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ͕KĐƚŽďĞƌλξ͕μκλμĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂƚŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ŝĂƌ-ŐǁƵ͘ŽƌŐͬŶŽĚĞͬξνς
23 μκλπĚĂƚĂĚĞƌŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐŽƉĞŶƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĚĂƚĂďĂƐĞŽĨǁǁǁ͘ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘ďĞĂŶĚ
ĐŽƌƌŽďŽƌĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽŶ-ƚŚĞ-ŐƌŽƵŶĚŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͘ŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶμκλπ
ĂĚĚĞĚλŵŽƚŽƌ-ƌŝĨůĞĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ͕μŵŽƚŽƌ-ƌŝĨůĞ ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞ
^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƚƌŝĐƚĂŶĚλƚĂŶŬĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĞŶƚƌĂůDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ͕ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚ
ŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂŶŐĞŽŶŽƚŚĞƌƵŶŝƚƐŝƐŶŽƚǇĞƚĨƵůůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ͘
6
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞDŽƐĐŽǁĂƌĞĂ͘ůůŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞƐĞĞŶĂƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐĂ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ǁĂƌĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐĂŶĚƐŽĂƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĐĞŶƚƌĂůůǇĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞĚ͘
ĨƚĞƌƚŚĞμκκς'ĞŽƌŐŝĂŶtĂƌ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĞĚĨƌŽŵĂ
ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ-ďĂƐĞĚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŚĞůĚŽǀĞƌĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂƚŽĂůŝŐŚƚĞƌ
ďƌŝŐĂĚĞ-ďĂƐĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƵŶĚĞƌĞĨĞŶƐĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŶĂƚŽůŝǇ^ĞƌĚǇƵŬŽǀ͘ 24
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ƐŝŶĐĞWƵƚŝŶ͛ƐƌĞƚƵƌŶ ƚŽƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇŝŶμκλμ͕ƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů
Type Western Central Southern Eastern
MD MD MD MD
2 ŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ λŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ νŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ λŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ
Motor Rifle 5 ƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ 10 ƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ σ ƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ 10
2 ZĞŐŝŵĞŶƚ ƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ
λŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ λŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ EŽŶĞ λƌŝŐĂĚĞ
Tank μƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ λƌŝŐĂĚĞ
νŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ λƌŝŐĂĚĞ λŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ μƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ

VDV (Airborne)
1 ƌŝŐĂĚĞ λƌŝŐĂĚĞ
μƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ μƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ μƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ 1 ƌŝŐĂĚĞ
^ƉĞƚƐŶĂǌ
λZĞŐŝŵĞŶƚ
Naval Infantry λƌŝŐĂĚĞ EŽŶĞ μƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ μƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ
4 ƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ λŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ μƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ 5 ƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ
Artillery ξƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ 3
ZĞŐŝŵĞŶƚƐ
4 ƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ 4 ƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ μƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ 3 ƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ
Air Defense ρZĞŐŝŵĞŶƚƐ 6 5 6
ZĞŐŝŵĞŶƚƐ ZĞŐŝŵĞŶƚƐ ZĞŐŝŵĞŶƚƐ
Surface-to-Surface νƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ μƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ λƌŝŐĂĚĞ νƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ
Missiles
11 6 ρ 8
Air Superiority
^ƋƵĂĚƌŽŶƐ ^ƋƵĂĚƌŽŶƐ ^ƋƵĂĚƌŽŶƐ ^ƋƵĂĚƌŽŶƐ
5 ^ƋƵĂĚƌŽŶƐ 3 10 ρ
Strike Aircraft
^ƋƵĂĚƌŽŶƐ ^ƋƵĂĚƌŽŶƐ ^ƋƵĂĚƌŽŶƐ
λ^ƋƵĂĚƌŽŶ EŽŶĞ 8 4
Close Air Support
^ƋƵĂĚƌŽŶƐ ^ƋƵĂĚƌŽŶƐ
Table 2. Assets by District
24 ĂƌĂďĂŶŽǀ͕DŝŬŚĂŝů͕͞ŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞ&ŽƌĐĞĂŶĚDŽǀŝŶŐ&ŽƌǁĂƌĚĨƚĞƌ'ĞŽƌŐŝĂ͕͟Brothers Armed:
Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine͕ĞĚ͘ŽůďǇ,ŽǁĂƌĚΘZƵƐůĂŶWƵŬŚŽǀ͕ĞŶƚĞƌĨŽƌ
ŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐĂŶĚdĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ͕DŽƐĐŽǁ͕μκλξ͖σλ-123.
ρ
^ƚĂĨĨ ŚĂƐƌĞǀĞƌƐĞĚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƵŶŝƚƐ ďĂĐŬƚŽĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ. 25 ^ŽŵĞĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů
ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐďĂĐŬƚŽĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŵĂǇǇĞƚďĞĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚ͕ƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚƐĞĞŵƐ
ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĂƚĂďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐĂŶĚďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐǁŝůůĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽ
ĨŽƌŵƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽƌĚĞƌŽĨďĂƚƚůĞ͘
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŶĂǀĂůĂƐƐĞƚƐĂƌĞĂƌƌĂŶŐĞĚŝŶƚŽĨŽƵƌĨůĞĞƚƐĂŶĚŽŶĞĨůŽƚŝůůĂ
;EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ&ůĞĞƚ͕WĂĐŝĨŝĐ&ůĞĞƚ͕ĂůƚŝĐ&ůĞĞƚ͕ůĂĐŬ^ĞĂ&ůĞĞƚ͕ĂŶĚĂƐƉŝĂŶ
&ůŽƚŝůůĂͿ͘dŚĞƐĞƚŽŽĂƌĞŵŽƐƚůǇŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚďǇŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ͗ƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶ
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƚƌŝĐƚŽǀĞƌƐĞĞƐƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶĂŶĚĂůƚŝĐ&ůĞĞƚƐ͕ƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶ
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƚŚĞůĂĐŬ^ĞĂ&ůĞĞƚĂŶĚĂƐƉŝĂŶ&ůŽƚŝůůĂ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƚŚĞWĂĐŝĨŝĐ&ůĞĞƚ͘ dŚĞEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ&ůĞĞƚ͕ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů
ŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇďĞĐĂŵĞƚŚĞŽǀĞƌƐĞĞƌŽĨ:ŽŝŶƚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ŽŵŵĂŶĚ͞EŽƌƚŚ͟ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĐƚŝĐĂƌĞĂŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ͕26
ŐĂŝŶŝŶŐŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ͘
ůůZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨůĞĞƚƐĂƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇŵƵĐŚƐŵĂůůĞƌ ƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŝƌ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
ĂŶƚĞĐĞĚĞŶƚƐ͕ďƵƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƌĞƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ ƐŝŶĐĞμκκξĂŶĚ
ŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞĂƐƐĞƚƐĚƵŵƉĞĚƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶŚĂĚďĞĞŶ
ďĂƌĞůǇĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂůĂƐŽĨλσσλ. dŚĞƌĞĐĞŶƚĨŝƌŝŶŐŽĨĂƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚĐƌƵŝƐĞ
ŵŝƐƐŝůĞŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞĂƐƉŝĂŶ^ĞĂŝŶƚŽ^ǇƌŝĂĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚboth ƚŚĞir
ĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨtĞƐƚĞƌŶ-ƐƚǇůĞƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽn
ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ.μρ KƚŚĞƌEĂǀĂůĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƐ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞμκλπŽŶĞŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐŽŶůǇĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚĐĂƌƌŝĞƌ͕ƚŚĞAdmiral Kuznetsov,
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƐĞŶĚƚŚĞĨůĞĞƚƚŽƐĞĂ͕28 ŝĨŶŽƚĂůǁĂǇƐǁŝƚŚ
ĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞĐŽŵďĂƚĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇ͘ μσ DŽƌĞŽĨƚĞŶ͕ƚŚĞEĂǀǇƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞƐĞŝƚŚĞƌŝŶ
25 ͞tĞƐƚĞƌŶĞĨĞŶƐĞ͗ZƵƐƐŝĂƚŽĨŽƌŵνŶĞǁĂƌŵǇĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŝŶμκλπ͕͟RT; January 12, 2016,

ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƌƚ͘ĐŽŵͬŶĞǁƐͬνμςπξς-ƌƵƐƐŝĂ-ŶĞǁ-ĂƌŵǇ-ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐͬ ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚDĂǇσ͕μκλπ͘
26 ͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĞĨĞŶƐĞDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐƌĐƚŝĐ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ͕͟TASS͕λĞĐĞŵďĞƌμκλξ͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬƚĂƐƐ͘ĐŽŵͬƌƵƐƐŝĂͬρπξξμς͘
μρ <ĂůŝďƌƌƵŝƐĞDŝƐƐŝůĞ͗ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐtŝŶŐĞĚ/ŶĐŝŶĞƌĂƚŽƌĂƚtŽƌŬ͕͟Sputnik͘λνĞĐĞŵďĞƌμκλο͘
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬƐƉƵƚŶŝŬŶĞǁƐ͘ĐŽŵͬƌƵƐƐŝĂͬμκλολμλνͬλκνλπςξμλσͬƌƵƐƐŝĂ-ŬĂůŝďƌ-ŵŝƐƐŝůĞ-ǀŝĚĞŽ͘Śƚŵů
28 ͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĞĨĞŶƐĞDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐƌĐƚŝĐ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ͕͟TASS͕λĞĐĞŵďĞƌμκλξ͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬƚĂƐƐ͘ĐŽŵͬƌƵƐƐŝĂͬρπξξμς͘
μσ EĂƚŚĂŶ,ŽĚŐĞƐΘ:ƵůŝĂŶ͘ĂƌŶĞƐ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶ^ǇƌŝĂǆƉŽƐĞƐDŽƐĐŽǁ͛ƐĞĨĞŶƐĞ
'ĂƉƐ͕͟Wall Street Journal͕μςEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλπ͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ǁƐũ͘ĐŽŵͬĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐͬƌƵƐƐŝĂŶ-

ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ-in-ƐǇƌŝĂ-ĞǆƉŽƐĞƐ-ŵŽƐĐŽǁƐ-ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ-ŐĂƉƐ-λξςκμρνσξλ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚςEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚςEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
8
ůŽĐĂůŝǌĞĚĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ 30 ŽƌĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ͞ƐŚŽǁƚŚĞĨůĂŐ͟ǀŝƐŝƚƐƚŽ
ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͘ 31
dŚĞEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ͕ĂůƚŝĐ͕ĂŶĚůĂĐŬ^ĞĂ&ůĞĞƚƐĂƌĞŵŽƐƚƉĞƌƚŝŶĞŶƚƚŽĂĂůƚŝĐ
ZĞŐŝŽŶĂůƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ͘ƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞμκλξhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶĐƌŝƐŝƐ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂůƚŝĐ
&ůĞĞƚĂŵƉŚŝďŝŽƵƐǁĂƌĨĂƌĞǀĞƐƐĞůƐǁĞƌĞƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐƚŽƚŚĞ
ůĂĐŬ^ĞĂ, 32 ůŝŬĞůǇĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨĂƐƐŝƐƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĂůĂƌŐĞ-
ƐĐĂůĞŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶ ŽĨhŬƌĂŝŶĞƚŚĂƚƐƉƌŝŶŐ͘Zapad ǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚ it ŝƐ
ƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚŝŶƌĞǀĞƌƐĞŝŶƚŚĞ
ŵŝĚƐƚŽĨĂĐƌŝƐŝƐŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘dŚŽƵŐŚEdKŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞǁŽƵůĚ
ǀĞƌǇƐŽŽŶ ĚĞƚĞĐƚƐƵĐŚĂƌĞĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ͕EdKǁŽƵůĚ not ďĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽ
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĐĞƉƚ – ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ŝŶĂƚŝŵĞŽĨĐƌŝƐŝƐ — in ŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĂǀŽŝĚ
ĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŽŶ͘
In the midst of a larger conflict in the Baltic region, the Northern and
Baltic Fleets would effectively be fighting two separate operations.
dŚĞĂůƚŝĐ&ůĞĞƚĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇŵŝŶĞƐǁĞĞƉŝŶŐĐƌĂĨƚ͕ĂŵƉŚŝďŝŽƵƐ
ĂƐƐĂƵůƚĐƌĂĨƚ͕ŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐŚŝƉƐ͕ŚǇĚƌŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐƐŚŝƉƐ͕ĂŶĚĚŝĞƐĞůƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐ,
ŽŶůǇĂĐƋƵŝƌŝŶŐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŵŝƐƐŝůĞĂƐƐĞƚƐŝŶůĂƚĞμκλπ. 33 KŶĞ-ƚŚŝƌĚŽĨƚŚĞ
ĂůƚŝĐ&ůĞĞƚŝƐďĂƐĞĚĂƚ<ƌŽŶƐŚƚĂĚƚ ŽĨĨƚŚĞĐŽĂƐƚŽĨ^ƚ͘WĞƚĞƌƐďƵƌŐ͕
ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĂůůĨůĞĞƚƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞĂƐƐĞƚƐŝŶƉĞĂĐĞƚŝŵĞ͘dŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƚǁŽ-ƚŚŝƌĚƐ
ĂƌĞďĂƐĞĚĂƚĂůƚŝǇƐŬ͕ĂƚƚŚĞŵŽƵƚŚŽĨƚŚĞsŝƐƚƵůĂ^Ɖŝƚ͕ƚŚĞŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ
ĂĐĐĞƐƐƉŽŝŶƚƚŽ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͘ ĂůƚŝǇƐŬŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐŚŝƉƐ
30 ŐŽŽĚĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝƐƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇůŝŵŝƚĞĚƌĂŶŐĞŽĨĂůƚŝĐ&ůĞĞƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƚŚĞ
ůĂƌŐĞƌZapad-2017 ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͘͞Korvety Baltiyskogo flota unichtozhili
podvodnuyu lodku uslovnogo protivnika v ramkakh ucheniya ‘ĂƉĂĚ-μκλρ’,͟Russian Ministry of
Defense͕λρ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǆŶ--ĚλĂĐĂǇŬŐǀĚĨκŚĞλĂ͘ǆŶ--σκĂŶůĨďĞďĂƌπŝ͘ǆŶ--
ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξμοσμΛĞŐEĞǁƐ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚςEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξορσσΛĞŐEĞǁƐ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚςEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
31 ŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐǀŽǇĂŐĞŽĨƚŚƌĞĞƐŚŝƉƐŽĨƚŚĞWĂĐŝĨŝĐ&ůĞĞƚĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞ
tĞƐƚĞƌŶWĂĐŝĨŝĐŝŶƚŚĞƵƚƵŵŶŽĨμκλρ͘͞Otryad korabley Tikhookeanskogo flota pribyl s

delovym zakhodom v Bruney͕͟Russian Ministry of Defense͕λμKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǆŶ--
ĚλĂĐĂǇŬŐǀĚĨκŚĞλĂ͘ǆŶ--σκĂŶůĨďĞďĂƌπŝ͘ǆŶ--
ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξορσσΛĞŐEĞǁƐ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚςEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
32 ǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ&ůĞĞƚ>^dĂƐƐĞƚƐǁĞƌĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞůĂĐŬ^ĞĂ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚμκλξĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĂŐŐƌĂǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ<Ǉŝǀ͘^ĞĞƚŚĞλκμ<ος
Kaliningrad ĂŶĚλμρ<ξνMinsk ŝŶ͞&ŽƌĞŝŐŶtĂƌƐŚŝƉƐŽŶŽƐƉŚŽƌƵƐŝŶμκλξ͕͟Bosphorus
Naval News, ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬƚƵƌŬŝƐŚŶĂǀǇ͘ŶĞƚͬĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ-ǁĂƌƐŚŝƉ-on-ďŽƐƉŚŽƌƵƐͬĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ-ǁĂƌƐŚŝƉ-on-
ďŽƐƉŚŽƌƵƐ-in-μκλξͬ. ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚDĂǇσ͕μκλπ͘
33 ůĞŬƐĞǇZĂŵŵ͕͞Rossiya usilivaet baltiyskuyu gruppirovku͕͟Izvestiya͕μπKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬŝǌ͘ƌƵͬŶĞǁƐͬπξκπρκ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚςEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
σ
ĂŶĚĂŵƉŚŝďŝŽƵƐĐƌĂĨƚ;ƚŽĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇƚŚĞŶĂǀĂůŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇďƌŝŐĂĚĞďĂƐĞĚĂƚ
<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚͿ͘ 34
The Baltic Fleet’s primary mission would be to extend a broader anti-
access area denial (A2AD) campaign into the sea. /ƚǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞůǇƵƐĞŝƚƐ
ĂƐƐĞƚƐƚŽƚŚǁĂƌƚďŽƚƚůĞŶĞĐŬŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽŵŝŶĞƚŚĞsŝƐƚƵůĂ^Ɖŝƚ
Žƌ'ƵůĨŽĨ&ŝŶůĂŶĚ͘ 35 dŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂŝƐƚŽŽƐŚĂůůŽǁĨŽƌŶƵĐůĞĂƌƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐ͕
ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐĞĂŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽ ĚŝĞƐĞůƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐ͘tŚŝůĞ
ǁŝŶƚĞƌĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƚŚĞƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨĂŶŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ
ŐƌŽƵŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽƵƚŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ǁŝŶƚĞƌĐĂŶƐĞĞƚŚĞ'ƵůĨƐŽĨ&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂŶĚ
ŽƚŚŶŝĂĨƌĞĞǌĞ͕ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇƌĞĚƵĐĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽƉƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ
ďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐŽƵƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚĞƌƐĞĂ͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂŶĚ^ǁĞĚĞŶ͘tŝŶƚĞƌĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂĂůƐŽ
ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇĞŶĚĂŶŐĞƌƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ&ůĞĞƚ͕
ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶEĂǀǇŚĂƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚƚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚŝƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů
ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ͘ 36
dŚĞEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ&ůĞĞƚ͕ďǇĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ͕ƉŽƐĞƐĂŵŽƌĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽ
EdK͘/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽďĞŝŶŐŚŽŵĞƚŽĂŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶďĂůůŝƐƚŝĐŵŝƐƐŝůĞ
ƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐ;^ÊƐͿ͕ƚŚĞƐĞĂ-ďĂƐĞĚĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŶƵĐůĞĂƌ
ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͖ƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ&ůĞĞƚďŽĂƐƚƐZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐŽŶůǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ
ĐĂƌƌŝĞƌ νρ ĂŶĚŵƵůƚŝƉůĞůĞŐĂĐǇĂŶĚŶĞǁĐƌƵŝƐĞƌƐ͕ĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĞƌƐ͕ĂŶĚŶƵĐůĞĂƌ
34 dĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůůǇ͕ĂůůZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂƐƐĞƚƐŝŶ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚKďůĂƐƚĨĂůůĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ
ƉƵƌǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ&ůĞĞƚ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŐƌŽƵŶĚďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐĂŶĚƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ-to-ƐƵƌĨĂĐĞŵŝƐƐŝůĞďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ͘
dŚŝƐĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƐĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĞƐ
ĞǆĞĐƵƚĞŶŽƚƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŽƐĞƵŶŝƚƐ͕ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞƚŚĞĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ
ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂĐƌŽƐƐĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĂƐǀĂƐƚĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĂƐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͘
35 dŚĞĂůƚŝĐ&ůĞĞƚŚĂƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚƵƐĞŽĨĂŶƚŝ-ƐŚŝƉǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŵŽƌĞĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽŽƚŚĞƌĨůĞĞƚƐ
ŝŶμκλρ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƵƐŝŶŐĂŶĂĐƚŝǀĞ-ĚƵƚǇƐŚŝƉĂƐKW&KZĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƚǇƉŝĐĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨ
ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĂƌƚŝĨŝĐŝĂůƚĂƌŐĞƚ͘͞Korvet ‘^ƚŽǇŬŝǇ͛ otrazil uslovnuyu torpednuyu ataku v Baltiyskom
more, primeniv kompleks ‘WĂŬĞƚ͕͛͟Russian Ministry of Defense͕μξKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǆŶ--
ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξςμλκΛĞŐEĞǁƐ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚςEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
ŵŽƌĞƚǇƉŝĐĂůƐƵƌĨĂĐĞǁĂƌĨĂƌĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŝƐƚŚŝƐŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂ͗͞Korabli Chernomorskogo flota
vypolnili raketnuyu strel’bu po nadvodnoy tseli͕͟Russian Ministry of District͕νκKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǆŶ--ĚλĂĐĂǇŬŐǀĚĨκŚĞλĂ͘ǆŶ--σκĂŶůĨďĞďĂƌπŝ͘ǆŶ--
ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξςςςρΛĞŐEĞǁƐ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚςEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
36 ͞Ukhudshenie pogodnykh usloviy ne povliyalo na boegotovnost’ Baltiyskogo flota͕͟Russian
Ministry of Defense͕νκKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǆŶ--ĚλĂĐĂǇŬŐǀĚĨκŚĞλĂ͘ǆŶ--σκĂŶůĨďĞďĂƌπŝ͘ǆŶ--
ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξςςςσΛĞŐEĞǁƐ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
νρ dŚŝƐĐĂƌƌŝĞƌ͕ƚŚĞAdmiral Kuznetsov͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ŚĂƐƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŝŶƌĞĐĞŶƚǇĞĂƌƐ
ĂŶĚ͕ĂĨƚĞƌĂĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞDĞĚŝƚĞƌƌĂŶĞĂŶŝŶůĂƚĞμκλπ͕ŝƐďĞŝŶŐƌĞƉĂŝƌĞĚĨŽƌĂƉĞƌŝŽĚ
ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚƚŽůĂƐƚƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐ͘͞Remont avianostsa ‘Admiral Kuznetsov’ prodlitsya okolo trekh
10
ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐ͘As during the Cold War, the Northern Fleet would
support the operational objective of creating logistical uncertainty in
the North Atlantic Ocean, Norwegian Sea, and North Sea; while posing
a strategic threat to the world with its boomers as an ultimate
insurance against the destruction of Russia in the event of escalation
to a larger war. ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐǁŽƵůĚŝŶŚŝďŝƚEdKŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚĂŶĚEŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶ^ĞĂƐďǇŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ͖
ĐƌƵŝƐĞŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐĂŶĚ ŶĂǀĂůĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞŵĂŝŶĚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ
&ůĞĞƚǁŽƵůĚĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĂŶǇŵĂũŽƌEdK ŶĂǀĂůĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽ
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƐĞĂĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽƌ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĚŝƐƌƵƉƚ ŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ
traffic.
ĞƐƉŝƚĞŵŽƐƚůǇůĞŐĂĐǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĂƚƐĞĂ 38 ĂŶĚĂŵƵĐŚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŝƌĨŽƌĐĞ͕it is the Ground and Airborne Forces that would be
the centerpiece of any Russian strategic offensive operation. dŚĞ
ŐƌŽƵŶĚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞǁŽƵůĚďĞĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐ
ĂĐĞƐƐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĂĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƵŶĚĞƌĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĨĂǀŽƌĂďůĞƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŝŵ;ƚŽƚŚĂƚĞŶĚ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂǁŽƵůĚďĞǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽƚŽůĞƌĂƚĞĐĂƐƵĂůƚŝĞƐ
ĂŵŽŶŐŝƚƐŶĂǀĂůĂŶĚĂŝƌĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚĂƚŶŽtĞƐƚĞƌŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇǁŽƵůĚ
ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚĞͿ͘ νσ dŚƵƐ͕Russia’s capability to deploy ground and
airborne forces over the border is the critical instrument of its
conventional force projection.
ZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂƐƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽůŝŐŚƚĞŶƵŶŝƚƐĂŶĚŵĂŬĞƚŚĞŵŵŽƌĞĚĞƉůŽǇĂďůĞďǇ
conǀĞƌƚŝŶŐĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŽďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ĂƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĞǀŝĚĞŶƚ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞŽŶďĂƐ tĂƌ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐǇĞƚƚŽŵĂƐƚĞƌƚŚĞĂƌƚ
ŽĨďƌŝŐĂĚĞĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚĂƐĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚƵŶŝƚƐ͘ 40 /ŶƐƚĞĂĚ͕ŝƚŚĂƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇ
ƌĞůŝĞĚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĚ-ŚŽĐƵŶŝƚƐĐĂůůĞĚ͞ďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů
ŐƌŽƵƉƐ͟;d'ƐͿƚŽƉƌŽũĞĐƚĨŽƌĐĞǁŚĞŶĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚ͘ 41 dŚĞƐĞd'ƐƐĞƌǀĞ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĂƐZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŽEdKĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ-ĂƌŵƐƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ͕—
ĐŽŵďŝŶŝŶŐŚĞĂǀǇŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĨŝƌĞ͕ŚĞĂǀǇĂƌŵŽƌ͕ĂŶĚůĂƌŐĞĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
let͕͟RIA Novosti͕μνƵŐƵƐƚμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬƌŝĂ͘ƌƵͬĚĞĨĞŶƐĞͺƐĂĨĞƚǇͬμκλρκςμνͬλοκκσκςοπρ͘Śƚŵů.
ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
38 ZĞĐĞŶƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶEĂǀĂůŵŽĚĞƌŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŵŽƐƚůǇŽŶƚŚĞůĂĐŬ^ĞĂ&ůĞĞƚƚŚŽƵŐŚƐŽŵĞ
ŵŽĚĞƌŶĐƌƵŝƐĞƌƐĂŶĚƐŵĂůůƉĂƚƌŽůďŽĂƚƐŚĂǀĞĞŶƚĞƌĞĚƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶĂŶĚĂůƚŝĐ&ůĞĞƚƐ
ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ͘
νσ Ĩ͘^ƵǀŽƌŽǀ͘
40 &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ŝŶ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλπ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚŽŶůǇλďƌŝŐĂĚĞƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽλλďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůƐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ͘/ŶKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕ƚŚŝƐƌĂƚŝŽǁĂƐμďƌŝŐĂĚĞ
ƚŽρďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶ͘^ĞĞƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂƚǁǁǁ͘ǁĂƌǀƐƉĞĂĐĞ͘ŽƌŐ.
41 ^ƵƚǇĂŐŝŶ͕/ŐŽƌ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ŽƌĐĞƐŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͕͟ZŽǇĂůhŶŝƚĞĚ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ͕DĂƌĐŚμκλο͘
11
ŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇ͘dŚĞƐĞĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƌĞĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚƵŶŵĂŶŶĞĚĂĞƌŝĂů
ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ;hsͿƌĞĐŽŶŶĂŝƐƐĂŶĐĞƚŽĚŝƌĞĐƚĨŝƌĞƐĂŶĚĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ
ǁŝƚŚŝŶĂŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͘42
d'ƐĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĂŶĚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ
ĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚƐŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͘hŶŝƚƐĂƌĞŵĞůĚĞĚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌƚŽ
avŽŝĚƉƵďůŝĐƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇŽĨŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇŶƵŵďĞƌƐŚŽƌƚĨĂůůƐĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŵĞĚŝĂ͘ 43 dŚĞƐĞĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĐŽǀĞƌĞĚďǇƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚĂŝƌ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĐĂůůŝŶŚĞĂǀǇĨŝƌĞƐŽƌĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ
ĂƚŬĞǇƉŽŝŶƚƐ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕d'ƐĂůƐŽŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞŶĞǁƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůďƵƌĚĞŶƐŽŶ
ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͕ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƚŽĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĂůĂƌŐĞ
nƵŵďĞƌŽĨŶŽŶ-ĐŽŶƐĐƌŝƉƚƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ͘ ůĂƌŐĞ-ƐĐĂůĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ
ĞĨĨŽƌƚŝƐĂƚǁŽƌŬƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞŽĨĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŽƌ;ŝ͘Ğ͘ǀŽůƵŶƚĞĞƌͿ
ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽĐŽŶƐĐƌŝƉƚƐ͘dŚŝƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚƌŝǀĞŶ
ƚŚƌĞĞŬĞǇŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ͗ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĨĨĂŝƌƐƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƉƌĞƐƚŝŐĞ
ĂŵŽŶŐĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐ͕ 44 ǇŽƵƚŚŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ͕ 45 ĂŶĚŽǀĞƌĂƌĐŚŝŶŐĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ
42 dŚĞƐĞhs-ďĂƐĞĚĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĚƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŝŶ
d'ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ͘KŶĞƚǇƉŝĐĂůĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͗͞V Krymu proshlo masshtabnoe takticheskoe
uchenie s motorstrelkami obshchevoyskovogo sedineniya Chernomorskogo flota͕͟Russian
Ministry of Defense͕λο^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǆŶ--ĚλĂĐĂǇŬŐǀĚĨκŚĞλĂ͘ǆŶ--σκĂŶůĨďĞďĂƌπŝ͘ǆŶ--
ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξμνοςΛĞŐEĞǁƐ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
43 dŚŝƐƚƌĞŶĚŝƐĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚŝŶŐĂƐĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƚŽĨŽƌŵd'ƐĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇ
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶĂƐƐĞƚƐ͘&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ͕ƚŚƌĞĞĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŶŽǁƐĞƌǀĞƚŽĞƋƵŝƉƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƐŽĨd'Ɛ
ĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚŝŶĞĂƐƚĞƌŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͕ƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĚĞŵĂŶĚĨŽƌĂĚŚŽĐd'Ɛ͘dŚĞƐĞĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ
ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐĞŶƚĞƌƐďƵŝůƚĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌǁŝƚŚŽŶďĂƐƚŽƚƌĂŝŶƵŶŝƚƐĨƌŽŵŵĂŶǇ
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽŵĞůĚŝŶƚŽŶĞǁĐŽŵďĂƚ-ĐĂƉĂďůĞƵŶŝƚƐƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝǌĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞǁĂƌŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͘
ŶƚŽŶǀĞƌĞǀ͕͞ǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞ͗ZƵƐƐŝĂďƵŝůĚŝŶŐŵĂũŽƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇďĂƐĞŶĞĂƌhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌ͕͟ZĞƵƚĞƌƐ͕
σ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλο͘ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƌĞƵƚĞƌƐ͘ĐŽŵͬĂƌƚŝĐůĞͬƵƐ-ƵŬƌĂŝŶĞ-ĐƌŝƐŝƐ-ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞ-
ŝĚh^<EκZσμξ'μκλοκσκσ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚDĂǇσ͕μκλπ͘
44 DŽƐƚŶŽƚĂďůǇƚŚĞ͞Est’ takaya professiya – Rodinu zashchishchat’!͟ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ͕ůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇ
ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĚĂƐ͞dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚƚŚĞŵŽƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚ͊͟ŽǀĞƌĂŐĞŽĨŽŶĞƐƵĐŚĞǀĞŶƚŝŶ
<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͗͞V Kaliningrade proshla informatsionno-agitatsionnaya aktsiya ‘Est’ takaya
professiya – Rodinu zashchishchat’!͕͟Russian Ministry of Defense͕οEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǆŶ-
-ĚλĂĐĂǇŬŐǀĚĨκŚĞλĂ͘ǆŶ--σκĂŶůĨďĞďĂƌπŝ͘ǆŶ--
ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξσπνοΛĞŐEĞǁƐ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘dŚĞ
ƌĞƐƵůƚƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƉƌŽĨĞƐƐĞĚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶ͗͞V Kaliningradskoy
oblasti znachitel’no vyros sredi molodezhi prestizh sluzhby v armii͕͟Russian Ministry of
Defense͕λλKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǆŶ--ĚλĂĐĂǇŬŐǀĚĨκŚĞλĂ͘ǆŶ--σκĂŶůĨďĞďĂƌπŝ͘ǆŶ--
ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξοππςΛĞŐEĞǁƐ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
45 ƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇYunarmiya͘͞Luchshie voennosluzhashchie Severnogo flota provedut uroki
Muzhestva dlya straheklassnikov͕͟Russian Ministry of Defense͕ςEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǆŶ--

ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξσσπκΛĞŐEĞǁƐ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
12
ĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ46 ƚŽĚƌŝǀĞƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ξρ ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƐǇŵƉĂƚŚǇĂďƌŽĂĚ͘48 dŚŝƐŝƐ
ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇĂŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞŵĞŵŽƌŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ'ƌĞĂƚ
WĂƚƌŝŽƚŝĐtĂƌ͕ďŽƚŚǁŝƚŚŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ ξσ ŝŶĨƌŽǌĞŶĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚǌŽŶĞƐ͕ 50 ĂŶĚ
ĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƌǁŽƌůĚ͘ 51
During the confusion of the early phase of the war in the Donbas,
Russia could generate approximately 30 BTGs. tŝƚŚŶŽǁ-ƌĞŐƵůĂƌ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐŽĨďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůŐƌŽƵƉƐŝŶŵŽƐƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌƵŶŝƚƐ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌĞŐƵůĂƌĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƐƵƐƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶǁĂƌĞĨĨŽƌƚŝŶĞĂƐƚĞƌŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͕ƚŚŝƐŶƵŵďĞƌŝƐůŝŬĞůǇŶŽǁ
incƌĞĂƐŝŶŐ͘EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ͕ŝƚŵƵƐƚďĞĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚŽƚĂůŶƵŵďĞƌ
ŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ-ĚĞƉůŽǇĂďůĞd'ƐŝƐĨĞǁĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƚŽƚĂůŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
ďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽƌĚĞƌŽĨďĂƚƚůĞ͘
dŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĂƐƐĞŵďůĞa ĨŽƌĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂŶǇƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŚĂƐ
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇďĞĞŶƚĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƐŶĂƉĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ ŝŶƌĞĐĞŶƚǇĞĂƌƐ. 52 hŶƚŝů
ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐĂĚũĂĐĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐǁĞƌĞƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ
46 ͞V Moskve proshlo zasdanie Glavnogo shtaba Yunarmii͕͟Russian Ministry of Defense͕σ

EŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǆŶ--ĚλĂĐĂǇŬŐǀĚĨκŚĞλĂ͘ǆŶ--σκĂŶůĨďĞďĂƌπŝ͘ǆŶ--
ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλοκλλνΛĞŐEĞǁƐ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
ξρ EŽǁƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨĞĨĞŶƐĞ͘ƌĞĐĞŶƚĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝŶƚŚĞ&ĂƌĂƐƚ͗
͞V voyska VVO napravleno bolee 8 tysyach chelovek͕͟Russian Ministry of Defense͕νλKĐƚŽďĞƌ

μκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǆŶ--ĚλĂĐĂǇŬŐǀĚĨκŚĞλĂ͘ǆŶ--σκĂŶůĨďĞďĂƌπŝ͘ǆŶ--
ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξςσρξΛĞŐEĞǁƐ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
48 ZĞĐĞŶƚůǇ͕ďƌĂŶĐŚĞƐŽĨYunarmiya ŽƉĞŶĞĚĂďƌŽĂĚ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŝŶ^ĞƌďŝĂĂŶĚ
^ůŽǀĞŶŝĂ͗͞Otdeleniya ‘Yunarmii’ mogut byt’ otkrity v Belgrade I Lyublyane͕͟Russian Ministry of

Defense͕λσKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǆŶ--ĚλĂĐĂǇŬŐǀĚĨκŚĞλĂ͘ǆŶ--σκĂŶůĨďĞďĂƌπŝ͘ǆŶ--
ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξοππςΛĞŐEĞǁƐ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
ξσ dŚŝƐĞĨĨŽƌƚŝƐƐƉĞĂƌŚĞĂĚĞĚďǇBessmertniy Polk ;͞/ŵŵŽƌƚĂůZĞŐŝŵĞŶƚ͟Ϳ͕ĂŶŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ
ƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŽůŝŶŬĚĞƐĐĞŶĚĂŶƚƐŽĨůůŝĞĚƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐĨƌŽŵtŽƌůĚtĂƌ//ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞƐƉĂƚƌiotic
ĞǀĞŶƚƐƐǇŵƉĂƚŚĞƚŝĐƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ͗ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬŵŽǇƉŽůŬ͘ƌƵͬ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌ
μκλρ͘
50 ƐŝŶƚŚŝƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞĨƌŽŵďŬŚĂǌŝĂ͗͞’Bessmertniy polk’ proydet v pyati gorodakh Abkhazii͕͟
Sputnik͕μσ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬƐƉƵƚŶŝŬ-
ĂďŬŚĂǌŝĂ͘ƌƵͬďŬŚĂǌŝĂͬμκλρκσμσͬλκμλσςπσλξͬďĞƐƐŵĞƌƚŶǇũ-ƉŽůŬ-ƉƌŽũĚĞƚ-v-ƉǇĂƚŝ-ŐŽƌŽĚĂǆ-
ĂďǆĂǌŝŝ͘Śƚŵů͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
51 ƐŝŶƚŚŝƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞĨƌŽŵsŝĐƚŽƌǇĂǇŝŶĂŶĂĚĂ͗͞’Bessmertniy polk’ v Kanade. Toronto, 9
maya͕͟Topwar͕λξDĂǇμκλο͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬƚŽƉǁĂƌ͘ƌƵͬρξπσσ-ďĞƐŵĞƌƚŶǇǇ-ƉŽůŬ-v-ŬĂŶĂĚĞ-toronto-σ-
ŵĂǇĂ͘Śƚŵů ǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐǀŝĚĞŽŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ǇŽƵƚƵďĞ͘ĐŽŵͬǁĂƚĐŚ͍ǀсǁρŬοŵKσDYŶ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσ
EŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
52 WŚŝůůŝƉ͘WĞƚĞƌƐĞŶ͕EŝĐŚŽůĂƐDǇĞƌƐ͕Θ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶdĂĨƚ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶdŚĞĂƚĞƌǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ&Ăƌ
ĂƐƚĞƌŶds͕μκκν-μκλξ͕͟dŚĞWŽƚŽŵĂĐ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ͕KĐƚŽďĞƌμκ͕μκλξ͘
13
ĂŶƚŝƋƵĂƚĞĚŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ 53 ďƵƚƚŚŝƐŝƐŶŽǁĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ͕ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŝŶ
ƚŚĞĂŝƌĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶ͘
&ƌŽŵƚŚĞŽŶƐĞƚŽĨĂĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůǁĂƌƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐEdKĂŶĚŝƚƐ
ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ;ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇĨŽƌƚŚĞ
ƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂĨŝŐŚƚͿ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂǁŽƵůĚĨĂĐĞfive potential fronts of
conflict:
1. The Arctic High North
2. The broader front with Finland near St. Petersburg
3. The Baltic States
4. Kaliningrad Oblast
5. The Polish-Belarusian border
Figure 3. Five Potential Fronts
TŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨ ǁŽƵůĚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŶĞĞĚƐŽĨĞĂĐŚŽĨ
ƚŚĞƐĞĨŝǀĞĨƌŽŶƚƐĂƐŝƚĂůůŽĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĞd'ƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĨŽƌ ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ.
53 DŝĐŚĂĞů<ŽĨŵĂŶ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇƵŝůĚƵƉŝŶƚŚĞtĞƐƚ͗&ĂĐƚsĞƌƐƵƐ&ŝĐƚŝŽŶ͕͟Russia Matters͕ρ
^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƌƵƐƐŝĂŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ͘ŽƌŐͬĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐͬƌƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ďƵŝůĚƵƉ-ǁĞƐƚ-fact-
ǀĞƌƐƵƐ-fiction͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
14
KĨƚŚĞĨŝǀĞĨƌŽŶƚƐůŝƐƚĞĚĂďŽǀĞ͕ƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚŝƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇŽŶĞƚŚĂƚƐĞĞŵƐ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŽĞƌƵƉƚŝŶƚŽĂĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͘
ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂƐĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƌĞŐŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĂĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĨŽĐƵƐ͕ĞǀĞŶŝĨŶŽƚŽŶƚŚĞŵĂŐŶŝƚƵĚĞŽĨƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨŽƚŚĞƌĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘
dŚĞƐĞůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞ͗
x ƌŝŵĞĂ
x ƌŵĞŶŝĂ
x dƌĂŶƐŶŝƐƚƌŝĂ
x ďŬŚĂǌŝĂΘ^ŽƵƚŚKƐƐĞƚŝĂ
x ŽŶďĂƐ
x EŽƌƚŚĂƵĐĂƐƵƐ
x dĂũŝŬŝƐƚĂŶ
x <ǇƌŐǇǌƐƚĂŶ
x ZƵƐƐŽ-ŚŝŶĞƐĞďŽƌĚĞƌ
dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŶŽƚƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇĞŶĚĂŶŐĞƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐŽƌĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ͕ƚŚĞ
ĂƐƐĞŵďůǇŽĨνκd'ƐƚŽĨŝŐŚƚEdKǁŝůůůŝŬĞůǇƌĞůǇŽŶĂŐĞŶĞƌĂů
ŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĂƐĞĐŽŶĚĞĐŚĞůŽŶŽĨĂĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĨŝŐŚƚ͘dŚŝƐ
ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŝƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽƌĚĞƌƐ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚŝŶĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĂũŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞƐŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞƐŝŶĐĞ
2014. ŐĂŝŶ͕ƚŚĞƌĞĐĞŶƚƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚĚƌŝǀĞŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽ
ƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚŝƐĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇ͕ďƵƚŝƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƵŶĐůĞĂƌƚŽǁŚĂƚĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŚŝƐ
ƉƌŽďůĞŵŚĂƐďĞĞŶƌĞŵĞĚŝĞĚĨŽƌĂŶĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚǁŝƚŚEdK͘
/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĞƐĞĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐĂůƐŽƉŽŽůĞĚĂ
ǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨƉĂƌĂŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝĞƐŝŶƚŽŝƚƐEĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƵĂƌĚ͕ďĞƚƚĞƌŬŶŽǁŶƚŽ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĂƐRosgvardiya͘dŚĞƐĞĨŽƌĐĞƐǁŝůůďĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĨŽƌƌĞĂƌĂƌĞĂ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂĨƚĞƌĂƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘dŚĞ
EĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƵĂƌĚƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĂƉŝĚ ƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚĂƐŬĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĨŽƌŵĞĚďǇĚĞƉůŽǇŝŶŐĂ^ƉĞĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐĐŽƌĞŽĨƚƌŽŽƉƐƚŽĂůŽĐĂů
ďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶ͕ƌĞŐŝŵĞŶƚ͕ŽƌďƌŝŐĂĚĞƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽĂƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƚŚƌĞĂƚ͘dŚĞƐĞ
^ƉĞĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĞůŝƚĞŵĂƌŽŽŶďĞƌĞƚƐĂŶĚŵĂǇďĞ
ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƵŶĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶŐŽŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉŚĂƐĞŽĨĂ
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͘/ŶƚŚĞƚǁŽEĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƵĂƌĚƌĞŐŝŽŶƐĂĚũĂĐĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞƐƚǁŽŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ^ƉĞĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐƵŶŝƚƐŝŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ
ƚŚƌĞĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ-ĐĂƉĂďůĞƌĞŐƵůĂƌďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐŶŽƚĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐ
rĞƐĞƌǀĞĚĨŽƌĂŶĂƉŽĐĂůǇƉƚŝĐĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨDŽƐĐŽǁ͘
15
ĞƐƉŝƚĞŵĂŶǇĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂƌĞƚĂŝŶƐĂĐĂƉĂďůĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇǁŝƚŚĂǁĞůů-
ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƐŵĂůůŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ–
ĞǀĞŶǁĞůů-ĞƋƵŝƉƉĞĚƐŵĂůůŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐǁŝƚŚĚĞĨĞŶƐŝďůĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ͘dŚŝƐ
ĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŝƐĂĨĂĐƚŽƌŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐƐŝǌĞŝŶŵŽďŝůŝǌŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞĂŶĚŝƚƐ
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚĞƉůŽǇĨŽƌĐĞƐŽǀĞƌĂůŽŶŐƌĂŶŐĞ͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞ
ƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůĞĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŝŶƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘
ŶŽƚŚĞƌĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŝƐZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ
ŽĨƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚŵŽĚĞƌŶǁĞĂƉŽŶƌǇ. dŚŝƐ͕ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂů
ĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂƐ͞ƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĚ͟ƚŽĂƉŽǁĞƌŽŶƉĂƌǁŝƚŚthat of
ƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ͕ŝƐƚŚĞƚƌƵĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ͘
2. Denmark
ĞŶŵĂƌŬ͕ƚŚĞŽŶůǇĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐEdKŵĞŵďĞƌŽŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂ͕ŚĂƐĂ
ƐŵĂůůďƵƚĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇĂƌŽƵŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ĂŶŝƐŚ^ƚƌĂŝƚƐ͘^ŝŶĐĞtŽƌůĚtĂƌ//͕ĞŶŵĂƌŬŚĂƐƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚŝŶ
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨ^ĐĂŶĚŝŶĂǀŝĂ;ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞ of ƵƌŽƉĞͿŽŶ
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝƐƐƵĞƐ͕ŬĞĞƉŝŶŐĂĐůĞĂƌĨŽĐƵƐŽŶĂůƚŝĐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͘ 54 ĨƚĞƌǇĞĂƌƐŽĨ
ŚŝĂƚƵƐ͕ŝƚƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŚĂƐƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚǁŝƚŚƌĞƐŽůǀĞƚŽƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽ
ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘/ŶKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕ĞŶŵĂƌŬƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĂμκйŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƌĞĐĞŶƚĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ͘ 55
ĞŶŵĂƌŬŚĂƐĞŵĞƌŐĞĚĂƐa leading provider of air support to the Baltic
Air Policing mission in Estonia and Lithuania ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞŚĂǀŝŶŐŽŶůǇξξ
ĐŽŵďĂƚ-ĐĂƉĂďůĞĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ͘
dŚĞĂŶŝƐŚƌŵǇŝƐĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞĚŽĨĂƐŝŶŐůĞĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƚǁŽďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐŶŽƚ
ĨƵůůǇŵĂŶŶĞĚďƵƚĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŝƐůĂŶĚŽĨ^ũĂĞůůĂŶĚƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞ
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŽĨŽƉĞŶŚĂŐĞŶ͕ĂŶĚŽŶƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚĞƌŶƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ:ƵƚůĂŶĚ
ŵĂŝŶůĂŶĚƉĞŶŝŶƐƵůĂ͘dŚĞƐĞƚǁŽďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐŚĂǀĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ
ƐŚĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞůůŝĞĚZĂƉŝĚZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŽƌƉƐ;ZZͿŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚĨĞǁǇĞĂƌƐ͕ 56
54 ,ƵŐŚ&ĂƌŝŶŐĚŽŶ͕͞dŚĞEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ&ůĂŶŬ͕͟Strategic Geography: NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the

Superpowers, ZŽƵƚůĞĚŐĞ͕λσςσ͖ƉƉ͘μςξ-285.
55 :ĂĐŽď'ƌŽŶŚŽůƚ-WĞĚĞƌƐĞŶĂŶĚ:ƵůŝĞƐƚƌŝĚdŚŽŵƐĞŶ͕͞ĂŶŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƐμκƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ
ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞďƵĚŐĞƚŚŝŬĞƚŽĚĞƚĞƌZƵƐƐŝĂ͕͟Reuters͕λλKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬƵŬ͘ƌĞƵƚĞƌƐ͘ĐŽŵͬĂƌƚŝĐůĞͬƵŬ-ĚĞŶŵĂƌŬ-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇͬĚĂŶŝƐŚ-ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ-ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƐ-20-ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ-
ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ-ďƵĚŐĞƚ-ŚŝŬĞ-to-ĚĞƚĞƌ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂ-ŝĚh<<Eλ'λ'/͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
56 ͞ƐƐŝŐŶĞĚ&ŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕͟ůůŝĞĚZĂƉŝĚZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŽƌƉƐ͗ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĂƌƌĐ͘ŶĂƚŽ͘ŝŶƚͬĂďŽƵƚ-
ƵƐͬĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ:ƵŶĞμ͕μκλπ͘
16
ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŝƌĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇůĞĂǀĞĞŶŵĂƌŬƵŶĚĞĨĞŶĚĞĚ
but for ƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐ͘dŚŽƵŐŚĂƌŵĞĚǁŝƚŚŵŽĚĞƌŶĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ͕
ƚŚĞĂŶŝƐŚƌŵǇŝƐĂůŵŽƐƚĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇĚĞǀŽŝĚŽĨĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ͕ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇ
ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐŽŶůǇμξDλκσƐĂŶĚμκŵŽƌƚĂƌƐ͘ ορ ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞĂŶŝƐŚƌŵǇ
ŚĂƐŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĚƉƌŽĐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚŽĨλςƐĞůĨ-ƉƌŽƉĞůůĞĚŚŽǁŝƚǌĞƌƐ͘
dŚĞĂŶŝƐŚEĂǀǇŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐŵŽĚĞƌŶĂŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĨƌŝŐĂƚĞƐ58 ĂŶĚŵŝŶĞ
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƐŚŝƉƐŝĚĞĂůůǇƐƵŝƚĞĚĨŽƌ ĐůŽƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĂŶŝƐŚ^ƚƌĂŝƚƐ͘In
the event of a crisis in the Baltic region, closing the straights would be
the central focus of Danish maritime operations. dŚŽƵŐŚĐĂƉĂďůĞ͕ƚŚĞƐĞ
ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞĨŽƌĐĞĂƌĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚŝŶŶƵŵďĞƌ͕ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŝŶŐŽĨ
ƚŚŝƌƚĞĞŶƚĂƐŬĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐƉůƵƐŶŝŶĞƉĂƚƌŽůĂŶĚĐŽĂƐƚĂůĐŽŵďĂƚĂŶƚƐ͘ οσ Ɛ
ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͕ĞŶŵĂƌŬŽŶůǇŚĂƐĂĨĞǁƐŚŝƉƐĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨĨŝƌŝŶŐ
anti-ƐŚŝƉŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐ͕ŵĂŝŶůǇHarpoons͘ĞŶŵĂƌŬĂůƐŽŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌŚĂƐĂŶǇ
ƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐŽĨŝƚƐŽǁŶ͘
ŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞĂŶŝƐŚ^ƚƌĂŝƚƐŚĂƐůŽŶŐďĞĞŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂŚŝŐŚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŝŶ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ŽǀŝĞƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ͗ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͕ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐĂǁĂǇ
ƚŽǁƌĞƐƚĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƌĂŝƚƐŽƌƚŚĞ<ŝĞůĂŶĂůƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŵƉŚŝďŝŽƵƐ
ŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽƵƚŽĨĞŶŵĂƌŬŽĨĨĞƌĞĚĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƐǁŝĨƚůǇ
ƐƵƉƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĞŶĞůƵǆĂŶĚĨŽƌĐŝŶŐŽƚŚĞƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŶĂǀŝĞƐŝŶƚŽ
ůŽĐĂůŝǌĞĚĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘ 60 dŚĞĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĂƐƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͕
WŽůĂŶĚ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐƚŽEdKŚĂƐŐƌĞĂƚůǇĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŚŝƐ
ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ͕ďƵƚŚĂƐŶŽƚĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚĞĚŝƚĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇ͘
dŚĞĂŶŝƐŚŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞŝƐďĂƐĞĚĂƚ^ŬƌǇĚƐƚƌƵƉŝƌĂƐĞŝŶƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚĞƌŶ
ƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ:ƵƚůĂŶĚƉĞŶŝŶƐƵůĂ͘/ƚĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇĨůŝĞƐ ƚŚĞ &-λπDͬD͕ĂŶĚŝŶ
μκλοŚĂƐƌĞŶĞǁĞĚĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽƉƌŽĐƵƌĞĂŶĞǆƚ-ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ͘ 61 /ŶDĂǇ
μκλπ͕ĞŶŵĂƌŬ͕ĂůƌĞĂĚǇŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŶŝŶĞ:ŽŝŶƚ^ƚƌŝŬĞ&ŝŐŚƚĞƌƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ
ŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽĐƵƌĞƚŚĞ&-νο:ŽŝŶƚ^ƚƌŝŬĞ&ŝŐŚƚĞƌ
ορ ͞ĞŶŵĂƌŬ͕͟The Military Balance, 2016͘/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŽĨ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ͖Ɖ͘ςσ͘

58 &ŽƌƐǀĂƌĞƚ&ŽƌĂŶŵĂƌŬ͕ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂƚŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁμ͘ĨŽƌƐǀĂƌĞƚ͘ĚŬͬWĂŐĞƐͬĨŽƌƐŝĚĞ͘ĂƐƉǆ͕ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ
ŽŶ:ƵŶĞμ͕μκλπ͘
οσ //^^͕ŝďŝĚ͕Ɖ͘ςσ͘
60 &ĂƌŝŶŐĚŽŶ͕,ƵŐŚ͕͞dŚĞEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ&ůĂŶŬ͕͟Strategic Geography: NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and
the Superpowers, ZŽƵƚůĞĚŐĞ͕λσςσ͖ƉƉ͘μςξ-285.

61 'ĞƌĂƌĚK͛ǁǇĞƌ͕͞EĞǁ&ŝŶŶ͕ĂŶŝƐŚ>ĞĂĚĞƌƐƚŽ>ĞĂĚ&ŝŐŚƚĞƌWŝĐŬƐ͕͟DefenseNews͕:ƵŶĞς͕μκλο͖
ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂƚŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŶĞǁƐ͘ĐŽŵͬƐƚŽƌǇͬĚĞĨĞŶƐĞͬĂŝƌ-
ƐƉĂĐĞͬƐƚƌŝŬĞͬμκλοͬκπͬκρͬĨŝŶůĂŶĚ-ĚĞŶŵĂƌŬ-ĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ-ƌĞƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚ-ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ-f35-ŚŽƌŶĞƚ-
ĞƵƌŽĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ-ƚǇƉŚŽŽŶ-ŐƌŝƉĞŶͬμςξμλπλο͕ͬĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚŽŶ:ƵŶĞμ͕μκλπ͘
λρ
ƚŽƌĞƉůĂĐĞŝƚƐ&-λπƐ͕ŚŽƉŝŶŐƚŽďĞŐŝŶĨŝĞůĚŝŶŐŝŶμκμκ͘ 62 dŚĞƐĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƐĂƌĞ
ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚŝƚƐŐƌŽǁŝŶŐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƐƚǇŵŝĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŝŶ
ƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͕ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚďǇĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƐŝŶμκκξ͕μκκσ͕μκλλ͕μκλν͕
ĂŶĚμκλξ;ĚĞƉůŽǇŝŶŐƐŚŽƌƚůǇĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝŵĞĂͿ͘ 63
3. Estonia
ƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕ƚŚĞŶŽƌƚŚĞƌŶŵŽƐƚ ŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕ŝƐĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŽĨhŐƌŝĐ-
ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞŵŽƐƚĐůŽƐĞůǇƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ&ŝŶŶƐ͘/ƚƐ ůŽŶŐĐŽĂƐƚůŝŶĞ
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƚŚĞŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƵƉŽŶ ƐƚŽŶŝĂƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚŝƚƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ͘
dŚĞƐƚŽŶŝĂŶĐĂƉŝƚĂůŽĨdĂůůŝŶŶǁĂƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůůǇĨŽƵŶĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĂŶĞƐĂŶĚ
'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĂƐĂƚƌĂĚĞĐĞŶƚĞƌĨŽƌƚŚĞ,ĂŶƐĞĂƚŝĐ>ĞĂŐƵĞŝŶƚŚĞ,ŝŐŚDŝĚĚůĞ
ŐĞƐ͘ǇƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĚĞĐĂĚĞŽĨƚŚĞƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ͕ƐƚŽŶŝĂŚĂĚďĞĞŶ
ĂƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĞŵƉŝƌĞƐŽĨĞŶŵĂƌŬ͕dĞƵƚŽŶŝĐ<ŶŝŐŚƚƐ͕^ǁĞĚĞŶ͕WŽůĂŶĚ͕
ĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ͘/Ŷλσμκ͕ĂŵŝĚƐƚ ƚŚĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚďĞĨĞůůƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ĨƌŽŶƚŝĞƌĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝǀŝůtĂƌ͕ƐƚŽŶŝĂƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇĐůĂŝŵĞĚŝƚƐ
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ͘ƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕ĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕ǁĂƐĂďƐŽƌďĞĚ
ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶŝŶλσξκƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞDŽůŽƚŽǀ-ZŝďďĞŶƚƌŽƉWĂĐƚĂŶĚ
ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚƵŶƚŝůλσσλ͘ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͕ƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕ĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĂůƚŝĐDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ͕ŚŽƐƚĞĚĂƐŝǌĂďůĞƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
&ůĞĞƚ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐůŽŶŐ-ƌĂŶŐĞŶĂǀĂůĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶĂƚ ŵĂƌŝŝƌĂƐĞ͘dŚĞůĂƐƚ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĂŝůŽƌƐǁĞƌĞĞǀŝĐƚĞĚĨƌŽŵŝƚƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇŝŶλσσο͘ 64
dŽĚĂǇ͕ƚŚĞƐƚŽŶŝĂŶEĂǀǇŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĨŝǀĞƐŚŝƉƐ͕ŽŶĞƉĂƚƌŽůƐŚŝƉĂŶĚĨŽƵƌ
ŵŝŶĞĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƐŚŝƉƐĂŶĚμκκƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů͘65 Estonia retains
contingencies for mining its territorial waters using pre-distributed
mines across the country, and involving merchant marine to deploy
mines offshore in the event of Russian aggression. ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů&ŝŶŶŽ-
ƐƚŽŶŝĂŶŵŝŶŝŶŐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĐŽƵůĚďŽƚƚůĞŶĞĐŬZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞĂƐƐĞƚƐ
62 ^ǇĚŶĞǇ:͘&ƌĞĞĚďĞƌŐ͕:ƌ͕͘͞&-νοtŝŶƐĞŶŵĂƌŬŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ͗dƌŽƵŶĐĞƐ^ƵƉĞƌ,ŽƌŶĞƚ͕
ƵƌŽĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ͕͟Breaking Defense͕DĂǇλμ͕μκλπ͖ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚĂƚ
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ͘ĐŽŵͬμκλπͬκοͬĨ-35-ǁŝŶƐ-ĚĞŶŵĂƌŬ-ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝon-ƚƌŽƵŶĐĞƐ-ƐƵƉĞƌ-ŚŽƌŶĞƚ-
ĞƵƌŽĨŝŐŚƚĞƌͬ ŽŶ:ƵŶĞμ͕μκλπ
63 ͞tĂŵŵĞŶ͗ĂŶƐŬĞ&-λπŬůĂƌƚŝůĂůƚŝĐŝƌWŽůŝĐŝŶŐ͕͟Forsvarsminsteriet͕DĂƌĐŚμρ͕μκλξ͕
ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚĂƚŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĨŵŶ͘ĚŬͬŶǇŚĞĚĞƌͬWĂŐĞƐͬtĂŵŵĞŶ-ĂŶƐŬĞ-&-16-ŬůĂƌ-ƚŝů-ĂůƚŝĐ-ŝƌ-
WŽůŝĐŝŶŐ͘ĂƐƉǆ ŽŶ:ƵŶĞμ͕μκλπ
64 WŚŝůůŝƉ͘WĞƚĞƌƐĞŶ͕Securing the Fruits of Victory: A History of the Potomac Foundation’s
Activities at the End of the Cold War, 1991-2006͕dŚĞWŽƚŽŵĂĐ &ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ͕μκλμ͘

65 ͞ƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕͟The Military Balance, 2016͕/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŽĨ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ͕Ɖ͘σλ͘
18
ďĂƐĞĚŝŶ<ƌŽŶƐŚƚĂĚƚŝŶƚŚĞ'ƵůĨŽĨ&ŝŶůĂŶĚ͘EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ͕ƐƚŽŶŝĂŚĂƐ
ǀĞƌǇůŝƚƚůĞŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞĐŽŵďĂƚĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇďĞǇŽŶĚŵŝŶĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ͘
ƐƚŽŶŝĂŚĂƐĂƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇƐŵĂůůƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůůĂŶĚĨŽƌĐĞĂƵŐŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇ
ĐŽŶƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂůĂƌŐĞƌĞƐĞƌǀŝƐƚƐǇƐƚĞŵ͘/ŶƌĞĐĞŶƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ
ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐ͕ŝƚŚĂƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇŵŽďŝůŝǌĞĚĂůŵŽƐƚĂƐŵĂŶǇƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ
ĂƐWŽůĂŶĚ͕ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞŚĂǀŝŶŐĂĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůǇƐŵĂůůĞƌƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ͘/ƚƉůĂŶƐŝƚƐ
ůĂƌŐĞƐƚĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞǇĞƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ^ƉƌŝŶŐŽĨμκλςŝŶ^ŝŝů-μκλςǁŝƚŚĂůŵŽƐƚς͕κκκ
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ͘ 66 The reservist system called the Kaitseliit is trained to
provide local specialty support, effectively serving as indigenous
engineering and counter-agitprop force serving specific communities.
It regularly exercises with the Estonian regular force.
dŚĞƐƚŽŶŝĂŶƌŵǇĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇŽĨůŝŐŚƚŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇ͕ƚŚŽƵŐŚĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ
ƐŽŵĞ&ŝŶŶŝƐŚůŝŐŚƚĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐĂŶĚĂůŝŵŝƚĞĚŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
ůĞŐĂĐǇ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ͘/ŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨǁĂƌ͕ƐƚŽŶŝĂŶůĂŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕
ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞĚŝŶƚǁŽƌĞŐƵůĂƌďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ͕ǁŽƵůĚďĞĂďůĞ ƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ
ĨƌĞĞůǇ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞŝƌŵĂŝŶŵŝƐƐŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŽdefend the approaches
to the major population centers of Tallinn and Tartu as well as
protecting or reentering Narva.
ƐƚŽŶŝĂ͛ƐƌŵǇŝƐŶŽǁĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞDƵůƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌƉƐ
EŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶƐƚŽŶŝĂƵŶĚĞƌƌŝƚŝƐŚĐŽŵŵĂŶĚǁŝƚŚďŽƚŚƌŝƚŝƐŚ
ĂŶĚ&ƌĞŶĐŚŵĂŝŶďĂƚƚůĞƚĂŶŬƐŝŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĂĂŶŝƐŚĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ͘/ƚ
ďĞĐĂŵĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨDĂƌĐŚμκλρ͘ πρ
dŚĞƐƚŽŶŝĂŶŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞ͕ďĂƐĞĚĂƚ ŵĂƌŝ ŝŶƚŚĞŶŽƌƚŚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͕ŝƐ
ĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŽƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ͕ďƵƚhosts half of the Baltic Air
Policing provided by other NATO member states.
66 ͞V 2018 godu proydut krupneyshie voennye ucheniya s uchastiem rezervistov I dobrovol’tsev͕͟

Stolitsa͕ξKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬƐƚŽůŝƚƐĂ͘ĞĞͬλςςκσλ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
πρ ZŽůĂŶĚKůŝƉŚĂŶƚ͕͞ƌŝƚŝƐŚƚƌŽŽƉƐĂƌƌŝǀĞŝŶƐƚŽŶŝĂĂƐ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐƉǇĐŚŝĞĨǁĂƌŶƐŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚƌŽŽƉ
ďƵŝůĚƵƉ͕͟The Telegraph͕λςDĂƌĐŚμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƚĞůĞŐƌĂƉŚ͘ĐŽ͘ƵŬͬŶĞǁƐͬμκλρͬκνͬλςͬďƌŝƚŝƐŚ-ƚƌŽŽƉƐ-ĂƌƌŝǀĞ-ĞƐƚŽŶŝĂ-ŐĞƌŵĂŶ-ƐƉǇ-ĐŚŝĞĨ-
ǁĂƌŶƐ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂŶͬ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
λσ
4. Finland
&ŝŶůĂŶĚŝƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŚĂƐĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇĨŽƵŐŚƚƚŚĞ
^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŚĂǀŝŶŐŝƚƐĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚ͘ 68
dŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ ŝƚĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝŶĂĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐďĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐĂĐƚ
ƌĞƚĂŝŶŝŶŐŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶĂŶĚƐƚĂǇŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨEdK͘
dŚĞλσξρdƌĞĂƚǇŽĨWĂƌŝƐĐĞŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŽĨ&ŝŶŶŝƐŚŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ͕
ůŝŵŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐŝǌĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŶĚƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŶŐ&ŝŶŶŝƐŚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ďŽŵďĞƌƐ͕ƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐ͕ŽƌŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐ;ĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐŽŶůǇďĞŝŶŐĂůůŽǁĞĚ
ŝŶλσπνƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŵŽĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶͿ͘ πσ dŚĞƚƌĞĂƚǇĂůƐŽŽďůŝŐĂƚĞĚ&ŝŶůĂŶĚƚŽ
ƉĂǇƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ ρκ ŽŶƚŽƉŽĨĨŽƌŵĂůůǇĐĞĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĞƐŽĨWĞƚƐĂŵŽ;WĞĐŚĞŶŐĂͿ͕<ĂƌĞůŝĂ͕ĂŶĚsǇďŽƌŐ͘ ρλ /Ŷλσξς͕Ă
ďŝůĂƚĞƌĂů&ŝŶŶŝƐŚ-^ŽǀŝĞƚdƌĞĂƚǇŽĨ&ƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ͕ŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͕ĂŶĚDƵƚƵĂů
ƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞŽďůŝŐĂƚĞĚ&ŝŶůĂŶĚƚŽƌĞƐŝƐƚƚŚĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĨŽƌĐĞƐĂůůŝĞĚǁŝƚŚ
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͕ ρμ ĂŶĚĨŽƌŵĂůůǇƉƌŽƐĐƌŝďĞĚ&ŝŶůĂŶĚĨƌŽŵEdKƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĂĨƚĞƌ
λσοο͘ ρν
ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚŝƐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ͕&ŝŶůĂŶĚŚĂƐůŽŶŐŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ ŝŵƉĂĐƚĨƵů
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐǁŝƚŚŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌƐ͘>ŽŽŬŝŶŐƚŽĂůůĞǀŝĂƚĞŐĂƉƐŝŶĞĂĐŚ
ŽƚŚĞƌ͛ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂŶĚ^ǁĞĚĞŶĨŽƌŵĞĚĂƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂů
ƉĂĐƚŝŶμκλξ͘ ρξ
In 2015 ρο͕ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞμκλξEdK^ƵŵŵŝƚŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶtĂůĞƐ͕
&ŝŶůĂŶĚƐŝŐŶĞĚĂŵĞŵŽƌĂŶĚƵŵŽĨƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ^ǁĞĚĞŶ͕ĂŶĚ
68 sŝŬƚŽƌ^ƵǀŽƌŽǀ͕͛͞KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĠƚĞŶƚĞ͕͛͟Inside the Soviet Army͕DĂĐŵŝůůĂŶWƵďůŝƐŚŝŶŐŽ͕͘/ŶĐ͘

λσςμ͘λπς-λπσ͘
πσ :ĂƌǀĞŶƉĂĂ͕WĂƵůŝ͕͞dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽĐƚƌŝŶĞŝŶƚŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞŽĨ&ŝŶŶŝƐŚĞĨĞŶƐĞ͕͟Nordic
Security at the Turn of the Century͕ĞĚ͘ŝƌŽůůŝŽƚƚŽƉƉŽ͕'ƌĞĞŶǁŽŽĚWƌĞƐƐ͕λσσσ͕Ɖ͘λκμ

ρκ ͞dƌĞĂƚǇŽĨWĞĂĐĞǁŝƚŚ&ŝŶůĂŶĚ^ŝŐŶĞĚĂƚWĂƌŝƐŽŶ&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇλκ͕λσξρ͕͟Treaty Series: Treaties and
International Agreements Registered or Filed and Recorded with the Secretariat of the United
Nations͕λσξρ͘
ρλ ͞&ŝŶůĂŶĚ-h͘^͘^͘Z͘ŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ͕͟International Boundary Study͕KĨĨŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞŽŐƌĂƉŚĞƌ͕ƵƌĞĂƵ
ŽĨ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĂŶĚZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ͕h͘^͘ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞ͕λσπρ͕Ɖ͘λκ͘
ρμ ͞dŚĞŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ&ƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ͕ŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͕ĂŶĚDƵƚƵĂůƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶdŚĞhŶŝŽŶŽĨ
^ŽǀŝĞƚ^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚZĞƉƵďůŝĐƐĂŶĚdŚĞZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨ&ŝŶůĂŶĚ͟dĞǆƚ͕͟
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬŚĞŶŝŶĞŶ͘ŶĞƚͬƐŽƉŝŵƵƐͬλσξςͺĞ͘Śƚŵ ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ:ƵŶĞν͕μκλπ͘
ρν tŚĞŶtĞƐƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇũŽŝŶĞĚƚŚĞůůŝĂŶĐĞ
ρξ K͛ǁǇĞƌ͕'ĞƌĂƌĚ͕͞&ŝŶůĂŶĚ͕^ǁĞĚĞŶǇĞEŽŶ-EdKĞĨĞŶƐĞWĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ͕͟Defense News,
JanuarǇμπ͕μκλξ͖ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬĞŶ͘ƚǁǁƚŶ͘ĐŽŵͬDŝůŝƚĂƌǇͬςλͺορξομ͘Śƚŵů ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ:ƵŶĞμ͕μκλπ͘
ρο ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ,ĂƌƌĞƐƐ͕͞^ĐĂƌĞĚďǇZƵƐƐŝĂ͕^ǁĞĚĞŶĂŶĚ&ŝŶůĂŶĚDĂŬĞtĂƌWĂĐƚ͕͟International
Business Times͕&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇλσ͕ μκλο͖ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚĂƚŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ŝďƚŝŵĞƐ͘ĐŽŵͬƐĐĂƌĞĚ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂ-

ƐǁĞĚĞŶ-ĨŝŶůĂŶĚ-ŵĂŬĞ-ǁĂƌ-ƉĂĐƚ-λςμλσκπ ŽŶ:ƵŶĞμ͕μκλπ͘
20
EdKŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐĂů,ŽƐƚEĂƚŝŽŶ^ƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌEdK
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽƵƚŽĨ&ŝŶŶŝƐŚŽƌ^ǁĞĚŝƐŚƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͕ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĚĞƉĂƌƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵ
ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇĂƐƚŚĞĐŽƌŶĞƌƐƚŽŶĞŽĨŝƚƐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƉŽůŝĐǇ͘ ρπ /Ŷμκλρ͕ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ
^ǁĞĚĞŶ͛ƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞǁŝƚŚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨEdKĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͕&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚ
ŝƚƐŽǁŶůĂƌŐĞ-ƐĐĂůĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚ^ǁĞĚĞŶ
ŽƉĞŶƚŽŽƚŚĞƌEdKŵĞŵďĞƌƐĨŽƌμκμκ͘ ρρ
ǇŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĂreservist culture focused on territorial defense,
&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚĂƚƌƵĞĨĞĂƚŽĨŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĚĞƐƉŝƚĞĂλ͕μκκ-ŬŵďŽƌĚĞƌ
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ͘ǀĞŶƚŽĚĂǇ͕&ŝŶůĂŶĚƌĞƚĂŝŶƐĂƌĞƐĞƌǀĞŽĨνοξ͕κκκ
ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůŝŶĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇǁŝƚŚĂƚŽƚĂůƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨο͘οŵŝůůŝŽŶ͘ρς
dŚĞ&ŝŶŶŝƐŚƌŵǇŝƐĂǁĞůů-ŽŝůĞĚŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŵĂĐŚŝŶĞǁŝƚŚĂĐŽƌĞŽĨ
ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇŵŽĚĞƌŶŝǌĞĚ>ĞŽƉĂƌĚƚĂŶŬƐ͕^ŽǀŝĞƚĂŶĚ^ǁĞĚŝƐŚ/&s͛Ɛ͕ĂŶĚĂ
ůĂƌŐĞƐƵƉƉůǇŽĨĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ-ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚW͛ƐĂŶĚĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇƉŝĞĐĞƐ͘
&ŝŶůĂŶĚ͛ƐŚĞĂǀǇĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚŶĞĂƌƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚĞƌŶƉĂƌƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞ^ƚ͘WĞƚĞƌƐďƵƌŐ— ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚŽĨƚŚĞ
tŝŶƚĞƌĂŶĚŽŶƚŝŶƵĂƚŝŽŶ tĂƌƐ͘>ŝŐŚƚĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƐĐĂƚƚĞƌĞĚĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞ
ƌĞŵĂŝŶĚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͘
dŚĞ&ŝŶŶŝƐŚEĂǀǇŝƐďĂƐĞĚŝŶ,ĞůƐŝŶŬŝŽŶƚŚĞ'ƵůĨŽĨ&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂŶĚŝŶdƵƌŬƵ͕
ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞƚŚĞ ÅůĂŶĚ/ƐůĂŶĚƐĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞ'ƵůĨŽĨŽƚŚŶŝĂ͘/ƚ
ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞƐĂůŝŵŝƚĞĚĂŵƉŚŝďŝŽƵƐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇ͕ďƵƚŝƐƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝǌĞĚĂƚŵŝŶĞ
warfare with a primary mission of mining the Gulf of Finland in the
event of a war to prevent amphibious assaults being launched against
the capital. Finland also possesses anti-ship capability on its patrol
ships.
dŚĞ&ŝŶŶŝƐŚŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞŝƐĞƋƵŝƉƉĞĚǁŝƚŚ&ͬ-λς,ŽƌŶĞƚƐĂŶĚŝƐĚŝǀŝĚĞĚŝŶƚŽ
ƚŚƌĞĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐ͗^ĂƚĂŬƵŶƚĂ;tĞƐƚͿ͕<ĂƌĞůŝĂ;ĂƐƚͿ͕ĂŶĚ>ĂƉůĂŶĚ;EŽƌƚŚͿ͕
ĞĂĐŚǁŝƚŚŽŶĞƐƋƵĂĚƌŽŶŽĨμνũĞƚƐ͘>ĂĐŬŽĨŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĚĞƉƚŚŵĂŬĞƐ
&ŝŶŶŝƐŚĂŝƌĨŝĞůĚƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů^^DƐďĂƐĞĚŶĞĂƌ^ƚ͘
ρπ ͞&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂŶĚ^ǁĞĚĞŶ^ŝŐŶDĞŵŽƌĂŶĚƵŵŽĨhŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚEdK͕͟SHAPE͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌο͕
μκλξ͕ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚĂƚŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƐŚĂƉĞ͘ŶĂƚŽ͘ŝŶƚͬĨŝŶůĂŶĚ-ĂŶĚ-ƐǁĞĚĞŶ-ƐŝŐŶŝŶŐ-a-ŵĞŵŽƌĂŶĚƵŵ-of-
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ-ǁŝƚŚ-nato-for-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ĂŶĚ-ůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐ-ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ŽŶ:ƵŶĞμ͕μκλπ
ρρ ͞&ŝŶůĂŶĚƚŽ^ƚĂŐĞDĂƐƐŝǀĞtĂƌ'ĂŵĞƐǁŝƚŚůůŝĞƐŝŶμκμκ͕͟The Baltic Review͕ξEŽǀĞŵďĞƌ
μκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬďĂůƚŝĐ-ƌĞǀŝĞǁ͘ĐŽŵͬĨŝŶůĂŶĚ-to-ƐƚĂŐĞ-ŵĂƐƐŝǀĞ-ǁĂƌ-ŐĂŵĞƐ-ǁŝƚŚ-ĂůůŝĞƐ-in-μκμκͬ.
ρς ͞&ŝŶůĂŶĚ͕͟The Military Balance, 2016͕ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŽĨ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ͕Ɖ͘σν͘
21
WĞƚĞƌƐďƵƌŐ͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŽĂŝƌĂƐƐĞƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶĂŶĚĂƚƚĂĐŚĞĚ ƚŽƚŚĞ
EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ&ůĞĞƚ͘
5. Germany
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͕ĂEdKŵĞŵďĞƌ͕ŚĂĚƌƵůĞĚŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚĞƌŶĂŶĚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ
ƐŚŽƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂĂƚƐŽŵĞƉŽŝŶƚŽƌĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƚǁĞůĨƚŚ
ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞtĞŶĚŝƐŚƌƵƐĂĚĞ͘DŝůŝƚĂƌŝůǇ͕'ĞƌŵĂŶǇŚĂƐ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚƐŽŵĞĨŽƌŵŽĨŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇŽŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͕ďŽƚƚůŝŶŐƚŚĞ/ŵƉĞƌŝĂů
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶEĂǀǇŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂĚƵƌŝŶŐtŽƌůĚtĂƌ/ǁŚŝůĞǁŝŶŶŝŶŐ
ŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐŐƌŽƵŶĚŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶƐŝŶŝƚƐĨŝŶĂůƉŚĂƐĞ͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƉŚĂƐĞƐŽĨtŽƌůĚtĂƌ//͘'ĞƌŵĂŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĚĞĐůŝŶĞĚ
ĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌ͘&ŽƌĐĞĚ^ŽǀŝĞƚƌĞƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ
ƌĞŵŽǀĞĚƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵWŽŵĞƌĂŶŝĂĂŶĚĂƐƚWƌƵƐƐŝĂĂƐ
ǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-ǁĂƌĞƌĂ͕tĞƐƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ
ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞ<ŝĞůĂŶĂůĂŶĚƐŽŵĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂůŽŶŐ
ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĐŽĂƐƚƚŽĚĞƉůŽǇĚŝĞƐĞůƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĂ͘EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ͕
ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-ǁĂƌƉĞƌŝŽĚ͕ŵŽƐƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞĨĨŽƌƚƐǁĞƌĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚ
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚĂŶĚĂŝƌǁĂƌƐŽǀĞƌŝƚƐŽǁŶƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͘
ĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞĚŝƐƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ, ƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇǁĂƐ
ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ ĨŽƌǇĞĂƌƐ ďǇĂŶƚŝƋƵĂƚĞĚƉŽƐƚǁĂƌƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶ
ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƐďŽƚŚŝŶůĂǁĂŶĚŝŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞĚĞŶŝŐƌĂƚĞĚŝƚƐǀĂůƵĞ
ƚŽEdK͛ƐĞǆƉĞĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŽƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ͘The German Army
remained virtually absent from the military balance likely to affect a
conflict in the Baltic region until quite recently. ǀĞŶƚŽĚĂǇ͕ƚŚĞŽŶůǇ
'ĞƌŵĂŶƌŵǇĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶůŽĐĂƚĞĚŽŶƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇĂƐƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇŝƐ
ƚŚĞξλ DĞĐŚĂŶŝǌĞĚ/ŶĨĂŶƚƌǇƌŝŐĂĚĞŝŶEĞƵďƌĂŶĚĞŶďƵƌŐ͕DĞĐŬůĞŶďƵƌŐ-
Ɛƚ
sŽƌƉŽŵŵĞƌŶ͘dŽĚĂǇ͕ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ
'ĞƌŵĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂďƌŽĂĚ;ĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐĞǀĞŶĂĐƚŝǀĞĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨEdKŝŶƚŚĞ
ĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĂĐůĞĂƌƌƚŝĐůĞsͿŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƚŽŚĂŵƉĞƌƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨh^
ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌůůŝĂŶĐĞĂƐƐĞƚƐ ĨƌŽŵĚĞƉůŽǇŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͘ ρσ dŚĞ
ƌĞĐĞŶƚĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨĂ'ĞƌŵĂŶPanzerkompanie ĂƐƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ
DEEĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶŝŶ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƐƚĂƌƚƚŽ'ĞƌŵĂŶ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘
ρσ dŚŝƐƉƌŽďůĞŵŝƐĂŐŐƌĂǀĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐƌĞƚĂŝŶƐƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨŝƚƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞŝŶ^ŽǀŝĞƚ-ĞƌĂĨŽƌǁĂƌĚďĂƐĞƐŽŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐŽŝů͕ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇŝŶǁŚĂƚĨŽƌŵĞƌůǇ
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚtĞƐƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͘
22
ĨƚĞƌǇĞĂƌƐŽĨƐƚĂŐŶĂƚŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƌŵǇŚĂƐĨŝŶĂůůǇďĞŐƵŶƚŽ
ƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŝƚƐĞůĨĨŽƌĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇŝŶĂ
ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůǁĂƌ͘80
dŚŝƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶŽĨĨƐĞƚďǇŝƚƐƚĂŬŝŶŐĐŽŵŵĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ
DƵůƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌƉƐEŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶŝŶ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͘ 81 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇŚĂƐĂůƐŽ
ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ĨŽƌŐĞĚĂĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ-ĂŶĚ-ĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŶŐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ƵŶŝƚƐŽĨŵƵůƚŝƉůĞhŵĞŵďĞƌƐ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ&ƌĂŶĐĞ͕ƚŚĞEĞƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚƐ͕ǌĞĐŚ
ZĞƉƵďůŝĐ͕ĂŶĚZŽŵĂŶŝĂ͘82 ƐǇĞƚ͕ŝƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽƚĞůůǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚŝƐǁŝůů
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƉŽǁĞƌŽƌƐĞƌǀĞƚŽŚĂŵƉĞƌŝƚƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚŽĂĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨĨŽƌĐĞ͘
dŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚŝŶĂůƚŝĐŝƌWŽůŝĐŝŶŐŝŶμκκο͕μκκς͕
μκκσ͕μκλλ͕μκλμ͕μκλξ͕ĂŶĚμκλο͕ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƐŽĨξ - th
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶdǇƉŚŽŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞμκλξĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ͘ 83 /ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ͕ŽŶĞŽĨ
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͛ƐĨŽƵƌƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐǁŝŶŐƐŝƐĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚŝŶDĞĐŬůĞŶďƵƌŐ-
sŽƌƉŽŵŵĞƌŶ͘dŚŝƐŝƐĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇ'ĞƌŵĂŶŶĂǀĂůĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
^ĐŚůĞƐǁŝŐ-,ŽůƐƚĞŝŶ͘'ĞƌŵĂŶĂŝƌĂƐƐĞƚƐĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐƚĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƌƚĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞůǇƉůĂǇĂĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƌŽůĞŝŶĂĂůƚŝĐ
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ͘
The German Navy could have the largest impact on a conflict in the
Baltic region of all of Germany’s services. tŝƚŚƐƚĞĂůƚŚǇĚŝĞƐĞů
ƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐĂŶĚĨĂƐƚ-ŵŽǀŝŶŐĨƌŝŐĂƚĞƐ͕ƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶEĂǀǇƌĞŵĂŝŶƐŝĚĞĂůůǇ
ƐƵŝƚĞĚĨŽƌĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘/ƚĂůƐŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƐĂůĂƌŐĞŵŝŶĞ
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŝŵƉĂĐƚĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^>KƐ͘
hŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇ͕ƚŚŝƐ'ĞƌŵĂŶEĂǀǇƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚďǇŝƚƐƉĞĂĐĞƚŝŵĞ
ƐƚƵƉŽƌ͕ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚĂŵŝŶŽƌĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚĚƵƌŝŶŐĂŶ
80 ͞Bundesver zametno uvelichil chislennost’͕͟VPK͕μλƵŐƵƐƚμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǀƉŬ-

ŶĞǁƐ͘ƌƵͬŶĞǁƐͬνςξρκ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
81 ͞V batal’on NATO v Litve pribudut nemetskie tanki͕͟RIA Novosti͕μπKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλπ͕
ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬƌŝĂ͘ƌƵͬǁŽƌůĚͬμκλπλκμπͬλξςκκρςπμλ͘Śƚŵů͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
82 ůŝƐĂďĞƚŚƌĂǁ͕͞'ĞƌŵĂŶǇŝƐYƵŝĞƚůǇƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƌŵǇhŶĚĞƌŝƚƐŽŵŵĂŶĚ͕͟Foreign
Policy͕μμDĂǇμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ͘ĐŽŵͬμκλρͬκοͬμμͬŐĞƌŵĂŶǇ-ŝƐ-ƋƵŝĞƚůǇ-ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ-a-
ĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ-ĂƌŵǇ-ƵŶĚĞƌ-ŝƚƐ-ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚͬ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
83 WƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ͕ƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞŚĂĚĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚƚŚĞνƌĚ-ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ&-ξ&WŚĂŶƚŽŵŽŶĂůƚŝĐŝƌ
WŽůŝĐŝŶŐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ͘
23
ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂƚƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚŝƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ
ŶŽŶĞŽĨŝƚƐƐŝǆƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐǁĞƌĞĚĞƉůŽǇĂďůĞ͘ 84
6. Latvia
>ĂƚǀŝĂ͕ƚŚĞŵŝĚĚůĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞ͕ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĂŵĂůŐĂŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂůů
non->ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶĂůƚŝĐĐƵůƚƵƌĞƐĨŝƌƐƚĨŽƌŐĞĚŝŶƚŽĂƐŝŶŐůĞŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂƌŽƵŶĚ
ƚŚĞƚƵƌŶŽĨƚŚĞμκ ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ͘tŝƚŚŝƚƐĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝŶZŝŐĂ͕ƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƐƚĐŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞ
th
ĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂƚŽĚĂǇĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐŽĨĨŽƵƌĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ͗<ƵƌǌĞŵĞ͕
>ĂƚŐĂůĞ͕sŝĚǌĞŵĞ͕ĂŶĚĞŵŐĂůĞ͘KǁŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƌƚĐŝƚǇ
ŽĨZŝŐĂƚŽƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶĂŶĚŝƚƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƚǇƚŽƚŚĞŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ
ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂƐĂǁĂƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇŚŝŐŚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨ
^ŽǀŝĞƚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ƚŽƐƚŽŶŝĂĂŶĚ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͘dŚŝƐ͕ŝŶƚƵƌŶ͕
ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶĂĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂƚĞůǇůĂƌŐĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĚŝĂƐƉŽƌĂ, a factor ƚŚĂƚŵĂǇ
ƐĞƌǀĞĂƐĂĨůĂƐŚƉŽŝŶƚĨŽƌƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶEdKĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ͘
>ĂƚǀŝĂŚĂƐĂůĂŶĚ-ŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŝŶŐŽĨĂƐŝŶŐůĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů
ďƌŝŐĂĚĞĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇƚŚƌĞĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƵĂƌĚďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐǁŝƚŚĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚ
ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůĂƌĞĂƐŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ;KZƐͿ͘dŚĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůĂĐƚŝǀĞ-ĚƵƚǇ
ďƌŝŐĂĚĞ͛ƐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝƐƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůůŝŶĞĂƌŽƵŶĚZŝŐĂ͕ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞλ Ɛƚ
EĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƵĂƌĚƌŝŐĂĚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚƐ<ƵƌǌĞŵĞ;ǁĞƐƚͿ͕ƚŚĞμ ĚĞĨĞŶĚƐ>ĂƚŐĂůĞ ŶĚ
;ĞĂƐƚͿ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞν ĚĞĨĞŶĚƐsŝĚǌĞŵĞ;ŶŽƌƚŚͿ͘dŽƚŚĂƚĞŶĚ͕ƚŚĞƐĞ
ƌĚ
ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ŽŶƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶƐĂŶĚŚĂǀĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇŚŝŐŚ
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌKZƐ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞŝƌŽǀĞƌĂƌĐŚŝŶŐĚĞƐŝŐŶŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ
ĂƐůŝŐŚƚŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇŐĞĂƌĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƐǁŝƚŚEdK
ĞǆƉĞĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŝŶĂŚŝŐŚ-
ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůǁĂƌƉŽƐĞƐĂĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŝŶƚŚĞŶĞĂƌ-ƚĞƌŵ͘ĞƐƉŝƚĞ
ƚŚŝƐ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂŚĂƐŚŽƐƚĞĚĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨůĂƌŐĞ-ƐĐĂůĞEdK
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐƐŝŶĐĞμκλξƚŽĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞ
ĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ͘ 85 KƚŚĞƌƌŝƐŬĨĂĐƚŽƌƐĂƌĞĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞůŽǇĂůƚǇǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌďŽƌĚĞƌƐ͕ĂŶĚthe geographic position
that coincides with a potential major rail axis running from the main
bases of the Russian 6 Army to Kaliningrad Oblast.
th
84 :ĂŬƵďWĂůŽǁƐŬŝ͕͞EŝĞŵĐǇďĞǌƐƉƌĂǁŶǇĐŚŽŬƌħƚſǁƉŽĚǁŽĚŶǇĐŚ͕͟Defence24.pl͕μλKĐƚŽďĞƌ
μκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞμξ͘Ɖůͬπςπκλπ͕ŶŝĞŵĐǇ-ďĞǌ-ƐƉƌĂǁŶǇĐŚ-ŽŬƌĞƚŽǁ-ƉŽĚǁŽĚŶǇĐŚ.
85 ͞NATO ezhergodno narashchivaet masshtab ucheniy ‘Serebryanaya strela’ v Latvii,” Sputnik, 13
KĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬƌƵ͘ƐƉƵƚŶŝŬŶĞǁƐůǀ͘ĐŽŵͬ>ĂƚǀŝĂͬμκλρλκλνͬπλπλομπͬŽůĞĞ-3500-ƐŽůĚĂƚ-
ƉƌŝŵƵƚ-ƵĐŚĂƐƚŝĞ-ƵĐŚĞŶŝũĂŚ-^ĞƌĞďƌũĂŶĂũĂ-ƐƚƌĞůĂ->Ăƚǀŝŝ͘Śƚŵů͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
24
>ĂƚǀŝĂ͛ƐƌŵǇŝƐŶŽǁĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇĂDƵůƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌƉƐEŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚ
ĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶƵŶĚĞƌĂŶĂĚŝĂŶĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ 86 ĨĞĂƚƵƌŝŶŐWŽůŝƐŚĂŶĚ^ƉĂŶŝƐŚŵĂŝŶ
ďĂƚƚůĞƚĂŶŬƐςρ ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇƐŵĂůůĞƌĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚƐĨƌŽŵůďĂŶŝĂ͕/ƚĂůǇ͕
ĂŶĚ^ůŽǀĞŶŝĂ͘88 /ƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůǇďĞĐĂŵĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶ:ƵŶĞμκλρ͘ ςσ
dŚĞ>ĂƚǀŝĂŶEĂǀǇĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐŽĨƐŵĂůůƉĂƚƌŽůĂŶĚŵŝŶĞĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ
ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐďĂƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉŽƌƚƐŽĨ>ŝĞƉĂũĂĂŶĚsĞŶƚƐƉŝůƐĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
^ĞĂĐŽĂƐƚ͘dŚĞǇĂƌĞŶŽƚďĂƐĞĚŝŶZŝŐĂŽǁŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽů
ŽĨƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞ'ƵůĨŽĨZŝŐĂĐĂŶďĞƐĞŝǌĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐƚŽŶŝĂŶŝƐůĂŶĚŽĨ
^ĂĂƌĞŵĂĂ͕ĂƐƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚŝŶtŽƌůĚtĂƌƐ /ĂŶĚ//
;ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚŵŝŐŚƚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞďĞĂƉƌŝŵĂƌǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƚĂƌŐĞƚͿ͘
>ŝŬĞƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕ƚŚĞ>ĂƚǀŝĂŶŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇŽĨƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĐƌĂĨƚ—
ďŽƚŚĨŝǆĞĚ-ǁŝŶŐĂŶĚƌŽƚĂƌǇ͘>ĂƚǀŝĂĂůƐŽŚĂƐĂ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĂŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ
ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨůŝŵŝƚĞĚĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞ ƐŽŽŶƚŽďĞĂĐƋƵŝƌŝŶŐ
Stingers. σκ /ƚŝƐďĂƐĞĚĂƚ>ŝĞůǀĂƌĚĞ͕ŶĞĂƌƚŚĞĐĞŶƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͘
dŚŽƵŐŚĐŽǀĞƌĞĚďǇĂůƚŝĐŝƌWŽůŝĐŝŶŐ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŚŽƐƚĂŶǇĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ͘
7. Lithuania
hŶůŝŬĞƐƚŽŶŝĂĂŶĚ>ĂƚǀŝĂ͕>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŚĂƐĂĐĞŶƚƵƌŝĞƐ-ůŽŶŐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽf
ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͕ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇŵĞƌŐĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚ->ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶ
ŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐŝǆƚĞĞŶƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ͘>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶƉŽǁĞƌŚĂĚ
ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚĂƐĂĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶdĞƵƚŽŶŝĐ<ŶŝŐŚƚƐŝŶ
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚŝƚƐƉŽǁĞƌŽǀĞƌǁŚĂƚŝƐ
ƚŽĚĂǇĞůĂƌƵƐĂŶĚhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͘dŚŝƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŚĂƐƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚin ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ
>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ǁŝƚŚWŽůĂŶĚ͕ĞůĂƌƵƐ͕ĂŶĚhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͕ĂƚƚŝŵĞƐ
ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĚ͕ĂƚŽƚŚĞƌƚŝŵĞƐ͕ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘
86 ͞Kanada dovol’na tem, kak Latviya gotovitsya prinyat’ batal’on NATO͕͟EurAsia Daily, 30
KĐƚŽďĞƌμκλπ͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬĞĂĚĂŝůǇ͘ĐŽŵͬƌƵͬŶĞǁƐͬμκλπͬλκͬνκͬŬĂŶĂĚĂ-ĚŽǀŽůŶĂ-ƚĞŵ-ŬĂŬ-ůĂƚǀŝǇĂ-
ŐŽƚŽǀŝƚƐǇĂ-ƉƌŝŶǇĂƚ-ďĂƚĂůŽŶ-nato͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
ςρ ͞KǀĞƌλ͕κκκƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐƚŽŵĂŬĞƵƉEdK͛ƐŶĞǁŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶŝŶ>ĂƚǀŝĂ͕͟RT, 12 January
μκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƌƚ͘ĐŽŵͬŶĞǁƐͬνρνολμ-ůĂƚǀŝĂ-nato-ƚƌŽŽƉƐ-ƐƉĂŝŶͬ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
88 ͞Ispanskim soldatam v Pribaltike veleno ne priblizhat’sya k granitsam Rossii͕͟EurAsia Daily, 28
DĂǇμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬĞĂĚĂŝůǇ͘ĐŽŵͬƌƵͬŶĞǁƐͬμκλρͬκοͬμςͬŝƐƉĂŶƐŬŝŵ-ƐŽůĚĂƚĂŵ-v-ƉƌŝďĂůƚŝŬĞ-ǀĞůĞŶŽ-
ŶĞ-ƉƌŝďůŝǌŚĂǇƵƚƐǇĂ-Ŭ-ŐƌĂŶŝĐĂŵ-ƌŽƐƐŝŝ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
ςσ ͞<ĂŶĂĚƐŬŝǇďĂƚĂů͛ŽŶEdKǀ>ĂƚǀŝŝƉƌŝƐƚƵƉŝůŬŶĞƐĞŶŝǇƵƐůƵǌŚďǇ͕͟Kremlin Press͕μλ:ƵŶĞμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬŬƌĞŵůŝŶƉƌĞƐƐ͘ĐŽŵͬμκλρͬκπͬμλͬŬĂŶĂĚƐŬŝǇ-ďĂƚĂůŽŶ-nato-v-ůĂƚǀŝŝ-ƉƌŝƐƚƵƉŝů-Ŭ-ŶĞƐĞŶŝǇƵ-
ƐůƵǌŚďŝͬ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
σκ ͞Latyshi teper’ pri Stingerakh͕͟VPK͕μλƵŐƵƐƚμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǀƉŬ-ŶĞǁƐ͘ƌƵͬŶĞǁƐͬνςξρσ.
25
dŚĞ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŚĂƐůŽŶŐƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚĨƌŽŵĨƵŶĚŝŶŐƐŚŽƌƚĂŐĞƐ ĂŶĚ
ŚĂƐŽŶůǇƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇďĞŐƵŶƚŽďĞƌĞďŽƌŶŝŶƚŽĂĨŽƌĐĞĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƵƉ
ƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͘/Ŷμκλς͕ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐǁŝůůĨŝŶĂůůǇƌĞĂĐŚμ͘κπй
ŽĨ'WŝŶĂƐƚĂƌŬƌĞǀĞƌƐĂůŽĨŝƚƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐůĂǆŝƚǇ͘ σλ
>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͛ƐƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƐŝƚĨƌŽŵŝŶĐƵƌƐŝŽŶƐĂůŽŶŐŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ
ĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌ͕ďƵƚďĞŝŶŐǁĞĚŐĞĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂůůǇĞůĂƌƵƐ
ĂŶĚ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚKďůĂƐƚŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚŝƚĨĂĐĞƐthree potential fronts: (1)
Kaliningrad, (2) through the Vilnius gap in the otherwise generally
difficult-to-maneuver Belarusian frontier territory, and (3) the
northeast border with Latgale through which Russia might attempt a
larger offensive.
dŚĞ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶƌŵǇŶŽǁĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐƚŚƌĞĞďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ͕ƚǁŽŽĨƌĞŐƵůĂƌƐĂŶĚ
ŽŶĞŽĨƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐ͕ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐƵƉŽŶ ŵĂŶƉŽǁĞƌƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
ƌĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͘ σμ dŚĞ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶƌŵǇŝƐ
ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨĞŶƐĞsŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͕ǁŚŝĐŚ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƐĞƌǀĞƚŽĞƌĞĐƚďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůŬĞǇƚĞƌƌĂŝŶǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ
ƌĞŐƵůĂƌĂƌŵǇĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĂĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĂĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͘ dŚĞƌŵǇĂŶĚ
EĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨĞŶƐĞsŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇ&ŽƌĐĞƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĨƌŽŵŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŝŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ŝŶĂďŽůĚŵĂŶŶĞƌĨŽƌĂEdKŵĞŵďĞƌ-ƐƚĂƚĞ͘ σν
dŚĞDƵůƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌƉƐEŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶŝŶ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŝƐĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞĚ
ďǇ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂŶĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĂ'ĞƌŵĂŶƚĂŶŬĐŽŵƉĂŶǇσξ ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇ
σλ ͞Minoborony Litvy: na voennye nuzhdy planiruetsya vydelyat’ 2,06% ot VVP͕͟Baltnews, 10

KĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬďĂůƚŶĞǁƐ͘ůƚͬǀŝůŶŝƵƐͺŶĞǁƐͬμκλρλκλκͬλκλρππσλρξ͘Śƚŵů͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσ
σμ ͞Bnov’ formiruemoy lyogkoy pekhotnoy brigade Aukštaitija vruchat Boevoe znamya͕͟
Baltnews͕μνDĂƌĐŚμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬďĂůƚŶĞǁƐ͘ůƚͬǀŝůŶŝƵƐͺŶĞǁƐͬμκλρκνμνͬλκλπσξπςσσ͘Śƚŵů.
σν sĂǇĚĂƐ^ĂůĚǌŚǇƵŶĂƐ͕͞Redkoe sobytie v Litve: vo vremya osobyx ucheniy proveryat, chto v
sluchae krizisa budut delat’ politiki͕͟Delfi͕σKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕

ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬƌƵ͘ĚĞůĨŝ͘ůƚͬŶĞǁƐͬƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐͬƌĞĚŬŽĞ-ƐŽďǇƚŝĞ-v-ůŝƚǀĞ-vo-ǀƌĞŵǇĂ-ŽƐŽďǇŚ-ƵĐŚĞŶŝũ-ƉƌŽǀĞƌǇĂƚ-
chto-v-ƐůƵĐŚĂĞ-ŬƌŝǌŝƐĂ-ďƵĚƵƚ-ĚĞůĂƚ-ƉŽůŝƚŝŬŝ͘Ě͍ŝĚсροσςσομν͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ͘σEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
σξ ͞'ĞƌŵĂŶǇƚŽƐĞŶĚŵŽĚĞƌŶƚĂŶŬƐƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞr – ĞĨĞŶƐĞDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ͕͟RT͕μςKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλπ͕
ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƌƚ͘ĐŽŵͬŶĞǁƐͬνπξξρρ-ŐĞƌŵĂŶǇ-ƚĂŶŬƐ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ďŽƌĚĞƌͬ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌ
μκλρ͘
26
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƚƌŽŽƉƐĨƌŽŵ>ƵǆĞŵďŽƵƌŐ͕ƚŚĞEĞƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚƐ͕ σο EŽƌǁĂǇ͕ σπ
ĞůŐŝƵŵ͕&ƌĂŶĐĞ͕ĂŶĚƌŽĂƚŝĂ͘ σρ dŚĞĨŽƌĐĞďĞĐĂŵĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶĞĂƌůǇ
μκλρ͘ σς
dŚĞ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶEĂǀǇŝƐƐŵĂůů͕ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŝŶŐŽĨĂƉĂƚƌŽůĂŶĚŵŝŶĞ
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐďĂƐĞĚĂƚƚŚĞƐŝŶŐůĞƉŽƌƚĐŝƚǇŽĨ<ůĂŝƉĞĚĂĂƚ
ƚŚĞŵŽƵƚŚŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽŶŝĂŶ>ĂŐŽŽŶ͘
dŚĞ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞŝƐ͕ůŝŬĞƚŚŽƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕Ă
ƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĨŽƌĐĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇďĂƐĞĚĂƚ^ŝĂƵůŝĂŝŝƌĂƐĞ͘IƚƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞƐĂŶĂŝƌ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĂƌŵĂƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƌŵĞĚŽŶůǇǁŝƚŚDEWƐ, but ǁŝůůƐŽŽŶďĞ
ĞƋƵŝƉƉĞĚǁŝƚŚE^D^ĨƌŽŵEŽƌǁĂǇ͘ σσ ^ŝĂƵůŝĂŝŚĂƐůŽŶŐŚŽƐƚĞĚĂ
ĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐŝƌWŽůŝĐŝŶŐ͘
8. Poland
Poland, a Warsaw Pact member turned NATO member state,
represents the most powerful European member of the Alliance likely
to participate in a conflict in the Baltic region. WŽůĂŶĚŚĂƐůŽŶŐďĞĞŶĂŶ
ĂĐƚŝǀĞĂŐĞŶƚŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŚŝƐƚŽƌǇĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĐĞŶƚĞƌƐŽĨtĞƐƚĞƌŶ
ŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶity ĂŶĚǁĂƐ ƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƐƚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ƐĞǀĞŶƚĞĞŶƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ͘ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĂŶĚĂŶŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽďƌŝĚŐĞ
ƚŚĞĂƚŚŽůŝĐ-KƌƚŚŽĚŽǆĚŝǀŝĚĞĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨŝƚƐƉŽůŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞλπκκƐůĞĚƚŽ
ĂƉƌĞĐŝƉŝƚŽƵƐĚĞĐůŝŶĞŝŶƉŽǁĞƌƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĞŝŐŚƚĞĞŶƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ͕
ĐƵůŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝƚŝŽŶƐĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶ͕ƵƐƚƌŝĂŶ͕ĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŵƉŝƌĞƐŝŶƚŚĞλρρκƐĂŶĚλρσκƐ͘ 100
σο ͞V Litve nachalis’ ucheniya gollandskikh voennykh͕͟Liga͕λς^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕

ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬŶĞǁƐ͘ůŝŐĂ͘ŶĞƚͬŶĞǁƐͬǁŽƌůĚͬλξςμμμλς-
ǀͺůŝƚǀĞͺŶĂĐŚĂůŝƐͺƵĐŚĞŶŝǇĂͺŐŽůůĂŶĚƐŬŝŬŚͺǀŽĞŶŶǇŬŚ͘Śƚŵ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
σπ ͞EŽƌǁĂǇ^ĞŶƚμκκ^ŽůĚŝĞƌƐƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŽƌĚĞƌ͕͟The Nordic Page͕μκ:ƵŶĞμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƚŶƉ͘ŶŽͬŶŽƌǁĂǇͬƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐͬŶŽƌǁĂǇ-ƐĞŶƚ-200-ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂ-ďŽƌĚĞƌ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ σ
σρ ͞NATO ob’’qvilo, kakie strany zashchityat Pribaltiku ot vozmozhnoy agressii RF͕͟Baltnews͕μρ
KĐƚŽďĞƌμκλπ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬďĂůƚŶĞǁƐ͘ůƚͬǁŽƌůĚͬμκλπλκμρͬλκλπνοςρνν͘Śƚŵů͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌ
μκλρ͘
σς ͞'ĞƌŵĂŶEdKďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůǁĞůĐŽŵĞŝŶ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͕͟Deutsche Welle͕ρ&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ
μκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘Ěǁ͘ĐŽŵͬĞŶͬŐĞƌŵĂŶ-nato-ďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶ-ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƐ-ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů-ǁĞůĐŽŵĞ-in-ůŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂͬĂ-
νρξξνρςξ. ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
σσ ͞>ŝƚǁĂ͗ƵŵŽǁĂŶĂĚŽƐƚĂǁħƐǇƐƚĞŵŽďƌŽŶǇƉƌǌĞĐŝǁůŽƚŶŝĐǌĞũE^D^͕͟Defence24.pl, 26
KĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞμξ͘Ɖůͬπςςνξλ͕ůŝƚǁĂ-ƵŵŽǁĂ-na-ĚŽƐƚĂǁĞ-ƐǇƐƚĞŵƵ-obrony-
ƉƌǌĞĐŝǁůŽƚŶŝĐǌĞũ-ŶĂƐĂŵƐ. ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚσEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
100 dŚĞWŽůŝƐŚ->ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨλρσλ͕ǁŚŝĐŚƉƌĞĚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ͕ůĞĚ
ĂƚŚĞƌŝŶĞƚŚĞ'ƌĞĂƚƚŽůĂƵŶĐŚZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĨŝƌƐƚĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů;ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇͿŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ
μρ
dŚŽƵŐŚƉĂƌƚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ͕WŽůĂŶĚƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚĂƐƚƌŽŶŐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ
natiŽŶƌŽƐĞƵƉƵŶĚĞƌEĂƉŽůĞŽŶ͛ƐƌĞŝŐŶ ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚdƐĂƌŝƐƚƌƵůĞĂĨƚĞƌ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŐĂŝŶĞĚŵŽƐƚŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶWŽůŝƐŚƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇĂƐƚŚĞƐƉŽŝůƐŽĨŝƚƐǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ
ŝŶƚŚĞEĂƉŽůĞŽŶŝĐtĂƌƐ͘dŚŝƐůĞĚƚŽůĂƌŐĞ-ƐĐĂůĞƐƵƉƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͕ďƵƚƚŚĞ
ĐĂůĂŵŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚtŽƌůĚtĂƌƐĂǁƚŚĞƌĞďŝƌƚŚŽĨƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚƐƚĂƚĞ͘
&ĂĐĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚƌĞĂƚƐŽŶĂůůƐŝĚĞƐĂŶĚŶŽŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůůy-ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďŽƌĚĞƌƐŽŶ
ǁĞƐƚŽƌĞĂƐƚ͕WŽůĂŶĚǁĂƐĂŐĂŝŶĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌĂŶĚ
ŵŽǀĞĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƚŽƚŚĞǁĞƐƚƵŶĚĞƌ^ŽǀŝĞƚĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶλσξο͘dŚĞ
ĐŽůůĂƉƐĞŽĨ^ŽǀŝĞƚƉŽǁĞƌĂůůŽǁĞĚWŽůĂŶĚƚŽũŽŝŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ͘ƚĨŝƌƐƚ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝƐƚƐƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚWŽůĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚďĞ
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂůůŝĞƐĂŵŽŶŐŝƚƐŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌƐ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕WŽůĂŶĚĨŽƵŶĚĂƉůĂĐĞ
ǁŝƚŚŝŶEdKĂŶĚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚŚĞůĞĂĚŝŶŐĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞŽĨƵƐŝŶŐEdK͛ƐƉŽǁĞƌ
ƚŽƉƵƚĂŶĞŶĚƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨŝƚƐŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌƐŝŶ
ƵƌŽƉĞ͘
dŚĞWŽůŝƐŚ EĂǀǇ͕ƚƌĂŝŶĞĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞtĂƌƐĂǁWĂĐƚǇĞĂƌƐĨŽƌĂŵƉŚŝďŝŽƵƐ
ĂƐƐĂƵůƚƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĞŶŵĂƌŬ͕ŚĂƐƚƵƌŶĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶŐ^>KƐŝŶƐŝĚĞ
ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂĨƌŽŵƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŽĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŵƉŚŝďŝŽƵƐĂƐƐĂƵůƚƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĞƐĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞƉŽƌƚŽĨ'ĚĂŶƐŬĂŶĚƚŚĞŵŽƵƚŚŽĨƚŚĞ
sŝƐƚƵůĂZŝǀĞƌ͘ hƐŝŶŐĂĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨh͘^͘ĂŶĚ^ŽǀŝĞƚƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ
ĐŽŵďĂƚĂŶƚƐ͕ƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚEĂǀǇƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞƐĂŵŝƐƐŝůĞĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĨŝǀĞ
ƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐ͘ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞƐŝŵƉůĞĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨWŽůŝƐŚŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͕ 101 ƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨĞĨĞŶƐĞĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚĂŵĂũŽƌ
ƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞEĂǀǇŝŶ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕ĂƐǇĞƚůĞĂǀŝŶŐĚĞƚĂŝůƐŽĨ
ƚŚŝƐƵŶĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞĚ͘ 102
dŚĞWŽůŝƐŚŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞŝƐƐƚŝůůĨŽƌŵĞĚĨƌŽŵ^ŽǀŝĞƚ-ĞƌĂDŝ'-μσƐĂŶĚ^Ƶ-μμƐ͕
but ŚĂƐƉƌŽĐƵƌĞĚ &-λπƐŝŶƌĞĐĞŶƚǇĞĂƌƐƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĂEdK-ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ
ĂŝƌĨƌĂŵĞ͘WŽůĂŶĚŚĂƐĂůƐŽĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĂĐůĞĂƌŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ
ƉƌŽĐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚŽĨtĞƐƚĞƌŶĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ͘WŽůĂŶĚŚĂƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
ŝƌWŽůŝĐŝŶŐŝŶμκκπ͕μκκς͕μκλκ͕μκλμ͕μκλξ͕ĂŶĚμκλο͘ 103 dŚĞƌĞĐĞŶƚ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŽĨŝƚƐŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌƐ͘EŽƌŵĂŶĂǀŝĞƐ͕Europe: A History͕KǆĨŽƌĚhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇWƌĞƐƐ͕
λσσπ͕Ɖ͘ρλσ͘
101 :ĂƌŽƐųĂǁƌǇƐŝĞǁŝĐǌĂŶĚĂƌŝƵƐǌ'ǁŝǌĚĂųĂ͕Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security,
ŝƵƌŽĞǌƉŝĞĐǌĞŶƐƚǁĂEĂƌŽĚŽǁĞŐŽ͕'ǇĚŶŝĂ͕WŽůĂŶĚ͕μκλρ͕Ɖ͘νς͘
102 ͞DĂĐŝĞƌĞǁŝĐǌ͗DĂƌǇŶĂƌŬĂtŽũĞŶŶĂďħĚǌŝĞŵƵƐŝĂųĂƉƌǌǇďƌĂđŶŽǁǇŬƐǌƚĂųƚ͕͟Defence24.pl, 2
^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞμξ͘Ɖůͬποοσλρ͕ŵĂĐŝĞƌĞǁŝĐǌ-ŵĂƌǇŶĂƌŬĂ-ǁŽũĞŶŶĂ-ďĞĚǌŝĞ-
ŵƵƐŝĂůĂ-ƉƌǌǇďƌĂĐ-ŶŽǁǇ-ŬƐǌƚĂůƚ. ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
103 dŽĚĂƚĞ͕WŽůĂŶĚŚĂƐŽŶůǇĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚDŝ'-μσƐƚŽŝƚƐĂůƚŝĐŝƌWŽůŝĐŝŶŐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ͘
28
ĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐƌƵŝƐĞŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŽĨĨǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ
ŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞŚĂǀĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚŚŽǁĂŶĚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŽ
ƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƐŝĚĞƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇŽĨĞůĂƌƵƐ͘WŽůĂŶĚĂůƐŽƌĞƚĂŝŶƐƐŽŵĞ
^ŽǀŝĞƚ-ĞƌĂĂŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͕ďƵƚƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞŵŽƐƚůǇŽƵƚĚĂƚĞĚ ĂŶĚĂƌĞ
ĨŝŶĂůůǇďĞŝŶŐƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚǁŝƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶWĂƚƌŝŽƚŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐ. 104
dŚĞWŽůŝƐŚƌŵǇ͕ŶŽǁůĂƌŐĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƌŵǇ͕ŝƐĂƌƌĂŶŐĞĚŝŶƚŚƌĞĞ
ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƐƚŝůůĨĞĂƚƵƌĞĂ^ŽǀŝĞƚ-ƐƚǇůĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ͕ďƵƚa
ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĂũŽŝŶƚĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐǇƐƚĞŵǁĂƐĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚŝŶ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ
μκλρ͘ 105 dŚĞWŽůŝƐŚƌŵǇhaƐ ƐĞĞŶŵĂƐƐŝǀĞŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶĂƌŵĂŵĞŶƚ
ĂŶĚŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƉĂƐƚĚĞĐĂĚĞƐ͕ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐŝƚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐ
ǁŝƚŚǀŝŐŽƌ.106 dǁŽĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞĂƌŵǇĂƌĞƐƚŝůůĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚŝŶ^ŽǀŝĞƚ-
ĞƌĂďĂƐĞƐŶĞĂƌƚŚĞǌĞĐŚĂŶĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌƐƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞŽůĚ
ƉƌĞƌŽŐĂƚŝǀĞŽĨĚĞƉůŽǇŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐǁĞƐƚ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞƚŚŝƌĚĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐ
ĂƌƌĂǇĞĚĂĐƌŽƐƐtĂƌŵŝĂ-DĂǌƵƌǇũƵƐƚƐŽƵƚŚŽĨƚŚĞ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚďŽƌĚĞƌǁŝƚŚ
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŚĞĂǀǇĨŽƌĐĞƐĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚŶĞĂƌtĂƌƐĂǁĂŶĚ>ŽĚǌŝŶƚŚĞĐĞŶƚĞƌŽĨ
ƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͘ŽĂƐƚĂůĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƌĞĂůƐŽĂĐƚŝǀĞŝŶWŽŵĞƌĂŶŝĂŝŶƚŚĞ
ŶŽƌƚŚǁĞƐƚ͘ /Ŷμκλρ͕ĂĨŽƵƌƚŚĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶǁĂƐĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚƚŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞŶŚĂŶĐĞ
ƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝŽŶĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚĂĨĨŽƌĚĂƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĂďůĞƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚWŽůĂŶĚǁŚŝůĞ
ĚĞƉůŽǇŝŶŐĂƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĞǆƉĞĚŝƚŝŽŶĂƌǇĨŽƌĐĞ͘
KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƌĞĂƐƌĞƋƵŝƌŝŶŐƵƌŐĞŶƚĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚƌŵǇ
ƚŽĚĂǇŝƐŝƚƐƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ͘EŽŵŝŶĂůůǇƋƵŝƚĞůĂƌŐĞ͕ƚŚĞƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐŚĂǀĞŶŽƚ
ďĞĞŶĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚŝŶƐŽŵĞǇĞĂƌƐ͕ůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŽ
ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝǌĞƌĞĨŽƌŵŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐ͘dŽƚŚĂƚĞĨĨĞĐƚ͕ƚŚĞ
WŽůŝƐŚDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨĞĨĞŶƐĞĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂďƌĂŶĚŶĞǁ
EĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƵĂƌĚŝŶμκλπ͘ĞƚĂŝůƐŽĨƚŚŝƐĨŽƌĐĞĂƌĞŶŽǁƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐƚŽďĞ
ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚĂƐƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚǁŽƌŬƐƚŽĐŽƌƌĞĐƚƚŚŝƐ
104 :ĂŬƵďWĂůŽǁƐŬŝ͕͞dƌƵŵƉŝƌĂŬŝĞƚŽǁĞƉƌǌǇƑƉŝĞƐǌĞŶŝĞƉŽůƐŬŝĞũĂƌŵŝŝ΀ϳWhE<dMt΁͕͟
Defence24.pl͕π:ƵůǇμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞμξ͘Ɖůͬπμξπνπ͕ƚƌƵŵƉ-i-ƌĂŬŝĞƚŽǁĞ-
ƉƌǌǇƐƉŝĞƐǌĞŶŝĞ-ƉŽůƐŬŝĞũ-Ăƌŵŝŝ-ρ-ƉƵŶŬƚŽǁ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
105 ZĂĨĂų>ĞƐŝĞĐŬŝ͕͞<ƌſůŝŬŽǁƐŬŝ͗ƉŽǁŽųĂŶŝĞŽǁſĚǌƚǁĂ^ŝųWŽųČĐǌŽŶǇĐŚďħĚǌŝĞŽǌŶĂĐǌĂųŽ
ĚǁƵǁųĂĚǌħ͕͟Defence24.pl͕ν^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞμξ͘Ɖůͬπονρςν͕ŬƌŽůŝŬŽǁƐŬŝ-
ƉŽǁŽůĂŶŝĞ-ĚŽǁŽĚǌƚǁĂ-Ɛŝů-ƉŽůĂĐǌŽŶǇĐŚ-ďĞĚǌŝĞ-ŽǌŶĂĐǌĂůŽ-ĚǁƵǁůĂĚǌĞ-ǁǇǁŝĂĚ. ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκ
106 ͞Wiceszef MON: konieczne przeorganizonizowanie armii͕͟Defence24.pl͕μ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞμξ͘Ɖůͬποπκμξ͕ǁŝĐĞƐǌĞĨ-ŵŽŶ-ŬŽŶŝĞĐǌŶĞ-ƉƌǌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌŽǁĂŶŝĞ-Ăƌŵŝŝ.
ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
μσ
ƉƌŽďůĞŵ͘ λκρ WitŚŽƵƚĂĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐEĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƵĂƌĚ͕ĚĞƉůŽǇŝŶŐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ
ƌĞŐƵůĂƌĨŽƌĐĞƐŽƵƚƐŝĚĞWŽůŝƐŚƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞůŝĞĨŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐŽƌ
ĨŽƌƚŚĞƐƵƉƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚŚƌĞĂƚƐŝŶ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚŽƌĞůĂƌƵƐ
ǁŽƵůĚďĞĂƉƌĞĐĂƌŝŽƵƐƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ͘dŚĞƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƵƉŽĨĂĐĂƉĂďůĞ
EĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƵĂƌĚǁŝůůĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ
ƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝŶŐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉŽǁĞƌƚŽĐŚĞĐŬƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͘
WŽůĂŶĚŶŽǁŚŽƐƚƐĂŵƵůƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶǁŝƚŚEdKDƵůƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ŽƌƉƐEŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚ 108 ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĂƌŽƚĂƚŝŶŐh͘^͘ĂƌŵŽƌĞĚďƌŝŐĂĚĞĐŽŵďĂƚ
ƚĞĂŵ͘ λκσ ƵƌŝŶŐZapad-2017͕ĂƉĞƌŝŽĚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚĂƐŽŶĞŽĨŚĞŝŐŚƚĞŶĞĚ
ƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĞŶƐƵƌĞĚŝƚŚĂĚƚǁŽŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŚĞĂǀǇďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ
ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚŝŶWŽůĂŶĚ͘ 110 WŽůĂŶĚĂůƐŽŚŽƐƚƐƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ůĂƌŐĞƐƚEdKĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƌĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĐŚĞĚƵůĞ͕ŵŽƐƚƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ
ƌĂŬŽŶ-λρ͘ 111 ůůŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĨĂĐƚŽƌƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚWŽůĂŶĚŝƐ
ŶŽǁƚŚĞĐĞŶƚĞƌŽĨŐƌĂǀŝƚǇŽĨEdK͛ƐĞĂƐƚĞƌŶĨƌŽŶƚ͘
9. Sweden
ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞǀĞŶƚĞĞŶƚŚ ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ͕^ǁĞĚĞŶŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƉŽǁĞƌŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘/ƚĐŽůŽŶŝǌĞĚŵŽĚĞƌŶ&ŝŶůĂŶĚ͕
ƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂ͕ĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƉĂƌƚƐŽĨWŽůĂŶĚĂŶĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂŶĚ
ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞůǇĐŽŵƉĞƚĞĚǁŝƚŚWŽůĂŶĚĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂĨŽƌĨŽƌŵĂůĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞ
ƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘^ǁĞĚĞŶ͛ƐĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞǁĂŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĞĨĞĂƚŽĨŝƚƐƐĞǀĞŶƚĞĞŶƚŚ-
ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶďǇWŽůĂŶĚ͕ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚďǇĂĚŝƐĂƐƚƌŽƵƐŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ
'ƌĞĂƚEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶtĂƌǁŝƚŚZƵƐƐŝĂ͘ĞƐƉŝƚĞŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶĨĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚĞŶŵĂƌŬĂŶĚEŽƌǁĂǇ͕^ǁĞĚĞŶǁĂƐ
λκρ ͞ϱƚǇƐ͘ǏŽųŶŝĞƌǌǇǁtŽũƐŬĂĐŚKďƌŽŶǇdĞƌǇƚŽƌŝĂůŶĞũ͕͟Defence24.pl͕λμ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞμξ͘Ɖůͬππλοκκ͕ο-ƚǇƐ-ǌŽůŶŝĞƌǌǇ-ǁ-ǁŽũƐŬĂĐŚ-obrony-ƚĞƌǇƚŽƌŝĂůŶĞũ. ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ
λκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
108 dŚŝƐďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶŝƐƵŶĚĞƌ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĐŽŵŵĂŶĚǁŝƚŚĂĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚĨƌŽŵZŽŵĂŶŝĂ͘͞h^-ůĞĚEdK
ďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚŝŶWŽůĂŶĚŶĞĂƌƚĞŶƐĞďŽƌĚĞƌǁŝƚŚZƵƐƐŝĂ͕South China Morning Post͕λξƉƌŝů

μκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƐĐŵƉ͘ĐŽŵͬŶĞǁƐͬǁŽƌůĚͬĞƵƌŽƉĞͬĂƌƚŝĐůĞͬμκςροοσͬƵƐ-ůĞĚ-nato-ďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶ-
ůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚ-ƉŽůĂŶĚ-ŶĞĂƌ-ƚĞŶƐĞ-ďŽƌĚĞƌ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
λκσ ^ƚĂĨĨ^Őƚ͘dĂŵŝŬĂŝůůĂƌĚ͕͞dŚĞ͚zĞĂƌŽĨǆĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ͛͗h͘^͘ƌŵǇƵƌŽƉĞƌŽƚĂƚŝŽŶĂůĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶ
ĂĐƚŝŽŶ͕͟U.S. Army͕μς^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĂƌŵǇ͘ŵŝůͬĂƌƚŝĐůĞͬλσξξςπͬƚŚĞͺǇĞĂƌͺŽĨͺĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŽŶͺƵƐͺĂƌŵǇͺĞƵƌŽƉĞͺƌŽƚĂƚŝŽŶĂůͺĨŽ
ƌĐĞƐͺŝŶͺĂĐƚŝŽŶ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
110 ĂŵŝĞŶ^ŚĂƌŬŽǀ͕͞h͘^͘ƌŵǇ^ĞŶĚƐdǁŽdĂŶŬƌŝŐĂĚĞƐƚŽƵƌŽƉĞŵŝĚZƵƐƐŝĂdĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ͕͟
Newsweek͕λν^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ŶĞǁƐǁĞĞŬ͘ĐŽŵͬƵƐ-ĂƌŵǇ-ƐĞŶĚƐ-ƚǁŽ-ƚĂŶŬ-
ďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ-ĞƵƌŽƉĞ-ĂŵŝĚ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂ-ƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ-664258. ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
111 ZĂĨĂų>ĞƐŝĞĐŬŝ͕͞Dworczyk o Dragonie-ϭϳ͗ŶĂũŝƐƚŽƚŶŝĞũƐǌĞƉƌǌĞđǁŝĐǌĞŶŝĞǁƐƉſųĚǌŝĂųĂŶŝĂǌ
sojusznikami͕͟Defence24.pl, ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞμξ͘Ɖůͬπππλπν͕ĚǁŽƌĐǌǇŬ-o-ĚƌĂŐŽŶŝĞ-λρ-
ŶĂũŝƐƚŽƚŶŝĞũƐǌĞ-ƉƌǌĞĐǁŝĐǌĞŶŝĞ-ǁƐƉŽůĚǌŝĂůĂŶŝĂ-ǌ-ƐŽũƵƐǌŶŝŬĂŵŝ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
30
ƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚůǇƐŝĚĞůŝŶĞĚƚŽŝƚƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͘^ǁĞĚĞŶŚĂƐŶŽƚĨŽƵŐŚƚŝŶ
ĂǁĂƌƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞEĂƉŽůĞŽŶŝĐĞƌĂ͕ĐĂƌĞĨƵůůǇŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐŝƚƐŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚďĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ͕'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͕ĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ
ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƉĂƐƚμκκǇĞĂƌƐ͘
ůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ͕^ǁĞĚĞŶŬĞƉƚŝƚƐŽǁŶŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ– ĂŶĚĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞ
– ĂƌŵƐŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ͕ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐŝŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞμλƐƚ
ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇǁŝƚŚƐƵĐŚŝƚĞŵƐĂƐƚŚĞ^ƚƌǀ-λμλDdĂŶĚ:^-νλ'ƌŝƉĞŶĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ-
ďŽŵďĞƌ͘KǀĞƌƚŚĞĚĞĐĂĚĞƐƐŝŶĐĞtŽƌůĚtĂƌ//͕^ǁĞĚĞŶŚĂƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚ
ŝŶĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůĂůůŝĂŶĐĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐǁŝƚŚ&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ
^ĐĂŶĚŝŶĂǀŝĂŶĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͘ ĞƐƉŝƚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐ^ŽǀŝĞƚĚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĨŽƌ
^ǁĞĚŝƐŚŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƉĂƚƌŽůƐĂŶĚŽƉĞŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
'ŽƚůĂŶĚ͛ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƐ^ǁĞĚŝƐŚƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͕^ǁĞĚĞŶŚĂƐŶĞǀĞƌŚĂĚ
ĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŝŵƉĞƚƵƐĨŽƌũŽŝŶŝŶŐEdK͘ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ͕^ǁĞĚĞŶŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚĂ
ůĂƌŐĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐοκκĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚĂŶĚ
ĚŽǌĞŶƐŽĨďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƚƌƵŶŬŽĨ^ǁĞĚŝƐŚ
ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŶŽƌƚŚĞƌŶďŽƌĚĞƌ͘
dŽĚĂǇ͕ƚŚĞ^ǁĞĚŝƐŚƌŵǇŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůǇƐŵĂůůĞƌ͕ǁŝƚŚƐŝŶŐůĞƌĞŐŝŵĞŶƚƐ
ĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚŶĞĂƌ^ƚŽĐŬŚŽůŵ͕'ŽƚŚĞŶďƵƌŐ͕ĂŶĚŝŶƚŚĞŶŽƌƚŚĞƌŶĨƌŽŶƚŝĞƌ
ƌĞŐŝŽŶĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŽŶĞĂŝƌďŽƌŶĞƌĞŐŝŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĂŶĂƌŵŽƌĞĚ
ƌĞŐŝŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞǁĞƐƚ͘ƵƌŝŶŐǁĂƌƚŝŵĞ͕ƚŚĞƐĞƌĞŐŝŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞƚŽďĞ
ƌĞĨŽƌŵĞĚŝŶƚŽďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌEdKĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚĂƌŵƐ
ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ͘In the event of a conflict of the Baltic region, this army
would seek to protect Gotland, though it maintains some capacity for
power projection across the entire region.
dŚĞ^ǁĞĚŝƐŚEĂǀǇƌĞƚĂŝŶƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞ͕ŵŝŶĞ
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ͕ĂŶĚĂŵƉŚŝďŝŽƵƐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ͘ ^ǁĞĚĞŶĂůƐŽĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐĂ
ŶĂǀĂůŵŝƐƐŝůĞĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĞŶŵĂƌŬĂŶĚ&ŝŶůĂŶĚĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ͘ /ŶƚŚĞƌĞĐĞŶƚ
ǇĞĂƌƐ͕ŝƚƐĨŽĐƵƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶĐƵƌƐŝŽŶƐŶĞĂƌ^ǁĞĚŝƐŚƐŚŽƌĞƐĂŶĚĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵ
ƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐƉĂƚƌŽůƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘In a regional conflict scenario, Russian
attempts to use underhanded amphibious and maritime tactics to
disable Swedish capability to resist Russian aggression or even provide
logistical support would be of main concern.
dŚĞ^ǁĞĚŝƐŚŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞƚŽĚĂǇĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐŽĨσρ:^-νσGripen, — ĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ
ĚƌŽƉĨƌŽŵƚŚĞοκκĐŽŵďĂƚĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚŝƚďŽĂƐƚĞĚĂƚƚŚĞŚĞŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
31
ĞƌĂ͘dŚĞƐĞĂƌĞŚŝŐŚůǇĐĂƉĂďůĞĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚĂƌƌĂŶŐĞĚŝŶĨŽƵƌƐƋƵĂĚƌŽŶƐďĂƐĞĚ
ŝŶƚŚĞĨĂƌŶŽƌƚŚĂŶĚƐŽƵƚŚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͘
NATO’s ability to use Swedish air space to carry out air operations over
the Baltic States from airfields further from Russia (i.e. beyond the
range of Russian conventional SSMs like the Tochka and Iskander) is
one of the decisive factors in a regional conflict scenario.
ĞƐƉŝƚĞŝƚƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ͕^ǁĞĚĞŶŚĂƐƚĂŬĞŶĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐƉĂŝŶƚƐŝŶ
ƚŚĞǇĞĂƌƐƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞμκλξhŬƌĂŝŶĞĐƌŝƐŝƐƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞ ƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐŶŽ
ůŽŶŐĞƌƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ͘dŚŝƐŚĂƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶƐĞďƵĚŐĞƚ͕ 112
ĐĂůůŝŶŐŽƵƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐƌĞŐŝŽŶ͕ 113 ũŽŝŶŝŶŐEdK
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůEdKĐŽŵďĂƚĐĞŶƚĞƌƐ͕ 114 ĂŶĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐŽƉĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇǁŝƚŚEdK
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ;ĂŶĚ&ŝŶůĂŶĚͿŵŽƐƚŶŽƚĂďůǇĂƚƚŚĞƵƌŽƌĂ-λρĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͘ 115
RELEVANT NON-BALTIC STATES

1. Belarus
ĞůĂƌƵƐŚĂƐůŽŶŐĨŽƵŶĚŝƚƐĞůĨŽŶƚŚĞĨƌŝŶŐĞƐŽĨĂŶŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůƉŽůŝƚǇ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƵŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ͘dŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ,
ĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚƉŽƌƚŝŽŶƐŽĨhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͕ŝƐĂƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞKƌƚŚŽĚŽǆ^ůĂǀŝĐ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƚŚĂƚĨŽƵŶĚŝƚƐĞůĨǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĂƚŚŽůŝĐWŽůŝƐŚ->ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶ
ŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĂƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĂƚ
ŝŶƚŚĞKƌƚŚŽĚŽǆZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵĞƚƌŽƉŽůĞ ĐĞŶƚĞƌĞĚŽŶDŽƐĐŽǁ-^ƚ͘WĞƚĞƌƐďƵƌŐ͘
dŚĞĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞůǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶŽŶĞŝŶ
ŶŽƐŵĂůůƉĂƌƚĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞWƌŝƉǇĂƚDĂƌƐŚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇůĞƐƐĨƌĞĞůǇ-ŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌĂďůĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶŽĨĞůĂƌƵƐ͘^ŝƚƚŝŶŐĂƚŽƉƚŚĞ
^ŵŽůĞŶƐŬ'ĂƚĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶtĂƌƐĂǁĂŶĚDŽƐĐŽǁ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ĞůĂƌƵƐŚĂƐ
112 :ĂŬƵďWĂůŽǁƐŬŝ͕͞^ǌǁĞĐũĂƐǌǇŬƵũĞƐŝħĚŽ͚ƚŽƚĂůŶĞũŽďƌŽŶǇ͕͛͟Defence24.pl͕μλ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞμξ͘Ɖůͬπππρσς͕ƐǌǁĞĐũĂ-ƐǌǇŬƵũĞ-ƐŝĞ-ĚŽ-ƚŽƚĂůŶĞũ-obrony-ŬŽŵĞŶƚĂƌǌ.
ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
113 EŽƚĞƚŚĞƐƉĞĞĐŚŽĨƚŚĞĞƉƵƚǇŚĂŝƌŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ͘<ĂƌŝŶŶƐƚƌƂŵ͕
͞/ŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂ͕͟The Baltic Course͕ςEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕

ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ďĂůƚŝĐ-ĐŽƵƌƐĞ͘ĐŽŵͬĞŶŐͬĚŝƌĞĐƚͺƐƉĞĞĐŚ͍ͬĚŽĐсλνξςολ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
114 ͞^ǁĞĚĞŶƚŽũŽŝŶEdKƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĐŽŵŵƐĐĞŶƚƌĞ͗ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ͕͟Yahoo͕νκ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλπ͕
ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ǇĂŚŽŽ͘ĐŽŵͬŶĞǁƐͬƐǁĞĚĞŶ-ũŽŝŶ-nato-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ-ĐŽŵŵƐ-ĐĞŶƚƌĞ-ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ-
λρξλνοσκς͘Śƚŵů͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
115 ͞&ƌĞŶĐŚĂŶĚh^ƚƌŽŽƉƐŚĞĂĚƚŽ'ŽƚŚĞŶďƵƌŐĂƐ^ǁĞĚĞŶ͛ƐďŝŐŐĞƐƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĚƌŝůůŝŶμκǇĞĂƌƐŬŝĐŬƐ
ŽĨĨ͕͟The Local͕λμ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƚŚĞůŽĐĂů͘ƐĞͬμκλρκσλμͬĨƌĞŶĐŚ-ĂŶĚ-ƵƐ-ƚƌŽŽƉƐ-
ŚĞĂĚ-to-ŐŽƚŚĞŶďƵƌŐ-ĂƐ-ƐǁĞĚĞŶƐ-ďŝŐŐĞƐƚ-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-Ěƌŝůů-in-20-ǇĞĂƌƐ-ŬŝĐŬƐ-off͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκ
32
ŶŽƚŝŶĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇƐĞĞŶŵĂũŽƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĐƌĂƐŚŝŶŐĂĐƌŽƐƐŝƚƐ
ĨƌŽŶƚŝĞƌƐ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞŽĨŚĂƌůĞƐy//͕EĂƉŽůĞŽŶ͕ĂŶĚ,ŝƚůĞƌ͘ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝǀŝůtĂƌ͕ĞůĂƌƵƐďƌŝĞĨůǇĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚƐŽŵĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨ
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ͕ďƵƚǁĂƐƐǁŝĨƚůǇƌĞĂďƐŽƌďĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ͘
ZŽƵŐŚůǇĂƚŚŝƌĚŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇǁĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨWŽůĂŶĚŝŶƚŚĞ
/ŶƚĞƌǁĂƌzĞĂƌƐ͕ďƵƚǁĂƐĂŶŶĞǆĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ
ŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌ͘ 116
ĞůĂƌƵƐďĞĐĂŵĞĨŽƌŵĂůůǇŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŝŶλσσλ͕ďƵƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ĂƋƵĂƐŝ-
ƐĂƚĞůůŝƚĞƐƚĂƚĞŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ͘&ĂĐĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĞďŝůŝƚĂƚŝŶŐĐŽƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ŚĞƌŶŽďǇůĐĂƚĂƐƚƌŽƉŚĞŝŶλσςπ͕λλρ ƚŚĞĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂǀŽŝĚĞĚ
ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƉŽƐƚ-ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƐƚƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŚŽůĚŽƌĚĞƌ
ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ͘dŽĚĂǇ͕ĞůĂƌƵƐŝƐŚĞĂǀŝůǇĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŽ
ŬĞĞƉŵĂŶǇ^ŽǀŝĞƚ-ĞƌĂŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂůŝǀĞ͘ 118
ZĞĐŽŐŶŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŵĂǇƉƌŽǀĞĨĂƚĂůƚŽŝƚƐĨƌĂŐŝůĞ
government, Belarus is concerned with avoiding a larger fight.
WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚůĞŬƐĂŶĚƌ>ƵŬĂƐŚĞŶŬŽŚĂƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞĚƚŚŝƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ
ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶĐŽŶƐĐƌŝƉƚƐĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƌĂƌŵǇĂŶĚ
ŝŶƚŽǀĂƌŝŽƵƐŵŝůŝƚŝĂƐĂŝŵĞĚŵŽƌĞĂƚŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŶŐĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶƉĂƚƌŝŽƚŝƐŵ
ƚŚĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇ͘Unfortunately for Belarus, its
geographic centrality to military considerations of regional strategies
ensures that, if not Moscow, then Warsaw would demand Belarusian
cooperation in the ongoing strategic competition in the Baltic region.
dŚĞĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐǁĞƌĞďŽƌŶŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶ
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŶλσσλ͘>ĂĐŬŝŶŐĂĐŽĂƐƚůŝŶĞ͕ĞůĂƌƵƐŚĂƐŶŽEĂǀǇ͘dŚĞ
ĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶ'ƌŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŽĨĞŝŐŚƚƌĞŐƵůĂƌďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ
ĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂƚĞůǇŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚĂŶĚ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌƐ.
dŚŝƐ͕ŝŶƉĂƌƚ͕ŝƐĂŶĂƚƵƌĂůĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ͖ďƵƚŝƐĂůƐŽĐŽŶŐƌƵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂů
ĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ͗ŶĂŵĞůǇ͕defense from potential NATO
116 ĨƚĞƌďĞŝŶŐďƌŝĞĨůǇŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞDŽůŽƚŽǀ-
ZŝďďĞŶƚƌŽƉWĂĐƚ͕ǁŚŝĐŚĞǀĞŶďƌŽƵŐŚƚƐŽŵĞƉĂƌƚƐŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶWŽůĂŶĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ͘
λλρ ŚĞƌŶŽďǇůŝƚƐĞůĨŝƐůŽĐĂƚĞĚŝŶŵŽĚĞƌŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͘
118 ůĞƑůĂĐŚŶŽǀŝē͕͞,ŽǁZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ^ƵďƐŝĚŝĞƐ^ĂǀĞƚŚĞĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶĐŽŶŽŵǇ͕͟Belarus Digest, 26
ƵŐƵƐƚμκλοŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬďĞůĂƌƵƐĚŝŐĞƐƚ͘ĐŽŵͬƐƚŽƌǇͬŚŽǁ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂƐ-ƐƵďƐŝĚŝĞƐ-ƐĂǀĞ-ƚŚĞ-ďĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶ-
ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇͬ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
33
offensives launched to facilitate the defeat of a broader Russian
operation in the Baltic region.
ĞƐƉŝƚĞĂůĂƌŐĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽŝƚƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚ
ƚŽŽƚŚĞƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƚĂƚĞƐ͕ĞůĂƌƵƐŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƐǀĞƌǇůŝŵŝƚĞĚŵĂŶŶŝŶŐĨŽƌĂ
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƐĞďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ͘ λλσ KŶĞĨƵůůǇ-ŵĂŶŶĞĚďƌŝŐĂĚĞ 120 ĂƌĞŐĞĂƌĞĚ
ƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚůǇƚŽǁĂƌĚĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ͘
dŚĞĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌƉŽǁĞƌƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝŽŶĚĞƌŝǀĞƐĂůŵŽƐƚĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇ
ĨƌŽŵŝƚƐƚǁŽĂŝƌĂƐƐĂƵůƚĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ121 ĂŶĚƚŚĞλμκ 'ƵĂƌĚƐDĞĐŚĂŶŝǌĞĚ
th
ƌŝŐĂĚĞůŽĐĂƚĞĚŝŶDŝŶƐŬ͘dŚĞƐĞĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶμƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ— ĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƚŚĂƚŚĂƐ
ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚůǇďĞĞŶĚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƌŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞŝŶ
2014͕ďƵƚǁŚŝĐŚƐƚŝůůĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇǁŝƚŚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ. 122
ĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚƚŽĚĂǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞďĞƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
ŚĂƌĚǁĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞλσςκƐ͕ďƵƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƉŽŽƌůǇŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚĂŶĚŝƐof
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞƌĞůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ͘EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ͕ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞμκλξhŬƌĂŝŶĞĐƌŝƐŝƐ͕
ƐŽŵĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƐĂƚŵŽĚĞƌŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŚĂǀĞďĞŐƵŶŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĂůŵƐŽĨŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐ͕ 123
ŵĂŝŶďĂƚƚůĞƚĂŶŬƐ͕ 124 ŚĞůŝĐŽƉƚĞƌƐ͕ 125 ĂŶĚŚĞĂǀǇĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ͕ 126 ƚŚŽƵŐŚŶŽƚǇĞƚ
ƚŚĞŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞ͘
dŚĞĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐďĂƐĞĚĂůŵŽƐƚĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇŝŶƚŚĞDŝŶƐŬ-
,ƌŽĚŶĂ-ƌĞƐƚƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞ͕ŝƐĐŽŵƉŽƐĞĚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇŽĨ^Ƶ-μοĐůŽƐĞĂŝƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
;^ͿĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚůĞĨƚŽǀĞƌĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ͘dŚŝƐŝƐĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚ by
λλσ 'ĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ͕ŵŽƐƚĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐŚĂǀĞŽŶůǇŽŶĞĂĐƚŝǀĞďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶ͛ƐǁŽƌƚŚŽĨŵĂŶŶŝŶŐ͘
120 dŚĞπth 'ƵĂƌĚƐDĞĐŚĂŶŝǌĞĚƌŝŐĂĚĞŝŶ'ƌŽĚŶŽ͘
121 ĂůůĞĚ͞DŽďŝůĞƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ͟
122 /Ŷμκλρ͕ƚŚĞƐĞĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝƌďŽƌŶĞdƌŽŽƉƐŝŶDĂƌĐŚ
;ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬƐŽƵǌǀĞĐŚĞ͘ƌƵͬŶĞǁƐͬνοςνσͬͿ͕Ɖƌŝů;ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬĞŶŐ͘ďĞůƚĂ͘ďǇͬƐŽĐŝĞƚǇͬǀŝĞǁͬĂďŽƵƚ-1000-
ďĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚ-in-ǀŝƚĞďƐŬ-ŽďůĂƐƚ-for-ĂƌŵǇ-ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ-σσςσκ-μκλρͬͿ͕:ƵŶĞ
;ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬƚĂƐƐ͘ƌƵͬĂƌŵŝǇĂ-i-ŽƉŬͬξνλμοορͿ͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ;Zapad-2017Ϳ͕ĂŶĚKĐƚŽďĞƌ;ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǆŶ--
ƉλĂŝͬŶĞǁƐͺƉĂŐĞͬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξνςξξΛĞŐEĞǁƐͿ͘
123 ^ŝĂƌŚĞŝŽŚĚĂŶ͕͞ŽĞƐĞůĂƌƵƐŚĂǀĞŝƚƐŽǁŶŵŝƐƐŝůĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ͍͕͟Belarus Digest, 30
^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλπ͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬďĞůĂƌƵƐĚŝŐĞƐƚ͘ĐŽŵͬƐƚŽƌǇͬĚŽĞƐ-ďĞůĂƌƵƐ-ŚĂǀĞ-ŝƚƐ-ŽǁŶ-ŵŝƐƐŝůĞ-
ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞͬ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
124 ͞Belorusskiy tank T-72BME s usilennoy zashchitoy I teplovizorom͕͟VPK͕μμDĂǇμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǀƉŬ-ŶĞǁƐ͘ƌƵͬŶĞǁƐͬνπςπκ. ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
125 ͛͞Vertolety Rossii’ podpisali kontrakt na remont Mi-8 i Mi-17 v Belorussii͕͟VPK͕μμDĂǇμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǀƉŬ-ŶĞǁƐ͘ƌƵͬŶĞǁƐͬνπςξρ. ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκ EŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘

126 WĂǀĞů<ŽǀĂůĞǀ͕͞’Dlinnaya ruka’ Belarusi: ‘Polonez’ b’et na 300km͕͟Voenno-Politicheskoe
Obozerenie͕μEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ďĞůǀƉŽ͘ĐŽŵͬƌƵͬςρσκξ͘Śƚŵů͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκ
34
Dŝ'-μσƐďĂƐĞĚŶĞĂƌDŝŶƐŬ͘dŚĞĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƐůŝƚƚůĞ
ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽŝƚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉĞĞƌƐĂŶĚŝƐŽĨĐŽŵƉĂƌĂďůĞƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐ
ƚŽƚŚĂƚŽĨhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͘
2. Norway
EŽƌǁĂǇ͕ƚŚĞŽŶůǇEdKŵĞŵďĞƌŶŽƌƚŚŽĨƚŚĞĂŶŝƐŚ^ƚƌĂŝƚƐ͕ƌĞƚĂŝŶƐ
ďŽƚŚĂEŽƌĚŝĐĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŽƵƚůŽŽŬĂŶĚĂĚĞĐŝĚĞĚůǇƚůĂŶƚŝĐ-ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ͘/ŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚǀĂƌŝŽƵƐůǇŝŶƚŽĞŶŵĂƌŬĂŶĚ^ǁĞĚĞŶ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚŵŽĚĞƌŶŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ͕ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚEŽƌǁĂǇ λμρ ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ
ĨĂƌŵŽƌĞǁŝƚŚƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚ^ĞĂƚŚĂŶŽŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂ͘ƐƉĞĐŝĂů
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞŽŶƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚŝŶŐ^>KƐǁŝƚŚƚůĂŶƚŝĐƚƌĂĚŝŶŐ
ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐĂŶĚŽŝůƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐŝŶƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚ^ĞĂ͘ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ͕EŽƌǁĂǇ
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚĂŶŝŶƚĞŶƐĞĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ&ůĞĞƚďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞ
<ŽůĂWĞŶŝŶƐƵůĂĂŶĚǀŝŐŝůĂŶĐĞŝŶŐƵĂƌĚŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂ^ŽǀŝĞƚĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶƚŚĞ
,ŝŐŚEŽƌƚŚ 128 ŽƌĂĚƌŝǀĞƚŽĐƵƚŽĨĨŶŽŶ-ŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂůEdKŵĞŵďĞƌƐĨƌŽŵ
ŝƚƐƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞƐĞĂ͕— ŝŶĂŵĂŶŶĞƌƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͛ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ
ƚŽĨŽƌĐŝďůǇĚŝǀŝĚĞEŽƌǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƌŝƚĂŝŶŝŶλσξκ͘/ŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ͕EŽƌǁĂǇŚĂƐĞƋƵĂůůǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĂůůƚŚƌĞĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŽĨŝƚƐĂƌŵĞĚ
ĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘
dŚĞEŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶƌŵǇ͛ƐƐŝŶŐůĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝǌĞĚďƌŝŐĂĚĞ;ƌŝŐĂĚĞEŽƌĚͿŝƐ
ŐĞĂƌĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌǁŝƚŚZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ƚŚŽƵƐĂŶĚƐ
ŽĨŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇEŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶƵƌďĂŶĐĞŶƚĞƌƐ. It
ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇŚŽůĚƐŵĂũŽƌƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐŽŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂĐƚĐƌŝƐŝƐŵŽŵĞŶƚƐ͘ λμσ dŚĞŵĂŝŶEŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶŵĞƚƌŽƉŽůŝƚĂŶĂƌĞĂ͕
ŝŶƚƵƌŶ͕ŝƐĚĞĨĞŶĚĞĚŽŶůǇďǇĂůŝŐŚƚŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶ͘
dŚĞEŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶEĂǀǇƐĞƌǀĞƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇƚŽƉƌŽďĞEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ&ůĞĞƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ
ŝŶƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚ͕EŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶ͕ĂŶĚĂƌĞŶƚƐ^ĞĂƐ͖ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŽƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞ^>KƐ
ƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĞEŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶŝƐůĂŶĚƐŽĨ^ǀĂůďĂƌĚ͘130 dŚĞĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨ
λμρ EŽƌǁĂǇůĂƐƚďĞĐĂŵĞĂƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůůǇŝŶλσκοǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚŝƐƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨŝƚƐƵŶŝŽŶ
ǁŝƚŚ^ǁĞĚĞŶ͖ƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚǁĂƐƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĚƵƌŝŶŐtŽƌůĚtĂƌ//͘
128 /ƚǁĂƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƚĂŬĞĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŽĨƚŚĞ
^ĐĂŶĚŝŶĂǀŝĂŶ,ŝŐŚEŽƌƚŚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚŝƚƐ^ÊďĂƐĞƐŶĞĂƌDƵƌŵĂŶƐŬĨƌŽŵEdK
ĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇĂŶĚƐŚŽƌƚ-ƌĂŶŐĞŵŝƐƐŝůĞĨŝƌĞŝŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƐŚŽƌƚ-ƌĂŶŐĞĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚĂŶĚůŽŶŐ-ƌĂŶŐĞŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐ
ĐŽŵŝŶŐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚWŽůĞ͘
λμσ :ĂŬƵƉWĂůŽǁƐŬŝ͕͞Norwegia sprawdza gotowo ƑđďŽũŽǁČ͕͟Defence24.pl͕μξKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞμξ͘Ɖůͬπςρνπρ͕ŶŽƌǁĞŐŝĂ-ƐƉƌĂǁĚǌĂ-ŐŽƚŽǁŽƐĐ-ďŽũŽǁĂ. ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκ
130ƚǁŚŝĐŚZƵƐƐŝĂƐƚŝůůŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƐĂůŝŵŝƚĞĚŵŝŶŝŶŐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚƐĞƌǀĞƐĂƐĂĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů
ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƉŽŝŶƚĨŽƌƉĂƐƐŝŶŐƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐ͘
35
^ǀĂůďĂƌĚŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞĂŚŝŐŚĞƌƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ 131 ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇĂƐZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂƐďĞĞŶ
ƋƵŝƚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂďŽƵƚŝƚƐƌĐƚŝĐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐ͘ 132 EŽƌǁĂǇƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞƐƐĞǀĞƌĂů
ƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐ͕ĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĞƌƐ͕ĂŶĚĂŵƉŚŝďŝŽƵƐĐƌĂĨƚƚŽĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞƚŚĞƐĞ ƚĂƐŬƐ.
EŽƌǁĂǇĂůƐŽŚŽƐƚƐDWW-E͕ 133 Ăh^DĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚƐŝƚĞ͕ŶĞĂƌdƌŽŶĚŚĞŝŵ
ĨŽƌƌĂƉŝĚĨĂůůŝŶŐŝŶŽĨh^ĂŵƉŚŝďŝŽƵƐĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚŽƌƌĞƚĂŬĞƚŚĞ
EŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶ,ŝŐŚEŽƌth. ^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŽĨμκλρ͕ƚŚĞh^DŚĂƐ
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚůŽŶŐĞƌ-ƚĞƌŵĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƐŽĨŵĂŶƉŽǁĞƌŝŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ
ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ͘134
dŚĞEŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐŽĨƚŚƌĞĞƐƋƵĂĚƌŽŶƐŽĨ&-λπDͬDƐ
ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞƉĂƚƌŽůĂŶĚĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ
aircrĂĨƚĨŽƌŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞĂƐĂĚũĂĐĞŶƚƚŽEŽƌǁĂǇ͘ƐŽĨƚŚŝƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ͕
EŽƌǁĂǇŚĂƐũƵƐƚďĞŐƵŶƚŽƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĨŝĨƚŚ-ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ&-νοƐ͘ 135 EŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶ
ĐŽŵďĂƚĂŝƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨůŝĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ,ŝŐŚEŽƌƚŚĂŶĚƚŚĞdƌŽŶĚŚĞŝŵĂƌĞĂŝŶ
ƚŚĞĐĞŶƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͘EŽƌǁĂǇƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚŝŶĂůƚŝĐŝƌWŽůŝĐŝŶŐŝŶ
μκκο͕μκκρ͕ĂŶĚμκλο͘
3. United Kingdom
&Žƌ ĐĞŶƚƵƌŝĞƐ͕ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ͕ŽŶĞŽĨEdK͛ƐĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ͕
ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂĨƌŽŵďĞŝŶŐĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ
ďǇĂŶǇƐŝŶŐůĞƉŽǁĞƌ͘,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇ͕ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂůĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƌƐŚĂǀĞƉŽƐĞĚƚŚĞ
ŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚƉƌŽďůĞŵƚŽƌŝƚŝƐŚĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ͘ŽƚŚǁŽƌůĚǁĂƌƐƐĂǁ
'ĞƌŵĂŶĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂ͕ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞWŽƐƚ-tĂƌƉĞƌŝŽĚ ƐĂǁ
^ŽǀŝĞƚĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ͕ǁŝƚŚĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůƚŚƌĞĂƚƐƚŚĞƌĞďǇĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞ
EŽƌƚŚĂŶĚEŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶ^ĞĂƐ͘dŚŝƐǁĂƐ ĞǆĂĐĞƌďĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ƌŝƚŝƐŚ^>KƐďĞŝŶŐĐƵƚŽĨĨĨƌŽŵƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚĞƌĐŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ͖ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ
131 <ũĞƚŝů^ƚŽƌŵĂƌŬ͕͞Russland trente på invasjon av Svalbard͕͟Aldrimer͕λςKĐƚŽďĞƌμκλρ͕

ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĂůĚƌŝŵĞƌ͘ŶŽͬƌƵƐƐůĂŶĚ-ƚƌĞŶƚĞ-ƉĂ-ŝŶǀĂƐũŽŶ-av-ƐǀĂůďĂƌĚͬ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌ
μκλρ͘
132 ͞Glava voennogo vedomstva Rossii general armii Sergey Shoygu prinyal uchastie v tseremonii
nachala uchebnogo goda v Pansione vospitannits Minoborony͕͟Russian Ministry of Defense, 1

^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬĞŶƐ͘ŵŝů͘ƌƵͬĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶͬŵŽƌĞ͘Śƚŵ͍ŝĚсλμλξκοξσΛĞŐEĞǁƐ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκ
133 DĂƌŝŶĞŽƌƉƐWƌĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶŐWƌŽŐƌĂŵ-EŽƌǁĂǇ
134 ͞,ƵŶĚƌĞĚƐŽĨh͘^͘DĂƌŝŶĞƐůĂŶĚŝŶEŽƌǁĂǇ͕ŝƌŬŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂ͕͟Reuters͕λπ:ĂŶƵĂƌǇμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƌĞƵƚĞƌƐ͘ĐŽŵͬĂƌƚŝĐůĞͬƵƐ-ŶŽƌǁĂǇ-ƵƐĂ-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇͬŚƵŶĚƌĞĚƐ-of-u-Ɛ-ŵĂƌŝŶĞƐ-ůĂŶĚ-in-
ŶŽƌǁĂǇ-ŝƌŬŝŶŐ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂ-ŝĚh^<Eλοκλ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
135 sĂůĞƌŝĞ/ŶƐŝŶŶĂ͕͞EŽƌǁĂǇĂĐĐĞƉƚƐŝƚƐĨŝƌƐƚƚŚƌĞĞ&-νοƐ͕͟Defense News͕πEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŶĞǁƐ͘ĐŽŵͬĂŝƌͬμκλρͬλλͬκπͬŶŽƌǁĂǇ-ĂĐĐĞƉƚƐ-ŝƚƐ-ĨŝƌƐƚ-ƚŚƌĞĞ-f-νοƐͬ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ
λκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
36
ďůŽĐŬŝŶŐƚŚĞĂĐĐĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚĂŶĂĚĂĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌ
ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂŶĚƉŽǁĞƌ͘
dŽĚĂǇ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂ ŝƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƉŽƐŝŶŐĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƚŚƌĞat ƚŽƌŝƚŝƐŚ
ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ͘dŚŝƐŚĂƐƐĞƌǀĞĚĂƐĂƐƚƌŽŶŐŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŽƌĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶƚŽƵƉŚŽůĚŝƚƐ
EdKĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐǁŝƚŚŚŝŐŚĞƌĨŝĚĞůŝƚǇƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌǁĞƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
ŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘tŝƚŚŶŽŽƚŚĞƌƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƚŚƌĞĂƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͕ĂŶĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
ĚƌĂǁĚŽǁŶŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŝŶ/ƌĂƋĂŶĚĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶ, Britain is
capable of committing the majority of its armed services to operations
in the Baltic Sea.
EĂǀĂůĂŶĚĂŝƌƉŽǁĞƌŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ
ŚŽŵĞůĂŶĚ͕ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƌŵǇŚĂƐƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇďĞĞŶĚĞĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞĚ͘/ƚ
ŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŶŽƚƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝŶĂŶĞƌĂŽĨƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇŚŝŐŚƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕ƚŚĞ
ƌŝƚŝƐŚƌŵǇŚĂƐĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚĞĚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ͕ƌĞƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚǁŽĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ͕ŽŶůǇ
ŽŶĞŽĨǁŚŝĐŚ 136 ŚĂƐĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĨŝŐŚƚĂŵŽĚĞƌŶǁĂƌ͘dŚŝƐ
ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐŽĨƚŚƌĞĞďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ͗ƚŚĞλ , 12 , aŶĚμκ ƌŵŽƌĞĚ/ŶĨĂŶƚƌǇ
Ɛƚ th th
ƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ͘dŚĞƐĞďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐŚŽǁŶŝŶƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ƚŽďĞŝŶĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨƉƵƚƚŝŶŐƵƉĂƉƌŽůŽŶŐĞĚĨŝŐŚƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ƌŽƵŶĚ
&ŽƌĐĞƐ͘ λνρ dŚĞμκ ƌŝŐĂĚĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞůĂƐƚĂĐƚŝǀĞĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŝůů
th
ĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇŝŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƌŵǇŽŶƚŚĞZŚŝŶĞ͕ƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚŝƐďĞŝŶŐ
ǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁŶďĂĐŬƚŽŶŐůĂŶĚĂŶĚǁŝůůŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌďĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞŽŶƚŚĞ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ͘138 tŚŝůĞƐƚŝůůŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͕ŝƚŵĂŬĞƐĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞEdKƌĂƉŝĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĨŽƌĐĞ͘ƌŝƚĂŝŶ͛ƐƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐ
^ƉĞĐŝĂůŝƌ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ;^^ͿĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨƌĂƉŝĚĂĞƌŝĂůŝŶƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ
ŝŶƚŽƵƌŽƉĞƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ͘ dŚŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐ
ďƌŝŐĂĚĞŝƐƌĞƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ͕ĂŚĞĂǀǇĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽ
ƚŚĞDEEĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶŝŶƐƚŽŶŝĂƐƚŽŽĚƵƉŝŶμκλρ. λνσ
136 dŚĞνƌĚ ŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ

λνρ :ĞŶŶŝĨĞƌEĞǁƚŽŶ͕͞ƌŝƚŝƐŚƌŵǇĂĚŵŝƚƐZƵƐƐŝĂĐŽƵůĚĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇĚĞƐƚƌŽǇƚŚĞŽŶůǇƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐ
ĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƵŶŝƚŝŶũƵƐƚĂŶĂĨƚĞƌŶŽŽŶĂĨƚĞƌǇĞĂƌƐŽĨĚĞĨĞŶĐĞĐƵƚƐ͕͟Daily Mail͕μμ:ĂŶƵĂƌǇμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚĂŝůǇŵĂŝů͘ĐŽ͘ƵŬͬŶĞǁƐͬĂƌƚŝĐůĞ-ξλξξρρμͬƌŝƚŝƐŚ-ƌŵǇ-ƐĂǇƐ-ZƵƐƐŝĂ-ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇ-
ĚĞƐƚƌŽǇ-ƵŶŝƚ͘Śƚŵů͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
138 dƌǇƐƚĂŶ:ŽŶĞƐ͕͞ƌŝƚŝƐŚƌŵǇƚƌŽŽƉƐůĞĂǀŝŶŐ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂĨƚĞƌρκǇĞĂƌƐ͕͟BBC͕λς:ƵŶĞμκλο͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ďďĐ͘ĐŽŵͬŶĞǁƐͬƵŬ-ĞŶŐůĂŶĚ-33142613͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
λνσ ͞ƌŝƚŝƐŚƚƌŽŽƉƐůĂŶĚŝŶƐƚŽŶŝĂĨŽƌEdKŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŽĚĞƚĞƌZƵƐƐŝĂ͕͟The Guardian͕λςDĂƌĐŚ
μκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƚŚĞŐƵĂƌĚŝĂŶ͘ĐŽŵͬƵŬ-ŶĞǁƐͬμκλρͬŵĂƌͬλςͬďƌŝƚŝƐŚ-ƚƌŽŽƉƐ-ůĂŶĚ-in-ĞƐƚŽŶŝĂ-for-
nato-ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ-to-ĚĞƚĞƌ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
νρ
dŚĞZŽǇĂůEĂǀǇĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐŽĨĂĨĂŝƌŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƐƵƌĨĂĐĞĂƐƐĞƚƐ͕ĂůďĞŝƚǁŝƚŚ
ŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚŵĂŶƉŽǁĞƌƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĂůůŽĨƚŚĞŵ͘140 In a Baltic conflict
ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ͕ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚEĂǀǇǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞůǇƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝǌĞŚŽŵĞĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽǀĞƌ
expeditionary deployments. dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ ǁŚŝůĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĞƌƐ͕
ĨƌŝŐĂƚĞƐ͕ĂŶĚŵŝŶĞĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐĐƌĂĨƚĂƌĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŽĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŶĂǀĂů
ĂƐƐĂƵůƚƐĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶŝƚƐĞůĨ͕ƚŚĞǇǁŝůůďĞŽĨůŝŵŝƚĞĚƵƐĞŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
ĚƵƌŝŶŐĂĐƌŝƐŝƐ͘KĨƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŝƐƚŚĞZŽǇĂůEĂǀǇ͛ƐŽǁŶĨůĞĞƚŽĨ
^ÊƐƐĞƌǀŝŶŐĂƐŶƵĐůĞĂƌĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĚŝƌĞĐƚĂƚƚĂĐŬƐŽŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ
ŚŽŵĞůĂŶĚ͘In the event of a crisis, the amphibious capability of the
Royal Marines would likely be directed to assist in Norwegian as
opposed to Baltic defense.
dŚĞZŽǇĂůŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐĂůĂƌŐĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĐŽŵďĂƚĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐ
dŽƌŶĂĚŽƐĂŶĚdǇƉŚŽŽŶƐ͖ĂŶĚŚĂƐƉůĂŶƐƚŽĂĐƋƵŝƌĞ&-νοƐ͘dŚĞZ&ĨŝƌƐƚ
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚŝŶĂůƚŝĐŝƌWŽůŝĐŝŶŐŝŶμκλξƐŚŽƌƚůǇĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝŵĞĂĂŶĚŚĂƐƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĚĨŽƌƌŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶďŽƚŚμκλοĂŶĚ
2016, ĨůǇŝŶŐdǇƉŚŽŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƐ͘ /ƚĂůƐŽŚĂƐƚĂŬĞŶƵƉ
ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƐŽĨZ&ĂƐƐĞƚƐƚŽƐƚŽŶŝĂ 141 ĂŶĚZŽŵĂŶŝĂ 142 ƚŽƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨEdKĂůůŝĞƐĨƌŽŵZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƚƚĂĐŬĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŵĂƌŝƵŵ͘
The British Air Force assets represent competent capabilities decisive
in a Baltic conflict. ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞŝƌƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
^ƚĂƚĞƐŚĂƐƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƚŽůŝŵŝƚƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŐĞŶĞƌĂďůĞƐŽƌƚŝĞƐ͘
ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽĨŶĞƵƚƌĂů^ǁĞĚŝƐŚĂŝƌƐƉĂĐĞŝŶĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵďĂƚǌŽŶĞĐŽƵůĚĂůƐŽďĞĐŽŵĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌůŝŵŝƚŝŶŐĨĂĐƚŽƌ͘dŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ
ŽĨĚĞƉůŽǇŝŶŐŽŶĞŽƌƚǁŽƌŝƚŝƐŚƐƋƵĂĚƌŽŶƐƚŽĞŶŵĂƌŬŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĂ
ĐƌŝƐŝƐǁŽƵůĚŵĞĚŝĂƚĞƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚďƵƚǁŽƵůĚĂůƐŽƉƵƚƌŝƚŝƐŚ
ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƌĂŶŐĞŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶIskander ^^DƐ͘
140 ŽŶŽƵŐŚůŝŶ͕͞ZŽǇĂůEĂǀǇĂ͚ůĂƵŐŚŝŶŐƐƚŽĐŬ͛ǁŝƚŚƚŚƌĞĞƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐŽĨŝƚƐǁĂƌƐŚŝƉƐŽƵƚŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ
ĂŶĚ͚ƐƚƌƵŐŐůŝŶŐƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƌŝƚŝƐŚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ͕͛͟The Telegraph͕λξ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƚĞůĞŐƌĂƉŚ͘ĐŽ͘ƵŬͬŶĞǁƐͬμκλρͬκσͬλξͬƌŽǇĂů-navy-ůĂƵŐŚŝŶŐ-ƐƚŽĐŬ-ƚŚƌĞĞ-ƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ-
ǁĂƌƐŚŝƉƐ-action-ƐƚƌƵŐŐůŝŶŐͬ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
141 ͞Chetyre istrebitelya VVS Velikobritanii pribyli na ucheniya v Estoniyu͕͟RIA Novosti͕νλKĐƚŽďĞƌ
μκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬƌŝĂ͘ƌƵͬǁŽƌůĚͬμκλρλκνλͬλοκρσξνξλπ͘Śƚŵů͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
142 ͞Velikobritaniya napravit v Rumyniyu 4 istrebitelya dlya patrulirovaniya Chyornogo morya,͟
Navkolo͕ςEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬŶĂǀŬŽůŽ͘ŵĞͬǀĞůŝŬŽďƌŝƚĂŶŝǇĂ-ŶĂƉƌĂǀŝƚ-v-ƌƵŵŝŶŝǇƵ-4-
ŝƐƚƌĞďŝƚĞůǇĂ-ĚůǇĂ-νσκπςς͘Śƚŵů͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚλκEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͘
38
4. United States
^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌ͕ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŚĂƐĂƐƐƵŵĞĚ
ĂŶĂĐƚŝǀĞƌŽůĞŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͘dŚŝƐǁĂƐĂĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞĨƌŽŵ
λοκǇĞĂƌƐŽĨƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŶŽŶ-ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ͕ďƵƚŚĂƐƐŝŶĐĞ
tƵƌŶĞĚŝŶƚŽĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ — ƵŶŝƚŝŶŐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂƐƐĞƚƐƚŽ
ĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŚĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ͘hŶĚĞƌƚŚŝƐĂĞŐŝƐ͕
ƉŽƐƚ-λσξοƵƌŽƉĞŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůǇůĞƐƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝƐƚŝĐĂŶĚŐƌĞǁ
ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞh^ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĨŽƌŝƚƐŽǁŶƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ͘The United
States, therefore, would almost certainly find itself immediately drawn
into a conflict in the Baltic region to demonstrate its resolve in
defending its allies and values in Europe.
dŚĞĂůƚŝĐƌĞŐŝŽŶŝƐĂƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇŶĞǁƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇĨŽƌh^ƉŽǁĞƌ͘/ŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚ
ŽĨĂĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͕ŝƚǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞůǇďĞƌĞĂĐŚĞĚďǇh^ŐƌŽƵŶĚĂŶĚĂŝƌĂƐƐĞƚƐ͘
DŽƐƚĨĂǀŽƌĂďůǇůŽĐĂƚĞĚh^ƵŶŝƚƐĂƌĞƚŚŽƐĞďĂƐĞĚŝŶ^ŽǀŝĞƚ-ĞƌĂďĂƐĞƐŝŶ
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͘dŚĞƐĞĂƐƐĞƚƐĂƌĞŵƵĐŚƌĞĚƵĐĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌ^ŽǀŝĞƚ-ĞƌĂ
ŶƵŵďĞƌƐ͕ďƵƚƌĞĐĞŶƚĞǀĞŶƚƐŚĂǀĞĚƌŝǀĞŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐƚŽďĞŐin
ĚĞƉůŽǇŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚWŽůĂŶĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
ƚůĂŶƚŝĐZĞƐŽůǀĞ;KZͿŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨĂŚĞĂǀǇďƌŝŐĂĚĞŝŶƚŽ
WŽůĂŶĚ͘
In a crisis situation, the US Army would likely activate its units in
Europe and up to two divisions for combat in Europe͘h^ZhZĂƐƐĞƚƐ
ŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŽĨŽŶĞĂŝƌďŽƌŶĞďƌŝŐĂĚĞ͕ 143 ŽŶĞŚĞĂǀǇĂƌŵŽƌĞĚďƌŝŐĂĚĞ
ĐŽŵďĂƚƚĞĂŵ͕ 144 ŽŶĞŵĞĚŝƵŵďƌŝŐĂĚĞĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚ͕ 145 ŽŶĞĐŽŵďĂƚ
ĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ͕ 146 KZĂƐƐĞƚƐ͕ λξρ ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ƵŶŝƚƐ͘/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚŝƐ͕ƚŚĞξ /ŶĨĂŶƚƌǇŝǀŝƐŝŽŶŝŶŽůŽƌĂĚŽǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞůǇ
th
ďĞĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚ͕ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŝŶŐŽĨŽŶĞŚĞĂǀǇ͕ŽŶĞŵĞĚŝƵŵ͕ĂŶĚŽŶĞůŝŐŚƚ
ďƌŝŐĂĚĞ, ŝŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĐŽŵďĂƚĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶĂƐƐĞƚƐ͘dŚŝƐĐŽƵůĚďĞ
ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞςμ ŝƌďŽƌŶĞŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ;ĂƌĂƉŝĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƵŶŝƚͿŽƌĂ
ŶĚ
briŐĂĚĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞν /ŶĨĂŶƚƌǇŝǀŝƐŝŽŶŝŶ'ĞŽƌŐŝĂ͘While the 82 Airborne

ƌĚ nd
Division could be deployed relatively rapidly from the continental
143 dŚĞλρνƌĚ ŝƌďŽƌŶĞƌŝŐĂĚĞŽŵďĂƚdĞĂŵďĂƐĞĚŝŶsŝŶĐĞŶǌĂ͕/ƚĂůǇ͘

144 ĂƐĞĚŝŶŵƵůƚŝƉůĞŝŶƐƚĂůůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂĐƌŽƐƐǁĞƐƚĞƌŶĂŶĚŶŽƌƚŚĞƌŶWŽůĂŶĚ͘
145 dŚĞμŶĚ ƌŵŽƌĞĚĂǀĂůƌǇZĞŐŝŵĞŶƚďĂƐĞĚŝŶĂǀĂƌŝĂ͕'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͘
146 ĂƐĞĚŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͘
λξρ KŶĞŚĞĂǀǇĐŽŵƉĂŶǇĞĂĐŚŝŶƐƚŽŶŝĂĂŶĚ>ĂƚǀŝĂĂŶĚŽŶĞŵĞĚŝƵŵĐŽŵƉĂŶǇĞĂĐŚŝŶ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ
ĂŶĚWŽůĂŶĚ͘
νσ
United States (CONUS), the other units would require considerable
efforts to move by sea and air and may not be able to arrive in time to
affect the strategic environment in a Baltic crisis.
h^&͕ƚŚĞh^ŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ͕ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐŽĨĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ
hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵǁŝƚŚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐŽĨĂŝƌĨŝĞůĚƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĨŽƌ
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůďĂƐŝŶŐĂƌŽƵŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ͘dŚĞƐĞĂƐƐĞƚƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞ&-λοƐ͕&-λοƐ͕&-
λπƐ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƐƵƉƉůǇ&-μμƐĂŶĚ-λκƐďƌŽƵŐŚƚŝŶĨƌŽŵKEh^͘
dŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƚŚĞƐĞĨŽƌĐĞƐǁŽƵůĚĨĂĐĞŝƐƚŚĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞ
ĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŝƌŚŽŵĞĨŝĞůĚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ͘EĞǁďĂƐĞ
ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞ ƵŶŝƚƐ;ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƚŚĞ&-λπĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐͿĂƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇ
ďĞŝŶŐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ͘WŽůĂŶĚ͕ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĂƌŵĂŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƉĂƌƚƐĨŽƌ&-λπƐĂƌĞ
ĂůƌĞĂĚǇƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŝƌĨŽƌĐĞ͕ŽĨĨĞƌƐĂŶĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞŽƉƚŝŽŶ͕ĂƐŝƚŝƐ
ĂĚũĂĐĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞĂƌĞĂ.
Additionally, USAFE controls a limited number of gravity tactical
nuclear weapons at Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany that would
comprise the US capacity for a tactical nuclear response to potential
Russian aggression in the Baltic region.
h^&ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽĂůƚŝĐŝƌWŽůŝĐŝŶŐŝŶμκκο;&-λπ:Ϳ͕μκκς;&-λοͿ͕
μκλκ;&-λοͿ͕ĂŶĚμκλξ;&-λοͿ͘
In the event of a Baltic crisis, the US Navy would most likely work to
secure Transatlantic SLOCs, safeguarding the movement of ground and
air assets into Europe (as opposed to actively participating in the
conflict in the Baltic Sea itself). It will also operate US SSBNs to deliver
a potential strategic nuclear response.
QUANTITATIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS148

dŚĞĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚůĂŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐŶƵŵďĞƌ
ĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇλσ͕λκκŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐĂŶĚĞŶůŝƐƚĞĚĂĐƚŝǀĞ-ĚƵƚǇ ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů in
ƉĞĂĐĞƚŝŵĞ͕ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƐƚĂŶĚƵƉĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇρμ͕λοκƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐŝĨ
ĨƵůůǇŵŽďŝůŝǌĞĚ;ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐEĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƵĂƌĚƚƌŽŽƉƐͿ͘ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶůĂŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ŶƵŵďĞƌρρλ͕κκκĂĐƚŝǀĞ-ĚƵƚǇ͕ǁŝƚŚĂŶĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚμ͕κκκ͕κκκƌĞƐĞƌǀŝƐƚƐ
;ŶŽƚŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĂŝƌďŽƌŶĞŽƌŶĂǀĂůŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůͿ͘
148 ůůƋƵĂŶƚŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞĂƐŽĨŵŝĚ-2016.
40
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŽǀĞƌĂůůŶƵŵďĞƌƐŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐůǇĨĂǀŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐĐŽǀĞƌĂǀĂƐƚƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͘dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ŽŶůǇĂĨƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀĞĚƵƚǇĨŽƌĐĞƐĐŽƵůĚďĞĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚŝŶĂĂůƚŝĐĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͘ ƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇ͕Ă
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƉŽƌƚŝŽŶ ŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚƌŽŽƉƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŝƐƚŝĞĚĚŽǁŶŝŶĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ
hŬƌĂŝŶĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŝŵĞĂ͘ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƌĞĂůƐŽƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞŝƚƐ
ƐŽƵƚŚĞƌŶďŽƌĚĞƌĂŶĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞĞĂƐƚĞƌŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ͘ However, even if Russia deploys only twenty percent of its
active duty personnel, combined with activated reserve forces to
provide logistical support and rear area security, its force will
outnumber the total Baltic indigenous defense force by at least two,
and up to four to one.
The quantitative disparity is even more pronounced when weapon
system quantities are considered. EŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞĂůƚŝĐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ
ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇŚĂǀĞŵĂŝŶďĂƚƚůĞƚĂŶŬƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŝŶǀĞŶƚŽƌŝĞƐ;ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƐŽŵĞ
ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞƐĂƌĞƉůĂŶŶĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞŶĞĂƌĨƵƚƵƌĞ͕ĂůďĞŝƚŝŶǀĞƌǇƐŵĂůů
ƋƵĂŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞ>ĂƚǀŝĂŶƌŵǇŚĂƐƚŚƌĞĞ ƵƐĞĚĨŽƌƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐͿ͘ ^ŽŵĞ
ŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƌĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝǌĞĚǁŝƚŚĂƌŵŽƌĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůĐĂƌƌŝĞƌƐ͕ƚŽƚĂůŝŶŐ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂďŽƵƚροκĂŶĚλκκκ͕ĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐƵƉŽŶǁŚŝĐŚǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐĂƌĞ
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚ͘
ĂůƚŝĐĂŝƌĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƌĞĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇŶŽŶ-ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚ͕ďĞŝŶŐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĂƐŵĂůů
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĨŝǆĞĚǁŝŶŐĂŶĚƌŽƚĂƌǇǁŝŶŐƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ͘
LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINABILITY
/ƚŝƐǀĞƌǇƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĂƚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ͕ĂůƚŝĐůĂŶĚĂƌŵŝĞƐǁŽƵůĚ
ďĞĂďůĞƚŽƐƚĂŶĚƵƉƚŽĂĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚŚƌĞĂƚ͕ĞŝƚŚĞƌŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůůǇŽƌ
ũŽŝŶƚůǇ͘ ^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĂůŵŽƐƚŶŽĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚĨŽƌĂ
ƉƌŽƚƌĂĐƚĞĚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĂƐĂƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞ͕ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇŽǀĞƌĂŶ
ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŝƐŶŽƚĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŝƐƐƵĞ͘ With
ŵŝŶŝŵĂůůĂƌŐĞĐĂůŝďĞƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂŶĚĨĞǁĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĂŶĚƵŶĂƌŵŽƌĞĚ
ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŶŽƚůŝŬĞůǇƚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚĨŽƌůŽŶŐ͕ĂůƚŝĐůĂŶĚ
ĨŽƌĐĞůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐĂůƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐĐĂŶďĞŵĞƚǁŝƚŚĞĂƐĞ͘tŝƚŚƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů
ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĨƌŽŵEdK͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇŽǀĞƌĂ
ƉƌŽƚƌĂĐƚĞĚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĚŽĞƐďĞĐŽŵĞĂ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŝƐƐƵĞ͘ DŽĚĞƌŶ
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝǌĞĚůĂŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐĐĂŶĐŽŶƐƵŵĞĂŵŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĨƵĞůĂƚĂŶ
ĂůĂƌŵŝŶŐƌĂƚĞ͘ EdKŵĞĐŚĂŶŝǌĞĚůĂŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐŵĂǇďĞĂďůĞƚŽŚŽůĚŽĨĨĂ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚŚƌĞĂƚĨŽƌĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƚŝŵĞ͕elevating the importance of
sources of supply and supply routes.
41
There are three possible methods to resupply NATO forces deployed to
the Baltic States: 1) by sea via the Danish Straits and the Baltic Sea, 2)
by air from other NATO nations, 3) by land via Poland and the area
between Belarus and Kaliningrad, known as the Suwalki Gap (after the
town of Suwalki in northeast Poland).
/ŶŝƚŝĂůůǇ͕ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƐƵƐƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚŽĨŵĂũŽƌůĂŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ
ĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐďǇƐĞĂĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽďĞƚŚĞďĞƐƚŽƉƚŝŽŶ͕ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ
ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐƉŽƌƚƐĂŶĚŽĐĞĂŶŐŽŝŶŐǀĞƐƐĞůƐĐĂŶĐĂƌƌǇĂ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĂŵŽƵŶƚ
ŽĨĐĂƌŐŽ͘ ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐŽƵƚ͕ƚŚŝƐŽƉƚŝŽŶ
ŵĂǇĂůƐŽďĞƚŚĞůĞĂƐƚǀŝĂďůĞ͘ dŚĞƐŚĂůůŽǁĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ
ĚĞƉƚŚŽĨŽŶůǇĂďŽƵƚλςκĨƚ͘;οοŵͿŚĂƐŝƚƐĚĞĞƉĞƐƚƉŽƌƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞ
^ǁĞĚŝƐŚƐŝĚĞ͘ dŚŝƐĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇƚŚĞĚĞƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽĂƐƚĂů
ƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞƐĞǁĂƚĞƌƐ͘ ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ͕ŽŶĐĞŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐďƌĞĂŬ
ŽƵƚ͕ĐĂƌŐŽƐŚŝƉƐŵĂǇďĞŚĞůĚĂƚƌŝƐŬĨŽƌĂĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨƚŝŵĞ͘
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶEĂǀĂůǀŝĂƚŝŽŶŚĂǀŝŶŐĂƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇůŽŶŐĐŽŵďĂƚƌĂĚŝƵƐĂŶĚ
ĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞĂŶƚŝ-ƐŚŝƉŵŝƐƐŝůĞĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐǁŽƵůĚďĞĂďůĞƚŽĂĚĚĂƐĞĐŽŶĚ
ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĚĞŶŝĂůŽĨƐĞĂůŝŶĞƐŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽEdK͘ &Žƌ
ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ͕ƚŚĞ<Ś-35 anti-ƐŚŝƉŵŝƐƐŝůĞĐĂŶďĞůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨ
ƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵƐĂŶĚŚĂƐĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨρκŶŵ;λνκŬŵ– ĂŶĚŵĂǇďĞĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐ
νκκŬŵ ĨŽƌƚŚĞ<Ś-νοh). /ƚĐĂŶďĞůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ^Ƶ-μξ&ĞŶĐĞƌ͕
ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐĂŶƵŶƌĞĨƵĞůĞĚĐŽŵďĂƚƌĂĚŝƵƐ;ǁŝƚŚĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĨƵĞůƚĂŶŬƐͿŽĨ
προŶŵ͘λξσ
ǀĞŶĂŶĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůůǇǁĞůů-ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚĞĨĨŽƌƚďǇƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌEdK
ŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞƉŽǁĞƌƐƚŽĐůĞĂƌĂŶĚƐĞĐƵƌĞƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂĨƌŽŵZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ƐƵďƐƵƌĨĂĐĞĂŶĚĂŝƌƚŚƌĞĂƚƐǁŝůůƚĂŬĞƚŝŵĞ͘
^ŚŽƵůĚŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐďƌĞĂŬŽƵƚĂĨƚĞƌEdKƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ
ĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͕ƚŚŝƐƐƵƉƉůǇůŝŶĞǁŝůůďĞƚĞŶƵŽƵƐĂƚ ďĞƐƚ͕ĂŶĚ
ŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇŝŶƚĞƌĚŝĐƚĞĚĨŽƌĂƚůĞĂƐƚƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĨĞǁĚĂǇƐŽĨany ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ͘ If
ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚƐŚĂǀĞŶŽƚǇĞƚďĞĞŶĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͕ƚŚŝƐƌŽƵƚĞ
ǁŝůůůŝŬĞůǇďĞĚĞŶŝĞĚďǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƵďƐƵƌĨĂĐĞĂŶĚĂŝƌƉŽǁĞƌůŽŶŐĞŶŽƵŐŚ
ĨŽƌƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶůĂŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĂƚůĞĂƐƚƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ͘
/ĨEdKůĂŶĚƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞĂĨůŽĂƚŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐǁŚĞŶĂƌŵĞĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ
ĐŽŵŵĞŶĐĞƐ͕ƚŚĞǇǁŝůůůŝŬĞůǇďĞĐŽŵĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƚĂƌŐĞƚƐŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
λξσ&ŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽĨĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ͕ƚŚĞĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶZŝŐĂ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂĂŶĚDŽƐĐŽǁ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŝƐ
ĂďŽƵƚξοοŶŵ͘
42
ƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐĂŶĚEĂǀĂůǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ͕ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ĐĂƐƵĂůƚŝĞƐ͘ ǀĞŶŝĨEdKĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƌĞĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝǌŝŶŐ
ŽƌĚĞƐƚƌŽǇŝŶŐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞƚŚƌĞĂƚ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ĐĂŶůĂǇŶĂǀĂůŵŝŶĞƐƵƐŝŶŐĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůďŽĂƚƐŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƋƵĂŶƚŝƚǇƚŽ
ĐůŽƐĞĂůůŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƌƚƐŝŶƚŚĞĞĂƐƚĞƌŶĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂĨŽƌƚŚĞĚƵƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚĂŶĚďĞǇŽŶĚ͘
dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐƵƉƉůǇůŝŶĞŝƐĂŶĂŝƌďƌŝĚŐĞĨƌŽŵĞŶƚƌĂůĂŶĚ
tĞƐƚĞƌŶEdKĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘ dŚĞďƵůŬĞǆƉĞŶĚĂďůĞƐ
;Ğ͘Ő͕͘ůĂƌŐĞĐĂůŝďĞƌĂŵŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĨƵĞůͿƚŚĂƚĂƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇůĂƌŐĞEdK
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝǌĞĚůĂŶĚĨŽƌĐĞǁŽƵůĚŶĞĞĚƚŽƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂƉƌŽƚƌĂĐƚĞĚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĂƌĞ
ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽŵŽǀĞďǇĂŝƌŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƋƵĂŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ͘ ƐƐƵŵŝŶŐh^Ăŝƌ
ƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƐƐĞƚƐĂƌĞƵƐĞĚƚŽƉĞƌĨŽƌŵƚŚŝƐĂĞƌŝĂůƌĞƐƵƉƉůǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞ
ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĂĐƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚĞ-λρŽƌƚŚĞ-
130.
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚĂĨƵůůǇůŽĂĚĞĚ-λρŝƐĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨůĂŶĚŝŶŐŽŶĂƉĂǀĞĚƌƵŶǁĂǇ
ƚŚĂƚŝƐĂďŽƵƚν͕οκκĨĞĞƚŝŶůĞŶŐƚŚ͕ƚŚŝƐĂƐƐƵŵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŝůŽƚŝƐĂďůĞƚŽ
ŚŝƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞƌƵŶǁĂǇǁŝƚŚƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚǁĞĂƚŚĞƌŚĂƐŶŽ
ŝŵƉĂĐƚ͘ tĞƚƌƵŶǁĂǇƐ͕ǁŝŶĚ͕ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐĂĨĞƚǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŽƵůĚ
ůŝŬĞůǇƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚƚŚĞ-λρƐƚŽƌƵŶǁĂǇƐŽĨĂƚůĞĂƐƚρ͕κκκĨĞĞƚ͘dŚĞ-λρŚĂƐ
ƚŚƌĞĞƌƵŶǁĂǇĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐŝŶ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ;sŝůŶŝƵƐ͕aŝĂƵůŝĂŝĂŶĚ<ĂƵŶĂƐ– ƐĞĞ
dĂďůĞνͿǁŝƚŚƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůĞŶŐƚŚĨŽƌůĂŶĚŝŶŐĂĨƵůůǇůŽĂĚĞĚ-λρ 150. KŶůǇŽŶĞ
ƌƵŶǁĂǇ;ŝŶZ5ŐĂͿŝƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞŝŶ>ĂƚǀŝĂ151. ƐƚŽŶŝĂƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚǁŽĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů
ƌƵŶǁĂǇƐŽĨƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůĞŶŐƚŚ͕ĂƚdĂůůŝŶŶĂŶĚĂƚWćrnu.
150 ĨŽƵƌƚŚƌƵŶǁĂǇĂƚWĂůĂŶŐĂ͕>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŝƐŶĞĂƌůǇůŽŶŐĞŶŽƵŐŚ͕ĂŶĚŵĂǇďĞƵƐĞĚŝĨƐĂĨĞƚǇ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌůĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ-λρĂƌĞŽŶůǇŵŝŶŝŵĂůůǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ͘
151 ƐĞĐŽŶĚƌƵŶǁĂǇĂƚ>ŝĞƉĂũĂ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂŝƐůŽŶŐĞŶŽƵŐŚ͕ďƵƚŶŽƚďǇŵƵĐŚ͕ǁŚĞŶƐĂĨĞƚǇ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌůĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ -λρĂƌĞŵŝŶŝŵĂůůǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ͘
43
Table 3. Lengths of Key Baltic Runaways
dŚĞ-λνκ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐŽŶůǇĂďŽƵƚƚǁĞŶƚǇƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ
ĐĂƌŐŽŽĨĂ-λρ͕ĂŶĚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐĂďŽƵƚν͕οκκĨĞĞƚĨŽƌƐĂĨĞůĂŶĚŝŶŐ͘ ůůŽĨƚŚĞ
ƐŵĂůůĞƌƌƵŶǁĂǇƐĂƌĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĨŽƌůĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ-130 152. ůƐŽ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŐƌŽƵŶĚĂŶĚĂŝƌ-ďĂƐĞĚĂŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐŵĂǇƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŽƌĐƵƌƚĂŝůƚŚŝƐŽƉƚŝŽŶ͘
The preferred method of resupply into the Baltic States from Central
and Western NATO countries is, therefore, by land, preferably by rail.
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞŽŶůǇĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƌŽƵƚĞƐĨŽƌůĂŶĚ-ďĂƐĞĚƐƵƐƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚĂƌĞ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ͚^ƵǁĂųŬŝ'ĂƉ͛ŝŶŶŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚWŽůĂŶĚ͕ŝŶƚŽƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ
>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͘ dŚŝƐƌŽƵƚĞŝƐďŽƌĚĞƌĞĚďǇ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŝŶƚŚĞ
ŶŽƌƚŚǁĞƐƚ͕ĂŶĚĞůĂƌƵƐŝŶƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚ͘dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƚǁŽŵĂŝŶŚŝŐŚǁĂǇƐ
ƚŚĂƚƌƵŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶWŽůĂŶĚĂŶĚ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ;ƵŐƵƐƚŽǁ-^ƵǁĂųŬŝ-DĂƌŝũĂŵƉŽůĦ
ŝŶƚŚĞǁĞƐƚĂŶĚƵŐƵƐƚŽǁ->ĂǌĚŝũĂŝ-ůǇƚƵƐŝŶƚŚĞĞĂƐƚͿ͘ƐŝŶŐůĞƌĂŝůůŝŶĞŽĨ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŐĂƵŐĞŝŶWŽůĂŶĚĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶŐĂƵŐĞŝŶ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ 153 ƌƵŶƐ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽŚŝŐŚǁĂǇƐ͘ dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĂĨĞǁƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇĂŶĚ ƚĞƌƚŝĂƌǇ
ƌŽĂĚƐƚŚĂƚĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚ->ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌďĞƚǁĞĞŶĞůĂƌƵƐĂŶĚ
<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͘
152dŚĞ-λνκĐĂŶůĂŶĚƐĂĨĞůǇǁŝƚŚŝŶĂďŽƵƚν͕οκκĨƚ͘;λ͕κππŵͿ͕ĂŶĚĐĂŶĂůƐŽƵƐĞƵŶƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ
ƐƵƌĨĂĐĞƐ͘EƵŵĞƌŽƵƐŚŝŐŚǁĂǇĂƌĞĂƐĂƌĞŽƌĐŽƵůĚƌĞĂĚŝůǇďĞŵĂĚĞƐƵŝƚĂďůĞĨŽƌ-λνκŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ŝŶĂůůƚŚƌĞĞĂůƚŝĐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͘
153WĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶƌĂŝůŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝƐĚƵĂůŐĂƵŐĞ͕ĂďůĞƚŽĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚĞďŽƚŚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂŶĚ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŽůůŝŶŐƐƚŽĐŬĂŶĚůŽĐŽŵŽƚŝǀĞƐ͘
44
dŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĞĂƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞůĂŶĚƌŽƵƚĞƐŝƐĚĞŶƐĞůǇĨŽƌĞƐƚĞĚ͕ŚĂƐ
ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐƐŵĂůůďŽĚŝĞƐŽĨǁĂƚĞƌĂŶĚŶŽŵĂũŽƌƌŽĂĚƐ͘ ƐƐƵĐŚ͕ŝƚŽĨĨĞƌƐ
ƉŽŽƌŵŽďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĞĂƐŝůǇĚĞĨĞŶƐŝďůĞ͘ dŚĞ
ƚĞƌƌĂŝŶƚŽƚŚĞǁĞƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƌŽƵƚĞƐŝƐŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞŽƉĞŶ͘ DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞ
ƉŽŝŶƚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǁĞƐƚĞƌŶƌŽĂĚĂŶĚƌĂŝůůŝŶĞĐƌŽƐƐŝƐŽŶůǇĂďŽƵƚμοŵŝůĞƐ
;ξκŬŵͿĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ->ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌ͕ǁŝƚŚĂŵĂũŽƌŚŝŐŚǁĂǇ
ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂĐŽŶǀĞŶŝĞŶƚƌŽƵƚĞŽĨĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĨŽƌĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚƚŽ
ŝŶƚĞƌĚŝĐƚďŽƚŚŽĨƚŚŽƐĞƌŽƵƚĞƐ͘ dŚĞĞĂƐƚĞƌŶŚŝŐŚǁĂǇƌŽƵƚĞůĞĂĚƐĨƌŽŵ
WŽůĂŶĚƚŽsŝůŶŝƵƐŝŶ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĂŬĞǇƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶŚƵďĨŽƌƚŚĞ
ĞŶƚŝƌĞƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘
NATO RESUPPLY
dŚĞƚŚƌĞĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŵĞƚŚŽĚƐŽĨƌĞƐƵƉƉůǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ
ĨŽƌEdKĨŽƌĐĞƐ- ƐĞĂ͕ĂŝƌĂŶĚůĂŶĚ– ĞĂĐŚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ
ůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘ dŚĞƐĞĂƌŽƵƚĞƐĐĂŶďĞĚĞŶŝĞĚďǇƐĞĂŵŝŶĞƐ͕ƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐŽƌ
ůĂŶĚ-ďĂƐĞĚĂŝƌƉŽǁĞƌ͘ dŚĞĂŝƌƌŽƵƚĞƐŚĂǀĞŽŶůǇĂƐŵĂůůŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
ƌƵŶǁĂǇƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ĂŶĚĂƌĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐ͘dǁŽŽĨƚŚĞ
ƚŚƌĞĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞůĂŶĚƌŽƵƚĞƐĐĂŶďĞĞĂƐŝůǇŝŶƚĞƌĚŝĐƚĞĚĨƌŽŵ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͘
dŚĞƚŚŝƌĚ͕ĞĂƐƚĞƌŶůĂŶĚƌŽƵƚĞŝƐĐůŽƐĞƚŽƚŚĞĞůĂƌƵƐďŽƌĚĞƌ͕ĂŶĚĐŽƵůĚ
ĂůƐŽďĞŝŶƚĞƌĚŝĐƚĞĚ͕ƐŚŽƵůĚĞůĂƌƵƐĞŶƚĞƌƚŚĞǁĂƌŽŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐŝĚĞ͕Žƌ
ĂůůŽǁZƵƐƐŝĂĨƌĞĞƉĂƐƐĂŐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝƚƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͘
MITIGATION OPTIONS
dŽƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐƐĂŶĚƌĞƐƵƉƉůǇďƵƌĚĞŶŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨǁĂƌŝŶƚŚĞ
ĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕ĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇůŽǁĐŽƐƚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĐĂŶďĞƚĂŬĞŶǁĞůůŝŶ
ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŽĨa ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͘ >ĂƌŐĞĐĂůŝďĞƌĂŵŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĨƵĞůĐŽƵůĚ
ďĞƐƚŽƌĞĚŝŶǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĂƌĞĂƐĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘ 154 ŽƚŚŶĞĞĚ ƚŽďĞ
ĚŝƐƉĞƌƐĞĚƐŽĂƐƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞƐƚŽĐŬƐĨƌŽŵďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĂŶĂŝƌŽƌĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ
ƚĂƌŐĞƚ͘ WƌĞůŽĂĚŝŶŐƐŽŵĞŽƌĂůůŽĨƚŚĞĂŵŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĨƵĞůŽŶƚŽƚƌĂŝůĞƌƐ
ĨŽƌƌĂƉŝĚŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚǁŽƵůĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞŶŚĂŶĐĞƚŚŝƐŽƉƚŝŽŶ͘
/ŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĞĂƐƚĞƌŶƌŽĂĚůŝŶŬŝŶƚŽWŽůĂŶĚďǇĞŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ŚŝŐŚǁĂǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶůǇƚƵƐ͕>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂĂŶĚ<ĂƵŶĂƐ;ƌŽƵƚĞλνκǀŝĂ
ĂůďŝĞƌŝƐŬŝƐĂŶĚWƌŝĞŶĂŝͿǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂůĞƐƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƌŽƵƚĞĨƌŽŵ
154/ŶĞĂƌůǇμκλπ͕ƚŚĞh͘^͘ƌŵǇͬƵƌŽƉĞŵŽǀĞĚĂďŽƵƚο͕κκκƚŽŶƐŽĨĂŵŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŽƵƌŽƉĞƚŽ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘dŚŝƐĂŵŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŵŽǀĞĚƚŽƐƚŽƌĂŐĞůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŶĞĂƌ
DŝĞƐĂƵ͕'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŶĞĂƌŝƚƐǁĞƐƚĞƌŶďŽƌĚĞƌ͘/ƚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇλ͕οροŵŝůĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞ
ƚŽ<ĂƵŶĂƐ͕>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͘
45
WŽůĂŶĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĐĞŶƚĞƌŽĨ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͕ĂŶĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞ͕ŶŽƌƚŚǁĂƌĚŝŶƚŽ
>ĂƚǀŝĂĂŶĚƐƚŽŶŝĂ͘dŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚĂůƐŽƐŚŽƌƚĞŶƚŚĞĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ
ƌŽƵƚĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƵŐƵƐƚŽǁ͕WŽůĂŶĚĂŶĚWĂŶĞǀĦǎǇƐ͕>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂĨƌŽŵĂďŽƵƚ
νξοŬŵƚŚƌŽƵŐŚsŝůŶŝƵƐ͕ƚŽĂďŽƵƚμροŬŵ͘
THE THREAT PERSPECTIVE

dŚĞƌĞƐƵƉƉůǇŽĨŝŶǀĂĚŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐĨƌŽŵĞĂƐƚŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐǁŝůůŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇ
ĚĞƉĞŶĚƵƉŽŶŵĂũŽƌƌŽĂĚƐ͕ŽĨǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƋƵŝƚĞĨĞǁ͘ dŚĞƉŽƌƚƐŝŶ
ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĂƌĞŝŶEdK͛ƐƌĞĂƌĂƌĞĂ͕ĂŶĚŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞĂŝƌĨŝĞůĚƐĂƌĞĨĂƌĨƌŽŵ
ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌ͘ǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇ͕ƌĂŝůƌĞƐƵƉƉůǇǁŝůůďĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĂŶĚǁŝůůďĞ
ƚŚĞƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨƐƵƐƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶǀĂĚŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕
ƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂůŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶǁŝůůďĞƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĞĚďǇƌŽĂĚ͘
/ŶƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŽŶůǇƚǁŽŵĂŝŶƌŽƵƚĞƐĨƌŽŵZƵƐƐŝĂŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ
country. 155 dŚĞŶŽƌƚŚĞƌŶƌŽĂĚĂŶĚŶĞĂƌ-ƉĂƌĂůůĞůƌĂŝůƌŽƵƚĞ͕ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ^ƚ͘
WĞƚĞƌƐďƵƌŐĂŶĚdĂůůŝŶŶ͕ĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞĐŽĂƐƚůŝŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ'ƵůĨŽĨ&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂŶĚ
ƉĂƐƐďǇƚŚƌĞĞƚŽǁŶƐ͕ŽŶĞŽĨǁŚŝĐŚ– EĂƌǀĂ– ŝƐŽŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ďŽƌĚĞƌ͘ dŚĞƐŽƵƚŚĞƌŶƌŽƵƚĞĐůŝƉƐƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚĞĚŐĞŽĨƐƚŽŶŝĂĂŶĚ
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂĚŝƌĞĐƚƌŽƵƚĞƚŽZŝŐĂ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂ͘ ƌĂŝůůŝŶĞƚŽZţŐĂŝƐĂůƐŽĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ
ƚŽƚŚĞŶŽƌƚŚŽĨƚŚĞƌŽĂĚ͘ KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚŝƐĂƌĞĂĂůƐŽŽĨĨĞƌ ĂĨůĂŶŬŝŶŐ
ƌŽƵƚĞ͕ǀŝĂdĂƌƚƵ͕ƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕ƚŽǁĂƌĚƚŚĞƐƚŽŶŝĂŶĐĂƉŝƚĂůĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚ͘
dŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƌŽĂĚƌŽƵƚĞƐŝŶ>ĂƚǀŝĂƚŚĂƚŵĂǇďĞƵƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝŶǀĂĚŝŶŐ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƌĞĂůƐŽůŝŵŝƚĞĚ͘ /ĨZŝŐĂŝƐĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ͕ĞŝƚŚĞƌĨŽƌ
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽĨ ŬŶŽĐŬŝŶŐ>ĂƚǀŝĂŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƌŽƌĨŽƌŽĐĐƵƉǇŝŶŐƚŚĞ>ĂƚǀŝĂŶ
ƌŵǇŝŶŝƚƐĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ͕ƚŚĞƌŽĂĚĂŶĚƌĂŝůƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐƚŽŶŝĂŝŶƚŽ
nŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ>ĂƚǀŝĂǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨƌĞƐƵƉƉůǇ͘ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ
ƌŽĂĚĂŶĚƌĂŝůƌŽƵƚĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚZĞǌĞŬŶĞ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂ͕ŐŽŝŶŐĂůŵŽƐƚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇǁĞƐƚ
ĨƌŽŵZƵƐƐŝĂƚŽZŝŐĂǁŽƵůĚĂůƐŽůŝŬĞůǇďĞƵƐĞĚ͘
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ŝĨĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐĂůĂŶĚďƌŝĚŐĞƚŽ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚŝƐƚŚĞinitiaůŐŽĂůŽĨ
ƚŚĞŝŶǀĂĚŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞ͕ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞĐƌŽƐƐƌŽĂĚƐĂƚZĞǌŶĞŬĞĂŶĚĂƵŐĂǀƉŝůƐŝŶ
ƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ>ĂƚǀŝĂďĞĐŽŵĞƚŚĞŬĞǇůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƌŽĂĚ
ĂŶĚƌĂŝůƌĞƐƵƉƉůǇƌŽƵƚĞƐĨƌŽŵ^ƚ͘WĞƚĞƌƐďƵƌŐĂŶĚWƵƐƚŽƐŚŬĂ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂ͘
155ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚŵĂǇďĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĐƌŽƐƐ>ĂŬĞWĞŝƉƵƐ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŽĐĐƵƉŝĞƐŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
ZƵƐƐŝĂ ĂŶĚ ƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕ ǁŝƚŚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĨĞƌƌǇ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ Žƌ ĞǀĞŶ Ă ƉŽŶƚŽŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞ Ăƚ ŝƚƐ ŶĂƌƌŽǁĞƐƚ
ƉŽŝŶƚ͕ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶŽŐŽŽĚƌŽĂĚƐŽŶĞŝƚŚĞƌƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞůĂŬĞƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞƐƵƉƉůǇƌŽƵƚĞ͘
46
>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƐŚĂƌĞĂĐŽŵŵŽŶďŽƌĚĞƌǁŝƚŚZƵƐƐŝĂƉƌŽƉĞƌ͕ŽŶůǇ
ǁŝƚŚ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͘ dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶǀĂĚŝŶŐ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂďǇůĂŶĚ
ĨƌŽŵZƵƐƐŝĂƉƌŽƉĞƌǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞƌĞƐƵƉƉůŝĞĚĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ>ĂƚǀŝĂŽƌ
ĞůĂƌƵƐ͘ /ĨǁĞĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŝƐƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĂůĂŶĚ
ĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌƚŽ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͕ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞďĞƐƚ ƌŽĂĚƌŽƵƚĞŝƐĨƌŽŵĂƵŐĂǀƉŝůƐ͕
>ĂƚǀŝĂƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ<ĂƵŶĂƐ͕>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͘ ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞƌĂŝůƌŽƵƚĞƚŽ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ
ŐŽĞƐĨƌŽŵĂƵŐĂǀƉŝůƐ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂƚŽWĂŶĞǀĞǌǇƐ͕>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͕ƉĂƌĂůůĞůĞĚďǇĂ
ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇƌŽĂĚ͕ĂŶĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞƚŽ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚǀŝĂdĂƵƌĞŐĞ͘
ξρ
CHAPTER 2
Operational Assessment
Phillip A. Petersen with Phillip A. Karber and Nicholas Myers
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞĚŝĨĨĞƌƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĂƚŽĨ
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ͘/ƚŝƐŶŽƚĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌƚŚŝƐĨĂĐƚǁŚĞŶŽŶĞ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐƚŚĂƚŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŵĂĚĞƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĂǀĂůƉŽǁĞƌ͕ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ
ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŵĂĚĞZƵƐƐŝĂĂĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂů;ŝ͘Ğ͕͘ůĂŶĚͿƉŽǁĞƌ͘/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚŝƐ
ŐĞŽƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůƌĞĂůŝƚǇ͕ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĞŚĂƐĂůƐŽƉůĂǇĞĚĂĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƌŽůĞŝŶ
ƐŚĂƉŝŶŐŚŽǁŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĚĞĐŝƐŝŽn-ŵĂŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞƚǁŽĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĐƌĞĂƚĞƐ
ƉƌĞĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƵŶŝƋƵĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ͘dŚĞ
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ŽŶƚŚĞŽŶĞŚĂŶĚ͕
ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚŶŽƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐƚĂĨĨĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ͘dŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ͕ŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ͕ŚĂƐďĞĞŶ
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽŶǁĂƌĚƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂŶǇĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚƉŽƐĞĂƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƚŚƌĞĂƚĨŽƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂďƵƐĞƚŚĂƚ
ŵŝŐŚƚďĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŽĨƚŚĞZĞƉƵďůŝĐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ
&ŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ&ĂƚŚĞƌƐ͘ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĚŝƐĐŽƌĚĂŶƚǁŽƌůĚ-ǀŝĞǁƐ͕ƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ
ǁĂƌĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĨŽƌŝƚĂƌĞĂůƐŽĚŝǀĞƌŐĞŶƚ͘dŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŽĨ
ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝon – ĂƐƚŚĞ͞ďƌĂŝŶŽĨƚŚĞĂƌŵǇ͟ 156 – ƐƚĂŶĚƐĂďŽǀĞƚŚĞDĂŝŶ
^ƚĂĨĨƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐĂŶĚ͕ĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ͕ƉůĂŶƐƚŽĨŝŐŚƚĂƐŝŶŐůĞǁĂƌǁŝƚŚĞĂĐŚ
^ĞƌǀŝĐĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĂƚƐŝŶŐůĞƉůĂŶ͘dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕ŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ͕
ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞƐŝƚƐĨŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚƉůĂŶƐŝƚƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇĂ:ŽŝŶƚ^ƚĂĨĨ͘
ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͕ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŝŶǀĞƐƚĞĚ
ŚĞĂǀŝůǇŝŶƐƚƵĚǇŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶĂŶĚŝƚƐ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ͘DŽƐƚŽĨƚŚŝƐ
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚǁĂƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌŽĨďĂƚƚůĞǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞh͘^͘-^ŽǀŝĞƚ
ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŵĂŶƉŽǁĞƌ͕ƚĂŶŬƐ͕ĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ͕ĂŝƌƉůĂŶĞƐ͕ŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĂƌŚĞĂĚƐ͕
ĂŶĚŵŝƐƐŝůĞƚŚƌŽǁ-ǁĞŝŐŚƚ͘/ƚǁĂƐŶŽƚƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞŵŝĚ-λσρκƐƚŚĂƚĂŶŝŶƚĞŶƐĞĚĞďĂƚĞ
ĂƌŽƐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŵĞƚƌŝĐƐ͘ǀĞŶƚŚĞĨĂŵŽƵƐ͞-TĞĂŵǀƐ͘-
dĞĂŵ͟ĚĞďĂƚĞƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚĞĚŝŶλσρξоǁŚĞŶůďĞƌƚtŽŚůƐƚĞƚƚĞƌĂĐĐƵƐĞĚƚŚĞ/ŽĨ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇƵŶĚĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŶŐ^ŽǀŝĞƚŵŝƐƐŝůĞĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚоŵŝƐƐĞĚƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚ
ŽĨŚŽǁƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚƐŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ͘/ƚǁĂƐŶ͛ƚ
ƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĐĂĚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇďĞŐĂŶ
156
dŚŝƐƚĞƌŵǁĂƐŵĂĚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƌďǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶŚŝĞĨŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŽƌŝƐD͘^ŚĂƉŽƐŚŶŝŬŽǀ͕ǁŚŽ
ǁƌŽƚĞŝŶƚŚĞůĂƚĞλσμκƐĂƚŚƌĞĞ-ǀŽůƵŵĞƐƚƵĚǇŽŶThe Brain of the Army.
48
ƚŽŵŽǀĞĨƌŽŵ͞ďĞĂŶĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ͟ƚŽƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚŚŽǁƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨ
ƉůĂŶŶĞĚƚŽĨŝŐŚƚĂǁĂƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚƚůĂŶƚŝĐdƌĞĂƚǇKƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ;EdKͿ͘ λορ
ƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞλσρκƐĂŶĚƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞλσςκƐĂƐǇŶĞƌŐŝƐŵǁĂƐ
ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚďǇĂǇŽƵŶŐŐƌŽƵƉŽĨĂŶĂůǇƐƚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞZŽǇĂůDŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐĂĚĞŵǇĂƚ
^ĂŶĚŚƵƌƐƚ 158 ĂŶĚĂŶŝŶƚĞƌ-ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞƌ-ĂŐĞŶĐǇƚĞĂŵŽĨ WĞŶƚĂŐŽŶ
ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĂŶĂůǇƐƚƐ λοσ ďƌŽƵŐŚƚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞďĂŶŶĞƌŽĨ ͞ƉƵďůŝĐ
ĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇ͟ďǇ'ĞŶĞƌĂů ZŝĐŚĂƌĚ^ƚŝůůǁĞůů͕h͘^͘ĞƉƵƚǇhŶĚĞƌƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ
ĞĨĞŶƐĞĨŽƌ WŽůŝĐǇ. 160 ƌĂǁŝŶŐƵƉŽŶƚŚŝƐ͞ŶĞǁƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ͕͟ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐƐƵĐŚ
ĂƐƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ŝƌEŝŐĞů ĂŐŶĂůůĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂůĞƌŶŝĞ
ZŽŐĞƌƐ͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ
tŽƌŬƐŚŽƉŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚďǇtŽŚůƐƚĞƚƚĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚhǁĞEĞƌůŝĐŚ
ĂŶĚĨƵŶĚĞĚďǇŶĚǇDĂƌƐŚĂůůŽĨƚŚĞWĞŶƚĂŐŽŶ͛ƐKĨĨŝĐĞŽĨEĞƚƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ͕
ůĞĂƌŶĞĚƚŽĚĞĨĞĂƚŶŽƚ ^ŽǀŝĞƚĂƌŵƐďƵƚ^ŽǀŝĞƚƉůĂŶƐ͘ 161 ĞĨĞĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉůĂŶŵĞĂŶƚ
ĂǀŽŝĚŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂƌ͕ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞůĞƐƐŽŶ ƚŽďĞůĞĂƌŶĞĚĨƌŽŵŚŝƐƚŽƌǇƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ
ƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĨƌƵŝƚƐŽĨǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŝŶƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ͘ 162
hŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇ͕ƚŚĞtĞƐƚŚĂƐĂůůŽǁĞĚŝƚƐĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĨĨĂŝƌƐƚŽ
ĚŝƐƐŝƉĂƚĞ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƌĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐŝƚǁŝůůƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĐĂƌĞĨƵůƐƚƵĚǇƚŽĂǀŽŝĚ
ƚŚĞŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ͘/ŶƚŚŝƐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚ͕ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐƵƐĞĚďǇ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉůĂŶŶĞƌƐŝƐĂƉƌĞƌĞƋƵŝƐŝƚĞƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞĂŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶƐ͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ ƚŽƉƌĞƉĂƌĞ
ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂĨĨĂŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐto ĞǆĞĐƵƚĞƐĂŝĚƉůĂŶƐ͘
dŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ŚŽǁƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐĨŝŐŚƚŽŶĞŵƵƐƚůŽŽŬĂƚ ƚŚĞǁĂǇ

ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝǌĞƐǁĂƌƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ
ŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉŽǁĞƌƚŽƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĂƚƉŽǁĞƌ͘/ƚŝƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚŝƐ
λορ ^ĞĞ'ŽƌĚŽŶ^͘ĂƌƌĂƐƐ͕The Great Cold War: A Journey Through the Hall of Mirrors͕^ƚĂŶĨŽƌĚ͗
^ƚĂŶĨŽƌĚhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇWƌĞƐƐ͕μκκσ͕ƉƉ͘μλν-216.
158 ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌŽŶŶĞůůǇĨŝƌƐƚĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞŵ͖ƐĞĞĂƌƌĂƐƐ͕Ɖ͘μρκ͘
λοσ :ŽŚŶůĂƌŬĂŶĚZĞŝŶĂWĞŶŶŝŶŐƚŽŶĨƌŽŵŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ͖:ŽŚŶ'͘,ŝŶĞƐĂŶĚWŚŝůůŝƉ͘
WĞƚĞƌƐĞŶĨƌŽŵ/͖dŚĞŽĚŽƌĞEĞĞůĞǇĂŶĚtĂǇŶĞtƌŝŐŚƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞKĨĨŝĐĞŽĨEĂǀĂů/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ͕
EŽƚƌĂdƌƵůŽĐŬĂŶĚŚĂƌůĞƐWƌŝĐŚĂƌĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŐĞŶĐǇ͖ĂŶĚ'ƌĂŚĂŵdƵƌďŝǀŝůůĞ
ĨƌŽŵƌŵǇ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ͘ĂƌƌĂƐƐ͕Ɖ͘μπς͘
160 ĂƌƌĂƐƐ͕Ɖ͘μπς͘
161 ŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚďǇ^ƵŶdǌƵ͘^ĞĞZ͘>͘tŝŶŐ͕The Art Of Strategy: A New
Translation of Sun Tzu’s Classic The Art of War͕EĞǁzŽƌŬ͗ ŽƵďůĞĚĂǇ͕λσςς͕Ɖ͘ξο͘

162 dŚĞƐĞĞƚŚŝŶŐƌĞƐĞŶƚŵĞŶƚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĨŽƌ͞ŚĂǀŝŶŐĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚŝƚƐĞůĨƚŚĞǁŝŶŶĞƌŽĨ
ƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ͟ǁĂƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚĚƵƌŝŶŐsůĂĚŝŵŝƌWƵƚŝŶ͛ƐƚŚƌĞĞ-ŚŽƵƌƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞĂƚƚŚĞμκλξsĂůĚĂŝ
ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶ^ŽĐŚŝ͕ǁŚĞƌĞŚĞŽĨĨĞƌĞĚƚŚĞtĞƐƚĂĐŚŽŝĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐĞĚŝŶŐhŬƌĂŝŶĞĂŶĚ
ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌŽƚŚĞƌƉĂƌƚƐŽĨƵƌĂƐŝĂŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶĐůĂŝŵƐĚŽŵŝŶŝŽŶŽƌ͞ĂǁŚŽůĞƐĞƚŽĨ
ǀŝŽůĞŶƚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐ͘͟͞WƵƚŝŶŽŝĂŽŶĨƵůůĚŝƐƉůĂǇ͗dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶůĞĂĚĞƌůĂǇƐŽƵƚĂŵĞŶĂĐŝŶŐĐŚŽŝĐĞĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞtĞƐƚ͕͟The Washington Post, KĐƚŽďĞƌμς͕μκλξ͕Ɖ͘λξ͘
ξσ
ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌǇďǇǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨ
ĐƌĞĂƚĞƐĂƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƉƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐĨŽƌĂŶĚĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘ 163
Definitions
dŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ for ƚŚĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ of

ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƉŽǁĞƌ ;^ĞĞ &ŝŐƵƌĞ 4) ĂůůŽǁƐ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ to ďĞ ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞ in ƚŚĞŝƌ
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ of ĨŽƌĐĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ in any ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ĂŶĚ͕ in fact, ŚĂƐ a
ĐůĂƌŝĨǇŝŶŐ ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ƵƉŽŶ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-ŵĂŬĞƌƐ͘ In ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ
a ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ that ĂůůŽǁƐ for ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ of a ƌĂŶŐĞ of ŵĞĂŶƐ to a
ƌĂŶŐĞ of ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ͕ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ŚĂǀĞ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚ ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ in ĨŽƌĐĞ
ƵƚŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ at ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐĐĂůĞ͘ TŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ to ƐĞĞŬ victory at ƚŚĞ ůŽǁĞƐƚ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ĐŽƐƚ ;ƌŝƐŬͿ͘ tŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ŚĂǀĞ ŵĂĚĞ no ƐĞĐƌĞƚ of ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ
of ƚŚĞŝƌ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ͕ ƚŚĞ ůĂĐŬ of ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ƉĞƌƐŝƐƚƐ ĂŵŽŶŐ ŵŽƐƚ
tĞƐƚĞƌŶ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ
ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ƵƉŽŶ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ƐŽůǀŝŶŐ͘
Military Doctrine
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ŝƐ a ŚŝŐŚůǇ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ that ŽĨĨĞƌƐ a
ƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ for ƚŚĞ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĨŽƌĐĞ
ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ͘ It ŝƐ ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞĚ at ƚŚĞ
ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚ ůĞǀĞůƐ of ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ͕ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ of
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ͕ ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ͕ ĂŶĚ ĨŽƌŵƐ
of ƉƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐ for ĂŶĚ ǁĂŐŝŶŐ ǁĂƌ͘
163^ĞĞ͕ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕WŚŝůůŝƉ͘WĞƚĞƌƐĞŶĂŶĚƌƵĐĞ͘tĂůůĂĐĞ͕͞dŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů&ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ
ĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨDŝůŝƚĂƌǇWŽǁĞƌ͕͟Contra: An NFAC Journal of Alternative Views͕ƵŐƵƐƚ
λσςκ͕ƉƉ͘λο-λς΀EŽƚĞƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůĞƚŚŝƐũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚ^ĞĐƌĞƚ͕ƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞŝƚƐĞůĨŝƐ
ƵŶĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚ͘΁͖WŚŝůůŝƉ͘WĞƚĞƌƐĞŶ͕͞dŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů&ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇWŽǁĞƌ͕͟Naval War College Review͕DĂǇ-:ƵŶĞλσςλ͕ƉƉ͘λο-μξ͖WŚŝůůŝƉ͘WĞƚĞƌƐĞŶ͕The
Soviet Conceptual Framework for the Development and Application of Military Power͕-2610-
36-ςλ͕tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ͗ĞĨĞŶƐĞ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŐĞŶĐǇ͕:ƵŶĞλσσλ
50
Figure 4. Russian War Planning
Military doctrine ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ of ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐ͕ ĂŶĚ
ŽĨĨĞƌƐ ĐůĞĂƌ ŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞ for ƚŚĞ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ in ƉƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ for
ǁĂƌ͘ dŚƵƐ͕ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ŝƐ an ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ of ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ƉŽůŝĐǇ of ƚŚĞ ^ƚĂƚĞ͕ a ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ of ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͘ It ŝƐ ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚ
ĨƌŽŵ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ in that ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ŝƐ a ƵŶŝĨŝĞĚ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ of ǀŝĞǁƐ ĂŶĚ a
ŐƵŝĚĞ to action ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚ by ƚŚĞ ^ƚĂƚĞ͘
Military science, in turn, ŝƐ ͞ƚŚĞ ĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞ of ĚŝǀĞƌƐĞ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐ ĂŶĚ
ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ of aƌŵĞĚ ĐŽŵďĂƚ ďĞŝŶŐ ƐƚƵĚŝĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĂŶĂůǇǌĞĚ
for ƚŚĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ of ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ for ƚŚĞ
51
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚ of victory in ǁĂƌ͘͟ 164 tŚŝůĞ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ŝƐ ďĂƐĞĚ ƵƉŽŶ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ͕ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐĞƐ in ƚŚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ of
ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĚŽ not ďĞĐŽŵĞ ƉĂƌƚ of
ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ for ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚƵƐ ĚŽ not ĂĐƋƵŝƌĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ
of ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ^ƚĂƚĞ ǀŝĞǁƐ on ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ͘
dŚĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ƚŚĞŽƌǇ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ĚĞĨŝŶĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ďƌĂŶĐŚĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĨŝĞůĚ͘
ůĂƐƐŝĨǇŝŶŐ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ into ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ͕
ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ art ŝƐ ĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ to ďĞ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ
of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ͘ Military art ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ďŽĚǇ of ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ on ƚŚĞ
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ of ĨŽƌĐĞƐ in ĐŽŵďĂƚ͘ ͞dŚĞ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ art
ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͕ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů art, ĂŶĚ ƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ͕ ĞĂĐŚ of ǁŚŝĐŚ
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ a ǁŚŽůĞ ĨŝĞůĚ of ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ͘͟ 165 ůů ƚŚƌĞĞ ĂƌĞ͕
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ŝŶƚĞƌƌĞůĂƚĞĚ͕ iŶƚĞƌĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ͕ ĂŶĚ ƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ĞĂĐŚ ŽƚŚĞƌ͘
ŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƚŚƌĞĞ͕ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ƉůĂǇƐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ƌŽůĞ͘
Strategy
͞^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ŝƐ a ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ art ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ of
ƉƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐ for, ĂŶĚ ǁĂŐŝŶŐ͕ ǁĂƌ ĂƐ a ǁŚŽůĞ͕ ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ͘͟ 166 In ŝƚƐ
ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ĂƐƉĞĐƚ͕ it ŝƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ of ƚŚĞ
country͛Ɛ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵďĂƚ ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌƐ for ǁĂƌ͕ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐ to
ƚŚĞ ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĂƚƚĂĐŬ͕ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ͕ ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƚǇƉĞƐ of
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ on a ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ƐĐĂůĞ͘ ͞^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ
ďĂƐŝĐ ŵĞĂŶƐ for ĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŐŽĂůƐ of ǁĂƌ͘͟λπρ dŚƵƐ͕ in
ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ of ǁĂƌ͕ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐ that ͞ǁĂƌ ŝƐ a ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ of ŝŶƚĞƌƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ůĂƌŐĞ
ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐ ĂŶĚ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝǀĞ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
in a ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂů ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ͘͟ 168 ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ͞ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ for Ăůů ĨŽƌĐĞ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ͕ ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ
164 ^͘ E͘ <ŽǌůŽǀ͕ The Officer’s Handbook (Moscow: 1991)͕ tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ͕ ͗ h͘^͘ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
WƌŝŶƚŝŶŐKĨĨŝĐĞ͕Ɖ͘ξς͘
165 Ibid., Ɖ͘ορ͘
166 Ibid.
λπρ ͞ˁ̛̯̬̯̖̌̐́ʦ̨̖̦̦̌́΀DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ΁͕͟ˁ̨̡̖̯̭̏̌́ʦ̨̖̦̦̌́ˑ̶̡̨̛̛̦̣̪̖̔́΀^ŽǀŝĞƚDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ŶĐǇĐůŽƉĞĚŝĂ΁͕sŽůƵŵĞρ͕DŽƐĐŽǁ͗sŽǇĞŶŝǌĚĂƚ͕λσρσ͕Ɖ͘οοπ͘
168 Ibid., Ɖ͘οπξ͘
52
ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ŽŶĞƐ for ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ of ǁĂƌ ĂƐ a ǁŚŽůĞ ĂŶĚ for ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ of
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ of ĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞ ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ in
ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌƐ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ͘͟ λπσ ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ĞĂĐŚ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŚĂƐ ŝƚƐ ŽǁŶ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐ ƐĐŽƉĞ͕ ƚŚĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ŐŽĂů of ĞĂĐŚ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝůů ďĞ ŽŶĞ of ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĂů ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŐŽĂůƐ of
ƚŚĞ ǁĂƌ͘
Operational Art
Within ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ͛Ɛ ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ for ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ƉŽǁĞƌ͕ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ art ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ an ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŐƵŝĚĞ for
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ in ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ of ŚŝŐŚĞƌ-ůĞǀĞů ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ. dŚƵƐ͕
͞ƐƚĞŵŵŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ͕ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů art ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐ
ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ of ƉƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐ for ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ to ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ŐŽĂůƐ͕ ĂŶĚ it ŐŝǀĞƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶŝƚŝĂů ĚĂƚĂ for ƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ͘͟ λρκ In ĞƐƐĞŶĐĞ,
͞ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů art ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŶŐ ůŝŶŬ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ĂŶĚ ƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ͘͟ λρλ
It ĐŽǀĞƌƐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ of ƉƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐ ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ-ĂƌŵƐ ĂŶĚ
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ by ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ͕ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů͕ ĂŶĚ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ĨŝĞůĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ of ƚŚĞ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ of ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘ Ɛ a
ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂŶt of ƚŚĞ ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ of ƉƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐ for, ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ of,
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ to ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŐŽĂůƐ by ŵĂũŽƌ ĨŝĞůĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů
art ŝƐ ŵŽƐƚ ŽĨƚĞŶ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚ in front ĂŶĚ ĂƌŵǇ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘
Tactics
dĂĐƚŝĐƐ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĨŝŶĞĚ ůĂǁƐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ of ĂĐƚƵĂů ĐŽŵďĂƚ͕ ŵŽƐƚ ŽĨƚĞŶ
ƵƐĞĚ in ĐŽŶũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ by ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ at ƚŚĞ ůĞǀĞů of
ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ůŽǁĞƌ͘ Ɛ ƐƵĐŚ͕ ͞ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ ŽĐĐƵƉŝĞƐ a ƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞ
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ to ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů art ĂŶĚ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͕ ĂĐƚŝŶŐ in ƚŚĞŝƌ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ͕ ĂŶĚ ƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ to achŝĞǀĞ ƚŚĞ ŐŽĂůƐ ƐĞƚ for it by ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů Ăƌƚ͘͟λρμ
dŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ art ŝƐ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ to ƚŚĞ ǁĂŐŝŶŐ of
ǁĂƌ ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐ of ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ĂƌĞ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ or
ŶŽŶŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ;ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ĐŚĞŵŝĐĂů or ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů. ŽŵďĂƚ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ĂƌĞ
λπσ Ibid., Ɖ͘οπο͘

λρκ ͞ʽ̨̛̪̖̬̯̦̖̌̏ʰ̡̨̭̱̭̭̯̏΀KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌƚ΁͕͟Dictionary of Basic Military Terms͕Ɖ͘λξμ͘
λρλ Ibid.
λρμ ͞˃̡̡̛̯̌̌;ʦ̨̖̦̦̌́Ϳ΀DŝůŝƚĂƌǇdĂĐƚŝĐƐ΁͕͟Dictionary of Basic Military Terms͕Ɖ͘μλς͘
53
ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝǌĞĚ ĂƐ͗ 1) ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů͖ 2) ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů͖ or 3) ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ͘ dŚĞƐĞ ƚĞƌŵƐ͕
ĂůŽŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ͕
ĐŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĨƵůů ƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵ of
ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ or ŵĞĂŶƐ͘ ǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ cŽŶĐĞƉƚ of ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞ͕ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ to ďĞ ŽŶĞ of ƚŚĞ ŵĂũŽƌ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ art, ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐ of
ĨŽƌŵƐ that ĞǆĞŵƉůŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ ƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ of ƚŚŝƐ ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ͘
The Conceptual Framework Applied
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ŝƐ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů to ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ͛Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů
ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ for ƚŚĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ anĚ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƉŽǁĞƌ.
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ branch of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ĚĞĂůŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů͕ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ͕ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů͕ ĂŶĚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ in ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ
ĂŶĚ ˃̵̖̯̬̌̌ ʦ̵̨̖̦̦̼ ʪ̛̖̜̭̯̜̏ ;TVDƐͿ frŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƉŽŝŶƚ of ǀŝĞǁ of ƚŚĞŝƌ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚ on ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ for, ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ of, ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ of ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ into ŶŐůŝƐŚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ a ŵĂƚƚĞƌ
of ĚĞďĂƚĞ͕ λρν ŚĞƌĞ ǁĞ ǁŝůů ƵƐĞ dŚĞĂƚĞƌ of ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐƚŝŽŶ
λρν/͕ŵǇƐĞůĨ͕ŚĂǀĞŐŽŶĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ĨƌŽŵ͞ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͟;dDKͿƚŽ͞ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶ͟;dDͿƚŽĨŝŶĂůůǇƐĞƚƚůĞƵƉŽŶ͞ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶ͟;d^DͿ͘tĞƐƚĞƌŶƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƐŽŶƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͕ŝŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽ
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĞŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨds;ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂĐƌŽŶǇŵĨŽƌƚĞĂƚƌǀŽǇĞŶŶǇŬŚĚĞƐǀƚǀŝǇͿƚŽ
non-ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƐŚĂǀĞŽĨĨĞƌĞĚĂƚůĞĂƐƚƐĞǀĞƌĂůĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘dŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ;dDKͿŝƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚǁŝĚĞůǇƵƐĞĚ͘:ŽŚŶ,ŝŶĞƐĂŶĚ/ĐĂŵĞƚŽĂĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ
ĨĂǀŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͞ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶ͘͟sŝĐƚŽƌ^ƵǀŽƌŽǀ;ƐĞĞ/ZλμͬλσςξͿĂƌŐƵĞĚ
ƚŚĂƚdsŵĞĂŶƐ͞ƚŚĞĂƚƌĞŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƐĐĂůĞ͕͟ďƵƚŚĞĂůƐŽĂƌŐƵĞĚĨŽƌĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƵƐĞ
ŽĨdsƚŽĚŝƐĐŽƵƌĂŐĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶĂŶĂůǇƐƚƐĨƌŽŵĚŝƐƚŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƚŽĨŝƚƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ
ƉƌĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ͘ůƐŽƐĞĞ>d:ŽŚŶ'͘,ŝŶĞƐĂŶĚƌ͘WŚŝůůŝƉ͘WĞƚĞƌƐĞŶ͕͞dŚĞ ŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
^ǇƐƚĞŵŽĨŽŶƚƌŽůĨŽƌdŚĞĂƚĞƌtĂƌ͕͟ŝŶ^/'E>͕ĞĐĞŵďĞƌλσςπ͕ƉƉ͘σρ-110.
͞tĞĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚ^ƵǀŽƌŽǀ͛ƐƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶďƵƚĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚŚŝƐĂĚǀŝĐĞ͘ĞĐĂƵƐĞdsĚŽĞƐ
ŶŽƚŵĞĂŶĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŽŵŽƐƚtĞƐƚĞƌŶƌĞĂĚĞƌƐ͕ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞǀĞƌǇůŝŬĞůǇƚŽŵĂŬĞŝŶĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ
ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ͘tĞďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞĂŶĚƵƐĞĨƵů
ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚĞƌŵŝƐ͕ĂƐ^ƵǀŽƌŽǀƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ͕ƚŚĞĂƚƌĞŽĨƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĂĐƚŝŽŶ;d^DͿ͘
͞/ŶƚŚĞλσςν^ŽǀŝĞƚDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŶĐǇĐůŽƉĞĚŝĐŝĐƚŝŽŶĂƌǇĂŶĚŝŶĂλσςο^ŽǀŝĞƚďŽŽŬĚĞǀŽƚĞĚƚŽ
ĐůĂƌŝĨǇŝŶŐĂŶĚƵƉĚĂƚŝŶŐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇ͕ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶ;ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƉůƵƌĂůŝŶ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ͕ƚŚĞŶŐůŝƐŚĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚŝƐƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌͿĂƐƵƐĞĚŝŶdsŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶŽŶĂ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƐĐĂůĞ͘dŚĞƐĂŵĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐƉŽŝŶƚŽƵƚƚŚĂƚƐŵĂůůĞƌƐĐĂůĞĂĐƚŝŽŶĂƚƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚ
ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůůĞǀĞůƐŝƐďŽǇĞǀŝǇĞĚĞǇƐƚǀŝǇĂ͕ǁŚŝĐŚůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇŵĞĂŶƐ͞ĐŽŵďĂƚĂĐƚŝŽŶ͘͟dŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ͕
͞ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕͟ŝŶƚŚĞǁŝĚĞůǇƵƐĞĚƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ͞ƚŚĞĂƚƌĞŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͟;dDKͿ͕
thĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŝƐĂŵŝƐƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ͘
DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ͕dDKĨĂŝůƐƚŽĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞƚŽƚŚĞŶŽŶ-ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚǁŚĂƚĂŶǇ^ŽǀŝĞƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉůĂŶŶĞƌ
ŐƌĂƐƉƐŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇǁŚĞŶŚĞŚĞĂƌƐƚŚĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶds– ƚŚĂƚŝƐĂƌĞŐŝŽŶŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĨŽƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
54
;d^DͿ͘ DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ŶĂǀĂů ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ĂƐ an
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ŝƚƐ ďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐ͘
dŚĞ ďƌŽĂĚĞƐƚ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ in ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ŝƐ that of ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ of ǁĂƌ
;˃̖̯̬̌ ʦ̨̜̦̼ or TV). ͞ ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ of ǁĂƌ ĚŽĞƐ not ŚĂǀĞ ƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ
ďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐ͘ EŽƌŵĂůůǇ͕ it ĞŵďƌĂĐĞƐ ŽŶĞ ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ŝƚƐ ĐŽŶƚŝŐƵŽƵƐ
ǁĂƚĞƌ ĂƌĞĂƐ or ŽŶĞ ŽĐĞĂŶ ǁŝƚŚ ŝƚƐ ĐŽĂƐƚƐ͕ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŝƐůĂŶĚƐ ĂŶĚ
ĂƌĐŚŝƉĞůĂŐŽĞƐ ůŽĐĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ŝƚƐ ĐŽŶĨŝŶĞƐ͘ In ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚŝƐ͕ ƚŚĞ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ of a ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ of ǁĂƌ ŝƐ ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ƵƐĞĚ in ƚŚĞ ƐĞŶƐĞ of ƚŚĞ
ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ͙͘͟ λρξ ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ͞ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌƐ of ǁĂƌ can
ĂůƐŽ ďĞ ƐƵďĚŝǀŝĚĞĚ into ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌƐ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ͘͟ λρο ;^ĞĞ
&ŝŐƵƌĞ 5) tŚŝůĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ƉůĂŶŶĞƌƐ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ of a
ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ of ǁĂƌ ĂŶĚ ŶŽƚĞ that it ǁĂƐ a ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ by ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵǇ of
dƐĂƌŝƐƚ ZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ ƚŚĞǇ ůŝŵŝƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ to
ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌƐ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ action.
dŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ haƐ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ action
;d^DͿ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ĂƐ that ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ǁŚŽƐĞ ůŝŵŝƚƐ a ŬŶŽǁŶ
ƉĂƌƚ of ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ of ƚŚĞ country or ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚƐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
in ǁĂƌƚŝŵĞ͘ dŚĞĂƚĞƌƐ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ action ŵĂǇ ďĞ conƚŝŶĞŶƚƐ or
ŽĐĞĂŶƐ ;ƐĞĂƐͿ͘ ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ at ƚŚĞ ĞŶĚ of ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ƉůĂŶŶĞƌƐ ĞŶǀŝƐŝŽŶĞĚ ĨŝǀĞ ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂů ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌƐ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ action,
ƚŚĞ ůŽƐƐ of ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ-ĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĚĞƉƚŚ that ŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ
ƚŚĞ ĐŽůůĂƉƐĞ of ƚŚĞ tĂƌƐĂǁ WĂĐƚ ĂŶĚ͕ ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ hŶŝŽŶ͕
ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚ in a ƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ ĨŝǀĞ to ƚŚƌĞĞ͘ dŚƵƐ͕ by ƚŚĞ ĞŶĚ of ƚŚĞ λσσκƐ͕
ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ĞŶǀŝƐŝŽŶĞĚ ƚŚƌĞĞ ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂů d^DƐ͗ 1) tĞƐƚĞƌŶ or
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ͖ 2) ^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶ͖ ĂŶĚ 5) ĂƐƚĞƌŶ͘ ;^ĞĞ &ŝŐƵƌĞ 2) In ƚĞƌŵƐ of
ŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ d^DƐ͕ four ĂƌĞ Ɛƚŝůů ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚ͗ 1) ƚůĂŶƚŝĐ KĐĞĂŶ͖ 2) WĂĐŝĨŝĐ
KĐĞĂŶ͖ 3) /ŶĚŝĂŶ KĐĞĂŶ͖ ĂŶĚ 4) ƌĐƚŝĐ KĐĞĂŶ͘ λρπ dŚŝƐ ůĞĨƚ four
ŝŶƚĞƌĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂů d^DƐ͗ 1) EŽƌƚŚ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ͖ 2) ^ŽƵƚŚ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ͖ 3)
ĂĐƚŝŽŶŽŶĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƐĐĂůĞ͘͟:ŽŚŶ'͘,ŝŶĞƐĂŶĚWŚŝůůŝƉ͘WĞƚĞƌƐĞŶ͕͞ŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚ^ǇƐƚĞŵ
ŽĨŽŶƚƌŽů͗ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞĂƚƌĞǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕͟/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨĞŶƐĞZĞǀŝĞǁ͕EŽ͘νͬλσςπ͖ƌĞƉƌŝŶƚĞĚŝŶ
ƵƌƌĞŶƚEĞǁƐ͕&ƌŝĚĂǇ͕:ƵŶĞμκ͕λσςπ͘
λρξ ͞˃̖̯̬̌ʦ̨̜̦̼͕΀dŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨtĂƌ΁͕͟ˁ̨̡̖̯̭̏̌́ʦ̨̖̦̦̌́ˑ̶̡̨̛̛̦̣̪̖̔́[Soviet Military
Encylopedia΁͕sŽůƵŵĞς͕DŽƐĐŽǁ͗sŽǇĞŶŝǌĚĂƚ͕λσςκ͕Ɖ͘σ͘
λρο Ibid.
λρπ ͞˃̖̯̬̌ʦ̵̨̖̦̦̼ʪ̛̖̜̭̯̜̏΀dŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨDŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐƚŝŽŶ΁͟ˁ̨̡̖̯̭̏̌́ʦ̨̖̦̦̌́
ˑ̶̡̨̛̛̦̣̪̖̔́[Soviet Military Encyclopedia΁͕sŽůƵŵĞς͕DŽƐĐŽǁ͗sŽǇĞŶŝǌĚĂƚ͕λσςκ͕ƉƉ͘ς-σ͘
55
ĨƌŝĐĂŶ͖ ĂŶĚ 4) ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂŶ͘ ͞ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ to ƚŚĞŝƌ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ͕ d^DƐ ĂƌĞ ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚ ĂƐ ŵĂŝŶ or ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ͘͟ λρρ
Figure 5. Theaters of Strategic Military Action

Within ĞĂĐŚ d^D ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ŽŶĞ or ŵŽƌĞ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ̛̦̪̬̣̖̦̖̌̌̏, ǁŚŝĐŚ
ŵĂǇ ďĞ ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĚ ĂƐ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ͕ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ͕ or ĂǆŝƐ͘ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ
ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐ of a ǁŝĚĞ ƐƚƌŝƉ of ůĂŶĚ or ƐĞĂ͕ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĂŝƌƐƉĂĐĞ ĂďŽǀĞ͕ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ of ŽŶĞ ǁĂƌƌŝŶŐ ƉĂƌƚǇ to ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ͛Ɛ ŵŽƐƚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů-ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĐĞŶƚĞƌƐ͘ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂƌĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶ by
ĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ of fronts, ĨůĞĞƚƐ͕ or ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ĂƌŵŝĞƐ or ĨůŽƚŝůůĂƐ͘ dŚƵƐ͕
͞Ă ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ƵƐƵĂůůǇ ƉĞƌŵŝƚƐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ by ŵĂŶǇ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ of ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ͘͟ λρς
λρρ ͞ď̸̵̵̡̨̛̛̖̯̬̯̬̯̖̖̭̖̦̦̼̌̐ʪ̛̖̜̭̯̜̏΀ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶ΁͕͟
ŝĐƚŝŽŶĂƌǇŽĨĂƐŝĐDŝůŝƚĂƌǇdĞƌŵƐ͕Ɖ͘μμκ͘
λρς ͞ˁ̸̡̨̛̯̬̯̖̖̭̖̌̐ʻ̛̪̬̣̖̦̖̌̌̏΀^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ΁͕͟Dictionary of Basic Military Terms͕Ɖ͘
214.
56
^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚ of ŽŶĞ or ŵŽƌĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ͘ Ŷ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ a ǌŽŶĞ of ƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ͕ ǁĂƚĞƌ͕ or ĂŝƌƐƉĂĐĞ͕ ĂŶĚ
ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ a ĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ of ƚŚĞƐĞ͕ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘ Within ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ of ƚŚĞ d^D in ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞǇ
ůŝĞ͕ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŵĂǇ bĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů or ĐŽĂƐƚĂů͘ &ŝŐƵƌĞ 6 ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ
ŚŽǁ ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ to ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ǁĂƌ in ĞŶƚƌĂů
ƵƌŽƉĞ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ.
Figure 6. Soviet TSMA boundaries in the European Theater of War

The System of Strategic Leadership
dŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ a ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ that ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚ to ƚŚĞŝƌ ŚŝŐŚůǇ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚ ǀŝĞǁ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ͘ ĞĨĞŶƐĞ ŽƵŶĐŝů ;ˁ̨̖̯̏ ʽ̨̨̬̦̼̍) ƵŶŝĨŝĞĚ ƚŚĞ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĂŶĚ ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ to ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝǌĞĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ͘ dŚŝƐ ĞĨĞŶƐĞ ŽƵŶĐŝů ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ
^ƵƉƌĞŵĞ ,ŝŐŚ ŽŵŵĂŶĚ ;^,Ϳ ;ŝŶ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ͕ ʦ̵̨̨̖̬̦̖̏
ʧ̨̡̨̨̛̣̦̥̦̦̖̌̏̌̔̏̌ or VGK). dŚĞ ^, ǁĂƐ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ for ͞ĚŝƌĞĐƚ
ορ
ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ of ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ both in ƉĞĂĐĞƚŝŵĞ ĂŶĚ in ǁĂƌ͘͟ λρσ It
ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂƌƚ of ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ to ďĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ of
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ;^ĞĞ &ŝŐƵƌĞ ρ). dŚĞ ƚǁŽ ŬĞǇ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ of ƚŚŝƐ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ǁĞƌĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ^, ŝƚƐĞůĨ͘ dŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ĂŶĚ ͞ƐƵƉƌĞŵĞ ŽƌŐĂŶ of
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ͟ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ,ĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ͕ ^, ;ŝŶ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ˁ̡̯̌̏̌ ʦʧʶ). dŚĞ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ŽƌŐĂŶ of ƚŚĞ ^,͕ ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ͕ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ
ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ͘ dŚĞ ƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚ ͞ŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ŽƌŐĂŶƐ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ͕͟ ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƚŚŝƌĚ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞĚ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ of ĨŽƌŵĂů
,ŝŐŚ ŽŵŵĂŶĚƐ of &ŽƌĐĞƐ ;,K&Ϳ or ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ of ,ĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ
;,YͿ ^, ĂŶĚ ǁĞƌĞ ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ to ĞǆƚĞŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŶƚƌŽů by ƚŚĞ
,Y ^, out to ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ĞŶŐĂŐĞĚ in ĐŽŵďĂƚ͘ dŚĞ fourth
ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ǁĂƐ ĂůƐŽ a ƐǇƐƚĞŵ of ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ͕ in ƚŚŝƐ ĐĂƐĞ an
ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ of ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ͘ 180 dŚĞƐĞ ^, ƐƚĂĨĨ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ
ĞŶƐƵƌĞĚ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ of ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ĚŽǁŶ to ƚŚĞ ůĞǀĞů of ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ
ĂŶĚ ĨůŽƚŝůůĂ͘
KŶ ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ 10, 2013, ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ sůĂĚŝŵŝƌ WƵƚŝŶ ƐŝŐŶĞĚ an ŽƌĚĞƌ
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĞĨĞŶƐĞ ŽŶƚƌŽů ĞŶƚĞƌ ;EͿ ǁŚŝĐŚ͕
ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ to >ƚ͘ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů DŝŬŚĂŝů DŝǌŝŶƚƐĞǀ͕ ƐĞƌǀĞƐ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ
^ƵƉƌĞŵĞ ,ŝŐŚ ŽŵŵĂŶĚ ;^,Ϳ͘ 181
λρσ ŽůŽŶĞůD͘W͘^ŬŝƌĚŽ͕The People, the Army, the Commander͕DŽƐĐŽǁ͗λσρκͿ͕ĂƐƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĚďǇ

h͘^͘ƌŵǇ&ŽƌĐĞ͕^ŽǀŝĞƚDŝůŝƚĂƌǇdŚŽƵŐŚƚ^ĞƌŝĞƐ͕EŽ͘λξ͕tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ͗'WK͕Ɖ͘λκσ͘
180 ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŵĂǇŚĂǀĞĐŽŵĞĨƌŽŵŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞDĂŝŶ^ƚĂĨĨƐ͘
181 ͞dŚĞĐůŽƐĞƐƚĂŶĂůŽŐǇŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚĂƐŬƐǁĂƐƚŚĞŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ-in-ŚŝĞĨ
,YŝŶλσξλ-ξο͕ǁŚŝĐŚĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝǌĞĚĂůůĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐŽĨďŽƚŚƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŵĂĐŚŝŶĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵǇŽĨ
ƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƌ͕͟>ƚ͘'ĞŶĞƌĂůDŝŬŚĂŝůDŝǌŝŶƚƐĞǀ͕ƚŚĞEĐŚŝĞĨ͕ƚŽůĚ
>ĞŶƚĂ͘ƌƵ ŝŶĂŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ͘͟^ĞĞ͞ZƵƐƐŝĂůĂƵŶĐŚĞƐ͚ǁĂƌƚŝŵĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͛,YŝŶŵĂũŽƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ƵƉŐƌĂĚĞ͕͟RT͕ĞĐĞŵďĞƌλ͕μκλξ͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƌƚ͘ĐŽŵͬŶĞǁƐͬμλκνκρ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂ-ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ-
ĐĞŶƚĞƌͬ
58
Figure 7. The Soviet System of Strategic Leadership
dŚĞ E͕ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƐ 52 ĨĞĚĞƌĂů ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚƌĞĞ
ƐƚĂƚĞ-ŽǁŶĞĚ ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ ŝƐ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ— ĂƐ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
^ƵƉƌĞŵĞ ,ŝŐŚ ŽŵŵĂŶĚ ;^,Ϳ – by ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ĂƐ ŝƚƐ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ͘ 182 ͞dŚĞ ŶĞǁ ĐĞŶƚĞƌ ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ŽŶƚƌŽů ĞŶƚĞƌ
of ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ EƵĐůĞĂƌ &ŽƌĐĞƐ ;ǁŚŝĐŚ ŽǀĞƌƐĞĞƐ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ of ƵƐĞ of ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ of
ŵĂƐƐ ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶͿ͕ ƚŚĞ ŽŵďĂƚ ŽŶƚƌŽů ĞŶƚĞƌ ;ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐ ƚŚƌĞĂƚƐͿ
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĂŝůǇ ĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ŽŶƚƌŽů ĞŶƚĞƌ ;ǁŚŝĐŚ ĚĞĂůƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƉƌŽĐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚ
ŝƐƐƵĞƐͿ͘͟ 183 DĂŶŶĞĚ by ŽǀĞƌ ͞λ͕κκκ ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ on a rotĂƚŝŶŐ ǁĂƚĐŚ
182 ͞tŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐEĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨĞŶƐĞŽŶƚƌŽůĞŶƚĞƌ͗,Žǁ/ƚtŽƌŬƐ͍͟KƌŝŐŝŶĂůůǇĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚĂƚ
Rusplt͕ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĚďǇDŝŬŚĂŝůůĞǆĂŶĚƌŽǀŝĐŚĨŽƌ^ŽƵƚŚ&ƌŽŶƚ͕ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬƐŽƵƚŚĨƌŽŶƚ͘ŽƌŐͬƌƵƐƐŝĂƐ-
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ-ĐŽŶƚƌŽů-ĐĞŶƚĞƌ-ǁŽƌŬƐ͕DĂǇλξ͕μκλο
183 ͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐEĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨĞŶƐĞŽŶƚƌŽůĞŶƚĞƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůǇƚĂŬĞƐƵƉĐŽŵďĂƚĚƵƚǇ͕͟TASS͕ĞĐĞŵďĞƌλ͕
2014, ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬƌĂƐƐ͘ƌƵ͘ĞŶͬƌƵƐƐŝĂͬρπξξςκ ^ĞĞĂůƐŽ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂKƉĞŶƐEĞǁEĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨĞŶƐĞŽŶƚƌŽů
οσ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ͕͟ ĂŶĚ ĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐ a ŶĞǁ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ƐƵƉĞƌĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ
ƐĂŝĚ to ďĞ ĐĂƉĂďůĞ of ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ͞οκ >ĞŶŝŶ >ŝďƌĂƌŝĞƐ in a ƐĞĐŽŶĚ͕͟ ƚŚĞ
E ŝƐ ĐůĂŝŵĞĚ to ďĞ ĂďůĞ to ŵŽĚĞů ĐƌŝƐŝƐ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶǇǁŚĞƌĞ in ƚŚĞ
ǁŽƌůĚ͘ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ĞĨĞŶƐĞ DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ^ĞƌŐĞy ^ŚŽǇŐƵ ŝŶƐŝƐƚƐ that ƚŚĞ E
͞ǁŝůů ĂůůŽǁ for ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ of ƚŚĞ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ͕ to ĚĞǀĞůŽƉ ǁĂǇƐ to
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ to ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ƉƌŽŵƉƚůǇ ĂŶĚ to ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬŝŶŐƐ of
ĨĞĚĞƌĂů ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ďŽĚŝĞƐ in ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ͘͟
dŚĞ ͞ŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ŽƌŐĂŶƐ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ͟ ǁĞƌĞ a ƐŽƵƌĐĞ of
ŵƵĐŚ ĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐǇ in ƚŚĞ tĞƐƚ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ůĂƐƚ ĚĞĐĂĚĞƐ
ďĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽůůĂƉƐĞ of ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ hŶŝŽŶ͘ dŚĞ ŵĂũŽƌ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
an ,K& ĂŶĚ an ,Y ^, ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ĚĞŐƌĞĞ of ƚŚĞŝƌ
ƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐŝǌĞ of ƚŚĞŝƌ ƐƚĂĨĨƐ͘ In fact, ĞĂĐŚ ,ŝŐŚ ŽŵŵĂŶĚ͕
ũƵƐƚ ůŝŬĞ ƚŚĞ ^,͕ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞĚ of ŝƚƐ ŽǁŶ ŚĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƐƚĂĨĨ͘
dŚĞ ,Y ^, ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ͕ on ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŚĂŶĚ͕ ǁĂƐ ŵŽƌĞ of a ĐƌŝƐŝƐ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ͘ ,Ğ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ŵŽƌĞ ůŝŬĞůǇ to ŚĂǀĞ ŽŶůǇ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂĨĨ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ of a
ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ƐŵĂůů ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŐƌŽƵƉ that ĐŽƵůĚ ŵŽǀĞ ƋƵŝĐŬůǇ to ƐŽůǀĞ
ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ but ŵŽƌĞ ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ͘ ^ƵĐŚ a ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ͕
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ĐŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ĂůƐŽ ĚƌĂǁŶ ƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂĨĨƐ of fronts ĂŶĚ ĨůĞĞƚƐ ǁŚŽ
ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌŝůǇ ǁĞƌĞ ƵŶĚĞƌ ŚŝƐ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů͘ ,Y ^, ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ĐŽƵůĚ ĞǀĞŶ
ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĚŝƐƉĂƚĐŚĞĚ to ŽǀĞƌƐĞĞ ǁĂƌƐ of ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͘ &Žƌ
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ in ƚŚĞ ĞĂƌůǇ λσςκƐ͕ &ŝƌƐƚ ĞƉƵƚǇ DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ of ĞĨĞŶƐĞ WĞƚƌŽǀ
ĂŶĚ ^ŽŬŽůŽǀ ƐĞƌǀĞĚ ĂƐ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ of ƚŚĞ ,Y ^, to ͞ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ͟
ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ in ƚŚŝŽƉŝĂ ĂŶĚ ĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶ͘ ŽƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ-in-
ŚŝĞĨ ;/EͿ of a ,K& ĂŶĚ a ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ of ,Y ^, ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ŚĂĚ
ƚŚĞ ĨƵůů authority of ƚŚĞ ,Y ^, ĂŶĚ ǁŽƵůĚ ƉƌŽďĂďůǇ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ďĞ
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ of ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ͘ ƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĂů ĚĞĐĂĚĞ of ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
hŶŝŽŶ͕ /E͛Ɛ of ,K&Ɛ ǁĞƌĞ ĂƐƐŝŐŶĞĚ to ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ in four of ƚŚĞ
ĨŝǀĞ ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌĂů ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂů d^DƐ͘
'ŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ ůŽƐƐ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĚĞƉƚŚ in ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ƵƌŽƉĞ͕ ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ ĞƌĂ ƌŽůĞƐ
of DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐ ĂƐ iŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ of ŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ of ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ĞĐŚĞůŽŶ
ĂƌŵŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ fronts for ŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ůĞǀĞů ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐ ƐĞĞŵĞĚ
ŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ͕ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŶŐ͕ ĂŶĚ ĞǀĞŶ ŝŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ͘ ŚŝĞĨ of ƚŚĞ
ĞŶƚĞƌ͗dĞĐŚ^ĂǀǀǇĂŶĚWƌŽŵƉƚ͕͟Military & Intelligence͕:ĂŶƵĂƌǇλμ͕μκλξ͕ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚĂƚ

ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬƐƉƵƚŶŝŬŶĞǁƐ͘ĐŽŵͬŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇͬμκλξλμκλͬλκλονοςπξλ͘Śƚŵů
60
'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ zƵƌŝǇ ĂůƵǇĞǀƐŬŝǇ ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚůǇ ĨůŽĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ of ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ
KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŽŵŵĂŶĚƐ ;K^ or OSK) ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ĂǇŬĂů-2006, but
͞ĚŝĚŶ͛ƚ ŵĂŶĂŐĞ to ďƌĞĂŬ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ of ĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐ ǁŚŽ
ĚŝĚŶ͛ƚ ǁĂŶƚ to ƐŚĂƌĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ authority ǁŝƚŚ OSK ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐ͘͟ 184 ĨƚĞƌ
ƐŽŵĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ͕ it ǁĂƐ ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ to ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ of Ăůů ĨŽƌĐĞƐ in a DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ to that ,ĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ
ĚƵƌŝŶŐ Zapad-2009. dŚĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ǇĞĂƌ͕ ƚŚĞ ŚŝĞĨ of ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů
^ƚĂĨĨ ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚ that ͞ƚŚĞ ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŶĞƐƐ of ƚŚĞ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚ by
ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚ ͚Vostok-2010͛ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ in
ƚŚĞ &Ăƌ ĂƐƚ͘͟ 185 :ƵůǇ 6, 2010 ĚĞĐƌĞĞ ƐŝŐŶĞĚ by ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ
ŵŝƚƌŝǇ DĞĚǀĞĚĞǀ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ƚŚĞ K^<Ɛ by ƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶƵŵďĞƌ of
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐ to four ĂŶĚ ŐŝǀŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ of ƚŚĞ
ĨŽƌĐĞƐ on ƚŚĞŝƌ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĞƐ͘ ;^ĞĞ &ŝŐƵƌĞ 8).
Figure 8. Russian Regional Military Commands
184 ͞tŝůů'ĞŶƐŚƚĂďĂŶĚK^<ƐZĞƉůĂĐĞƚŚĞ'ůĂǀŬŽŵĂƚǇ͍͕͟ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĞĨĞŶƐĞWŽůŝĐǇ͕:ƵůǇμσ͕μκλκ͕
ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚĂƚŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬƌƵƐƐŝĂŶĚĞĨƉŽůŝĐǇ͘ǁŽƌĚƉƌĞƐƐ͘ĐŽŵͬƚĂŐͬŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ-ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚͬ
185 'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŚŝĞĨDĂƌŬĂƌŽǀ͛ƐWƌĞƐƐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ͕:ƵůǇλξ͕μκλκ͕ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚĂƚ
ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬƌƵƐƐŝĂŶĚĞĨƉŽůŝĐǇ͘ǁŽƌĚƉƌĞƐƐ͘ĐŽŵͬƚĂŐͬŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ-ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚͬ
61
dŚĞ fourth ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ of ^, ƐƚĂĨĨ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ͘ dŚĞŝƌ ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ function ǁĂƐ to
ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ to ĞŶƐƵƌĞ that ƚŚĞ ŽǀĞƌĂůů ƉůĂŶƐ of ƚŚĞ
^, ǁĞƌĞ ďĞŝŶŐ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĞĚ͘ dŚĞǇ ĂůƐŽ ƐĞƌǀĞĚ ĂƐ a ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ĐŽŶĚƵŝƚ for
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ůŽǁĞƌ ůĞǀĞů ƵŶŝƚƐ ĂŶĚ both ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ DĂŝŶ ^ƚĂĨĨƐ of ƚŚĞ ĨŝǀĞ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ͘ dŚŝƐ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ
ĨŽƌŵĞĚ tŚĞ ďĂƐŝƐ for ƌĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ͕ ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ͕ ĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘ dŚĞ ƐƚĂĨĨ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ǁĞƌĞ
ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ of ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ǁŝƚŚ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ or
ǁĞƌĞ ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ DĂŝŶ ^taff of ƚŚĞ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ǁŚŽ ĂƐƐŝƐƚĞĚ͕ on ďĞŚĂůĨ
of ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ͕ in ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝǌĞĚ ĂƌĞĂƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ air, ĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ͕ ĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌ
ĂŶĚ ŶĂǀĂů ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ͘ tŚŝůĞ ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ nor ƚŚĞ DĂŝŶ ^ƚĂĨĨƐ
of ƚŚĞ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ĨŽƌŵĂůůǇ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞĚ any ĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ ƚŚŝƐ ĞŶƚŝƌĞ ƐƚĂĨĨ
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚ a ƐŚĂĚŽǁ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ
ƐƵƉĞƌŝŵƉŽƐĞĚ by ^, ƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĂů ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ͘ dŚĞ
ŝŶƚĞŶƚ ǁĂƐ to ŬĞĞƉ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ on ƚŚĞ ^,͛Ɛ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ than on ŵŽƌĞ ŶĂƌƌŽǁůǇ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ of ƚŚĞ
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ or of ůŽǁĞƌ ůĞǀĞů ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐ͘
ŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ in ^ŽǀŝĞƚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ that, ǁŚĞŶ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ͕
ƚŚĞ /E of an ,K& in a ŐŝǀĞŶ d^D ǁŽƵůĚ ĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚĞ ŚŝƐ ŽǁŶ ŚŝŐŚ ůĞǀĞů
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ to ŽǀĞƌƐĞĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ by ŐƌŽƵƉƐ of fronts on ĚŝǀĞƌŐŝŶŐ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ d^D͘ TŚĞƐĞ ,ŝŐŚ ŽŵŵĂŶĚ
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ /E͛Ɛ ŽǁŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐŽƵŶĐŝů͕
ŚŝƐ ĐŚŝĞĨ of ƐƚĂĨĨ͕ ĐŚŝĞĨƐ of ƚŚĞ ŵĂũŽƌ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ŚŝƐ ƐƚĂĨĨ or
ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ of ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ͘ dŚĞ ƵƐĞ of ƐƵĐŚ ,ŝŐŚ
ŽŵŵĂŶĚ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ǁĂƐ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ in tŽƌůĚ War II, ĂŶĚ
ŽŶůǇ ƌĂƌĞůǇ ǁĞƌĞ ƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐ ĐĂůůĞĚ to ƚŚĞŝƌ /E͛Ɛ
ŚĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ to ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞ ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐ͘ dŚĞ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ǁĂƌ in ƚŚĞ ŽŶďĂƐ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ that ƚŚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ of ĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ to ďĞ a ƵƐĞĨƵů ƚŽŽů to ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ to
ĞŶƐƵƌĞ that ƚŚĞ ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐ of ƚŚĞ ^, ĂƌĞ ďĞŝŶŐ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚ͘
62
Post-Soviet Operational-Strategic Planning and Exercises
'ƌĞĂƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐŝĂŶƐ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚDĂũŽƌ'ĞŶĞƌĂů/͘E͘sŽƌŽďǇŽǀ͕
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚƚŚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ
ŽĨ^ŽǀŝĞƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌǇ͘IŶƚŚĞλσρκƐ-λσςκƐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨoƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ 186 ƚŚĂƚĐƵůŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ in
Zapad-1981͘dŚŝƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞǁĂƐ͞ƵŶƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚĞĚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŵĞŶĂŶĚƋƵĂŶƚŝƚǇŽĨĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ͘dŚĞƐĞŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌƐƌĞŚĞĂƌƐĞĚĂŶ
ŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞďǇ^ŽǀŝĞƚĂŶĚĂůůŝĞĚƚƌŽŽƉƐŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĂƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ǁĂƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ
EdKďůŽĐ͘͟ λςρ
dŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞλσςκƐ, ^ŽǀŝĞƚŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐ ƐƵĐŚĂƐDĂƌƐŚĂůůEŝŬŽůĂŝ

KŐĂƌŬŽǀǁŽƌŬĞĚ ƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉƚŚĞƚĂďůĞŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĞ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƌĞŚĞĂƌƐĞĚŝŶZapad-1981. dŚŝƐǁĂƐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚďǇ
ƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐƚŽƐĞůĨ-ƉƌŽƉĞůůĞĚĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇĂŶĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ-ĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚƚƵďĞƐ
ďǇοκй͘DŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƚƌƵĐŬƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŚĂĚƚŽďĞĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ-ĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚƚŽŬĞĞƉƚŚĞ
ŶĞǁĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇĨŽƌĐĞƐƐƵƉƉůŝĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŵŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨǁĂƌ͘dŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ
ƚŽŽŬĂŚĞĂǀǇƚŽůůŽŶƚŚĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇƐůƵŐŐŝƐŚ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ͘ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ/
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ͕ƐŽŵĞξκйŽĨĨŽŽĚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŝŵƉŽƌƚƐĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽŐĞƚƚŽ
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨĂůĂĐŬŽĨƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚ͘
dŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽůůĂƉƐĞŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶŽĨ^ŽǀŝĞƚ^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚZĞƉƵďůŝĐƐ
;h^^ZͿ ŝŶλσσλůĞĚƚŽĂŚŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ^ŽǀŝĞƚƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͘
ZƵƐƐŝĂǁĂƐŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌĂďůĞƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚǁŽŵŝůůŝŽŶŵĞŶŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ĞĐŚĞůŽŶ͕ƐŝǆŵŝůůŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĞĐŚĞůŽŶ͕ĂŶĚƚǁŽŵŝůůŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƚŚŝƌĚĞĐŚĞůŽŶ.
TƌŽŽƉƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĂŶĚǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐŚĂĚƚŽďĞĐƵƚ͕ĂƐƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌĐŽƌƉƐŝƚƐŽǁŶƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ͘
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ĂŶĚ EdK air ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ ďĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĂŶŐĞ of air ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐ in ƚŚĞ
ĂůŬĂŶƐ ĂŶĚ in /ƌĂƋ ŚĂĚ a ƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚ ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ŝŵƉĂĐƚ on ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ in ƚŚĞ λσσκƐ. ,ĂǀŝŶŐ ďƌŽƵŐŚƚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů art to ŝƚƐ
ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚ ůĞǀĞů in ŚƵŵĂŶ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ͕ it ǁĂƐ ĚĞǀĂƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ to ƐĞĞ ĞŶĞŵǇ
ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ĚĞƐƚƌŽǇ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ĞƋƵŝƉƉĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ ŚĂƌĚǁĂƌĞ ĂŶĚ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ͛Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ͘ ƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ
ĚĞĐĂĚĞ͕ ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞĚ to ƉƵƚ in ƉůĂĐĞ a ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ
ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐ to ƚŚĞ ƌĂƉŝĚůǇ ĞǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ of ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ.
186 DĂũŽƌ'ĞŶĞƌĂů/͘E͘sŽƌŽďǇŽǀĂŶĚŽůŽŶĞůs͘͘<ŝƐĞůĞǀ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇƌƚ͗,ŝƐƚŽƌǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ
WƌĞƐĞŶƚ͕͟Military Thought͕sŽůƵŵĞλ͕μκλκ͘
λςρ dŝŵŽĨĞǇŽŐĂŶŽǀ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂĂŶĚĞůĂƌƵƐ:ŽŝŶ&ŽƌĐĞƐĂƚĂƉĂĚ-μκκσ͕͟KM-Novosti͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ
μσ͕μκκσ͘
63
dŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ of a ŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ-ďĂƐĞĚ
ĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ that ǁĂƐ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ƵŶƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂůůǇ ĂŶĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ.
Ɛ ŽŶĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĂŶĂůǇƐƚ ĐŽŐĞŶƚůǇ ƐƵŵŵĂƌŝǌĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ͕
ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ͞λσσμ-2008, ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ƌŵǇ ǁĂƐ a ƐŚƌŝŶŬŝŶŐ
ŝƚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ of ŝƚƐ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ ƉƌĞĚĞĐĞƐƐŽƌ͘ It ǁĂƐ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇ ŝůů-ƐƵŝƚĞĚ to
ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ ŵŝůŝƚĂry-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ͕ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛Ɛ ŐƌĞĂƚůǇ ƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ͕ ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ŶĞǁ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ-ďĂƐĞĚ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƐŽĐŝĂů
ƐĞƚƵƉ͘͟ 188
dŚĞƌĞ ǁĞƌĞ ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ four ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ĚƌŝǀŝŶŐ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ WůĂŶŶŝŶŐ
ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶŝƚŝĂů ƉŽƐƚ-^ŽǀŝĞƚ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ͘ dŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ that
ƚŚĞ noncontact ĂŶĚ ŶĞƚĐĞŶƚƌŝĐ ƐƚǇůĞ of ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ŽďǀŝĂƚĞĚ ŵĂƐƐŝǀĞ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƉůĂŶŶĞĚ by ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ
ŚĞŝŐŚƚ of ƚŚĞ ^ĞĐŽŶĚ tŽƌůĚ War. ^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ͕ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ŽǀĞƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ of
ŶĞǁ ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ĂŶĚ ǁĂǇƐ in ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞǇ ǁŽƵůĚ ĞŶĂďůĞ ƚŚĞ
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů WƌŽŵƉƚ 'ůŽďĂů ^ƚƌŝŬĞ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ƉƌŽŵƉƚĞĚ
ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ of a ŶĞǁ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ of ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĂƌŚĞĂĚƐ ĂŶĚ
ŝŶǀŝŐŽƌĂƚĞĚ ƐĞĂƌĐŚ for ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ ƐƵƌǀŝǀĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ŵŽďŝůŝƚǇ͘
dŚŝƌĚůǇ͕ tŚĞƐĞ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĐŽŵƉŽƵŶĚĞĚ by ƚŚĞ ůŽƐƐ of
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĚĞƉƚŚ, ǁŚŝĐŚ ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚĂƚĞĚ ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ in ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ of
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ-ĂŶĚ-ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ to ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ of ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘ &ŽƵƌƚŚůǇ͕
a ŶĞƚ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ of ƚŚĞ ŽǀĞƌĂůů ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ůĞĚ to a
ƐĞĂrch for ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐ ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƐ a ŵĞĂŶƐ of ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŶŐ for
ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚ ŝŶĨĞƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ͘
To ƌĞĨůĞĐƚ ŶĞǁ ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ĂŶĚ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ƌĞĂůŝƚŝĞƐ͕ tŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ-ĞƌĂ
EŽƌƚŚǁĞƐƚĞƌŶ͕ tĞƐƚĞƌŶ͕ ĂŶĚ ^ŽƵƚŚǁĞƐƚĞƌŶ d^DƐ in ƚŚĞ tĞƐƚĞƌŶ
dŚĞĂƚĞƌ of War ǁĞƌĞ ĚŽǁŶŐƌĂĚĞĚ to ƚŚƌĞĞ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ in ŽŶĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ tĞƐƚĞƌŶ or ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ d^D ;^ĞĞ &ŝŐƵƌĞ σ). dŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƚǁŽ
ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂů d^DƐ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ to ĂƐ ^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶ ;^ĞĞ &ŝŐƵƌĞ 10)
ĂŶĚ ĂƐƚĞƌŶ ;^ĞĞ &ŝŐƵƌĞ 11).
188DŝŬŚĂŝůĂƌĂďĂŶŽǀ͕͞,ĂƌĚ>ĞƐƐŽŶƐ>ĞĂƌŶĞĚ͗ZƵƐƐŝĂŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇZĞĨŽƌŵƵƉƚŽƚŚĞ'ĞŽƌŐŝĂŶ
ŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͕͟ŝŶŽůďǇ,ŽǁĂƌĚĂŶĚZƵƐůĂŶWƵŬŚĂŽǀ͕Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis
in Ukraine, DŝŶŶĞĂƉŽůŝƐ͕ED͗ĂƐƚsŝĞǁWƌĞƐƐ͕μκλξ͕Ɖ͘ςς͘
64
Figure 9. Western (European) TSMA
Figure 10. Southern TSMA
65
Figure 11. Eastern TSMA
ŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƚǇƉĞƐ of ƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ for ĞĂĐŚ of ƚŚĞƐĞ ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂů

d^DƐ͗ tĞƐƚĞƌŶ or ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ – ͞ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞ ĂƌŵŝĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ ĨŽƌŵƐ ĂŶĚ
ŵĞĂŶƐ of non-contact ƵƐĞ of ƐƚĂƚĞ-of-ƚŚĞ-art ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ͖͟
^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶ – ͞ŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ŐƵĞƌƌŝůůĂ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ͖͟ ĂŶĚ
ĂƐƚĞƌŶ – ͞Ă ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ to ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ůĂƌŐĞ
ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ĂŶĚ ĨŝƌĞƉŽǁĞƌ in ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ĂƌĞĂƐ͘͟ λςσ
dŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ of ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ƚŚƌĞĞ ĐŽƌĞ ƚŚĞŵĞƐ͗ 1) that ŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐ ͞ĞƚŚŶŝĐ ĂŶĚ
ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ͟ ŝƐ not ĚŝƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌ to ǁĂŐŝŶŐ ͞ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶĂů ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͟λσκ
λςσ ŚŝĞĨŽĨƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐDĂŝŶ^ƚĂĨĨ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂEĞĞĚƐDŽďŝůĞ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͕͟ITAR-TASS͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ
μν͕μκκσ͘
λσκ ^ĞĞ:ŽŚŶ:͘zƵƌĞĐŚŬŽ͕Coalition Warfare: The Soviet Approach͕<ŽůŶ͗ƵŶĚĞƐ-ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĨƺƌ
ŽƐƚǁŝƐƐĞŶĐŚĂĨƚůŝĐŚĞƵŶĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂǇŝŽŶĂůĞ^ƚƵĚŝĞŶ͕λσςπ͘zƵƌĞĐŚŬŽ͛ƐǁŽƌŬŽŶ͞ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶĂů
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͟ĂůƐŽƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĨŽƌŝƚƐŽǁŶƐĂŬĞ͕ĂƐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐƚŽƉůĂŶ
66
ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ both ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ that ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ƉůĂŶŶĞĚ
for anĚ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚ͖ 2) that ͞ŶŽŶ-ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ͟ ĂŶĚ ͞ŶĞƚĐĞŶƚƌŝĐ͟ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ
ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ a ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ a ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ŵĂƐƐĞĚ ĂƌŵǇ to ŚŝŐŚůǇ
ŵŽďŝůĞ ĨůĞǆŝďůĞ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ that ŵĂǇ ďĞ ƌĂƉŝĚůy ƌĞĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĞĚ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
ĐŽƵƌƐĞ of ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͖ ĂŶĚ 3) that ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ĂƌĞ to ďĞ ĨƵůůǇ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ
into ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƉůĂŶ in ĐĂƐĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƵƐĞ ďĞ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ to ŝƐŽůĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ
ǌŽŶĞ of ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ĂŶĚ ďƌĞĂŬ ƚŚĞ ǁŝůů of ƚŚĞ ŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ
to ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ ƚŚĞ ǁĂƌ͘
Ethnic and Religious Divisions
dŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵĞ – ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ to ĚĞĨĞŶĚ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ λσλ of ĂŶĚ to ĞǆƉůŽŝƚ ĞƚŚŶŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ –
ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ of ĞǀĞƌǇ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ
ĐĂƌƌŝĞĚ out in ƚŚĞ Zapad ;tĞƐƚͿ ĂŶĚ Vostok ;ĂƐƚͿ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ƐĞƌŝĞƐ͕ ĂƐ ǁĞůů
ĂƐ in a ŶƵŵďĞƌ of ŽƚŚĞƌ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ of ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ƐĐĂůĞ, ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ in ƚŚĞ ƉŽƐƚ-
^ŽǀŝĞƚ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ. tŚŝůĞ ŵŽƐƚ tĞƐƚĞƌŶ ĂŶĂůǇƐƚƐ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĚŝƐŵŝƐƐŝǀĞ of
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ĐůĂŝŵƐ that ŝƚƐ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ͞ĂŶƚŝ-
ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚ͟ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ƐĐĂůĞ ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ for ĐŽŵďĂƚŝŶŐ
ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ ŵĂŬĞƐ ĞŵŝŶĞŶƚůǇ ŐŽŽĚ ƐĞŶƐĞ ŐŝǀĞŶ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ǀŝĞǁƐ about ƚŚĞ
ŶĂƚƵƌĞ of ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ in ƚŚĞ ƉŽƐƚ-^ŽǀŝĞƚ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ͘ tŚĞƌĞĂƐ ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů
^ƚĂĨĨ ŚĂĚ ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞĚ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƉůĂŶƐ for ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ƐĐĂůĞ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ d^DƐ ĂŶĚ on ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ͕ ŶĞǁ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ŚĂĚ ŽďǀŝĂƚĞĚ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ĨŽƵŶĚĞĚ on ƚŚĞ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚEdKǁŝƚŚĂŶĞǇĞƚŽǁĂƌĚďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐĂůůŝĂŶĐĞĐŽŚĞƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ͘/ŶƚŚĞW-μκκσ
ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ͕ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ͞ƉůĂǇĞĚ͟&ƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂƐďĞŝŶŐƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽŚŽŶŽƌ
ƚŚĞŝƌEŽƌƚŚƚůĂŶƚŝĐdƌĞĂƚǇKƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƌƚŝĐůĞ&ŝǀĞŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ– ŝ͘Ğ͕͘ƚŚĞǇƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚŶĞƵƚƌĂů
ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ͘dŚŝƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ&ƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇŚĂǀĞĐŽŶǀĞǇĞĚƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂ
ŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞŽĨĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ͘
λσλ DŽƐĐŽǁŚĂƐǁĞůů-ĨŽƵŶĚĞĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐŵ͕ŶŽƚŽŶůǇŝŶƚŚĞĂƵĐĂƐƵƐďƵƚĂůƐŽ
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐ^ŝďĞƌŝĂĂŶĚ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͘͞WƵƚŝŶŚĂƐƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƌĞĐĞŶƚƵƉƐƵƌŐĞŝŶƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚ
ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŝŶ^ŝďĞƌŝĂďǇƵƐŝŶŐŚŝƐƉŽůŝĐĞƉŽǁĞƌƐƚŽďůŽĐŬƉůĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƌĐŚĞƐŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨ
ĨĞĚĞƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞŶǁŝƚŚŚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐƚŽƐŚŝĨƚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌŝĞƐĂŶĚ
ůĂƵŶĐŚĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨŵĞŐĂƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐŝŶƚŚĂƚƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘͟WĂƵů'ŽďůĞ͕͞WƵƚŝŶ͛ƐĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚWůĂŶĨŽƌ
^ŝďĞƌŝĂƌŝǀĞŶďǇ&ĞĂƌƐŽĨ^ĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐŵƵƚDĂǇ^ƉĂƌŬDŽƌĞ͕ŶĂůǇƐƚ^ĂǇƐ͕͟Window on Eurasia,
^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌο͕μκλξ͘͞<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͛ƐŶŽŶ-ĐŽŶƚŝŐƵŽƵƐůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ͕ŝƚƐĐůŽƐĞŶĞƐƐƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚμοƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨŝƚƐƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐŚĂǀĞ^ĐŚĞŶŐĞŶǀŝƐĂƐĂŶĚπκƉĞƌĐĞŶt
ŚĂǀĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉĂƐƐƉŽƌƚƐĂůůŚĂǀĞƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨŵĂŬŝŶŐĞǀĞƌŵŽƌĞ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚĞƌƐůŽŽŬƚŽǁĂƌĚ
ƵƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŽǁĂƌĚZƵƐƐŝĂƉƌŽƉĞƌ͘͟WĂƵů'ŽďůĞ͕͛͞^ŝďĞƌŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ͛/ĚĞĂ^ƉƌĞĂĚƐ
ƚŽ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚĂŶĚ<ƵďĂŶ͕͟Window on Eurasia͕ƵŐƵƐƚλν͕μκλξ͘
πρ
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ of ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞĂƚ WĂƚƌŝŽƚŝĐ War ;λσξλ-λσξοͿ ĂŶĚ ŵĂĚĞ
ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂry by ƚŚĞ ŽůĚ War ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ of 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ.
ŶĞǁ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ of ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ŝƐ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ for
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ĐĂƉĂďůĞ of ĚĞĨĞĂƚŝŶŐ ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ
in a ŶŽŶůŝŶĞĂƌ ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ͘ Ŷ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ of ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ƐĐĂůĞ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ in λσσσ ƐŚŽǁƐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ to that ǁŚŝĐŚ
WƵƚŝŶ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ǁĂŐŝŶŐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ hŬƌĂŝŶĞ. dŚŝƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ: 1) ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů
ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ of ĂŝƌďŽƌŶĞ ƚƌŽŽƉƐ to ďůŽĐŬ a ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚ ŝŶĐƵƌƐŝŽŶ ĂƐ ƉĂƌƚ of
Vostok-2003͖ 2) ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ͞ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚ ĂŶĚ ƌĂĚŝĐĂů ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ-
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚ ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ or ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĂĚŝĐĂů ŐƌŽƵƉƐ͟ ĂƐ ƉĂƌƚ of
Vostok-2005͖ 3) ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŚŝŶĞƐĞ ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ĐŽŵďĂƚ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ͕ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐŵ ĂŶĚ ĞǆƚƌĞŵŝƐŵ in ŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ 2005
ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ Vostok-2005͖ 4) ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ of ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ĂƌŵĞĚ
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ͞ŝůůĞŐĂů ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ͟ ĂŶĚ ͞ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ͟ in
Vostok-2007͖ 5) ĐŽŵďĂƚŝŶŐ an ƵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ by ƚŚĞ WŽůŝƐŚ ŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇ in ĞůĂƌƵƐ
in Zapad-2009͖ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ 6) ŝŶƚĞƌĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ of ŝůůĞŐĂů ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ in
Zapad-2013. dŚĞƐĞ ĂƌĞ ŽŶůǇ a ĨĞǁ ƐĞůĞĐƚ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ to ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞ that ƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƐ ĂŶĚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƉƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐ for ƚŚĞ
ŶĂƚƵƌĞ of ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘
tŚĞŶ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů sĂůĞƌǇ 'ĞƌĂƐŝŵov, ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŚŝĞĨ of ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ͕
ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ŝŶĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ in a
ƐƉĞĞĐŚ to ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ĐĂĚĞŵǇ of DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ in January 2013, λσμ ŚĞ
ǁĂƐ ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ ĂŶƐǁĞƌƐ to ƚŚĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚƌĞĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ͗
1) What ŝƐ ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ǁĂƌ͍
2) What ƐŚŽƵůĚ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵǇ ďĞ ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ ĨŽƌ͍
3) ,Žǁ ƐŚŽƵůĚ it ďĞ ĂƌŵĞĚ͍
In ĂŶƐǁĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƚŚƌĞĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ͕ 'ĞƌĂƐŝŵŽǀ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ that ͞ǁĂƌ in

ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ŝƐ not ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ͟, ĂŶĚ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ that ͞ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ͕ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů͕ ĂŶĚ ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ůĞǀĞůƐ͕ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ
λσμdŚŝƐ ƐƉĞĞĐŚǁĂƐůĂƚĞƌƌĞǁŽƌŬĞĚĂŶĚƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚĂƐĂŶĂƌƚŝĐůĞ͘^ĞĞs͘s͘'ĞƌĂƐŝŵŽǀ͕͞ˉ̨̖̦̦̭̯̽
ʻ̡̛̱̌̏ʿ̛̛̛̬̖̖̦̔̏̔͟΀dŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŝŶĨŽƌĞĐĂƐƚŝŶŐ΁͕ʦ̨̨̖̦̦-ʿ̨̬̥̼̹̣̖̦̦̼̜ʶ̱̬̖̬̽,
ƵŐƵƐƚμκλν͘dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐĂĚĞŵǇŽĨDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞŝƐŚĞĂĚĞĚďǇƌŵǇ'ĞŶĞƌĂůD͘͘'ĂƌĞĞǀ͘
^ĞĞ hůƌŝŬ &ƌĂŶŬĞ͕ War by non-military means: Understanding Russian information warfare,
^ƚŽĐŬŚŽůŵ͗^ǁĞĚŝƐŚĞĨĞŶƐĞZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŐĞŶĐǇ͕&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇλς͕μκλο͕Ɖ͘ξλ͘
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ĂŶĚ ĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ ĂƌĞ ďĞŝŶŐ ĞƌĂƐĞĚ͘͟ In ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ǁĂƌ ͞ƚŚĞ
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ďƌŽĂĚ ƵƐĞ of ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů͕ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ͕ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂů͕ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ͕ ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ
ŶŽŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌy ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ— ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ in ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƚĞƐƚ
ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů of ƚŚĞ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ͘͟ ^ƚŝůů ďĞŝŶŐ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ ͞Ăůů ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ
ƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚ by ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŵĞĂŶƐ of a ĐŽŶĐĞĂůĞĚ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ͕ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ
ĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐ out ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ of ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ of ƐƉĞĐŝĂů-
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What ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵǇ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ for, ŶŽƚĞĚ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů 'ĞƌĂƐŝŵŽǀ͕ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ
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ƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ front thrŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ĞŶƚŝƌĞ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ of ƚŚĞ ĞŶĞŵǇ
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What ŝƐ ŶĞǁ about ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ͞ŶĞǁ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͟ ŝƐ a ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ of
͞ĚĞĞƉ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͟ that ĞǆƚĞŶĚƐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚout ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ of
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ƵƚŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĨŽƌĐĞ ĂŶĚ͕ ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ͕ in ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ of ƐŚĂƉŝŶŐ
a ĨĂǀŽƌĂďůĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ to ƚŚĞ ƵƚŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ of
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λσν dŚŝƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚďǇŝĞŐŽZƵŝǌ-WĂůŵĞƌŽĨEdK,ĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐĂƚƚŚĞ:ƵŶĞ
μκλοƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇtŽƌŬƐŚŽƉŝŶ&ůŽƌĞŶĐĞ͕/ƚĂůǇ͘
λσξ 'ƌĞŐŽƌǇ<ĂƌĂƐŝŶ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĞƉƵƚǇ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ͕ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĂŶĞĨĨŽƌƚ͞ƚŽ
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƵƚŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĨŽƌĐĞ͟ǁŚĞŶŚĞǁĂƌŶĞĚhŬƌĂŝŶĞ
ƚŚĂƚƌĞůǇŝŶŐŽŶĂŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽĞŶĚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚ͞ƌĞďĞůůŝŽŶ͟ŝŶƚŚĞŽŶďĂƐ
ǁŽƵůĚďĞ͞ƚŚĞďŝŐŐĞƐƚ͕ĞǀĞŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ͟ĂŶĚĐŽƵůĚ͞ůĞĂĚƚŽŝƌƌĞǀĞƌƐŝďůĞĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ
ĨŽƌhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͛ƐƐƚĂƚĞŚŽŽĚ͘͟dŚĂƚƚŚŝƐĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐďƵůůǇŝŶŐǁĂƐŶŽƚƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůůǇĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĞĚĐĂŶďĞ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚ͞ŶĞǁŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘͟
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ƐŽĐŝĂů ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ͘͟ λσο It ĞǀĞŶ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ĂƐ ͞ƚŚĞ
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĨŽƌĐĞ͕ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů͕ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ͕
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ non-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŵĞĂŶƐ͕ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ
ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƵƐĞ of ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƚĞƐƚ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů of ƚŚĞ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƐƉĞĐŝĂů
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘͟ dŚŝƐ, ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ to ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ĞĨĞŶƐĞ DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ^ĞƌŐĞǇ
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ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞ 52 ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ into ͞Ă ƐŝŶŐůĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ƐƉĂĐĞ for
ƐŽůǀŝŶŐ ƚĂƐŬƐ in ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ of ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛Ɛ ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ͘͟ λσπ
dŚĞ <ƌĞŵůŝŶ ƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚŝƐƚ͕ ŵŝƚƌǇ <ŝĞƐĞůĞǀ͕ ŵĂĚĞ ĐůĞĂƌ that ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵǇ
ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇ ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ for ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ǁŚĞŶ ŚĞ ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ
͞ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƌ ŝƐ ŶŽǁ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ ƚǇƉĞ of ǁĂƌ͕ ƉƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇ for
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ͘͟ ͞ĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ͟ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ǁŽƌĚ ŚĞƌĞ͕ ƐŝŶĐĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ ͞ĚĞƌŝǀĞĚ ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ĨƌŽŵ spetspropaganda ;ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂͿ
ƚŚĞŽƌǇ͕ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ ĨŝƌƐƚ ƚĂƵŐŚƚ ĂƐ a ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ in λσξμ at ƚŚĞ
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ /ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ of &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƐ͘͟ λσρ ŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐ to ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĂŶĚ ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ in spetspropaganda, ͞ƚŚĞ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ŝƐ ŶŽǁ ŬŶŽǁŶ
ĂƐ ƚŚĞ DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƐ ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ of ƚŚĞ
λσο ͞ŵŝĚŐƌŽǁŝŶŐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶŝƐďĂĐŬŝŶŐĂŶƚŝ-ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞ
΀ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ΁ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ͕͟DĂƌŝŶĞ>ĞWĞŶĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞƌĨĂr-ƌŝŐŚƚ&ƌŽŶƚEĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ
ŵŽŶĞǇĨƌŽŵĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ŽǁŶĞĚďĂŶŬ͕ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇ͛ƐƚƌĞĂƐƵƌĞƌƐĂŝĚ͞ǁŽƵůĚďĞƵƐĞĚƚŽĨŝŶĂŶĐĞ
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶŐĞǆƉĞŶƐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞůĞĂĚƵƉƚŽƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶμκλρ͘͟͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶůŽĂŶƐ
ŚĂǀĞĂůƐŽďĞĞŶĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽ'ƌĞĞĐĞ͛ƐŶĞŽĨĂƐĐŝƐƚ'ŽůĚĞŶĂǁŶƉĂƌƚǇ͕ĞůŐŝƵŵ͛ƐsůĂĂŵƐĞůĂŶŐ͕
/ƚĂůǇ͛ƐEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ>ĞĂŐƵĞ͕,ƵŶŐĂƌǇ͛Ɛ:ŽďďŝŬĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ƌĞĞĚŽŵWĂƌƚǇŽĨƵƐƚƌŝĂ͘ůůŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĞǆĐĞƉƚƚŚĞ'ŽůĚĞŶĂǁŶǁĞƌĞŝŶǀŝƚĞĚƚŽŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌŝŵĞĂǀŽƚĞŽŶũŽŝŶŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂĂŶĚĂůů
ŽĨĨĞƌĞĚƚŚĞŝƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĂŶŶĞǆĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚ-ĞĂƐƚĞƌŶhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘͟͞ZƵƐƐŝĂĨƵŶĚƐ
&ƌĞŶĐŚEĂƚŝŽŶĂů&ƌŽŶƚ͗ŝƐDŽƐĐŽǁƐŽǁŝŶŐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƵŶƌĞƐƚ͍͟
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƚŚĞǁĞĞŬ͘ĐŽ͘ƵŬͬĞƵƌŽƉĞͬπλξσςͬƌƵƐƐŝĂ-ĨƵŶĚƐ-ĨƌĞŶĐŚ-ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů-fron-ŝƐ-ŵŽƐĐŽǁ-
ƐŽǁŝŶŐ-ĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ-ƵŶƌĞƐƚ ͕οͬλοͬλπ͕λλ͗μρD͘^ĞĞĂůƐŽ͕,ĞŶƌǇZŝĚŐǁĞůů͕͞&ƌĞŶĐŚ&Ăƌ-ƌŝŐŚƚ
EĂƚŝŽŶĂů&ƌŽŶƚZĞǀĞĂůƐZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝŶŐ͕͟Voice of America͕EŽǀĞŵďĞƌμο͕μκλξ͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ǀŽĂŶĞǁƐ͘ĐŽŵͬĐŽŶƚĞŶƚͬĨƌĞŶĐŚ-ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů-front-ƌĞǀĞĂůƐ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂŶ-
ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝŶŐͬμονξλςξ͘Śƚŵů /ƚŝƐǁŝĚĞůǇŬŶŽǁŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶĨŝŶĂŶĐŝŶŐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂů&ƌŽŶƚ͘ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽZŽŵĂŶŽďƌŽĐŚŽƚŽǀ͕Ă͞ũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚĂŶĚ
ĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚ͟ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ͞dŚĞ/ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ͕͟ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ͞ĂƐŵĂůůŐƌŽƵƉŽĨ
ĨƌĞĞůĂŶĐĞũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚƐĂŶĚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐŝŶDŽƐĐŽǁĨŝŶĂŶĐĞĚďǇĂĚƐ͕ĐƌŽǁĚĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ͕ĂŶĚ͚ĂĨĞǁ
ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ͕͙͛ŝƚŝƐŶŽƐĞĐƌĞƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶŝƐĐŽ-ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝŶŐƵůƚƌĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚŐƌŽƵƉƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ
͚ďůĂĐŬ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů͕͛ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞŐƌŽƵƉƐŽƌŐĂŶŝǌŝŶŐĂŶƚŝ-DĞƌŬĞůĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘͟
:ƵƌŝZĞƐĐŚĞƚŽ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶǀŽŝĐĞƐĨŽƌƐĂůĞŝŶŵĞĚŝĂǁĂƌŽŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͕͟DW.com, 04.02.2016.
λσπ ͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐEĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨĞŶƐĞŽŶƚƌŽůĞŶƚĞƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůǇƚĂŬĞƐƵƉĐŽŵďĂƚĚƵƚǇ͕͟TASS͕ĞĐĞŵďĞƌλ͕
2014, ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬƌĂƐƐ͘ƌƵ͘ĞŶͬƌƵƐƐŝĂͬρπξξςκ
λσρ :ŽůĂŶƚĂĂƌĐǌĞǁƐŬĂ͕The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A
Case Study͕tĂƌƐĂǁ͗ĞŶƚĞƌĨŽƌĂƐƚĞƌŶ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ͕DĂǇμκλξ͕Ɖ͘σ͘
ρκ
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ of ƚŚĞ DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ of ĞĨĞŶƐĞ of ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͘͟ λσς dŚŝƐ ŶĞǁĨŽƵŶĚ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ on ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ĂƐ a
ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ of ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ of ƚŚĞ WƵƚŝŶ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ͛Ɛ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ to ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞ ǁŝƚŚ tĞƐƚĞƌŶ
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐŝĞƐ͘ hŶĂďůĞ to ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞ in ƚŚĞ ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ǁŽƌůĚ͕ WƵƚŝŶ ŚĂƐ ƐŽƵŐŚƚ
out a ƉůĂĐĞ for ZƵƐƐŝĂ ŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐ ǁŚĂƚ it cannot ďĞ — a ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ƐƚĂƚĞ
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ to ŚƵŵĂŶ ĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ͘ dŚŝƐ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŵŝŵŝĐƐ ƚŚĞ ůŽŶŐ-ƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚ ĂƐ ͞ŝĨ you ǁŝůů not ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ŵĞ͕ ƚŚĞŶ /͛ůů
ŵĂŬĞ you ĨĞĂƌ ŵĞ͘͟ That ŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ͞ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ͟
ŐƵŝĚŝŶŐ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚ by
WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ /ŐŽƌ WĂŶĂƌŝŶ of ƚŚĞ ŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ ĐĂĚĞŵǇ in ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ of &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ ĨĨĂŝƌƐ͘ In ŚŝƐ ǁŽƌŬ Information Warfare and the
World, WĂŶĂƌŝŶ ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐ ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ of ƚŚĞ 21Ɛƚ ĞŶƚƵƌǇ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ to ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ by sůĂĚŝŵŝƌ WƵƚŝŶ in ŚŝƐ λσσσ
ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚŽ Russia at the Turn of the Millennium.
Russia Today ;ŶŽǁ RT) ƐĞƌǀĞƐ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĨůĂŐƐŚŝƉ of ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
͞ĂĚǀĞƌƚŝƐŝŶŐ͟ to ͞ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇ for ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ͘͟ ^Ğƚ ƵƉ by
ƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂů ĚĞŐƌĞĞ in 2005, ƚŚĞ μξͬρ ĐŚĂŶŶĞů ďƌŽĂĚĐĂƐƚŝŶŐ in ŶŐůŝƐŚ͕
ƌĂďŝĐ͕ ĂŶĚ ^ƉĂŶŝƐŚ ŚĂƐ an ĂŶŶƵĂů ďƵĚŐĞƚ of ŽǀĞƌ $300 ŵŝůůŝŽŶ͘ λσσ tŚŝůĞ
ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͛Ɛ ƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ Ăƌŵ ŚĂƐ a ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ to ͞ŐŝǀĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ ƉŽŝŶƚ of ǀŝĞǁ on ǁŽƌůĚ ĞǀĞŶƚƐ͕͟ 200 it ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĐĂƵŐŚƚ ƵƐŝŶŐ ĨĂŬĞ
λσςIbid.
λσσĚǁĂƌĚĞůŵĂŶ͕͞tŚĞŶŝƐĂdsŚĂŶŶĞůĂ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶŐĞŶƚ͍͟ZĞƵƚĞƌƐ͕Ɖƌŝůμμ͕μκλο͘/ŶƐƉŝƚĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞďƵĚŐĞƚĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ŶŽǁďĞŝŶŐĞŶĚƵƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞWƵƚŝŶƌĞŐŝŵĞĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĐůŝŶĞŽĨĞŶĞƌŐǇ
ƉƌŝĐĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞtĞƐƚ͛ƐƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌǀŝŽůĂƚŝŶŐhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͛ƐƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ͕ƚŚĞ
ďƵĚŐĞƚĨŽƌRT ŝƐ͞ƐĞƚƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞďǇξλйƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶ- ĂŶĚ&ƌĞŶĐŚ- ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĐŚĂŶŶĞůƐ͘͟
WĞƚĞƌWŽŵĞƌĂŶƚƐĞǀĂŶĚDŝĐŚĂĞůtĞŝƐƐ͕͞dŚĞDĞŶĂĐĞŽĨhŶƌĞĂůƚŝǇ͗,ŽǁƚŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶ
tĞĂƉŽŶŝǌĞƐ/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ͕ƵůƚƵƌĞĂŶĚDŽŶĞǇ͕͟The Interpreter͕/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŽĨDŽĚĞƌŶZƵƐƐŝĂ͕Ɖ͘
6.
200 ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞĚƵďŝŽƵƐĂŶŶĂůƐŽĨĐůŝŵĂƚĞ-ĐŚĂŶŐĞĚĞŶŝĂů͕ƚŚĞ
ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇMerchants of Doubt ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƐƚŚŝƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨƉĂƐƐŝŶŐĂƐĨĂĐƚ-ďĂƐĞĚŚĂƌĚŶĞǁƐ

ƚŚĞƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚ͞ŝŶǀĂůƵĂďůĞŽƚŚĞƌƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇ͟ƚŚĂƚĂŶƵŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐtĞƐƚĞƌŶ ƉƌĞƐƐĂŶĚ
ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĂĞĂŐĞƌƚŽĂŵƉůŝĨǇŵŝƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŶĂŵĞŽĨ͞ĨĂŝƌŶĞƐƐĂŶĚďĂůĂŶĐĞ͟ƚŽĂŶ
ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůůǇůĂǌǇƉƵďůŝĐƐĞƌǀĞƐĂƐĂƐŽďĞƌŝŶŐĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨ͞ŚŽǁƚƌŝďĂůĨĞĂůƚǇƚƌƵŵƉƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ
ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ͘͟^ĞĞŶŶ,ŽƌŶĂĚĂǇ͕͞^ƉŝŶŶŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨĐŽŶƚƌŽůǁŝƚŚĂĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌĨŽƌŵƵůĂ͕Washington Post,
DĂƌĐŚλν͕μκλο͘
ρλ
ƉŝĐƚƵƌĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĨĂŬĞ ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ of ĂůůĞŐĞĚ hŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶ ĂƚƌŽĐŝƚŝĞƐ͘ 201 Ɛ
ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ by ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ of ƚŚĞ ĂƌĚŝĨĨ ^ĐŚŽŽů of :ŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐŵ͕ ZŝĐŚĂƌĚ
^ĂŵďƌŽŽŬ͕ ͞tŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ͛ƌĞ ƐĂǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ŝƐ a ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ
ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ – ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ͛Ɛ ƋƵŝƚĞ ŽĨƚĞŶ ĨŝĐƚŝŽŶĂů͘͟ 202 In ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ
to ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŵĞĚŝĂ ƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ͕ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ƚŚŝŶŬ-ƚĂŶŬ͕ ŚĂƚŚĂŵ
,ŽƵƐĞ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ͞E'K͟ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ of ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ŝƐ ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ $100 ŵŝůůŝŽŶ ƉĞƌ ǇĞĂƌ͘
WĞƌŚĂƉƐ ƚŚĞ ďĞƐƚ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ of ŚŽǁ ƚŚŝƐ ͞E'K͟ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ of ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ŝƐ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐ to ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ in
hŬƌĂŝŶĞ͛Ɛ ŽŶďĂƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ůŝŶŬĂŐĞ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ by Dr. WŚŝůůŝƉ ͘ <ĂƌďĞƌ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚ ͞ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂn ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ͟ ĐŽŶǀŽǇƐ to ƚŚĞ ŽŶďĂƐ
by ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ZĞĚ ƌŽƐƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ĐŽŵďĂƚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ǁŚŝƚĞ-ƉĂŝŶƚĞĚ ƚƌƵĐŬƐ of ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ZĞĚ ƌŽƐƐ ŚĂǀĞ ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚ ƌĞƐƵƉƉůǇ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘ TŚĞ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ that ƚŚĞ
ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ͞ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ͟ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ it ŝƐ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ by ƚŚĞ ͞ZĞĚ
ƌŽƐƐ͟ ŝƐ ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ by ƚŚĞ fact that ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇ no ůĞŐĂů
ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ZĞĚ ƌŽƐƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ZĞĚ
ƌŽƐƐ – a ƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚ ͞ŶŽŶ-ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂů ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ͟ ĨƵŶĚĞĚ by ƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂn 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͘ WĂŝŶƚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƌĞƐƵƉƉůǇ ĐŽŶǀŽǇƐ ǁŚŝƚĞ͕ ĐĂůů ƚŚĞŵ
by a ŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚ ŶĂŵĞ͕ ĂŶĚ ŐĞƚ a ͞ĨƌĞĞ ƉĂƐƐ͟
not ŽŶůǇ ĨƌŽŵ ŝŶƚĞƌĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ͕ but ƚĂŬĞ a ĐƌĞĚŝƚ ǁŝƚŚ ŐůŽďĂů ƉƵďůŝĐ ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ
for ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ ƐƵĐĐŽƌ to ƚŚĞ ƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ĐĂƵƐĞĚ by ŝƚƐ ŽǁŶ ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͘
ƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ, KGB ĐƚŝǀĞ DĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ an ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ
15,000 ĂŐĞŶƚƐ to ƉůĂĐĞ ĨŽƌŐĞƌŝĞƐ in ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŵĞĚŝĂ͘ tŚŝůĞ KGB
ĐƚŝǀĞ DĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ǁĞŶƚ to ŐƌĞĂƚ ůĞŶŐƚŚƐ to ŵĂŬĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĨŽƌŐĞƌŝĞƐ ůŽŽŬ
ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐŝŶŐ͕ ŶŽǁ ƚŚĞ <ƌĞŵůŝŶ ĚŽĞƐŶ͛ƚ ĐĂƌĞ if it ŝƐ ĐĂƵŐŚƚ͖ ƚŚĞ Ăŝŵ ŝƐ to
201 ĞƵƚƐĐŚĞtĞůůĞŚĂƐĞǆƉŽƐĞĚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵĞĚŝĂĨŽƌŚŝƌŝŶŐ͞ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞƐ͟ƌĞĂĚǇĨŽƌƚĞůůŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌ
ƐƚŽƌŝĞƐĂƚǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƉƌŝĐĞĨŝƚƐ͞ƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚĐĂƐƚĞƌ͛ƐďƵĚŐĞƚ͘͟^ĞĞ͕ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕:ƵƌŝZĞƐĐŚĞƚŽ͕
͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶǀŽŝĐĞƐĨŽƌƐĂůĞ ŝŶŵĞĚŝĂǁĂƌŽŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͕͟DW.com͕&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇξ͕μκλπ
202 dŚĞDĂŶĂŐŝŶŐŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨRT͕ůĞǆĞǇEŝŬŽůŽǀ͕ĚŽĞƐŶ͛ƚĞǀĞŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĨĞŝŐŶũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚŝĐ
ŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇǁŚĞŶŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƐ͞ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƐƵĐŚƚŚŝŶŐĂƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ͘͟/ƚ͛ƐŶŽƚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ
͞ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ͟ďƵƚƚŚĞ͞ŵĞƐƐĂŐŝŶŐ͟ĂƐEŝŬŽůŽǀŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐ͙͞ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂůǁĂǇƐĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ͘
dĂŬĞĂďĂŶĂŶĂ͘&ŽƌƐŽŵĞŽŶĞŝƚƐĨŽŽĚ͘&ŽƌƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞŝƚ͛ƐĂǁĞĂƉŽŶ͘&ŽƌĂƌĂĐŝƐƚŝƚ͛Ɛ
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŽƚĞĂƐĞĂďůĂĐŬƉĞƌƐŽŶǁŝƚŚ͘͟ƐƐƵŵŵĂƌŝǌĞĚďǇWĞƚĞƌWŽŵĞƌĂŶƚƐĞǀ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƐƚŝĐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ͕ĂůůǁƌĂƉƉĞĚƵƉŝŶĂďĂŶĂŶĂŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌ͘͟
ρμ
ĐŽŶĨƵƐĞ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ than ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞ͕ to ĐƌŽǁĚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ƐƉĂĐĞ ƐŽ ƚŚĞ
ĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞ ŐŝǀĞƐ ƵƉ ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ for any truth ĂŵŝĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂŽƐ͘
ƐƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŽƵƚďǇŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌtĂůŬĞƌŽĨƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂůŶĚŽǁŵĞŶƚĨŽƌ
ĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ͕
not long ago, many observers were dismissive of RT’s

influence. Today, however, thoughtful analysts are not as
cavalier. While it is admittedly difficult to offer a precise
metric of influence, RT and other Russian government media
have become intertwined with the world of normal news,
especially online. Key narratives pushed by such Russian
media are picked up and propagated by Western news
outlets. Popular aggregators of information on
Russia…seamlessly include RT and other Kremlin-backed
media alongside sources such as the Associated Press and the
German broadcaster Deutshe Welle. Slick web sites with
phony, misleading news reports appear increasingly in the
new democracies of Central Europe to offer a Kremlin spin on
events. 203
dǁŽ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ officĞƌƐ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ƚŚĞ ŶŝŶĞ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ of ͞ŶĞǁ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕͟ ĐŝƚŝŶŐ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ for ŵĂŶǇ of ƚŚĞ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ of tĞƐƚĞƌŶ ĂƌŵŝĞƐ͘ 204 dŚĞƐĞ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ĂƌĞ: 1) non-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ to ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ a ĨĂǀŽƌĂďůĞ ƐŽĐŝŽ-ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĂŶĚ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ͖ 2) ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ to ŵŝƐĚŝƌĞĐƚ ĞůŝƚĞƐ͖ 3)
ŝŶƚŝŵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ͕ ĨƌĂƵĚ͕ ĂŶĚ ďƌŝďĞƌǇ͖ 4) ĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ of a ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ͖ 5) ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ of ĂƌŵĞĚ
ŝŶƐƵƌŐĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƚŚĞƌĞŽĨ͖ 6) ĐůĂŶĚĞƐƚŝŶĞ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ͖ ρͿ
ƵƐĞ of ĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ĂŶĚ ŚŝŐŚ-ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ƌĞĐŽŶŶĂŝƐƐĂŶĐĞ to
ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ of ƌĞƐŝƐƚŝŶŐ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ͖ 8) ŽǀĞƌƚ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ to
ŽĐĐƵƉǇ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ ĂŶĚ ƐƵƉƉƌĞƐƐ any ƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ͖ ĂŶĚ σͿ ƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ
to ƵƐĞ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͕ ĂŶĚ to ƵƐĞ ƉƌĞĐŝƐion ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ to ĚĞƐƚƌŽǇ
203 ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌtĂůŬĞƌ͕͞dŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨǌŽŵďŝĞĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ͕͟The Washington Post͕Ɖƌŝůλσ͕μκλο͕

Ɖ͘μν͘
204 ŽůŽŶĞů^͘'͘ŚĞĐŬŝŶŽǀĂŶĚ>d'^͘͘ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕͞KŶƚŚĞŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌĂŶĚŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨEĞǁ
'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕͟ʦ̨̖̦̦̌́ʺ̼̭̣͕̽KĐƚŽďĞƌμκλν͘
ρν
ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ƉŽǁĞƌ ƉůĂŶƚƐ͕ ĐŚĞŵŝĐĂů ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ůĂƌŐĞ ŚǇĚƌŽ-
ĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐ ƉŽǁĞƌ ƉůĂŶƚƐ͘ dŚĞ ŶŝŶĞ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ not ďĞ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ĂƐ
ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚĞůǇ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ of ŽŶĞ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ĂƐ any ŶƵŵďĞƌ of ƚŚĞŵ ŵĂǇ ďĞ at
ƉůĂǇ at ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƚŝŵĞ ;^ĞĞ &ŝŐƵƌĞ 12).
ŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ to train ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ƌŵĞĚ &ŽƌĐĞƐ in ƚŚĞ ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ
of ƚŚĞ ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ of ͞ŶĞǁ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕͟ ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ
ƌŽƵƚŝŶĞůǇ ĚĞƉůŽǇƐ into ƚŚĞ ĨŝĞůĚ ͞ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ͟ to train on ůŽǁĞƌ-ůĞǀĞů
ĨŽƌŵƐ of ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ, ĂŶĚ ͞ĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ͟ to train on ĐŽŵďĂƚŝŶŐ ƐƵĐŚ
ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ǁŝƚŚ Ăůů ŵĞĂŶƐ ƵƉ to ĂŶĚ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶŽƚŝŽŶĂů ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ of
ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͘
Figure 12. Russian New Generation Warfare

,ĞŶĐĞ͕ ͞ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌ͟ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚŝŶŐ ĞƚŚŶŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ
ĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ to ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐŵ͖ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ǁŝƚŚ
ĂƌŵƐ ĂŶĚ ĂĚǀŝƐŽƌƐ͖ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ƚŚĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ of ĂƐ ŵĂŶǇ ĂƐ 1,000
͞ĚŝǀĞƌƐŝŽŶĂƌǇ͟ ƌĞŐƵůĂƌƐ in ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ of ƚŚĞ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚƐ͖ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ
ƚŚĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ of ͞ƌĞŐƵůĂƌ͟ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ to ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨĞĂƚ of
ƚŚĞ ĨĂƵǆ ͞ƌĞďĞůůŝŽŶ͘͟ Ɛ ƉĂƌƚ of ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ĂƐ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ
ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ͕ ĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ in ƚŚĞ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ ŝƐŽůĂƚĞ ĚŝǀĞƌƐŝŽŶĂƌǇ ƌĞŐƵůĂƌƐ of
ρξ
ƚŚĞ ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ͕ ĂůŽŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ /ŶƚĞƌŝŽƌ DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ dƌŽŽƉƐ ;MVD),
cŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ of ƚŚĞ ŝůůĞŐĂů ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ͖ ĂŶĚ ĞŵƉůŽǇ
ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ to ŝƐŽůĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌ
ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ͕ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵƉĞů ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘
dŚĞ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ĞĨĨĞĐƚ of ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ƐĐĂůĞ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ ŝƐ
that, in ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ ͞ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌ͟ ĨŽƌĐĞ ĨŝĞůĚ ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ͕ GRU ĂŶĚ FSB ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ
ĂƌĞ ƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ to ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞ ĂŶĚ ůĞĂĚ ͞ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƐ͟ ĂŶĚ ͞ŝůůĞŐĂů ĂƌŵĞĚ
ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ͟ ƵŶĚĞƌ ĐŽǀĞƌ of ͞ĚĞĐĞƉƚŝǀĞ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ͘͟ Ɛ a ƌĞƐƵůƚ of ƚŚĞ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ͕ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ƌŵĞĚ &ŽƌĐĞƐ ĂƌĞ ƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ to ƵƐĞ ͞ƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶ-ƐƚǇůĞ
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͟ that ͞ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ
of ĚŝǀĞƌƐŝŽŶĂƌǇ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ͕ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ĂƌŵǇ ĂŶĚ ƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶ ƵŶŝƚƐ͟ that ͞ĐĂŶ ďĞ
ĞǆƚƌĂŽƌĚŝŶĂƌŝůǇ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ǁŚŽ ƌĞůǇ ŽŶůǇ on ƌĞŐƵůĂƌ
ƵŶŝƚƐ͘͟ 205 dŚĞ fact that ƚŚĞ /ŶƚĞƌŝŽƌ DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ dƌŽŽƉƐ ;MVD) ĂƌĞ ƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ to
͞ƉĂĐŝĨǇ͟ ŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚ ĂƌĞĂƐ ŽŶĐĞ ŵĂũŽƌ ŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŚĂǀĞ
ƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ͕ ĂŶĚ that ƚŚĞ MVD ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ĂƐ ŵƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƐŝǆƚǇ ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ of ƚŚĞ
ƚŽƚĂů ƚƌŽŽƉƐ ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ in an ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͕ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ƚŚĞ
'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ͛Ɛ ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ to ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶƉŽǁĞƌ ƐŚŽƌƚĂŐĞƐ ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ĐŝƚĞĚ ĂƐ
ǁŚǇ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ 'ƌŽƵŶĚ &ŽƌĐĞƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ ŶƵŵďĞƌƐ to
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ a ŵĂũŽƌ ŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ EdK.
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ĞŶĚ of ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ hŶŝŽŶ
ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƌŵĞĚ &ŽƌĐĞƐ for ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ĨĂĐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ country in ƚŚĞ
ĨŽƌŵĞƌ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĞƐ͘ ǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ůĞƐƐŽŶƐ ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ in WƵƚŝŶ͛Ɛ ǁĂƌ to ƐĞŝǌĞ
ƌŝŵĞĂ 206 ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ƚŚĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ͗ 1) ĞƚŚŶŝĐŝƚǇ ŝƐ a ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ƚŽŽů for
205 >ŝĞƵƚĞŶĂŶƚ'ĞŶĞƌĂůĂŶĚŽĐƚŽƌŽĨ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞƐŶĂƚŽůǇĂŝƚƐĞǀ͕͞'ƵĞƌŝůůĂDĞƚŚŽĚƐ͗ĂŵŽĚĞƌŶ
ĂƌŵǇƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂďůĞƚŽĨŝŐŚƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĨƌŽŶƚůŝŶĞƐ͕͟ʦ̨̨̖̦̦-ʿ̨̬̥̼̹̣̖̦̦̼̜ʶ̱̬̖̬͕̽
^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκλξ͖;'ĞŶĞƌĂůĂŝƚƐĞǀŝƐĂĨŽƌŵĞƌĞƉƵƚǇŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞdƌĂŶƐďĂŝŬĂůDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ŝƐƚƌŝĐƚĂŶĚĨŽƌŵĞƌĞƉƵƚǇĞĨĞŶƐĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨďŬŚĂǌŝĂͿ͘
206 /ŶĂ͞ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĐĂůůĞĚ͚ƌŝŵĞĂ͗dŚĞZŽĂĚĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞDŽƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚ͛͟ƐŚŽǁŶŽŶ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚĞůĞǀŝƐŝŽŶ͕WƵƚŝŶƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚƚŚĂƚ͞ŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůůǇŽǀĞƌƐĂǁƚŚĞƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƌŝŵĞĂ͟ĂŶĚŝŶĂZŽƐƐŝǇĂ-λŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚ͞ZƵƐƐŝĂƉůĂŶŶĞĚĂƐƉĞĐŝĂůŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽŶƌĞƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƌŝŵĞĂ͙΀Ăƚ΁ĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĂƚǁĞŶƚŽŶƚŝůůƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇŵŽƌŶŝŶŐŽĨ&Ğď͘
μν͕μκλξ͕ǁŚĞŶŚĞƚŽůĚŚŝƐƐƉĞĐŝĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ͚ŚĂǀĞƚŽƐƚĂƌƚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽŶƌĞƚƵƌŶŽĨ
ƌŝŵĞĂƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂ͛͘͟&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ͕͞/ŐŽƌ'ŝƌŬŝŶ͕ĂĨŽƌŵĞƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƐĞůĨ-
ƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵĞĚŽŶĞƚƐŬWĞŽƉůĞ͛ƐZĞƉƵďůŝĐ͕ƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůŽĐĂůƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚŵĞŵďĞƌƐǁĞƌĞďĂƐŝĐĂůůǇ
ŚĞůĚĂƚŐƵŶƉŽŝŶƚƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŚĞĂŶŶĞǆĂƚŝŽŶ͘͟^ĞĞKůĞŶĂ'ŽŶĐŚĂƌŽǀĂ͕͞WƵƚŝŶ͛ƐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŽŶ
ƌŝŵĞĂĂŶŶĞǆĂƚŝŽŶƚĂŬĞƐĂŶĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇůĞĂƉ͕͟Kyiv Post,
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ŬǇŝǀƉŽƐƚ͘ĐŽŵͬĐŽŶƚĞŶƚͬŬǇŝǀ-ƉŽƐƚ-ƉůƵƐͬƉƵƚŝŶƐ-ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ-on-ĐƌŝŵĞĂ-ĂŶŶĞǆĂƚŝŽŶ-
ƚĂŬĞƐ-an-ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ-ůĞĂƉ-383183͘Śƚŵů
ρο
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͖ 2) ƐƵďǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ via ƌĞŐƵůĂƌ
aƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ĐŽŶĐĞĂůĞĚ ĂƐ ͞ŝůůĞŐĂů ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ͟ ŝƐ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ͖ μκρ 3)
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ to ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶĂů ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ can ďĞ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇ
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ to ĂƚƚĂĐŬ ƚŚĞ ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ͛Ɛ ĐŽŚĞƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ͖ ĂŶĚ 4) ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƵƐĞ of
ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ ŝƐ an ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚ to ĚĞůĂǇ or ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ƚŚĞ
ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ͛Ɛ ƚŝŵĞůǇ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ͘ ůĞĂƌůǇ͕ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ǁĂŐĞĚ in ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ of ƚŚĞ ĞĂƌůǇ ƐƚĂŐĞƐ of WƵƚŝŶ͛Ɛ ǁĂƌ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
hŬƌĂŝŶĞ ǁĂƐ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ďĞǇŽŶĚ ŚŝƐ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ. 208 ͞dŚĞ ŝĚĞĂƐ ĂŶĚ
ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐ of ĨĂƵǆ E'KƐ ĂŶĚ ĞůĞĐƚŝŽn ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌƐ ΀ǁĞƌĞ΁ ǁŝĚĞůǇ
ĚŝƐƐĞŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ authoritarian-ďĂĐŬĞĚ ŵĞĚŝĂ͕ ƉƌŽƉĞůůŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŝƌ
ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚĞ ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ĂďƌŽĂĚ͘͟ μκσ EŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ĚŝĚ WƵƚŝŶ͛Ɛ ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ to
ƐĞŝǌĞ ƌŝŵĞĂ ƚĂŬĞ hŬƌĂŝŶĞ by ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞ͕ it ƉĂƌĂůǇǌĞĚ tĞƐƚĞƌŶ ĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐ͘
During the ΀ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ΁ referendum in Crimea, a
hodgepodge of radical political figures, uncredentialed for
authentic election monitoring, appeared on Russian
government media outlets to present findings that went lock
step with those of the Kremlin. In this brave new world, faux
monitors speaking about a fake referendum are broadcast to
the world from a simulated news outlet. 210
Since “the enemy” per se was not Ukraine, but European political
culture as represented by the European Union and defended by NATO,
the war has been shifting to the next vulnerability— the Baltic States.
ŚĞĐŬŝŶŽǀ ĂŶĚ ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ ƉŽƐƚƵůĂƚĞ that ͞ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ĂŝŵĞĚ at ĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐ ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ in ƚŚĞ ĨŝĞůĚ of ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ ĂŶĚ
ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĂů ĂŶĚ ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ƐƵƉƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ of ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵĞĚ
μκρ dŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨƌĞŐƵůĂƌĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐĐŽŶĐĞĂůĞĚĂƐ͞ŝůůĞŐĂůĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ͟ĐůĞĂƌůǇ
ĚĞƉĞŶĚƐƵƉŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ͘&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ƚŚĞĞĨĨŽƌƚ
ďǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŝŶ^ĂŝŶƚWĞƚĞƌƐďƵƌŐĂŶĚZŽƐƚŽǀ-on-Don tŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚ
͞ĞƐƐĂƌĂďŝĂŶWĞŽƉůĞ͛ƐZĞƉƵďůŝĐ͟ŝŶKĚĞƐƐĂƋƵŝĐŬůǇĐŽůůĂƉƐĞĚǁŚĞŶƉƌĞĞŵƉƚĞĚďǇǁĞůů-ƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ
ĂŶĚůŽǇĂůĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƚƌŽŽƉƐ͘^ĞĞDĂǆŝŵdƵĐŬĞƌ͕͞hŬƌĂŝŶĞĐůĂŝŵƐƚŽĨŽŝů<ƌĞŵůŝŶƉůŽƚĨŽƌ
ŶĞǁďƌĞĂŬĂǁĂǇƐƚĂƚĞ͕͟ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬĞƵƌŽƉĞ͘ŶĞǁƐǁĞĞŬ͘ĐŽŵͬƵŬƌĂŝŶĞ-ĐůĂŝŵƐ-ĨŽŝů-ŬƌĞŵůŝŶ-ƉůŽƚ-ŶĞǁ-
ďƌĞĂŬĂǁĂǇ-ƐƚĂƚĞ-νμρλρλ
208 DŝĐŚĂĞůŝƌŶďĂƵŵ͕͞/ŶĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ͕WƵƚŝŶƐĂǇƐĞĂƐĞŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƌŝŵĞĂǁĂƐĂƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞ͕͟
Washington Post͕DĂƌĐŚλπ͕μκλο͕Ɖ͘λλ͘
μκσ tĂůŬĞƌ͕͞dŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨǌŽŵďŝĞĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ͕͟The Washington Post͕Ɖƌŝůλσ͕μκλο͕Ɖ͘μν͘
210 Ibid.
ρπ
ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ of ƚŚĞ ŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐ ƐŝĚĞ ǁŝůů ĂƐƐƵŵĞ a ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ
ƌŽůĞ in ŶĞǁ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͙ĂŶĚ ůĂƌŐĞůǇ ĐƌĞĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ for
ĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐ ǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ͘͟ Accordingly, Putin’s strategic objectives are not
aimed outright against the EU and NATO, but against the Baltic States
in an effort to show that neither ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ is capable of ensuring
their security. 211
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŵĞĚŝĂ hĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ of ƚŚĞ ĂůƚŝĐ
^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐ that, ǁŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ ƚŝƚƵůĂƌ ƉĞŽƉůĞƐ of ƚŚĞƐĞ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ŵĂǇ
ŚĂǀĞ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ĐůĂŝŵƐ to ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ ŚŽŵĞůĂŶĚƐ, ƚŚĞǇ ĚŽ not ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ Ăůů
ƐƵĐŚ ĐůĂŝŵƐ͕ nor ĚŽ ƚŚĞǇ account for ƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ĂƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ of ƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ƐƉĞĂŬĞƌƐ ůŝǀŝŶŐ ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞŵ ;^ĞĞ &ŝŐƵƌĞ 13).
Figure 13. Russian-Published Alternative Map of the Baltic Region

EŽƚĞ that in ƚŚŝƐ ĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚ to ƚŚĞ ĂůƚŝĐ ďŽƌĚĞƌƐ͕ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐ of Ăůů
ƚŚƌĞĞ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ĂƌĞ trĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚ to ZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ ĂŶĚ a ŶĞǁ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ƐƚĂƚĞ of
>ĂƚŐĂůŝǇĂ ŝƐ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ͘ >ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ ďĞĐŽŵĞƐ ůĂŶĚ-ůŽĐŬĞĚ͖ <ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ ŝƐ no
ůŽŶŐĞƌ an ĞǆĐůĂǀĞ͖ ĂŶĚ ZƵƐƐŝĂ ŐĞƚƐ ƚŚĞ ƐƚŽŶŝĂŶ ŝƐůĂŶĚƐ of ,ŝŝƵŵĂĂ ĂŶĚ
^ĂĂƌĞŵĂĂ. 212 In ƚŚŝƐ ŵĂŶŶĞƌ͕ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ďŽƌĚĞƌƐ ĂƌĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĞĚ ĂƐ ďĞŝŶŐ
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝǀĞ of, in ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌĚƐ of ŚĞŬŝŶŽǀ ĂŶĚ ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůƐ of
͞ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ for ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ͘͟ WůĂŶƐ for ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŶŐ a ͞ŶĞǁ
211 ƌŝĞĨŝŶŐďǇt͘^Ăŵ>ĂƵďĞƌ͕AWG Russian Hybrid Warfare Study: Using Crimea to Assess the
Vulnerability of the Baltic States͕:ŽŚŶƐ,ŽƉŬŝŶƐ͕ƉƉůŝĞĚWŚǇƐŝĐƐ>ĂďŽƌĂƚŽƌǇ͕DĂǇλο͕μκλο͘
212 ƐƚŽŶŝĂŶŝƐůĂŶĚƐŽĨ,ŝŝƵŵĂĂĂŶĚ^ĂĂƌĞŵĂĂ͕ŝĨĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚďǇZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ǁŽƵůĚŚŽƐƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŝƌ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐĞǆƚĞŶĚŝŶŐĨĂƌŽƵƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂĂŶĚ͕ƚŚĞƌĞďǇ͕ĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇƐŚŝĨƚƚŚĞŐĞŽ-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐic
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ͘
ρρ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͟ ǁĂƌ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ĂůƚŝĐ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ĐĞŶƚĞƌ on ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƵŐĂǀƉŝůƐ
ĂŶĚ >ĂƚŐĂůĞ ͞ƚŚĞ ŽŶďĂƐ of ƚŚĞ ĂůƚŝĐ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͟ ǁŝƚŚ ĂƵŐĂǀƉŝůƐ 213 ĂŶĚ
ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ ͞ƚŚĞ ŽŶĞƚƐŬ ĂŶĚ >ƵŚĂŶƐŬ of >ĂƚǀŝĂ͘͟ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ-ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ ĐŽƌƉƐ ŚĂƐ ƐĞƚ ƵƉ >ĂƚŐĂůŝǇĂ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚ
ǁĞďƐŝƚĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĐůƵďƐ͕ ĂŶĚ ĞǀĞŶ ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚ a ĨůĂŐ for ƚŚŝƐ ͞ƉĞŽƉůĞ͛Ɛ ƌĞƉƵďůŝĐ-
to ďĞ͟ ;^ĞĞ &ŝŐƵƌĞ 14). 214
Figure 14. The Latgale Peoples Republic flag
Transformation to Highly Mobile and Rapidly Reconfigurable Forces

dŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵĞ – that ͞ŶŽŶ-ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ͟ ĂŶĚ
͞ŶĞƚĐĞŶƚƌŝĐ͟ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ĚĞŵĂŶĚ a ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ a ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů
ŵĂƐƐĞĚ ĂƌŵǇ to ŚŝŐŚůǇ ŵŽďŝůĞ ĨůĞǆŝďůĞ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ that ŵĂǇ ďĞ ƌĂƉŝĚůǇ
ƌĞĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĞĚ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƐĞ of ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ǁĂƐ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚ in ƚŚĞ ĂƉĂĚ-
λσσσ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ ďĂƐĞĚ ƵƉŽŶ zƵŐŽƐůĂǀ ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘ Ɛ ƚŚĞ focuƐ
of ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ƐĐĂůĞ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ ƐŚŝĨƚĞĚ to ƚŚĞ ĞĂƐƚ͕ ƚŚĞǇ
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ to ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞ a ǁŝĚĞ-ƌĂŶŐĞ of ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐ to ĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƐ
ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ that ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ
ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ƵŶŝƚƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ /ŶƚĞƌŝŽƌ DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ĂŶĚ ŵĞƌŐĞncy ^ŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ
DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ in ƚŚĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ of ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůůǇ ĚŝƐƉĞƌƐĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ to ǁĂŐĞ
213 ůƚŚŽƵŐŚĂƵŐĂǀƉŝůƐŝƐƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚůĂƌŐĞƐƚĐŝƚǇŝŶ>ĂƚǀŝĂ͕ŝƚǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽďĂďůǇďĞƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŝĨWƵƚŝŶ͛ƐƉůĂŶƐĨŽƌƌĞǀŝƐŝŶŐĂůƚŝĐďŽƌĚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞƚŽďĞĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĞĚ͕ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚ
ůĂƌŐĞƐƚĐŝƚǇŽĨ>ĂƚŐĂůĞ͕ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ– ŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ͞ƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨ>ĂƚŐĂůĞ͟ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůŽĨĂ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉƵƉƉĞƚƐƚĂƚĞ͘
214 ^ĞĞŶĚƌĞǁ,ŝŐŐŝŶƐ͕͞>ĂƚǀŝĂŶZĞŐŝŽŶ,ĂƐŝƐƚŝŶĐƚ/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ͕ĂŶĚůůƵƌĞĨŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂ͕͟The New York
Times͕DĂǇμκ͕μκλο͘
ρς
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ of ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ non-contact
ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇ͘ dŚĞ ͞ŶĞĞĚ to ĐƌĞĂƚĞ ŵŽďŝůĞ͕ ƐĞůĨ-ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ƚƌŽŽƉ ŐƌŽƵƉŝŶŐƐ
ĐĂƉĂďůĞ of ďĞŝŶŐ ƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĞĚ to tŚĞ ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ of ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛Ɛ
ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͟ ĂƐ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚ in ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĐŝŶŐ of 85 WĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ ZĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐ ƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ
ĨƌŽŵ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ-ĞƌĂ ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƌĞŐŝŵĞŶƚƐ ďĞĐĂŵĞ͕ ĂůŽŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ a ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ
to ƚŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ of ƚŚĞ KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŽŵŵĂŶĚ of &ŽƌĐĞƐ͕ ƚŚĞ
ĐŽƌĞ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ of KƐĞŶ-μκκσ͕ ǁŝƚŚ ŝƚƐ ŽŶĞ ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ for ƚŚƌĞĞ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ;>ĂĚŽŐĂ for ƚŚĞ EŽƌƚŚǁĞƐƚĞƌŶ͕ ĂƉĂĚ for ƚŚĞ tĞƐƚĞƌŶ͕ ĂŶĚ
<ĂǀŬĂƐ for ƚŚĞ ^ŽƵƚŚǁĞƐƚĞƌŶͿ͘
'ŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ ůŽƐƐ of ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĚĞƉƚŚ in ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ƵƌŽƉĞ͕ ƚŚĞ ŽůĚ War ƌŽůĞƐ of
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐ ĂƐ ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ of ŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ of ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ĞĐŚĞůŽŶ
ĂƌŵŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ fronts for ŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ůĞǀĞů ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐ ƐĞĞŵĞĚ
ŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ͕ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŶŐ͕ ĂŶĚ ĞǀĞŶ ŝŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ͘ ĨƚĞƌ ƐŽŵĞ
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ͕ it ǁĂƐ ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ to ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ of
Ăůů ĨŽƌĐĞƐ in a DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ to that ,ĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ Zapad-2009.
Ǉ ƚŚĞ ĞŶĚ of ƚŚĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ǇĞĂƌ͕ ƚŚĞ ŶƵŵďĞƌ of DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐ ǁĂƐ
ƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ to four, ǁŝƚŚ ĞĂĐŚ ŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ of ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ
on ƚŚĞŝƌ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĞƐ͘ dŚƵƐ͕ ƚŚĞ tĞƐƚĞƌŶ DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ͛Ɛ
,ĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ in ^ƚ͘ WĞƚĞƌƐďƵƌŐ ĐĂŵĞ to ĂƐƐƵŵĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ of ĨŽƌĐĞƐ on ŝƚƐ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ ;^ĞĞ &ŝŐƵƌĞ 15).
ρσ
Figure 15. Western Military District – ĨƌŽŵDŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂƐĞƚŽ,ŝŐŚ
Command.
KŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ of ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ďƌŝŐĂĚĞ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ͕ ƚŚĞ Zapad-2009 ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ
ǁĂƐ͕ by ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ͕ a ĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚ͘ dŚĞ ŶĞǁ ďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ͕
ƌĞƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌĞƉŽǁĞƌ of ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ͕ ǁĞƌĞ too ŚĞĂǀǇ ĂŶĚ ĐƵŵďĞƌƐŽŵĞ͘
ŽŵŵĂŶĚ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů of ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ ƉƌŽǀĞĚ ŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ. n
͞ƵŶŶĂŵĞĚ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ >ŝĞƵƚĞŶĂŶƚ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů͟ ƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ to
ŚĂǀĞ ƉŽƐĞĚ a ƐƉĂŶ of ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ:
With the elimination of the divisions, the army commanders
were compelled to directly command and control the
brigades. But there are masses of them there. A division
commander can command and control 3-4 regiments with
difficulty. He simply cannot deal with a larger number of
units. I know that from my own personal experience. But
right now there will be up to 15 brigades and separate
battalions in an army. Try to deal with that bunch. 215
ĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚŝƐ ďĂƐŝĐ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶ of ƚŚĞ ƐƉĂŶ of ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŶŽƌŵ of
ƚŚƌĞĞ to ĨŝǀĞ͕ Zapad-2009 ĂůƐŽ ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƐŚŽƌƚĂŐĞ of ƵŶŵĂŶŶĞĚ
215sǇĂĐŚĞƐůĂǀdĞƚĞŬŝŶ͕͞>ĂǇŝŶŐ/ƚŽŶdŚŝĐŬ͗dŚĞĂƉĂĚ-μκκσǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ͗ĂWƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů͛ƐsŝĞǁ͕͟
Pravda, EŽǀĞŵďĞƌλν͕μκκσ͘
80
ĂĞƌŝĂů ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů to ŶĞƚĐĞŶƚƌŝĐ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘ dŚĞ ƵŶĂǀĂŝůĂďŝůŝƚǇ of a ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ŶƵŵďĞƌ of ĚƌŽŶĞƐ ĂŶĚ͕ in
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ƚŚĞ ůĂĐŬ of ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ by ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐ of ŚŽǁ to
ĞŵƉůŽǇ ƚŚĞŵ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ in ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ ĨŝƌĞ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ of ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ƉůĂŶ͕ ǁĂƐ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐ to ƐĞŶŝŽƌ cŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐ͘ Ɛ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ by
ƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ DĂƌƐŚĂů V. DŝŬŚĂůŬŝŶ at ƚŚĞ ƚŝŵĞ, ͞ƚŚĞ tĞƐƚ ĚŽĞƐ not ĞǀĞŶ ŚĂǀĞ
ĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚƐ to ƐŽŵĞ of our ŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ͘ dŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ
ĐĂƉĂďůĞ of carryinŐ out any ƚĂƐŬ͘ Ƶƚ ƚŚĞǇ ŶĞĞĚ ĞǆĂĐƚ ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƐ͖ ĂŶĚ
ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĂƚ͘͟ 216 Within ĨŝǀĞ ǇĞĂƌƐ͕ both ƚŚĞ ŶƵŵďĞƌƐ of
ĚƌŽŶĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐŬŝůů in ĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ in ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ of
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌ ǁĂƐ ƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚ͘ ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ to Dr. WŚŝůůŝƉ
<ĂƌďĞƌ͕ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ĚƌŽŶĞƐ ĂƌĞ ƵďŝƋƵŝƚŽƵƐ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŽŶďĂƐ ďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚ aŶĚ
ŚŝƐ ĨŝƌƐƚ-ŚĂŶĚ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƚŝŵĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƌĞĐŽŶŶĂŝƐƐĂŶĐĞ to
ƐƚƌŝŬĞ ŐŝǀĞ a ĐůĂƌŝĨǇŝŶŐ ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ to ƚŚĞŝƌ ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ
͞ĐŽŵƉůĞǆĞƐ͘͟
ŽŵďĂƚ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ of ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ŚĂƐ ĂůƐŽ ďĞĐŽŵĞ an ĂƌĞĂ of ƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůĞ
ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ƐŝŶĐĞ ĂƉĂĚ-μκκσ͘ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ in ƚŚĞ ŽŶďĂƐ ŚĂǀĞ
ďĞĞŶ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ ůĂƌŐĞůǇ by ĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶ TactiĐĂů 'ƌŽƵƉƐ ;^ĞĞ &ŝŐƵƌĞ 16), ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ of ƚŚĞƐĞ ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŚĂƐ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ƉƌŽǀĞĚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ͘ Dr.
<ĂƌďĞƌ ŚĂƐ ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ƚŚŝƐ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ to ůĞƐƐŽŶƐ of ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐ ǁĂƌ ůĞĂƌŶĞĚ
in ŚĞĐŚŶǇĂ anĚ 'ĞŽƌŐŝĂ͘ In ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ of ŚĞĐŚŶǇĂ͕ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ǁŝƚŚ
ŚĂƐƚŝůǇ ŵŽďŝůŝǌĞĚ ĐŽŶƐĐƌŝƉƚƐ ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĚ to ƉŽŽƌ ŵŽƌĂůĞ ĂŶĚ ůŽǁ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ that, in turn, ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚ in ŚŝŐŚ ĐĂƐƵĂůƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ an ƵŶƉŽƉƵůĂƌ
ǁĂƌ͘ Ǉ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƌƚ of ƚŚĞ 2008 ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ in 'ĞŽƌŐŝĂ͕ ĐŽŶƐĐƌŝƉƚƐ ǁĞƌĞ
ƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞĚ of spetznaz ĂŶĚ ĂŝƌďŽƌŶĞ
͞ƚĂŶŬ ƌŝĚĞƌƐ͟ μλρ ĂůŽŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ contract ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ for ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƐŬŝůůĞĚ branch
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ. In WƵƚŝŶ͛Ɛ 2014 ŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶ of hŬƌĂŝŶĞ͕
͞ĞǆƉĞŶĚĂďůĞ ŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇ͟ ǁĂƐ ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞĚ of ŵĞƌĐĞŶĂƌŝĞƐ ;ůĂƌŐĞůǇ ŚĞĐŚĞŶƐ
216 /ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚƌƚŝůůĞƌǇDĂƌƐŚĂůůsůĂĚŝŵŝƌDŝŬŚĂůŬŝŶ͕ŝŶ'ĞŶŶĂĚŝǇDŝƌĂŶŽǀŝĐŚ͕͞ŶƌŵǇKŶĞ
tĂŶƚƐƚŽ^ĞƌǀĞ/Ŷ͕͟ʶ̬̭̦̌̌́ʯ̖͕̏̔̌̚KĐƚŽďĞƌλξ͕μκκσ͘
μλρ ͞,/^:ĂŶĞ͛ƐĂƐƐĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶλο͕κκκĂŶĚλρ͕κκκSpetsnaz ƚƌŽŽƉƐƐƉůŝƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ
ƌĞŐƵůĂƌĂŶĚŶĂǀĂůSpetsnaz͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂƌĂďůĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨŝƌƐƐĂƵůƚdƌŽŽƉƐ
;ʦ̨̨̱̹̦̔̚-ʪ̖̭̦̯̦̼̖̌ʦ̨̡̜̭̌: ʪͿĂŶĚƚŚĞDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŝŽƌ;ʦ̛̦̱̯̬̖̦̦̖ʦ̨̡̜̭̌:
BBͿ͘͟/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ͕ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ͕͞ƚŚĞŶĞǁůǇĨŽƌŵĞĚ^ƉĞĐŝĂůKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ŽŵŵĂŶĚ;ʶ̨̥̦̌̔̌ˁ̶̵̛̪̖̣̦̼̌̽ʽ̶̛̪̖̬̜̌: KSOͿ͟ŚĂƐĂ͞ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĐůŽƐĞƌƚŽũƵƐƚοκκ
ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů͘͟͞dŚĞƌŝƐŝŶŐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƉĞĐŝĂůĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕͟Jane’s Intelligence Review,
EŽǀĞŵďĞƌμξ͕μκλξ͘
81
ĂŶĚ ŽƐƐĂĐŬƐͿ͕ ͞ďŽŶƵƐ ǀŽůƵŶƚĞĞƌƐ͟ ;ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ŵŝƐůĞĂĚ or
ĐŽĞƌĐĞĚ ĐŽŶƐĐƌŝƉƚƐ218), ůŽĐĂů ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐ ŵŝƐĐƌĞĂŶƚƐ ;ƚŽ
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐͿ͕ μλσ ĂŶĚ a ƐŵĂůů ŶƵŵďĞƌ of ŚŝŐŚůǇ ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚ
͞ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ͟ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ to ďĞ ͞ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚƐ͟. 220 dŚŝƐ
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŚĂƐ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ WƵƚŝŶ ǁŝƚŚ a ƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ —
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ͕ ŚĞ ǁĂƐ ĂďůĞ to ĚĞŶǇ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ͖ ĂŶĚ
ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ͕ ŚĞ ǁĂƐ ĂďůĞ to ŚŝĚĞ ƚŚĞ ƚƌƵĞ ĐŽƐƚ in ůŝĨĞ ĂŶĚ ƚƌĞĂƐƵƌĞ ĨƌŽŵ
ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ƉƵďůŝĐ͘
Figure 16. Battalion Tactical Group
218 ͞EŽŽŶĞŝƐƚŽůĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁŝůůŐŽƚŽhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͘KĨĨŝĐŝĂůůǇƚŚĞǇŐŽ΀ƐŽƵƚŚ΁ĨŽƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ͙͘͟
^ĞƌŐĞŝŚĞƌŶŽǀ͕͞ŽŶƐĐƌŝƉƚƐ͛ZĞůĂƚŝǀĞƐ&ĞĂƌdŚĞǇ͛ůůĞ^ĞŶƚƚŽhŬƌĂŝŶĞŵŝĚůůĞŐĞĚŽĞƌĐŝŽŶ͕͟
The Moscow Times͕:ĂŶƵĂƌǇμσ͕ 2015.
μλσ KŶŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐŚĂǀĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚƉĞŶĂůďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶŽĨƉŽŽƌůǇƚƌĂŝŶĞĚĂŶĚŚĞĂǀŝůǇ
ĚƌƵŐŐĞĚƚƌŽŽƉƐƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐ͞ǌŽŵďŝĞƐ͟ďǇhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶƚƌŽŽƉƐ͘
220 ůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌŽƌŽĚĂŝ͕ǁŚŽƐĞƌǀĞĚĂƐƉƌŝŵĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƐĞůĨ-ƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵĞĚ͞ŽŶĞƚƐŬWĞŽƉůĞ͛Ɛ
ZĞƉƵďůŝĐ͕͟ĂŶĚ/ŐŽƌ^ƚƌĞůŬŽǀ͕ǁŚŽǁĂƐƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƌĞďĞůĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞDĂůĂǇƐŝĂŶĨůŝŐŚƚ
D,-λρǁĂƐƐŚŽƚĚŽǁŶďǇĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ŵĂŶŶĞĚĂŶƚŝ-ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚŵŝƐƐŝůĞ͕ĂƌĞďŽƚŚDƵƐĐŽǀŝƚĞƐǁŚŽ
ĨŽƵŐŚƚŝŶDŽůĚŽǀĂ͛ƐďƌĞĂŬĂǁĂǇdƌĂŶƐĚŶŝĞƐƚƌƌĞŐŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞλσσκƐ͘ŶƚŽŶǀĞƌĞǀ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝan
ĨŽƌŵĞƌůĞĂĚĞƌŽĨhŬƌĂŝŶĞƌĞďĞůƐǁĂƌŶƐŽĨ͚ďŝŐǁĂƌ͕͛͟World͕:ƵŶĞμξ͕μκλο͘
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƌĞƵƚĞƌƐ͘ĐŽŵͬĂƌƚŝĐůĞͬμκλοͬκπͬμξͬƵƐ-ƵŬƌĂŝŶĞ-ĐƌŝƐŝƐ-ďŽƌŽĚĂŝ-
ŝĚh^<EKWξλ^Yμκλοκπμξ
82
dŚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĐĂƌƌŝĞĚ out by dŚĞ WŽƚŽŵĂĐ &ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ͛Ɛ WŚŝůůŝƉ <ĂƌďĞƌ
ĂŶĚ EŝĐŚŽůĂƐ DǇĞƌƐ ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŝŐŝŶƐ of ĞĂĐŚ of ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶ dĂĐƚŝĐĂů 'ƌŽƵƉƐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ in hŬƌĂŝŶĞ͛Ɛ DonbaƐ ;^ĞĞ &ŝŐƵƌĞ λρ).
Ɛ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ůĞĚ to a ĨƵůůǇ ĞŶƚƌĞŶĐŚĞĚ ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ of ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ƌŵĞĚ &ŽƌĐĞƐ in hŬƌĂŝŶĞ͛Ɛ ŽŶďĂƐ͕ ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ƉƵƚ in ƉůĂĐĞ a ŽƌƉƐ
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ to ŝŶƐƵƌĞ ƉƌŽƉĞƌ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů of ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ;^ĞĞ
&ŝŐƵƌĞ 18), ŚĞŶĐĞ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ͞ƐƉĂŶ-of-ĐŽŶƚƌŽů͟ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ in
Zapad-2009.
ŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů 'ĞƌĂƐŝŵŽǀ͛Ɛ ǀŝĞǁ that ͞ǁĂƌ in ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ŝƐ not
ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ͕͟ ĂŶĚ ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ by ŚĞĐŬŝŶŽǀ ĂŶĚ ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ that ƚŚĞ
͞ĐůĂŶĚĞƐƚŝŶĞ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ͟ ŝƐ ĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ by ͞ŵĂƐƐŝǀĞ ƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ͟
in ǁŚŝĐŚ ͞ŶŽŶ-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŵĞĂŶƐ can ƌĞĚƵĐĞ ƚŚĞ ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ͟ for
ĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŵĞĂŶƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƵƐĞ of ͞ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͟
ĞǆƉůŽŝƚŝŶŐ ͞ĂůŵŽƐƚ Ăůů ƉƵďŝĐ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ͟ to ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ͞ƉƵďůŝĐ ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ
ĨƵŶĚĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ĂďƌŽĂĚ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ on ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ŐƌĂŶƚƐ,” Putin
has yet again managed to ƐĞŝǌĞ territory in Europe without military
opposition by the European governments. dŚĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ of ƚŚŝƐ fact
cannot ďĞ ŽǀĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ in ͞ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ƐŵĂůůĞƐƚ ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ in ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ
that ŚĂƐ ŵŽƌĞ than 50 ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚ͕ ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶ nation-ƐƚĂƚĞƐ͘͟ ^ŝŶĐĞ ͞ƚŚĞ ĐŽƌĞ
of ƚŚĞ h ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ŝƐ an ĞĨĨŽƌƚ to ƌĞĚƵĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƉŽǁĞƌ ĂŶĚ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ of
ďŽƌĚĞƌƐ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ĂďŽůŝƐŚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵ͕͟ 221 WƵƚŝŶ͛Ɛ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ
ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐ of ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ that ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ďŽƌĚĞƌƐ cannot ďĞ ĂůůŽǁĞĚ
to ĐŚĂŶŐĞ͕ in fact, a ƉĂƌƚ of a ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ for ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ĚĞƐƚƌŽǇŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ hŶŝŽŶ͘ WƵƚŝŶ ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐ ŚĂǀĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ĂǀŽŝĚĞĚ
ƐĂǇŝŶŐ ƐŽ͕ but ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ at ǁĂƌ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ hŶŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ EŽƌƚŚ
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ĂůůŝĞƐ͘
221'ĞŽƌŐĞ&ƌŝĞĚŵĂŶ͕͞tŚĂƚŽƌĚĞƌƐDĞĂŶƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ͕͟Geopolitical Weekly͗^ƚƌĂƚĨŽƌ'ůŽďĂů
/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ͕:ƵŶĞμν͕μκλο͘
83
Figure 17. Origin of Russian Battalion Tactical Groups in Ukraine
Figure 18. New Russian Corps Structure in Ukraine
84
4th Generation Nuclear Weapons
dŚĞ ƚŚŝƌĚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵĞ — ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ of ůŽǁ-
ǇŝĞůĚ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ — ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ĐĂŵĞ to
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ that ŝƚƐ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ to ďĞ ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĞĚ by a
ĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞ-to-ƐƉĂĐĞ ratio ĂŶĚ that ƚŚĞ ŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ďĂƐŝƐ of ^ŽǀŝĞƚ-
ĞƌĂ ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ǁĂƐ not ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞ͘
ůƌĞĂĚǇ in λσσρ͕ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ZĂĚǇ Ivanovich /ůŬĂĞǀ͕ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ of ƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ /ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ of ǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂů WŚǇƐŝĐƐ ;sE//&Ϳ͕ ǁĞƌĞ
ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐ that ͞ŝn ƚŚĞ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ͕ ǁĞ ŵĂǇ ŚĂǀĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚ
;ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůͿ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͕ but at ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ǁĞ ŵƵƐƚ ƌĞůǇ on ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ
ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͘ If ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ƵƐĞĚ at ƚŚĞ ůŽĐĂů or ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ůĞǀĞů͕ ƚŚĞƌĞ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ
no ǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ—ŽŶůǇ ƚŚĞ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ͘ tĞ ŵƵƐƚ ŵŽǀĞ ĂǁĂǇ
ĨƌŽŵ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ of ŵĂƐƐ ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ to ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ for ůŽĐĂů ƵƐĞ͘͟ Ɛ
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ in ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ƉŚǇƐŝĐƐ ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚĞĚ in ƚŚŝƐ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ͕ sŝŬƚŽƌ EŝŬŝƚŽǀŝĐŚ
DŝŬŚĂŝůŽǀ͕ ^ĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ of sE//&͕ ŵĂĚĞ ĐůĞĂƌ in 2002 that ͞ǁĞ
ƐŚŽƵůĚ ĂůƐŽ ĐĂƌĞĨƵůůǇ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ of ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ ůŽǁ ĂŶĚ
ƐƵƉĞƌ-ůŽǁ ǇŝĞůĚ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ
ǁĂƌŚĞĂĚƐ͘ ^ƵĐŚ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ can ďĞ ƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ƵƚŝůŝǌĞĚ in ƚŚĞ ĞǀĞŶƚ of
ůĂƌŐĞ ƐĐĂůĞ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ of ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů ĂƌŵƐ or
ŵĂƐƐ ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ a ƚŚƌĞĂƚ to our ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛Ɛ
ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ or ǁŽƌƐĞŶŝŶŐ of ƚŚĞ ůŝǀŝŶŐ conĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ of our ƉĞŽƉůĞ͘͟ 222
Ǉ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ŚĂůĨ of λσσσ͕ ƚŚĞ ͞ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ĨĞƚŝƐŚŝƐŵ͟ that ŚĂĚ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝǌĞĚ
ƚŚĞ ^ŽŬŽůŽǀƐŬǇ-ĞƌĂ of ^ŽǀŝĞƚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ λσπκƐ ĂŶĚ
λσρκƐ ƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ǀĞŶŐĞĂŶĐĞ͘ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƌĞĂĚǇ
to ƐƚĂƚĞ ďŽůĚĨĂĐĞĚůy that ͞ǁĞ ďĞůŝĞǀĞ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚ
222dŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĂŶ͞ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƚŚƌĞĂƚ͟ĐŽƵůĚůĞĂĚƚŽƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŝŶ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŝƐĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĚŝƐƚƵƌďŝŶŐŐŝǀĞŶƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĐĞŶƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĞǆƉĞůůŝŶŐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ͞^t/&d͟ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽWƵƚŝŶ͛Ɛ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͘ŶĚƌĞǇ>͘<ŽƐƚŝŶ͕WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚĂŶĚŚĂŝƌŵĂŶŽĨsd;ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚůĂƌŐĞƐƚ
ďĂŶŬͿǁĂƌŶĞĚĂƚƚŚĞ:ĂŶƵĂƌǇμκλοtŽƌůĚĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ&ŽƌƵŵƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĞǆƉƵůƐŝŽŶĨƌŽŵ^t/&d
ǁŽƵůĚŝŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇůĞĂĚƚŽƚŚĞĞǆƉƵůƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞh͘^͘ĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌĨƌŽŵDŽƐĐŽǁĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĐĂůůŽĨ
ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƚŽtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ͘/ƚǁŽƵůĚŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚ͞ƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĂƌĞŽŶƚŚĞ ǀĞƌŐĞŽĨ
ǁĂƌ͕ŽƌƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇŝŶĂĐŽůĚǁĂƌ͘͟tŚĞŶĂƐŬĞĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ^t/&d
ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ͕ǁŚŝĐŚďĂƌZƵƐƐŝĂĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐǇƐƚĞŵ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ
ŵŝƚƌǇDĞĚǀĞĚĞǀǁĂƌŶĞĚƚŚĂƚDŽƐĐŽǁ͛ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞǁŽƵůĚďĞ͞ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚůŝŵŝƚƐ͘͟ůƐŽƐĞĞ͕
&ĂƌĞĞĚĂŬĂƌŝĂ͕͞^ĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐZƵƐƐŝĂǁŝůůƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ͕͟The Washington Post͕&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇλν͕μκλο͕Ɖ͘
λσ͘
85
ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂů ŵĞĂŶƐ of ĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ of ZƵƐƐŝĂ ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ
ĂůůŝĞƐ at ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ in ƚŚĞ ŶĞĂƌ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ͙͘͟ 223
Fulfilling the de-escalation function is understood to mean
actually using nuclear weapons both for showing resolve as well
as for the immediate delivery of nuclear strikes against the
enemy. It is advisable to execute this mission using non-
strategic (above all operational-tactical) nuclear weapons,
which can preclude an “avalanching” escalation of the use of
nuclear weapons right up to an exchange of massed nuclear
strokes delivered by strategic assets. It seems that the cessation
of military operations will be the most acceptable thing for the
enemy in this case/…/
The condition for using non-strategic nuclear weapons can be as

follows: enemy use of mass destruction weapons or reliable
discovery of his preparation for their use; destruction of our
strategic weapons, above all nuclear weapons, and also
important economic installations (atomic electric power
stations, hydroelectric stations, major enterprises of the
chemical and military industry, the most important
transportation hubs) by enemy conventional weapons;
appearance of a threat of disturbance of stability of a strategic
defense in the presence of a large-scale enemy invasion. 224
hŶůŝŬĞ ƚŚĞ ĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝǀĞ continuity ŵŽĚĞů of ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ŐƌĂĚƵĂƚĞĚ

ĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŽŶ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ, ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐ ŝŶƚŝŵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ
ŵŽĚĞů of ĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŶŐ to ĚĞ-ĞƐĐĂůĂƚĞ ;^ĞĞ &ŝŐƵƌĞ λσ) ŝƐ ĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚ at ƚŚĞ
vuůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ of both ƚŚĞ ŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐ ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ͕ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ
ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚƐ ĂŶĚ ǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐĞƐ of ŝƚƐ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ.
223 DĂũŽƌ-'ĞŶĞƌĂůs͘/͘>ĞǀƐŚŝŶ͕ŽůŽŶĞů͘s͘EĞĚĞůŝŶ͕ĂŶĚŽŶůŽŶĞůD͘zĞ͘^ŽƐŶŽǀƐŬŝǇ͕͞dŚĞhƐĞ
ŽĨEƵĐůĞĂƌtĞĂƉŽŶƐƚŽĞ-ĞƐĐĂůĂƚĞDŝůŝƚĂƌǇKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕͟Military Thought͕DĂǇ-:ƵŶĞλσσσ͕ƉƉ͘
34-νρ͘
224 Ibid.
86
Figure 19. Russian Theory of Nuclear De-escalation
dŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ŚĂĚ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ ĨŽƌďŝĚ ŝƚƐ ůĂďƐ ĨƌŽŵ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ
on 4th ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ that it ŝƐ
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ to ĂǀŽŝĚ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ƵƐĞ ƐŽ ůŽŶŐ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ƌĞŵĂŝŶ ͞ƚŽŽ
ƚĞƌƌŝďůĞ to ƵƐĞ͟. ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ƐƵĐŚ an ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ĨĂŝůƐ to ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ƚŚĞ
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ of ŽŶĞ ƐŝĚĞ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ of .02 ŬŝůŽƚŽŶ or ůĞƐƐ, ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ — ŽŶůǇ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ of ŝŶĚŝƐĐƌĞƚĞ ƐŝǌĞ ĂŶĚ ŵĞĂŶƐ of ĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ͘ The
quandary of an appropriate contemporary response to a discrete use
of small-yield nuclear weapons by the Russians is, in fact, routed in a
long disconnect in how Russian military planners and Western arms-
control theorists view the role of nuclear weapons. dŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ
ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ ƌĞũĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ tĞƐƚĞƌŶ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ of ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞ͕ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞǇ
ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇ ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞ ĂƐ ̛̱̭̯̬̹̖̦̖̌, ǁŚŝĐŚ ŵĞĂŶƐ ͞ĨƌŝŐŚƚĞŶŝŶŐ͟ or
͞ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝǌŝŶŐ͘͟ dŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ĂƚƚĂĐŬ ƚŚŝƐ notion ĂƐ a ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ that
ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƐ an ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ for ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ςρ
ŵŝƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌ͕ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĞĚ ĂĨƚĞƌ it ŝƐ too ůĂƚĞ to ŚĂǀĞ any ŵĂũŽƌ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ;ŝ͘Ğ͕͘ ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ of ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ǁŝůů not ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ƚŚĞ
ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ of ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚͿ͘ KŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŚĂŶĚ͕ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ŚĂǀĞ a
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ of ĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞǇ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌĚ
̛̛̭̖̬̙̦̖̔̏̌, ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ͞ƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ͕͟ ĂƐ in ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇ ƚŚĞǇ ƌĞůĂƚĞ to ƚŚĞŝƌ
ŽǁŶ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ of ƚŚĞ ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƉŽǁĞƌ͘ hŶůŝŬĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞ ŬŝůůŝŶŐ
ĐĂůůĞĚ for by ƚŚĞ tĞƐƚĞƌŶ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ̛̱̭̯̬̹̖̦̖̌, ̛̛̭̖̬̙̦̖̔̏̌
ƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶƐ ƚŚĞ ĞŶĞŵǇ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŚŝƐ ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ that ŚŝƐ ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ ŝƐ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ
ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ to ĚŽ ďĂƚƚůĞ at ĞǀĞƌǇ ůĞǀĞů of ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͘ In ŽƚŚĞƌ ǁŽƌĚƐ͕ ƚŚĞ
ĂďŝůŝƚǇ to ƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶ an ĞŶĞŵǇ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ by-ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚ of ŽŶĞ͛Ɛ ƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐ to ĨŝŐŚƚ͕
ƵŶůŝŬĞ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ͞ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝǌŝŶŐ͕͟ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚĞŶĚƐ to ƐĞƌǀĞ ĂƐ a ƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ for ƚŚĞ
ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇ to ĨŝŐŚƚ͘ 225
dŚĞ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚ͕ 'ĞŽƌŐĞ hůůƌŝĐŚ͕ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ŵŽƌĞ than ƚǁŽ
ǇĞĂƌƐ ĂŐŽ that ͞ξth 'ĞŶ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ŚĂǀĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ǁŝƚŚ
ŵŝŶŝŵĂů ƵŶĚĞƐŝƌĞĚ ĐŽůůĂƚĞƌĂů ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ͟ ĂŶĚ͕ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ ͞ĐŽƵůĚ
ůŽǁĞƌ ΀ƚŚĞ΁ ƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚ of ƵƐĞ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞ ƌĞƚĂůŝĂƚŽƌǇ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ͘͟ hůůƌŝĐŚ
ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞĚ that ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ ͞ƐƚƌŽŶŐ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ that ZƵƐƐia ;ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ŽƚŚĞƌƐͿ
ĂƌĞ ƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐ 4th 'ĞŶ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ŵĂǇ ďĞ on ƚŚĞ ǀĞƌŐĞ of
ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ͕͟ 226 ĂŶĚ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ŚĞ ǁĂƐ ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ͘ μμρ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ƐŝŶĐĞ μκκσ
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐ that ͞ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ no ůŽŶŐĞƌ any ŶĞĞĚ to ĞƋƵŝƉ ŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ
ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĂƌŚĞĂĚƐ͘ tĞ can ŝŶƐƚĂůů ůŽǁ-ǇŝĞůĚ ǁĂƌŚĞĂĚƐ on
ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ĐƌƵŝƐĞ ŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐ͘͟ 228 ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ to hůůƌŝĐŚ͕ ͞ƚŚĞ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ
ƉůĂŶŶĞĚ ŐůŽďĂů ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ĚĞƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ ĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ĚŽĞƐ not
account for ĂŶĚ ǁŽƵůĚ not ďĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ 4th 'ĞŶ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͕͟ ĂŶĚ
225 dŚŝƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚǁĂƐĨŝƌƐƚĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚďǇ:ŽŚŶ'͘,ŝŶĞƐĂŶĚWŚŝůůŝƉ͘WĞƚĞƌƐĞŶŝŶ͞dŚĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů
KĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞŝŶ^ŽǀŝĞƚdŚĞĂƚĞƌ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͕͟ORBIS͕&Ăůůλσςν͕ƉƉ͘ρνπ-ρνρ͘
226 ƌŝĞĨŝŶŐďǇ'ĞŽƌŐĞt͘hůůƌŝĐŚ͕͞h^-ZƵƐƐŝĂEŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐEƵĐůĞĂƌtĞĂƉŽŶƐ͗dƌŽƵďůŝŶŐ
EƵŵĞƌŝĐĂůĂŶĚdĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƐǇŵŵĞƚƌǇ͕͟DĂǇλο͕μκλξ͘
μμρ dŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĂŶǇůŽǁ-ǇŝĞůĚŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĂƌŚĞĂĚƐǁĂƐ
ƚĂŬĞŶďǇƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽƵŶĐŝůŝŶƉƌŝůλσσσĚƵƌŝŶŐsůĂĚŝŵŝƌWƵƚŝŶ͛ƐĨŝƌƐƚŵĞĞƚŝŶŐĂƐ
^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ͘^ĞĞEŝŬŽůĂŬ^ŽŬŽǀ͕ƚŚĞƉƌŝůλσσσZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽƵŶĐŝůDĞĞƚŝŶŐŽŶ
EƵĐůĞĂƌtĞĂƉŽŶƐ͕ĞŶƚĞƌĨŽƌEŽŶƉƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ͕DŽŶƚĞƌĞǇ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ͕:ƵŶĞλ͕λσσσ
228 sŝĐĞĚŵŝƌĂůKůĞŐƵƌƚƐĞǀ͕ĞƉƵƚǇ,ĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶDĂŝŶEĂǀĂů^ƚĂĨĨ͕RIA Novosti͕DĂƌĐŚ
μο͕μκκσ͘
88
ƵƌŐĞƐ that ͞h͘^͘ ĂƌŵƐ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ƉŽůŝĐǇ ŶĞĞĚƐ to catch ƵƉ to ƚŚĞ ŶĞĂƌ- ĂŶĚ
ůŽŶŐĞƌ-ƚĞƌŵ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů of ĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚ 4th 'ĞŶ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͘͟ μμσ
That ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ǁŝůů ƌĞŵĂŝŶ an ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ of ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƉŽǁĞƌ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ŵĂĚĞ ĐůĞĂƌ by ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŵĂĚĞ in
ƚŚĞ 2014 ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ ƉŽƐƚƵƌĞ ƌĞǀŝĞǁ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͗ 1) ƚŚĞ
^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ZŽĐŬĞƚ &ŽƌĐĞƐ D/Zs ĂŶĚ ƌĞƚƵƌŶ to ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ DŽďŝůĞ ZĂŝů
ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ͖ ĂŶĚ 2) ƚŚĞ ĂĐƚŝǀĞ ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĂƌŚĞĂĚ ŝŶǀĞŶƚŽƌǇ ďĞ
ƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ 2,500 to 2,050 ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝǌĞĚ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ to ƚĂŬĞ ĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ of
ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ in ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ ƐŵĂůůĞƌ ƐŝǌĞ ;ǁĞŝŐŚƚͬĚŝĂŵĞƚĞƌͬƐƵď-Ŭƚ ǇŝĞůĚͿ ĂƐ
ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ ĨŝƐƐŝŽŶ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ;ŝ͘Ğ͕͘ ĐůĞĂŶĞƌͿ͘ dŚĞ 2,050 ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů
ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĂƌŚĞĂĚƐ ďĞůŽŶŐ to ƚŚĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ĨŝǀĞ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ͕ ǁŝƚŚ not ůĞƐƐ
than 300 nor ŵŽƌĞ than 600 in ĞĂĐŚ: 1) air-ĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚ ŐƵŝĚĞĚ ŐƌĂǀŝƚǇ
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ǀĂƌǇŝŶŐ ƌĂŶŐĞ͖ 3) ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ ĂƌŵĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ οκŬŵн ZW
ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ƌŽƵŶĚ ĂŶĚ ƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ ĂƐ a ͞ŐŽůĚĞŶ ŐƵŶ͟ not ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ in ďĂƚƚĞƌǇ
ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ͖ 4) air ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ƐƵď-ŬŝůŽƚŽŶ ǁĂƌŚĞĂĚ for ^-500
in ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ďĂůůŝƐƚŝĐ ŵŝƐƐŝůĞ ƌŽůĞ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ for ^-νκκͬ^-400 in ͞ĂŶƚŝ-
ƐƚĞĂůƚŚ͟ ƌŽůĞ͖ ĂŶĚ 5) ŶĂǀĂů ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ƌŽůĞƐ to ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ-to-
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What ŚĂƐ not ďĞĞŶ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞĚ ŝƐ that the nuclear play in
Russian exercises, as well as Moscow’s threats to regional non-nuclear
states, 230 are not only consistent with the development of a capacity
μμσhůůƌŝĐŚ͕ibid.
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ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨǁŚĂƚǁŝůůŚĂƉƉĞŶŝĨĞŶŵĂƌŬũŽŝŶƐƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ-ůĞĚŵŝƐƐŝůĞ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ͘/ĨƚŚŝƐŚĂƉƉĞŶƐ͕ĂŶŝƐŚǁĂƌƐŚŝƉƐǁŝůůďĞĐŽŵĞƚĂƌŐĞƚƐĨŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƚŽŵŝĐŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐ͙͘/
ǁĂŶƚƚŽƐŝŵƉůǇƌĞŵŝŶĚǇŽƵƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŝůůĐŽƐƚǇŽƵďŽƚŚŵŽŶĞǇĂŶĚƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͘͟Jyllands-Posten,
DĂƌĐŚμκλο͘tŚĞŶƚŚĞĂŶŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶĚŝŐŶĂŶƚůǇĂƐŬĞĚĨŽƌ͞ĐůĂƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ͟ĨƌŽŵDŽƐĐŽǁ͕
ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇĐƵƌƚůǇŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌǁƌŽƚĞĞǆĂĐƚůǇǁŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐ
ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚƚŽǁƌŝƚĞ͘ǀĞŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŝƐŶŽƚŝŵŵƵŶĞƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶŶƵĐůĞĂƌƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ͘ƵƌŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞDĂƌƐŚμκλοůďĞ'ƌŽƵƉDĞĞƚŝŶŐŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂůƐƌŝĞĨĞĚďǇ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ
^ĞƌŐĞŝ>ĂǀƌŽǀŽŶƚŚĞŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐŚĞǁĂŶƚĞĚĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚ͕ǁĂƌŶĞĚŽĨƚŚƌĞĞĨůĂƐŚƉŽŝŶƚƐƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚ
ůĞĂĚƚŽŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĂƌ͗λͿƌŝŵĞĂ͕ǁŚĞƌĞĂŶǇĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŚĞĂŶŶĞǆĞĚƉĞŶŝŶƐƵůĂƚŽhŬƌĂŝŶĞ
ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞŵĞƚ͞ĨŽƌĐĞĨƵůůǇŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĂƌ͖͟μͿĞĂƐƚhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͕ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ
ƐƵƉƉůǇŽĨǁĞĂƉŽŶƐďǇEdKƚŽ<ǇŝǀǁŽƵůĚďĞƌĞĂĚĂƐ͞ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞŶĐƌŽĂĐŚŵĞŶƚďǇEdKƚŽƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌ͕͟ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ͞ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉĞŽƉůĞǁŽƵůĚĚĞŵĂŶĚĂĨŽƌĐĞĨƵůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ͖͟ĂŶĚνͿƚŚĞ
ĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĂǁ͞ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĞǆŝƐƚĞĚŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞĂŶĚĐĂƵƐĞĚ
ZƵƐƐŝĂƚŽƚĂŬĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĞƌĞ͘͟^ĞĞWŽůŝŶĂdŝŬŚŽŶŽǀĂ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂdŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƐEƵĐůĞĂƌtĂƌdŽƌŝǀĞ
EdKKƵƚKĨĂůƚŝĐƐ͕͟ǀĂůƵĞǁĂůŬ͘ĐŽŵͬμκλοͬκξͬƌƵƐƐŝĂ-ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƐ-ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ-ǁĂƌͬůƐŽƐĞĞ͟ZƵƐƐŝĂ
ςσ
to deliver on doctrine and strategy levels, but reflect genuine changes
in Russia’s military posture and planning. ƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ƉŽƐƚ-^ŽǀŝĞƚ
ĞƌĂ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ in Zapad-1999, ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚ
that ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ͞ƌĞŚĞĂƌƐŝŶŐ ŽŶĞ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ of ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ—
ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ of ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ǁŚĞŶ Ăůů ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ for ƚŚĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ of
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĞǆŚĂƵƐƚĞĚ͘͟ In ƚŚŝƐ ĐĂƐĞ͕ ƚŚĞ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ ĐĂůůĞĚ
for ͞ĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ͟ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ͞ƉƌĞĞŵƉƚŝǀĞ ƵƐĞ of a ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ
ǁĞĂƉŽŶ͘͟ ĐƚƵĂůůǇ͕ ƐĞǀĞƌĂů ƐƵĐŚ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ƵƐĞĚ͕ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ
^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ZŽĐŬĞƚ &ŽƌĐĞƐ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ^^-μρͬdKWK> ŵŝƐƐŝůĞ ƐƚƌŝŬĞƐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ to ŝƐŽůĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚ͖ ĂŶĚ ĐƌƵŝƐĞ ŵŝƐƐŝůĞ ƐƚƌŝŬĞƐ
ůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ >ŽŶŐ ZĂŶŐĞ ǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ aircraft ǁĞƌĞ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
ƚůĂŶƚŝĐ ŽĂƐƚ ƉŽƌƚƐ of ƚŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ to ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ of ƚŚĞ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ͘ &ŝŶĂůůǇ͕ a ŶŽƚŝŽŶĂů ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ƐƚƌŝŬĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ tĂƌƐĂǁ ǁĂƐ
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ to ͞ƉĞƌƐƵĂĚĞ͟ ŽƚŚĞƌ EdK ĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐ to ĂŐƌĞĞ to ĞŶĚ ƚŚĞ
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͘ tŚŝůĞ DŽƐĐŽǁ ǁĂƐ ĐĂƌĞĨƵů to ŵŝŶŝŵŝǌĞ ͞ďĂĚ ƉƵďůŝĐŝƚǇ͟ ĨĂůůŽƵƚ
ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŶŽƚŝŽŶĂů ƵƐĞ of ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ in ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ Zapad-ƐĞƌŝĞƐ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ͕ ĚŝǀŝĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ Zapad ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ into ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ͞ƉůĂǇĞĚ͟
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚůǇ ĐŽƵůĚ not ĚŝƐŐƵŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ůŝŶŬ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŶŽƚŝŽŶĂů ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ
ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐ ƵƉŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ƉůĂǇ ǁĂƐ ďĂƐĞĚ͘
Asymmetries in Opposing Operational Concepts
It is critical to assess the asymmetries in how Russia and the West
perceive the conduct of operations during contemporary warfare.
That ƚŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƐůŽǁ to ĚƌĂǁ ůĞƐƐŽŶƐ ĨƌŽŵ ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ ǁĂƌƐ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ŝƚƐ ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌƐ— ĨƌŽŵ 'ĞŽƌŐŝĂ231 to hŬƌĂŝŶĞ— ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ƚŚĞ
͞ĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ůĂƐƚ ǁĂƌ͟ ƐǇŶĚƌŽŵĞ͘ ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ŝƐ ĂůƐŽ ŚĂŶĚŝĐĂƉƉĞĚ by ŝƚƐ
͞ũŽŝŶƚ͟ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ to ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ ǁŚŝĐŚ ůĞĂǀĞƐ ĞĂĐŚ ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ for ŝƚƐ
ƉŝĞĐĞ of ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ ďƵĚŐĞƚ ;ĂƐ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚ to ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ-
ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚůǇŝƐƐƵĞƐŶĞǁƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽEdKŽǀĞƌĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶĂůƚŝĐƐ͕&ŽǆEĞǁƐ͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĨŽǆŶĞǁƐ͘ĐŽŵͬǁŽƌůĚͬμκλοͬκξͬκμͬƌƵƐƐŝĂ-ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚůǇ-ŝƐƐƵĞƐ-ŶĞǁ-ƚŚƌĞĂƚ-to-natio-
ŽǀĞƌ-ĨŽƌĐĞƐ-in-ďĂůƚŝĐƐͬ ůƐŽƐĞĞ͞sůĂĚŝŵŝƌWƵƚŝŶdŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƐtŽƌůĚtĂƌν͕^ĂǇƐZƵƐƐŝĂŽƵůĚ
/ŶǀĂĚĞƵƌŽƉĞtŝƚŚŝŶdǁŽĂǇƐ͕͟INQUISITR͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌλσ͕μκλξ͘
231 ͞sůĂĚŝŵŝƌWƵƚŝŶ͛ƐĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǁĂƌ ŝŶ'ĞŽƌŐŝĂŝŶμκκς͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚƐ͕
ǁĂƐƉƌĞƉůĂŶŶĞĚ͕͟<ƌĞŵůŝŶ͘ƌƵ͕ƵŐƵƐƚλκ͕μκλμ͖^ƚĞƉŚĞŶůĂŶŬ͕͞tŚĂƚŽƚŚĞĂƉĂĚμκλν
ǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐZĞǀĞĂů͍/Ŷ>ŝƵĚĂƐĚĂŶĂǀŝēŝƵƐĂŶĚDĂƚƚŚĞǁǌĞŬĂŝ͕ĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ͕Russia’s Zapad 2013
Military Exercise: Lessons for Baltic Regional Security͕dŚĞ:ĂŵĞƐƚŽǁŶ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚEĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĞĨĞŶƐĞĐĂĚĞŵǇŽĨ>ĂƚǀŝĂ͗tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ͕͗ĞĐĞŵďĞƌμκλο͕Ɖ͘λμ͘
σκ
ĂƌŵƐ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ĚƌŝǀĞŶ by a 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ). tŚŝůĞ sůĂĚŝŵŝƌ WƵƚŝŶ ŚĂƐ
ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ a ƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞ ,ŝŐŚ ŽŵŵĂŶĚ ,ĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ to ƉůĂŶ ĂŶĚ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞ ŚŝƐ ƵŶĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ ǁĂƌ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ hŶŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ EdK͕ ƚŚĞ
ůĂƚƚĞƌ ŝƐ ƚƌǇŝŶŐ to ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ non-ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚ ͞ŚǇďƌŝĚ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕͟ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
WĞŶƚĂŐŽŶ͛Ɛ ͞ďƌĂƐƐ͟ ŝƐ ƋƵŝďďůŝŶŐ ŽǀĞƌ ŚŽǁ to ĚŝǀŝĚĞ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ ďƵĚŐĞƚ͘
>ŽŶŐ ĂĨƚĞƌ WƵƚŝŶ ŚĂĚ ƉƵďůŝĐĂůůǇ ĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚ that ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ŚŝƐ ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ
thĞ ŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ a ƉůĂŶŶĞĚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ to ƐĞŝǌĞ ƚŚĞ ƌŝŵĞĂ͕ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ
about ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ĂƌĞ Ɛƚŝůů ďĞŝŶŐ ƉƌĞĨĂĐĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞƌ
͞ĂůůĞŐĞĚ͖͟ ĂŶĚ the high-intensity end of Russia’s New Generation
Warfare is being willfully ignored by the focus on special operations
implied in hybrid warfare. 232
ĨĞǁ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ƚĂƐŬƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĞĚ to ŵĞĞƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ of
'ĞŶĞƌĂů 'ĞƌĂƐŝŵŽǀ͛Ɛ EĞǁ 'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ tĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘ ĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ
ĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĞĚ by ƉĞƌƐƵĂĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ that ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂǀĞ ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ to ŐĂŝŶ
ĨƌŽŵ ĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŶŐ͕ ĂŶĚ ƚŚŝƐ can ŽŶůǇ ďĞ ĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĞĚ by ĐĂůůŝŶŐ into ĚŽƵďƚ
ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ to ǁŝŶ at ƚŚĞ ŽǀĞƌƚ ůĞǀĞů of ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘ KŶĐĞ ƚŚŝƐ fact ŝƐ
ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶĚĞĚ͕ EdK ŶĞĞĚƐ to ĚĞĂů ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ of ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ
ĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŽŶ to ĚĞĞƐĐĂůĂƚĞ͕ ƚŚĞŶ ŚŝŐŚ-ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ ĂŶĚ ŽŶůǇ ƚŚĞŶ ĚŽ
ĐŽǀĞƌƚ ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ĞŶƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞ ƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ
The United States Army’s effort to move its tanks back into Europe and
deploy them forward where they would actually be relevant to
deterrence is probably the single most critical element to restoring
military stability in Europe today. ŽĂƐƚŝŶŐ that ŵĞƌŝĐĂ͛Ɛ Dλλ dĂŶŬ
ŚĂƐ ŶĞǀĞƌ ďĞĞŶ ĚĞĨĞĂƚĞĚ in ďĂƚƚůĞ ŝƐ ĚŽǁŶƌŝŐŚƚ ƐŝůůǇ ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƚĂŶŬƐ
ĂƌĞŶ͛ƚ ĞǀĞŶ in ƵƌŽƉĞ or ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚ͘ ƌŐƵŝŶŐ that ƚŚĞ ƌŵǇ ŝƐ not
͞ŽƵƚƌĂŶŐĞĚ ĂŶĚ ŽƵƚŐƵŶŶĞĚ͟ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ h͘^͘ ŐŽĞƐ to ǁĂƌ ǁŝƚŚ
ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ĨƌŽŵ Ăůů ƚŚĞ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ŝƐ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ĨŽŽůŝƐŚ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ if ƚŚĞ
ƌŵǇ ŝƐ too ƐŵĂůů ĂŶĚ not ĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚ in ƵƌŽƉĞ. DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ͕ ŐŝǀĞŶ that ƚŚĞ
h͘^͘ EĂǀǇ ǁŝůů not ĨŝŐŚƚ in ƚŚĞ ĂůƚŝĐ ^ĞĂ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŝƌ &ŽƌĐĞ ǁŽŶ͛ƚ ďĞ
ĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶŐ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŐƌŽƵŶĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ƵŶƚŝů ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞŝƌ ůĂǇĞƌĞĚ air ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐ
ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĞĚ, the question arises of exactly who would be
232͞>ŝŬĞƚŚĞzŽŵ<ŝƉƉƵƌtĂƌξκǇĞĂƌƐĞĂƌůŝĞƌ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŽ-hŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶtĂƌŝƐĂŶĂƚƵƌĂů͚ƚĞƐƚďĞĚ͛ĂŶĚ
ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚĨƵůŐůŝŵƉƐĞŽĨǁŚĂƚ ŝƐƚŽĐŽŵĞŽŶĨƵƚƵƌĞďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚƐ͘͟WŚŝůůŝƉ<ĂƌďĞƌĂŶĚ>ƚ͘Žů͘:ŽƐŚƵĂ
dŚŝďĞĂƵůƚ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕͟Army Magazine͕:ƵŶĞμκλπ͘
σλ
holding the ground until the other services show up. The failure to
address this important question is indicative of the lack of appreciation
of asymmetries in operational concepts. 233 dŚĞ ĂƌƌŽŐĂŶĐĞ ďĞŝŶŐ ŚĞĂƌĚ
in ƚŚĞ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ intra-ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ĂŶĚ intra-ƌŵǇ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ŐŽŝŶŐ into ƚŚĞ 2016
WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂů ůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞ of a ŵĂƐƐŝǀĞ ŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞ of ƚŚĞ
ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĞƐ in ŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů cŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ͘ KŶĞ ŵĂǇ not ŚĂǀĞ to
ŵĂƚĐŚ an ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ͛Ɛ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ŶƵŵĞƌŝĐĂůůǇ͕ but if ŽŶĞ ŝŶƚĞŶĚƐ to ĚĞƚĞƌ that
ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ͕ ŽŶĞ ĚŽĞƐ ŚĂǀĞ to ďĞ ĐƌĞĚŝďůǇ ĐĂƉĂďůĞ of ĚĞĨĞĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ͛Ɛ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͘ hŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ĞŶĞŵǇ ƚŚŝŶŬƐ ŚĞ
ŚĂƐ to ďĞ ĐĂƉĂďůĞ of ĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚŝŶŐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐ ƉŽŝŶƚ of ĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞ͘
/ƚǁĂƐƐŽŵĞĞŝŐŚƚǇĞĂƌƐĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĐŽůůĂƉƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨƉĞƌƐƵĂĚĞĚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŽĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝƚƐ
ĨŝƌƐƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͘ƐŶŽƚĞĚďǇƌǌĞǌŝŶƐŬŝĂŶĚsĂƌĂŶŐŝƐ͕
Exercises are used by defense establishments to test their

readiness, deployability, and logistical and combat
proficiency. They can be used as demonstrations of force to
underscore determination to defend national
territory/interests and those of allies and partners. They can
also be use to intimidate and to camouflage offensive
operations. Regarding the latter, in February 2014 Russia
mobilized 150,000 troops under the guise of an anti-terror
simulation. Many of the units in this exercise were deployed
along Ukraine’s border just as Russia invaded Crimea and
then later eastern Ukraine.234
ƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ͕ƌǌĞǌŝŶƐŬŝĂŶĚsĂƌĂŶŐŝƐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐƚǁŽĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ͖λͿƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ
ĂƚƌŽƵďůŝŶŐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞƐĐĂůĞŽĨĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶEdKĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͖ĂŶĚμͿƚŚĂƚWƵƚŝŶ͛Ɛ͞ƐŶĂƉ-ĐŚĞĐŬ͟ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂ
ĐŽǀĞƌĨŽƌ͞ĂƐǁŝĨƚĂƚƚĂĐŬ΀ƚŚĂƚ΁ĐŽƵůĚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĂfait accompli ďĞĨŽƌĞ
EdKĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-ŵĂŬĞƌƐĐŽŶǀĞŶĞĚƚŽĂŐƌĞĞŽŶǁŚĂƚŚĂĚƚƌĂŶƐƉŝƌĞĚĂŶĚ
233 ^ĞĞ͕ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕DĂƌŬWĞƌƌǇ͕͞dŚĞh͘^͘ƌŵǇ͛ƐtĂƌKǀĞƌZƵƐƐŝĂ͕͟WK>/d/K͕DĂǇλμ͕μκλπ͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬƉŽůŝƚŝĐŽ͘ĐŽŵͬŵĂŐĂǌŝŶĞͬƐƚŽƌǇͬμκλπͬκοͬĂƌŵǇ-ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů-ĨŝŐŚƚ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂ-ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ-ďƵĚŐĞƚ-
213885
234 /ĂŶ:͘ƌǌĞǌŝŶƐŬŝĂŶĚEŝĐŚŽůĂƐsĂƌĂŶŐŝƐ͕͞dŚĞEdK-ZƵƐƐŝĂ ǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ'ĂƉ͕͟tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ͗dŚĞ
ƚůĂŶƚŝĐŽƵŶĐŝů͕&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇμν͕μκλο͘
σμ
ŚŽǁƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ͘͟ 235 ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƐĞ͞ƐŶĂƉ-ĐŚĞĐŬ͟ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĐŽƵůĚ
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞmaskirovka ĨŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂŶŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨEdK
DĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕ǁĂƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚEdKŝŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽĨ
KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝƐĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞůǇƐŝŵƵůĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞZapad ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĞƌŝĞƐ͘
Zapad-1999
dŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƵƌŽƉĞƚŽĚĞĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽůůĂƉƐĞŽĨzƵŐŽƐůĂǀŝĂ
ůĞĚƚŽŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇ
ŽŶĞĂŶĚŽŶĞ-ŚĂůĨĚĞĐĂĚĞƐůĂƚĞƌ͘ƐƚŚĞĐƌŝƐŝƐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚďǇ^ůŽďŽĚĂŶ
DŝůŽƐĞǀŝĐ͛ƐĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƚŚĂƚůĞĚƚŽ^ůŽǀĞŶŝĂĂŶĚ^ůŽǀĂŬŝĂ
ĚĞĐůĂƌŝŶŐŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞzƵŐŽƐůĂǀ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐ
ǁĂƌďǇ^ĞƌďŝĂĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŽƐŶŝĂ͛ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞŵ͕ƌŝǀĞƚĞĚƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ͛Ɛ
ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽŶǇĞƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŚŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ͕ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐǁĂƐ
ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĞĚďǇƚǁŽƉŽůŝĐǇĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ͘dŚĞŶĞĂƌ-ƚĞƌŵĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞǁĂƐŚŽǁ
ƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚDŝůŽƐĞǀŝĐ͛ƐǁĂƌŝŶzƵŐŽƐůĂǀŝĂĨƌŽŵƵŶĚŽŝŶŐŽĨĂůůƚŚĞĞƚŚŶŝĐ
ŚĂƌŵŽŶǇďƌŽƵŐŚƚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞďǇƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨEdKĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-λσξο
ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƚƌŽŽƉƐ͘hůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ͕ƚŚŝƐůĞĚƚŽƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͛
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨǁŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐĐĂŵĞƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽĂƐ͞ŶŽŶ-
ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ͟ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂŶŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ͛ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĨŽƌƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ
ŝƐĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĞĚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĚŝƌĞĐƚĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ;ŝ͘Ğ͕͘ǀŝĂĂŝƌ
ĂŶĚŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐƚƌŝŬĞƐͿ͘dŚĞƐŽďĞƌŝŶŐŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨƚŚŝƐůĂƚĞƐƚ͞ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝŶ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ͟ŽŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞƵŶĚĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ͘dŚĞ
ƐĞĐŽŶĚ͕ůŽŶŐĞƌ-ƚĞƌŵĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚƚŚĂƚDŝůŽƐĞǀŝĐ͛Ɛ
ĞƚŚŶŝĐǁĂƌŽŶŽƐŶŝĂ͛ƐDƵƐůŝŵƐŚĂĚŽŶ/ƐƌĂĞů͛ƐĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨ
ƵƌŽƉĞ͛ƐǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽƚŽůĞƌĂƚĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŚŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶƐĞǀĞŶƚǇ
ǇĞĂƌƐĂĨƚĞƌĂůůŽǁŝŶŐƐŝǆŵŝůůŝŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ :ĞǁƐďĞĞǆƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ͘͞EĞǀĞƌ
ĂŐĂŝŶ͟ŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĞƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞƌ͞ƵŶůĞƐƐŝƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐďůŽŽĚĂŶĚƚƌĞĂƐƵƌĞ͘͟
dŚŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĐŚĂŶŐĞĚĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐŶŽƚŽŶůǇĨŽƌ/ƐƌĂĞůĂŶĚŝƚƐ
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĂůůǇ͕ďƵƚĨŽƌĂůůŽĨ/ƐƌĂĞů͛ƐŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌƐ͕ĞǀĞŶĂƐĨĂƌĂǁĂǇĂƐ
DŽƐĐŽǁ͘
dŚŝƐĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚůĞĚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚŽĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚŝƚ͞ŚĂƐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůůǇŶŽĂůůŝĞƐ
ŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚĞǆĐĞƉƚĞůĂƌƵƐ͘͟ 236 ͞ZƵƐƐŝĂƉƌŽǀĞĚƵŶĂďůĞƚŽƌĂƉŝĚůǇ
235 Ibid.
236 ůĞŬƐĂŶĚƌDŝŶĂŬŽǀ͕DŽƐĐŽǁCenter TV͕:ƵŶĞμλ͕λσσσ͘
σν
ĚŝƐƉĂƚĐŚŝƚƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƵŶŝƚƐƚŽƚŚĞĂůŬĂŶƐďǇĂŝƌ͕ďĞĐĂƵƐĞEdKĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͕
ŽƌƐƚĂƚĞƐǁŝƚŚĂƐƚƌŽŶŐǁŝƐŚƚŽũŽŝŶEdK͕ĂƌĞůŽĐĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ͘/ŶŽƚŚĞƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŵƵĐŚƚŚĞ
ƐĂŵĞ͘͟ μνρ ůĞĂƌůǇ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŚĂĚĐŽŵĞƚŽĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ
ƵƌŐĞŶĐǇŝŶƌĞǀŝƐŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ͘ 238 ThĞƌĞĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂǁĂƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇŝƐŽůĂƚĞĚĂŶĚ
needed to give careful thought to defending itself in a rapidly changing
strategic environment led in 1999 to the holding of operational-
strategic military exercises, the first since 1985. μνσ ĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-
ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůƌĞĂƐŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚŝƐŵĂũŽƌλσσσĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͕͞ŝŶĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐĞŶƐĞ͕ƚŚŝƐ
ǁĂƐĂƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽEdK͛ƐĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶĂŶĚĂǁĂƌŶŝŶŐŽĨĂƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ͘͟ 240
dŚĞƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽŽĨZapad-1999 ǁĂƐĚƌŝǀĞŶďǇǁŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨ
ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐĂŶĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐƐƚǇůĞŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ;ŝ͘Ğ͕͘ŶŽŶĐŽŶƚĂĐƚĂŶĚŶĞƚ-
ĐĞŶƚƌŝĐͿĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽǀĞƌ
ůĞŬƐĂŶĚƌ>ƵŬĂƐŚĞŶŬĂ͕WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŽĨĞůĂƌƵƐǁŚŽŚĞĞĚĞĚƚŚĞĨĂƚĞŽĨ
DŝůŽƐĞǀŝĐ͘dŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŽĨĨĞƌĞĚƵƉĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƚŚĂƚ
ĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƐƵƉĞƌĨŝĐŝĂůŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨEdK͛ƐĐŽŵďĂƚ
ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ^ĞƌďŝĂ͗͞ĨƚĞƌĂůŽŶŐƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŽŶ
ĞůĂƌƵƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĂĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐŽĨƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůƉƌĞƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŝƚ͕ĂŶĚĂĨƚĞƌ
ĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽůŝŵŝƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇŝŶ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚKďůĂƐƚ͕ƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ
ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽƌĞƐŽƌƚƚŽŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘͟ 241 tŝƚŚƚŚŝƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ
ĂƐďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ͕ƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽǁĂƐďĂƐĞĚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨ͛Ɛ
ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
DŝůŽƐĞǀŝĐ͛ƐĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶzƵŐŽƐůĂǀŝĂ͗
μνρ DŝŶĂŬŽǀ͕DŽƐĐŽǁCenter TV͕:ƵŶĞμλ͕λσσσ͘

238 KůĞŐ&ĂůŝĐŚĞǀĂŶĚKůĞŐWŽĐŚŝŶǇƵŬ͕͞dƌĂŝŶŝŶŐDĂŬĞƐƚŚĞƌŵǇ^ƚƌŽŶŐ͘tĞDƵƐƚEĞǀĞƌ&ŽƌŐĞƚ
dŚĂƚ͕͟Krasnaya Zvezda͕:ƵŶĞμν͕λσσσ͕Ɖ͘λ͘
μνσ ^ĞƌŐĞǇŶŝƐŬŽ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂĂŶĚĞůĂƌƵƐZĞƐƚŽƌĞdĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂů/ŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇ͘tŚŝůĞŽƌŝƐzĞůƚƐŝŶDĂŬĞƐ
WĞĂĐĞtŝƚŚtĞƐƚ͚ĨƚĞƌƚŚĞ&ŝŐŚƚ͕͛DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ^ƚĂƌƚWƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐĨŽƌĂ͚ZĞĂů͛&ŝŐŚƚ͕͛Segodnya͕:ƵŶĞ
μν͕λσσσ͕Ɖ͘ν͘
240 WĞƚƌWŽůŬŽǀŶŝŬŽǀ͕͞&ƌŽŵ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚƚŽƚŚĞŚŝŶĞƐĞŽƌĚĞƌ͗DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ>ŝŬĞ
ĂƉĂĚ-σσWƌŽŵŝƐĞdŽĞ^ǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐ͕͟ʻ̨̛̛̖̭̥̖̌̏̚ʦ̨̨̖̦̦̖ʽ̨̛̬̖̦̖͕̍̚:ƵůǇμ͕λσσσ͕EƵŵďĞƌ
μο͕Ɖ͘ο͘
241 WŽůŬŽǀŶŝŬŽǀ͕ibid.
σξ
an enemy strike aviation and naval grouping of 450 tactical
and strategic aircraft as well as 120 cruise missiles with non-
nuclear warheads which were deployed ahead of time in
north and northeast Europe inflicted strikes in Belarusian
territory. At the same time 110 aircraft and 40 cruse missiles
attacked troops in Kaliningrad Special Region. Enemy ground
forces began a limited attack on Russia and Belarus.242
ƐŽŶĞŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚŝŶĂƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽǁƌŝƚƚĞŶďǇƚŚĞKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨ͕ƚŚĞ͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ
ƌĞƉĞůůĞĚƚŚĞĂƚƚĂĐŬƐŽŶ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚKďůĂƐƚ͕ďƵƚƚŚĞĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ
ŚĞůƉ͘͟243 dŚĞŵĞƌŐĞĚŝƌĂŶĚŝƌĞĨĞŶƐĞ&ŽƌĐĞƐǁĞƌĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŝŶ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌĞƉŽƌƚƐĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚĂĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂŝƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
;̶̨̨̛̱̹̦̪̖̬̏̔̌́̌́̚Ϳ͘dŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƚŽ͞ĚĞůŝǀĞƌ
ƉƌĞĞŵƉƚŝǀĞŵŝƐƐŝůĞĂŶĚĂŝƌƐƚƌŝŬĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŽĨĂŝƌĨŝĞůĚƐŝŶ
WŽůĂŶĚĂŶĚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƚŚĂƚEdKŝƐƵƐŝŶŐ͟ƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞĂƚƚĂĐŬ
ŽŶĞůĂƌƵƐĂŶĚ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͘ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ͕ŝƚǁĂƐŵĞĂŶƚƚŽĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĂ
ĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂŶƚŝ-ĂŝƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ;̶̨̨̨̨̛̛̪̬̯̱̹̦̪̖̬̏̏̔̌́̌́̚ͿŝŶƚĞŐƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ĂŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĂƐƐĞƚƐŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĞůĂƌƵƐ͞ƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ
ĞŶĞŵǇŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĂŝƌĂƚƚĂĐŬĨƌŽŵďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŽŬĞǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů͕
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͕ĂŶĚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ͘͟ 244 /ŶĂŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƚĂůĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵ
ƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚǁĞƐƚĞƌŶ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ͕
͞ĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐƚƌŝŬĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂůůŝĂŶĐĞĂŝƌĂŶĚŶĂǀĂůďĂƐĞƐŝŶ
EŽƌǁĂǇ͕ĂŶĚĂůƐŽĂŐĂŝŶƐƚEdKĐĂƌƌŝĞƌƚĂƐŬĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĂƌĞŶƚƐĂŶĚ
EŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶ^ĞĂƐ͘͟ 245 /ŶŝƚŝĂůƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ͛ƐĂŝƌĂŶĚŶĂǀĂů
ĨŽƌĐĞƐĂůůŽǁĞĚĨŽƌ͞ůĂŶĚŝŶŐĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞŽŶƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇŽĨƐƚŽŶŝĂ
ĂŶĚ>ĂƚǀŝĂĂŶĚŵŽǀŝŶŐĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶƚƌŽŽƉƐŝŶƚŽ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͘͟ 246 ƐƉĂƌƚŽĨ
conƚŝŶƵĞĚŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƚĂůĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚǁĞƐƚĞƌŶ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ͕
͞ůĂĐŬ^ĞĂ&ůĞĞƚĨŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚĂƌĞƵƐĞĚƚŽĚĞůŝǀĞƌƐƚƌŝŬĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
dƵƌŬĞǇ͛ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŝƌĨŝĞůĚƐ͘͟ μξρ
244 /ŐŽƌ<ŽƌŽƚĐŚĞŶŬŽ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵǇWƌĞƉĂƌĞƐdŽZĞƉƵůƐĞŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͘EdKůůŝĞĚƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ
tŝůů&ĞĂƚƵƌĞŽŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨDĂƉƐƐ>ŝŬĞůǇĚǀĞƌƐĂƌǇ͕͟ʻ̛̛̖̭̥̌̏̌́̚ʧ̖̯͕̌̌̚:ƵŶĞμμ͕λσσσ
245 <ŽƌŽƚĐŚĞŶŬŽ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵǇWƌĞƉĂƌĞƐdŽZĞƉƵůƐĞŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͕͟ibid.
246 <ŽƌŽƚĐŚĞŶŬŽ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵǇWƌĞƉĂƌĞƐdŽZĞƉƵůƐĞŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͕͟ibid.
μξρ <ŽƌŽƚĐŚĞŶŬŽ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵǇWƌĞƉĂƌĞƐdŽZĞƉƵůƐĞŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͕͟ibid.
σο
ƐƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƉƌŽĐĞĞĚĞĚ͕͞ĂĨƚĞƌƌĞƉƵůƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ΀ĞŶĞŵǇ͛ƐĂŝƌ΁ŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ͕
ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞůĂƵŶĐŚĞƐƚŚĞνρth ŝƌƌŵǇ;ůŽŶŐ-ƌĂŶŐĞĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶͿƚŽ
ďůŽĐŬƚŚĞĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ͛ƐƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐ͟ĂŶĚ͕ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ
ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĚĞƉƚŚƐŽĨĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇǁĂƐĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
ǁĞƐƚĞƌŶĂŶĚŶŽƌƚŚǁĞƐƚĞƌŶfronts͕͞ƚŚĞŶŽƌƚŚǁĞƐƚĞƌŶfront, ũŽŝŶƚůǇǁŝƚŚ
ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ&ůĞĞƚƌĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĞďůŽĐŬĂĚĞŽŶƚŚĞ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ^ƉĞĐŝĂů
ZĞŐŝŽŶ͘͟248 ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŶĚĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕
the enemy, with his overwhelming superiority in conventional
armaments, opts for an escalation of the conflict. To stop
him, Russia’s leadership decides to resort to a nuclear strike
for demonstration purposes. This task, which was already
rehearsed during the exercises in October 1998…is assigned
to the 37th Strategic Aviation Army. 249
“Two pairs of strategic missile-carrying aircraft from the
Donbas Red Banner 22nd Guards Heavy Bomber Division”
were launched from Engels air base 14 kilometers (8.7 miles)
east of Saratov. 250
A pair of supersonic Tu-160’s followed the entire Norwegian
coastline, simulated the launch of Kh-55 cruise missiles, turned
round, and took the same route back to their own base area.
The Norwegian F-16’s were too late to intercept – in the space
of a few years it appears that NATO pilots have lost the ability
to deal with eastern visitors. On entering the air force’s
southern firing range one of the crews carried out a real
launch. Without waiting for the missile’s three-hour flight to
end, the “Blackjacks” (NATO designation for Tu-160’s)
returned to the airfield, having spent 12 hours aloft.
μξσ ^ĞƌŐĞǇ^ŽŬƵƚ͕͞ĂůŬĂŶKƉƚŝŽŶƐ&ĂŝůƐ͘ZĞƉƵůƐŝŽŶŽĨŶĞŵǇ͛ƐŝƌKĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞZĞŚĞĂƌƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
ŽƵƌƐĞŽĨĂƉĂĚ͛σσǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ͕͟ʻ̛̛̖̭̥̌̏̌́̚ʧ̖̯̌̌̚;ůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐsĞƌƐŝŽŶͿ͕:ƵŶĞμξ͕λσσσ͕Ɖ͘μ͘
250 ^ĞƌŐĞǇ^ŽŬƵƚ͕͞ZĞƚƵƌŶ͚ĨƌŽŵZŽƵŶĚƚŚĞŽƌŶĞƌ͛͘>ŽŶŐ-ZĂŶŐĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶWŝůŽƚƐ&ůǇƚŽŵĞƌŝĐĂĨŽƌ
&ŝƌƐƚdŝŵĞŝŶZĞĐĞŶƚzĞĂƌƐ͕͟ʻ̛̛̖̭̥̌̏̌́̚ʧ̖̯͕̌̌̚:ƵŶĞμσ͕λσσσ͕Ɖ͘μ͘ŶŐĞůƐǁĂƐ͕ƵŶƚŝůλσξλ͕
ĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽǁŶŽĨƚŚĞsŽůŐĂ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐĂůůĞĚWŽŬƌŽǀƐŬ͘͞dƵƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƌŶĞƌ͟ŝƐĂƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ
ƚŽǁŚĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐďŽŵďĞƌƐĨůǇŝŶŐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƌĐƚŝĐKĐĞĂŶǁŽƵůĚƚĂŬĞĂ
ƐŚĂƌƉƐŽƵƚŚ-ǁĞƐƚƚƵƌŶƚŽǁĂƌĚ/ĐĞůĂŶĚĂŶĚEŽƌƚŚŵĞƌica.
σπ
Meanwhile a pair of Tu-95MS’s was still in the air. In the
course of a 15-hour flight they crossed the North Atlantic,
made a detour to take in Iceland, indicated a missile launch
and then returned, launching on the way a Kh-55 at a target
on the firing range.251
dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉƌĞƐƐŵĂĚĞĐůĞĂƌƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ
ŽĨƚŚĞŶƵĐůĞĂƌƐƚƌŝŬĞƐŽĨ>ŽŶŐ-ZĂŶŐĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ͘ƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞZapad-1999
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ͕͞ŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽĂŶĂŝƌĂƚƚĂĐŬŽŶŝƚƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ;ŽŶƚŚĞ
<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ^ƉĞĐŝĂůZĞŐŝŽŶ͕ ƚŽďĞĞǆĂĐƚͿĂŶĚŽŶƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇŽĨĞůĂƌƵƐ͕
ZƵƐƐŝĂŝŶĨůŝĐƚĞĚĂŶƵĐůĞĂƌƐƚƌŝŬĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇŽŶƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ
ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐďƵƚĂůƐŽŽŶh͘^͘ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͘͟ 252 dŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĞĨĞŶƐĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƵŶĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂůůǇŵĂĚĞĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͞ǁĂƐĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŽůĂƵŶĐŚŶƵĐůĞĂƌƐƚƌŝŬĞƐĨŝƌƐƚǁŚŝĐŚĞŶĂďůĞĚ
ŝƚƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĂďƌĞĂŬƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝŶƚŚĞƚŚĞĂƚĞƌƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ͘͟ 253 ƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇ
ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉƌĞƐƐ͗
The Russian Federation’s military doctrine does not contain
the Soviet Union’s previously declared commitment not to be
first to use nuclear weapons. Admittedly what it does enshrine
is that Russia does not intend to use any weapons first and
ŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂƌĞƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐĂŶĞǆƚƌĞŵĞƌĞƐŽƌƚ΀̡̬̜̦̖̖̌
̨̭̬̖̭̯̔̏΁͘tĞĚŽŶŽƚŝŶƚĞŶĚƵƐŝŶŐŽƵƌŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŶow
against any state which is party to the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty except in cases of armed aggression by
such a state against Russia or of joint military actions by it
with a state which possesses nuclear weapons against Russia
or its allies.” 254
ƐũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞƐŚŝĨƚŝŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨĨŝƌƐƚƵƐĞŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͕
ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉƌĞƐƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ͞ƐƵĐŚ͚ŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝƐŵ͛ďǇZƵƐƐŝĂŝƐŝŶĚĞĞĚĂŶ
ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĚƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ͗zŽƵŚĂǀĞƚŽĚĞƚĞƌƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌƐ
251 ^ŽŬƵƚ͕͞ZĞƚƵƌŶĨƌŽŵ͚ZŽƵŶĚƚŚĞŽƌŶĞƌ͕͛͟ibid.
252 ůĞŬƐĂŶĚƌ<ŽƌĞƚƐŬŝǇ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ/ŶĨůŝĐƚĞĚEƵĐůĞĂƌ^ƚƌŝŬĞƐŽŶhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘KŶůǇŝŶdƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĨŽƌ
EŽǁ͕͟ˁ̨̖̦͕̐̔́:ƵůǇμ͕λσσσ͕Ɖ͘λ͘
253 DĂƌƐŚĂů/ŐŽƌ^ĞƌŐĞǇĞǀĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶsůĂĚŝŵŝƌ^ŽŬŝƌŬŽ͕͞dŽƉ-Žů͕dŽƉ-Žů͕͟Moskovskiy
Komsolmolets͕μνĞĐĞŵďĞƌλσσσ͘
254 sůĂĚŝŵŝƌ^ŽŬŝƌŬŽ͕͞dŽƉ-Žů͕dŽƉ-Žů͕͟ʺ̨̡̨̡̛̭̭̜̏ʶ̶̨̨̨̥̭̥̣̖͕ĞĐĞŵďĞƌμν͕λσσσ͘
σρ
ƐŽŵĞŚŽǁ͘͟ 255 /ŶƐŽŵĞǁĂǇƐ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ
ǁŽƵůĚďĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚĨŝĨƚĞĞŶǇĞĂƌƐůĂƚĞƌǁŚĞŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐƐĞŝǌĞĚ
ƌŝŵĞĂ͘KŶĐĞŝŶƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐƚĂƚĞ͛ƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂĂƐƐƵŵĞĚ
ĂĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞƉŽƐƚƵƌĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽĞŵƉůŽǇŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐƚŽƌĞƚĂŝŶŝƚƐ
ŐĂŝŶƐ͘
/ŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞZapad-1999 ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƚŽĂĐůŽƐĞ͕ƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ
ĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞĚƚŚĂƚ͕͞ĨĞĂƌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŵĂǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶƚŽĂƚŽƚĂů
ŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĂƌ͕ƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇŝƐĐŽŵƉĞůůĞĚƚŽƐƚĂƌƚŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘͟ 256 dŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĞĨĞŶƐĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚƚŚĂƚ͞ǁĞǁĞƌĞƌĞŚĞĂƌƐŝŶŐŽŶĞ
ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ– ƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ
ǁŚĞŶĂůůŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ
ĞǆŚĂƵƐƚĞĚ͘͟μορ ŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŝƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇĚĞĨĞŶĚ
ZƵƐƐŝĂĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ͛ĚƐĞĞŶĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĞĚďǇEdKĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
DŝůŽƐĞǀŝĐǁŝƚŚŶŽŶ-ŶƵĐůĞĂƌƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
͞ǁŽƌŬĞĚŽƵƚĂǀĂƌŝĂŶƚŽĨĂƉƌĞĞŵƉƚŝǀĞƵƐĞŽĨĂŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
ĂŶĞŶĞŵǇ͟ 258͘dŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚŝƚƐŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŝŵƉĂĐƚ
ǁŚĞŶŝƚ͞ƌĂƚƚůĞĚƚŚĞŶĞƌǀĞƐŽĨEdKŵĞŵďĞƌ-ĐŽƵŶƚƌ΀ŝĞƐ΁͙ĚĞƉƌŝǀŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞŵŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĨĞĞůŝŶŐŽĨŝŶǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚĂƐĂĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ–
ŝŵƉƵŶŝƚǇ͘͟ μοσ
dŚĞŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ-in-ŚŝĞĨŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞĂŶĚŝƌĞĨĞŶƐĞŚĂĚ
ĂůƌĞĂĚǇĚƌĂǁŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƉƌŝŽƌƚŽĂŶǇĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐŽĨ
Zapad-1999 that
High-precision weapons must predominate in the Army
today. Not only frontline aviation but also long-range
aviation must have them. At the moment we clearly have a
shortage of such weapons. For example, our strategic
bombers are equipped with missiles which only have nuclear
warheads, but high-precision missiles fitted with conventional
warheads are also necessary. It was these missiles that NATO
255 ^ŽŬŝƌŬŽ͕͞dŽƉ-Žů͕dŽƉ-Žů͕͟ibid.
256 ^ĞƌŐĞǇ^ŽŬƵƚ͕͞ĂůŬĂŶKƉƚŝŽŶƐ&ĂŝůƐ͕͟ibid.
μορ DĂƌƐŚĂů/ŐŽƌ^ĞƌŐĞǇĞǀĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶsůĂĚŝŵŝƌzĞƌŵŽůŝŶ͕͞ƌŵǇZĞĂĚǇdŽZĞƐŽůǀĞ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
dĂƐŬƐ͕͟ʰ̛̖̭̯͕̏́̚:ƵůǇλκ͕λσσσ͕Ɖ͘λ͘
258 ^ĞƌŐĞǇ/ƐŚĐŚĞŶŬŽ͕͞^ĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶ͗ŽŶ͛ƚƌŝǀĞZƵƐƐŝĂŝŶƚŽĂŽƌŶĞƌ͕͟˃̬̱͕̔:ƵůǇλκ͕λσσσ͕Ɖ͘λ
μοσ sůĂĚŝƐůĂǀzĞǀĚŽŬŝŵŽǀ͕͞/^ĞƌǀĞƚŚĞ&ĂƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚ͕͟Russian Television Network͕:ƵůǇξ͕λσσσ͘
σς
used extensively; they destroyed bridges, factories, oil storage
tanks, and other important targets with them. These
weapons are close to nuclear weapons in their effectiveness,
but they are not nuclear weapons.260
/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞ͕ƚŚĞDĂŝŶKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐƐŽƵŐŚƚ
to improve the operating methods of command and
operations personnel of formations of the branches of the
Armed Forces of the Western Region in command and control
under conditions of a worsening of the military-political
situation, outbreak of armed conflicts, and their development
into a regional war. 261
dŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŚĂĚƚŽďĞĂůůƚŚĞŵŽƌĞƐŽďĞƌŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞǁŚĞŶ
two days before the start of the exercises, the previously
stipulated fuel allocations were cut in half. They thus had to
drop from the forces participating in the exercise the Admiral
>ĞǀĐŚĞŶŬŽĂŶĚĚŵŝƌĂů<ŚĂƌůĂŵŽǀW<Ɛ΀ůĂƌŐĞ^tƐŚŝƉ΁͕
and reduce the time at sea for the Admiral Chabanenko BPK
ĂŶĚƚŚĞDĂƌƐŚĂůhƐƚŝŶŽǀZ<Z΀ŵŝƐƐŝůĞĐƌƵŝƐĞƌ΁͘DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞ
projected time spent in the air by missile-carrying and
helicopter aviation was cut exactly in half. The exercise plan
thus did not have the “prize” search for nuclear-powered and
diesel submarines and the landing of a commando group
from a submarine. 262
260 ŽůŽŶĞů'ĞŶĞƌĂůŶĂƚŽůŝǇ<ŽƌŶƵŬŽǀ͕ˀ̨̡̛̭̭̜̭̌́ʧ̖̯͕̌̌̚:ƵŶĞμπ͕λσσσ͕Ɖ͘μ͘
261 ŽůŽŶĞů'ĞŶĞƌĂůzƵƌŝǇĂůƵǇĞǀƐŬŝǇĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶsůĂĚŝŵŝƌDƵŬŚŝŶ͕͞&ŽƌƚŚĞĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
͚hŶĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͛͗ǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĂƉĂĚ-σσĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐďŝůŝƚǇƚŽKƉƉŽƐĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů
ŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͕͟ʻ̨̛̛̖̭̥̖̌̏̚ʦ̨̨̖̦̦̖ʽ̨̛̬̖̦̖͕̍̚:ƵŶĞμο͕λσσσ͕EƵŵďĞƌμξ͕Ɖ͘μ͘
262 ŝŵŝƚŝǇ>ŝƚŽǀŬŝŶĂŶĚZŽŵĂŶ&ŽŵŝƐŚĞŶŬŽ͕͞dŚĞ͚ĂƉĂĚ-σσ͛dƌĂŶƐƉŽůĂƌdĂĐŬ͕͟ʶ̬̭̦̌̌́ʯ̖͕̏̔̌̚
:ƵůǇλν͕λσσσ͘
σσ
Zapad-2009
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚZapad-2009 ǁĂƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƐĂĚŝƐĐƌĞƚĞƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĞǀĞŶƚ͕ƚŚŝƐ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞǁĂƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚŝŶĐŽŶĐĞƌƚǁŝƚŚLadoga-2009 ĂŶĚKavkas-2009
;ĂƵĐĂƐƵƐ-μκκσͿ 263 ĂƐĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨůĂƌŐĞ-ƐĐĂůĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ
ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞOsen-20κσ;ƵƚƵŵŶ-μκκσͿŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌƐ͘ 264 dŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂů
ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨOsen-2009 ǁĂƐƚŚĂƚŝƚĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐĞĚĂůůƚŚƌĞĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂǆĞƐŝŶ
ƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶŽƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶd^D— ƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚǁĞƐƚ͕ǁĞƐƚ͕ĂŶĚ
ŶŽƌƚŚǁĞƐƚ͘ 265 dŚĞŐƌĞĂƚƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĚĞƉƚŚŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇƚŚĞ
'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŚĂƐƚŽƉůĂŶƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚŚĂƐƚƵƌŶĞĚǁŚĂƚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
ĞƌĂǁĞƌĞƚŚƌĞĞd^DƐŝŶƚŽ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉĞƌŝŽĚ͘dŚŝƐƌĞĂůŝƚǇĂůƐŽůĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇĨŽƌĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ
ƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐ͕ǁŚŝĐŚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚƉĞƌŝŽĚŚĂĚůĂƌŐĞůǇ
ƉůĂǇĞĚƚŚĞƌŽůĞƐŽĨĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞŚŽƵƐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ĞĐŚĞůŽŶĂŶĚŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶďĂƐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƚŚŝƌĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĞĐŚĞůŽŶĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘Ɛ
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ-in-ŚŝĞĨ͕
the military district – it is an operational-strategic command.
That is its function and that is the statute on the military
district…. The military district commander is the operational-
strategic command commander. Let’s take the specific
example of our Ladoga exercises. Leningrad Military District
covers the Northwestern Strategic Direction. The entire troop
grouping, which is on this territory, is part of the composition
of Leningrad Military District and is completely subordinate to
the operational-strategic command commander.266
ŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůŝƐƐƵĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů
^ƚĂĨĨǁĂƐƚŚĞƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞĨŽƌĐĞƐĚƵƌŝŶŐĂ͞ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĂƐǇƐƚĞŵ
263 dŚĞ<ĂǀŬĂǌ-μκκσŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐƚŽŽŬƉůĂĐĞŝŶ ƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚĂƵĐĂƐƵƐƌĞŐŝŽŶ

264 ŚŝĞĨŽĨƚŚĞDĂŝŶ^ƚĂĨĨŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ƌŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͕>ƚ-'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ĞƌŐĞǇ^ŬŽŬŽǀ͕ĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚďǇ
/dZ-d^^͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμν͕μκκσ͘
265 ŶĚƌĞǇ<ŽƌďƵƚ͕͞&ƌŽŵDŽƐĐŽǁƚŽƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ^ĞĂƐ͕͟Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer,
^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌνκ͕μκκσ͘
266 sůĂĚŝŵŝƌŶĂƚŽůǇĞǀŝĐŚŽůĚǇƌĞǀĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶKůŐĂŽǌŚǇĞǀĂ͕͞dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵǇ,ĂƐĞĞŶ
dŽƚĂůůǇƌŽŬĞŶŽǁŶ͘/ŶƚŽƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ͗Z&'ƌŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ-in-ŚŝĞĨsůĂĚŝŵŝƌŽůĚǇƌĞǀ
ƚŽůĚDŽƐĐŽǀƐŬŝǇ<ŽŵƐŽŵŽůĞƚƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚZĞĂůZĞƐƵůƚƐŽĨDŝůŝƚĂƌǇZĞĨŽƌŵ͕͟ ʺ̨̡̨̡̛̭̭̜̏
ʶ̶̨̨̨̥̭̥̣̖͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌνκ͕μκκσ͘
100
ŽĨŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ-ĐĞŶƚƌŝĐǁĂƌƐ͘͟ μπρ ǇƚŚŝƐƚĞƌŵ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐŝŶ
ĂŶĚŽƵƚŽĨƵŶŝĨŽƌŵŵĞĂŶ
Pentagon know-how that has been evaluated in all recent
military conflicts in which the American Army or its allies have
taken part. Its essence lies in large-scale use of electronic
reconnaissance and target acquisition employing satellites,
unmanned aerial vehicles and so on, as well as the
employment of mobile groups of troops that can be
redeployed rapidly throughout a TVD to deliver attacks
against an enemy from the flanks or rear.268
/Ŷμκκσ͕ƚŚŝƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚǁĂƐĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚƚŽďĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽ ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĨŽƌĂǁŝĚĞůǇĚŝǀĞƌŐĞŶƚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌƚŽ
ƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ͘
There are fundamental differences between the potential
enemy’s methods of conducting military operations and
hostilities in different theaters of operations, the western,
eastern and southern ones.” If we take the western strategic
area, Russian forces there may be confronted by innovative
armies with forms and means of non-contact use of state-of-
the-art forces and resources. In the east, it can be an army of
many millions with a traditional approach to military
operations: head-on, with large concentration of personnel
and firepower in specific areas. As regards southern Russia,
there we may face irregular formations and sabotage-and-
reconnaissance groups using guerrilla warfare methods to
fight the federal authorities.”269
dŽŵĞĞƚƚŚŝƐĐŽŵƉůĞǆĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŽĨǀĂƌǇŝŶŐƚǇƉĞƐŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŝŶĂƌĂƉŝĚůǇ
ĞǀŽůǀŝŶŐƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŚĂĚ
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂƐŚŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŵŽďŝůĞƐĞůĨ-ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĨŽƌĐĞƐĐĂƉĂďůĞ
μπρ ͘ĂŶŬŽ͕͞ĂƉĂĚ-μκκσ͗&ŝƌƐƚZĞƐƵůƚƐ͕͟ˁ̯̬̙̌ʥ̡̛̛̣̯͕̌λς^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκκσ͘
268 ŵŝƚƌŝǇ>ŝƚŽǀŬŝŶ͕͞dŚĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐŶĚĞĚƵƉŝŶƚŚĞEĞƚǁŽƌŬ͕͟ʰ̛̖̭̯̏́̚ ;ŽŶůŝŶĞǀĞƌƐŝŽŶͿ͕
^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμς͕μκκσ͘
μπσ ŚŝĞĨŽĨƚŚĞDĂŝŶ^ƚĂĨĨŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ƌŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͕>ƚ-'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ĞƌŐĞǇ^ŬŽŬŽǀ͕ĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚďǇ
/dZ-d^^͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμν͕μκκσ͘
101
of rĞƉĞůůŝŶŐĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŝŶĂůůŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞĂƐ— ƚŚĞǁĞƐƚ͕ƚŚĞĞĂƐƚ͕ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚ͘ƐƚŚŝƐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞǁĂƐĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞĚ͕
contemporary wars, just like future wars, do not have a
sharply defined front line. They flow and will flow…and
actually, while preparing to repel the aggression of a serious
probable enemy (not detachments of terrorists), we need to
create mobile, self-sufficient troop groupings, which are
capable of being transported to the threatened sector of the
country’s territory, to the area that is imminent or has flared
up, in a matter or hours. And these units are being created
right now – these are the permanent combat readiness
brigades. 270
dŚƵƐ͕ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĂŶĚ
ĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨĐŽŵďĂƚŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŚĂƐ
ďĞĞŶƐƚƌƵŐŐůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŝƐĂĚĂƉƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŽůĚ^ŽǀŝĞƚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĨŽƌ
ǁŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐƌĞĨĞƌƚŽĂƐ͞ŶŽŶĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ͟ĂŶĚ͞ŶĞƚ-
ĐĞŶƚƌŝĐ͟ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͘&ŽƵƌŵŽƚŽƌŝǌĞĚƌŝĨůĞĂŶĚƚĂŶŬďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐĨƌŽŵZƵƐƐŝĂĂŶĚ
ƚǁŽŵĞĐŚĂŶŝǌĞĚĂŶĚŽŶĞ ƚĂŶŬďƌŝŐĂĚĞĨƌŽŵĞůĂƌƵƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚŝŶ
Zapad-2009. μρλ
hŶƚŝůƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵďĂƚĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐǁĂƐ
ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨμκκς͕ZƵƐƐŝĂ͞ŚĂĚƐŝǆƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐ
ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ͟ĂŶĚďǇ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμκκσƚŚĞĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƌĞŐŝŵĞŶƚƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶ
͞ƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚ͟ŝŶƚŽςοƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐĂŶĚĂŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů
͞ƌĞĐŽŶŶĂŝƐƐĂŶĐĞďƌŝŐĂĚĞ͟ǁĂƐďĞŝŶŐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ͘͞dŚĞƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐ
ƵŶŝƚƐŵƵƐƚďĞŶŽůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶσοйŵĂŶŶĞĚ;ςκйǁĂƐƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚŝŶ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
ƚŝŵĞƐͿ͘͟ μρμ ĂĐŚƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐďƌŝŐĂĚĞǁĂƐƚŽďĞĞƋƵŝƉƉĞĚǁŝƚŚ
ĂŶ͞/ƐŬĂŶĚĞƌ͟;^^-μπ^ƚŽŶĞͿŵŝƐƐŝůĞďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞĚǁŝƚŚŶŽƚůĞƐƐ
μρκ sŝŬƚŽƌ>ŝƚŽǀŬŝŶ͕͞DŝůŝƚĂƌǇDŽďŝůĞ/ŶĂĚĞƋƵĂĐǇ͕͟Nezavisimaya Gazeta͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμο͕μκκσ͘

μρλ dĂƚǇĂŶĂsŝƐŚŶĞǀƐŬĂǇĂ͕͞'ƌŽĚŶŽ͗dŚĞWůĂŶŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞĂƉĂĚ-μκκσKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŝƐŽŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ͕͟BELTA͕ƵŐƵƐƚνλ͕μκκσ͘
μρμ /ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚ'ƌŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ-in-ŚŝĞĨsůĂĚŝŵŝƌŶĂƚŽůǇĞǀŝĐŚŽůĚǇƌĞǀŝŶKůŐĂ
ŽǌŚǇĞǀĂ͕͞dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵǇ,ĂƐĞĞŶdŽƚĂůůǇƌŽŬĞŶŽǁŶŝŶƚŽƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ͗Z&'ƌŽƵŶĚ&ƌŽĐĞƐ
ŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ-in-ŚŝĞĨsůĂĚŝŵŝƌŽůĚǇƌĞǀƚŽůĚDŽƐŬŽǀƐŬŝǇ<ŽŵƐŽŵŽůĞƚƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚZĞĂů
ZĞƐƵůƚƐŽĨDŝůŝƚĂƌǇZĞĨŽƌŵ͕ʺ̨̡̨̡̛̭̭̜̏ʶ̶̨̨̨̥̭̥̣̖;ŽŶůŝŶĞǀĞƌƐŝŽŶͿ͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌνκ͕μκκσ͘
102
ƚŚĂŶĨŽƵƌůĂƵŶĐŚĞƌƐƉůƵƐƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĞƌ-ůŽĂĚĞƌ͘ μρν dŚĞŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ-in-
ŚŝĞĨŽĨƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐĂůƐŽŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĂŝƌĂƐƐĂƵůƚďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐǁŽƵůĚďĞ
ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĨŽƌĞĂĐŚDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ͘ƐŽĨKĐƚŽďĞƌμκκσ͕͞ƚŚƌĞĞŽĨƚŚĞŵ
ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ͙ĂŶĚǁŝůůďĞƵƐĞĚĂƐĂŵŽďŝůĞƌĞƐĞƌǀĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ͘͟ĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐŵŽǀĞŽĨ
ƌŵǇǀŝĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĂŶĚŝƌĞĨĞŶƐĞ
&ŽƌĐĞƐ͕ƚŚĞ/EŽĨƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚďĂƐĞĚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞ
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ'ĞŽƌŐŝĂ͕
Army Aviation must be in the Ground Forces. It was created
ĨŽƌƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚƚƌŽŽƉƐ͘ĂĐŚ΀ĂŝƌĂƐƐĂƵůƚ΁ďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐŝŵƉůǇ
needs a helicopter regiment— approximately 60 helicopters.
And we also need to have helicopter regiments to support the
operations of our combined-arms brigades. 274
ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞŵŽǀĞƚŽ͞ƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐƵŶŝƚƐ͕͟ƚŚĞ/EŽĨƚŚĞ
'ƌŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐŚĞůĚĨŝƌŵƚŽƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐĐŽŶƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶĂƐĂ
ŵĞĂŶƐŽĨ ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ͘/ŶŚŝƐǀŝĞǁ͕
With respect to the mobilization component, no army will
ever fight using its initial composition. The Army is designed
only for some initial period of military operations. Then the
reserves arrive to assist it. In connection with than, we have
a mobilization plan. There are more than 60 storage bases in
our troops besides the permanent readiness subunits. They
are primarily approximately of that same brigade
composition. What does that base look like right now? This
is a small team of servicemen, approximately 100 civilian
personnel and military equipment, which is in storage at their
base. Equipment, weapons and ammunition are also stored
nearby at the military district depots. 275
μρν ŽǌŚǇĞǀĂ͕͞dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵǇ,ĂƐĞĞŶdŽƚĂůůǇƌŽŬĞŶŽǁŶŝŶƚŽƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ͕͟ibid. dŚĞ

/ƐŬĂŶĚĞƌĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞƐĞǀĞƌĂůĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůǁĂƌŚĞĂĚƐ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĂ ĐůƵƐƚĞƌ
ŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶƐǁĂƌŚĞĂĚ͕ĂĨƵĞů-ĂŝƌĞǆƉůŽƐŝǀĞ ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ-ďůĂƐƚǁĂƌŚĞĂĚ͕ĂŶĞĂƌƚŚƉĞŶĞƚƌĂƚŽƌĨŽƌ
ďƵŶŬĞƌďƵƐƚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚĂŶĞůĞĐƚƌŽ-ŵĂŐŶĞƚŝĐƉƵůƐĞ ĚĞǀŝĐĞĨŽƌĂŶƚŝ-ƌĂĚĂƌŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ͘
μρξ /ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚ'ƌŽƵŶĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ-in-ŚŝĞĨŽůĚǇƌĞǀŝŶŽǌŚǇĞǀĂ͕͞dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵǇ
,ĂƐĞĞŶdŽƚĂůůǇƌŽŬĞŶŽǁŶŝŶƚŽƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ͕͟ibid.
μρο ŽůĚǇƌĞǀŝŶŽǌŚǇĞǀĂ͕͞dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵǇ,ĂƐĞĞŶdŽƚĂůůǇƌŽŬĞŶŽǁŶŝŶƚŽƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ͕͟ibid.
103
dŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐĐĞŶĂrio of Zapad-2009 ǁĂƐĂŐĂŝŶĂŶĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ
<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚĂŶĚĞůĂƌƵƐ͘/ƚƐŽƉĞŶŝŶŐǀŝŐŶĞƚƚĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚĂĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐǇŝŶ
ĞůĂƌƵƐŽǀĞƌƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐĞƚŚŶŝĐWŽůĞƐ μρπ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŽĂŶ
ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĂŶŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƌĞƐŽůǀĞƚŚĞŵĂƚƚĞƌďǇĨŽƌĐĞ͘WŽůŝƐŚ
ƚƌŽŽƉƐĐƌŽƐƐĞĚƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌŝŶƚŽĞůĂƌƵƐ͞ĂŶĚƚŚĞWŽůĞƐ΀ǁĞƌĞ΁ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ
ďǇƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘͟ŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚĂďŽƵƚŚŽǁ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂŶĚ
&ƌĂŶĐĞĂƌĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚďǇƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ǁĂƐŵĂĚĞ
ďǇƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƚŚĂƚ͞ƚŚĞůĞĂĚŝŶŐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŽĨ
EdKĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ– &ƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ– ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚĂƉƌƵĚĞŶƚ
ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ͘͟ μρρ
dŚŝƐƚŝŵĞ͕͞<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚOblast ǁĂƐƐƵďũĞĐƚĞĚƚŽĂŶĂƚƚĂĐŬĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
ĞĂƐƚĞƌŶĂǆŝƐ͘dŚĞĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌƐďƌŽŬĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŽ->ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌ
ŶĞĂƌ<ƌĂƐŶŽǌŶĂŵĞŶƐŬĂŶĚ͕ŚĂǀŝŶŐĨŽƌĚĞĚƚŚĞEĞŵĂŶZŝǀĞƌ͕ĞŶƚĞƌĞĚŝŶƚŽ
ĂŶĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚƌŽŽƉƐŽĨ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞZĞŐŝŽŶ͘͟ μρς
͞dŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŐŽĂů΀ǁĂƐ΁ƚŽĨĞŶĚŽĨĨƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĐĂůůƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ĞůĂƌƵƐhŶŝŽŶ^ƚĂƚĞ͘͟ μρσ ^ŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇǁŝƚŚ
Zapad-2009͕ƚŚĞLadoga-2009 ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞǁĂƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚŝŶ
DƵƌŵĂŶƐŬ͕WƐŬŽǀĂŶĚ>ĞŶŝŶŐƌĂĚƌĞŐŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞŶĞǁďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞŽůĚĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ
ƌĞŐŝŵĞŶƚƐŝŶŚĞƌŝƚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͘
With the beginning of aggression, the Regional Group of
Troops repels the enemy’s air attack and delivers a number of
retaliatory attacks against his command and control facilities,
infrastructure facilities, and troop grouping. With the
beginning of the invasion by the ground troop grouping, the
ZĞŐŝŽŶĂů'ƌŽƵƉŽĨdƌŽŽƉƐĐĂƌƌ΀ŝĞĚ΁ŽƵƚĂĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
in which it inflicts damage on the aggressor by an active
defense of troops in coordination with territorial troops, other
μρπ DŝĐŚĂů<ƌǌǇŵǁƐŬŝ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶtĂƌŐĂŵĞƐ͕͟Wprost͕EŽǀĞŵďĞƌς͕μκκσ͖ĂŶĚ:ĞĚƌǌĞůŝĞůůĞĐŬŝ͕
͞EdKdŽĚĚƌĞƐƐZƵƐƐŝĂŶDĂŶĞƵǀĞƌƐ͕͟Dziennik Gazetta Prawna͕EŽǀĞŵďĞƌλμ͕μκκσ͘
μρρ ͞dƌŽŽƉƐtĞƌĞEŽƚƐƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŚĞdĂƐŬŽĨdĂŬŝŶŐtĂƌƐĂǁ͕͟Argumenty Nedeli Online͕KĐƚŽďĞƌλ͕
μκκσ͘
μρς ůĞǆƐĂŶĚƌZǇĂďƵƐŚĞǀ͕͞<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͕ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƌƵďƌŝĐ͗ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ ZĞŐŝŽŶƐ͗ŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌƐ,ĂǀĞ
ƚƚĂĐŬĞĚzĂŶƚĂƌŶǇǇ<ƌĂǇ͕͟ʻ̛̛̖̭̥̌̏̌́̚ʧ̖̯͕̌̌̚^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌσ͕μκκσ͘
μρσ ͞>ĂƌŐĞ-^ĐĂůĞĞůĂƌƵƐ-ZƵƐƐŝĂDŝůŝƚĂƌǇǆĞƌĐŝƐĞhŶĚĞƌtĂǇŽŶ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶ&ƌŽŶƚŝĞƌ͕͟sŝůŶŝƵƐBNS
ŝŶŶŐůŝƐŚ͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌσ͕μκκσ͘
104
troops, and military force elements and tries not to let the
enemy develop the attack into the depth of its territory.
Conducting a mobile defense on intermediate lines,
formations of the first echelon of the Regional Group of
&ŽƌĐĞƐŝŶĨůŝĐƚ΀ĞĚ΁ĚĂŵĂŐĞŽŶƚŚĞĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶŐ͞ĞŶĞŵǇ͘͟
Formations of second echelons and the combined-arms
reserves complete their restoration of combat effectiveness in
ŽĐĐƵƉ΀ŝĞĚ΁ĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚĞĚǌŽŶĞƐŽŶƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞůŝŶĞ͘ 280
ƐƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ͛ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂůĂƚƚĂĐŬďĞŐĂŶƚŽƐƚĂůů͕ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞμκth
ŽŵďŝŶĞĚ-ƌŵƐƌŵǇĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚƌĞŐƌŽƵƉŝŶŐĂŶĚŵŽǀĞĚƚŽĂƐƐĞŵďůǇ
ĂƌĞĂƐŝŶƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐƚŽƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞŝŶĂĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-ĂƚƚĂĐŬ͕ĂŶĚĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇŵŽǀĞĚ
ŝŶƚŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĨŝƌĞ-ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŽƚŚĞ
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-ĂƚƚĂĐŬ͘ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŽĨŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞĂŶĚŝƌĞĨĞŶƐĞdƌŽŽƉƐ
ƚŽůŝŵŝƚƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨĞŶĞŵǇŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞĂŝƌĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ͕ƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƐĞĐŽŶĚĞĐŚĞůŽŶĐŽƌƉƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ;ŝ͘Ğ͕͘ĂŵƵůƚŝ-ĐŽƌƉƐĂƚƚĂĐŬͿ
ƚŽƚŚĞďĂƚƚůĞ͘
&ŽƌĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶ^ƚĂƚĞĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽƉƌĞĞŵƉƚƚŚŝƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞ
ďĂƚƚůĞďǇĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶĚĞůŝǀĞƌŝŶŐĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶƐ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚĂƌŐĞƚƐŝŶƚŚĞĚĞƉƚŚŽĨƚŚĞ͞ĞŶĞŵǇ͟ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ͘tŝƚŚ
ƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇĨŝƌĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůĚĞƉƚŚŽĨƚŚĞ
ĞŶĞŵǇ͛ƐĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ͞ƚŚĞdƵŶŐƵƐŬĂĂŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŵŝƐƐŝůĞ-ŐƵŶ
ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ͟;^-λσ'ƌŝƐŽŶͿƚŽĚƌŝǀĞƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ͛ƐĨŝƌĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŚĞůŝĐŽƉƚĞƌƐ
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞďĂƚƚůĞĂƌĞĂ͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŽĨĂ
ĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚĞ^-νκκďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶĂŶĚďǇĂŶOsa ;^-ς'ĞĐŬŽͿďĂƚƚĞƌǇƚŽ
ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚŽĨhŶŝŽŶ^ƚĂƚĞƐƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŽƚŚĞďĂƚƚůĞ͕ƚŚĞ
ĞŶĞŵǇǁĂƐĚĞŶŝĞĚƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐĂŶĚƐƵďũĞĐƚĞĚƚŽĂŶ
ĂƐƐĂƵůƚŽŶƚŚĞƐƚƌŽŶŐƉŽŝŶƚƐŝŶŝƚƐĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ͘
ĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶ-ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ůĞǀĞůƵŶŵĂŶŶĞĚĂĞƌŝĂů
ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƉƌŽƚŽƚǇƉĞƐǁĞƌĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ͞ƌĞĂů-ƚŝŵĞ͟ƚĂƌŐĞƚ
ĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ͕ŝŶĂŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞƚĞŵƉŽŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-ĂƚƚĂĐŬ͕
͞ƵŶĚĞƌĐŽǀĞƌŽĨĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨDŝ-μξŚĞůŝĐŽƉƚĞƌƐ͕Dŝ-ςŚĞůŝĐŽƉƚĞƌƐ
280sŝƚĂůŝǇĞŶŝƐŽǀĂŶĚKůĞŐ'ŽƌƵƉĂǇ͕͞/ŶhŶŝĨŝĞĚĂƚƚůĞ&ŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ͕͟ʶ̬̭̦̌̌́ʯ̖͕̏̔̌̚^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ
μσ͕μκκσ͘
105
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ΀ĞĚ΁ĂůĂŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĚĞƉƚŚďǇĂŶĂƐƐĂƵůƚĨŽƌĐĞ͕ǁŚŝĐŚƐĞŝǌĞĂŶĚ
ŚŽůĚƐďƌŝĚŐĞƐ͘͟ 281 ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐƌŝƚŝĐƐ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ǁĞƌĞŶŽƚŝŵƉƌĞƐƐĞĚǁŝƚŚ
ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ͘
dŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ'ĞŽƌŐŝĂŶƐ͕ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŚŽŵƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐŚĂĚŐŽŶĞƚŽǁĂƌ
ƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐǇĞĂƌ͕ŚĂĚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚƵŶŵĂŶŶĞĚƌĞĐŽŶŶĂŝƐƐĂŶĐĞ
ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐǁĞƌĞĐŽŵƉĞůůĞĚƚŽĞŵƉůŽǇdƵ-μμDνůŽŶŐ-
ƌĂŶŐĞĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚĨŽƌƐƵĐŚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐǁĂƐĐŝƚĞĚĂƐƚŚĞĐůĞĂƌƐŝŐŶƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂ
ǁĂƐůĂŐŐŝŶŐŝŶŝƚƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŵŽĚĞƌŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘tŚŝůĞ
ƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽĐĂƚĐŚƵƉǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌĂƌŵŝĞƐǁĂƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ͕͙͞ŝŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ
^ƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚŽĨƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĞƚĐĞŶƚƌŝĐĐŽŵďĂƚ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĐŽƵůĚƌĞĂĐŚƚŚĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨΧμκκďŝůůŝŽŶŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞŶĞǆƚĚĞĐĂĚĞ͘ZƵƐƐŝĂĚŽĞƐŶ͛ƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĂƚŬŝŶĚŽĨŵŽŶĞǇƌŝŐŚƚŶŽǁ͘͟282
dŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌĞƉƵƚǇŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵƉŽĨ&ŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĂƵĐĂƐƵƐ
ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƵƐĂƌĞĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƵƐŝŶŐŽƵƌ
ŐƌĂŶĚĨĂƚŚĞƌƐ͛ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ— ǁĞĂƌĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚŝŶŐ
ŵĂƌĐŚĞƐ͕ĚŝŐŐŝŶŐƚƌĞŶĐŚĞƐĂŶĚƐŽĨŽƌƚŚ͘KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ͕ƚŚĂƚŝƐĂůƐŽ
ŶĞĞĚĞĚ͘ůůƚŚĞŵŽƌĞƐŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĂƌĐŚĞƐĂƌĞďĞŝŶŐĐĂƌƌŝĞĚ
ŽƵƚĂƚůŽŶŐĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŽŶƵŶĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌ
ƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐŝƐďĞŝŶŐĚŽŶĞďĂƐĞĚƵƉŽŶĂůůŽĨ
ƚŚĞĐŽŵďĂƚƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ͘ 283
ĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞƚŚĞďĂƐŝĐƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇŽĨƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚŶĞƚĐĞŶƚƌŝĐǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ
ĚƵƌŝŶŐZapad-2009 ĨŽƵŶĚĞƌĞĚŽŶƐƵĐŚƌĞĂůŝƚŝĞƐĂƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚŶƵŵďĞƌƐŽĨ
unŵĂŶŶĞĚĂĞƌŝĂůǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉĂŐůŽďĂů
ŶĂǀŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƚĞůůŝƚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ;ʧ̨̣̣̦̍̌̽̌́ʻ̶̨̛̛̦̦̌̏̐̌̌́ˁ̡̨̛̪̱̯̦̏̌́
ˁ̛̭̯̖̥̌or GLONASSͿ͘͞^ŽƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĂůůŝĞĚ
ĂƌŵŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨŶĞƚ-ĐĞŶƚƌŝĐǁĂƌƐŝƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƚŝŵĞďĞŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞ
281 ĞŶŝƐŽǀĂŶĚ'ŽƌƵƉĂǇ͕͞/ŶhŶŝĨŝĞĚĂƚƚůĞ&ŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ͕͟ibid.
282 sůĂĚŝŵŝƌDƵŬŚŝŶ͕͞dŚĞǇ,ĂǀĞŽŵŵĂŶĚĞĚƚŚĞŽƵŶƚƌǇƚŽ͚^ƚĂŶĚdŽ͕͛͟ʻ̛̛̖̭̥̌̏̌́̚ʧ̖̯̌̌̚,
^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌλρ͕μκκσ͘
283 >ŝĞƵƚĞŶĂŶƚ'ĞŶĞƌĂůzƵƌŝǇEĞƚŬĂĐŚĞǀ͕ĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶsůĂĚŝŵŝƌDƵŬŚŝŶ͕͞dŚĞǇ,ĂǀĞŽŵŵĂŶĚĞĚ
ƚŚĞŽƵŶƚƌǇƚŽ͚^ƚĂŶĚdŽ͕͛͟ʻ̛̛̖̭̥̌̏̌́̚ʧ̖̯͕̌̌̚^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌλρ͕μκκσ͘
106
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ͘͟ 284 ƌƚŝůůĞƌǇDĂƌƐŚĂůůsůĂĚŝŵŝƌDŝŬŚĂůŬŝŶĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŚĂƚZapad-
2009 ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚ
That as far as reconnaissance is concerned, we still lag
behind, just like in the Soviet era. We have wonderful striking
capabilities. The West does not even have equivalents to
some of our missiles and artillery systems. They are capable
of carrying out any tasks. But they need exact coordinates.
And we have problems with that. For example, our missile
salvo systems are capable of striking the enemy at a distance
of 60 kilometers. But our reconnaissance capability is so low
that the effectiveness of existing weapons is reduced to
20%. 285
dŚĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚƌŽŽƉƐĂŶĚĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽŐĞƚƚŚĞ
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐƚŽƚŚĞƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĂƌĞĂƐĂŶĚǁĞĂƉŽŶƐƌĂŶŐĞƐĨŽr Zapad-2009
ŝƚƐĞůĨďĞĐĂŵĞŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƐŽĨĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͘͞dŚĞDŽƐĐŽǁDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ͛Ɛμκth ƌŵǇ͛Ɛξth ^ĞƉĂƌĂƚĞdĂŶŬ
ƌŝŐĂĚĞƐƉĞŶƚŶĞĂƌůǇĨŝǀĞĚĂǇƐŝŶŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ͚Zapad-2009͛KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů
^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͙ƚŝŵĞƚŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚŶŽƚďĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƵŶĚĞƌĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
ĂĐƚƵĂůĐŽŵďĂƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ͚ƉƌŽďĂďůǇĞŶĞŵǇ͛͘͟ 286
'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞ͞ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇ͟ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞtĞƐƚ͛ƐŶĞƚĐĞŶƚƌŝĐĐŽŵďĂƚ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕— ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŝƚƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇǁŚĞƌĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐǁĞƌĞ
ŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞĨŽƌƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ— ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨĐŽƵůĚ
ĨŝŶĚŝƚƐĞůĨǁŝƚŚŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŝŵĞƚŽĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞƌĞĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ
ŽĨĐŽŵďĂƚĨŽƌĐĞƐďǇƌĂŝůĂŶĚƌŽĂĚ͘dŚĞƐĞůĨ-ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚǁĂƐƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂ
ǁĂƐ͞ƐŚŽƌƚŽŶƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƋƵĂŶƚŝƚǇŽĨƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƐƐĞƚƐƚŽ
ƌĞĚĞƉůŽǇƚŚĞďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƉůĂĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŝŵĞ͘͟ μςρ dŚƵƐ͕ŝƚ
ǁĂƐĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚ͕͞ŚĞĂǀǇƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚĂŶĚŚĞĂǀǇŚĞůŝĐŽƉƚĞƌƐĂƌĞ
284 &ŽƌŵĞƌĞƉƵƚǇŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵƉŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞdƌĂŶƐĐĂƵĐĂƐƵƐĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶ
ůĞŬƐĂŶĚƌůĞƐŝŶ͕͞^ŚŽƵůĚdŚĞƌĞdŽŵŽƌƌŽǁĞtĂƌ͕͟ʥ̨̡̛̖̣̬̱̭̭̖ʻ̨̨̛̭̯͕̏KĐƚŽďĞƌς͕μκκσ͘
285 /ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚƌƚŝůůĞƌǇDĂƌƐŚĂůůsůĂĚŝŵŝƌDŝŬŚĂůŬŝŶ͕ŝŶ'ĞŶŶĂĚŝǇDŝƌĂŶŽǀŝĐŚ͕͞ŶƌŵǇKŶĞ
tĂŶƚƐƚŽ^ĞƌǀĞ/Ŷ͕͟ʶ̬̭̦̌̌́ʯ̖͕̏̔̌̚KĐƚŽďĞƌλξ͕μκκσ͘
286 >ŝƚŽǀŬŝŶ͕͞DŝůŝƚĂƌǇDŽďŝůĞ/ŶĂĚĞƋƵĂĐǇ͕͟ibid.
μςρ sŝŬƚŽƌ>ŝƚŽǀŬŝŶ͕͞dŚƵŶĚĞƌŽĨ&ŝƌĞ͕&ůĂƐŚŽĨ^ƚĞĞů͘ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵǇ͛ƐKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ,ĂǀĞZĞǀĞĂůĞĚEŽƚKŶůǇZĞĨŽƌŵ^ƵĐĐĞƐƐĞƐƵƚůƐŽhŶƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚWƌŽďůĞŵƐ͕͟
ʻ̨̛̛̖̭̥̖̌̏̚ʦ̨̨̖̦̦̖ʽ̨̛̬̖̦̖͕̍̚KĐƚŽďĞƌμ͕μκκσ͘
λκρ
ŶĞĞĚĞĚ͘ƵƚǁĞŽŶůǇŚĂǀĞλκŶ-λμξ͚ZƵƐůĂŶ͛ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ͕ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶ
ƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚƚĂŶŬƐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌŽƵƚƐŝǌĞĚǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ͕ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĂŶĚǁĞŚĂǀĞ
ĂĨĞǁŵŽƌĞDŝ-μπŚĞůŝĐŽƉƚĞƌƐ– νο͘͟ 288
Zapad-2009͕ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚǁĂƐƐĂŝĚƚŽďĞůĂƌŐĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞZapad-1999
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͕ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĨŽƌĐĞƐƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚ
;ŶƵŵďĞƌŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞƚĞŶƐŽĨƚŚŽƵƐĂŶĚƐͿǁĂƐĨĂƌƐŵĂůůĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƐĐĂůĞŽĨ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ;ŶƵŵďĞƌŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞŚƵŶĚƌĞĚƐ
ŽĨƚŚŽƵƐĂŶĚƐͿ͘tŚŝůĞŝŶƐŽŵĞǁĂǇƐZapad-2009 ĐŽƵůĚďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ͕ŝƚƐĞƌǀĞĚŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŽĞǆƉŽƐĞƚŚĞĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ
͞ƐŚŽƌƚĐŽŵŝŶŐƐ͟ŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͕ďƵƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚƚŚĞƌŵĞĚ
&ŽƌĐĞƐǁŝƚŚĂŶŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽůĂƵŶĐŚĂŶĂƐƐĂƵůƚŽŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ
ĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽŵŽĚĞƌŶŝǌĞƚŚĞĨŽƌĐĞƐ͗
If an exercise of this nature had been held some 20 or so
years ago then I would have awarded it an excellent rating.
In fact, the personnel operated competently enough, they
gave it everything. But the weapons and equipment
employed on the mock battlefield seemed to have come from
a 1970s or 1980s newsreel. 289
ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞZapad-2009 ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͞ƚŚĞŽŶĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞƚŚĞDŝ-μςE
ĂŶĚ<Ă-ομŚĞůŝĐŽƉƚĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĞǁ^Ƶ-34 front-ůŝŶĞďŽŵďĞƌ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕
ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŽŶůǇŽŶĞ^Ƶ-νξ͙͘͟ μσκ tŚĞŶĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂů
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚǇƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐůŝƚƚůĞŶĞǁĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚŝŶǁŝĚĞƵƐĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
Zapad-2009 ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͕ƚŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌǁĂƐ
Because it doesn’t actually exist. There is merely a PR circus
surrounding individual specimens. But our reform-devastated
industry is in no condition to put them into series production.
Right in the final days of the exercises the Russian
Federation’s Comptroller’s Office came out with this gloomy
figure: The proportion of new equipment available to Russian
288 >ŝƚŽǀŬŝŶ͕͞DŝůŝƚĂƌǇDŽďŝůĞ/ŶĂĚĞƋƵĂĐǇ͕͟ibid.
μςσ ŽůŽŶĞů;ZĞƚŝƌĞĚͿŶĂƚŽůŝǇsůĂƐŽǀĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶ͞ĂƉĂĚ-μκκσ͗dƌŝƵŵƉŚĨŽƌμκ-zĞĂƌKůĚ
tĞĂƉŽŶƐ͘EĞǁZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵǇ&ŽƌĐĞĚƚŽ&ŝŐŚƚŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨĂdŚĞĂƚƌŝĐĂů
WĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ͕͟ˁ̨̨̦̏̍̔̌́ʿ̬̖̭̭͕̌KĐƚŽďĞƌλ͕μκκσ͘
μσκ /ůǇĂ<ĞĚƌŽǀ͕͞dŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͚ƵƚƵŵŶ͕͛͟ʦ̨̨̖̦̦-ʿ̨̬̥̼̹̣̖̦̦̼̜ʶ̱̬̖̬͕̽KĐƚŽďĞƌλξ͕μκκσ͘
108
troops is just 6 percent at the most (compared to 70 percent
in the United States). Consequently, the organization of the
mock battles was also based on the tactics of the past. So, if
the authorities learn even a single correct lesson from Zapad-
2009 then that will be of enormous benefit to the army. And
this lesson suggests itself. We need to really address the
rearmament of the army and navy and not try to get by,
parasite fashion, on Soviet combat hardware that is now
almost completely worn out.291
dŚĞŚŝĞĨŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨĐŽƌƌŽďŽƌĂƚĞĚƚŚŝƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ͗͞ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ
ƚŽĨŝŐŚƚŝŶƚŚĞŶĞǁŵĂŶŶĞƌĂŶĚƚĂĐŬůĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŶĞǁ
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ͕ŝƚŝƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ƚŽŚĂǀĞƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ
ĂŶĚĂƌŵƐ͘͟ μσμ
dŚĞƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ͞EĞǁ>ŽŽŬ͟ďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂůƐŽǁĂƐĂ
ƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨOsen-2009͕ƐŝŶĐĞ͞ƚŚĞ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨƚƌŽŽƉĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂƚďƌŝŐĂĚĞůĞǀĞůŵĂůĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĞĚ
ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞKavkaz-2009 ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ͘͟ μσν dŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚĂƐƉĂƌƚ
of Osen ƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶĞǁďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐĚŝĚŶŽƚ͞ĞŵĞƌŐĞ͟ŽƌŐĂŶŝĐĂůůǇ
ĨƌŽŵŶĞǁƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ďƵƚŵŽƌĞĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ
ŽĨƌĞŐŝŵĞŶƚƐŽƌƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ͘ μσξ ƌƚŝůůĞƌǇDĂƌƐŚĂůsůĂĚŝŵŝƌ
DŝŬŚĂůŬŝŶ͕ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ
Transitioning to a brigade structure requires the creation of
an appropriate artillery fire control system. As we know, in a
division an artillery chief had a control battery, which had
reconnaissance capabilities, communications, capabilities,
and firing capabilities. Obviously, the same has to happen in
a brigade. If a brigade has, for example, four battalions, then
μσλ ŽůŽŶĞůsůĂƐŽǀĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶ͞ĂƉĂĚ-μκκσ͗dƌŝƵŵƉŚĨŽƌμκ-zĞĂƌKůĚtĞĂƉŽŶƐ͕͟ibid.
μσμ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŚŝĞĨ'ĞŶĞƌĂůŽĨƚŚĞƌŵǇEŝŬůĂǇDĂŬĂƌŽǀ͕͞ZĞƐƵůƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĂƉĂĚ-μκκσ
KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͕͟Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation͕KĐƚŽďĞƌο͕
μκκσ͘
μσν >ŝƚŽǀŬŝŶ͕͞DŝůŝƚĂƌǇDŽďŝůĞ/ŶĂĚĞƋƵĂĐǇ͕͟
ibid.
μσξ ůĞŬƐĞǇEŝŬŽůƐŬŝǇ͕͞dŚĞƌŵǇtŝůůĞZĞďƵŝůƚŐĂŝŶ͕͟ʦ̨̨̛̖̥̭̯͕̔ ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμσ͕μκκσ͘
λκσ
the artillery chief cannot create a group and control it, if the
chief does not have reconnaissance and command and
control capabilities. Each battalion commander would
control the fire at his own discretion. And this would be
tantamount to striking not with a fist but with spread out
fingers.295
ƐŽŶĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌŽĨƚŚĞLadoda-2009 ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚ͕͞ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ
ƌĞŵĂŝŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽů͘ŶĚĂƐůŽŶŐĂƐƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƐƵĐŚĂ
ŵƵĚĚůĞŝŶƚŚŝƐŵĂƚƚĞƌĞǀĞŶŝŶƚŚĞŚĞĂĚƐŽĨƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐ͕ǁĞƐƚŝůůĂƌĞ
ĚŽŽŵĞĚĨŽƌĂůŽŶŐǁŚŝůĞƚŽŵĂŬĞĂŶĂƐƐĂƵůƚůĂŶĚŝŶŐƐƉĞĐƚĂĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶ
ŽĨĨƐŚŽƌĞǁĂǀĞƐĂŶĚĨŝŐŚƚƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐǁŚŝůĞƚĞůůŝŶŐĨĂŝƌǇƚĂůĞƐĂďŽƵƚ
ŶĞƚĐĞŶƚƌŝĐǁĂƌƐ͘͟ μσπ
ŶĂŶŽŶǇŵŽƵƐZƵƐƐŝĂŶ>ŝĞƵƚĞŶĂŶƚ-'ĞŶĞƌĂůĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĞĚƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-^ŽǀŝĞƚ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĂƐ͞ƚŚĞƉƌĞŵĞĚŝƚĂƚĞĚĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƌŵǇ͘͟dŽďĞŐŝŶǁŝƚŚ͕͞ƚŚĞ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ-in-
ŚŝĞĨ͛Ɛ,ĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐŚĂƐŶŽƚƚƌĂŝŶĞĚĞǀĞŶŽŶĐĞƐŝŶĐĞλσσλ͘͟/ŶƚƌƵƚŚ͕
ƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůĂƌŐƵĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉĂŐĞƐŽĨʿ̬̌̏̔̌,
in our country, matters have reach the point that no one can
develop major strategic exercises. We have raised such
general cadres, who have never conducted even regimental
tactical live-fire exercises. They ended up in the Army when it
was in a frozen state. Now these “cadres” have become
major leaders. And the experience of the development and
preparation of exercises has been completely lost297
Zapad-2013
dŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽŽĨĂƉĂĚ-μκλνǁĂƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĂůŵŽƐƚ
ĞǀĞƌǇŽƚŚĞƌĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƌƵŶďǇƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨƐŝŶĐĞλσσσ͘ĂƐĞĚ
μσο /ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚƌƚŝůůĞƌǇDĂƌƐŚĂůůDŝŬŚĂůŬŝŶ͕ŝŶDŝƌĂŶŽǀŝĐŚ͕͞ŶƌŵǇKŶĞtĂŶƚƐƚŽ^ĞƌǀĞ/Ŷ͘͟
ibid.
μσπ KůŐĂŽǌŚǇĞǀĂ͕͛͞EĞǁtĂƌƐ͛&ĞƐƚŝǀĂů͗DŽƐŬŽǀƐŬŝǇ<ŽŵƐŽŵŽůĞƚƐ^ƉĞĐŝĂůŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚtĂƐ
dĂŬĞŶĨŽƌĂ/ŐĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŽĨƚŚĞhƉĚĂƚĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͕͟ʺ̨̡̨̡̛̭̭̜̏
ʶ̶̨̨̨̥̭̥̣̖KŶůŝŶĞ͕KĐƚŽďĞƌς͕μκκσ͘
μσρ sǇĂĐŚĞƐůĂǀdĞƚĞŬŝŶ͕͞>ĂǇŝŶŐ/ƚŽŶdŚŝĐŬ͗dŚĞĂƉĂĚ-μκκσǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ͗ĂWƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů͛ƐsŝĞǁ͕͟
ʿ̬͕̌̏̔̌ EŽǀĞŵďĞƌλν͕μκκσ͘
110
ƵƉŽŶƚŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶ͛ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŽůŽƌƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ;ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚŝƐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨzƵŐŽƐůĂǀŝĂͿďůĂŵĞĚŽŶtĞƐƚĞƌŶĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŝŶ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐŝŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƌĞƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ͕ƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů
^ƚĂĨĨƚƌĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĞĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƚŝƚƐĚŝƐƉŽƐĂůƚŽďŽƚŚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ͞ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚƐ͟ĂƐŝƚ
ŝƐĚŽŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞŽŶďĂƐĂŶĚƚŽƐƵƉƉƌĞƐƐ͞ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƐ͟ǁŚŽŵŝŐŚƚŵŽƵŶƚ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽŶďĞŚĂůĨŽĨĞƚŚŶŝĐ
ŬŝŶƐŵĞŶ;WŽůĞƐͿĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ;ďǇ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶƐ͕ǁŚŽĂƌĞ
ƐĂŝĚƚŽŶƵŵďĞƌĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇμκ͕κκκŝŶ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚͿĂŶĚ<ĂƌĞůŝĂ;ǁŚŝĐŚ
ŝƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶƚŽŽŬĨƌŽŵ&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞ
<ƌĞŵůŝŶ͛Ɛλσνσ-ξκĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŝŶůĂƵŶĐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞtŝŶƚĞƌtĂƌͿ͘dŚĞ
͞ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƐ͟ŝŶĂƉĂĚ-μκλνǁĞƌĞƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĞĚĨƌŽŵƐĞŝǌŝŶŐŬĞǇĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚ
ƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ͕ƐŽƚŚĞ͞ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƐ͟ĂƌĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇEdKĂŶĚ&ŝŶŶŝƐŚĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ĐŽǀĞƌƚůǇ;ŝůůĞŐĂůĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐͿĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞƵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ
;ŵƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĚŝĚƚŚĞƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚ͞ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚƐ͟ŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞŽŶĐĞ
hŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚWŽƌŽƐŚĞŶŬŽ͛Ɛ WůĂŶŚĂĚƚŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶ͛ƐƉƌŽǆŝĞƐŽŶ
ƚŚĞƌŽƉĞƐͿ͘ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŶĚĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚĞŶďůŽĐŬĞĚĂŝƌĂŶĚƐĞĂ
ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ͞ŝůůĞŐĂůĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ͟ƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞŝƌ
ǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů͘dŚĞƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚ͞ŝůůĞŐĂůĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ͟ƚŚĞŶƌĞƚƌĞĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽ
ĐŝƚŝĞƐ;ĂƐĚŝĚ ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉƌŽǆŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŽŶďĂƐͿ͕ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞDsĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚĞƚŚĞ͞ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƐ͟ĂŶĚƐƵƉƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞŵ;ũƵƐƚĂƐƚŚĞhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐŚĂǀĞŚĂĚƚŽĐŽŶƚĞŶĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
ƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐƌĞůĞĂƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐŽŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĞǇĨŝŐŚƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ
hŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶƐ– ƚŚĞƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚǌŽŵďŝĞƐǁŚŽĂƌĞ͞ũƵŝĐĞĚ͟ƵƉďǇƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ
ǁŝƚŚĂůĐŽŚŽůĂŶĚĚƌƵŐƐďĞĨŽƌĞďĞŝŶŐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽďĂƚƚůĞͿ͘
dŚĞƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚĂĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞ͞ĚĞƚĞƌŝŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐƚĂƚĞƐĚƵĞƚŽŝŶƚĞƌ-ĞƚŚŶŝĐĂŶĚĞƚŚŶŽ-ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ
ĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĞƐ͕ĂŶĚƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůĐůĂŝŵƐ͘͟ μσς tŚŝůĞŽŶƚŚĞƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ͕ƚŚŝƐŵŝŐŚƚ
ƐĞĞŵĂĨĂƌĐƌǇĨƌŽŵ͞ĂƌŝƉŽƐƚĞƚŽƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƐ͕͟ƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚŝĚ͕ŝŶĨĂĐƚ͕
ĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚǁŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇďĞĐĂůůĞĚƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵƐŝŶĐĞƚŚŝƐŝƐĞǆĂĐƚůǇ
ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶ<ǇŝǀĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉƌŽǆŝĞƐŝŶ
ƚŚĞŽŶďĂƐƚŽďĞ͘&ŝĞůĚƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŽĨĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĂŵƉůĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽƚƌĂŝŶƚŚĞ&^ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐƚŽƌĞĐƌƵŝƚĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƐ
μσςĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶĞƉƵƚǇĞĨĞŶƐĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌDĂũŽƌ'ĞŶĞƌĞůWǇŽƚƌdƐŝŬŚĂŶŽǁƐŬŝ͕ĂƐĐŝƚŝĞĚŝŶŝůů'Ğƌƚǌ͕
͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ŚŝŶĂ,ŽůĚ>ĂƌŐĞ-^ĐĂůĞtĂƌ'ĂŵĞƐ͕͟dŚĞtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ&ƌĞĞĞĂĐŽŶ͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμπ͕
2013.
111
ĂŶĚŵĞƌĐĞŶĂƌŝĞƐ;ŽƌƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚƐ͕ŝĨǇŽƵƉƌĞĨĞƌͿ͕'ZhĂŶĚŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐƚŽ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĂŶĚůĞĂĚƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƐ;ŽƌƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶƵŶŝƚƐ͕ŝĨǇŽƵƉƌĞĨĞƌͿ͕ĂŶĚ
ĚŝǀĞƌƐŝŽŶĂƌǇŐƌŽƵƉƐĂŶĚƵƉƚŽďƌŝŐĂĚĞ-ƐŝǌĞƵŶŝƚƐŽĨƌĞŐƵůĂƌĂƌŵǇĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞƌĞďĞůƐŝŶ͞ĂƚǇƉŝĐĂůƐƉĞĐŝĂůŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƐĞŶƐĞ
ƌĞƐĞŵďůŝŶŐƚĞǆƚďŽŽŬƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐŽŶĞƐ͘͟ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͕
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŶĚĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐǁĞƌĞƚƌĂŝŶĞĚƚŽƵƐĞ͞ƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶ-ƐƚǇůĞ
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͟ƚŚĂƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůůǇĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚĞƐƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ
ŽĨĂĚŝǀĞƌƐŝŽŶĂƌǇŐƌŽƵƉ͕ƚŚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƌĂƌŵǇĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶƵŶŝƚƐ͘͟ƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ
IŶƚĞƌŝŽƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇƚƌŽŽƉƐ͕ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƚƌĂŝŶĞĚƚŽ͞ƉĂĐŝĨǇ͟ŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚĂƌĞĂƐ
ŽŶĐĞŵĂũŽƌŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĂǀĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ;ŝ͘Ğ͕͘ƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌĞĂƌĂƌĞĂƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƚŽĨŽƌĐĞƐƐƚŝůůŝŶĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ͘&Žƌ
ĂůůŝŶƚĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ͕͞ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƉĂĚμκλνĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚƚĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƚŽƚĂůǁĂƌ͘DŝůŝƚĂƌǇƵŶŝƚƐ
ĂĐƚĞĚŚĂŶĚŝŶŚĂŶĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ&^͕ŝŶƚĞƌŝŽƌŵŝŶŝƐƚƌǇƚƌŽŽƉƐ͕ƉŽůŝĐĞĂŶĚ
ĞǀĞŶůŽĐĂůŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ͘͟ μσσ ^ƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĞǆŝƐƚƐƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞŚŝĞĨ
ŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ'ĞƌĂƐŝŵŽǀ͛ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ͞΀ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ΁
ǁŽƌŬĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŽƉĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂůůƚŚĞďƌĂŶĐŚĞƐĂŶĚĐŽŵďĂƚĂƌŵƐĂŶĚ
ĂůƐŽŽĨƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŵŽďŝůŝǌĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͘͟ 300
μσσ ͞<ĞǇ&ŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ͕͟>ŝƵĚĂƐĚĂŶĂǀŝēŝƵƐĂŶĚDĂƚƚŚĞǁǌĞŬĂŝ͕ĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĂƉĂĚ μκλνDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ

ǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͗>ĞƐƐŽŶƐĨŽƌĂůƚŝĐZĞŐŝŽŶĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕dŚĞ:ĂŵĞƐƚŽǁŶ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚEĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĞĨĞŶƐĞĐĂĚĞŵǇŽĨ>ĂƚǀŝĂ͗tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ͕͗ĞĐĞŵďĞƌμκλο͕Ɖ͘π͘
300 ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶůĂŶŬ͕͞tŚĂƚŽƚŚĞĂƉĂĚμκλνǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐZĞǀŝĞǁ͍͟/Ŷ>ŝƵĚĂƐĚĂŶĂǀŝēŝƵƐĂŶĚ
DĂƚƚŚĞǁǌĞŬĂŝ͕ĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĂƉĂĚμκλνDŝůŝƚĂƌǇǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͗>ĞƐƐŽŶƐĨŽƌĂůƚŝĐZĞŐŝŽŶĂů
^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕dŚĞ:ĂŵĞƐƚŽǁŶ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚEĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨĞŶƐĞĐĂĚĞŵǇŽĨ>ĂƚǀŝĂ͗tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ͕
͗ĞĐĞŵďĞƌμκλο͕Ɖ͘λκ͘^ŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ͞ŽƚŚĞƌĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŵŽďŝůŝǌĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͟ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ
ŶĞƌŐǇĂŶĚdƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŝŽƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ͘
112
ƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ͞ĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇ͟ĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͕ůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌ>ĂƉŝŶ͕ƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶμκth ƌŵǇ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞμκͿ͕ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŚĂƚ
͞ƚŚĞƌŵǇŵƵƐƚďĞƌĞĂĚǇƚŽƌĞƉĞůĂŶǇƚŚƌĞĂƚ͕ďĞŝƚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŽƌĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů͘
tĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚŽƵƌŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƐƵƉƉƌĞƐƐůĂƌŐĞƌŝůůĞŐĂůĂƌŵĞĚŐƌŽƵƉƐ͙ĂŶĚ
ĚŝǀĞƌƐŝŽŶĂƌǇŐƌŽƵƉƐ͕ďƵƚǁĂƐĂůƐŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƐĞǀĞƌĂůƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌ͘͟ 301
Figure 20. The Russian 20th (and 6th) Army
The debate over the number of troops participating in Zapad-2013

betrays not the lack of transparency of the Kremlin, but a lack of
understanding of what the Russian General Staff was exercising. dŚĞ
ŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŶŐŝŶZapad 2013 ǁĞƌĞĂŶĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚλλ͕ρμκ
ĨƌŽŵZƵƐƐŝĂĂŶĚλκ͕οκκĨƌŽŵĞůĂƌƵƐ͘dŚĞƐĞĨŽƌĐĞƐĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚĂŵŽĚĞƐƚ
ςκƚĂŶŬƐ͕ξοκĂƌŵŽƌĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůĐĂƌƌŝĞƌƐ͕οκƐĞůĨ-ƉƌŽƉĞůůĞĚĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇĂŶĚ
301:ƂŐĞŶůĨǇŝŶŐĂŶĚWĞƚĞƌ͘DĂƚƚƐƐŽŶ͕͞Zapad 2013͗DƵůƚŝĨĂĐĞƚĞĚǆĞƌĐŝƐĞtŝƚŚhŶŝƋƵĞ
/ŶŐƌĞĚŝĞŶƚƐ͕͟ŝŶ>ŝƵĚĂƐĚĂŶĂǀŝēŝƵƐĂŶĚDĂƚƚŚĞǁǌĞŬĂŝ͕ĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ͕Russia’s Zapad 2013 Military
Exercise: Lessons for Baltic Regional Security͕dŚĞ:ĂŵĞƐƚŽǁŶ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚEĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨĞŶƐĞ
ĐĂĚĞŵǇŽĨ>ĂƚǀŝĂ͗tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ͕͗ĞĐĞŵďĞƌμκλο͕Ɖ͘μλ͘
113
ƌŽĐŬĞƚůĂƵŶĐŚĞƌƐ͕ĂŶĚσκƉůĂŶĞƐĂŶĚŚĞůŝĐŽƉƚĞƌƐ͘dŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůƐĐĂůĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ǁĂƐĨĂƌůĞƐƐŵŽĚĞƐƚƚŚĂŶƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚŶƵŵďĞƌƐ͘&ŽƌŝŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇμμ͕νκκ
ŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ǁĂƐσ͕κκκŶĂǀĂůĨŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚξο͕κκκ/ŶƚĞƌŝŽƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ
&ŽƌĐĞƐ;MVD ƚƌŽŽƉƐͿ͘ƚρπ͕νκκκƚƌŽŽƉƐ͕ĂƉĂĚ-μκλνŵĂĚĞEdK
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐůŽŽŬƐŵĞĞŬ͘A breakdown in the percentages of Armed
Forces (40%) to MVD Forces (60%) is very revealing about how the
Russian General Staff was preparing to offset its shortage of infantry
when having to rely upon contract soldiers for its first echelon
forces. 302
dǁŽŽƚŚĞƌĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨZapad 2013 ĚĞŵĂŶĚŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ: 1) amphibious
operations in the Baltic Sea were reinforced by two landing craft
“which do not belong to the Baltic Sea Fleet: the Azov, from the Black
Sea Fleet…and the Georgij Pobedonosets (of the Northern Fleet)”303;
and 2) the participation of amphibious assault troops in the exercise
suggests the General Staff anticipates one or more coastal assaults
should an operational-strategic offensive be launched against the
Baltic States.304 >ĂŶĚŝŶŐĐƌĂĨƚǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞůĂĐŬ^ĞĂ
ƉƌŝŽƌƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐƐĞŝǌƵƌĞŽĨƌŝŵĞĂ͕ƉƌŽďĂďůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ
<ǇŝǀǁŽƵůĚƌĞƐŝƐƚƚŚĞŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶ͕ĂŶĚƉŽƐƐŝďůǇĂƐĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐŝĞƐĨŽƌ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌǁĞƐƚĂůŽŶŐhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͛ƐůĂĐŬ^ĞĂĐŽĂƐƚ͘dŚĞƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌŽĨ
ĂŵƉŚŝďŝŽƵƐůĂŶĚŝŶŐĐƌĂĨƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶĨůĞĞƚƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂƐĞĞŶĂƐĂŬĞǇ
ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌŽĨƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͘Furthermore, the employment of
amphibious operations in the Zapad exercise should be indicative of
the Russian General Staff’s intention to employ assault landings as part
of its operational-strategic plans for warfare in the Baltic region.
302 ^ĞĞŶĚƌǌĞũtŝůŬ͕͛͞tĞƐƚμκλν͛͗ƚŚĞĞůĂƌƵƐŝĂŶĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƌŵŝĞƐ͛ĂŶƚŝ-EdKŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ͕͟KƑƌŽĚĞŬ^ƚƵĚŝſǁtƐĐŚŽĚŶŝĐŚ͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμο͕μκλν͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ŽƐǁ͘ǁĂǁ͘ƉůͬƉƌŝŶƚͬμλκξκ
303 ůĨǇŝŶŐĂŶĚDĂƚƚƐƐŽŶ͕ibid.͕Ɖ͘μο͘ůƐŽƐĞĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐŽƵƌĐĞĂƚ͞DŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ͚Zapad-2013͛
ŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ͕͟^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌλπ͕μκλν͕ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƚǀƌ͘ďǇͬĞŶŐͬŶĞǁƐ͘ĂƐƉ͍ŝĚсλκμρκΘĐŝĚсλπ
304 ^ĞĞZŽŐĞƌDĐĞƌŵŽƚƚ͕͞ĞůĂƌƵƐĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂWƌĞƉĂƌĞZapad 2013 DŝůŝƚĂƌǇǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͕͟Eurasia
Daily Monitor͕sŽůƵŵĞλκ͕/ƐƐƵĞρλ͕Ɖƌŝůλπ͕μκλν͘
114
Snap Exercises
^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ^ĞƌŐĞŝ^ŚŽŝŐƵĂƐDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨĞĨĞŶƐĞŝŶ
EŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλμ͕ĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨ͞ƐŶĂƉŝŶƐƉĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ͟ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŽƐƚĞŶƐŝďůǇ
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŽĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞƚŚĞƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘dŚĞƐĐĂůĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ— ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂǀĞƌĞĂĐŚĞĚĂƐŵĂŶǇ ĂƐλπκ͕κκκƚƌŽŽƉƐ– ŐŽĨĂƌ
ďĞǇŽŶĚĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƚƌŽŽƉƐ͕ĂŶĚĂƌĞĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞƚŽŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝůǇĞǆĞĐƵƚĞƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨ
sůĂĚŝŵŝƌWƵƚŝŶ͘
dŚĞƐŶĂƉZƵƐƐŝĂŶĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŽŽŬƉůĂĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞλπth ĂŶĚμλƐƚ of
DĂƌĐŚμκλοĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƌĂƉŝĚƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐŽƵƚůǇŝŶŐ
ƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ— ƚŚĞ<ŽůĂWĞŶŝŶƐƵůĂĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƵƚůǇŝŶŐƌƚŝĐŝƐůĞƐ͕ƚŚĞ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ
ĞǆĐůĂǀĞ͕ĂŶĚŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚƌŝŵĞĂ͘͞dŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞďĞŐĂŶĂƐĂŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
ƚŚĞĨĂƌEŽƌƚŚĐĞŶƚĞƌĞĚŽŶƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ&ůĞĞƚďƵƚǁĂƐƋƵŝĐŬůǇĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚ
ƚŽĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞƚǇŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͘dŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ
ǁŽƵůĚĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞςκ͕κκκƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů͕λμ͕κκκƉŝĞĐĞƐŽĨŚĞĂǀǇ
ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ͕ποǁĂƌƐŚŝƉƐ͕λοƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐ͕ĂŶĚμμκĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ͘͟ 305 The snap
exercise has moved from being an evaluative tool to becoming an
instrument of military doctrine itself – providing both the accepted
view on the nature of future conflict and guidance for the military in
preparing the armed forces for war.
tŚŝůĞŝƚŵŝŐŚƚďĞĞĂƐǇƚŽĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĂůĂƌŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ͞ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇ
ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇƐŶĂƉŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĚƌŝůůƐďĞŝŶŐĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŽƵƚďǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶĞĂƌŝƚƐ
ĞĂƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌƐĐŽƵůĚďĞƉĂƌƚŽĨĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŚĂƚǁŝůůŽƉĞŶ
ƚŚĞĚŽŽƌĨŽƌĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞŽŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕͟ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
ƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐƵĐŚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ͘dŚĞλσρνzŽŵ<ŝƉƉƵƌtĂƌƵŶůĞĂƐŚĞĚ
ďǇƚŚĞŐǇƉƚŝĂŶƐƵŶĚĞƌ^ŽǀŝĞƚƚƵƚĞůĂŐĞŝƐŽŶĞƐƵĐŚĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͘Ǉ
ĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐƚŚĞ/ƐƌĂĞůŝƐƚŽƌĞĂĐƚƚŽŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞ/ƐƌĂĞůŝƐ
ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚŶŽƚƚŽƌĞĂĐƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚǁĂƐĂŚŽůŝĚĂǇ͕ƚŚĞŐǇƉƚŝĂŶƐŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ/ƐƌĂĞůŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚƚŚĂƚĂŶ
ĂƚƚĂĐŬǁĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ͘
305dŚŽŵĂƐ&ƌĞĂƌ͕͞ŶĂƚŽŵǇŽĨĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͕͟
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ͘ŽƌŐͬĂŶĂƚŽŵǇ-of-a-ƌƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ĞǆƌĐŝƐĞͺμσλξ͘Śƚŵů ͕ƵŐƵƐƚ
12, 2015
115
'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚ͞ŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚĞŶŵŽŶƚŚƐŽĨμκλξ͕ξκZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇǀĞƐƐĞůƐ
ŚĂĚďĞĞŶƐƉŽƚƚĞĚŶĞĂƌ>ĂƚǀŝĂŶǁĂƚĞƌƐ͕ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚǁŝƚŚŽŶůǇŽŶĞŝŶ
μκλκ͕͟ 306 ǁŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŵƉŚŝďŝŽƵƐƚĂƐŬĨŽƌĐĞ
ĂƉƉĞĂƌŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞ'ƵůĨŽĨZŝŐĂ͍dŚĞĞƉƵƚǇŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌŽĨEdKĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ͕ĂŶĚŽŶĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ͛ƐŵŽƐƚƐĞŶŝŽƌŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐ͕͞ǁĂƌŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐŶĂƉĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĐŽƵůĚůĞĂĚƚŽĂƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨEdK
dĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͘͟ νκρ ĞĐĂƵƐĞZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂƐƚƵƌŶĞĚƚŚĞƐŶĂƉĐŚĞĐŬĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐŝŶƚŽĂŶ
ĂůŵŽƐƚƌŽƵƚŝŶĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ͕ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƵŶƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞƚŽǁŽƌƌǇƚŚĂƚEdKĐŽƵůĚ
ĨŝŶĚŝƚƐĞůĨĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĞĚďǇŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĂĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂƚƚĂĐŬƚŽĂ
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůƉƌĞĞŵƉƚŝŽŶŽƌĨĂĐĞĂĐŽůůĂƉƐĞŽĨƚŚĞůůŝĂŶĐĞ͘ 308
NATO and Partner-Nation Exercises
/ŶĞĂƌůǇμκλο͕ĂŶƚůĂŶƚŝĐŽƵŶĐŝůƌĞƉŽƌƚĐĂůůĞĚĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ
ŽĨĂEdK-ZƵƐƐŝĂ͞ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŐĂƉ͟ƌĞǀĞĂůŝŶŐ͕ŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐŽĨƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ͕
͞ĂƚƌŽƵďůŝŶŐĚŝƐƉĂƌŝƚǇŝŶŵĂŐŶŝƚƵĚĞ͘͟νκσ tŚŝůĞŽŶĞŽĨEdK͛ƐůĂƌŐĞƐƚ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ;dƌŝĚĞŶƚ:ƵŶĐƚƵƌĞŝŶμκλοͿƚŽƉƉĞĚŽƵƚĂƚĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇνπ͕κκκ
ƚƌŽŽƉƐ͕ 310 ZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐƚŚĂƚƌĂŶŐĞĚ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶπο͕κκκĂŶĚλπκ͕κκκƚƌŽŽƉƐ͘dŚĞĚŝƐƉĂƌŝƚǇŝƐĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƐƚĂƌŬ͕
ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚEdKŝƐĂŶĂůůŝĂŶĐĞŽĨƚǁĞŶƚǇ-ĞŝŐŚƚŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘
dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨhŬƌĂŝŶĞĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌŽŶŐŽŝŶŐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉƌŽǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ311 ŚĂǀĞŝŐŶŝƚĞĚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽǀĞƌ^ǁĞĚŝƐŚĂŶĚ&ŝŶŶŝƐŚĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ
306 ĂŵŝĞŶ^ŚĂƌŬŽǀ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ^ŶĂƉDŝůŝƚĂƌǇƌŝůů͚ŽƵůĚdƵƌŶŝŶƚŽƐƐĂƵůƚŽŶĂůƚŝĐĂƉŝƚĂů͕͛͟
&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇμν͕μκλο͕ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚĂƚŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ŶĞǁƐǁĞĞŬ͘ĐŽŵͬƌƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ-ƐŶĂƉ-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-Ěƌŝůů-ĐŽƵůĚ-
turn-ƋƵŝĐŬ-ĂƐƐĂƵůƚ-ďĂůƚŝĐ-ĐĂƉŝƚĂů-νκςρομ
νκρ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ŝƌĚƌŝĂŶƌĂĚƐŚĂǁ͕ĂƐĐŝƚĞĚŝŶ:ĞƌĞŵǇĞŶĚĞƌ͕DŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞǆƉĞƌƚ͗ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐŶĂƉŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĚƌŝůůƐĐŽƵůĚƚƵƌŶŝŶƚŽĂƐƐĂƵůƚƐŽŶĂůƚŝĐĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐ͕͟Business Insider͕&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇμν͕μκλο͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐůĞĂĚĞƌ͘ĐŽŵͬŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ĞǆƉĞƌƚ-ƌƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ƐŶĂƉ-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ĚƌŝůůƐ-ĐŽƵůĚ-turn-into-
ĂƐƐĂƵůƚƐ-on-ďĂůƚŝĐ-ĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐ-2015-2
308 ^ƚƌĂƚĨŽƌ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂdĂƌŐĞƚƐEdKtŝƚŚDŝůŝƚĂƌǇǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ͕͟&ŽƌďĞƐ͕DĂƌĐŚμκ͕μκλο͕
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĨŽƌďĞƐ͘ĐŽŵͬƐŝƚĞƐͬƐƚƌĂƚĨŽƌͬμκλοͬκνͬμκͬƌƵƐƐŝĂ-ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ-nato-ǁŝƚŚ-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞͬημλμλĚĨĚοξσςĨ
νκσ /ĂŶ:͘ƌǌĞǌŝŶƐŬŝĂŶĚEŝĐŚŽůĂƐsĂƌĂŶŐŝƐ͕͞dŚĞEdK-ZƵƐƐŝĂǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ'ĂƉ͕͟ƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐŽƵŶĐŝů͕
&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇμν͕μκλο
310 <ǇůĞ:ĂŚŶĞƌ͕͞EdKŐĞŶĞƌĂů͗ZƵƐƐŝĂĨĞĂƌƐŵĞĚŝĂ͕ƐŬŝƉƐdƌŝĚĞŶƚ:ƵŶĐƚƵƌĞμκλοĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ͕͟Army
Times͕EŽǀĞŵďĞƌξ͕μκλο͘
311 ͞ƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂŶĚ^ǁĞĚĞŶŚĂǀĞĂůůŚĂĚƚŚĞŝƌĂŝƌƐƉĂĐĞǀŝŽůĂƚĞĚďǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚǁŚŝůĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂƐƐĞŝǌĞĚĂŶƐƚŽŶŝĂŶŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĂŐĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƐƚŽŶŝĂŶƐŽŝůĂŶĚĂ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶĨŝƐŚŝŶŐ
ďŽĂƚĨƌŽŵŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůǁĂƚĞƌƐ͘͟ZŝĐŚĂƌĚDŝůŶĞ͕͞^ǁĞĚĞƐůĞĂŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐEĂƚŽŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ͕ƉŽůů
ƐŚŽǁƐ͕Financial Times͕KĐƚŽďĞƌμσ͕μκλξ͘
116
ĂůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚƐ͘ 312 tŚŝůĞ^ǁĞĚĞŶĂŶĚ&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂƌĞƐĂŝĚƚŽŚĂǀĞĂŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĂů
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚŽŶůǇƚĂŬĞĂĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽũŽŝŶEdKĂƚƚŚĞ
ƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ͕͞^ǁĞĚĞŶĂŶĚ&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂůƐŽƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇƐŝŐŶĞĚĂƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚŚŽƐƚ
ŶĂƚŝŽŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĂůůŽǁƐEdKƚƌŽŽƉƐƚŽĚĞƉůŽǇŝŶƚŚĞŽŶůǇ
ƚǁŽĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂĂƌĞĂŶŽƚƚŽďĞůŽŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ͘͟ 313 ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞ,ĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐůůŝĞĚWŽǁĞƌƐ
ƵƌŽƉĞ;^,WͿWƵďůŝĐĨĨĂŝƌƐKĨĨŝĐĞ͕͞dŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐDĞŵŽƌĂŶĚƵŵ
ŽĨhŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŝƐƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐĨŽƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů͕
ĂŶĚůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐƐƐŝƚĞƐ͘dŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨ,ŽƐƚEĂƚŝŽŶ^ƵƉƉŽƌƚŝƐĂŝŵĞĚƚŽ
ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶEdK-ůĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶ͕ŽƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚĨƌŽŵ͕,ŽƐƚEĂƚŝŽŶƐĚƵƌŝŶŐ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘͟ 314
Information Warfare Scenarios
ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐ͕ŝƚŵƵƐƚďĞĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝůůŶŽƚůŝŬĞůǇĐŽŵŵŝƚƚŽĂŶĂƌŵĞĚ ĂƚƚĂĐŬĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂŶǇŽĨŝƚƐ
ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌƐ͗ZƵƐƐŝĂŶďĞůůŝŐĞƌĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂŶǇŽĨŝƚƐŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌƐǁŝůůƌĂƚŚĞƌ
ďĞďĂƐĞĚƵƉŽŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇĐŽǀĞƌƚĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐďĂĐŬĞĚďǇ
ƚŚĞthreat ŽĨĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŽŶ͘/ŶĚĞĞĚ͕ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉƌĞƐƐĂďŽƵƚ
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƌĞĂĚůĞƐƐĂƐƌĞĂů
ƚŚƌĞĂƚƐŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĚǀĞŶƚƵƌĞƐĂŶĚŵŽƌĞĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ
ŽĨĐĞŶƚƌĂůůǇ-ĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚƚŽĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĞůŝƚĞƐŽĨ
ĂǀŝĐƚŝŵŝǌĞĚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇůĂĐŬĂŶǇǀŝĂďůĞŵĞĂŶƐŽĨ
ƌĞƐŝƐƚŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ͘
dŽŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨŶĞǁ-ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ƐŽŵĞŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂů
ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐĂƌĞůŝƐƚĞĚďĞůŽǁƚŽĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞŚŽǁƚŚĞƐĞĂƚƚĂĐŬƐŵĂǇďĞ
ĞŝƚŚĞƌůŝŵŝƚĞĚŽƌůĂƌŐĞŝŶƐĐĂůĞ͘/ŶĂůůŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐ͕ŽŶůǇŽŶĞŽƌĂŶǇ
312 ͞ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶtĂƌ'ĂŵĞƐ͗ZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇƌŝůůƐ͕͟STRATFOR Global Intelligence,

DĂǇο͕μκλο͘
313 ZŝĐŚĂƌĚDŝůŶĞ͕͞^ǁĞĚĞƐůĞĂŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐEdKŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ͕ƉŽůůƐŚŽǁƐ͕Financial Times,
KĐƚŽďĞƌμσ͕μκλξ͘dŚĞǁĂǇŝƚǁĂƐƉƵƚďǇĂƐĞŶŝŽƌ^ǁĞĚŝƐŚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƚŽƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝŶμκλπǁĂƐ
ƚŚĂƚ^ǁĞĚĞŶŚĂƐĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŝƚƐĨŽƌŵĞƌŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůƐƵďũĞĐƚƐƚŽŶŽƚŽŶůǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞďƵƚ͕ĨŝƌƐƚ ŽĨĂůů͕ƚŽŶŽƚƉůĂĐĞƚŚĞŵĂƚĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƌŝƐŬďǇƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽĞŶŚĂŶĐĞ^ǁĞĚŝƐŚ
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƵŶŝůĂƚĞƌĂůůǇ͘tŚŝůĞƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ͞ŝƐŶŽƚĂĨŽƌŵĂůĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ͕͟ƚŚĞǇĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽƉƵƌƐƵĞ
͞ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ΀ƚǁŽ΁ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĐŽŵŵŽŶƵƐĞŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇďĂƐĞƐ
ĂŶĚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘͟͞^ǁĞĚĞŶĂŶĚ&ŝŶůĂŶĚŝŶũŽŝŶƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͚ǁĂƌ͛ƉůĂŶ͕͟
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ƚŚĞůŽĐĂů͘ƐĞͬμκλοκμλσͬƐǁĞĚĞŶ-ĂŶĚ-ĨŝŶůĂŶĚ-in-ũŽŝŶƚ-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ƉůĂŶ ;&Ğďλσ͕μκλπͿ͘
314 ͞&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂŶĚ^ǁĞĚĞŶƐŝŐŶDĞŵŽƌĂŶĚƵŵŽĨhŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚEdK͕͟^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌο͕μκλξ͘
λλρ
ĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŽƉƚŝŽŶƐĐŽƵůĚďĞƵƐĞĚ͘dŚĞƐĞĂƌĞŶŽƚĞǆŚĂƵƐƚŝǀĞ
ůŝƐƚƐŽĨŽƉƚŝŽŶƐ͘
1. Encouraging Pro-Russian Interests in Latgale
dŚŝƐĨŝƌƐƚƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐĂĨĂŝƌůǇůŝŵŝƚĞĚƵƐĞŽĨŶĞǁ-ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶWƌŽďůĞŵ^Ğƚ͗^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĚŝƐƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞ
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ>ĂƚǀŝĂŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞŵŽƌĞ>ĂƚǀŝĂŶĂŶĚůĞƐƐZƵƐƐŝĂŶ͘
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ͕ƚŚŽƐĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐůŝǀŝŶŐŝŶĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ>ĂƚǀŝĂĂƌĞŵŽƌĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚƚŽ
ůŝǀĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞZƵƐƐŝĂĂŶĚĂƌĞŐƌĂǀŝƚĂƚŝŶŐĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞƉŽƐƚ-
^ŽǀŝĞƚ͞ƉĂƐƐƉŽƌƚůĞƐƐ͟ƐƚĂƚƵƐƚŚĂƚĨŽƌƐŽůŽŶŐŽĨĨĞƌĞĚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĂ
ƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘dŚŝƐĞƌŽĚŝŶŐƐŽĐŝŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶ>ĂƚǀŝĂƌĂŝƐĞƐůŽŶŐ-
ƚĞƌŵƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚŝǀŝĚĞĂŶĚĐŽŶƋƵĞƌ>ĂƚǀŝĂŝŶƚŚĞ
ĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĂĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌŝŶŐĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨƉŽǁĞƌďĞŝŶŐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ
ƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘
dŽŽůƐŽĨEĞǁ-'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͗
E'KƐ͗,ĂǀĞůŽĐĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚZƵƐƐŝĂŶďĂĐŬŝŶŐǁƌŝƚĞĂďŽƵƚ
ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐŽĨ>ĂƚǀŝĂŶ͞ĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ͟ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚůŽĐĂůZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ͕ƐƵĐŚ
ĂƐƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ>ĂƚǀŝĂŶůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĞǀĞŶŝŶZƵƐƐŽƉŚŽŶĞ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ͘
EĞǁƐŽŶƚƌŽů͗ŝƌƐƚŽƌŝĞƐŽĨ^ŽǀŝĞƚ- ŽƌdƐĂƌŝƐƚ-ĞƌĂƉĂƚƌŝŽƚŝƐŵĂŶĚ
ĚĞŶŝŐƌĂƚĞ>ĂƚǀŝĂ͛ƐŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĞƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ-ĚƌŝǀĞŶ
ŵĞŵŽƌŝĞƐ͘/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ/ŵŵŽƌƚĂůZĞŐŝŵĞŶƚ315 ĐĂŶŚĞůƉ
ƚŽŬĞĞƉƚŚĞƐĞŵĞŵŽƌŝĞƐĨƌĞƐŚ͘dŚŝƐĂĚĚƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵƚŽ
ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŽŽů͘
315dŚĞ/ŵŵŽƌƚĂůZĞŐŝŵĞŶƚ;ʥ̖̭̭̥̖̬̯̦̼̜ʿ̨̡̣ͿŝƐĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƚŽŚĂǀĞĚĞƐĐĞŶĚĂŶƚƐŽĨ
ǀĞƚĞƌĂŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌ;'ƌĞĂƚWĂƚƌŝŽƚŝĐtĂƌͿĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐ
ƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌǁŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌĂŶĐĞƐƚŽƌƐĚŝĚŝŶƚŚĞǁĂƌĂŶĚůŝŶŬƵƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌŽůĚĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐ-in-ĂƌŵƐĂƐ
ǁĞůůĂƐĐŽŵƉŝůĞĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚŚŝƐƚŽƌǇĚĂƚĂďĂƐĞ͘/ƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƐƉŽŶƐŽƌĞĚďǇĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨƉƵďůŝĐĂŶĚ
ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ͕ďƵƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶďůŽĐŬĞĚďǇŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŝŶ
ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚhŬƌĂŝŶĞĨŽƌƐƉƌĞĂĚŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ͘tŚĞŶƚŚŝƐŽĐĐƵƌƐ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŵĞĚŝĂŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐŚŽǁƚŚŽƐĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĚŽŶŽƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĨŝŐŚƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĨĂƐĐŝƐŵĂŶĚ
ĂůůĞŐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƐŽŵĞĨĂƐĐŝƐƚƐǇŵƉĂƚŚǇ͘
118
ŝƌŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ&ĂĐƚƐŽĨ>ĂƚǀŝĂŶtĞĂŬŶĞƐƐͬZƵƐƐŝĂŶ^ƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ͗dŚŝƐ
ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƚŽŽůďǇŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŶŐŚŽǁ^ŽǀŝĞƚ-ĞƌĂƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŚĂƐ
ĚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽŵŽĚĞƌŶǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇǁŝƚŚŶŽĐŚĂŶĐĞŽĨďĞŝŶŐĂďůĞƚŽ
ƌĞƐŝƐƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉŽǁĞƌŝĨŝƚƚƌŝĞĚ͘dŚŝƐǁŝůůŝĚĞĂůůǇŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚĞĨĞĂƚŝƐŵĂŵŽŶŐ
ĞƚŚŶŝĐ>ĂƚǀŝĂŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌEdKĂůůŝĞƐǁŚŝůĞĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐƚŚĞůŽĐĂůZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůǀŝĐƚŽƌŝĞƐƚŚĂƚŽďǀŝĂƚĞĂŶǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŶĞĞĚƚŽŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞŵŽƌĞŚĂŵ-ĨŝƐƚĞĚůǇŝŶ>ĂƚǀŝĂŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŽƌƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞĂŶ
ĂƌŵĞĚĂƚƚĂĐŬĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ>ĂƚǀŝĂ͘
2. Dividing NATO Allies (Coalitional Warfare)
dŚŝƐƐĞĐŽŶĚƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐůĞƐƐĂŶŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞŽĨŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐĂďƐŽůƵƚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĂŶŝƚƐĞĞŬƐƚŽǁĞĂŬĞŶƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞEdK
ĂůůŝĂŶĐĞƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽƉƌŽǀŽŬĞĂĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͘
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶWƌŽďůĞŵ^Ğƚ͗dŚĞEdKĂůůŝĂŶĐĞƐĞƚƐƵƉƵƌŽƉĞĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞĂƐĂ
ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƌŝǀĂůŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽŶǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŝƐƐƵĞƐ͘dŚŝƐ
ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽŬĞǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĐĂŶďĞŽďǀŝĂƚĞĚďǇƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞƌŝǀĂůĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ͘
dŽŽůƐŽĨEĞǁ-'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͗
E'KƐ͗ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶƚŽƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐďŝůĂƚĞƌĂůƌŝǀĂůƌŝĞƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĂŶŶĂůƐ
ŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŚŝƐƚŽƌǇǁŝůůĞŶĂďůĞƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶǇǀĂƌŝĞƚǇof
ƉŽůŝĐǇĂĚǀŝĐĞĂƌŐƵŝŶŐĨŽƌƐŬĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵƚŽǁĂƌĚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨ
ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌEdKĂůůǇ͛ƐŵŽƚŝǀĞƐ͘dŚŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐŝƐŵŽƐƚŽĨƚĞŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚ
ĂƚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƚŽĚŝƐƚƌƵƐƚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ͕ŝƚĐĂŶĂůƐŽďĞƵƐĞĚŵŽƌĞ
ůŽĐĂůůǇ͕ĂƐŝŶƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐƌŝǀĂůƌǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶWŽůĂŶĚĂŶĚ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͘
EĞǁƐŽŶƚƌŽů͗ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂĐŚĂŶŶĞůƐĐĂŶĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƚŽŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚůǇĚŝƐƚƌƵƐƚh^ƉŽůŝĐǇ;Ğ͘Ő͘ďǇŵŽĐŬŝŶŐ
WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŽŶĂůĚdƌƵŵƉŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶǀĂůƵĞƐͿŽƌ
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐƚĞĨĨŽƌƚƐĂŵŽŶŐEdKƐƚĂƚĞƐ;Ğ͘Ő͘
>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽĨŽƌĐĞ ĞƚŚŶŝĐWŽůĞƐŝŶ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂƚŽƚĂŬĞŽŶ
>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶŶĂŵĞƐŽƌWŽůŝƐŚĐĂǀĂůŝĞƌĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŝŶĚĞďĂƚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚ
>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇͿ͘
ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůdŚƌĞĂƚƐ͗ǇƌĞůĞĂƐŝŶŐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƉƌĞƐƐ͕ƚŚĞŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂůƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ
λλσ
ŽĨĂŵĂũŽƌ ĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚďŽƌĚĞƌǁŚŝůĞĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌĐĂŶƉƌŽǀŽŬĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨŚŽǁWŽůĂŶĚ
ŵƵƐƚĚĞĨĞŶĚŝƚƐĞůĨďĞĨŽƌĞƌĞůŝĞǀŝŶŐƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĨƌŽŵ
ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĂƚƚĂĐŬ͘dŚŝƐǀĞƌǇĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶĐĂŶƌĂŝƐĞĂůůƚŚĞĚŝƐƚƌƵƐƚ
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽĂůƚĞƌ ƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĨĂǀŽƌ͘
EƵĐůĞĂƌdŚƌĞĂƚƐ͗>ŽŽƐĞƚĂůŬŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌƚĂƌŐĞƚƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
ĐŝƚŝĞƐ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐŽƉĞŶŚĂŐĞŶŽƌtĂƌƐĂǁ͕ĐĂŶĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞƚŽůŽĐĂů
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐŽƐƚƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶŝŶŐƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŽƚŚĞƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͘ŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĐĂŶ
ďĞĂĚĚĞĚƚŽƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞŚĂĚĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ
ĞŶŵĂƌŬŽƌWŽůĂŶĚ;ĂƐŝŶƚŚŝƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞͿŝĨĞŝƚŚĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĚŝĚŶŽƚ
ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ͘
3. Demonstration of Power (Bullying)
dŚŝƐƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐĂŵŽƌĞĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŽĨĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͘dŚŽƵŐŚĂůůƚŚĞƐĞƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐĐĂŶďĞ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ͞ďƵůůǇŝŶŐ͕͟ƚŚŝƐƉƌŽďĂďůǇďĞƐƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞƚƌƵĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ͘
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶWƌŽďůĞŵ^Ğƚ͗dŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐƚĂŬĞĂ
ĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞůǇĂŶƚŝ-ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƐƚĂŶĐĞĂŶĚŝŶǀŝƚĞƐƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů
EdKĂƐƐĞƚƐƚŽƚĂŬĞƵƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂ͕Žƌ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͘dŚŝƐ
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ͕ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞEdK^ƵŵŵŝƚŝŶtĂůĞƐĂŶĚĂĐĐĞůĞƌĂƚĞĚ
ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞEdKtĂƌƐĂǁ^ƵŵŵŝƚƐŝƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇŝŶĂŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĚƐƚĂŐĞ͘dŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞŝƐƚŽĚŝƐĐƌĞĚŝƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚĚƌŝǀĞŽƚŚĞƌEdKŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐƉŽůŝĐǇ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐďĂĐŬĨƌŽŵĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚďǇĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌŝŶŐŝƚƐƌŝƐŬƐ͘
dŽŽůƐŽĨEĞǁ-'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ:
EĞǁƐŽŶƚƌŽů͗ƚƚĂĐŬƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
^ƚĂƚĞƐƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ͕
ůĞƚĂůŽŶĞƚŚĞƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ͘ŝƐŵŝƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ
ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨŝĂŶƚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŽƵƚŽĨŚĂŶĚĐĂŶŽƉĞŶ
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶEdKĂďŽƵƚŚŽǁĚĞĨĞŶƐŝďůĞƚŚĞƐĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ
ĂƌĞŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉůĂĐĞ͘
120
ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůdŚƌĞĂƚƐ͗^ŶĂƉĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĐĂůůĞĚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĞŵŝŶƚŽ
ƉĂƌƚŝĂůŽƌĨƵůůŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞďǇŝŶĐƵƌĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ĐŽƐƚƐƚŚĂƚĚŽŶŽƚƚŚĞŶŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝǌĞŝŶƚŽĂƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌƉŽƐƚƵƌĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
ĂƌĞĂůZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ͘
ǇďĞƌǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͗hƐŝŶŐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ŚĂĐŬĞƌƐĐĂŶĚŝƐƌƵƉƚƚŚĞ
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞ
ƉƵďůŝĐƐĞĐƚŽƌŽƌŝŶƚŚĞƵƚŝůŝƚǇƐĞĐƚŽƌƚŽƉƌŽǀŽŬĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨŚŽǁ
ƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŝƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞĂƐƐĞƌƚŝǀĞŶĂƚƵƌĞ
ŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͘
^ƉĞƚƐŶĂǌKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͗hƐŝŶŐƐƉĞĐŝĂůĨŽƌĐĞƐĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŽďĞ
ĚŝƐŐƌƵŶƚůĞĚůŽĐĂůƐ͕ƚĂŬĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨŬĞǇŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽƌĞůƐĞ
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĐŽĞƌĐŝǀĞĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŽƌǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
ĂŶǇŶĞĞĚƚŽƌĞƚĂŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽƌĂŐĞŶƚ͘ŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ
ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚĐĂŶďĞƚƌĂĚĞĚďĂĐŬŽƌĞǀĞŶƐŝŵƉůǇŐŝǀĞŶďĂĐŬ͗ƚŚĞ
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŝƐƐŝŵƉůǇƚŽĞŵďĂƌƌĂƐƐƚŚĞĚĞĨŝĂŶƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ͘
/ŶĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐ͕ŝĨŵĂƚƚĞƌƐŐĞƚŽƵƚŽĨĐŽŶƚƌŽů;ŚŝŐŚůǇƵŶůŝŬĞůǇŝŶ
ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚǁŽͿ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶƐŝŵƉůǇƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĞŵƉůŽǇŝƚƐƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͘dŚŝƐŝƐŚŝŐŚůǇƵŶůŝŬĞůǇĂƐƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ
ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽƐĐŽƌĞĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůǀŝĐƚŽƌǇĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨǁŽƵůĚŶĞĞĚƚŽĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽĚĚƐŽĨĂƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞ
ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞůǇŚŝŐŚ͘ŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐƐƵĐŚĂŶŽƉƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ
ŝŶƐƵƌĂŶĐĞĂƚďĞƐƚ͘
121
CHAPTER 3
Assessment of the Range of Threat Contingencies
WŚŝůůŝƉ͘WĞƚĞƌƐĞŶǁŝƚŚ:ĈŶŝƐĤƌǌŝŶƐĂŶĚWŚŝůůŝƉ͘<ĂƌďĞƌ
ƚĞĂŵŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĂŶĂůǇƐƚƐ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐtŝůůŝĂŵ^͘>ƵŶĚ͕ĚŝǀŝĚĞĚƚŚĞ
ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŝŶƚŽŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƐĂŶŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ
ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ͞ĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐĨĂĐĞŽĨǁĂƌ͘͟
dŚĞFirst Generation ŽĨDŽĚĞƌŶtĂƌ;λπξς-λςπκͿǁĂƐŵĂƌŬĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨůŝŶĞĂŶĚĐŽůƵŵŶƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ͖ďĂƚƚůĞƐǁĞƌĞĨŽƌŵĂůĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚǁĂƐŽƌĚĞƌůǇ͘/ƚƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞǁĂƐƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨĂ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐƵůƚƵƌĞ͕ƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ͞ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͟ĂŶĚ
͞ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ͘͟dŚĞSecond Generation ǁĂƐďƌŽƵŐŚƚĂďŽƵƚďǇƚŚĞ
ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘ƚƚƌŝƚŝŽŶďǇŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĐĞŶƚƌĂůůǇĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚ
ĨŝƌĞƉŽǁĞƌŝŶƐǇŶĐŚƌŽŶǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇ— ƚŚĞĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇĐŽŶƋƵĞƌƐ͕ƚŚĞ
ŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇŽĐĐƵƉŝĞƐ—ďĞĐĂŵĞƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ͘Third Generation WaƌĨĂƌĞ
ƐĂǁƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ƌŝƐĞŽĨŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘
tĂƌĨĂƌĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
͞ĚĞĞƉŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͟ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽĐŽůůĂƉƐĞƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ͛ƐĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐĨƌŽŵ
ǁŝƚŚŝŶ͕ĂŶĚĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨBlitzkrieg ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶ
λσξκŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨ&ƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ>ŽǁŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͘dŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨƌĂƉŝĚůǇ
ƉĞŶĞƚƌĂƚŝŶŐĚĞĞƉŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ͛ƐĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐ͕ƐĞƚŽĨĨĂƌĂƉŝĚĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶ
ƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐƐƵĐŚ͞ŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͟– ĨƌŽŵŚŽƌƐĞƐĂŶĚ
ǁŚĞĞůĞĚǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐƚŽƚĂŶŬƐĂŶĚƐĞůĨ-ƉƌŽƉĞůůĞĚĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ͕ĂŶĚĨƌŽŵĂŝƌďŽƌŶĞ
ƚŽŚĞůŝďŽƌŶĞĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘Fourth Generation tĂƌĨĂƌĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ͕ŝŶƐŽŵĞ
ǁĂǇƐ͕ĂƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽƉƌĞŵŽĚĞƌŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞůŽƐĞƐŝƚƐ
ŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŶĚǁĂƌ͕ĂŶĚĨŝŶĚƐŝƚƐĞůĨĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐŶŽŶ-ƐƚĂƚĞ
ĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌŝĞƐ͘
^ŽŵĞƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐŚĂǀĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƵƌƚŚ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ͞ƚŚĞ
ĞŶĚŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ͟ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚŝƐŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ͘/ƚŝƐƚŚĞŝƌǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚ
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚĂ&ŝĨƚŚ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĂĨŽƌŵŽĨ͞ŚƵĐŬƐƚĞƌŝƐŵ͟ĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚ
122
ĂƚƐĞůůŝŶŐƐĞůf-ƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵĞĚ͞ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ͟ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ͘ 316 tŚŝůĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ
ŶŽĚĞŶǇŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽĐůŝǀŝƚǇŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĐŽŵƉůĞǆ
ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐƚŽƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĂ͞ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ͟
ĂƚƚŚĞĚƌŽƉŽĨĂŚĂƚ͕ŝƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŝŶĨŽƌŵŽŶĞƐĞůĨĂďŽƵƚŚŽǁƚŚŝƐ
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶƉůĂǇŝŶŐŽƵƚŝŶDŽƐĐŽǁ͘dǁŽŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐƐƚĂůǁĂƌƚƐŽĨ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌǇ– DĂũŽƌ-'ĞŶĞƌĂůsůĂĚŝŵŝƌ^ůŝƉĐŚĞŶŬŽĂŶĚ'ĞŶĞƌĂů
DĂŬŚŵƵƚ'ĂƌĞĞǀ– ĚĞďĂƚĞĚƚŚĞƵƚŝůŝƚǇŽĨĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ
ďĞǇŽŶĚĨŽƵƌŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇŝŶ μκκο͘^ůŝƉĐŚĞŶŬŽ͕ŚĂǀŝŶŐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ
ƚŚĞƌŵŽŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĂƌĂƐƚŚĞĞƐƐĞŶĐĞŽĨFifth Generation tĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨŶŽŶ-ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁĂƌĨĂƌĞǁĂƐƚŚĞŽƉƚŝŵĂůĨŽƌŵŽĨ
Sixth Generation tĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĞŵŝĞƌtĞƐƚĞƌŶƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŽĨ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŶĚ^ŽǀŝĞƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ͕:ĂĐŽďt͘<ŝƉƉ͕ŚĂƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ
In the aftermath of Desert Storm in 1991, the late Major-
General Vladimir Slipchenko coined the phrase “sixth
generation warfare” to refer to the “informatization” of
conventional warfare and the development of precision strike
systems, which could make the massing of forces in the
conventional sense an invitation to disaster and demand the
development of the means to mass effects through depth to
fight systems versus systems warfare. Slipchenko looked back
Ăƚ΀DĂƌƐŚĂůŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶEŝŬŽůĂŝ΁KŐĂƌŬŽǀ͛Ɛ͞ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ
in military affairs” with “weapons based on new physical
principles” and saw “Desert Storm” as a first indication of the
appearance of such capabilities. He did not believe that sixth
generation warfare had yet manifested its full implications.317
tŚĂƚĞǀĞƌŽŶĞĐŚŽŽƐĞƐƚŽĐĂůůƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĨŽƌ
ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐŶŽŶ-ƐƚĂƚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐ͕
ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚŝƐĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐĂĐƵůƚƵƌĞǁĂƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ tĞƐƚ͘
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞWƵƚŝŶƌĞŐŝŵĞĚŽĞƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ– ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ
ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵƵƐĞĚďǇŝƚ͛ƐŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ– ĂƐĂ͞ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƚŚƌĞĂƚ͕͟ƚŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶ
ĚŽĞƐŶ͛ƚƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞŝƚƐƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞǁŝƚŚǀŝŽůĞŶƚŶŽŶ-ƐƚĂƚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐĂƐ͞ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͟
316 ^ĞĞ͕ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕͞tŝůůŝĂŵ^͘>ŝŶĚ͗&ŝĨƚŚ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͍͕͟Military.com͕&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇν͕
2015.
νλρ :ĂĐŽďt͘<ŝƉƉ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ^ŝǆƚŚ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞĂŶĚZĞĐĞŶƚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐ͕͟Eurasia Daily
Monitor͕sŽůƵŵĞσ͕/ƐƐƵĞλρ͕:ĂŶƵĂƌǇμο͕2012.
123
ŝŶƚŚĞĐůĂƐƐŝĐƐĞŶƐĞ͘dŚĞƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚ͞ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶƚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ͟ĂƌĞ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵĂŶĚ͕ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĨŽƌĐĞƐŵĂǇ
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂƐŶŽƚƚƌŝĞĚƚŽ
ƚƵƌŶŝƚƐĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŽ͞ƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐ͘͟tŚĞŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵĞĚ
&ŽƌĐĞƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ͞ƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ͟ ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ͕ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐƐŽ-
ĐĂůůĞĚƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐĨƌŽŵĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶďǇƚŚĞŝƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ;ĂƐZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ƌĞŐƵůĂƌĨŽƌĐĞƐŚĂǀĞĚŽŶĞŝŶDŽůĚŽǀĂ͛ƐdƌĂŶƐĚŶŝĞƐƚĞƌĂŶĚ'ĞŽƌŐŝĂ͛Ɛ
ďŬŚĂǌŝĂĂŶĚ^ŽƵƚŚKƐƐĞƚŝĂ͕ĂŶĚĂƌĞŶŽǁĚŽŝŶŐŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͛ƐŽŶďĂƐͿ͘/ƚ
ŵŝŐŚƚ ĞǀĞŶďĞŽƵƚŽĨĚĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽ'ĞŶĞƌĂůDĂŬŚŵƵƚ'ĂƌĞĞǀƚŚĂƚ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐƐŝŵƉůǇƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐĂĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞŶƵŵďĞƌ– ƐŝŵƉůǇĐĂůůŝŶŐŝƚNew
Generation Warfare͘tŚĂƚĞǀĞƌŝƚƐƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞŶƵŵĞƌŝĐĂůĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŽƌ͕ŝƚŝƐ
ĐƌƵĐŝĂůƚŚĂƚƚŚĞtĞƐƚƐƚƵĚǇ͕ĂŶĚĐŽŵĞƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ͕ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ
ŝŶƚĞŶĚƵŶĚĞƌƚŚŝƐŵŽŶŝŬĞƌ͘
WƵƚŝŶ͛ƐŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂĚǀŝƐŽƌsůĂĚŝƐůĂǀ^ƵƌŬŽǀ;ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƉƐĞƵĚŽŶǇŵŽĨ
EĂƚŚĂŶƵďŽǀŝƚƐŬǇͿĐŽŝŶĞĚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ͞EŽŶ->ŝŶĞĂƌtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͟ŝŶĂŶĂƌƚŝĐůĞ
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐĂŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚǁŚĞƌĞĂůůĨŝŐŚƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
Ăůů͘ 318 The central idea of the essay is that traditional geo-political
paradigms no longer hold, and that cooperative structures like the
European Union and NATO are perceived as being of less importance
than the economic interests of individuals and corporations. ƐƉƌŽŽĨ͕
ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĐŝƚĞƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ͕ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ͕ĂŶĚǁŚŽůĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƚŚĂƚ
ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĂŶĚďĞŶĞĨŝƚĨƌŽŵŝůůŝĐŝƚĨůŽǁƐŽĨƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-^ŽǀŝĞƚ
ƐƉĂĐĞ͘
dŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶďĞůŝĞǀĞƐƚŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂĐĂŶŐĞƚĂǁĂǇǁŝƚŚ
ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ νλσ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐŵŽƌĞǀĂůƵĂďůĞ
ƚŚĂŶƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͘/ƚŝƐĂǁĂƌŽĨĐŝǀŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ 320 ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ
318ƵďŽǀŝƚƐŬǇ͕E͘;μκλξͿʥ̖̚ʻ̖̍̌;tŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞ^ŬǇͿ͘ˀ̡̛̱̭̭̜ʿ̨̛̦̖̬͕DĂƌĐŚλμ͕μκλξ͘ǀĂŝůĂďůĞ
ĂƚŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬƌƵƐƉŝŽŶĞƌ͘ƌƵͬŚŽŶĞƐƚͬŵͬƐŝŶŐůĞͬξλνλ͘
νλσWŽŵĞƌĂŶƚƐĞǀ͕W͘;μκλξͿ͘Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: the Surreal Heart of the New
Russia͘EĞǁzŽƌŬ͕Ez͗WƵďůŝĐĨĨĂŝƌƐ͘
320sůĂĚŵŝƌŽǀ͕͘/͘;μκλμͿ͘ˁˌʤ— ʧ̣̦̼̜̌̏ʤ̡̯̘̬ʺ̨̨̛̬̜̏ʦ̨̜̦̼;dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ– dŚĞ
DĂŝŶĐƚŽƌŝŶƚŚĞtŽƌůĚtĂƌͿ͘ZĞƚƌŝĞǀĞĚĨƌŽŵ͗
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬŬĂĚĞƚ͘ƌƵͬůŝĐŚŶŽͬǀůĂĚͺǀͬh^ͺŐůͺĂŬƚŽƌ͘Śƚŵ͘
124
<ƌĞŵůŝŶĨĞĞůƐĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůĞďƵůůǇŝŶŐŝƚƐůŝďĞƌĂůŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐĂŶĚ ŵŽĐŬŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞŝƌŵŽƌĂůĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐŝĞƐŚĂǀĞĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽ
ĚĞĨĞŶĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ͘
ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ͕ǀĂůƵĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƐĞůĨ-ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ͕ŚƵŵĂŶĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ͕
ĂŶĚĨƌĞĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶǁĞƌĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŽŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞtĞƐƚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐ
ƚŽŵĂŶƚŚĞƌĂŵƉĂƌƚƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ͘dŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞƐŽĨ
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂŶĚ&ƌĂŶĐĞǁĞƌĞĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƐƚǀŽŝĐĞƐŝŶŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ
ƚŚĞĚĂƌŬĂŐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚƚŽƐŶƵĨĨŽƵƚƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĞ
ƚŚĂƚŚĂĚƐŽƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇďĞĞŶƚƌĂŶƐƉůĂŶƚĞĚƚŽEŽƌƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂ͘dŚĞƉĞĂĐĞ
ĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚƐƚŚĂƚƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞǁŝƚŚĞƌŝŶŐĂǁĂǇŽĨƚŚĞĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨƐƉĞĞĐŚĂŶĚĂƐƐĞŵďůǇ͕ĂŶŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ
ũƵĚŝĐŝĂƌǇ͕ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵ͕ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ͕ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ
ƚŚĂƚŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞƚŚĞĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŚƵŵĂŶƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇĨƌŽŵ
ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĨŽƌĐĞƐŽĨƐŽĐŝĞƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŚĂƐŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇůĞĚĂůƐŽƚŽĂ
ǁŝƚŚĞƌŝŶŐĂǁĂǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚŽƐĞǀĂůƵĞƐ͘dŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨEdKĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐƚŽĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ
ƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ– ŚĞƌĞǁĞĂƌĞƚĂůŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐƌĞĨĞƌƚŽĂƐ͞ƐǁĞĞƚĚĂǇ-ĚƌĞĂŵƐ ŽĨƚŚĞůŝďĞƌĂů͚ĞŶĚŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ͛͟–
ůĞĚ͕ŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƐĂŵĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ͕ƚŽƚŚĞ͞ĐĂƐƚƌĂƚ΀ŝŽŶŽĨ΁
ŝƚƐĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŐŽŽĚŽŶůǇĨŽƌ͙ǁĂƌƐǁŝƚŚ
ǁĞĂŬĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůůǇďĂĐŬǁĂƌĚĞŶĞŵŝĞƐ͘͟ 321
ĞĐĂĚĞƐŽĨĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐŝŶƐƵƌŐĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞDŝĚĚůĞĂƐƚŚĂǀĞĚƵůůĞĚƚŚĞ
ŵĞŵŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞƵƚŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĐŽŵďĂƚ͘
ƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇŚĂƌůĞƐ<͘ĂƌƚůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐKĨĨŝĐĞ
Ăƚ&Žƌƚ>ĞĂǀĞŶǁŽƌƚŚ͗
At a time when the U.S. military is cutting back on heavy
conventional capabilities, Russia is looking at a future
operational environment, and doubling down on hers. While
the United States increases it special operations forces (SOF),
Russia is keeping her SOF numbers relatively static and is
entrusting her conventional forces to perform many SOF
321ŵŝƚƌŝǇ^ƵĚĂŬŽǀ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂƚĂŬĞƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽĨĐĂƐƚƌĂƚĞĚĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞtĞƐƚ͕͟
Pravda.ru, 13.11.2014.
125
functions, not by necessity, but by design.322
ƵƌƌĞŶƚĂƌŵŽƌĞĚƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇŚĂƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƐǁŝƚŚůŽŶŐƌĂŶŐĞ͕
ůĞƚŚĂůĚŝƌĞĐƚĨŝƌĞ͕ĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨĚĞĨĞĂƚŝŶŐǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇĂŶǇƚĂƌŐĞƚ͕ĨƌŽŵĂŚŝŐŚůǇ
ƐƵƌǀŝǀĂďůĞƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵ͘DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞŵŽĚĞƌŶƚĂŶŬŝƐĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨƚƌĂǀĞƌƐŝŶŐ
ĂǁŝĚĞǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨƚĞƌƌĂŝŶƚǇƉĞƐĂƚŚŝŐŚƐƉĞĞĚ͕ĨŝƌŝŶŐĂƐŝƚŵŽǀĞƐ͕ǁŚŝůĞ
ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞůǇĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ͘hŶĂƌŵŽƌĞĚŽƌůŝŐŚƚůǇĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ĐĂŶŶŽƚƐƚĂŶĚƵƉƚŽĂŶĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĂƐƐĂƵůƚĨŽƌůŽŶŐ͘dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐŚĂǀĞŶŽƚ
ĨŽƌŐŽƚƚĞŶƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨƚĂŶŬƐŽŶƚŚĞŵŽĚĞƌŶďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚ͕ĂƐƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ
ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵPravda ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐ͘
For example, let’s consider the potential of conventional
weapons of Russia and the West in the European Theater of
Operations (ETO). In this area, it is generally believed that
NATO is a lot stronger than Russia. Yet, a first encounter with
reality smashes this misbelief into pieces. As is known, the
main striking force, the core of combat power of the ground
forces is tanks.
EŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ͞ƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ͟ŽŶĐĞŚĂĚ
deployed 6,000 heavy Abrams tanks on the territory of the
allied group…despite this, the combined potential of NATO
was still significantly inferior. In early 2013, the Americans
withdrew the last group of heavy Abrams tanks from Europe.
ƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚŝƚƐĂůůŝĞƐ͕
Russia was not decommissioning its tanks. As a result, today
Russia is the absolute leader in this regard. Therefore, the
decisive superiority of Russian tanks has not gone anywhere
since the times of the USSR. Here is another surprise. As for
tactical nuclear weapons, the superiority of modern-day
Russia over NATO is even stronger. 323
322 ŚĂƌůĞƐ<͘ĂƌƚůĞƐ͕͞'ĞƚƚŝŶŐ'ĞƌĂƐŝŵŽǀZŝŐŚƚ͕͟Military Review, January-&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ͕μκλπ͕ƉƉ͘

36-νρ͘
323 ŵŝƚƌŝǇ^ƵĚĂŬŽǀ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂƉƌĞƉĂƌĞƐŶƵĐůĞĂƌƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĨŽƌEdK͕͟Pravda.ru͕EŽǀĞŵďĞƌλμ͕μκλξ͘
tŚĂƚ^ƵĚĂŬŽǀŝƐƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽŝƐƚŚĞteatr voyennykh deystvii (TVD)͖ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
126
ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞλσοκƐ͕ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞtĞƐƚǁĂƐƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞ
^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƚŚŽĨŝŵƉŽǀĞƌŝƐŚŝŶŐŝƚƐƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƉƵƌƐƵŝƚ
ŽĨĂďƐŽůƵƚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇďǇĨŝĞůĚŝŶŐƚŚĞσπĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽĚĞĨĞĂƚtĂƌƐĂǁWĂĐƚĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͕͞ƚŚĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ
ĨŽƵŶĚŝŶĂŵŽǀĞƚŽĚĞƉůŽǇĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨh^ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůŶƵĐůĞĂƌ
ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ͘͟tŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽůůĂƉƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
hŶŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞtĞƐƚ͛ƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƌĞĂƐƐƵƌĞĂŶŝŶƐĞĐƵƌĞ
DŽƐĐŽǁĞůŝƚĞƚŚĂƚŝƚƉŽƐĞĚŶŽƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƚŚƌĞĂƚ͕ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ
ďĞŐĂŶƚŽĚŽǁŶƐŝǌĞŝƚƐĨŽƌĐĞƐĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚŝƚ
ĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĚĂ͞ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƉŝǀŽƚ͟ƚŽƚŚĞWĂĐŝĨŝĐ͕ǁŚŝůĞŝƚĂůƐŽ
ŵĂĚĞŝƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽƌĞƉůĂĐĞŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ
non-ŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͘/ŶƚŚĞƐƉŝƌŝƚŽĨ͞ŶŽŐŽŽĚĚĞĞĚŐŽĞƐ
ƵŶƉƵŶŝƐŚĞĚ͕͟ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŚŝƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽ
ůŽǁĞƌƚŚĞĨĞĂƌ-ĨĂĐƚŽƌƚŚĂƚĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚƚŚĞEƵĐůĞĂƌŐĞ– both for
DŽƐĐŽǁĞůŝƚĞƐĂŶĚ ĨŽƌtĞƐƚĞƌŶƉƵďůŝĐƐ– ĂƐ͞ŚĂǀŝŶŐǁƌŝƚƚĞŶŽĨĨ
DŽƐĐŽǁĂƐĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌŝǀĂů͘͟ 324 hŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ
ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵĂƐƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚŝƚƚƌƵůǇŝƐƚŽŝƚƐĨĞƵĚĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĞ͕
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƵŶůĞĂƐŚĞĚŝƚƐƚĞƌƌŽƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŝƚƐŽǁŶ
ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ͕ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ͕ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶĨŽƌĞŝŐŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ͘dŚĞƐĞ
ƐĂŵĞKGB ǀĞƚĞƌĂŶƐƌĞĐƌƵŝƚĞĚĂǀĂŶƋƵŝƐŚĞĚ^ŽǀŝĞƚŽĨĨŝĐĞƌĐŽƌƉƐ–
ŚƵŵŝůŝĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚĞĨĞĂƚŽĨŝƚƐƉůĂŶƐ͕ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ͕ĂŶĚ
ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚďǇƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶ/ƌĂƋ– ƚŚĂƚǁĂƐďŽƚŚƌĞĂĚǇ
ĂŶĚǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƌĞǀŝǀŝŶŐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŶŐ
ƵƌĂƐŝĂ͘ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚďǇThe Economist͕͞WĞŽƉůĞŝŶĂŶĚĂƌŽƵŶĚ
ƚŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶƚĂŬĞƵƌĂƐŝĂŶŝƐŵƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ͘dŚĞǇƌƵŶƚŚĞďŝŐŐĞƐƚ
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ͘dŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͘ŶĚƚŚĞǇ
ďĞůŝĞǀĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŝƐŽŶƚŚĞŝƌƐŝĚĞ͘͟ 325
WĞƌĐĞŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞtĞƐƚĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐĚŝƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂďǇŝƚƐƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨ
ƌĞĨƵƐŝŶŐƚŽĚĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĞůŝƚĞ͛ƐƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞƐǁŝƚŚ
ƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽ^ůŽďŽĚĂŶDŝůŽƐĞǀŝĐ͛ƐĐƌŝŵĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ͕ǁŚŝůĞ
ĞƌĂƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞƚŚƌĞĞ;EŽƌƚŚǁĞƐƚĞƌŶ͕tĞƐƚĞƌŶ͕ĂŶĚ^ŽƵƚŚǁĞƐƚĞƌŶͿ͕ƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŵĞƌŐĞĚ
ŝŶƚŽǁŚĂƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƐƚďĞƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĚĂƐĂƐŝŶŐůĞƵƌŽƉĞan dŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐDŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐƚŝŽŶ͘
324 ^ƵĚĂŬŽǀ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂƉƌĞƉĂƌĞƐŶƵĐůĞĂƌƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĨŽƌEdK͘͟
325 ͞EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂ͗dŚĞŝŶĐƌŽǁĚ– ĨŝŶĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨǁŚĂƚŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞƐsůĂĚŝŵŝƌWƵƚŝŶ͛Ɛ
ƌĞŐŝŵĞ͕͟The Economist͕Ɖƌŝůμν͕μκλπ͘
λμρ
ƚŚĞtĞƐƚƌĞĚƵĐĞĚŝƚƐƚĂŶŬƐĂŶĚĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĞĚŝƚƐƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůŶƵĐůĞĂƌ
ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ĨĞĞůŝŶŐŝƐŽǁŶǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐ͕ŬĞƉƚĂůůƚĂŶŬƐĂŶĚ
ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͘͟ 326 ǇŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐŝƚƐƐĞůĨ-ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ
ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŝŶĂƌŵŽƌĞĚǁĂƌĨĂƌĞĂŶĚŵŽĚĞƌŶŝǌŝŶŐŝƚƐƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ
ŶƵĐůĞĂƌĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕DŽƐĐŽǁŝƐŶŽǁƉĞƌƐƵĂĚĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚŚĂƐĚĞƉƌŝǀĞĚ
EdKŽĨŝƚƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĞŵƉůŽǇ͞ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͙ĂƐĂ
ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůĞƋƵĂůŝǌĞƌŽĨĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘͟νμρ
To date, NATO countries have only 260 tactical nuclear
ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞ΀ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶdŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ΁͘dŚĞ
United States has 200 bombs…located on six air bases in
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Turkey.
France has 60 more atomic bombs. That is pretty much it.
ZƵƐƐŝĂ͙ŚĂƐϱ͕ϬϬϬƉŝĞĐĞƐŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĐůĂƐƐĞƐŽĨ΀dŚĞĂƚĞƌ
EƵĐůĞĂƌtĞĂƉŽŶƐ΁– from Iskander warheads to torpedo,
aerial and artillery warheads! The US has 300 tactical B-61
bombs on its own territory, but this does not change the
situation against the backdrop of such imbalance. The US is
unable to improve it either, as it has destroyed the “Cold
War legacy” – tactical nuclear missiles, land-based missiles
and nuclear-warheads of sea-based Tomahawk cruise
missiles. 328
Ironically, Russia sees no contradiction between the West’s long-term
trend toward an increasingly non-threatening military posture and the
Russian conviction that the demise of Russia is NATO’s primary military
objective. ĞůŝĞǀŝŶŐƚŚĞtĞƐƚƚŽďĞ͞ǁĞĂŬŝŶŵŽƌĂůĂŶĚŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
ƚĞƌŵƐ͟ŝŶƐƉŝƚĞŽĨ͞ƚŚĞŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŽĨEdK͕ĂŶĚŵŽƐƚŽĨĂůůƚŚĞh^͕͟ƚŚĞĞŵďĂƌŐŽĂŶĚ
ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚZƵƐƐŝĂŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽŝƚƐĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚhŬƌĂŝŶĞĂƌĞ
ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐĂ͞ƉƌŽŽĨŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƉƵƐŚƚŚŝƐŵĂƚƚĞƌƚŽŝƚƐ
326 ^ƵĚĂŬŽǀ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂƚĂŬĞƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽĨĐĂƐƚƌĂƚĞĚĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞtĞƐƚ͘͟
νμρ ŵŝƚƌĞǇ^ƵĚĂŬŽǀ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂƉƌĞƉĂƌĞƐŶƵĐůĞĂƌƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĨŽƌEdK͕͟Pravda.ru͕EŽǀĞŵďĞƌλμ͕
2014.
328 /ďŝĚ͘
128
ůŽŐŝĐĂůĞŶĚĂƚĂŶǇĐŽƐƚ͘͟ νμσ ĞůŝĞǀŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh͘^͘ƌŵǇ͛Ɛ^ƉĞĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ
͞ŵĞƌŝƚƐƉĞĐŝĂůĐŽŵŵĞŶƚ͕͟ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐĂƐƐĞƌƚ͞ƚŚĞĐŝǀŝů
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶďƌŝŐĂĚĞ͙ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚƐƐĞĐƌĞƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů
ĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌǇĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƚŽĞƌŽĚĞĂŶĚƐƵďǀĞƌƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐǇƐƚĞŵĨƌŽŵ
ǁŝƚŚŝŶďǇďƌŝďŝŶŐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŽĨůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƵƌŐŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƚŽǁĂƌĚ
ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŵ͕ƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŝŶŐĂ͚ĨŝĨƚŚĐŽůƵŵŶ͕͛ĂŶĚŵŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ͘͟ 330
ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐƐƵĐŚƵŶŝƚƐƚŽďĞďĞƐƚƐƵŝƚĞĚƚŽ͞ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŚǇďƌŝĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͟
ŽĨ͞ĂŶĞǁƚǇƉĞŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͙ƚŚĂƚǁĂƐďŽƌŶĂŶĚŐĂŝŶĞĚĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇŝŶƚŚĞ
tĞƐƚŝŶƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇμκλκƐ͕͟ 331 ƚŚĞƐĞƐĂŵĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚ͞ĂŚǇďƌŝĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƉƵůůĞĚŽĨĨƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůůǇǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞ
ďĞƐƚĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨŚǇďƌŝĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞĞŶĞŵŝĞƐŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶZƵƐƐŝĂ͘͟ 332
Understandably, force alone cannot achieve the goals of a
hybrid operation against Russia today. The adversary would
have first to do the groundwork by exposing the population
and authorities of the territory where he wants to undertake
unlawful operations to political brainwashing. On top of it
all, the operation must be supported within the country by
forces and organizations that could get the act together and
head up the administration of the territory at issue, if need
be.
Establishing nonprofit organizations would be the preferred
choice for achieving the goals of a hybrid operation. A
nonprofit is an organization that is not driving itself hard to
make a profit, in the first place, and to distribute it among its
members. Here too, it is preferable to have a foreign
nonprofit nongovernmental organization (NGO) that could
best contribute to the attainment of the goal of a hybrid
νμσ <ŽŶƐƚĂŶƚŝŶ^ŝǀŬŽǀ͕͞dŚĞKĐĐƵƉŝĞƌ͛ƐĂůĐƵůƵƐ͗dŚĞWƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞ/ŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŝƐ
ƉŝĐŬŝŶŐƵƉ^ƉĞĞĚ͕͟The Military-Industrial Courier͕/ƐƐƵĞEŽ͘πμμ͕&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇμξ͕μκλπ͕ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĚ
ďǇDĂƌŬsŽǇŐĞƌ͕EdK>EKD͘
330 s͘͘<ŝƐĞůǇŽǀĂŶĚ/͘E͘sŽƌŽďǇŽǀ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͗,ǇďƌŝĚKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͗EĞǁdǇƉĞŽĨtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕͟
Military Thought͕/ƐƐƵĞμ͕μκλο͕Ɖ͘νμ͘
331 /ďŝĚ͕͘Ɖ͘μς͘
332 /ďŝĚ͕͘Ɖ͘νν͘
λμσ
operation. It can be established beyond the Russian
Federation under the rules of a foreign country by foreign
founders (participants) that are not government agencies. A
foreign NGO could operate through its structural units –
chapters, branches or representative offices.
A foreign nonprofit nongovernmental organization can draw
its members from residents of the disputed territory and its
political objectives will include discrediting the current
government agencies, eroding the prestige and pubic
standing of the law enforcement agencies, particularly the
armed forces, buying up the mass media and conduction
information operations purportedly to protect democracy,
and nominating delegates for local government elections,
and infiltrating them into the elected government authorities.
Neutralizing army units is a wide-ranging effort, its success
depending on the current situation.
A far greater significance is attached to the possibility of
hybrid operations being conducted by private military
companies (PMCs), for-profit organizations offering
specialized services, such as guarding, protection (defense) of
customers’ assets, as far as involvement in military conflicts,
intelligence collection, strategic planning, logistics, and
consulting. 333
WĞƌŚĂƉƐĂĨƚĞƌ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ͕ŝƚƐĞůĨ͕ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƌŝŵĞĂǁŝƚŚ
WDƐƚŽ͞ƐĞĐƵƌĞ͟ƚŚĞƌŝŵĞĂŶWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇďƵŝůĚŝŶŐƐŽƚŚĂƚ
ŽŶůǇƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌŝĂŶƐǁŚŽǁĞƌĞǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚĞŝŶ
ĂŶĞĨĨŽƌƚ͞ƚŽĐƵƚŽĨĨĂƉĂƌƚŽĨĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛ƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇďǇƵƐŝŶŐ
ĂĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů͕ĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ͕ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ͕
ƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ͕ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů͕ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ͕ĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ͟ 334 ŝƚŝƐ
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐŵŝŐŚƚ
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚ͞ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŐƌŽǁŝŶŐƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ
333 <ŝƐĞůǇŽǀĂŶĚsŽƌŽďǇŽǀ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͗,ǇďƌŝĚKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͗EĞǁdǇƉĞŽĨtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕͟Ɖ͘νν͘
334 /ďŝĚ͕͘Ɖ͘μς͘
130
ĐĂŶďĞƵƐĞĚĂƐƚŚĞďĂƚƚůĞŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌĂŚǇďƌŝĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůůǇŽƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨŽƌĐĞŽĨĂƌŵƐ͘͟ 335 /ŶĂƐĞůĨ-
ĚĞůƵƐŝŽŶĂůŵĂŶŶĞƌ͕ĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚZapad ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ
ƉŽƐƚ-^ŽǀŝĞƚƉĞƌŝŽĚ͕ŝƚŝƐĞǀĞŶŝŶƐŝƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ
the USA and NATO could actually decide to use their special
operations forces, long-range cruise missiles, tactical and
strategic aviation, for the physical neutralization of the
Russian nuclear forces, above all their control centers and
communications systems. This will be the first stage of the
direct military invasion. Under the guise of rebels, NATO
special operations forces could perform the tasks of
neutralizing elements of the command and control system
of even large cities, including Moscow.336
/ŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞ͕ŝƚŝƐĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ
the Ukrainian army will become the most important
component of the NATO group of forces, naturally, after its
complete reorganization by replacing its current personnel,
especially the command, with members that are loyal to the
West and to the current Ukrainian authorities, something
that is actively being carried out nowadays. 337
/ƚŝƐĞǀĞŶƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ͞ƚŚĞƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶĂƌŵǇǁŝůů
ďĞĐŽŵĞŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĞĐŚĞůŽŶŽĨEdK͛Ɛ
>ĂŶĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͕ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇǁŝůůƚƌǇƚŽƵƐĞŝŶƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐĂǀĞŶƵĞƐŽĨ
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞůŽƐƐĞƐĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞh^͘͟ 338
335 /ďŝĚ͕͘Ɖ͘νο͘
336 ^ŝǀŬŽǀ͕͞dŚĞKĐĐƵƉŝĞƌ͛ƐĂůĐƵůƵƐ͗dŚĞWƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞ/ŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŝƐƉŝĐŬŝŶŐƵƉ
^ƉĞĞĚ͘͟
ννρ /ďŝĚ͘
338 /ďŝĚ͘
131
The Theoretical Development of Russian New Generation Warfare
ŵŝƐŐƵŝĚĞĚĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĞĞƐƐĞŶĐĞŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐEĞǁ
'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇůĞĚEdKƚŽĂĚŽƉƚ͞,ǇďƌŝĚtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͟ĂƐ
ƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůŶĂŵĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ͘ννσ dŚĞƐĞŵŝŶĂůǁŽƌŬĂďŽƵƚ,ǇďƌŝĚ
tĂƌĨĂƌĞŝƐ,ŽĨĨŵĂŶ͛Ɛ͞,ǇďƌŝĚtĂƌĨĂƌĞĂŶĚŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ͘͟dŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌ
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚĂŚǇďƌŝĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůůǇ
ĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐĂŵŝǆŽĨŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ͕ƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐŝŶďĞŝŶŐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĨƵůůǇ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĂŶĚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĂƉƌŽƉĞƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚŝƚ͘dŚĞŵĂŝŶ
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵǁĂƐŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽĐŽŶǀĞǇǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƐƚĂƚĞĂŶĚŶŽŶ-
ƐƚĂƚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐǁŽƵůĚĞŵƉůŽǇƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐŝŶĂŵƵůƚŝ-ŵŽĚĞ
ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ͘/ƚŵĂǇŝŶĐůƵĚĞĞǆƉůŽŝƚŝŶŐŵŽĚĞƌŶĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
ŝŶƐƵƌŐĞŶƚ͕ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚ͕ĂŶĚĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ͕ƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨŚŝŐŚ-ƚĞĐŚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ͕ĂŶĚĐǇďĞƌǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů͕ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ͘ 340 ŶŽƚŚĞƌĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
tĂƌĨĂƌĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĐĂůůŝŶŐŝƚ͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&Ƶůů-^ƉĞĐƚƌƵŵŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͘͟ 341 dŚĞƌĞŝƐ
ĂĐůĞĂƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŝŵĞƚŚĞƚĞƌŵĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƵŶƚŝů
ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨ>Žǁ-/ŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͕πƚŚ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ĂŶĚ
EĞƚǁŽƌŬĞŶƚƌŝĐtĂƌĨĂƌĞǁĞƌĞŵĞƌŐĞĚǁŝƚŚƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐtĂƌĨĂƌĞĂƐ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͛ƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ͘
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐŚŝĐŚŬĂŶ͕sĞůĞƐŽǀ͕<ŽŶŽŶŽǀ͕
dƐǇŐŝĐŚŬŽ͕<ƵƌĂůĞŶŬŽ͕ƵůŶĞǀ͕^ůŝƉĐŚĞŶŬŽ͕sůĂĚŝŵŝƌŽǀ͕'ĞƌĂƐŝŵŽǀ͕
ŚĞŬŝŶŽǀ͕ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚĂƐŬŽĨ
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĂĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƚŽƚŚĞ
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽǀĞƌŚŽǁƚŽŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇĂŶĚĨƵƚƵƌĞ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘
/ƚƐŚŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŶŽƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞƚŚĂƚ'ĞŶĞƌĂů'ĞƌĂƐŝŵŽǀ͛ƐμκλνĂƌƚŝĐůĞ
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐŚŝƐǀŝĞǁŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞǁĂƐĐĂůůĞĚ͞dŚĞsĂůƵĞŽĨ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ
ŝŶWƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ͘͟Russians expect their military theory to provide the
political and military theoretical basis on which to construct military
art and military strategy. DĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ͕ƚŚŝƐƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƌŽŽƚĞĚŝŶ
ννσ dŚŝƐĐĂŶƉƌŽďĂďůǇďĞĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐŽĨDĂũŽƌ'ĞŶĞƌĂů'ŽƌĚŽŶ͞^ŬŝƉ͟ĂǀŝƐƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ƚĞƌŵ͞ŚǇďƌŝĚǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͟ĚƵƌŝŶŐĂďƌŝĞĨŝŶŐƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶǁĂƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͘
340 &͘,ŽĨĨŵĂŶ͕͞,ǇďƌŝĚtĂƌĨĂƌĞĂŶĚŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ͕͟Joint Forces Quaterly͕ŝƐƐƵĞομ͕μκκσ͘
341 K͘ :ŽŶƐƐŽŶ ĂŶĚ Z͘ ^ĞĞůǇ͕ ͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ &Ƶůů-^ƉĞĐƚƌƵŵ ŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͗ Ŷ ƉƉƌĂŝƐĂů ĨƚĞƌ hŬƌĂŝŶĞ͕͟ The
Journal of Slavic Military Thought͕sŽůƵŵĞμς͕/ƐƐƵĞλ͕μκλο͕ƉƉ͘λ-22.
132
DĂƌǆŝƐƚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐƐĂŶĚ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůDĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ͗ŝƚƐƋƵĞƐƚŝƐƚŽĨŝŶĚƚŚĞůĂǁƐ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ŝŶŝƚƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞĨŽƌŵĂŶĚĂƐĂƌĞĨůĞǆŽĨĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƉĞƌŝŽĚ͘Ɛcontinuous development is implicit, the laws of
warfare are constantly changing, transitioning from one form to
another. dŚŝƐƌĞƐƵůƚƐŝŶĂĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ͕ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞŽůĚ;ƚŚĞƐŝƐͿ
ĐŽůůŝĚĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŶĞǁ;ĂŶƚŝƚŚĞƐŝƐͿƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞŶĞǁ;ƐǇŶƚŚĞƐŝƐͿ͘dŚĞ
ŝĚĞĂŽĨƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶĂƐĂƚĂƐŬĨŽƌDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇƚŽ
ĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůĂǁƐŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ƚŽďĞ
ƚŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌ͞ŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŽƌŵƐĂŶĚŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐŐƌŽƵƉƐ
ŽĨĨŽƌĐĞƐ;ƌĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐͿƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƌŵĞĚ
&ŽƌĐĞƐ͘͟ 342
dŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞĐĂŶďĞ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚĐŚƌŽŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ͕ƐŚŽǁŝŶŐŚŽǁƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ
tĞƐƚĞƌŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĂŶĚƚĂĐƚŝĐƐǁĂƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚďǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ͘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĐŽƌƌĞĐƚƚŽƉƌĞƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
tĞƐƚĞƌŶǁĂǇŽĨĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐǁĂƌĨĂƌĞĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚŚŽǁZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ƚŚŝŶŬĞƌƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƚŚĞŝƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ
ĂŶĚĨƵƚƵƌĞǁĂƌ͕tĞƐƚĞƌŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝƐƵŶĚĞŶŝĂďůĞ͘ŽƚŚƚŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨ
>Žǁ-/ŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇŽŶĨůŝĐƚĂŶĚEĞƚǁŽƌŬĞŶƚƌŝĐtĂƌĨĂƌĞ ǁĞƌĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůůǇ
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚŝŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕ǁŚŝůĞπƚŚ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞŝƐǀĞƌǇ
ŵƵĐŚ^ůŝƉĐŚĞŶŬŽ͛ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
͞KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĞƐĞƌƚ^ƚŽƌŵ͟ĂŶĚƚŚĞEdKďŽŵďŝŶŐŝŶzƵŐŽƐůĂǀŝĂ͘
dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ,ǇďƌŝĚtĂƌĨĂƌĞŝƐĂĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĐŽŶĐĞƉƚĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞĚŽĞƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚƚŚĞ
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨtĞƐƚĞƌŶ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͘dŚŝƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐǁŚǇŵĂŶǇŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌƐǁŚŽĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŶĞǁŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞĂƌĞƵŶĂďůĞƚŽ
ĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƚŚŽƐĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘dŚĞƚĞƌŵhybrid
ďĞĐĂŵĞǀĞƌǇƉŽƉƵůĂƌĞǆĂĐƚůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚĐĂŶŵĞĂŶƚŚĞĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ
ĂŵŽŶŐŵĂŶǇĨŽƌŵƐŽĨĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘
dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉĂƉĞƌƚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ͞EĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌ͟ŝŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
342'ĞŶĞƌĂůsĂůĞƌǇ'ĞƌĂƐŝŵŽǀ͕͞dŚĞsĂůƵĞŽĨ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ/ƐŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞƐŝŐŚƚ͗EĞǁŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐĞŵĂŶĚ
ZĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĞ&ŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚDĞƚŚŽĚƐŽĨĂƌƌǇŝŶŐŽƵƚŽŵďĂƚKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕͟Military-Industrial
Courier͕&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇμπ͕μκλν͘
133
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞǁĂƐŚŝĐŚŬĂŶĂŶĚsĞůĞƐŽǀ͛ƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ͞^ŽŵĞYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ
ŽĨŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐ^ƉĞĐŝĂůKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͟ŝŶλσσμ͘ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĂƚ
ƉĂƉĞƌ͕EdKŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞǆƉĞƌƚƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŶĞǁŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƌƐǁŽƵůĚ
ďĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝǌĞĚďǇŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐƐŝĚĞƐĂǀŽŝĚŝŶŐƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ĞŶĞŵǇƚƌŽŽƉƐ͘/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ͕ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŽ
ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝŶƐŝĚĞ͘^ƉĞĐŝĂůKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
&ŽƌĐĞƐǁŽƵůĚƉůĂǇƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƌŽůĞ͕ďǇƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞ͕ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ͕ƐƉĞĞĚĂŶĚ
ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƐďǇĂǆŝƐĂŶĚŝŶĚĞƉƚŚ͕ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐŬŝůůĞĚ
ƵƐĞŽĨĂƚƚĂĐŬĂŶĚŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ŚĂƌĚǁĂƌĞ͕ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ͕ƚŝŵĞŽĨĚĂǇ͕ĂŶĚǁĞĂƚŚĞƌĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ͘ 343
dŚĞƚĞƌŵĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚĂŐĂŝŶŝŶĂŶĂƌƚŝĐůĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨ ŶĞǁ
ĨŽƌŵƐŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͘dŚŝƐƚŝŵĞ͕ƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƵƐĞĚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ͞EĞǁ
'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͟ƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽ>ŝŶĚ͛ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ͞&ŽƵƌƚŚ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘͟
dŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŝŶĚĞƚĂŝůƚŚĞ/ƐƌĂĞůŝĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝŶĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨŶŽŶ-ƐƚĂƚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐĂƐƚŚĞŶĞǁƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĨŽƌŵŽĚĞƌŶ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘ 344 /ŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǇĞĂƌ͕'ĞŶĞƌĂůsůĂĚŝŵŝƌ^ůŝƉĐŚĞŶŬŽƵƐĞĚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ
ĂŐĂŝŶ͕ƚŚŝƐƚŝŵĞƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽŚŝƐŝĚĞĂŽĨ^ŝǆƚŚ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞŽƌŚŝŐŚ-
ƚĞĐŚŶŽŶ-ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁĂƌ͘dŚĞƚĞƌŵƌĞĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚŝŶμκκλǁŚĞŶŽůŽŶĞů>͘͘
<ŽŶŽŶŽǀƵƐĞĚŝƚƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŶƵĐůĞĂƌƉƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͘,ŝƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞǁĂƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ͘dŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞŽĨ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞǁĂƐĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƌĂĚŝĐĂůůǇĨƌŽŵůŽǁ-contact to non-contact
ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĚďǇƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĂŶĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͕ĂƐǁĂƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ
ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞλσσλĞƐĞƌƚ^ƚŽƌŵŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŝŶzƵŐŽƐůĂǀŝĂŝŶλσσσ͘dŽ
ƚŚŽƐĞƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞŶŽƚŝŶĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĨŝĞůĚŚŝŐŚ-ƚĞĐŚǁĞĂƉŽŶƌǇ͕ƚŚĞ
ŶĂƚƵƌĂůĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞǁĂƐƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉŶƵĐůĞĂƌĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ͕ĂĐŚĞĂƉĞƌ
ĞǆƉĞĚŝĞŶƚ͕ĂƐǁĂǇĨŽƌŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞŝŶŐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͘ 345
^ŚŽƌƚůǇƚŚĞƌĞĂĨƚĞƌ͕dƐǇŐŝĐŚŬŽĂŶĚWŝŽŶƚŬŽǀƐŬŝǇĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŚŝƐƚĞƌŵƚŽǁĂƌƐ
ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂŝŵŝŶŐĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ͛ƐŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů͘
dŚĞǇƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĂŵĂŐĞŽĨĚĞƐƚƌŽǇŝŶŐŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŝƐĂƐ
ƵŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞĂƐƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͘dŚĞǇĂĚĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
343 ŚŝĐŚŬĂŶĂŶĚsĞůĞƐŽǀ͕͞^ŽŵĞYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐ^ƉĞĐŝĂůKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͕͟λσσμ͘
344 WĂŶŬŽǀ͕λσσρ͘
345 Žů͘>͘͘<ŽŶŽŶŽǀ͕Ηʧ̨̨̡̛̛̛̖̪̣̯̌ʥ̨̨̖̪̭̦̭̯̌̽͗̚ʽʿ̨̬̣̖̥̖̍˔̨̖̬̦̜̔ʽ̨̛̪̭̦̭̯̌̏
ˁ̨̨̬̖̥̖̦̦̥̏ʺ̛̬̖ ΀'ĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐĂŶĚ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͗ŽŶƚŚĞ/ƐƐƵĞŽĨEƵĐůĞĂƌdŚƌĞĂƚŝŶƚŚĞDŽĚĞƌŶ
tŽƌůĚ΁͕͟ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶʦ̨̖̦̦̌́ʺ̼̭̣̽΀DŝůŝƚĂƌǇdŚŽƵŐŚƚ΁͕/ƐƐƵĞλ͕μκκλ͕ƉƉ͘ξ-11
134
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞŝƐŽǀĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ͖ŚŝŐŚ-ƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ
ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͕ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌǀŝĞǁ͕ǁĞƌĞĂŶĞǁŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĂŶĞǁ
ĨĂĐƚŽƌŽĨƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞ͘ 346
/Ŷμκκμ͕ƚŚĞ͞EĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͟ƚĞƌŵǁĂƐĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚďǇDĂƚǀĞĞǀƚŽ
ĚĞĨŝŶĞǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞŶĞǁŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ
ƚŽŚŝŵ͕ŝƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ͛ƐǁĂƌĨĂƌĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů͘
ŽŵŝŶĂŶƚŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌǁŽƵůĚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽ
aĐŚŝĞǀĞĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞǁŝƚŚŚŝŐŚƐƉĞĞĚĂŶĚǁŝƚŚĂƌĂƉŝĚƉĂĐĞŽĨ
ŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐ͘dŚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚǇǁŽƵůĚďĞĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƌĂƉŝĚ
ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŝĚĞůǇĚŝƐƉĞƌƐĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚŵĞĂŶƐ͘^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ͕ŝŶ
ƉĞĂĐĞƚŝŵĞ͕ǁŝƚŚƉƌŽƉĞƌĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌǇŽĨƐƵĐŚƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŵŝŐŚƚďĞĞŶŽƵŐŚƚŽƐĞƌǀĞĂƐĂ
ĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶƚ͘νξρ ůƐŽŝŶμκκλ͕ŽůŽƚĂƌĞǀĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŚŽǁĂŶĞǁŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞǁŽƵůĚƌĞƐƵůƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚǁŽǀĞĐƚŽƌƐŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ͘KŶƚŚĞŽŶĞŚĂŶĚǁĂƐƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĂ
ƉǇƌĂŵŝĚĂůǁŽƌůĚŵŽĚĞů͕ƚŽƉƉĞĚďǇƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚEdK͖ĂŶĚ͕ŽŶ
ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ͕ĂŵŽĚĞůďĂƐĞĚŽŶŵƵůƚŝƉŽůĂƌŝƚǇůĞĚďǇZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ŚŝŶĂ͕/ŶĚŝĂ͕
ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͘tĂƌƐŝŶƚŚŝƐƐǇƐƚĞŵǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨĂƐŚĂƌƉ
ĂŐŐƌĂǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĂŶĚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ
ĐĞŶƚĞƌƐŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ͘tĂƌƐǁŽƵůĚƚĞŶĚƚŽďĞĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚŽŶůŽĐĂůůĞǀĞůƐĂƐ
ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽŐůŽďĂůĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐ͘dŚĞƐĞŶĞǁŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƌƐ
ǁŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚďĂƐĞĚŽŶfive main principles. 348
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽŽůŽƚĂƌĞǀ͕ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐǁĂƐƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŶŽŶ-ŶƵĐůĞĂƌĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚďǇĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƚŽŝŶĨůŝĐƚ
346 sŝƚĂůŝǇE͘dƐǇŐŝĐŚŬŽĂŶĚŶĚƌĞǇ͘WŝŽŶƚŬŽǀƐŬŝǇ͕͞ʦ̨̨̥̙̦̼̖̚ʦ̨̼̼̏̚ʻ̶̨̨̛̦̣̦̜̌̌̽
ʥ̨̨̛̖̪̭̦̭̯̌̚ˀ̨̛̛̭̭̏ ʻ̸̣̖̌̌yy/ʦ̡̖̌΀WŽƐƐŝďůĞŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐEĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶ
ƚŚĞĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞyy/ĞŶƚƵƌǇ΁͕͟ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶʦ̨̖̦̦̌́ʺ̼̭̣̽΀DŝůŝƚĂƌǇdŚŽƵŐŚƚ΁͕/ƐƐƵĞμ͕
μκκλ͕ƉƉ͘πν-ρκ͘
νξρ V. DĂƚǀĞĞǀ͕͞ʿ̡̛̖̬̭̪̖̯̦̏̌́ʦ̨̖̦̦̌́ˁ̛̯̬̯̖̌̐́ˁˌʤ̛ˀ̨̛̛̭̭΀dŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞDŝůŝtary
^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨƚŚĞh͘^͘ĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ΁͕͟ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶʻ̌ˁ̯̬̙̖̌ʯ̨̪̣̬̌́̽́΀ƚƚŚĞ'ƵĂƌĚŽĨƚŚĞWŽůĂƌ
ZĞŐŝŽŶ΁͕/ƐƐƵĞνμ͕Ɖƌŝůξ͕μκκμ͘
348 ŽůŽƚĂƌĞǀ͕͞ʺ̨̖̭̯ʪ̛̖̜̭̯̏́— ʦ̭́ʿ̣̦̖̯͕̌̌ʧ̨̣̦̖̌̏ʪ̖̜̭̯̱̺̖̖̏̀ʸ̶̨̛— ʽ̛̬̱̙̖ʻ̵̨̼̏
ʿ̨̡̨̛̣̖̦̜΀dŚĞ^ƚĂŐĞ— dŚĞŶƚŝƌĞWůĂŶĞƚ͖ ƚŚĞDĂŝŶWƌŽƚĂŐŽŶŝƐƚ— tĞĂƉŽŶƐŽĨEĞǁ

'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ΁͕͟ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚďǇʻ̨̛̛̖̭̥̖̌̏̚ʦ̨̨̖̦̦̖ʽ̨̛̬̖̦̖̍̚΀/ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
KǀĞƌǀŝĞǁ΁͕/ƐƐƵĞνλ͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌσ͕μκκμ͘
135
ƵŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞĚĂŵĂŐĞǁŝƚŚŚŝŐŚ-ƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͘
^ĞĐŽŶĚ͕ƚŚĞƌĞǁŽƵůĚĂŐƌĂĚƵĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ĂŶĚ͕
ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ͕ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨǁĂƌ͘dŚĞŵĂŝŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĨŽƌĐĞǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƚŚĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ͛ƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͕ďƵƚ
ĨŽƌĐŝŶŐƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚĞŵĂŶĚƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůŽƐƐĞƐ͘
dŚĞƚŚŝƌĚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞǁĂƐƚŚĞĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵ
ůĂŶĚ͕ƐĞĂĂŶĚĂŝƌƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐƉĂĐĞ͘dŚĞĨŽƵƌƚŚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞǁĂƐƚŚĞ
ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵŐƵŝĚĞĚǁĞĂƉŽŶƐƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞĚĂƌŵĞĚƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞĂŶĚ
ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘dŚĞĨŝĨƚŚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞǁĂƐƚŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƉŚĞƌĞ;ĂƌŵĞĚ
ĨŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚͿĂŶĚƐƵƉƌĞŵĂĐǇŝŶƚŚĞĂŝƌĂŶĚĐŽƐŵŝĐ
ĚŽŵĂŝŶƐ͘ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ͕ƚŚĞďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨƉŽǁĞƌŝŶůĂŶĚĂŶĚƐĞĂǁŽƵůĚ
ďĞĐŽŵĞŵŽƌĞĨĂǀŽƌĂďůĞ͕ĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐŽǀĞƌĂůůƋƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ
ƐƵƉƌĞŵĂĐǇŝŶĂůůĨŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ͘/ŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů͕ƚŚĞƐĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ
ǁŽƵůĚƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶƚŚĞŐƌĂĚƵĂůƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵĨŝƌĞĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞƚŽƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ
ĨŽƌĐĞƚŽŝƚƐĚĞĨĞĂƚďǇŚŝŐŚ-ƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͘ƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ͕ƚŚĞƌĞ
ǁŽƵůĚďĞĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨŵŽďŝůĞƚƌŽŽƉƐ͘
μκκμĂƌƚŝĐůĞďǇŽŐĚĂŶŽǀŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚĚĂƚĂĨƌŽŵEdKĂŶĚh^
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇdŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚƉůĂĐĞĚƚŚĞŶĞǁ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁĂƌǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŽĨŝŶŝƚŝĂůƉĞƌŝŽĚƐŽĨǁĂƌ͘/ƚƐ
ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶǁĂƐ that new generation wars woƵůĚďĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝǌĞĚďǇ
the defeat of the enemy by non-contact means targeting vital military
and economic structure. νξσ
^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŵĂŝŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂůƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨǁĂƌŝƐƚŽƉĂƌĂůǇǌĞƚŚĞ
ĞŶĞŵǇ͛ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŶĚĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ͕ƚŚĞĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌǇ͛ƐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐŽĨ
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂƌĞŝƚƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ͘dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƐƚĞƉŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ
ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĚŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ
ĐŚĂŶŶĞůƐ͕ƉƵďůŝĐĂŶĚƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƌĂĚŝŽĂŶĚƚĞůĞǀŝƐŝŽŶĐŚĂŶŶĞůƐ͕ƚƌĂŶƐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ
ŽĨĨĂŬĞŽƌĚĞƌƐĂŶĚĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐďǇƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŶĞůƐŽĨƐƚĂƚĞĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĐŽŶƚƌŽů͘KďƚĂŝŶŝŶŐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇŝƐ
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƚŽƚŚŝƐƉŚĂƐĞ͘
νξσ^͘ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕͞ʦ̨̨̪̬̭̼˃̨̛̛̖̬͘ʽ̪̼̯ʺ̨̛̦̱̹̖͕̏̐ʿ̨̨̬̦̦̐̌̚ʥ̱̱̺̖̖̔΀YƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
dŚĞŽƌǇ͘ǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞWĂƐƚ͖&ŽƌĞĐĂƐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞ΁͕͟ʦ̡̛̖̭̯̦ʦ̨̨̖̦̦̜ʰ̴̶̨̛̛̦̬̥̌
΀,ĞƌĂůĚŽĨDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ΁͕/ƐƐƵĞλλ͕μκκμ͘
136
dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƐƚĞƉĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞƐĂƚƚĂĐŬƐǁŝƚŚŚŝŐŚ-ƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŝŶƚĞƌĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂů
ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂŶĚǁĞĂƉŽŶƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶŶĞǁƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ͕
ĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͕ĂŶĚŵĂŶ-ŵĂĚĞĞĐŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
ĐĂƚĂƐƚƌŽƉŚĞƐ͘dŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝƐƚŽĂƐƐƵƌĞƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŝŶ
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂŶĚĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŝŶĂĞƌŽƐƉĂĐĞĂŶĚƚĞƌƌĞƐƚƌŝĂůĂƌĞĂƐ͘
ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƐƚĞƉŵƵƐƚďĞĞǆĞĐƵƚĞĚĂƐƋƵŝĐŬůǇĂƐ
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ͕ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂŝŵŽĨƉĂƌĂůǇǌŝŶŐƚŚĞĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌǇ͘dŚĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚƌĞƐƵůƚ
ǁĂƐƚŚĞĚŝƐŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞŶĞŵǇĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ďƌĞĂŬĚŽǁŶŽĨƐƚĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐ
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ͕ĚĞŵŽƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌǇ͛ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ͕ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĐŽŵƉůĞǆ͕ĂŶĚ͕ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ͕ƚŚĞŝŵƉĞĚŝŶŐŽĨĂŶǇ
ĨŽƌŵŽĨŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐƚŽĨƵůĨŝůůǁĂƌŶĞĞĚƐ͘
/ŶŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͛ƐǀŝĞǁ͕ƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂůƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌƐůĂƐƚŝŶŐ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶξο-πκĚĂǇƐ350 ǁŽƵůĚƐĞĞŬƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŶĚ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐbefore ŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘
/ŶŚŝƐμκκνĂƌƚŝĐůĞ͕ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞĚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶĨƵƚƵƌĞ
ǁĂƌƐ͕ǁŚŝĐŚ͕ŚĞďĞůŝĞǀĞĚ͕ǁŽƵůĚĨĞĂƚƵƌĞfour main phases. The first
phase͕ƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐƐĞǀĞƌĂůŵŽŶƚŚƐďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĂƚƚĂĐŬ͕ǁŽƵůĚĐƌĞĂƚĞ
ĨĂǀŽƌĂďůĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů͕ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͕ĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐďǇŝŶƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐ
ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ— ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂů͕ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů͕ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů͕ĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ͕
ĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ͘
The second phase ŝƐĂƉƵďůŝĐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶǁŝƚŚĂƐƚƌŽŶŐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ
ŽŶƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͘/ƚƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƐĂŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ
ůĞŐŝƚŝŵŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞƉůĂŶŶĞĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶ;ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ĂƐĂƉƌĞĞŵƉƚŝǀĞ
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽĐŽŵďĂƚƚǇƌĂŶŶǇĂŶĚƚŽƌĞƐƚŽƌĞĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇͿ͘
DĂƐƐŝǀĞƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂŝƐƵŶůĞĂƐŚĞĚƚŽĨŽŵĞŶƚĚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞŶƚĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĂŶĚĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƵŶĚĞƌĂƚƚĂĐŬ͕ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ
ŝƚƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ͛ƐůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ͖ǁĞĂŬĞŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽ
ĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ͖ĂŶĚƉĂƌĂůǇǌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ͘ƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĐŚĂŽƐĂŶĚŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ
ƵŶŐŽǀĞƌŶĂďůĞŝƚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐƚŚĞĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĐŽŶĚƵĐŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞ
ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌ͛ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŐŽĂůƐŝŶĂ
350^͘ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕͞ʦ̨̨̪̬̭̼˃̨̛̛̖̬͘ʽ̪̼̯ʺ̨̛̦̱̹̖͕̏̐ʿ̨̨̬̦̦̐̌̚ʥ̱̱̺̖̖̔΀YƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
dŚĞŽƌǇ͘ǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞWĂƐƚ͖&ŽƌĞĐĂƐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞ΁͕͟ʦ̡̛̖̭̯̦ʦ̨̨̖̦̦̜ʰ̴̶̨̛̛̦̬̥̌
΀,ĞƌĂůĚŽĨDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ΁͕/ƐƐƵĞλλ͕μκκμ͘
λνρ
ƐŚŽƌƚƚŝŵĞĂŶĚǁŝƚŚůŝƚƚůĞŽƌŶŽƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŚƵŵĂŶůŽƐƐĞƐ͘ 351
The third phase͕ĂƐĞŶǀŝƐŝŽŶĞĚďǇŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ
ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĂŶĚǀĞƌŝĨǇƚŚĞĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚŽďũĞĐƚƐ͘ůůĨŽƌŵƐ͕
ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ͕ƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĂƐƐĞƚƐĂƌĞĂƉƉůŝĞĚǁŝƚŚĂƐƉĞĐŝĂů
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĂĐĐŽƌĚĞĚƚŽƐƉĂĐĞ͕ƌĂĚŝŽĂŶĚƌĂĚŝŽĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐ͕ĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐ͕
ĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ͕ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĂŶĚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ͘
The fourth phase͕ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶ͕ǁŽƵůĚďĞŐŝŶ͕ĂƐĂƌƵůĞ͕ǁŝƚŚĂŶĂŝƌ-
ƐƉĂĐĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶůĂƐƚŝŶŐƐĞǀĞƌĂůĚĂǇƐ͘dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĚĂǇŽĨƚŚŝƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
ǁŽƵůĚĂŝŵƚŽĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĂŝƌĂŶĚŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐƚƌŝŬĞƐǁŝƚŚƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁĞĂƉŽŶ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐƚŽĚĂŵĂŐĞƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŶĚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ͖
ƚŽĚĞƐƚƌŽǇƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ͖ĂŶĚĚŝƐƌƵƉƚƚŚĞƐƵƉƉůǇŽĨ
ĞŶĞƌŐǇĂŶĚǁĂƚĞƌ͕ĨŽƌĐŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ͛ƐĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽĐĂƉŝƚƵůĂƚĞ͘
^ƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ͕ŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐǁŽƵůĚĞŶƚĞƌĞŶĞŵǇƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇƚŽĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĂŶǇ
ƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐŵĂũŽƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƵŶŝƚƐƐƚŝůůƌĞƐŝƐƚŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŽŽĐĐƵƉǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů
ĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ͘dŚĞŵĂŝŶĨŽƌŵŽĨŐƌŽƵŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŽƵůĚďĞƐƉĞĐŝĂů
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶĐƌƵƐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐƉŽĐŬĞƚƐŽĨƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞďǇ
ƚŚĞĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌǇ͘ 352
ƐĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƌĞĐĞĚŝŶŐŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁŽĨůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶEĞǁ
'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞŝƐŶŽƚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŶĞǁŝŶĂŶĚŽĨŝƚƐĞůĨ͘353 ZĂƚŚĞƌ͕ŝƚŝƐ
ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚŝŶŬĞƌƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ
ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂƌƚŝŶŝƚƐĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞƐ
ƚŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽǁĂƌĨĂƌĞĂƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞ͘Four themes ŚĂǀĞ
351 ^͘ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕͞ʽ̨̨̛̭̖̦̦̭̯̍ʻ̸̨̨̣̦̌̌̽̐ʿ̨̛̖̬̔̌ʦ̨̜̦ʿ̨̨̨̛̬̹̣̐ʥ̨̱̱̺̖̔̐
΀ŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐŽĨƚŚĞ/ŶŝƚŝĂůWĞƌŝŽĚŽĨtĂƌƐŽĨƚŚĞWĂƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞ΁͕͟ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚďǇ
ʦ̨̖̦̦̌́ʺ̼̭̣̽΀DŝůŝƚĂƌǇdŚŽƵŐŚƚ΁͕/ƐƐƵĞο͕μκκν͕ƉƉ͘λρ-20
352 ^͘ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕͞ʽ̨̨̛̭̖̦̦̭̯̍ʻ̸̨̨̣̦̌̌̽̐ʿ̨̛̖̬̔̌ʦ̨̜̦ʿ̨̨̨̛̬̹̣̐ʥ̨̱̱̺̖̔̐
΀ŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐŽĨƚŚĞ/ŶŝƚŝĂůWĞƌŝŽĚŽĨtĂƌƐŽĨƚŚĞWĂƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞ΁͕͟ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚďǇ
ʦ̨̖̦̦̌́ʺ̼̭̣̽΀DŝůŝƚĂƌǇdŚŽƵŐŚƚ΁͕/ƐƐƵĞο͕μκκν
353 ůƚŚŽƵŐŚEdKŚĂƐĂĚŽƉƚĞĚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ͞,ǇďƌŝĚtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͟ĂƐŝƚƐƚĞƌŵŽĨƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĨŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ
EĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐƚƐŚĂǀĞƐƚƌĞŶƵŽƵƐůǇŽďũĞĐƚĞĚ͘^ĞĞ͕ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕
ƚŚĞǁĞůů-ĂƌŐƵĞĚĐĂƐĞďǇDŝĐŚĂĞů<ŽĨŵĂŶ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ,ǇďƌŝĚtĂƌĨĂƌĞĂŶĚKƚŚĞƌĂƌŬƌƚƐ͕͟
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁĂƌŽŶƚŚĞƌŽĐŬƐ͘ĐŽŵͬμκλπͬκνͬƌƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ŚǇďƌŝĚ-ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ-ĂŶĚ-ŽƚŚĞƌ-ĚĂƌŬ-ĂƌƚƐͬ <ŽĨŵĂŶ͛Ɛ
ŵŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŽĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚĂůůƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ͞ŚǇďƌŝĚ͟Žƌ
ůŽǁ-ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞůĞǀĞůĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐĚŝƐƚƌĂĐƚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂƉƌĞƉĂƌĞƐĨŽƌ͕ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ͕ĂŶĚ
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚƐ͞ŚŝŐŚ-ĞŶĚĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů͟ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘dŚŝƐŝƐĞǆĂĐƚůǇƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŵĂĚĞŝŶWŚŝůůŝƉ<ĂƌďĞƌ
ĂŶĚ>ƚ͘Žů͘:ŽƐŚƵĂdŚŝďĞĂƵůƚ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐEĞǁ-'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕͟Army͕:ƵůǇμκλπ͘
138
ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚĂŶĚƉĞƌƐŝƐƚĞĚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞůĂƐƚμοǇĞĂƌƐ͘dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĂŶĚŵŽƐƚ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŚĞŵĞŝƐAsymmetric Warfare͕ǁŚŝĐŚĨŽƌŵƐ ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶďĂƐĞ
ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƚŚƌĞĞ͖ƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƚŚĞŵĞŝƐƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨ
Low Intensity Conflict ĂƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚďǇƚŚĞWĞŶƚĂŐŽŶ͛Ɛ:ŽŝŶƚ^ƉĞĐŝĂů
KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŵŵĂŶĚ͖ƚŚĞƚŚŝƌĚƚŚĞŵĞŝƐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨNetwork-Centric Warfare͖ĂŶĚƚŚĞĨŽƵƌƚŚ
ƚŚĞŵĞŝƐ'ĞŶĞƌĂůsůĂĚŝŵŝƌ^ůŝƉĐŚĞŶŬŽ͛ƐSixth Generation Warfare͘dŚĞƌĞ
ŝƐǇĞƚƚŚĞĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚŽĨŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ– Reflexive Control –
ƚŚĂƚŐŝǀĞƐZƵƐƐŝĂŶEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞŝƚƐŝŶƐŝĚŝŽƵƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŝŶ
thaƚŽŶůǇǁŚĞŶŝƚŝƐĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞĚŽĞƐƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ
ďĞĐŽŵĞĨƵůůǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů͘
Asymmetric Warfare
ŶŽĨƚĞŶ-ŝŐŶŽƌĞĚĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂƌƚŝƐƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ
ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌǇŝŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘ƐsůĂĚŝŵŝƌWƵƚŝŶƉƵƚŝƚŚŝŵƐĞůĨŝŶμκκπ͕
͞YƵĂŶƚŝƚǇŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞĞŶĚ͙͘KƵƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐĂƌĞƚŽďĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂů
ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ͘dŚĞǇǁŝůůďĞĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂůĂŶĚůĞƐƐĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞ͘͟ 354
/ŶŝƚƐĐůĂƐƐŝĐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ͕ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌǇŝƐƚŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨĂǁĞĂŬĞƌŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ
ƚŽĨŝŐŚƚĂƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌǇ͘dŚĞŵĂŝŶŝĚĞĂŝƐ͕ĂƐůĂƵƐĞǁŝƚǌƉƵƚŝƚ͕ƚŚĂƚ
ǁĂƌ͙͞ŝƐŶŽƚŵĞƌĞůǇĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂĐƚďƵƚĂƌĞĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚ͕Ă
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶƚĞƌĐŽƵƌƐĞ͕ĂĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĂŵĞďǇŽƚŚĞƌ
ŵĞĂŶƐ͘;͘͘͘ͿdŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚĞƐŝŐŶŝƐƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚ͕ǁŚŝůĞǁĂƌŝƐƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƐ͕ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƐĐĂŶŶĞǀĞƌďĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŽĨĂƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚ͘͟ 355
^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨǁĂƌŝƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů͕ƚŚĞŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŵĂǇďĞ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŶŽŶ-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͘ĚŝƌĞĐƚĂƚƚĂĐŬŵŝŐŚƚŶŽƚďĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ
ĨŽƌƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂŶŶĞǆĂƚŝŽŶ͘dŚĞǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ŵĂǇ
ďĞĚŝƌĞĐƚ͕ŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚ͕ŽƌďŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ͘
ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚďǇŚĞĐŬŝŶŽǀĂŶĚŽŐĚĂŶŽǀŝŶμκλκ͕͞ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ
͚ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ͛ĂŶĚ͚ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ͛ĂƌĞĐůŽƐĞŝŶ
ƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨ͚ŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ͛ŽƌŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĂĐƚŝŽŶ
354 s͘s͘WƵƚŝŶĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶ^͘'͘ŚĞŬŝŶŽǀĂŶĚ^͘͘ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕͞ƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂůĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽDĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ
ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕͟Military Thought͕EƵŵďĞƌλ͕μκλκ͕Ɖ͘ς͘
355 ůĂƵƐĞǁŝƚǌμκκκ͕Ɖ͘μςκ͘
λνσ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͛͟ 356 ŝŶƚŚĂƚĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂůƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝƐŶŽǁĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚ͕ĨŝƌƐƚŽĨĂůů͕Ăƚ
ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƌĞƐŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŽĂƌŵƐ;ďǇŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐͿ͕ŝŶ
ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉůĂĐĞ͕ďǇŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ͘ νορ /ŶƚŚĞŝƌŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ͕͞ƚŽĚĂǇ͕
information operations ;ŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐͿŚĂǀĞƌĞĂĐŚĞĚĂƉŽŝŶƚŝŶ
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇcan take on strategic tasks͘͟358 dŚƵƐ͕
͞ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƌĞůǇŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶŚŝŐŚ-ƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ
ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůůǇĞƋƵŝƉƉĞĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐǁĞĂƉŽŶƐƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇ
ƐƵďǀĞƌƐŝǀĞĂŶĚƌĞĐŽŶŶĂŝƐƐĂŶĐĞŐƌŽƵƉƐŝƐĂƉĞƌƐƵĂƐŝǀĞĞŶŽƵŐŚĨĂĐƚŽƌĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇƚŽĐĞĂƐĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚĞƌŵƐĨĂǀŽƌĂďůĞĨŽƌ
ZƵƐƐŝĂ͘͟ νοσ Ǉμκλκ͕ŚĞĐŬŝŶŽǀĂŶĚŽŐĚĂŶŽǀŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇ
ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ͞ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĨƵůůƌĂŶŐĞŽĨĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂů
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƚŽƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůůǇŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇǁŝůůĞŶĂďůĞZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐƚŽďĞŵŽƌĞĨůĞǆŝďůĞŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐƚŽǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ
ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘͟ 360
/ŶŝƚƐĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂƐĨƵůůǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚ
ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ƵƐŝŶŐĚŝƌĞĐƚĂŶĚŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚ͕ĂŶĚůŝŶĞĂƌĂŶĚŶŽŶ-ůŝŶĞĂƌ
ƚĂĐƚŝĐƐĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ͘dŚĞǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ
ƐǇŶĐŚƌŽŶŝǌĞĚŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů͕ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů͕ĂŶĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ͘/ƚƐŝŶŝƚŝĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŝƐĐŽƌƌŽďŽƌĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŝŶũƵƐƚ
thrĞĞǁĞĞŬƐ͕ĂŶĚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂƐŚŽƚďĞŝŶŐĨŝƌĞĚ͕ƚŚĞŵŽƌĂůĞŽĨƚŚĞhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŚĂĚďĞĞŶďƌŽŬĞŶĂŶĚƚŚĞλσκďĂƐĞƐŽŶƚŚĞƌŝŵĞĂŶWĞŶŝŶƐƵůĂ
ŚĂĚƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚŽƌďĞĞŶƐĞŝǌĞĚ͘/ŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨƌĞůǇŝŶŐŽŶĂŵĂƐƐ
ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨƚĂŶŬƐĂŶĚĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ͕ƚŚĞƌŝŵĞĂŶĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĨĞĂƚƵƌĞĚĨĞǁĞƌ
ƚŚĂŶλκ͕κκκĂƐƐĂƵůƚƚƌŽŽƉƐ– ŵŽƐƚůǇŶĂǀĂůŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇ͕ĂůƌĞĂĚǇƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĞĚŝŶ
ƌŝŵĞĂ͕ďĂĐŬĞĚďǇĂĨĞǁďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶƐŽĨĂŝƌďŽƌŶĞƚƌŽŽƉƐĂŶĚspetsnaz
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚŽƐ– ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚλπ͕κκκhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů͘ĨƚĞƌ
ďůŽĐŬŝŶŐhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶƚƌŽŽƉƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌďĂƐĞƐ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŚĂƐĞ͕ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŝŶŐŽĨƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ŝŶƚŝŵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ͕
ďƌŝďĞƌǇ͕ĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĞƚͬŵĞĚŝĂƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂƚŽƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ͕ƚŚƵƐ
356 ^͘'͘ŚĞŬŝŶŽǀĂŶĚ^͘͘ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕͞ƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂůĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽDĂŝŶƚĂŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕͟Ɖ͘ρ͘
νορ Ibid.͕Ɖ͘ς͘
358 Ibid.
νοσ ^͘'͘ŚĞŬŝŶŽǀĂŶĚ^͘͘ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕͞ƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂůĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽDĂŝŶƚĂŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͟
360 Ibid.͕Ɖ͘σ͘
140
ĂǀŽŝĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĨŝƌĞƉŽǁĞƌ͘
Low-Intensity Conflict
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐŚĂǀĞƉĂŝĚĐůŽƐĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƚŚĞWĞŶƚĂŐŽŶ͛ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨůŽǁ-ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐĂƐ͞ĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŽŶƚĞŶĚŝŶŐƐƚĂƚĞƐŽƌŐƌŽƵƉƐďĞůŽǁĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů
ǁĂƌĂŶĚĂďŽǀĞƚŚĞƌŽƵƚŝŶĞ͕ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĂŵŽŶŐƐƚĂƚĞƐ͘͟ 361
In μκλκ͕ŚĞĐŬŝŶŽǀĂŶĚŽŐĚĂŶŽǀŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŚĂƚ
The danger of catastrophic consequences of hostilities fought
on a varying scale with the use of highly effective modern and
next-generation weapons, not to say weapons of mass
destruction, points to the need for nonmilitary measures of
interstate confrontation to be employed more actively to
end armed conflicts and local wars, and the role and
significance of these measures continues to rise.362
A special point to be made here is that military security
today depends on all other forms of security (above all,
political, economic, and informational, to name but a few),
and, at the same time, is a foundation they need to be built
on. 363
dŚĞƚǁŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐĂůƐŽďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚ͞support for the war
aims by ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŝŶĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĂƚǁĂƌ͕ƚŚĂƚŝƐůĞŐŝƚŝŵŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁĂƌ͕ŝƐ
critical in winning victory. dŚŝƐŝƐĂĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞĨĂĐƚŽƌĨŽƌďŽƚŚƚŚĞƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ
ĂŶĚǁĞĂŬĞƌŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ͘364
tŝƚŚŚŝƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ
…many military and political leaders in countries that have
advanced most in military and economic development (above
all, the U.S. and its allies) are carefully concealing the true
361 ŚŝĐŚŬĂŶΘsĞůĞƐŽǀ λσσμ͖ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƌŵǇ,ĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ͕λσσν͕Ɖ͘λ-1.

362 ^͘^͘ŚĞŬŝŶŽǀĂŶĚ^͘͘ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕͞ƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂůĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽDĂŝŶƚĂŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕͟Military Thought͕EƵŵďĞƌλ͕μκλκ͕Ɖ͘μ͘
363 Ibid.͕Ɖ͘ν͘
364 Ibid.͕Ɖ͘ο͘
141
reasons for the armed conflicts they have initiated behind the
screen of more decent purposes such as the need to “spread
democracy,” “protect the weak,” or fight terrorism,” 365
ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŚŝĞĨŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨsĂůĞƌǇ'ĞƌĂƐŝŵŽǀĚƌĞǁƚŚĞ
ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶĨŽƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨŚŝƐŽǁŶĨŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͘
/Ŷμκλν͕'ĞƌĂƐŝŵŽǀǁƌŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ
the very “rules of war” have changed significantly. The use of
non-military methods to achieve political and strategic
objectives has in some cases proved far more effective than
ƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞ͘΀͙΁tŝĚĞůǇƵƐĞĚĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂůŵĞĂŶƐĐĂŶ
help neutralize the enemy’s military superiority. These
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƐƉĞĐŝĂůŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů
opposition to the creation of a permanent front throughout
the enemy state as well as the impact of propaganda
instruments, forms and methods which are constantly being
improved.366
sŝĞǁŝŶŐĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂŶŽƚũƵƐƚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
ƚŽŽůƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ͕ďƵƚĂƐƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝŶ
ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇƚƌĂĐĞďĂĐŬƚŽĂλσοπŵĞĞƚŝŶŐĂƚƚŚĞ
DĂƐƐĂĐŚƵƐĞƚƚƐ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŽĨdĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐƉŽƐŝƚ ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚŶĞǁŐĞŽ-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇďĂƐĞĚ
ƵƉŽŶĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĐŚĂŽƐĂƐĂŶŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚŽĨh͘^͘ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ͘dŚĞ
ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇĂŶĚŵĂƌŬĞƚƌĞĨŽƌŵƐďǇƚŚĞh͘^͘ŝƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐ
ĂŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨǀĂůƵĞƐĂŶĚŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚŝƐĂƉĂƌƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŽĨŶĞǁŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŵĂĚĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞďǇƚŚĞ
ǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇŝŶƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇμκκκƐ͘
dŚĞƉƌĞƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐǁĂƐ– ͞ĂƐĂůǁĂǇƐ͕ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ͚ƵƐĞƌƐ͛ŽĨ
΀ƚŚĞ΁ŶĞǁƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ͟ǁĞƌĞ͞ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚĐƌŝŵĞĂŶĚƐĞĐƌĞƚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ͕
ƉůŽƚƚŝŶŐƌĞŐŝŵĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŽƚŚĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͘͟ǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞh͘^͘
͞ƐĞĐƌĞƚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ͟ƵƐĞŽĨŶĞǁŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐǁŝƚŚ
365Ibid., Ɖ͘μ͘
366ƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶ,͘ZĞŝƐŝŶŐĞƌĂŶĚ͘'ŽůƚƐ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ,ǇďƌŝĚtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͗tĂŐŝŶŐtĂƌďĞůŽǁƚŚĞ
ZĂĚĂƌŽĨdƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĞĨĞŶƐĞ͕͟NATO Research Paper͕ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ– EdK
ĞĨĞŶƐĞŽůůĞŐĞ͕ZŽŵĞ͕/ƐƐƵĞλκο͕EŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλξ͕Ɖ͘μ͘
142
͞the criminal carnival͟ĞŶĂďůĞĚďǇƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ-ĚƌŝǀĞŶĂĐƚŝǀŝƐŵ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
thĞŽƌŝƐƚƐŵĂŬĞŝƚĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚƚŚĂƚ͞ƚŚĞƚĞƐƚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĂĨůĂƐŚŵŽďŝŶ
ƚŚĞ͚ĐŽůŽƌƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ͛ŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶŚĂƐƐŚŽǁŶŝƚƐŚŝŐŚ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐĂƐĂŶŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚŽĨƌĞŐŝŵĞĐŚĂŶŐĞ͘͟/ŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǀĞŝŶ͕
ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐĂŶĚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŝŶŐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŵŽŶĞǇƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƐĂƌĞ
ůŝŶŬĞĚƚŽƌĞĐƌƵŝƚƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐ͖ĂŶĚĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůŵĞĚŝĂ
ĂƐŽƌŐĂŶŝǌŝŶŐƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵƐ͘
ƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚ͞ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐƉĂǀĞĚƚŚĞǁĂǇĨŽƌĂŶĞǁůĞǀĞůŽĨ
ŐůŽďĂůĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐ͕͟ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐƉŽŝŶƚŽƵƚƚŚĂƚ͞ĞƉƵƚǇ ƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚ
^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞĂŶŝĞůĂĞƌ͕ŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞƵƌĞĂƵŽĨĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ͕
,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚ>ĂďŽƌ͕ǁŚŝĐŚĨƵŶĚĞĚƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚ΀'ƵŝĚĞƚŽ,ĞůƉ
/ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚhƐĞƌƐŝŶZĞƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ΁͕ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƚŚĞƚŽŽůƐƚŽŽǀĞƌĐŽŵĞ
ĐĞŶƐŽƌƐŚŝƉ͕͚ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚǁĂǇŽĨƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐĚŝŐŝƚĂůĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚƐĂŶĚ
ŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ͙ůŝǀŝŶŐŝŶĂŶĂƚŵŽƐƉŚĞƌĞŽĨƌĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͙͛͘͟ νπρ ^ƵĐŚǀŝĞǁƐ
ĂƌĞƐƉƌĞĂĚĞǀĞŶĂŵŽŶŐŚŝŐŚůǇĞĚƵĐĂƚĞĚĂŶĚǁĞůů-ƚƌĂǀĞůĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐǁŚŽ
ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞ͞ĂĐŽŶĐĞƌƚĞĚtĞƐƚĞƌŶĚƌŝǀĞƚŽĨŽƌĐĞƌĞŐŝŵĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŽŶZƵƐƐŝĂ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƵďǀĞƌƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŽƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞ
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ͕ĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽǁĞĂŬĞŶƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽ
ĂŐůŽďĂůh^-ůĞĚŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ͘͟ 368
dŚĞνƌĚ DŽƐĐŽǁŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨĞĨĞŶƐĞĨŽĐƵƐĞĚƐƋƵĂƌĞůǇƵƉŽŶĐŽůŽƌƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƐĂ
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƚŚƌĞĂƚ͘ƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ
ĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚ͞ĐŽůŽƌƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝƐĂŶĞǁĨŽƌŵŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ƚĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨ
ĂƌŵĞĚƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƌƵůĞƐŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚďƵƚ͕ŝŶƚŚŝƐ
ĐĂƐĞ͕ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐĂůůĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽŽůƐ͘͟ νπσ dŚĞŚŝĞĨŽĨƚŚĞKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞŽŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨ͕sůĂĚŝŵŝƌĂƌƵĚŶŝƚƐŬŝǇƐŚĂƌĞĚ
ŚŝƐǀŝĞǁŽŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨtĞƐƚĞƌŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇĂŶĚũƵƐƚŝĐĞ͗
&ŝƌƐƚ͕΀͙΁ƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŽĨĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŽƌŐĂŶŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
νπρ /ŐŽƌ^ƵŶĚ͕ ͞ŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚŚĂŽƐ͕͟Svobodnaia mysl͕EƵŵďĞƌρ͕μκλμ͘

368 DĂƌŬ'ĂůĞŽƚƚŝ͕Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services͕ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽƵŶĐŝůKŶ
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕DĂǇμκλπ͕Ɖ͘ο͘
νπσ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĞĨĞŶƐĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ^ĞƌŐĞǇ^ŚŽŝŐƵĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶZĞŝƐŝŶŐĞƌĂŶĚ'ŽůƚƐ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ,ǇďƌŝĚ
tĂƌĨĂƌĞ͗tĂŐŝŶŐtĂƌďĞůŽǁƚŚĞZĂĚĂƌŽĨdƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĞĨĞŶƐĞ͕͟Ɖ͘μ͘
143
overthrow of the enemy government is used for open
pressure. The goal of this pressure is to prevent the use of the
security forces to restore law and order. Then, with the
deployment of the opposition hostilities against government
forces, first foreign countries begin to give the rebels military
ĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŝĚ͘>ĂƚĞƌ͕ĂĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ΀͙΁ĐĂŶƐƚĂƌƚ
a military operation to assist the opposition in the seizure of
power.370
ƐŝƚŚĂƐŝŶŽƚŚĞƌĂƌĞĂƐŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ͕ƚŚĞďƌĞĂŬƵƉŽĨzƵŐŽƐůĂǀŝĂ
ƉůĂǇĞĚĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌŽůĞŝŶƐŚĂƉŝŶŐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶǀŝĞǁƐŽŶůŽǁŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇ
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐ͘ĨƚĞƌ^ůŽďŽĚĂŶDŝůŽƓĞǀŝđďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĞĚƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚƌĞĂƐƵƌǇŽĨ
ƚŚĞ^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚ&ĞĚĞƌĂůZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨzƵŐŽƐůĂǀŝĂĚƵƌŝŶŐŚŝƐƚƵƌŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ƌŽƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞzƵŐŽƐůĂǀWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶƚƌĞƉƵďůŝĐƐ͕
ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƌĞƉƵďůŝĐƐĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽƐĞĐĞĚĞĂŶĚDŝůŽƓĞǀŝđƐĞŶƚƚŚĞ^ĞƌďŝĂŶ-
ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚĂƌŵǇƚŽƐƵƉƉƌĞƐƐƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐŵ͘^ůŽǀĞŶŝĂŵĂŶĂŐĞĚƚŽ
ƋƵŝĐŬůǇďƌĞĂŬĂǁĂǇĂŶĚƌŽĂƚŝĂǁŽƵůĚǁŝŶŝƚƐŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĂƐǁĞůů͕ďƵƚ
ƚŚĞ^ĞƌďƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŽǁĂŐĞǁŚĂƚǁĂƐǁŝĚĞůǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚƚŽďĞĂ
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŽĨŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨŽƐŶŝĂĂŶĚ,ĞƌǌĞŐŽǀŝŶĂ͕
ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƵƚŽŶŽŵŽƵƐƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞŽĨ<ŽƐŽǀŽǁŝƚŚŝŶ^ĞƌďŝĂ͘
ƐŵƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
ĚŝƐƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨzƵŐŽƐůĂǀŝĂ͕ŝƚĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇŚĂĚƚŽƐƚĞƉŝŶƚŽƚŚĞůƵƌĐŚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
ƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨEdK͘DŽƐĐŽǁƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŚŝƐĂĐƚŝŽŶĂƐĂŶĞǁĨŽƌŵ
ŽĨ͞ƌĞŐŝŵĞĐŚĂŶŐĞ͘͟^ƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ͕ƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐǁĞƌĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŽ
ŚĂǀĞƐƵƉƉůĂŶƚĞĚŽǀĞƌƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚĐŽǀĞƌƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐǀŝĂ͞ƚŚĞ
ŝŶƐƚĂůůŵĞŶƚŽĨĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐƚĂƚĞƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ;Ğ͘Ő͕͘
EE͕Ϳ͕ƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůŵĞĚŝĂ͕ĂŶĚŶŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂů
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ;E'KƐͿ͘͟/ŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞŽǀĞƌƚĂƌŵĞĚƐƚƌŝŬĞƐ͕ƚŚĞh͘^͘ǁĞƌĞ
ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŽĞŵƉůŽǇĂŵŽƌĞĂĚĂƉƚŝǀĞƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĂŶĚ
ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐŵĞƚŚŽĚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƐƉĞĐŝĂůŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌƐ͕ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ͕
ĐǇďĞƌͬƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂǁĂƌƌŝŽƌƐ͕ƵŶĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ĂŶĚ
ƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐ͘ƐƚŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ͞ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ͟
νρκ ŚŝĞĨŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨDĂŝŶKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞsůĂĚŝŵŝƌĂƌƵĚŶŝƚƐŬŝǇ͕ĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶ,͘
ZĞŝƐŝŶŐĞƌĂŶĚ͘'ŽůƚƐ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ,ǇďƌŝĚtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͗tĂŐŝŶŐtĂƌďĞůŽǁƚŚĞZĂĚĂƌ ŽĨdƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů
ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĞĨĞŶƐĞ͕͟NATO Research Paper͕ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ– EdKĞĨĞŶƐĞŽůůĞŐĞ͕ZŽŵĞ͕
/ƐƐƵĞλκο͕EŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλξ͕Ɖ͘μ͘
144
ǁĞƌĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŽƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚ͞ĐŽůŽƌƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ͟ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇďĞŐĂŶƚŽƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞ͞ǁĂƌĂƐďĞŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͘͟ νρλ
6th Generation Warfare
ŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌƚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĨƚŚƉĞƌŝŽĚďǇDĂƚƐƐŽŶ
ĂŶĚŬůƵŶĚƐĞĞůŽŶŐ-ƌĂŶŐĞĂŶĚĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂŶĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞĂƐĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞ;ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞůŽŶŐ-ƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶƐďǇ'ĞŶĞƌĂů
DĂŬŚŵƵƚ'ĂƌĞĞǀƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŝůůďĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ͞ƚŽĨŝŐŚƚĂǁĂƌǁŝƚŚ
ŽŶůǇůŽŶŐ-ƌĂŶŐĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ͟ νρμͿ͘dŚĞǇĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ͞ƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐĂƌĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨsixth generation ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ĂŶĚ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌƚĂƐďĞŝŶŐŝŶŝƚƐfifth period ŶĞĞĚŶŽƚůĞĂĚƚŽŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶ͘͟ νρν DĂƚƐƐŽŶĂŶĚŬůƵŶĚƐƵŵŵĂƌŝǌĞƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐĂƐĨŽůůŽǁƐ͗
The type of war the Russian armed forces must be prepared

for in the next decade at the latest has one rule and four
distinct signifiers. The rule is that active planning and
preparation will give the strategic initiative, and the strategic
initiative will lead to victory. The signifiers are: 1) Superiority
via information operations, 2) Superiority in the air and in
space, 3) Superiority at sea and on the ground via the ability
to strike with precision, and 4) Consolidation of military
success with diplomatic and other political means. 374
/ŶƚŚĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ͕ƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶ͞Ă
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞ͕ƌŽůĞĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨŽƌŵƐŽĨ
ƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘͟ νρο tŚĞŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŽĨ
͞ƵŶĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͟ŝŶĂƌŵĞĚƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞĂƌĞĞǀŽŬĞĚ͕ƚŚĞǇŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚ
ƚŚĞǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞƐŚĂƉĞĚďŽƚŚƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞĂŶĚ
ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨ^ŽƵƚŚKƐƐĞƚŝĂŝŶƵŐƵƐƚμκκς͕ĂŶĚ
νρλ ŚĂƌůĞƐ<͘ĂƌƚůĞƐ͕͞'ĞƚƚŝŶŐ'ĞƌĂƐŝŵŽǀZŝŐŚƚ͕͟Military Review, January-&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇμκλπ͕Ɖ͘νξ͘

νρμ 'ĂƌĞĞǀĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶWĞƚĞƌ͘DĂƚƚƐƐŽŶĂŶĚEŝŬůĂƐŬůƵŶĚ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌƚŝŶƚŚĞ&ŝĨƚŚ
WĞƌŝŽĚ͗EŽƌĚŝĐĂŶĚƌƚŝĐƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕͟Revista de Ciências Militares͕sŽůƵŵĞλ͕μκλν͕Ɖ͘νς͘
νρν DĂƚƚƐƐŽŶĂŶĚŬůƵŶĚ͕Ɖ͘ξξ͘
νρξ /ďŝĚ͕͘Ɖ͘ξμ͘
νρο sůĂĚŝŵŝƌĂďŝĐŚ͕͞KŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚǁĂƌ͕͟Military Thought͕EƵŵďĞƌλμ͕μκκσ͘
145
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ;tͿ͘ƐĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚďǇƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨ
ŵŽĚĞƌŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞĂŶĚĂƌŵĞĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐ͕tŚĂƐĨŝŶĂůůǇŵŽǀĞĚďĞǇŽŶĚŽŶĞ
ŽĨƚŚĞƚǇƉĞƐŽĨĐŽŵďĂƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ͘͟ νρπ dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽǁĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ
ĂŵŽŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
computerization of society in general and military affairs in
particular…has opened broad opportunities in creating high-
performance automated control systems, the development of
qualitatively new high-precision weapons, including
functionally integrated systems and reconnaissance,
targeting and destruction, as well as in improving the forms
and methods of combat operations.377
Network Centric Warfare
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐŚĂǀĞĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚ͞ƚŚĞĨĂƐƚƐƉƌĞĂĚŽĨ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚĞůĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƐǇƐƚĞŵƐƚŚĂƚƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ ŽĨĨŝŶƚŚĞůĂƚĞ
λσσκƐŚĂƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇƚŽƚŚĞĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƐƚŚĞ
ĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ͛ƚŽƉůĞĂĚĞƌƐŝŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŚĞůĚŽŶƚŚĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨĐŽŵďĂƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘͟ νρς
/ŶƚŚĞŝƌǀŝĞǁ͕
it all began with the adoption of the Network Centric Warfare
concept in the United States. The concept goes by the name
of Network Centric Capability in NATO’s join armed forces;
Network Enabled Capability in the United Kingdom; Info
Centric Warfare in France, and by a variety of other names
elsewhere. In principle, whatever their names, the concepts
are built around the idea that the combatants are linked to
one another through a common information environment
νρπ /ďŝĚ͘
νρρ W͘͘ŽƵůŽǀĂŶĚs͘/͘KƌůǀĂŶƐŬǇ͕͞<ĞǇŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞEĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƌŵĞĚŽŶĨůŝĐƚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚ
dŚŝƌĚŽĨƚŚĞyy/ĞŶƚƵƌǇ͕͟Courier of the Academy of Military Sciences͕μκλο͕/ƐƐƵĞλ͘
νρς zƵ͘zĞ͘ŽŶƐŬŽǀ͕s͘/͘ŝŵĂƌŝŶ͕ĂŶĚ͘s͘/ůůĂƌŝŽŶŽǀ͕͞ĞƐŝŐŶŽĨůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐtĂƌĨĂƌĞ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ
ĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͛EĞƚǁŽƌŬĞŶƚƌŝĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ͕͟Military Thought͕sŽůƵŵĞμ͕μκλο͕Ɖ͘
ξρ͘
146
that, in military experts’ judgment, enhances the armed
forces’ efficiency in action many times over. 379
dŚĞĐŽƌĞŽĨEĞƚǁŽƌŬĞŶƚƌŝĐtĂƌĨĂƌĞŝƐĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐĞĂŵůĞƐƐĂŶĚŚŝŐŚůǇ
ƐƵƌǀŝǀĂďůĞ͕ĨůĞǆŝďůĞ͕ĂŶĚƐĞůĨ-ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ;ŵŽďŝůĞĂĚĂƉƚŝǀĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐͿ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚƌŽŽƉĐŽŶƚƌŽůĨŽĐƵƐĞĚĂƚƚŚĞ͞ŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ͛ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů
ĞĐŚĞůŽŶ͕ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚŚĞďƌŝŐĂĚĞĂŶĚďĞůŽǁ͟ĂŶĚĂůůŽǁŝŶŐ͞ƚĞĂŵǁŽƌŬ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚƌŽŽƉƐĨŝĞůĚĞĚďǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚďƌĂŶĐŚĞƐ͟ŽŶůĂŶĚ͕ĂƚƐĞĂ͕ĂŶĚŝŶ
ƚŚĞĂŝƌ͘ 380 ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚ͞ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ
ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ͕ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͕ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ͕ƌĞĐŽŶŶĂŝƐƐĂŶĐĞĂŶĚ
ĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐǁĂƌĨĂƌĞĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ͕ĂŶĚĂƵƚŽŵĂƚĞĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂŶĚ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŚĂǀĞŚĂĚƚŚĞŝƌĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵƐĂŶĚ
ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶ-ĚĂǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘͟ 381 /ŶƚŚĞŝƌŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ͕Ă͞ŶĞǁƚǇƉĞŽĨ
ĂƌŵĞĚƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞĚĞƌŝǀĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ-ĐĞŶƚƌŝĐƉĂƚƚĞƌŶŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚǁŝůůŚĞŶĐĞĨŽƌƚŚďĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ
ĐŽŵďĂƚĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĐŽŵďŝŶŝŶŐĂůůƌĞĂůŵƐŽĨĂƌŵĞĚƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞŝŶ
ƐǇŶĐŚƌŽŶŝƐŵ͕ďĞŝŶƚĞƌƌĞůĂƚĞĚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐƵŶĚĞƌĂƐŝŶŐůĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚŝŶ
ĂƐŚĂƌĞĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŵĞĚŝƵŵ͘͟382 dŚĞǇďĞůŝĞǀĞ
ƚŚĂƚ͞ĂůůŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞǆƉĞƌƚƐƚŽĚĂǇĂƌĞĂƚŽŶĞŝŶƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚǁĂƌƐŝŶƚŚĞ
ĂŐĞŽĨŶĞǁŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌŚŝŐŚƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐǁŝůůďĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ
ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇŝŶŶĂƚƵƌĞĨƌŽŵǁĂƌƐĨŽƵŐŚƚŝŶƚŚĞůĂƐƚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ͘͟ 383 ŝƚŝŶŐ
ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ͞ĂŐƌĂĚƵĂůĚĞĐůŝŶĞŝŶƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨ
ŶƵĐůĞĂƌĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶĚĞƚĞƌƌŝŶŐĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŶŐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŶĚ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐŚĂŽƐ͕͟ŝƚŝƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ͞ŶŽƚĞǀĞŶƚŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŶĚƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů
ŶƵĐůĞĂƌĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶƚǁŝůůďĞĂďůĞƚŽ͟ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ͞ĂŶĞǁůĂƌŐĞ-ƐĐĂůĞǁĂƌ
ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚŚŝŐŚ-ƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŝŶƐĞǀĞƌĂů
ƚŚĞĂƚĞƌƐŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƌĞŐŝŽŶƐŶĞǆƚĚŽŽƌĨƌŽŵZƵƐƐŝĂ͟
͞ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚǁŝůůďĞĨŽƵŐŚƚǁŝƚŚŶĞǁ-ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĞĂƉŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶ
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚŚĞǁĂƌŐŽĂůƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŵƵĐŚůŽƐƐŽĨůŝĨĞŽƌƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌ
νρσ Ibid.
380 zƵ͘zĞ͘ŽŶƐŬŽǀ͕s͘/͘ŝŵĂƌŝŶ͕ĂŶĚ͘s͘/ůůĂƌŝŽŶŽǀ͕͞ĞƐŝŐŶŽĨůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐtĂƌĨĂƌĞ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ
ĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͛EĞƚǁŽƌŬĞŶƚƌŝĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ͕͟Military Thought͕sŽůƵŵĞμ͕μκλο͕Ɖ͘
48.
381 ŽůŽŶĞů^͘'͘ŚĞĐŬŝŶŽǀĂŶĚ>ƚ͘'ĞŶĞƌĂů^͘͘ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͗/ŶŝƚŝĂůWĞƌŝŽĚƐŽĨtĂƌƐĂŶĚ
dŚĞŝƌ/ŵƉĂĐƚŽŶĂŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛ƐWƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂ&ƵƚƵƌĞtĂƌ͕͟Military Thought͕EŽ͘ξ͕μκλμ͕Ɖ͘
20.
382 Ibid.
383 Ibid.͕Ɖ͘μμ͘
λξρ
ƵƐĞƌ͘͟ 384 dŚĞǇĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ͞ƚŚĞŶĞǁǁĞĂƉŽŶƐƐǇƐƚĞŵƐǁŝůůďĞũƵƐƚĂƐ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƐŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͕ďƵƚǁŝůůďĞŵŽƌĞƚŽůĞƌĂďůĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇǀŝĞǁƉŽŝŶƚ͘͟ 385
EĞǁŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽǀĞƌƋƵĂŶƚŝƚǇ͘dŚĞǇ
ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞ͞ĨƵƚƵƌĞ-oƌŝĞŶƚĞĚƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ͟ƐƵĐŚĂƐ͞ƐƚĞĂůƚŚƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ͕
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ͕ŚŝŐŚ-ƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁĞĂƉŽŶƐůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚ
ĨƌŽŵĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵƐ͘͟ 386 Speed and efficiency replace attrition
warfare.
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐĂƌĞƉĞƌƐƵĂĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌĞŶĞŵŝĞƐǁŝůůƵƐĞĂůů
ƚŚĞŝƌƉŽǁĞƌ͞ƚŽĚŝƐŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞƉƵďůŝĐ͕ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͕ďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚĐŽŶƚƌŽů͟ƚŽŵĂŬĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂ͞ƵŶŵĂŶĂŐĞĂďůĞĂŶĚƐŝŶŬŝƚŝŶƚŽĐŚĂŽƐ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĚŝƐĂďůĞ
ĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞůǇ͟ŝƚƐĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚ͞ĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐďǇƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŵĂƐƐĞĚƐƚƌŝŬĞƐďǇƉŝůŽƚůĞƐƐŚŝŐŚ-ƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ
ůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵĞǀĞƌǇƌĞĂůŵŝŶĂŐůŽďĂůŽƌƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞ
ĂŶĚŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ-ĐĞŶƚƌŝĐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘͟ νςρ dŚĞǇĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ͞tĞƐƚĞƌŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůŽƐƐŽĨƵƉƚŽοκйŽĨƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŽŶƚƌŽů
ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůĂŶĚĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĂŶĂĚǀĞƌƐĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶƚŚĞ
ĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌǇ͛ƐǁŝůůƚŽĨŝŐŚƚŽŶĂŶĚĨŽƌĐĞŚŝŵƚŽĐĞĂƐĞƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ͕ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ
ƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞĨŽƌǁŚŝĐŚŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ-ĐĞŶƚƌŝĐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞ
ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶ͕ŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉůĂĐĞ͘͟ 388
dŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ
ŽǀĞƌĂůůƚƌĞŶĚŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐůĞĚƚŚĞŵƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƵĐĐĞƐƐǁŝůů
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞmaking the opponent’s adaptive communications networks
primary targets of electronic attack. dŚŝƐĐĂŶŽŶůǇďĞĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĞĚ͕ŝŶ
ƚŚĞŝƌŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ͕͞ďǇŵŽǀŝŶŐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂŶĚ
ĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐĂƚƚĂĐŬƐƵďƐǇƐƚĞŵƐĐůŽƐĞƌƚŽƚŚĞŶŽĚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŵŽďŝůĞĂĚĂƉƚŝǀĞ
ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ͕ƉŽƐƐŝďůǇďǇƵƐŝŶŐĂŝƌŵŽďŝůĞǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ͕ĂŝƌĚƌŽƉƉĞĚ͕ďĂĐŬƉĂĐŬĞĚ͕
384 Ibid.
385 /ďŝĚ͕͘Ɖ͘μλ͘
dŚĞŝƌ/ŵƉĂĐƚŽŶĂŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛ƐWƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂ&ƵƚƵƌĞtĂƌ͕͟Military Thought͕EŽ͘ξ͕μκλμ͕Ɖ͘
λσ͘
νςρ Ibid.͕Ɖμν͘
388 Ibid.͕Ɖ͘μκ͘
148
ŽƌŽƚŚĞƌtĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ͘͟νςσ ƵƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞůĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŝŵĞŽĨ
ĂŶĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐǁĂƌĨĂƌĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ͞ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĚĞƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƚĂƌŐĞƚĂŶĚĂŶ
ĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐĂƚƚĂĐŬůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚƚŽƉƵƚŝƚŽƵƚŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͟ νσκ ǁŝůůƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ
͞ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĂŶĚďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐŝŶƚŽƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĂŶĂĚĂƉƚŝǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐƵďƐǇƐƚĞŵ
ƚŚĂƚŝƐĐĂƉĂďůĞ͕ŶŽŵĂƚƚĞƌŚŽǁĨĂƐƚƚŚĞƉĂĐĞŽĨĐŽŵďĂƚŝƐ͕ŽĨĞǆƉůŽŝƚŝŶŐ
ĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂŶĚŶĞƚǁŽƌŬĞĚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ͘͟ νσλ
Reflexive Control
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚǀĂƌŝŽƵƐZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐĚĞĨŝŶĞƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŝŶ
ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐǁĂǇƐ͕ƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ^ŽǀŝĞƚͬZƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚdŝŵdŚŽŵĂƐŚĂƐ
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚŝƚƚŽŶŐůŝƐŚ-ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐtĞƐƚĞƌŶĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞƐŝŶĂĐůĞĂƌĂŶĚ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĂďůĞǁĂǇ͗͞ZĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨ
ĐŽŶǀĞǇŝŶŐƚŽĂƉĂƌƚŶĞƌŽƌĂŶŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ
ŝŶĐůŝŶĞŚŝŵƚŽǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌŝůǇŵĂŬĞƚŚĞƉƌĞĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĚĞƐŝƌĞĚďǇ
ƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŽƌŽĨƚŚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ͘͟νσμ ƐdŚŽŵĂƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ͕͞Ă͚ƌĞĨůĞǆ͛ŝƚƐĞůĨ
ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ͛ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐŽƌ
ŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ͛ƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌĂŶĚĐĂƵƐĞƐŚŝŵƚŽŵĂŬĞĂ
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƵŶĨĂǀŽƌĂďůĞƚŽŚŝŵƐĞůĨ͘͟ νσν dŚĞŝĚĞĂŝƐ͕ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞ
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚǀŝĐƚŝŵ͛ƐŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĨŽƌŽƌŐĂŶŝǌŝŶŐ
ĚĂƚĂ– ƵƐƵĂůůǇƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐƚŚĞ͞ĨŝůƚĞƌ͟– ƚŽĨĞĞĚŚŝŵŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ
ǁŝůůůĞĂĚŚŝŵƚŽĚƌĂǁŝŶĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚŚĞŵĂŬĞƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ
͞ŝŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƚŽĂŐŝǀĞŶƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ͘ZĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŵĞƚŚŽĚƐĂƌĞ
ǀĂƌŝĞĚĂŶĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĐĂŵŽƵĨůĂŐĞ;ĂƚĂůůůĞǀĞůƐͿ͕ĚŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ͕
ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ͕ďůĂĐŬŵĂŝůďǇĨŽƌĐĞ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐŝŶŐŽĨǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐĂŶĚŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ͘͟ νσξ
νςσ ŽŶƐŬŽǀ͕s͘/͘ŝŵĂƌŝŶ͕ĂŶĚ͘s͘/ůůĂƌŝŽŶŽǀ͕͞ĞƐŝŐŶŽĨůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐtĂƌĨĂƌĞ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐĂƐĞĚŽŶ
ƚŚĞƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͛EĞƚǁŽƌŬĞŶƚƌŝĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ͕͟Military Thought͕sŽůƵŵĞμ͕μκλο͕Ɖ͘ον͘
νσκ Ibid.͕Ɖ͘ομ͘
νσλ ŽŶƐŬŽǀ͕s͘/͘ŝŵĂƌŝŶĂŶĚ͘s͘/ůůĂƌŝŽŶŽǀ͕͞ĞƐŝŐŶŽĨůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐtĂƌĨĂƌĞ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞ
ƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐ͛EĞƚǁŽƌŬĞŶƚƌŝĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ͕͟Military Thought͕sŽůƵŵĞμ͕μκλο͕Ɖ͘ον͘
νσμ dŝŵŽƚŚǇ >͘ dŚŽŵĂƐ͕ ͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛Ɛ ZĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞ ŽŶƚƌŽů dŚĞŽƌǇ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͕͟ Journal of Slavic
Military Studies͕λρ͕μκκξ͕Ɖ͘μνρ͘ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽůŽŶĞů^͘͘<ŽŵŽǀ͕ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕͞ƌĞŶĂŵĞĚƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞ
ĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇĂƐ͚ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂů͛ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘͟^ĞĞdŚŽŵĂƐ͕Ɖ͘μξς͘
νσν Ibid.͕Ɖ͘μξλ͘
νσξ Ibid.͕Ɖ͘μξμ͘
λξσ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶDĂũŽƌ'ĞŶĞƌĂů;ƌĞƚ͘ͿD͘͘/ŽŶŽǀ͕ŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ͕ŚĂƐĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚŚŝƐ
ĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐŽŶƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŽů͘ƐŶŽƚĞĚďǇdŚŽŵĂƐ͕
Ionov identified four basic methods for assisting in the
transfer of information to the enemy to promote control over
him. These methods, which serve as a checklist for
commanders at all levels, include:
Power pressure, which includes: the use of superior force,
force demonstrations, psychological attacks, ultimatums,
threats of sanctions, threats of risk (developed by focusing
attention on irrational behavior or conduct, or delegating
powers to an irresponsible person), combat reconnaissance,
provocative maneuvers, weapons tests, denying enemy
access to or isolating certain areas, increasing the alert status
of forces, forming coalitions, officially declaring war, support
for internal forces destabilizing the situation in the enemy
rear, limited strikes to put some forces out of action,
exploiting and playing up victory, demonstrating ruthless
actions, and showing mercy toward an enemy ally that has
stopped fighting.
Measures to present false information about the situation,
which include: concealment (displaying weakness in a strong
place), creation of mock installations (to show force in a weak
place), abandoning one position to reinforce another, leaving
dangerous objects at a given position (the Trojan Horse)
concealing true relationships between units or creating false
ones, maintaining the secrecy of new weapons, weapons
bluffing, changing a mode of operation, or deliberately losing
critical documents. The enemy can be forces to find a new
target by conflict escalation or de-escalation, deliberate
demonstration of a particular chain of actions, striking an
enemy base when the enemy is not there, acts of subversion
and provocation, leaving a route open for an enemy to
withdraw from encirclement, and forcing the enemy to take
retaliatory actions involving an expenditure of forces, assets,
150
and time.
Influencing the enemy’s decision-making algorithm, which
includes the systematic conduct of games according to what
is perceived as routine plans, publishing a deliberately
distorted doctrine, striking control elements and key figures,
transmitting false background data, operating in a standby
mode, and taking actions to neutralize the enemy’s
operational thinking.
Altering the decision-making time, which can be done by
unexpectedly starting combat actions, transferring
information about the background of an analogous conflict so
that the enemy, when working out what seems feasible and
predictable, makes a hasty decision that changes the mode
and character of its operation.395
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŚĞĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂƐ͞ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂů
ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕͟ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽůŽŶĞů^͘͘<ŽŵŽǀ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ/ŽŶŽǀ͛ƐĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŶŐŽŶĞ͛Ɛ
ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚďǇŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐďĂƐŝĐƚŽŽůƐĨŽƌĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚŝŶŐŝƚ͗
Distraction, by creating a real or imaginary threat to one of
the enemy’s most vital locations (flanks, rear, etc.) during the
preparatory stages of combat operations, thereby forcing him
to reconsider the wisdom of his decisions to operate along
this or that axis;
Overload, by frequently sending the enemy a large amount of
conflicting information;
Paralysis, by creating the perception of a specific threat to a
vital interest or weak spot;
Exhaustion, by compelling the enemy to carry out useless
νσοD͘͘/ŽŶŽǀ͕͞KŶZĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞŶĞŵǇŝŶŽŵďĂƚ͕͟Military Thought͕/ƐƐƵĞλ͕
:ĂŶƵĂƌǇλσσο͕ĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶdŚŽŵĂƐ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐZĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞŽŶƚƌŽůdŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚƚŚĞDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͕͟ƉƉ͘
244-245.
151
operations, thereby entering combat with reduced resources;
Deception, by forcing the enemy to reallocate forces to a
threatened region during the preparatory stages of combat
operations;
Division, by convincing the enemy that he must operate in
opposition to coalition interests;
Pacification, by leading the enemy to believe that pre-
planned operational training is occurring rather than
offensive preparations, thus reducing his vigilance;
Deterrence, by creating the perception of insurmountable
superiority;
Provocation, by forcing him into taking action advantageous
to your side;
Overload, by dispatching an excessively large number of

messages to the enemy during the preparatory period;
Suggestion, by offering information that affects the enemy
legally, morally, ideologically, or in other areas; and
Pressure, by offering information that discredits the
government in the eyes of its population.396
ǀĞŶƉƌŝŽƌƚŽƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂƐŽŵĞh͘^͘ĂŶĂůǇƐƚƐŚĂĚĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞůǇ
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚƚŚĞŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚƐĨŽƌ
ĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇŝŶƚŚĞŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŽů͗
x ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌŽĨĂŶŝŵĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ͗ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂŶŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ
ǁŝƚŚĂŶĞƌƌŽŶĞŽƵƐŽƌŝŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞŝŵĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ͘
x ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŐŽĂůĨŽƌƚŚĞŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ͗ƉƵƚƚŝŶŐĂŶŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚŝŶĂ
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĞŵƵƐƚƐĞůĞĐƚĂŐŽĂůŝŶŽƵƌĨĂǀŽƌ;for
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ƉƌŽǀŽŬŝŶŐĂŶĞŶĞŵǇǁŝƚŚĂƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚŚĞŵƵƐƚ
νσπ ^͘ ͘<ŽŵŽǀ͕͞ďŽƵƚDĞƚŚŽĚƐĂŶĚ&ŽƌŵƐŽĨŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐ/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕͟Military
Thought͕EƵŵďĞƌξ͕λσσρ͕ĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶdŚŽŵĂƐ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐZĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞŽŶƚƌŽůdŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͕͟ƉƉ͘μξς-μξσ͘
152
ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇƌĞƐƉŽŶĚͿ͘
x ĨŽƌŵŝŶŐĂŐŽĂůďǇƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌŝŶŐĂŶŝŵĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ͗
ĨĞŝŐŶŝŶŐǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐŽƌĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂĨĂůƐĞƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ͘
x ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌŽĨĂŶŝŵĂŐĞŽĨŽŶĞ͛ƐŽǁŶƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ͗
ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂŶŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĨĂůƐĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽƌƉŽƌƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞƚƌƵƚŚďĂƐĞĚŽŶŽŶĞ͛ƐŽǁŶƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ͘
x ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌŽĨĂŶŝŵĂŐĞŽĨŽŶĞ͛ƐŽǁŶŐŽĂů͗ĂĨĞŝŶƚďǇĂ
ďĂƐŬĞƚďĂůůƉůĂǇĞƌŝƐĂĐůĂƐƐŝĐĞǆĂŵƉůĞǁŚĞƌĞǇŽƵĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞ
ĞŶĞŵǇ͛ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĞƌĞŚĞƚŚŝŶŬƐǇŽƵĂƌĞŽƌĂƌĞŶŽƚ
ŐŽŝŶŐ͘
x ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌŽĨĂŶŝŵĂŐĞŽŶŽŶĞ͛ƐŽǁŶĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ͗ŐŝǀŝŶŐĂĨĂůƐĞ
ǀŝĞǁŽĨŽŶĞ͛ƐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐĂŶĚĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵƐĨŽƌĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-ŵĂŬŝŶŐ͘
x ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌŽĨŽŶĞ͛ƐŽǁŶŝŵĂŐĞŽĨĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞ
ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚĚĞĚƵĐĞŚŝƐŽǁŶŐŽĂů͗ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ ĂĨĂůƐĞŝŵĂŐĞŽĨ
ŽŶĞ͛ƐŽǁŶƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ͕ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůĞǀĞůŽĨƌŝƐŬ͘
x ĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨĂďŝůĂƚĞƌĂůĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚďǇĂƚŚŝƌĚƉĂƌƚǇ͘
x ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŽǀĞƌĂŶŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚǁŚŽŝƐƵƐŝŶŐZĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞŽŶƚƌŽů͗
ĞǆƉůŽŝƚŝŶŐŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƐŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŽƌƐŽǁŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨZĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞŽŶƚƌŽů͘
x ĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌĂŶŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚǁŚŽƐĞĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞŝƐŐĂŵĞƚŚĞŽƌǇ͘νσρ
ƐdŝŵdŚŽŵĂƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚ ĂƐŝŶŐůĞŐůŽďĂů
͚ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐƉĂĐĞ͛ŝƐĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ͕ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚĂůůŽǁĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƚŽĞǆƉůŽŝƚ
ƚŚŝƐƐƉĂĐĞĂŶĚĂůƚĞƌƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ͘͟ νσς dŚĞŝƌƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƚŚĞ͞ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ͟ŽĨĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇŐůŽďĂůŝǌĞĚƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ
ĂůůŽǁƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽŽĨĨƐĞƚƚŝŶŐh͘^͘
^ƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂůŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ͕ƚŚĂƚŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚ
νσρ ůŝĨĨŽƌĚZĞŝĚ͕͞ZĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞŽŶƚƌŽůŝŶ^ŽǀŝĞƚDŝůŝƚĂƌǇWůĂŶŶŝŶŐ͕͟Soviet Strategic Deception,

ĞĚŝƚĞĚďǇƌŝĂŶĂŝůĞǇĂŶĚWĂƚƌŝĐŬWĂƌŬĞƌ͕^ƚĂŶĨŽƌĚ͕ĂůŝĨŽƌŶŝĂ͗dŚĞ,ŽŽǀĞƌ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶWƌĞƐƐ͕
λσςρ͕ĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶdŚŽŵĂƐ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐZĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞŽŶƚƌŽůdŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚƚŚĞDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͕͟Ɖ͘μοκ͘
νσς dŝŵŽƚŚǇdŚŽŵĂƐ͕͞dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶsŝĞǁŽĨ /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌ͕͟&ƚ͘>ĞĂǀĞŶǁŽƌƚŚ͕<^͕&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐKĨĨŝĐĞ͕μκκκ͖DŝĐŚĂĞůƌƵƚĐŚĞƌ͕͞dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵĞĚ&ŽƌĐĞƐĂƚƚŚĞĂǁŶŽĨƚŚĞ
DŝůůĞŶŶŝƵŵ͕͟ĂƌůŝƐůĞ͕W͗h͘^͘ƌŵǇtĂƌŽůůĞŐĞ͕ĂƌůŝƐůĞ͕μκκκ͕ĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶ^ƚĞǀĞdĂƚŚĂŵ͕
U.S. Governmental Information Operations and Strategic Communications: A Discredited Tool
or Use Failure? Implications for Future Conflict͕ĂƌůŝƐůĞĂƌƌĂĐŬƐ͕W͗hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐƌŵǇtĂƌ
ŽůůĞŐĞWƌĞƐƐ͕ĞĐĞŵďĞƌμκλν͕Ɖ͘οξ͘
153
ŝƚƐĞůĨĂƐƐŽĨƚĨŽƌĐĞ– ĂƚĞƌŵĐŽŝŶĞĚďǇDŽƐĐŽǁ^ƚĂƚĞhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇůĞĐƚƵƌĞƌ
ŶĚƌĞǇWƌŽŶŝŶ͘νσσ
tŚĞŶƚŚĞZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨ'ĞŽƌŐŝĂŵŽǀĞĚĐůŽƐĞƌƚŽ EdK͕ŚĂǀŝŶŐƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ
ŶŽĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŝŶƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚZĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞŽŶƚƌŽůƚŽƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĂŶĚƉƌŽǀŽŬĞĂ
'ĞŽƌŐŝĂŶWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚDŝŬŚĂŝů^ĂĂŬĂƐŚǀŝůŝ400 ;ǁŚŽƐĞƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇƚŚĞǇŚĂĚ
ĐĂƌĞĨƵůůǇƉƌŽĨŝůĞĚͿƚŽŝŵďƵĞĂĨĂůƐĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ͘ŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐ
ƐŽĨƚĨŽƌĐĞ͕ƚŚĞĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂŶ/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ;/KͿ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇƐŚĂƉĞĚƚŚĞ'ĞŽƌŐŝĂŶWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ͛ƐŝŵĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ͕
ĐĂƵƐĞĚƉĂƌĂůǇƐŝƐŝŶƚŚĞtĞƐƚ͕ĂŶĚĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐĂŵŽŶŐ'ĞŽƌŐŝĂŶĂŶĚ
tĞƐƚĞƌŶĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-ŵĂŬĞƌƐ͘/ŶĂμκλκďƌŝĞĨŝŶŐƚŽEdK͕ƚŚĞEŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶ
DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨĞĨĞŶƐĞ
…concluded that the Russian IO Campaign was focused on
four strategic objectives: (1) discredit and criminalize
Georgian operations as genocide; (2) undermine the
credibility of President Saakashvili; (3) legitimize its own
invasion of South Ossetia; and (4) use CNO to cut Georgian
communications at the critical early stages of the campaign.
The desired end state, according to the Norwegians, was
twofold: to prevent NATO intervention and support for
Georgia, and to solidify internal domestic Russian support. 401
The Initial Stage of Period: Context as the Key

ƐĞĂƌůǇĂƐƚŚĞλσνκƐ͕^ŽǀŝĞƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐŚĂĚ͞ƌĞĂĐŚĞĚƚŚĞ
ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĨƵƚƵƌĞǁĂƌƐǁŽƵůĚ͕ĂƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůƌƵůĞ͕ďĞŐŝŶǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ a
νσσ ^ĞĞdĂƚŚĂŵ͕U.S. Governmental Information Operations and Strategic Communications: A

Discredited Tool or Use Failure? Implications for Future Conflict͕Ɖ͘οο͘
400 ŚĂƌůĞƐůĂŶĚǇ͕͞'ĞŽƌŐŝĂΘZƵƐƐŝĂ͗&ƵƌƚŚĞƌĞƚĞƌŝŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕͟Z'WĂƉĞƌ͕
^ǁŝŶĚŽŶ͕hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ͗h<ĞĨĞŶĐĞĐĂĚĞŵǇ͕ƵŐƵƐƚμμ͕μκκς͕ĂƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶdĂƚŚĂŵ͕
ibid. ƉƉ͘οο-56.
401 ͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐͬKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŝŶ'ĞŽƌŐŝĂμκκς͕͟ƌŝĞĨŝŶŐƚŽEdK^ĞŶŝŽƌ
KĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ/ŶĨŽKƉƐKƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽƵƌƐĞ͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌμν͕μκλκ͕ĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶdĂƚŚĂŵ͕U.S.
Governmental Information Operations and Strategic Communications: A Discredited Tool or
Use Failure? Implications for Future Conflict͕Ɖ͘οο͘
154
ĨŽƌŵĂůĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁĂƌ͘͟ 402 Stealth in training and the sudden onset
of offensive operations are perceived by Russian military planners as
fundamental to strategic success. /ƚŝƐĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĂƚĂƐƵĚĚĞŶƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶ
ƚŽƚŚĞŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞĐĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞĐŽŵďĂƚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶλ͘οĂŶĚμƚŝŵĞƐ͘dŽďĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů͕ŽŶĐĞŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĚ͕ƚŚĞŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ
ŵƵƐƚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽĚĞĐĞŝǀĞƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĞƌĂƐƚŽƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĂǆĞƐŽĨĂƚƚĂĐŬ,
ĐĂƵƐŝŶŐŚŝŵƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇŝŶƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƚĞƌƌĂŝŶĂŶĚ͕
ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ͕ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐĞŶĞŵǇĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞŵ
ĨƌŽŵǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁŝŶŐƚŽĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĚĞƉƚŚ͘dŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌŐƌŽƵƉƐŽŶĚŝƐƉĂƌĂƚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐĂůůŽǁƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ
ĚĞĨĞĂƚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĞƌƐĨŽƌĐĞƐ͛ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂƚƚĂĐŬƐďǇŵĞĂŶƐŽĨƐƚƌŝŬĞƐ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞŝƌĨůĂŶŬƐĂŶĚƌĞĂƌ͘ 403
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐŚĂǀĞĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚ
the initial period of new-generation wars will be decisive for

the outcome of a war. It will comprise subversion and
provocations against the defending country’s military and
political leaders; bribing of top officials of that country to
make it ungovernable, reduce it to a state of chaos, and
force it to give up resistance; launching of information
operations, including technological information and
psychological information attack, electronic and fire
operations initiated as electronic operations; an aerospace
operation and continuing air force attacks from all directions
to the full depth of the country under attack; and electronic
noise generated by the attacking country a few hours before
the start of the aerospace operation/…/
With the start of aggression, information operations and
electronic fire strikes disorganize the government system,
demoralize the population and personnel of the armed
dŚĞŝƌ/ŵƉĂĐƚŽŶĂŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛ƐWƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂ&ƵƚƵƌĞtĂƌ͕͟Military Thought EŽ͘ξ͕μκλμ͕ƉƉ͘
16-λρ͘
403 DŝŚŬĂŝů/ůǇŝĐŚKƌůŽǀ͕͞ĞƌƚĂŝŶƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨWƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐĂŶĚŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐKĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶ
DŽĚĞƌŶŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ͕͟Military Thought͕EŽ͘λμ͕μκλκ͘
155
forces of the country attacked, and make its military and
political leaders unable to rally their forces for repelling
aggression/…/
The length of the initial period of a new-generation war will
probably depend on the attacker’s end goals, the scale of
military operations (a local or regional large-scale war)…. 404
tŚĞƚŚĞƌĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ;ŝ͘Ğ͕͘ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝŶŐŽǀĞƌƚĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ
ǁŝƚŚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůǇŽƌĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐĐŽŵďĂƚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚƌŽŽƉƐ
ĨŽƌŵĂůůǇŽŶ͞ůĞĂǀĞ͟Žƌ͞ŚŽůŝĚĂǇ͟– ĂƐZƵƐƐŝĂĚŝĚĚƵƌŝŶŐŝƚƐμκλοŽŶďĂƐ
tŝŶƚĞƌKĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚhŬƌĂŝŶĞͿŽƌĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-ŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
;ĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽƉƌĞĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚĨƌŽŵƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ
– ĂƐZƵƐƐŝĂĚŝĚŝŶĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŶŐĨŝƌĞƐƚƌŝŬĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ
WŽƌŽƐŚĞŶŬŽ͛ƐWůĂŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞŝŶƚŚĞŽŶďĂƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ƵŵŵĞƌ
KĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞμκλξͿ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŝƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƌĞƐŽůǀĞŝƚƐƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŝŶŝŶƚĞƌƐƚĂƚĞ
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďǇƵƐŝŶŐĞǀĞƌǇŬŝŶĚŽĨĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞ– by force or peacefully, or
ďǇŶŽŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŶĚŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚ;ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂůͿĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ͘͟ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚĞĂƌůŝĞƌ͕
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐǀŝĞǁŽŶĞ͛ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶĂŶĞŶĞŵǇĂƐƚŚĞ
by-ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŽĨŽŶĞ͛ƐƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐƚŽĨŝŐŚƚ͗
Any forms and methods will do to deter the aggressor by
force, such as, in the face of direct threat of attack,
demonstrative deployment of a powerful defensive task
force in the area where the aggressor is expected to strike;
an ultimatum with a caution that Russia would (in the
event of war) use nuclear weapons immediately and
exercise no restraint in employing high-precision weapons
to destroy strategically vital objectives on the aggressor’s
territory; and planning and conduct of an information
campaign to mislead the adversary about Russia’s
readiness to beat off aggression.405
dŚĞŝƌ/ŵƉĂĐƚŽŶĂŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛ƐWƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂ&ƵƚƵƌĞtĂƌ͕͟Military Thought EŽ͘ξ͕μκλμ͕Ɖ͘
25.
405 /ďŝĚ͕͘Ɖ͘μρ͘
156
dŚƵƐ͕ƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶƚŝƐĨŽƐƚĞƌĞĚƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĂŶŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚĂŬŝŶŐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽ
ƌĞƐŝƐƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ͘/ŶƚŚŝƐKƌǁĞůůŝĂŶ ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůƚǁŝƐƚŽŶƚŚĞStar
Trek ĨƌĂŶĐŚŝƐĞŽƌŐ406 ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕͞ĂůůƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞŝƐŶŽƚ
ŽŶůǇĨƵƚŝůĞ͕ŝƚŝƐĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͘͟
Since the mass media today can stir up chaos and confusion
in government and military management of any country
and instill ideas of violence, treachery, and immorality, and
demoralize the public…the information struggle must be
conducted to gain and retain information superiority and
create conditions for the government to achieve its political
objectives in peacetime, without using armed forces.407
tŚŝůĞ͞ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŝŶƚŚĞŶĞǁĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐǁŝůůďĞƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐ
ƉŽŝŶƚŽĨĞǀĞƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶŶŽǁĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞŶĞǁƚǇƉĞŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚďƌŽĂĚ
ƵƐĞǁŝůůďĞŵĂĚĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂƐƐŵĞĚŝĂĂŶĚ͕ǁŚĞƌĞĨĞĂƐŝďůĞ͕ƚŚĞŐůŽďĂů
ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ;ďůŽŐƐ͕ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƐŽĐŝĂůŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ͕ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌ
ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ͕͟ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ͞ǁĂƌƐǁŝůůďĞ
ƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚďǇĂƐŬŝůůĨƵůĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͕ŶŽŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͕ĂŶĚƐƉĞĐŝĂů
ŶŽŶǀŝŽůĞŶƚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ͘͟,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕͞ĨĂƌĨƌŽŵůŽƐŝŶŐĂŶǇŽĨŝƚƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ͕
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĨŽƌĐĞǁŝůůƚĂŬĞŽŶĂĚĚĞĚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ͘/ƚǁŝůůůĞŶĚǁĞŝŐŚƚƚŽ
ŽƚŚĞƌƚǇƉĞƐŽĨǁĂƌ͘͟ 408
Evaluation of the Threat Relative to Local Force Capabilities and

Terrain Limitations
dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͛ƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŝƐǁĞůůŬŶŽǁŶ͕ĂŶĚ
ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶĂĨŽĐƵƐŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ͘
ĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ^ŽǀŝĞƚ-ĞƌĂƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂů
406 dŚĞŽƌŐǁĞƌĞĂĨŝĐƚŝŽŶĂůĂůŝĞŶƌĂĐĞĂƉƉĞĂƌŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞ^ƚĂƌdƌĞŬĨƌĂŶĐŚŝƐĞĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞĚŽĨĂ
ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƉĞĐŝĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚĂŶĚƚƵƌŶĞĚŝŶƚŽĐǇďĞƌŶĞƚŝĐďĞŝŶŐƐĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨ
ŽǀĞƌƉŽǁĞƌŝŶŐůĞƐƐ͞ŚǇďƌŝĚ͟ƌĂĐĞƐ͕ŚĞŶĐĞ͕ƚŚĞŝƌĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌƚŽƚŚĞŵǁĂƐƚŚĞƌĞĨƌĂŝŶ
͞ƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞŝƐĨƵƚŝůĞ͘͟
ξκρ ŚĞĐŬŝŶŽǀĂŶĚŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͗/ŶŝƚŝĂůWĞƌŝŽĚƐŽĨtĂƌƐĂŶĚdŚĞŝƌ/ŵƉĂĐƚŽŶĂŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛Ɛ
WƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂ&ƵƚƵƌĞtĂƌ͕͟Ɖ͘μρ͘
408 ^͘'͘ŚĞĐŬŝŶŽǀĂŶĚ^͘͘ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕͞&ŽƌĞĐĂƐƚĨŽƌ&ƵƚƵƌĞ tĂƌƐ͗DĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶtŚĂƚdŚĞǇ
tŝůů>ŽŽŬ>ŝŬĞ͕͟Military Thought͕EƵŵďĞƌξ͕μκλο͕Ɖ͘σν
λορ
ĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞƚŚĂƚ
͞ǁĂƌĐĂŶďĞƚƌŝŐŐĞƌĞĚŝŶ͟ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐtĞƐƚĞƌŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƚƌŝĐƚďǇ
͞ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůĐůĂŝŵƐŽŶZƵƐƐŝĂ;ŝƚƐ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚĂŶĚWƐŬŽǀƌĞŐŝŽŶƐͿďǇ
tĞƐƚĞƌŶĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĂŶĚŐƌŽǁŝŶŐĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĂŶĂƌŵĞĚ
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͕ĨŽƌƌƚŝĐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ͘͟ ξκσ ThiƐƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇŝƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞZapad
ƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƐĐĂůĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚƐŝŶĐĞλσσσ͘
'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚĂůĂŶĚĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞǆĐůĂǀĞŽĨ
<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĂƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ͖ƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚĂĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌǁŽƵůĚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĂƌĂŝů
ůŝŶŬƚŽŵŽǀĞƚƌŽŽƉƐ͕ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ͕ĂŶĚƐƵƉƉůŝĞƐ͖ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĚŝƌĞĐƚ
ƌŽƵƚĞǁŽƵůĚƉƌĞƐƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͛ƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĂŶĚƉƌĞ-tŽƌůĚtĂƌ//
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐ͕Latgale would inevitably feature as the center of gravity in
Russian planning͘WůĂŶƐĨŽƌĂĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞ
ĞƚŚŶŝĐZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐ>ĂƚŐĂůŝĂŶƉĞŽƉůĞǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞůǇ
ƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨ͛ƐƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ͕ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞĐŽǀĞƌ͕
ŶŽŵĂƚƚĞƌŚŽǁƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĞƐĞƉĞŽƉůĞƐĂƌĞƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂƌĞǀŽůƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ
ĐĞŶƚƌĂů>ĂƚǀŝĂŶ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶZţŐĂ͘ƐĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ĐŽǀĞƌĨŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚĞǆĐƵƐĞĨŽƌŽƚŚĞƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƚŽĂƌŐƵĞ
ƚŚĂƚ>ĂƚǀŝĂŝƐĂ͞ĨĂƌŽĨĨƉůĂĐĞŽĨǁŚŝĐŚǁĞŬŶŽǁůŝƚƚůĞ͕͟>ĂƚŐĂůĞĨŝƚƐƚŚĞďŝůů
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ͞ĐŽǀĞƌ͟ƐƚĂŶĚƉŽŝŶƚ͘dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ĂŶǇappearance of a lack of
NATO solidarity undermines deterrence.
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ͕NATO force levels in the Baltic States have direct
implications for regional stability͘ǀĞŶůŝŵŝƚĞĚůůŝĞĚƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ
ĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚĞƐĂŶǇƉƌĞƚĞŶƐĞĂďŽƵƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂƐ
anythŝŶŐůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶĂŶŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶ͘WƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐŽĨůůŝĞĚ
ĨŽƌĐĞƐĨƌŽŵĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŶƵĐůĞĂƌĐĂƉĂďůĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞŶŚĂŶĐĞƐ
ĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞďǇŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽĂŶǇĂƚƚĂĐŬŽŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘
&ƌŽŵĂŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ͕ĂůůƚŚƌĞĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ
ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŽĨĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐĂůŽŶŐŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĨƌŽŶƚƐ͘&Žƌ
ĂůůƚŚƌĞĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͕ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞ͞ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽƵƉ-ƚǇƉĞ͟ŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶƐŝŶ
λσξκďǇƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ͕ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶŐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐĨƌŽŵƐƉĞĐŝĂů
ξκσŚĞĐŬŝŶŽǀĂŶĚ>ƚ͘'ĞŶĞƌĂů^͘͘ŽŐĚĂŶŽǀ͕͞ZƵƐƐŝĂ͗/ŶŝƚŝĂůWĞƌŝŽĚƐŽĨtĂƌƐĂŶĚdŚĞŝƌ/ŵƉĂĐƚ
ŽŶĂŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛ƐWƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂ&ƵƚƵƌĞtĂƌ͕͟Ɖ͘μμ͘
158
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝƐĂƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ͘KŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ͕ďŽƌĚĞƌĂƌĞĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů
ŝŶ͞ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ͟ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌĨĂǀŽƌƐƚŚĞ
ĚĞĨĞŶĚĞƌ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞμλͿ͘>ŝŬĞĐĂƐĐĂĚŝŶŐǁĂƚĞƌ͕ƐƚŽŶŝĂŶĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽ
ĚĞĨĞŶĚŝƚƐƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇůĞĂǀĞƐ>ĂƚǀŝĂŵŽƌĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ͖>ĂƚǀŝĂŶ
ĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚ>ĂƚŐĂůŝǇĂůĞĂǀĞƐ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŵŽƌĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ͘
ƐƚŽŶŝĂĨĂĐĞƐǇĞƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƌŝƐŬƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƌŽůĞ^ĂĂƌĞŵĂĂĐŽƵůĚ
ƉůĂǇŝĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĞŵƉůĂĐĞĂŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĂƐƐĞƚƐŽŶƚŚĞŝƐůĂŶĚ͘
&ŽƌĐĞ-to-ƐƉĂĐĞƌĂƚŝŽƐŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂƌĞůŽǁďǇŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ
;ŶŝŶĞƚŝŵĞƐůŽǁĞƌƚŚĂŶǁĂƐƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽŶƚŚĞĞŶƚƌĂů&ƌŽŶƚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
^ŽǀŝĞƚƉĞƌŝŽĚͿ͘/ƚ͛ƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐŚĂǀĞ
ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌĐĞƐ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞμμͿŽŶĂůůƚŚƌĞĞŽĨŝƚƐ
^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶdŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕hŬƌĂŝŶĞŽĐĐƵƉŝĞƐƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽƐŚŝĨƚEdK͛Ɛ
ĂƐƚĞƌŶĞŶƚĞƌŽĨ'ƌĂǀŝƚǇƚŽWŽůĂŶĚ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞμνͿ͘
'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚŝŶ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ;ƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů
ĂŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĂŶĚŶĂǀĂůĂƐƐĞƚƐͿ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕EdK͛ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂůůŝŶĞŽĨ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ;>KͿǁŽƵůĚďĞƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚƚŽůĂŶĚƌŽƵƚĞƐĂĐƌŽƐƐ
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚWŽůĂŶĚĂŶĚŶŽƌƚŚǁĂƌĚƵƉƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞƚŚƌĞĞĂůƚŝĐ
^ƚĂƚĞƐďĞĨŽƌĞŝƚƌĞĂĐŚĞƐdĂůůŝŶŶ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞμξͿ͘dŚĞƐŝŶŐůĞ>KďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
tĂƌƐĂǁĂŶĚdĂůůŝŶŶŝƐŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĂŶςκκŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐ;ƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂ
ĨƌŽŶƚŐĂƚĞςκйŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĚĞƉƚŚŽĨĂƚŚĞĂƚĞƌŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐͿ͘
Terrain as the Context

ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ͕͞ŝŶĂŶĞƌĂŽĨŚŝŐŚ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚŝŶƐƚĂŶƚ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĂŶĚ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĐĂŶďĞƵŶĚĞƌǀĂůƵĞĚ͘͟ 410 dŚŝƐŝƐĞǀĞŶ
ŵŽƌĞƚƌƵĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŝŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌƚ͘dŽƉĂƌĂƉŚƌĂƐĞ
:ĂŬƵď:͘'ƌǇŐŝĞů, operational-strategic success depends above all on the
ability to match operations and tactical-technical capabilities to the
terrain over which competing forces contend. ͞'ůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ͕ŝŶŽƚŚĞƌ
410:ĂŬƵď:͘'ƌǇŐŝĞů͕ Great Powers and Geopolitical Change͕ĂůƚŝŵŽƌĞ͕DĂƌǇůĂŶĚ͗dŚĞ:ŽŚŶƐ

,ŽƉŬŝŶƐhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇWƌĞƐƐ͕μκκπ͘
λοσ
ǁŽƌĚƐ͕ŚĂƐŶŽƚĚĞƚĂĐŚĞĚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƐƚĂƚĞƐĨƌŽŵŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ͘͟Ɛ
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇ'ƌǇŐŝĞů͕
͙ƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĨƌĞĞƐƐƚĂƚĞƐĨƌŽŵ
ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŐĞŽƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŝŐŶŽƌĞƐƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞ
hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ͘dŽƵƐĞĂŐĂŝŶƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨ
ŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞƚƌĂĚĞ͕ƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ͞ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ͟ŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĂůĂŶĞƐ ŝƐĂ
ƌĞƐƵůƚ͕ŶŽƚŽĨŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ͕ďƵƚŽĨƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ
ƉƌĞƉŽŶĚĞƌĂŶĐĞŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŬĞĞƉƐƚƌĂĚĞƌŽƵƚĞƐŽƉĞŶƚŽ
ŐůŽďĂůƚƌĂĨĨŝĐ͕ƚŚĞƌĞďǇĂůůŽǁŝŶŐh͘^͘ĂůůŝĞƐƚŽŝŐŶŽƌĞŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƉƵƌƐƵĞĂĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚĂƚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶŐ
ĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐŬĞǇƚƌĂĚĞƌŽƵƚĞƐŽƉĞŶƚŽŐůŽďĂůƚƌĂĨĨŝĐ͕
ƚŚĞƌĞďǇĂůůŽǁŝŶŐh͘^͘ĂůůŝĞƐƚŽŝŐŶŽƌĞŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚ
ƚŽƉƵƌƐƵĞĂĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚĂƚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶŐĂŶĚ
ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐŬĞǇƚƌĂĚĞƌŽƵƚĞƐ͘ 411
ŶĂůǇƐĞƐŽĨĂƉĂĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƐĐĂůĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐƌƵŶďǇ
ƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŝŶλσσσ͕μκκσ͕ĂŶĚμκλνƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĨĞĞůĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ͞ĞǆƉŽƐĞĚ͟ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŐĞŽ-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƐƉĂĐĞƚŚĞǇƌĞĨĞƌƚŽĂƐ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚKďůĂƐƚ͘/Ŷ
ĂůůƚŚƌĞĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨƚƌĂŝŶĞĚĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞ͞ƌĞůŝĞĨ͟ŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĨŽƌĐĞƐƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐĞǆĐůĂǀĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇƵŶŝůĂƚĞƌĂůůǇ
ƐĞŝǌĞĚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌ͘
KŶĐĞƚŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐŽĨĂůĂŶĚĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ZƵƐƐŝĂƉƌŽƉĞƌĂŶĚ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚĚƵƌŝŶŐĂŶǇƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶ
north-ĞĂƐƚƵƌŽƉĞƚŽĚĂǇŝƐĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ͕ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨ
ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐŶŽƌŵƐƚŽƚŚĞŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ;ŚĞƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕
>ĂƚǀŝĂ͕>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂĂŶĚWŽůĂŶĚͿŚĞůƉƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇƚŚĞprobable main
operational axis of advance within the Western Strategic Direction of
the European TSMA (Theater of Strategic Military Action) during
Russian offensive operations ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞμξͿ͘
411
:ĂŬƵď:͘'ƌǇŐŝĞů͕Great Powers and Geopolitical Change͕ĂůƚŝŵŽƌĞ͕DĂƌǇůĂŶĚ͗dŚĞ:ŽŚŶƐ
,ŽƉŬŝŶƐhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇWƌĞƐƐ͕μκκπ͕͘Ɖ͘λππ͘
160
dŚĞƉƌĞĚŝůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĨŽƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŵŽǀĞŵĞnt by
ƌĂŝů͕ŽĨĨĞƌƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƚǁŽŽƉƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞůŝĞĨŽĨ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͗λͿƚŚĞ
ĚŝƌĞĐƚƌŽƵƚĞĨƌŽŵĞůĂƌƵƐƌƵŶŶŝŶŐƐŽƵƚŚŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŝŶsŝůŶŝƵƐ– <ĂƵŶĂƐ
ŚŝŐŚǁĂǇ͕ĂŶĚƐŽƵƚŚ-ǁĞƐƚĨƌŽŵ<ĂƵŶĂƐƚŽ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͖ŽƌμͿƚŚĞƌŽƵƚĞ
ĨƌŽŵWƐŬŽǀƐŽƵƚŚ-ǁĞƐƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚZĤǌĞŬŶĞ ĂŶĚĂƵŐĂǀƉŝůƐ͕ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞ
ƌĂŝůƌŽƵƚĞĨƌŽŵDŽƐĐŽǁƚŽZĤǌĞŬŶĞĂŶĚĨƌŽŵ^ŵŽůĞŶƐŬƚŽĂƵŐĂǀƉŝůƐ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚĐĞŶƚƌĂů>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂƚŽ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͘
Figure 21: The “boggy” terrain (marked in blue) is reflected in Russian

military forces in the region having more helicopter and fewer tanks that
would otherwise be found in Russian units. The Russian formations, in
this region also are predominately “tracked” as opposed to being
wheeled, again reflecting the poor trafficability of the terrain for off-road
movement.
161
Figure 22. While the Russian Army is short of well-training infantry, a
substantial number of the forces it does have are also fixed in place by
Ukraine’s 25 brigades.
Figure 23. ĂƐƚĞƌŶ&ƌŽŶƚĂŶĚEdKdŚĞĂƚĞƌ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ
ZĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĂůůŽĨ>ĂƚŐĂůĞ ĐĂŶďĞ͞ůŝďĞƌĂƚĞĚ͟ƉƌŝŽƌƚŽĂŶŽǀĞƌƚ
ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂ
ŐƌŽƵŶĚĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌƚŽ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶπth ƌŵǇǁŽƵůĚďĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ
ƚŽĨŽůůŽǁĂŶĂǆŝƐŽĨĂĚǀĂŶĐĞWǇƚĂůŽǀŽ– ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ– ƵŐĂǀƉŝůƐ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶ
162
ƉŚĂƐĞůŝŶĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶZŽƐŬŝƓŬŝƐĂŶĚĂƌĂƐĂŝ͕<ƵƉŝƓŬŝƐĂŶĚhƚĞŶĂ͕
WĂŶĞǀĦǎǇƐĂŶĚhŬŵĞƌŐĦ͕ĂŶĚ^ŝĂƵůŝĂŝĂŶĚ<ĦĚĂŝŶŝĂŝ͘dŚĞĂǆĞƐǁŽƵůĚ
ƚŚĞŶůŝŬĞůǇƉŝǀŽƚĂƚ<ĦĚĂŝŶŝĂŝ͕ƚŽƐǁĞĞƉƚŚƌŽƵŐŚZĂƐĞŝŶŝĂŝĂŶĚĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞ
λͬςοŚŝŐŚǁĂǇƚŽĂůŝŶŬƵƉĂƚdĂƌƵĂŐĞǁŝƚŚĨŽƌĐĞƐĐŽŵŝŶŐout of
<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚĂŶĚĂŵĂũŽƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞEĞŵƵŶĂƐZŝǀĞƌƚŽ
ĚĞƐƚƌŽǇƚŚĞƌŽŽƚŽĨƚŚĞEdKůŝŶĞŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
^ƚĂƚĞƐĨƌŽŵĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚďŽƌĚĞƌ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞμοͿ͘dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĂƌĞ
ǁĞůůĂǁĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐŝŶƚŽWŽůĂŶĚ͕ďƵƚ
ŵĂǇƌĞƐŽƌƚƚŽŝƚĂŶǇǁĂǇ͕ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŝĨƚŚĞWŽůĞƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĞŶƚĞƌ
<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͘
dŚĞƚŚĞĂƚĞƌĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐǁĂƚĞƌ-ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚƚĞƌƌĂŝŶƌƵŶŶŝŶŐƐŽƵƚŚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
'ƵůĨŽĨ&ŝŶůĂŶĚƚŽ>ĂŬĞWĞŝƉƵƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ>ĂƚŐĂůĞĂŶĚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂƚŽ
ŶŽƌƚŚĞƌŶWŽůĂŶĚĂŶĚǁĞƐƚƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞμλͿ͘dŚŝƐƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ
ŝƐŶŽƚ͞ŐŽŽĚƚĂŶŬĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͘͟dŚĞƵďŝƋƵŝƚŽƵƐ͞ǁĂƚĞƌ-ďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐ͟ĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚ
ƉĂƚĐŚĞƐŽĨŚĞĂǀǇĨŽƌĞƐƚƐŽĨĨĞƌǀŝĂďůĞŽƉƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĚĞĨĞŶƐĞďǇ
ŝŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐĨŽƌĐĞƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŚĞĂǀǇĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚƐƵĐŚĂƐƚĂŶŬƐ͘
ǇŬĞĞƉŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŶŽƌƚŚǁĞƐƚŽĨƚŚŝƐůŽǁƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽŽŶůǇƚƌĂŶƐŝƚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝƌƚǇŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚŝƐůĂŬĞ-ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ
ƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ͘'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ'ĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŝƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌĨŝĞůĚƐŽĨƐƚƵĚǇ
ŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ͕ŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŶŽƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
ƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘dŚĞƌĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƉƌĞƐƐƌĞƉŽƌƚƐƚŚĂƚ͟ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƐĞĐƌĞƚEdK
ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐZƵƐƐŝĂŶĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚƐƐƚƵĚŝĞĚďƌŝĚŐĞƐŝŶƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶƐƚŽŶŝĂ͟
ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ƉƌŝŶŐŽĨμκλο͘ 412
412 ĂůƚŝĐEĞǁƐ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ͕dĂůůŝŶŶ͕ƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕DĂǇπ͕μκλπ͘
163
Figure 24: Probable Main Operational Axes into the Baltic States. It is
important to understand that the Operational Axes do not necessarily reflect
the routes Tactical Axes could move along to seize control of Operational Axes.
Operational Axes are zones through which Lines of Communication move.
Figure 25: The main reinforcements in the first 30 days would be the Allied
Rapid Reaction Corps, which would most likely deploy via rail through Germany
and Poland to the Baltic States.
164
Maneuver by Fires
dŚĞ ůĞƐƐŽŶƐ ůĞĂƌŶĞĚ by ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƉůĂŶŶĞƌƐ on ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ of
ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ĨƌŽŵ ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ of ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐ by ƚŚĞ
ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ tĞƐƚĞƌŶ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͕ ŝƐ that ground combat is usually conducted
in the absence of clearly defined lines of contact of the opposing
forces, the presence of open flanks, as well as frequent breaks or even
large gaps in operations. &ŝƌĞ ƐƚƌŝŬĞƐ ĂƌĞ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ ďĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĂŶŐĞ
of ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨĞŶĚĞƌ͛Ɛ ĨŝƌĞ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ air ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐ͘ &ŝƌĞ ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ of ƚŚĞ
ĞŶĞŵǇ͕ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ no ůŽŶŐĞƌ ĚĞƉĞŶĚƐ on ĐůŽƐŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĞŶĞŵǇ ŐƌŽƵŶĚ
ĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ but ͞ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌĞ ĚĂŵĂŐĞ at ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ůĞǀĞů͕ ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐ on ƚŚĞ
ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ of ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ͕ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ͕ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ͕ ĂŶĚ
ĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶic ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ ůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐƐ͕ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŵĞĂŶƐ of ƐƚƌŝŬĞƐ͘͟
'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ͕ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŝŶĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ͕ŝƚŝƐ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽĚǁĞůůĨŽƌĂŵŽŵĞŶƚŽŶŚŽǁmodern technology has
provided fundamentally new means of maneuver.
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞŚŽǁƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂƌƚ
ŚĂǀĞĞǀŽůǀĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌŽĨƚƌŽŽƉƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚtŽƌůĚtĂƌ
ƚŽƚŚĞŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌŽĨĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĂŶĚŵĞĐŚĂŶŝǌĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚ
tŽƌůĚtĂƌƚŽƚŚĞŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌŽĨĨŝƌĞƐďǇĂŝƌ͕ŵŝƐƐŝůĞĂŶĚĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶ
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƉĞƌŝŽĚ͘dŚĞƐĞĨŝƌĞƐ͕ŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ͕ŵƵƐƚďĞ
ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌŽĨŐƌŽƵŶĚĂŶĚĂŝƌďŽƌŶĞƚƌŽŽƉƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ
ƐƚƌŝŬĞƚŚĞĨůĂŶŬƐĂŶĚƌĞĂƌŽĨƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ͘dŚŝƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ
ƚŚĞƌĞƐƵƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŵǇǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ͞ŝŶŝƚƐƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƋƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ
ĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ͘͟
dŚƵƐ͕ of the three major components of combat – fire, maneuver, and
assault forces – today it is the first two that are most decisive, ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
ĂƐƐĂƵůƚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ͞ǁŝůů ŽŶůǇ ďĞ ƵƐĞĚ to ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨĞĂƚ of ƚŚĞ ĞŶĞŵǇ͘͟
It ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌ of ĨŝƌĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ of ƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-ŐƵŝĚĞĚ ŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶƐ –
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚ by aviation, ŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐ or ĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ that ǁŝůů ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ
ĂƚƚĂĐŬ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ŝƚƐ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ͘
dŚĞŬĞǇƚŽƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝƐƚŽĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƚŽĚŝƐƉĞƌƐĞŚŝƐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞďǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ͞ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŝŶŵĂŶƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚŝŶ
ƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚĂƌĞĂƐ͘͟ ƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ͕͞ĂůůƚŚŝƐŝƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŽŶůǇŝŶ
165
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂďƐŽůƵƚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĂĞƌŽƐƉĂĐĞĂŶĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ
ƐƉĂĐĞ͟ǁŚŝůĞĂǀŽŝĚŝŶŐƉƌŽůŽŶŐĞĚĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ŽĨƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ͘/ŶĨĂĐƚ͕ƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŝƐŶŽƚƚŽƐĞĞŬ͞ƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůĚĞĨĞĂƚŽĨƚŚĞ
ĞŶĞŵǇĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕͟ďƵƚƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĞĨĨŽƌƚĂƚƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĞǀĞůŝƐĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚĂƚ
͞ƚŚĞĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ
ĂŶĚĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŵĞĂŶƐŽĨ
ƐƚƌŝŬĞƐ͘͟/ŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨ͞ĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƉĂƚŝĂůƐĐŽƉĞŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕͟ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞ͞ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶƋƵĞƐƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞĂŝƌƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĂĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚĂƐŬĂŶĚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐƚŚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨ
ŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘͟ŽŶĐƌĞƚĞůǇƉƵƚ͕͞ƵŶůŝŬĞƉĂƐƚǁĂƌƐ͕ŝŶƚŚĞ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞμκth ĂŶĚďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞμλƐƚ ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ͕ƚŚĞ
ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŝŶƚĂŶŬƐĂŶĚŵĂŶƉŽǁĞƌĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĐƌĞĂƚĞƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞ
ƉƌĞƌĞƋƵŝƐŝƚĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĚĞĨĞĂƚŽĨƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇŝĨƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞĂŝƌ
ĂŶĚĨŝƌĞƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŽǀĞƌŚŝŵ͘͟ 413
ĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇŽĨ͕ĂƚƚŚĞǀĞƌǇůĞĂƐƚ͕ĂďĞŶŝŐŶĂŝƌĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ
ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŝŶĨŝƌĞƐ͕ďŽƚŚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶďĞŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚǀŝĂ͞ƚŚĞĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚ
ŽĨƐƚĞĂůƚŚƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƵĚĚĞŶŽŶƐĞƚŽĨƚŚĞŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ͕͟ŝƚŝƐĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƚŽ
͞ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐĞŶĞŵǇĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůǌŽŶĞĂŶĚƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ
ƚŚĞŵĨƌŽŵĚĞƉĂƌƚŝŶŐƚŽĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĚĞƉƚŚ͘͟ƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ
ƚŝŵĞ͕ƌĂƉŝĚƉĞŶĞƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĐĂŶĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇƚŽĂďĂŶĚŽŶ
ŚŝƐĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞǀĞƌǇƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨĞŶĐŝƌĐůĞŵĞŶƚ͕
ƚŚƵƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůĐŽůůĂƉƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ͛ƐƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůǌŽŶĞ
ƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĞƌůŽƐĞƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŚĞƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ͘ 414
Areas Where US Military Aid is Critical
ĞƌƚĂŝŶŵŽĚĞƌŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶĂƐƐŝƐƚŝŶƚŚĞ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂƌĞƐŝŵƉůǇƚŽŽĐŽƐƚůǇĨŽƌĂŶǇďƵƚƚŚĞ
ǁĞĂůƚŚŝĞƐƚŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘&ŽƌĞŵŽƐƚĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞƐĞŝƐŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ͕ƐƵƌǀĞŝůůĂŶĐĞ
ĂŶĚƌĞĐŽŶŶĂŝƐƐĂŶĐĞĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇ͘&ŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂƚŽŵŽƵŶƚĂŶŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕ŝƚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽĂƐƐĞŵďůĞĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞ
ǁĞƐƚĞƌŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌ;ĂŶĚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŝŶĞůĂƌƵƐͿ͘dŚŝƐƚĂŬĞƐƚŝŵĞ͕ĂŶĚ
ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŽďƐĞƌǀĂďůĞĨƌŽŵƐƉĂĐĞ͘dŚŝƐŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĐĂŶƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĞĂƌůǇ
413 DŝŬŚĂŝů/ůǇŝĐŚKƌůŽǀ͕ĞƌƚĂŝŶƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨWƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐĂŶĚŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐKĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶ
DŽĚĞƌŶŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ͕͟Military Thought͕EŽ͘λμ͕μκλκ͘
414 /ďŝĚ͘
166
ǁĂƌŶŝŶŐŽĨĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƚƚĂĐŬ͕ĂŶĚŵĂǇŽĐĐƵƌĨĂƌĞŶŽƵŐŚŝŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƚŽ
ĂůůŽǁEdKƚŽĚĞƚĞƌƚŚĞĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƌĂƉŝĚŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨEdK
ĨŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚŵĞĂŶƐ͘
^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŝƌƉŽǁĞƌĐĂŶďĞƵƐĞĚƚŽĚŝƐƌƵƉƚŽƌĚĞƐƚƌŽǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐƐ
ƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨƐƵƉƉůǇĂŶĚƐƵƉƉůǇƌŽƵƚĞƐ͘,ĞĂǀǇďŽŵďĞƌƐƵƐŝŶŐƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ
ŐƵŝĚĞĚǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĐĂŶŵĂŬĞĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞůĂŶĚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝĨ
ƵƐĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚĂƌŐĞƚƐĞƚ͘EƵĐůĞĂƌĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞŵĂǇďĞƚŚĞŽŶůǇ
ǁĂǇƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶƵƐĞŽĨƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ͘WŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚ
ĂĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞĨŽƌĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽĂĨŝƌƐƚƵƐĞ
ŽŶƚŚĞďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚŵĂǇƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞŝƌƵƐĞďǇƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ
ƉůĂĐĞ͘
λπρ
CHAPTER 4
Campaign Assessment
Nicholas Myers with Edmund Bitinas
NATO Operations in a Russian Coalitional Warfare Context

^ŝŶĐĞŝƚƐĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ͕EdK͛Ɛ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉůĂŶƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂƚĞĚĨƌŽŵŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĨƌŽŵĂĐĞŶƚƌĂůƐƚĂĨĨ, ŶŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŵĂŶǇ
ŵƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂůĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ. ǇĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ͕ƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůtĂƌƐĂǁWĂĐƚĂŶĚ
ƚŽĚĂǇ͛ƐZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƵŶŝĨŝĞĚƉůĂŶƚŽǁŝŶĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚĂƚƚŚĞƚŚĞĂƚĞƌůĞǀĞů͘
tŚĞŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐ͕^ŽǀŝĞƚĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝƐƚƐŚĂǀĞ
ƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽĞǆƉůŽŝƚŐĂƉƐŝŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƉůĂŶƐƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ
ĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ-ǁŝĚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ. ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͕^ŽǀŝĞƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ƚŚŝŶŬĞƌƐƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƚŚŝƐĂƐ͞ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶĂůǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘͟tŚŝůĞƚŚŝƐ ƚĞƌŵĚŽĞƐ
ŶŽƚĂƉƉĞĂƌĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ŝŶĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇũŽƵƌŶĂůƐ͕ƚŚĞ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐĞĞŵƐto ďĞ ĂĐĞŶƚƌĂůĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtar.
dŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶĂůǁĂƌĨĂƌĞƚŽĚĂǇŝƐ ƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞ
ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐǇĞƚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶŐEdK-ŵĞŵďĞƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ͕ďŽƚŚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŶĚŶŽŶ-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͘/ƚƐĞĞŬƐƚŽĚŝǀŝĚĞĂŶĚǁĞĂŬĞŶ
ƚŚĞƌĞƐŽůǀĞŽĨƚŚĞůůŝĂŶĐĞďǇƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞŵŝŶĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďůĞ
ǀŝĞǁƐŽŶƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌŝƐŬƐ ƉŽƐĞĚ ďǇZƵƐƐŝĂ͘ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ͕ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐƵŶĚĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚŚƌĞĂƚŽƌĂƌĞƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽĞǀĞŶ
ĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͖ǁŚŝůĞŽƚŚĞƌƐĨĞĞůĂ
ƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚƐĞŶƐĞŽĨǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚƌĞƐŽƌƚƚŽŝŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ
ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞĂůůŝĂŶĐĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ͘
ďŽǀĞĂůů͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽďĞ
ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůĐŽŶƋƵĞƐƚďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌĚŝǀŝĚŝŶŐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐŝƚ
ŝŶĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇ͘dŚŝƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŚĂƐ
ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞƌŽŽƚƐ͕ŶŽƚƚŚĞůĞĂƐƚŽĨǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ
ĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŵŝŶĚƐĞƚ͘TŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĞĞŬƐƚŽ
ƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨŝƚƐƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ;ŶĂŵĞůǇ͕ĂůůƉĂƌƚƐŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ
168
DŽƐĐŽǁͿĂŶĚĚĞƚĞƌ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ƚŽƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚƌŽů 415͘ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĂůůŚĂǀĞĂroot ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ
ƌŽŽƚƐŽĐŝĂůĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨĂĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŶĂƚŝŽŶ-ƐƚĂƚĞ͘n
ŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐŶƵŵďĞƌ of ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƚŚƌĞĂƚƐĞůĞǀĂƚĞƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ͛ƐǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽĐŽŶƐĞŶƚƚŽĐŽĞƌĐŝǀĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ͘
tŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ ĨƌŽŶƚŝĞƌǁŝƚŚEdKŝƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇƐĞĐƵƌĞďŽƌĚĞƌ ZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂƐ, tŚĞ
ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŽĨŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽĨĂĐĞĂ ĨŝƌŵůǇ ƵŶŝƚĞĚƵƌŽƉĞŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĨƵƚƵƌĞ
ƉŽǁĞƌĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚůǇƵŶŶĞƌǀĞƐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŵƉĞƌŝĂů
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚƉĂŶ-ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇ
ďĞĐŽŵĞƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ͘
dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂĚĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚƚŚĞhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶĐƌŝƐŝƐĂŶĚ
ĂŶŶĞǆĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝŵĞĂƚŽďĞŽĨƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇůŝƚƚůĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ͛ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ͘dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ƚŚĞŵƵůƚŝ-ǇĞĂƌďƌŽĂĚ-ƌĂŶŐŝŶŐ
ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐůĞǀŝĞĚŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŚĂǀĞĐŽŵĞĂƐĂƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞ͘EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ͕ƚŚĞǇ
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĐĞŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝan ǀŝĞǁ ŽĨEdKĂƐZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐŵŽƐƚĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ
ĨŽĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŽƌĞƐĞĞĂďůĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ͘ 416 'ƌŽǁŝŶŐůŽŶŐ-ƚĞƌŵƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ– ŵŽƐƚŶŽƚĂďůǇŚŝŶĂŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&Ăƌ
ĂƐƚĞƌŶďŽƌĚĞƌ– ŽŶůǇĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞ ƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐǁŝĨƚůǇĂŶĚĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞůǇǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞƚĂƐŬŝƐĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇ
ƐŝŵƉůĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŽƚŚĞŚŝŶĞƐĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŝƐŶŽƚŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ.
>ŝŬĞŽƚŚĞƌĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ WĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ
ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ĂŶŽǀĞƌƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ ĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨƐƵďƚůĞƌ͕ŵŽƌĞ
ŶƵĂŶĐĞĚŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ͘ŶŝĚĞĂůZƵƐƐŝĂŶŶĞǁŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ
ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐƐƵĐĐĞĞĚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůĞĂƐƚǀŝŽůĞŶƚĂŶĚŵŽƐƚĐŽǀĞƌƚ ŽƉƚŝŽŶƐ
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽƚĂĐƚŝĐƐĞŶĚĂŶŐĞƌŝŶŐ ŽƚŚĞƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ͘
dŚŽƵŐŚǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ of EĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtarfĂƌĞĐĂŶďĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ
ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ͕ĞĂĐŚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇŽĨŝƚƐ
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂŶƵŶǁĂŶƚĞĚŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇƚŽƌĂŝƐĞ ƚŚĞƐƚĂŬĞƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ
to ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ.
415 dŚŝƐŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĚŝĨĨĞƌƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ-ƐƚĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ
ƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ͕ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŝŵƉůǇĂĐƚƐĂƐĂŶĂƌďŝƚĞƌŽĨĂƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
ĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐŝŶĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŶĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝůĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌŝůǇĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ŶĂƚŝŽŶ͛Ɛ
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌŝƐŬ͘
416 ZƵƐƐŝĂŶEĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͕μκλξ
λπσ
Establishing a Favorable Socio-Economic and Political Environment
In ƵƌŽƉĞ͕RƵƐƐŝĂƐĞĞŬƐƚŽƌĞǀŝƐĞƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐƋƵŽ͘dŽƚŚŝƐĞŶĚ͕ŝƚĞǆƉůŽŝƚƐ
ƐŽĐŝŽ-ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŝƚŝĞƐŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐďǇĨĂǀŽƌŝŶŐďŝůĂƚĞƌĂůĨŽƌŵĂƚƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ͕ǁŚĞŶĞǀĞƌ
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ͕ĞǆĐůƵĚŝŶŐŵƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ĂŶĚĐŚĂŶŶĞůƐ͘
ĐƚŝǀĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ƌĞŵĂŝŶĐŽǀĞƌƚto ĂǀŽŝĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĂƚƚŚĞ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚůĞǀĞů͘&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶǀĞƐƚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇŝŶĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĂƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛Ɛ
ŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ͕ƚŚĞ<ƌĞŵůŝŶŵŝŐŚƚĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞ ĂƉƌŝǀĂƚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ
ŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚĂƚĞ-ŽǁŶĞĚĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ͕ĞǀĞŶŝĨƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇŵƵƐƚƐƵďƐŝĚŝǌĞ ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇto
ĞŶĂďůĞƚŚĞ ƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶ͘
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚĞŽƚŚĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͛ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĞƐĂŝŵƚŽƐŚĂƉĞ
thĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ͘ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉůĂŶŶĞƌƐƐƚƵĚǇ
ƚŚĞǀĂƌŝĞĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚƌĞŐŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ
ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞĂƐĂƌĞĚĞƉƌĞƐƐĞĚǀĞƌƐƵƐǁŚĂƚĂƌĞĂƐĂƌĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇƉƌŽƐƉĞƌŽƵƐ
ĂŶĚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŚŽǁƚŽĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝǌĞŽŶůŽĐĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐƚŽŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŽ
ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐƋƵŽ͘ξλρ /ŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞŐĂƉƐĨůŽǁƐƚŚĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƐŽĐŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ͘
ŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ͕ŽǀĞƌƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƉůĂǇ ƚŽĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ 418 ĂŶĚŶŽƚƉĂƌƚŽĨ
EĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘ ξλσ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƌĂƌĞůǇƚĂŬĞƐƚŚĞ
ĨŽƌŵŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚĂƚĞĚƉŽůŝĐǇ.
^ŽĐŝĂůŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇƐǇŵƉĂƚŚĞƚŝĐŽƌĚŝƐĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ
ĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐŐƌŽƵƉƐ͘ƚŚŶŝĐZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐƐĞŐŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂƌĞƉƌŝŵĞƚĂƌŐĞƚƐŝŶ͞ƚŚĞŶĞĂƌĂďƌŽĂĚ͘͟,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ŝŶƚŚĞ
ξλρ WĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞďĞƐƚĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞŽŝůƉŝƉĞůŝŶĞ
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶƉƌŝŽƌƚŽƚŚĞμκλξƉŽůĂƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨZƵƐƐŝan-tĞƐƚĞƌŶ
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘EŽƌĚ^ƚƌĞĂŵ͕ƚŽƚĂŬĞŽŶĞĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚǇ͕ŽĨĨĞƌĞĚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶŶĂƚƵƌĂůŐĂƐ
ƚŽ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĐŽƌĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽǁĞƌƐ͕ďǇƉĂƐƐŝŶŐWŽůĂŶĚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƉƵďůŝĐƚŽĂǀŽŝĚƚŚĞĚŝůĞŵŵĂŽĨůŝƐƚĞŶŝŶŐƚŽWŽůŝƐŚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ
ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞƵƉŽŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶŶĂƚƵƌĂůŐĂƐĞǆƉŽƌƚƐƵƉŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͘
418 tŝƚŶĞƐƐŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͛ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽďĂŶĨŽŽĚŝŵƉŽƌƚƐĨƌŽŵŵƵĐŚ
ŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ͘dŚŝƐŚĂƐŚĂĚůŝƚƚůĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ͕ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉůŽǇ
ĨŽƌĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŚĂƐŝŶƚƵƌŶďĂĐŬĨŝƌĞĚ͘dŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽĚĂǇŵŽƐƚůŝŬĞůǇ
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞůĨ-ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ͘
ξλσ dŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƐĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŵĂǇďĞƉĞƌƚŝŶĞŶƚƚŽďŽth.
λρκ
ĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶĚŝĂƐƉŽƌĂƐ͕ŽƌǁŚĞŶŽƚŚĞƌƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƐĞĞŶĂƐ
ŵŽƌĞƉƌŽŶĞƚŽŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŵĂǇĨŽĐƵƐŽŶŽƚŚĞƌ
ĞƚŚŶŝĐŝƚŝĞƐ. 420 ZƵƐƐŝĂĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇƐĞĞŬƚŽŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĂŶĚĚŝƌĞĐƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ
of ƚŚĞƐĞŐƌŽƵƉƐƚŽĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŝƚƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ͕421 ďƵƚĂůƐŽĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚĞƐ
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƐƐĞƚƐĂŶĚĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞŵƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚďĞĂĐƚŝǀĂƚĞĚfor
ŬŝŶĞƚŝĐĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐĚƵƌŝŶŐĐƌŝƐĞƐ.
ǀĞŶif ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĂŐŝƚĂƚĞĚƐŽĐŝĂůŐƌŽƵƉĚŽŶŽƚĂůŝŐŶǁŝƚŚ
DŽƐĐŽǁ͛ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ͕ ƚŚĞŝƌĚŝƐƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
ƌĞĚƵĐĞƐƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĚƵƌŝŶŐĂ
ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚĂŶĚ ƐŽǁƐ ƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛ƐĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƉĞĂĐĞƚŝŵĞ͘
dŽƐŚĂƉĞ ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚŽƉƉŽƐĞƉĂŶ-ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ 422 ĂŶĚ ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ for ůŽĐĂů
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘ 423 tŚŝůĞƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĂƌĞƵƐƵĂůůǇƐǇŵƉĂƚŚĞƚŝĐ
ƚŽǁĂƌĚ ƚŚĞůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨsůĂĚŝŵŝƌWƵƚŝŶ͕ƚŚĞǇ ƌĂƌĞůǇĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇĐĂůůƵƉŽŶ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŝƌƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ. IŶƐƚĞĂĚ͕ƚŚĞǇƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚďǇWƵƚŝŶ͛ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂƌĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚ
ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐ.
dŚĞǁŝůĚůǇĚŝǀĞƌŐĞŶƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƉƌŽǆǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐƋƵŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĞRussian preference for bilateral relationships
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƌĞŐŝŽŶƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƐĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐƉĞƌƚĂŝŶĂŶĚ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŝƚƐĞůĨ͘
ŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝƐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ
ŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŽǁƚŚĞtĞƐƚŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂůŝǌĞƐ
420 ^ƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨĨĂƌ-ƌŝŐŚƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐŝŶǁĞƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ
WŽůŝƐŚŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇŝŶ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂĂƌĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŽĨEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝǌŝŶŐŶŽŶ-ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ
ŽǀĞƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘
421 >ĞƐƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝƐĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĂĐƚŝǀĞƐǇŵƉĂƚŚǇƚŽDŽƐĐŽǁ͛ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘ǀĞŶŝŶƚŚĞŽŶďĂƐ͕ĨĂƌŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĞĨĨŽƌƚǁĂƐĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŽĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝǌŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͛Ɛ
ĂŶƚŝƉĂƚŚǇƚŽƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶ<ǇŝǀƚŚĂŶŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞĚŝƐĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ĚĞƐŝƌŽƵƐŽĨĂƌĞƚƵƌŶŽĨDŽƐĐŽǁ͛ƐƌƵůĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘
422 ,ĞŶĐĞƚŚĞĞƋƵĂůǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨĂƌƌŝŐŚƚĂŶĚĨĂƌůĞĨƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ
ƵƉŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŵŽƌĞŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽEdKĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ͘ŽƚŚƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚ-ǁŝŶŐ&ƌŽŶƚEĂƚŝŽŶĂů;&ƌĂŶĐĞͿ
ĂŶĚůĞĨƚ-ǁŝŶŐ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚEĂƚŝŽŶĂůWĂƌƚǇ;hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵͿŚĂǀĞƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
ŽĨƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞŝŵƉĂĐƚƐƵƉŽŶEdKƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇĚĞƌŝǀŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ͘
423 ^ƵĐŚĂƐ,ĂƌŵŽŶǇŝŶ>ĂƚǀŝĂŽƌƚŚĞĞŶƚĞƌWĂƌƚǇŝŶƐƚŽŶŝĂ͘
λρλ
͞ĐŽůŽƌƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ͘͟ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝƐƚƐĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞtĞƐƚŝŵďƵĞƐ a
ůŽĐĂůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇǁŝƚŚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŶĚƵĐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌŽŵŝƐĞƐ͕
coŶǀĞƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞŝŶƚŽĂĐƚŝǀĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĐĂŶƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇďĞ
ŵŽďŝůŝǌĞĚƚŽŝŶƐƚĂůůĂƉƌŽ-tĞƐƚĞƌŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͘dŚĞEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
WĂƌĨĂƌĞĐĂŶďĞǀŝĞǁĞĚ ĂƐĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƚƵƌŶƚŚĞƚĂďůĞƐĂŶĚ
ĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌ͞ĐŽůŽƌƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ͟ďĞŶĞĨŝƚŝŶŐ DŽƐĐŽǁ͘
ZƵƐƐŝĂĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌĐŽůŽƌƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƐŽƌƚƐǁŝƚŚŝŶ
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐby ƐƚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐǁĞĂŬƉŽŝŶƚƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐŽƌƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐĂŶĚďŽůƐƚĞƌŝŶŐĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨ
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŵĞŵďĞƌƐĂŶĚĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŚĂƌƚĞƌƐ͘&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕at ƚŚĞEdK-
ZƵƐƐŝĂŽƵŶĐŝů͕ŝƚƐĞĞŬƐƚŽƵƐĞƐǇŵƉĂƚŚĞƚŝĐ,ƵŶŐĂƌǇĂŶĚ'ƌĞĞĐĞƚŽ
ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞĚƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂƉŽƐĞƐƚŽWŽůĂŶĚ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚĞƌŽĚĞĐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůůŝĂŶĐĞ.
ƚƚŚĞŚĞŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞKďĂŵĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ͛ƐZĞƐĞƚWŽůŝĐǇ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂǁĂƐ
ĂďůĞƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŝŶƚŚĞtŽƌůĚdƌĂĚĞKƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ;ĂŚŝŐŚ-
ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂĚƉƵƌƐƵĞĚĨŽƌǇĞĂƌƐͿŝŶ
ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞĨŽƌĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŝŶĂƌĞĂƐƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂ
ƐŝŵƉůǇƐĂǁĂƐƵŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ͘>ŝŬĞǁŝƐĞ͕ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽŶŝƐƐƵĞƐ ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ
ǁĂƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ/ƐůĂŵŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞ;/^/>Ϳ͕ĂůůŽǁƐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ
to ƌĞĚƵĐĞƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĂĐƚŝǀĞĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĞǆĂĐĞƌďĂƚĞĂŶĚĞǆƉůŽŝƚ
ƉŽǁĞƌĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ.
Special Operations to Misdirect Elites
ǆƉůŽŝƚŝŶŐŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇƌƵůĞƐĂŶĚ
ŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇƌŝŐŚƚƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐŝĞƐ͕ 424 ZƵƐƐŝĂŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĂƐƐƵŵĞƐ
ƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨĂŶĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƚŽĚŝƐĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ͕ŐƌŽƵƉƐĂŶĚ
ƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ͘tĞƐƚĞƌŶĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨŵĂƐƐĚĂƚĂƚŽƐĞƌǀĞ ƐŵĂůůĞƌĂŶĚ
ƐŵĂůůĞƌƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐĞŐŵĞŶƚƐ ŵĂŬĞƐƚŚŝƐZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚŽŽůƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ͘ ǇƐƚŝƌƌŝŶŐĐĂůůƐ for ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ͕ ZƵƐƐŝĂƐƉůŝŶƚĞƌƐƚĂƌŐĞƚƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ
ĨƌŽŵďƌŽĂĚĞƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƉůĂŶƐŽƌƚŚǁĂƌƚƐƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŽƐƵĐŚ
424dŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŚĂǀŝŶŐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚĨƌŽŵĂƌŽƵŶĚοκŝŶλσξοƚŽĂƌŽƵŶĚ
μκκƚŽĚĂǇ͘dŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇĨŽƌĐĞĨŽƌĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ͕ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇĂƉƌŽďůĞŵĨŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂĂƚƚŚĞĨŝŶĂů
ĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͕ŝƐĂŐĂŝŶďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĂŶĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ͘
λρμ
ƉůĂŶƐ. 425 ǇƚŚĞƚŝŵĞĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂďĞĐŽŵĞƐ too
ŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞƐŝŵĂůůǇƐŵĂůůƚŽƐĞƌǀĞĂƐĂǀŝĂďůĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĞǀĞŶĨŽƌ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝƐƚƐǁŽƵůĚĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-ĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ
ĐŽƵůĚďĞƐŽĞĂƐŝůǇŶƵůůŝĨŝĞĚďǇĂĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ 426 that it
ŝƐŽĨŶŽƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ͘
dŽƚŚĞĞůŝƚĞƐƐŝĚĞůŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚŝƐĂǀĂůĂŶĐŚĞŽĨĚĞŵĂŶĚĨŽƌĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ͕ƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĞůƉĨƵůůǇĐĂƚĞƌƐ ĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐƚŽ
ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂƚĞƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇ͕ĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůůǇĂŶĚůĞŐĂůůǇ. &Žƌ
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ŵŽŶŽŐƌĂƉŚƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ͞ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ͟ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƌŝŵĞĂ
ǁĞƌĞƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚƐŚŽƌƚůǇĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŶŶĞǆĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉĞŶŝŶƐƵůĂŝŶ
2014. >ŝŬĞǁŝƐĞ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐŽĨƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƚƌĞŶĚƐǁŝƚŚŝŶtĞƐƚĞƌŶ
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐ͞tĞƐƚĞƌŶŚǇƉŽĐƌŝƐǇ͟ ĂƌĞƵƐĞĚƚŽũƵƐƚŝĨǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŐĞŶĚĞƌĂŶĚƐĞǆƵĂů
ŵŝŶŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ͘ ξμρ
ŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ŝŶƚŚĞtĞƐƚ ĨŽƌĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚǀŝĐƚŽƌǇin
ƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂǁŝůůŝŶŐůǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ
ĞůŝƚĞƐǁŝƚŚĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŝƚƐŽǁŶ ǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐ͘dŚŝƐƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŝŵŽĨůŝŵŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĞůŝƚĞ͛ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
ĂƐĂƌĞĂůƚŚƌĞĂƚ 428 ĂŶĚƌĞŵŽǀĞƐŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ
ƚŽƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇƐƚƵĚǇǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐ
tacticĂůƐŚŽƌƚ-ƚĞƌŵƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽŽǀĞƌĂƌĐŚŝŶŐƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŝŶĂŵĂŶŶĞƌƚŚĂƚ
ŵĂŬĞƐƉĞƌŝŽĚŝĐZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĞƐ͞ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ͕͟͞ƐŚŽĐŬŝŶŐ͕͟ĂŶĚ
͞ƵŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ͘͟ ξμσ
425 /ŶƐŽŵĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƐŽ-ĐĂůůĞĚ͞>ƵŚĂŶƐŬWĞŽƉůĞ͛ƐZĞƉƵďůŝĐ͕͟ƚŚĞũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐďĂƌĞůǇĞǆƚĞŶĚ
ĂĐƌŽƐƐǀŝůůĂŐĞƐŽĨλκκŝŶŚĂďŝƚĂŶƚƐƚŽƌĞĨůĞĐƚĂƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƌĞĨƵƚŝŶŐƚŚĞůŽĐĂů
ĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌƚĂǆƌĞǀĞŶƵĞďĞŵŝƐĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĚƚŽĂĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ͕ĞǀĞŶŝĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚ
ŝƐĂŵŽƌĞĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶDŽƐĐŽǁ͘
426 tŝƚŶĞƐƐƚŚĞĞƋƵĂůƐƵďũƵŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŽƐĞǀŝůůĂŐĞƐŝŶ>ƵŚĂŶƐŬKďůĂƐƚƚŽƉĂƐƐŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŶĚ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ďĂĐŬĞĚĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐŽƵƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĞŝƚŚĞƌƐƵƐƚĂŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚƌĞŐŝŵĞƐŝŶ
ƚŚĞŽŶďĂƐŽƌĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚhŬƌĂŝŶĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘
ξμρ ŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞĐĞŶƚ;ŝ͘Ğ͘μκth-ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇͿtĞƐƚĞƌŶĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŽŵŽƐĞǆƵĂůŝƚǇ͕ĞƚĐ͕͘ďŽƚŚ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůůǇ͘
428 dǇƉŝĐĂůůǇƚĂŬĞŶŝŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŽĚĂǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ
^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞλσςκƐŽƌĞůƐĞƌŽŽƚĞĚŝŶĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ͘
ξμσ ŽŵƉĂƌĞƚŚŝƐƚŽtĞƐƚĞƌŶĞǆƉĞƌƚŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞůŝŬĞůǇŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐƌŝƐŝƐ
ŝŶ<ǇŝǀŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇƉƌŝŽƌƚŽƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽĂŶŶĞǆƌŝŵĞĂĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨDĂƌĐŚμκλξ͘
λρν
ZƵƐƐŝĂĨŽƐƚĞƌƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŽŵĂŶƚŝĐŝƐŵ ƚŽĚŝǀŝĚĞƐŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐ. ŵƉůŝĨǇŝŶŐ
ĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŐƌŽƵƉƐůĞĨƚŽŶƚŚĞƐŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐŽĨĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐŐůŽďĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ,
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ƐƉŽŶƐŽƌĞĚŵĞĚŝĂĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐ ƚŚĞĞůŝƚĞƐ͛ĚĞƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚ
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŽĨŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ŚĂƌĚƐŚŝƉƐ ĞǀĞŶĂƐƚŚĞŝƌ country ŝƐŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ ƌŝĐŚĞƌ͘ƐĚŝƐƐŽůǀŝŶŐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
for ŐůŽďĂůŝƐŵĞƌŽĚĞƐ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂ
ƌĞĂĚŝůǇĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞƐƚŚĞƐĞƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶĂƌǇƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ĂŶĚEŽƌƚŚ
ŵĞƌŝĐĂ.
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ͕ǁŚĞŶDŽƐĐŽǁƐƵĐĐĞĞĚƐŝŶƚĂŬŝŶŐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨĂ
ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝƚƐEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ ƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ, it
ĂůƐŽĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐůĂƌŐĞƐƐ͘ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĐĂŶ
ƚĂŬĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŶĨƵƐŝŽŶŽĨĨƵŶĚƐĂŶĚƐƵďƐŝĚŝĞƐĂŶĚůŽŶŐ-ƚĞƌŵ
ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐŽĨƚĞŶƚŝŵĞƐƵŶƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďůĞƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂ͘dŚŝƐŝƐďĞƐƚĞǆĞŵƉůŝĨŝĞĚŝŶ
ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉƌŽƉƉŝŶŐƵƉŽĨĞůĂƌƵƐĂŶĚdƌĂŶƐŶŝƐƚƌŝĂŝŶƚŚĞǇĞĂƌƐ
ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂůĚŝƐƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ. ĨĨŽƌƚƐĂƌĞƵŶĚĞƌǁĂǇƚŽ
ĂƉƉůǇ ƚŚŝƐŵŽĚĞůto ďŬŚĂǌŝĂ͕^ŽƵƚŚKƐƐĞƚŝĂ͕ĂŶĚƌŝŵĞĂ͕ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ
ĚƌŽƉŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞƐŽĨŽŝůŚĂƐƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚƚŚĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ.
Intimidation, Fraud, and Bribery
ZƵƐƐŝĂ ƐĞĞŬƐƚŽŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝǌĞ ůŽĐĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐƚĂƐŬĞĚǁŝƚŚƉƌĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ďĂƐŝĐŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝŶƚŝŵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ͕ĨƌĂƵĚĂŶĚďƌŝďĞƌǇ͘dŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚĞŶĚƐ
ƚŽŝŶƚĞŶƐŝĨǇĂƐEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚĂŶ
ĂĐƚƵĂůŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ŝƚƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŝƐƚŽůŝŵŝƚƚŚĞ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚƉŽƐĞĚďǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ĂŶĚ ĞƌŽĚĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚƚŽ
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƚŚĞƐĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ͞ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵů͟ non-ŬŝŶĞƚŝĐƉŚĂƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ
EĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ. ZƵƐƐŝĂ ĐƵƐƚŽŵŝǌĞƐƚŚĞƐĞ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐto ĞĂĐŚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƌĞŐŝŽŶ͕ŝŵŵĞŶƐĞůǇĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ĚĞĨĞŶĚĞƌ͛ƐƚĂƐŬŽĨĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĚĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŶŐĂŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ.
ZƵƐƐŝĂĐůŽƵĚƐƚŚĞůĂǁĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ͛
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌŝŶŐĨĂĐƚŽƌƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ
ĂŶĚĐŽŶĐĞĂůƐƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚŽĨƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶĨŽƌĂƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ͘/ƚŐƌŽŽŵƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͛ŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚŽƚĂŬĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨ
ůŽĐĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ͕ƚŚĞƌĞďǇĨƵƌƚŚĞƌůŝŵŝƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƚŚĂƚ
λρξ
ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚ ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐǁŽƵůĚƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞ ŝŶƚŽŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚ
ůŝǀŝŶŐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐĨŽƌƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ͘dŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ͕ŝŶƚƵƌŶ͕ŵĂŬĞƐ ƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚ
ƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ĞǀĞŶŵŽƌĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƚŽĂŶƚŝ-ƐƚĂƚƵƐƋƵŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ͘ 430
/ŶƐŽŵĞŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ͕ƚŚĞƐĞůŽĐĂůŐƌŽƵƉƐƚŚƵƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ďĂĐŬĞĚ
ĂŐĞŶƚƐĐĂŶďĞĐŽŵĞƚŚĞĐŽƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶƉŽǁĞƌƚŚĂƚĨŽƌŵƐƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝǌĞĚ
ŐƌŽƵƉƐĞĞŬŝŶŐ͞ƐĞůĨ-ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ͟ƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐ.
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶůŝŵŝƚĞĚŝŶƐŝǌĞĂŶĚƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐŝŶƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŽ
ĂĐƚƵĂůĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ͘ZƵƐƐŝĂŶůĞƐƐŽŶƐůĞĂƌŶĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ
ĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐƐƵĐŚŐƌŽƵƉƐŝŶƚŚĞǁĂƌƐŝŶŚĞĐŚŶǇĂ͕'ĞŽƌŐŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŶďĂƐ
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽďƌĞĂŬƚŚĞůŽǇĂůƚǇĐŚĂŝŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚbĞŝŶĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĂƚĞĚƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƌĞŐƵůĂƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ͘ 431
ĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚKƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨDŝůŝƚĂŶƚKƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ
dŚĞĂĐƚŝǀĞĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŵƵůĂŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌƐĨƌŽŵ
ƉůĂĐĞƚŽƉůĂĐĞŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶĂůǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘
'ĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ͕ƚŚŝƐĐŽŵĞƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŐƵŝƐĞŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƐǇŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐ
ŽƌĞůƐĞƐŵĂůůďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐĂŝŵĞĚĂƚĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞƐƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ͘>ĞƐƐĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ
ĚŽĞƐŝƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶǀŽůƵŶƚĞĞƌƐďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞĂŐĞŶƚƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨďŽĚŝĞƐƚŽĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇƌĞƐŝƐƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐƋƵŽ͘
ZƵƐƐŝĂƐƵƐƚĂŝŶƐĂĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ-ŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶĂǀŽŝĚŝŶŐ
ƉĂƌĂůůĞůŝƐŵĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞƐĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ŝĨĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŽ
ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐĂƉƌĞĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐŐƌŽƵŶĚǁŽƌŬĨŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐƚŽƵƐĞ͕ƚŚŝƐŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞǁŝůůďĞŽǀĞƌƌŝĚĚĞŶĂƐďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ
ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŝƐŵŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŚĂŶƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐĐŽǀĞƌƚ.
Introduction of Armed Insurgents
ƐŝƚŵŽǀĞƐ ŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ͞ǀŽůƵŶƚĞĞƌƐ͟ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƌŵŝŶŐ
ŽĨƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂŶƚŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐƐŚŝĨƚƐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚĂĐƚŝǀĞ
430 dŚĞŵŝĚĚůĞ-ĐůĂƐƐĚŝƐŝŶĐůŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƉƌŽƚĞƐƚƐŽƌƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂůŚĂƐďĞĞŶǁĞůů-
ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĞĚƐŝŶĐĞůĞǆŝƐĚĞdŽĐƋƵĞǀŝůůĞĨŝƌƐƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚǀŽůƵŵĞŽĨ
Democracy in America ;λςξκͿ͘
431 dŚŝƐŝƐĂƚƚĞƐƚĞĚƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇĂŵŽŶŐĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶǀŽůƵŶƚĞĞƌƐǁŚŽĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽĞŶůŝƐƚŝŶ
ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚŵŝůŝƚŝĂƐŝŶƚŚĞŽŶďĂƐ͘ĨƚĞƌĂƌƌŝǀŝŶŐĂƚƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĐĂŵƉƐŶĞĂƌƚŚĞZƵƐƐŽ-hŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶ
bŽƌĚĞƌ͕ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĨŝƌƐƚďƌŽŬĞŶĨƌŽŵƉƌĞĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚƐƚŽƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐǀŽůƵŶƚĞĞƌŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ
ƚŚĞŵďĞĨŽƌĞďĞŝŶŐĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚŽŶƚŽhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͘
λρο
ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞůŝƚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐto
ŽƉƉŽƐĞŝƚƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ͘dŚŝƐĐĂŶƌĂŶŐĞĨƌŽŵƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞĚĞŶŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ to
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƵŶƌĞůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌĐůĂŝŵƐĂƌĞŵĂĚĞďǇƚŚĞ
ǀŝĐƚŝŵŝǌĞĚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƐŽĂƐƚŽƐĞĞĚĚŽƵďƚĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĂƚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛ƐĂůůŝĞƐ͘
DŽĚĞƌŶŚŝŐŚ-ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŝƐĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůůǇůĞƚŚĂůĂŶĚĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŽŶto
ƐƵĐŚĂǁĂƌƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ŝŶŵƵĐŚďůŽŽĚƐŚĞĚ. ZƵƐƐŝĂƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƐƚŚĂƚŝƚƐ
ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ͕ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐŝĞƐ͕ĂƌĞĂǁĂƌĞŽĨ
ƚŚŝƐĨĂĐƚĂƐǁĞůů͘ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ͕ƚŚĞĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞŽĨƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ
ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞĂŶĚĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽŐŽƚŽǁĂƌŝŶ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨĂsupposedly ǀŝĐƚŝŵŝǌĞĚĂůůǇ͕ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇǁŚĞŶƚŚĂƚǁĂƌǁŽƵůĚ
ďĞĨŽƵŐŚƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŶƵĐůĞĂƌ-ĂƌŵĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ŝƐĞǆƉůŽŝƚĞĚ to ĚŝĨĨƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ
ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚŽƐĞĂůůŝĞƐƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ͘ 432
&ŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂĂƚƚŚŝƐƐƚĂŐĞŝƚŝƐŵŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞƵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŽĚĞĨĞĂƚƚŚĞƉƌŽǆǇĨŽƌĐĞƐ than to
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇŽĨƵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ. ^ŚĂƉŝŶŐƚŚĞh͘^͘ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶ
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌEdKƌƚŝĐůĞsƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĞǀŽŬĞĚŝƐĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů͘
dŚĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨƐƵĐŚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶďǇƚŚĞh͘^͘ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĂƉĂƌĂůǇǌŝŶŐ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨƚŚĞĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶŝƚƐĞůĨŵĂǇďĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŽ
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨĚŝǀŝĚŝŶŐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͘
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŽǀĞƌƚŚƌŽǁŽĨĂ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ— ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ de jure ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌŚĂƐ
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶŵĂǇďĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ. tŚŝůĞZƵƐƐŝĂ ŵĂǇŽƌŵĂǇ
ŶŽƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞƚŚĞ͞ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚ͟ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ͕ 433 ƚŚĞŵĞƌĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ
ŽĨƚŚŝƐĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĐĂůůƐŝŶƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͛ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŽůŝƚƐŽǁŶƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͘
Clandestine Military Intervention
ůĂŶĚĞƐƚŝŶĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚůŝƚĞƌĂů
ĞŵďŽĚŝŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ ͞ŚǇďƌŝĚǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͟ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚĂŶĚĂĚĞĐŝĚĞĚĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŽŶ
432 ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ'ĞŽƌŐĞt͘ƵƐŚĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŚĞŶŝƚĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽĨŝŶĚǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŽĨ
ŵĂƐƐĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ/ƌĂƋŚĂǀŝŶŐƵƐĞĚƚŚĞŵĂƐũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌǁĂƌ͘
433 tŚĞƌĞĂƐďŬŚĂǌŝĂĂŶĚ^ŽƵƚŚKƐƐĞƚŝĂŚĂǀĞďŽƚŚďĞĞŶƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚďǇƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂƐ
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŶĞŝƚŚĞƌdƌĂŶƐŶŝƐƚƌŝĂŶŽƌƚŚĞ͞ƉĞŽƉůĞ͛ƐƌĞƉƵďůŝĐƐ͟ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚďǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐĂŶĚƉƌŽ-ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂŶƚƐŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞŚĂǀĞŐĂŝŶĞĚƐƵĐŚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ͘
λρπ
ŽǀĞƌŽƚŚĞƌĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĞĂƌůŝĞƌ. /ƚƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŝƐƚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞ
ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐďǇ ďŽƚŚƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĂŶĚ
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚĞƌŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ͘
tŚŝůĞƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĐůĂŶĚĞƐƚŝŶĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĨŽƌĐĞƐ ŵĂǇďĞƚƌŝŐŐĞƌĞĚ
by ƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌĞĚďǇZƵƐƐia ŵĂǇďĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇ
ĚĞĨĞĂƚĞĚ͕ƚŚĞǇĐĂŶĂůƐŽďĞŝŶƐĞƌƚĞĚ ĂƚƚŚĞǀĞƌǇƐƚĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ
ƉŝƚĐŚŝŶŐĂƌŵĞĚŝŶƐƵƌŐĞŶƚƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞůŽĐĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͘
^ƵĐŚƵŶŝƚƐŵĂǇ ƌĂŶŐĞĨƌŽŵƐŵĂůůƚĂƐŬĨŽƌĐĞƐŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚĂŶĚŽƵƚĨŝƚƚĞĚďǇ
ƚŚĞ'Zh 434 ƚŽ͞ǀŽůƵŶƚĞĞƌƐ͟ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽƌ
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽŶ͞ǀĂĐĂƚŝŽŶ͘͟435 dŚĞǇĂƌĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĂƚĂƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇůŽǁƉƌŽĨŝůĞŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ ĂǀŽŝĚĂĐůĞĂƌĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ
ƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞŐŝǀĞŶƚŽƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂ ĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ. 436
dŚƌŽƵŐŚĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐZƵƐƐŝĂ ǁŽƵůĚƐĞĞŬƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ
ĂŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƵĐŚƵŶŝƚƐĂƐ
ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͘ǀĞŶŝĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƐŚĂƉĞ
ƉƵďůŝĐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶĨĂŝů, ƚŚĞŶĞǁůǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐ – ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽƌ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ĂĨĨŝůŝĂƚĞĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůŽƌ͕ďĞƚƚĞƌǇĞƚ͕ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐ – ǁŽƵůĚĞŵĞƌŐĞĂƐŝŶĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƚŝďůĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚon
ŵĞĚŝĂĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚŵĂƉƐ͘
Use of Electronic Warfare and Reconnaissance Assets
KŶĐĞƚŚĞŐƵŝƐĞŽĨĂŶanti-ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĨŽƌĐĞ ŝƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ,
ƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌƐĂŶĚĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐǁĂƌĨĂƌĞĂƐƐĞƚƐĐĂŶďĞ
434 ʧ̨̣̦̖̌̏W̨̖̼̯̖̣̦̖̌̏̔̏̌̽̚ž̛̪̬̣̖̦̖̏;'ůĂǀŶŽǇĞƌĂǌǀĞĚǇǀĂƚĞů͛ŶŽǇĞƵƉƌĂǀůĞŶŝĞͿ Žƌ͞DĂŝŶ

/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞ͕͟ƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĂŐĞŶĐǇŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͘
435 /ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŵƵĐŚƉƵďůŝĐŝǌĞĚĐĂƐĞƐŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ͞ŽŶůĞĂǀĞ͟ǁŚŝůĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐŝŶ
hŬƌĂŝŶĞ͕ƚŚĞƌĞŚĂǀĞĂůƐŽďĞĞŶĂĨĂŝƌŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶǀŽůƵŶƚĞĞƌƐĐŽŵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ŵĂŶƉŽǁĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚŵŝůŝƚŝĂƐŝŶƚŚĞŽŶďĂƐ͕ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĂƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͘KǀĞƌ
ƚŝŵĞ͕ƚŚĞƐĞŚĂǀĞĚĞĐƌĞĂƐĞĚŝŶŶƵŵďĞƌ͕ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĂƐĂƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘
ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚŝƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůƚƌĞŶĚ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶĂŶƚŝ-EdKŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇĂŵŽŶŐŝƚƐŐĞŶĞƌĂů
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚtĞƐƚĞƌŶĞƌƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚŝŐŶŽƌĞƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚĂĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶĂEdKŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞŵŝŐŚƚŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƉĂƚƌŝŽƚŝĐƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƚŽŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞ
ĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚŽƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ͘
436 dŚĞŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝǀĞůǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ– ĞǀĞŶǁŚĞŶ
ƐƵĐŚĨĂĐƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞůŽĐĂůĂŶĚůůŝĞĚŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ– ǁŽƵůĚďĞĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ
ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚĨƌŽŵƉƵďůŝĐĚŝƐƐĞŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ͘ZƵƐƐŝĂǁŽƵůĚĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ
ĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶĂŶĚĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĂůůƐŬĞƉƚŝĐĂůƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƐƚŽŬŝŶŐĨĞĂƌŽĨĞƐĐĂůĂtion.
λρρ
ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚŽƐĞĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶůĞǀĞůĂŶĚ
ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚƐƚĂƚĞƐƉŽŶƐŽƌƐŚŝƉƚŚĞǇŵĂǇĨĞĂƚƵƌĞ.
Overt Military Intervention and Occupation
DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ or ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ĨŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂƚŽĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĂŶŽǀĞƌƚŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ
ĂŶĚĞǆĂĐƚĂŶŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶŵƵƐƚ ďĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚĂƐĂĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨEĞǁ
'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘It, ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ, ǁŽƵůĚŽŶůǇŽĐĐƵƌŝĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ
ŽĨŝŵƉĞŶĚŝŶŐĚĞĨĞĂƚŽĨƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ
ǁŽƵůĚůĞĂĚƚŽƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƐĞƚďĂĐŬƐƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽƌƚŚĞ
ůŽƐƐŽĨƚŽŽŵĂŶǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶ͞ǀŽůƵŶƚĞĞƌƐ͘͟
ƚƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚ͕ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞǁŽƵůĚƚĂŬĞ ŽŶĂĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂůŐƵŝƐĞ͕ŵŽƌĞ
ƚǇƉŝĐĂůŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͘/ƚŵĂǇŝŶĐůƵĚĞŽǀĞƌƚ ƚŚƌĞĂƚƐƚŽŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨĂŶǇĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƌĂůůǇŝŶŐƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵŝǌĞĚƐƚĂƚĞ͘/ƚŵĂǇ
ƚĂŬĞƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĂŶǇŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŚŽǁŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĂƌĞƵŶƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚĂĐƚŝĐƐŽƌŽĨůĂĐŬŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚƚŽĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂĐƚ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ͘
dŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĨŽĐƵƐŽĨƚŚŝƐƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚĂƌŝŶŐŝƐƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-
ŵĂŬŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐǁŝƚŚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƚĂƚĞƐ
ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞŝŶĐůŝŶĞĚƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚĂEdKŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞ͘ǀĞŶŝĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ
^ƚĂƚĞƐƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵŝǌĞĚƐƚĂƚĞ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂ
ǁŽƵůĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝƚƐƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŝŶĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇƐƚĂƌŝŶŐ
ĚŽǁŶĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽƌŽƚŚĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĨƌŽŵĚŽŝŶŐĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŽ
ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞ͘dŚŝƐŵĂy ŝŶĐůƵĚĞŝŶǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨůŽĐĂůůĂǁƐƚŽŽďĨƵƐĐĂƚĞƚŚĞ
ůĞŐĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨŐŽŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌ͕ŝŶƐŝŶƵĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐǁŝůůďĞ
ƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ͕ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ
ƚŽĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĐĞŶƚĞƌƐ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐĞůĞĐƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƚŚĂƚ
ĚĞĐŝĚĞƚŽĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇƌĞƐŝƐƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽǀĞƌƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͘
Nuclear Threats
dŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƵƐŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞŝƐ
ƚŚĞƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽƌĚĞ-ĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ͛ƐǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŝƚƐ
ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƌƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ͘
λρς
EƵĐůĞĂƌƚŚƌĞĂƚƐĚŽŶŽƚŚĂǀĞƚŽĐŽŵĞǁŝƚŚĂŶŽǀĞƌƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ͕
ŵĂǇƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŽǀĞƌƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ͕ŽƌŵĂǇďĞĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŽƵƚ
ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇǁŝƚŚŽǀĞƌƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ͘EƵĐůĞĂƌƚŚƌĞĂƚƐŵĂǇďĞ
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚĂƐĂĨŽƌŵŽĨƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞƚŽ
ƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŽŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐůĂƌŐĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŝƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ͘ ξνρ
EƵĐůĞĂƌƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ŚĂǀĞĂĚĞƚĞƌŝŽƌĂƚŝŶŐŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝĨ
ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĂĐƚƵĂůŝǌĞĚ. EƵĐůĞĂƌƐƚƌŝŬĞƐŵĂǇ ŚĞŝŐŚƚĞŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ƉƌŝĚĞŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵŝǌĞĚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇǁŚŝůĞĂůƐŽĚĞĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ĚĞŐƌĞĞƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ͛ƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŶĞĞĚƐƚŽĨĞĂƌĨŽƌŝƚƐ
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ͕ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŵŽƌĞŽĨŝƚƐůĞŐĂĐǇĂƐƚŚĞůĂƐƚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶƚŚĞ
ĨĂĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐĂƉŝƚƵůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĂŶĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌ͘ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ͕ĨƵƚƵƌĞ
ŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĂƌƐǁŝůůůŝŬĞůǇŚĂǀĞƚŚƌĞĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚƉŚĂƐĞƐ;ĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ
ŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚǁŽĂƌĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇ͞ŽĨĨ-ƌĂŵƉĞĚ͟ƚŽƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐͿĂƐ
ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĚŽǌĞŶƐĨĂŵŽƵƐůǇƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚďǇ,ĞƌŵĂŶ<ĂŚŶ
ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ͗
1. Conventional war with nuclear threats: ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƐƚĂŐĞ͕
ŶƵĐůĞĂƌƚŚƌĞĂƚƐǁŝůůďĞŵŽƐƚǀŽĐĂůĂƐĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ǁĂƌ͘dŚƌĞĂƚƐŵĂǇďĞƵƐĞĚ ǁŚĞŶa ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ-ĂƌŵĞĚƉĂƌƚǇĂƐƐƵŵĞƐ
ĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞĂŶĚĚŝĐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚĞƌŵƐŝŶĂƉĞĂĐĞƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ͘
ƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŝǌĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨǁĂƌĂŶĚ
ƐĐĂůĞŽĨŚƵŵĂŶůŽƐƐĞƐŝƐƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĨŽĐƵƐ͘
2. The period directly following nuclear first strike͗ƚƚŚŝƐƚŝŵĞ͕
ƚŚĞĨƵůůƐŚŽĐŬŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƵƐĞŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŝŶǁĂƌƚŝŵĞ
ƐŝŶĐĞλσξοǁŽƵůĚƌĞǀĞƌďĞƌĂƚĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ͘ 438 ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝƐƚƐŚĂǀĞǁƌŝƚƚĞŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůǇŽŶƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂŶ
͞ĞƐĐĂůĂƚĞƚŽĚĞĞƐĐĂůĂƚĞ͟ƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůŶƵĐůĞĂƌ
ƐƚƌŝŬĞƐ͕ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƐŚŽĐŬŽĨƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌ
ξνρ ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͕ŝƚƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝƐƚƐĂůƐŽƚĂůŬĞĚŽĨtĞƐƚĞƌŶĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ
ŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨĂĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶEdKĂŶĚƚŚĞtĂƌƐĂǁWĂĐƚĂƐ
͞ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ͘͟
438 tŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ– ĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐŽƌŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ– ďǇĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƵŶƚŝůƚŚŝƐƚŝŵĞ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĂůŽŽĨĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚĞƚĂŝůƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶZƵƐƐŝĂĂŶĚŝƚƐŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ͘dŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚ
ĂůŵŽƐƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŝĨŝƚƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽĨŽƌƐĂŬĞƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ-
ƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͘
λρσ
ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŵŝŐŚƚĚŝƐƐƵĂĚĞ an ĞŶĞŵǇĨƌŽŵƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂƌĂŶĚ
ĨŽƌĐĞĂŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ
ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚŝŶƚŚĞƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ͘
TŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƉůĂĐĞƐŚŝŐŚƐƚĂŬĞƐŽŶƚŚĞůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚ that Ăůů
nationƐ – ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŶƵĐůĞĂƌ-ĂƌŵĞĚŽŶĞƐ– ƉƌĞĨĞƌ ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐĂ
ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ĞǀĞŶ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚy
ŽĨĂƚŚŝƌĚ-ƉĂƌƚǇĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͕ƚŽŐůŽďĂůĂŶŶŝŚŝůĂƚŝŽŶ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ŝƚĚŽĞƐ
ŽĨĨĞƌĂůŽŐŝĐĂů͞ƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌ͛ƐĚŝůĞŵŵĂ͟ĨŽƌƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
ĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵĞĚŝĂŵĞƐƐĂŐŝŶŐƚŽƵƐĞƐŚŽƵůĚƚŚŝƐĞǀĞƌďĞŝŶǀŽŬĞĚ͘
dŚŝƐƉŚĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƌǁŽƵůĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĞǀĞŶďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ
ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐƵŶƚŝůĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐŝĚĞ
ďĞŐŝnƐ ƚŽƐŚŽŽƚŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐďĂĐŬŽƌƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐŝĚĞ
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚƚŚĂƚŶƵĐůĞĂƌƌĞůĞĂƐĞǁĂƐŶŽǁĂŶĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚĨĂĐƚŝŶ
ƚŚĞǁĂƌ͘
3. General nuclear war͗ƚƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ
ƌĞĐĞĚĞƐĨƌŽŵƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞĂƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐďĞĐŽŵĞŵŽƌĞĚĞƚĂĐŚĞĚ
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘/ŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů͕ŝĨŽŶĞƐŝĚĞůĂĐŬƐ
ŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ξνσ ŽƌƚŚĞǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞŵ͕440 it ǁŽƵůĚ
ĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŽƌďĞĂŶŶŝŚŝůĂƚĞĚ͘/ĨŝƚĚŽĞƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŶƵĐůĞĂƌ
ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂŶĚƵƐĞƐƚŚĞŵ͕ĂŶĂŐŐƌĂǀĂƚĞĚƉĂƚƚĞƌŶŽĨĚĞĐůŝŶŝŶŐ
ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚŵŽƵŶƚŝŶŐĐĂƐƵĂůƚŝĞƐ
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚǁŝůůĂůŵŽƐƚ
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇƉƵƐŚƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƚŽǁĂƌĚ ĨŝŶĂůǁĂƌ ŽĨƚŽƚĂůĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ.
Joint vs. Combined-Arms Planning and Operational Approaches

In cŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŽĨĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨEĞǁ
'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ŝƚďĞĐŽŵĞƐƵƐĞĨƵůƚŽĂŶĂůǇǌĞƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇEdKĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ͘tŚĞƌĞĂƐZƵƐƐŝĂƌĞƚĂŝŶƐƚŚĞŵŽƌĞĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂů͞ŐĞŶĞƌĂů
ƐƚĂĨĨ͟ƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨǁĂƌƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ͕EdKŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞ
ξνσ &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ŝĨŽŶůǇWŽůĂŶĚƌĞƐŝƐƚƐZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞĨƵƐĞƐƚŽƐƚĂŶĚĚŽǁŶ͘ǀĞŶŝŶƚŚĞ
ĨĂĐĞŽĨĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌ͘
440 &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ŝĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ͕ĂŶĚ&ƌĂŶĐĞĂůůƌĞĨƵƐĞĚ
ƚŽƵƐĞŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĞǀĞŶŝĨZƵƐƐŝĂďĞŐĂŶƚŽƵƐĞŝƚƐĂƌƐĞŶĂůŝŶĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚĞůǇ͘
180
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐƚǇůĞŽĨ͞ũŽŝŶƚ͟ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ͘dŚŝƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌǁŝůůĨŝƌƐƚ
ĂŶĂůǇǌĞƚŚĞŝƌĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƌĞĨůĞĐƚŽŶŚŽǁƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽƐƚǇůĞƐŽĨ
ǁĂƌƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐŵĂƚĐŚƵƉǁŚĞŶƉƵƚŝŶƚŽĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͘
Joint Operational Approach
dŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŝƐƐŚĂƉĞĚďǇ ŝƚƐĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ
to ĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂďŽǀĞ ƚŚĞĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͘dŚŝƐŝƐ
ƌŽŽƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĞŝŐŚƚĞĞŶƚŚ-ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨƌĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶŝƐŵ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞŶƐƵŝŶŐŶŝŶĞƚĞĞŶƚŚ-ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵƚŚĂƚĂŶŝŵĂƚĞĚŶĞĂƌůǇĂůů
h.^. ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ͘dŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞǀŽůǀĞĚ
ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ ŶŽƚŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ^ŽǀŝĞƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ, ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌĂƐ
ƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽƚŚĞsŝĞƚŶĂŵtĂƌĨĂŝůƵƌĞƐ͘/ƚǁĂƐĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽďƌŝĚŐĞƚŚĞ
ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŐĂƉƚŚĂƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐĨŽƐƚĞƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůh^ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ŵŽĚĞƌŶĞƌĂ͛ƐĚĞŵĂŶĚĨŽƌƐǇŶĐŚƌŽŶŝǌĞĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƐƵĐĐĞĞĚŝŶŚŝŐŚ-
ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ͘
dŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐƚĂĨĨĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝƐŵŽƌĞĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂů ĂĨŽƌŵŽĨ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ͕ŐŝǀĞŶĂƐŚŽǁŝƚ ĚĞƌŝǀĞƐŝƚƐƐƉŝƌŝƚƵĂůĨĂƚŚĞƌŝŶ
EĂƉŽůĞŽŶĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞůĂƚĞ-ƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚ-ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇh.^. ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ
ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂĐǇ͕ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶĂũŽŝŶƚƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƌĞĨĂƌŽůĚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƉƌŽƉĂŐĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐƚĂĨĨĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ͘ĂĐŚ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ;ƌŵǇ͕
EĂǀǇ͕ŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞ͕ĂŶĚ ĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ) of an ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĐŽƵŶƚƌǇǁŝƚŚĂ
ũŽŝŶƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĨŽƐƚĞƌƐŝƚƐŽǁŶĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞƚŚĂƚ
ƐƵƉĞƌĨŝĐŝĂůůǇŝŵƉŽƐĞƐŝŶƚĞƌŽƉĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŽŶůǇǁŝƚŚŝŶ
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘
dŚŝƐƌĞƐƵůƚƐŝŶƚŚĞǀĞƌǇďĂƐŝĐƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨĚĞďŝůŝƚĂƚŝŶŐĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĂŵŽŶŐ
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ͕ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚŶŽǁŚĞƌĞďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞůĞƚŚĂů
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ/ŵƉĞƌŝĂů:ĂƉĂŶĞƐĞƌŵǇĂŶĚEĂǀǇ. 441 ^ƵĐŚ
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶŚĂƐůĞĚƚŽ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞƐŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ
ŝŶƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ ĨĂŵŽƵƐĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞĐŽƐƚƐŝŶŚƵŵĂŶ
ůŝǀĞƐ͘ 442
441 dŚŽƵŐŚŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌĂůĞƚŚĂůĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞĚŝƐƚƌƵƐƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ:ĂƉĂŶĞƐĞůĂŶĚ
ĂŶĚŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ^ĞůĨ-ĞĨĞŶƐĞ&ŽƌĐĞƐƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶƚĞŶƐĞƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐŝŶŝŶƚĞƌ-ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƉĂƌĂůǇƐŝƐ͘
442 ^ĞĞŵĂũŽƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚtŽƌůĚtĂƌĂŶĚKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶhƌŐĞŶƚ&ƵƌǇ͘
181
ŽŶĨůŝĐƚŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĂůŵŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ͕
ǁŚĞƌĞŝŶũŽŝŶƚƐƚĂĨĨƐǁŝƚŚŝŶEdKĂƌĞƐƚŝůůƚĂƵŐŚƚƚŽƉĂƐƚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů
͞ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ͟ƉůĂŶƐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞ a ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚƉůĂŶƚŽ
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĂƵŶŝĨŝĞĚĞŶĚ-ƐƚĂƚĞ͘dŚŽƵŐŚũŽŝŶƚƐƚĂĨĨƐŚĂǀĞŐƌŽǁŶďĞƚƚĞƌŝŶ
ƌĞĐĞŶƚĚĞĐĂĚĞƐĂƚĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚĞŶĚ-ƐƚĂƚĞ͕ƚŚĞǇŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇůĞĂǀĞ
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ-to-ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĂĚŚŽĐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞŵŝĚĚůĞ
ŽĨĂŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͛ƐĞǆĞĐƵƚion.
dŚĞƐĞũŽŝŶƚĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƉůĂŶƐĂƌĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ. ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƉůĂŶŶĞƌƐĂƌĞĂďůĞƚŽĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇ
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƉůĂŶƐďƵƚĂůƐŽĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶƐĂƐEdK
ũŽŝŶƚƉůĂŶƐǁŚŝĐŚƚĞŶĚƚŽƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝǌĞ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĂůůŝĞƐ͕
ĂƚƚŝŵĞƐ ƚŽƚŚĞĚĞƚƌŝŵĞŶƚŽĨ ĚĞĨĞĂƚŝŶŐŐĞŶĞƌĂůĞŶĞŵǇ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘
dŚĞƐĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐƉĞƌǀĂƐŝǀĞǁŝƚŚŝŶĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ĂƌĞƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚĞǀĞŶŵŽƌĞƚĞŵƉĞƐƚƵŽƵƐďǇƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŽůŽǁĞƌ-ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨEĞǁ
'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘tŚĞƌĞĂƐũŽŝŶƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐŝƐĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƚ ĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂůůĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉŽǁĞƌĂƌĞ
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚƚŽĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ͛ƐƐƉĞĐŝĂůƚŝĞƐ͕ŝƚŝƐĂůŵŽƐƚ
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶƚĂƚĞŝƚŚĞƌĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐŽƌƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐŶŽŶ-
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ. 443 ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐƚĂĨĨƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ͕ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ͕
ĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƐĞŝŶƚŽƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞƐŝŐŶ͘
Combined Arms Operational Approach
ŽŵďŝŶĞĚĂƌŵƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝƐƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂů
ƐƚĂĨĨƐǇƐƚĞŵďĞƐƚĞǆĞŵƉůŝĨŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞtŝůŚĞůŵŝŶĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƌŵǇĂĚĂƉƚĞĚ
ĨŽƌƚŚĞǁŝĚĞǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨĂƌŵƐƚǇƉĞƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝĞƐƚŽĚĂǇ͘dŚŝƐƐƚǇůĞ
ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂĨŝǆƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚĂƚĞƐŝŶĐĞƉƌŝŽƌƚŽƚŚĞŽůƐŚĞǀŝŬ
ZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨλσλρĂŶĚ͕ƚŚŽƵŐŚĂĚĂƉƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŵŽƌĞĨůĞǆŝďůĞμ
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞ
&ŝƌƐƚŚĞĐŚĞŶtĂƌ͕ƐƚŝůůĞŶĚƵƌĞƐŝŶůĂƌŐĞůǇŝƚƐ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ ĨŽƌŵŝŶƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŽĚĂǇĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽĨĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘TŚĞ
incŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞƐŽĨEĞǁ 'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞŝŶƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
443 ͘Ő͘ƉŽůŝĐĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ͘
182
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŚĂƐŽŶůǇďƌŽĂĚĞŶĞĚƚŚĞƐǁĞĞƉŽĨƚŽŽůƐƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů
^ƚĂĨĨĂůƌĞĂĚǇƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞĚĨŽƌĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŶŐĂǁĂƌƚŽĂƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ͘
dŚĞŬĞǇƚŽƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶǁĂǇ ŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŝƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ
ŵĂŶŶĞƌŽĨĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐǀŝĐƚŽƌǇĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ
ĞŶĚ-ƐƚĂƚĞ͘dŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ͞ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ͟ŝŶƚƵƌŶƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƚŚĞ
ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŶŽŶ-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƐƚĂƚĞĐƌĂĨƚ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇ,
ŝŶƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ, ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐƚŚĞĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĞŶĚ-ƐƚĂƚĞƐŝƐ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚƚŽ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĂǀŽŝĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ
ĐƌĞĞƉ. WƌĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌĨŽƌĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ŝƐĚĞĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞĚĨŽƌ
ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐǁŚĞƌĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŝƐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚ͘dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽa
ũŽŝŶƚƐǇƐƚĞŵ͕ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ
ŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŝŶŵŝŶĚ͕ƚŚĞƚŽůĞƌĂŶĐĞĨŽƌĐĂƐƵĂůƚŝĞƐŝƐŵƵĐŚŚŝŐŚĞƌ.
WĞƌŚĂƉƐŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇ͕in ĂĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚĂƌŵƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂůů
ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛ƐĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƌĞĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ
of ĨƵƚƵƌĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶƐ͘dŚŝƐƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ŶĞŐůĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞĂŝƌĨŽƌĐĞŝŶĂŐƌŽƵŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽƌƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ
ŽĨŶĂǀĂůĂƐƐĞƚƐŝŶĂŵĂŶŶĞƌƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚƐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ͘&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ͕ŝƚĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞƐĂŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ of
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƵŶŝƚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇŽƌƵƐĞĨƵůǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĂƌŵƐ
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ͕ĞŶĂďůŝŶŐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŽŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐŝŶ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚ
ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨĂƉůĂŶ͘ǇĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ͕ƚŚĞũŽŝŶƚ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƌĞƐƵůƚƐŝŶĞĂĐŚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĚĞŵĂŶĚŝŶŐĂ
ĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂůůŽĨŝƚƐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĨƵůůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŽǁĂŶ
ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇǁŽƵůĚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĂƐƐŝƐƚƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŝŶĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐŝƚƐ
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ͘
ŽŵďŝŶĞĚĂƌŵƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ĂƌĞŶŽƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞŝƌ
ĚĞĨĞĐƚƐ͘ƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ĐŚůŝĞĨĨĞŶWůĂŶŝŶλσλξ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌ
ƉĞƌŝŽĚ͕ĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐƚĂĨĨƚĞŶĚƐƚŽƉůĂĐĞĨĂƌƚŽŽŵƵĐŚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶƚŚĞ
ŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĞĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƉůĂŶĂŶĚĐĂŶŝŵƉƌŝƐŽŶĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐŝŶƚŽĂ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƚŚĂƚŵĂǇŽƌŵĂǇŶŽƚďĞƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůůǇƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚǁŚĞŶ
ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĐĐƵƌƐ͘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽ
͞ƉƌĞ-ƉůĂŶ͟ĨŽƌƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇďǇĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŽ
ĂůůŽǁŚŝŐŚĞƌůĞǀĞůĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞŽƉƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĨƵůĨŝůůŝŶŐƚŚĞƉůĂŶ͘
183
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ͕ĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉůĂŶƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂůůƚŚĞǁĂǇƵƉ
ƚŽƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŝƚƐĞůĨ͕ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐƌĞĂƚĚĞůĂǇƐŝŶĂǁŽƌůĚ
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĚĞŵĂŶĚŝŶŐƐǁŝĨƚĂĐƚŝŽŶ͘/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞǀĞƌǇĨĂĐŝůŝƚǇŽĨ
ĚĞĐŝĚŝŶŐǁŚĂƚĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƚŽƉƵƌƐƵĞĂŶĚŶŽƚƉƵƌƐƵĞůĞŶĚƐƚŽĂŶ
ŝŶĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŵĂǇůĞĂĚƚŽƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞƐĂůĞŶĞŐůĞĐƚŽĨŶĞǁ
ŝĚĞĂƐƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞƵƉĞŶĚƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞƚǇŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇůŽŐŝĐŝŶĂ
ŵĂŶŶĞƌƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽƚŚĞ͞ŽĨĨƐĞƚƐ͟ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶďǇEdKŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝĞƐĚƵƌŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͘ƐƌĞƐƵůƚ͕ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐƚĂĨĨƐŵĂǇďĞŵŽƌĞƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĞƚŚĂŶ
ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ.
ƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŽ-'ĞŽƌŐŝĂŶtĂƌŽĨμκκςĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŶŐŽŝŶŐ
ǁĂƌŝŶƚŚĞŽŶďĂƐ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨŚĂƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽ
ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚĞƚŚĞƐĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐďǇĚĞǀŽůǀŝŶŐƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇƚŽĨŝĞůĚ
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐĂŶĚĞŶĂďůŝŶŐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĨƌĞĞůǇĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĞŝƌĨŽƌĐĞƐƐŽ
ůŽŶŐĂƐŝƚŝƐĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďůĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ͘dŚŝƐ
ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ͕ĨŝƌƐƚĂďůǇŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇ'ĞƌŵĂŶDĂƌƐŚĂůůDŽůƚŬĞƚŚĞůĚĞƌŝŶ
ƚŚĞŶŝŶĞƚĞĞŶƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ͕ƐƵĐĐĞĞĚƐǁŚĞŶƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƐŚĂǀĞĂƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ
ůŝŵŝƚĞĚǁŝŶĚŽǁŽĨŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌ͕ĂƐŝŶƚŚĞ^ĞǀĞŶtĞĞŬƐ͛tĂƌ͕ďƵƚĐĂŶůĞĂĚ
ƚŽŵĂƐƐŝǀĞĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶ ƐŽŵƵĐŚĂƐƚŽ
ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞŝƌĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ͕ĂƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉůĂŶ
ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶďǇ'ĞŶĞƌĂůƐǀŽŶ<ůƵĐŬĂŶĚǀŽŶƵůŽǁŝŶƚŚĞλƐƚ ĂŶĚ
2ŶĚ 'ĞƌŵĂŶƌŵŝĞƐĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚWĂƌŝƐŝŶλσλξ͘
/ŶĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͕ƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨĂĐůĞĂƌĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
ǀŝĐƚŽƌǇďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞƐƵƐƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂŶƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝŶ
ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇƵŶ-ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůŐƌĂĚƵĂůŝƐŵ 444 ŽĨŝŶƐĞƌƚŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŽ
ƚŚĞǁĂƌǌŽŶĞ͘dŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚŚĞŚĂƌĚĞŶŝŶŐŽĨhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐ
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐĂŶǇƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŝŶƚŚĞŽŶďĂƐ͘
EĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶWĂƌĨĂƌĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞƐƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇŽŶŚŽǁƚŽ
ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞůǇƵƐĞĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨŵĞƌĞůǇƐƵƐƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĂǀĂŐƵĞ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŐŽĂůĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ͘dŚŽƵŐŚŝƚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĂďůĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨ͕Ɛƚŝůů
ǀŝĞǁŝŶŐŝƚƐĞůĨƵŶƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚĨŽƌůĂƌŐĞ-ƐĐĂůĞĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůǁĂƌ͕ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ
ƚŚĞŽŶďĂƐĂƐĂůŽǁ-ƌŝƐŬŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽƚƌĂŝŶŝƚƐŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƐŽƌƚŽĨ
444 EŽƚĚŝƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƐŽĨƚŚĞh^ƌŵǇŝŶƚŚĞsŝĞƚŶĂŵtĂƌ͘
184
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚŶĞĞĚƚŽŵĂŬĞŝŶĂ ůĂƌŐĞƌĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ 445͕ƚŚŝƐƐĞĞŵƐ
ƵŶůŝŬĞůǇ.
Clash of Joint and Combined Arms Operational Approaches
dǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚ-ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŚĂƐŶŽƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĐůĂƌŝƚǇŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚƚĞƌŝŶǁĂƌƚŝŵĞ͘tŚĞƌĞĂƐƚŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚ
tŽƌůĚtĂƌƐŚŽǁĞĚƚŚĞ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽůůǇĂŶĚƐůŽǁůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐĐƵƌǀĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚĂƌŵƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶƚŚĞƚƌĂŐŝĐĞǆƚƌĞŵĞƐ͕ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ/ŵƉĞƌŝĂů
'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇŵĂŶĂŐĞĚƚŽŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞh^ĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŽŝƚƐƉůĂŶĂŶĚ
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĨŝŶĂůǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨ͘
dŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌĨĞĂƚƵƌĞĚ ƚŚĞĐůĂƐŚŽĨƚǁŽĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚĂƌŵƐ
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƉŽǁĞƌƐ͕ŶĂŵĞůǇEĂǌŝ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ͕ĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞ
ƚŚĞĐůĂƐŚŽĨƚǁŽũŽŝŶƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƉŽǁĞƌƐ͕ƚŚĞ:ĂƉĂŶĞƐĞŵƉŝƌĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ
hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ͕ŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐƚĂĨĨ
aƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ͕ĂŶĚĂůůŝĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ, ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚĂ
ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐŝŶŐǀŝĐƚŽƌǇĂŐĂŝŶƐƚEĂǌŝ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇŝŶǁĞƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞ͕ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐ
ǁĂƐŵŽƌĞĂƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŽĨƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŶƵŵďĞƌƐŽĨĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚĂƐŵŽƐƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶ
ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐǁĞƌĞůŽĐŬĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ&ƌŽŶƚ͘dŚĞƚǁŽŵĂũŽr ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƌ— ƚŚĞh͘^͘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƚŚĞƵůŐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
ŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨDĂŶĐŚƵƌŝĂ — ƐĞĞŵƚŽŚŽůĚĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŶŐůĞƐƐŽŶƐ͘h.^.
ŝŵƉƌŽǀŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƌĚĞŶŶĞƐƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇĚĞĨĞĂƚĞĚƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͕ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶǁĂƐŵĂƐƚĞƌĨƵůůǇĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚƚŽ
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŝƚƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐǀŝĐƚŽƌǇǁŝƚŚĂůŵŽƐƚƉĞƌĨĞĐƚƌĞƐƵůƚƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŚĂƚŚĂĚ
ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇďĞĞŶŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞďĞƐƚ/ŵƉĞƌŝĂů:ĂƉĂŶĞƐĞĨŽƌĐĞƐĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚŽŶ
ƚŚĞƐŝĂŶĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ͘
ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͕ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐƚĂĨĨ-ƉůŽƚƚĞĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐƐƵĐĐĞĞĚĞĚin
ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇĚĞĨĞĂƚŝŶŐh.^. ƉůĂŶƐŝŶƚŚĞ<ŽƌĞĂŶĂŶĚsŝĞƚŶĂŵtĂƌƐ͕ĂůďĞŝƚ
ĂƚĞŶŽƌŵŽƵƐĐŽƐƚƐƚŽĨŽƌĐĞƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐ͘dŚĞ
^ŽǀŝĞƚ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨ͛ƐƉůĂŶƚŽŝŶǀĂĚĞĂŶĚŽĐĐƵƉǇĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶƐƵĐĐĞĞĚĞĚ
ŝŶŐĂŝŶŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ, ďƵƚĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽƉĂĐŝĨǇĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐĞŝƚ͖ƚŚĞ
445KŶůǇŝŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞŚĂƐƚŚĞǁĂƌŝŶƚŚĞŽŶďĂƐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐǀŝĐƚŽƌǇĨŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂ͘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ
ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶtĂƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚhŬƌĂŝŶĞŚĂƐĂůƐŽĂůůŽǁĞĚtĞƐƚĞƌŶĂƌŵŝĞƐƚŽƌĞĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƚŚĞƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇǁĂƌ͘
185
ƐĂŵĞĐĂŶďĞƐĂŝĚŽĨƚŚĞũŽŝŶƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶƐŽĨ/ƌĂƋĂŶĚĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶ
ĂĨƚĞƌǁĂƌĚ͘
/ŶƚŚĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĂŶǇĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝǀĞƚƌĞŶĚŝŶƚŚĞĚĂƚĂ͕ŵŽĚĞůŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ
ƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞĂŚĞůƉĨƵůƚŽŽůŝŶĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ͘,ĞƌĞ͕ƚŚĞ
ĂƌƚŝĨŝĐŝĂůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨŐĂŵŝƐŵƐŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞ͕ďƵƚŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐŽĨĨĞƌƐŽŵĞ
ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐŝĞƐ͘
tŚĞŶƚŚĞŐĂŵĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ͕ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƌĞĂůŝƐŵ
ŽƌĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶ͕ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚĂƌŵƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƚĞŶĚƚŽ
ŽƵƚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵũŽŝŶƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨĂĐůĞĂƌ
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŚĂŶĚĞĚŽƵƚĂƌƚŝĨŝĐŝĂůůǇĂƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŐĂŵĞŵĂǇďĞƚŽŽ
ĚŝƐƌƵƉƚŝǀĞ. TĞĂŵƐĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĂĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚĂƌŵƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĐůĞĂƌŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƚĞŶĚƚŽĂƌƌĂǇƚŚĞŝƌĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞƐ
ĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚŚŽƐĞƐƚĂƚĞĚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ͕ĞǀĞŶŝĨƚŚĞŝƌŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĂƌĞ
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞŝŶŶĂƚƵƌĞ͘:ŽŝŶƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚĞĂŵƐ͕ďǇ
ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ͕ĚĞĨŝŶĞŐŝǀĞŶĞŶĚƐƚĂƚĞƐĨŽƌĞĂĐŚƐƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŐĂŵĞĂŶĚŚĂǀĞĂ
ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽĚĞĐůĂƌĞǀŝĐƚŽƌǇĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐƵƉŽŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĞŝƚŚĞƌ
ŵĞƚŽƌƵŶŵĞƚďǇƚŚĞƵŶĨŽůĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽŝŶƚŚĞŐĂŵĞ͘
dŚŝƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ƚŚĂƚĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚĂƌŵƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐĂƌĞƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌ
ĂƚŽƌŐĂŶŝǌŝŶŐŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞƐǁŝƚŚŐŝǀĞŶĨŽƌĐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞĂƐũŽŝŶƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐĂƌĞďĞƚƚĞƌĨŽƌŽƌŐĂŶŝǌŝŶŐĂŶĚŐĂƵŐŝŶŐĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐ͘
,ǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂůůǇ͕a military with a culture capable of using a joint
operational approach to establish defenses and then switch to a
combined arms approach when mounting a counteroffensive might be
the best placed to win a conflict͕ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚďĞĂĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂďŶŽƌŵĂůůǇĨůĞǆŝďůĞĂŵŽŶŐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ͘
Observations from Baltic Campaign Simulations
dŚĞWŽƚŽŵĂĐ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƌĂŶĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚ
ĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶďǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇ
ǁŝƚŚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨƌŽŵĞůĂƌƵƐ͘WŽůĂŶĚ͕^ǁĞĚĞŶ͕&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂŶĚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ EdK
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐǁĞƌĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ͘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚĞĂĐŚƐŝŵƵůĂƚĞĚƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽǁĂƐ
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ͕ƚŚĞǇƐŚĂƌĞĚĂĐŽŵŵŽŶƐĞƚŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ͗
1) ƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĂůĂŶĚĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌďĞƚǁĞĞŶZƵƐƐŝĂĂŶĚ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͕ĂŶĚ
186
2) ĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚEdKŝƐƵŶĂďůĞƚŽ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŶĞĞĚƐ͘
&ƌŽŵƚŚĞƐĞƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞĐŽŵŵŽŶ
ĂĐƌŽƐƐŵŽƐƚŽƌĂůůƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐŽŵƉŝůĞĚ͘
The Russian Threat
ZƵƐƐŝĂĐĂŶĂƐƐĞŵďůĞĂƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇůĂƌŐĞůĂŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƚŽŝŶǀĂĚĞĂŶĚĐŽŶƋƵĞƌ
ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕ŝĨEdKĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ͘dŚĞƐĞĨŽƌĐĞƐǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
ŶĞĞĚƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞĂŶǇĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͕
ďƵƚǁŽƵůĚƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞƐŝǌĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞŝŶŽƚŚĞƌƉĂƌƚƐŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ͘
&ŽƌƚŚŝƐŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶƚŽďĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů͕ŝƚŵƵƐƚďĞƐǁŝĨƚ͕ďĞĨŽƌĞEdKŽƌŽƚŚĞƌ
ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůƉŽǁĞƌƐĐĂŶĂĐƚĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞůǇ͘
dŽǁŝŶƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƌ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂǁŽƵůĚďŝůůŝƚƐĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƐ
͚ƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐ͛ ƐĞŶƚƚŽƉƵƚĚŽǁŶƌŝŽƚƐĂŶĚƌĞƐƚŽƌĞŽƌĚĞƌ͕ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝn
>ĂƚŐĂůĞ͕ďƵƚĂůƐŽŝŶƉĂƌƚƐŽĨƐƚŽŶŝĂǁŝƚŚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŶƵŵďĞƌƐŽĨĞƚŚŶŝĐ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ͘/ƚǁĂƐŽŶůǇǁŚĞŶŝƚǁĂƐŽďǀŝŽƵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞ͚ƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐ͛ŚĂĚ
ƐŽŵĞŽƚŚĞƌŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ͕ĚŝĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚĞƐĐĂůĂƚĞ͘ǀĞŶƐŽ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂƚƌŝĞĚƚŽ
ĂǀŽŝĚĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶŐŽƚŚĞƌEdKŶĂƚŝŽŶƐĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞŝůůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨĂ
ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂƐůŽŶŐĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ͘dŚŝƐƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĞĚ
ĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŝƌƉŽǁĞƌŝŶƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂůƐƚĂŐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ͕ŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĂ͚ŶŽĨůǇǌŽŶĞ͛ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘
ƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚĂŝƌƐƉĂĐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶŝƐĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƚŽ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ͕ĂŶĚĐŽƵůĚďĞĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĚďǇĂŶĂŵƉŚŝďŝŽƵƐŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ŝƐůĂŶĚŽĨ^ĂĂƌĞŵĂĂŝŶƚŚĞŶŽƌƚŚĞƌŶĂůƚŝĐ͕ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚďǇƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚƚŽ
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞŚŝŐŚĂŶĚŵĞĚŝƵŵĂŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐ͘ dŚĞ^-ξκκƐǇƐƚĞŵ͕ǁŝƚŚĂŶ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĂŶŐĞŽĨμοκŬŵƚŽξκκŬŵ;ĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐƵƉŽŶƚŚĞŵŝƐƐŝůĞ
ƵƐĞĚͿǁŽƵůĚďĞĂďůĞƚŽĐůŽƐĞƚŚĞĂŝƌƐƉĂĐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂŝĨĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚ
ƚŽďŽƚŚ^ĂĂƌĞŵĂĂĂŶĚĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞŝŶ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͘>ŽǁĂůƚŝƚƵĚĞƉĞŶĞƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ
ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĂŝƌƐƉĂĐĞǁŽƵůĚ ƐƚŝůůďĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŝŶƚŽ>ĂƚǀŝĂ͘
ůŽƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞƌŽƵƚĞƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͛ ƉŽƌƚƐ ǁŽƵůĚďĞĂ
ƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂ͘dŚŝƐĐŽƵůĚďĞĞĂƐŝůǇĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĞĚǁŝƚŚ
ƐĞĂŵŝŶĞƐ͕ƐƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞƐĂŶĚůŽŶŐ-ƌĂŶŐĞĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ͘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚĂĐŽŶĐĞƌƚĞĚ
ĞĨĨŽƌƚďǇƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƚŚĂƚƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂǁŽƵůĚĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇƌĞƐƚŽƌĞ
λςρ
ƚŚŽƐĞƐĞĂ-ůĂŶĞƐ͕ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƌĞƐƵƉƉůǇŽĨĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
^ƚĂƚĞƐǀŝĂƚŚĞƐĞĂǁŽƵůĚďĞĚĞŶŝĞĚĨŽƌĂƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇůŽŶŐƚŝŵĞƚŽĂůůŽǁ
ĨŽƌĂƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůĂŶĚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ͘
dŚĞůĂŶĚƚŚƌĞĂƚǁŽƵůĚƚĂŬĞƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĂŶĚ
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝǌĞĚĐŽůƵŵŶƐŵŽǀŝŶŐĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌƌŽĂĚĂŶĚƌĂŝůƌŽƵƚĞƐƚŽ
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞĚůĂŶĚĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌƚŽ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͘ƚƚĂĐŬƐŝŶƚŽŶŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ
ƐƚŽŶŝĂŵĂǇďĞƵƐĞĚƚŽƚŝĞĚŽǁŶEdKĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞďĞ
ƵƐĞĚĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ͘^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶĞůĂƌƵƐ͕ĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚ
ĞůĂƌƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ŵĂǇŬĞĞƉWŽůŝƐŚĂŶĚ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽn
ƚŚĂƚĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ͕ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞŵĂŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƚƚĂĐŬƐǁŽƵůĚĐŽŵĞŝŶƚŽ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ
ĨƌŽŵ>ĂƚǀŝĂ͘dŚĞƐĞůĂŶĚƚŚƌƵƐƚƐŵĂǇďĞƉƌĞĐĞĚĞĚďǇĂŝƌŵŽďŝůĞĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕
ŚĞůŝďŽƌŶĞĂŶĚͬŽƌĂŝƌďŽƌŶĞ͕ƚŽƐĞŝǌĞŬĞǇƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐ
ďƌŝĚŐĞƐŽǀĞƌŵĂũŽƌƌŝǀĞƌŽďƐƚĂĐůĞƐ͕ƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞŵĨƌŽŵďĞŝŶŐ
ĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĞĚĂŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ͘
Belarus Threat
/ŶƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ĞůĂƌƵƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ĂŝƌĂŶĚŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĨŝƌĞ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐĂĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĞůĂƌƵƐƐŝĂŶƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͕ŽƌŵĂĚĞ
ĚŝƌĞĐƚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĨƵůůĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚĂƌŵƐĨŽƌĐĞƚŽĂƵŐŵĞŶƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ĨŽƌĐĞƐŵŽǀŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂĂŶĚͬŽƌWŽůĂŶĚ͘dŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŽĨƚŚŝƐ
ƚŚƌĞĂƚĨŽƌĐĞĚWŽůŝƐŚĂŶĚ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽĚĞƉůŽǇĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĨŽƌĐĞ
ĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞĞůĂƌƵƐƐŝĂŶďŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĐůŽƐƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŝŶĞƐŽĨ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŝƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͘/ŶƚǁŽŽĨƚŚĞƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕Ă
ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶ-ĞůĂƌƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞĂƚƚĂĐŬĞĚŝŶƚŽŶŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚWŽůĂŶĚŝŶ
ĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĐƵƚƚŚĞ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶ-WŽůŝƐŚƐƵƉƉůǇĂŶĚƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ
ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇŽƌƚŽĨŽƌĐĞWŽůŝƐŚĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚWŽůĂŶĚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞďĞ
ƵŶĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘
Baltic Defense
/ŶĂůůŽĨƚŚĞƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐǁĞƌĞƉůĂǇĞĚďǇƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ
ƚĞĂŵƐ͘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚĞĂĐŚŚĂĚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƉůĂŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌ
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͕ŶŽŶĞŚĂĚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌŝŶŐƐƚĂƚĞƐ͛ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƉůĂŶƐ͘Ɛ
ĂƌĞƐƵůƚ͕ƚŚĞƉůĂŶƐǁĞƌĞŶŽƚĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚ͕ĂŶĚŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝǌĞĚƚŚĞ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŶĂƚŝŽŶ͛ƐĐĂƉŝƚĂů͘
188
^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐǁĞƌĞŶŽƚŝŶŝƚŝĂůZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ͕ǁŚĞŶ
ŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚEdKĨŽƌĐĞƐǁĞƌĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂ
ǁĂƐĂďůĞƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŝƚƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŝŶĂůŝƚƚůĞ ŽǀĞƌĂǁĞĞŬ. ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕
ŵŽĚĞƐƚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͛ĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇ͕
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĞŝƚŚĞƌďǇĨŽƌĐĞŵŽĚĞƌŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽƌƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚďǇ
EdKĂůůŝĞƐ͕ŐƌĞĂƚůǇĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶ͘dŚĞŵŽƐƚ
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĐĂŵĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨEdKĂƌŵŽƌĞĚ
ĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘EdKƚĂŶŬƐĂŶĚŚĞůŝĐŽƉƚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞĂďůĞƚŽ
ƐƚŽƉĂŶĚŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇĚĞĨĞĂƚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƐ͘
The Contributions Provided by Poland
^ŝŶĐĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐĂůĂŶĚĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌƚŽ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚǁĂƐƚŚĞŵĂŝŶŐŽĂůŽĨƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶ͕ŚŽůĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŽƵƚƉŽƐƚǁĂƐĂŬĞǇƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ƉůĂŶ͘WŽůŝƐŚĨŽƌĐĞƐƉŽŝƐĞĚĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚĞƌŶďŽƌĚĞƌŽĨ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ
ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĂƚƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇĨƌŽŵƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐ
ƚŽƚŚĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ͘/ĨĂ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƐŝǌĞĚĨŽƌĐĞůĞĨƚ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚƚŽ
ĞŝƚŚĞƌŐŽŶŽƌƚŚƚŽůŝŶŬƵƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨŽƌĐĞƐŵŽǀŝŶŐƐŽƵƚŚǁĞƐƚĨƌŽŵZƵƐƐŝĂ͕
ŽƌĞĂƐƚƚŽĐůŽƐĞƚŚĞůĂŶĚƌŽƵƚĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂĂŶĚWŽůĂŶĚ͕WŽůŝƐŚ
ĨŽƌĐĞƐǁĞƌĞĂďůĞƚŽĂƚƚĂĐŬĂŶĚǁŝŶŝŶ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͘ 446
/ŶĞǀĞƌǇƐŝŵƵůation, Poland emerged as the key to providing adequate
defense of the Baltic States͘WŽůŝƐŚĨŽƌĐĞƐƉŝŶŶĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶ
<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͕ŚĞůĚŽƉĞŶƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŝŶŬƚŽ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͕ĂŶĚ͕ŝŶƐŽŵĞĐĂƐĞƐ͕
ŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƚĂůůǇĞƐĐĂůĂƚĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶƚŽĞůĂƌƵƐƚŽĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚŽ
ƌĞƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞŝƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͘
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
/ŶƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚŚŽƐĞǁŚĞƌĞWŽůŝƐŚĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕
ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞĚďǇh.^. ĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ĞƐĐĂůĂƚĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚďǇ
ŝŶǀĂĚŝŶŐĞůĂƌƵƐ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚŽƌĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ
ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚEdKĨŽƌĐĞƐŽŶƚŚĞ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ of
ĞůĂƌƵƐ͘/ŶƚŚĞƐĞĐĂƐĞƐ͕EdKƉůĂǇĞƌƐĚŝĚŶŽƚŬŶŽǁŚŽǁƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ͘
446dŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞǁĂƐĂůƐŽƚƌƵĞ͘/ĨWŽůŝƐŚĨŽƌĐĞƐĚŝĚŶŽƚĚĞƉůŽǇĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚďŽƌĚĞƌŝŶ
ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĨŽƌĐĞ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐĐŽƵůĚďĞƵƐĞĚƚŽĞŶĐŝƌĐůĞWŽůŝƐŚĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶŶŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶWŽůĂŶĚ
ĂŶĚĐƵƚƚŚĞůŝŶŬƚŽ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͘
λςσ
TŚŝƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐĂŐĂƉŝŶEdKƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ͕ĂƚůĞĂƐƚĂƚƚŚĞƵŶĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚ
ůĞǀĞů͘
Conclusions on the Tactical and Technological Needs for a Credible
Defense: The Baltic States can be successfully defended if some
tactical and technological innovations are employed to improve the
overall defensive posture.
Tactical Needs
dŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐŝƐƚŚĞůĂŶĚŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶĨƌŽŵZƵƐƐŝĂ͕
ĂŶĚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĞůĂƌƵƐ͘dŚŝƐŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŵƵƐƚĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŝƚƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƋƵŝĐŬůǇ
ĂŶĚƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĨŽƌ͕ŽƌƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ͕ĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂƚƚĂĐŬďǇƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨ
EdK͘dŚƵƐ͕Ăsuccessful defense of the Baltic States depends upon
delaying the successful accomplishment of initial Russian objectives for
ĂƐůŽŶŐĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ͘
KŶĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞuse of covering force hit

and run tactics͘/ŶŵĂŶǇůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ƚŚĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƌŽĂĚŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝƐƐƉĂƌƐĞ͘
dŚĞĨĞǁƌŽĂĚƐƚŚĂƚĚŽĞǆŝƐƚƉĂƐƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚĞƌƌĂŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƐŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞŶĞĂƌůǇ
ŝŵƉĂƐƐŝďůĞĚƵĞƚŽŚĞĂǀǇǁŽŽĚƐ͕ŵĂƌƐŚĞƐŽƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐǁĂƚĞƌ͘/ĨĂƌŵŽƌĞĚ
ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŵƵƐƚƉĂƐƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƐĞĐŚŽŬĞƉŽŝŶƚƐŝŶƐŝŶŐůĞĨŝůĞ͕ĂŶƚŝ-ĂƌŵŽƌ
ĂŵďƵƐŚĞƐƚŚĂƚĚĞƐƚƌŽǇ ƚŚĞůĞĂĚǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐĐĂŶďůŽĐŬƚŚĞĐŚŽŬĞƉŽŝŶƚĨŽƌ
ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞ͘/ĨƚŚĞŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŝƐĂůƐŽĐŽǀĞƌĞĚďǇŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĨŝƌĞ͕ĐůĞĂƌŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŵĂǇďĞĐŽŵĞƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐĨŽƌƚŚĞŝŶǀĂĚĞƌ͘
ŶŽƚŚĞƌ ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞuse of ambushes against supply
columns from wooded areas͘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŝŶǀĂĚŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞŵĂǇŵŽǀĞ
ƋƵŝĐŬůǇĂŶĚĐŽŵĞĨƌŽŵĂŶǇĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ͕ŝƚǁŝůůĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů
ĨƵĞůĂŶĚĂŵŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶ͘>ŝŐŚƚŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇǁŝƚŚĂŶƚŝ-ĂƌŵŽƌĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐ
ƐŚŽƵůĚĞƌĨŝƌĞĚĂŶƚŝ-ĂƌŵŽƌƌŽĐŬĞƚƐ͕ĐĂŶĚŝƐƌƵƉƚŽƌĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĂůŝŐŚƚůǇ
ĂƌŵŽƌĞĚŽƌƵŶĂƌŵŽƌĞĚƐƵƉƉůǇĐŽŶǀŽǇĨƌŽŵĐŽŶĐĞĂůĞĚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞ
ǁŽŽĚƐĂůŽŶŐĂƐƵƉƉůǇƌŽƵƚĞ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶŵĞůƚďĂĐŬŝŶƚŽƚŚĞǁŽŽĚƐ͘ ξξρ
ĞůĂǇŝŶŐŽƌĚĞŶǇŝŶŐƌĞƐƵƉƉůǇŽĨƚŚĞĂĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐĐŽŵďĂƚĐŽůƵŵŶƐǁŝůů
ξξρKŶĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨůŝŐŚƚƚƌŽŽƉƐŝŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇŝƐƚŚĞ&ŝŶŶŝƐŚƵƐĞŽĨƐŬŝƚƌŽŽƉƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
tŝŶƚĞƌtĂƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶŝŶλσνσ-40.
λσκ
ĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĞŵƚŽƐůŽǁŽƌƐƚŽƉ͕ďƵǇŝŶŐŵƵĐŚŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŝŵĞ͕ĂŶĚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ
ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐůƵĐƌĂƚŝǀĞƚĂƌŐĞƚƐĨŽƌEdKĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ.
dŚĞƚŚŝƌĚƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞuse of barriers͘dƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ͕ďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐ
ǁĞƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚƚŽƐƚŽƉŽƌĐŚĂŶŶĞůŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘dŚŝƐ
ƵƐĞŽĨďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐŝƐƐƚŝůůǀŝĂďůĞŝŶƚŚĞ ĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘dŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĂǀĞŶƵĞƐ
ŽĨĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐŝƐůŽǁ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚƌŽƵƚĞƐĨĞǁĞƌƐƚŝůů͘ǇĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐƚŽŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ͕
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĞĂƐŝůǇŽǀĞƌĐŽŵĞ͕ƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ
ǁŝůůďĞĚĞůĂǇĞĚ͘ DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ͕ĨŽƌĐĞƐƐƚŽƉƉĞĚĂƚĂďĂƌƌŝĞƌĐĂŶďĞŵŽƌĞ
ƌĞĂĚŝůǇĂƚƚĂĐŬĞĚďǇŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĨŝƌĞŽƌĂŵďƵƐŚĞƐƚŚĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞ
ŵŽǀŝŶŐ͘ĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐĐŽůƵŵŶƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƐƉůŝƚďǇĂďĂƌƌŝĞƌŵĂǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƚŚĞ
ĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂƚƚĂĐŬƐŵĂůůĞƌƐŝǌĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞůŽƐƚƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
ŵĂƐƐ͘dŚŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚ͘^ƵŝƚĂďůĞůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ
ďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐ͕ĂŵďƵƐŚĂƌĞĂƐĂŶĚŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĨŝƌĞŬŝůůǌŽŶĞƐŵƵƐƚďĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚŝŶ
ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞƚĂĐƚŝĐƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞĂďĂƌƌŝĞƌŝŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŽĨĂŶ
ĞŶĞŵǇĐŽůƵŵŶĂŶĚĨŽůůŽǁŝƚƵƉǁŝƚŚĞŝƚŚĞƌĂĚŝƌĞĐƚĨŝƌĞĂŵďƵƐŚŽƌĂŶ
ŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĨŝƌĞƐƚƌŝŬĞŵƵƐƚďĞƌĞŚĞĂƌƐĞĚ͘
Technology Needs
dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƐĂƌĞƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞ͕ĂŶĚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ of ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĨƵŶĚƐ͘EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ͕ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐŵĂǇ
ďĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐŽĨĚĞĨĞŶƐĞďƵĚŐĞƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ ĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ.
,ĞĂǀǇĂƌŵŽƌŝƐƐƚŝůůƚŚĞƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚŵĞƚŚŽĚĨŽƌďŽƚŚĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶŐĂŶĚ
ĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĨƌŽŵĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĂƚƚĂĐŬ͘/ĨŽŶƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ͕ĂŶĚ
ǁĞůů-ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĚŝŶŚŝƚĂŶĚƌƵŶƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ͕ĂĨĞǁƚĂŶŬƐĐĂŶŐŽĂůŽŶŐǁĂǇƚŽ
ŚĞůƉƐůŽǁĂŶĞŶĞŵǇĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ͘dŚĞƐĞƚĂŶŬƐŵĂǇďĞŽďƐŽůĞƚĞŵŽĚĞůƐƚŚĂƚ
ĂƌĞŽƌĐĂŶďĞƉƵƚŝŶƚŽŐŽŽĚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŽƌĚĞƌ͘KďƐŽůĞƚĞƚĂŶŬƐĂƌĞƐƚŝůů
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂƌŵŽƌĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůĐĂƌƌŝĞƌƐ͕ŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ
ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌůŝŐŚƚůǇĂƌŵŽƌĞĚŽƌƵŶĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘WƵƌĐŚĂƐŝŶŐŵŽĚĞƌŶ
ƚĂŶŬƐŵĂǇďĞĐŽƐƚƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝǀĞ͕ďƵƚarrangements for bi-lateral training,
storage and maintenance of an armored capability ŵĂǇďĞǁŝƚŚŝŶĂ
ŶĂƚŝŽŶ͛ƐďƵĚŐĞƚ͘
Modern anti-armor systems ĂƌĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŵŽƐƚĂƌŵŽƌĞĚ
ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ͕ĂŶĚŵĂǇŶŽƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĂŶĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ͘
λσλ
^ŚŽƵůĚĞƌ-ĨŝƌĞĚĂŶƚŝ-ƚĂŶŬŐƵŝĚĞĚŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐ:ĂǀĞůŝŶ͕ŽƌǀĞŚŝĐůĞ
ŵŽƵŶƚĞĚƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞdKt;dƵďĞ-ůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚ͕KƉƚŝĐĂůůǇ-ƚƌĂĐŬĞĚ͕
tŝƌĞ-ŐƵŝĚĞĚͿŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ͕ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞĚŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƋƵĂŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ͕ĂƌĞĂŶ
ĂĨĨŽƌĚĂďůĞĂŶƚŝ-ĂƌŵŽƌƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ͘/ŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĨŝƌĞĂŶƚŝ-ĂƌŵŽƌƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐ
ƚŚĞ^dZ/yλμκŵŵŵŽƌƚĂƌƌŽƵŶĚ͕ĂƌĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞǁŽƌƚŚ
ĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐ͘
Rapid barrier creation ĐĂŶďĞƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƌŽƵƚŝŶĞƌŽĂĚ
ŵĂŝŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶĂƚƐƵŝƚĂďůĞƉŽŝŶƚƐĂůŽŶŐŵĂŝŶƌŽƵƚĞƐ͘
ƐŝŵƉůĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝƐƚŽďƵƌǇĂƉŝƉĞƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƌŽƵƚĞ͕ĂŶĚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽ
ƚŚĞƉŝƉĞǀŝĂŽŶĞŽƌŵŽƌĞƐƚĂŶĚƉŝƉĞƐůĞĨƚƐƚŝĐŬŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ͘/Ŷ
ƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĂĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͕ƚŚĞƉŝƉĞĐĂŶďĞĨŝůůĞĚǁŝƚŚĂůŝƋƵŝĚĞǆƉůŽƐŝǀĞĂŶĚ
ĚĞƚŽŶĂƚĞĚĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂŶŝŶƐƚĂŶƚďĂƌƌŝĞƌŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĂĚŝƚĐŚ͘sĂƌŝŽƵƐ
ŽƚŚĞƌƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŝŶǀĞŶƚĞĚĂŶĚƵƐĞĚƚŽĚĞŶǇǀĞŚŝĐůĞ
ĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽďƌŝĚŐĞƐ͘dŚĞƐĞƚŽŽĐŽƵůĚďĞŝŶƐƚĂůůĞĚĂůŽŶŐŵĂŝŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĂŶĚ
ƌĞƐƵƉƉůǇƌŽƵƚĞƐĂŶĚĂĐƚŝǀĂƚĞĚĂƐŶĞĞĚĞĚ͘
Mobile fire support ĐŽƵůĚďĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ͘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚEdKŚĂƐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŝǌĞĚŽŶƚŚĞλοοŵŵŚŽǁŝƚǌĞƌ͕
ƐĞůĨ-ƉƌŽƉĞůůĞĚŚŽǁŝƚǌĞƌƐĂƌĞďŽƚŚŚĞĂǀǇĂŶĚĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞ͕ǁŚŝůĞƚŽǁĞĚ
ŚŽǁŝƚǌĞƌƐĂƌĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƚŽĞŶĞŵǇĐŽƵŶƚĞƌďĂƚƚĞƌǇĨŝƌĞĂŶĚŵĂǇŶŽƚďĞ
ŵŽďŝůĞĞŶŽƵŐŚŝŶƚŚĞŵŽĚĞƌŶďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚ͘ŶĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞŝƐƚŚĞλμκŵŵ
ƌŝĨůĞĚŵŽƌƚĂƌ͘ 448 ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚ͛ƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝůĞŝƐƐŵĂůůĞƌĂŶĚƌĂŶŐĞŶŽƚĂƐ
ŐƌĞĂƚ͕ƚŚĞƚŽǁĞĚλμκŵŵŵŽƌƚĂƌĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĂƐůĂƌŐĞĂǀĞŚŝĐůĞĂƐĂ
ƉƌŝŵĞŵŽǀĞƌĂŶĚŝƐĂŝƌƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂďůĞďǇŵĂŶǇƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚŚĞůŝĐŽƉƚĞƌ
ŵŽĚĞůƐ͘tŝƚŚĨĞǁŵŽǀŝŶŐƉĂƌƚƐ͕ƚŚĞŵŽƌƚĂƌŝƐŝŶĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ
ĂŶĚŝƐƌĞůŝĂďůĞŝŶďĂƚƚůĞ͘
448dŚĞh^DĂƌŝŶĞŽƌƉƐŚĂƐƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞĚĂƌŝĨůĞĚλμκŵŵŵŽƌƚĂƌ͕ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞh^ƌŵǇƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚĂ
λμκŵŵƐŵŽŽƚŚďŽƌĞŵŽƌƚĂƌ͘
λσμ
CHAPTER 5
U.S. MILITARY OPTIONS AND AN ACTION PLAN FOR NATO
Phillip A. Petersen with Phillip A. Karber
EdKŶĞĞĚƐĂŶĞǁ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͘/ƚƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ͞^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ͟ǁĂƐ
ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚŝŶμκλκĂŶĚŝƐƉƌĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ͞^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
ŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ͕͟ƚŚĂƚ͞ƚŚĞƵƌŽ-ƚůĂŶƚŝĐĂƌĞĂŝƐĂƚƉĞĂĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨ
ĂĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĂƚƚĂĐŬĂŐĂŝŶƐƚEdKƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇŝƐůŽǁ͘͟ ξξσ ĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚŝƐ
ƉƌĞŵŝƐĞ͕ƚŚĞĨŽĐƵƐ
ǁĂƐŽŶ͞ƌŝƐŝƐDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ͙ďĞǇŽŶĚEdK͛ƐďŽƌĚĞƌƐ͕͟ 450 ĂƌŵƐĐŽŶƚƌŽů͕
ĚŝƐĂƌŵĂŵĞŶƚ͕ĂŶĚŶŽŶ-ƉƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚZƵƐƐŝĂĂƐĂƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ͕ĂƐ
ǁĞůůĂƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ͞ƌĞĨŽƌŵĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ͟ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ͞ƐƚƌĞĂŵůŝŶĞ
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ͕ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞƚŚŽĚƐĂŶĚŵĂǆŝŵŝǌĞĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ͘͟
'ĞŶĞƌĂůWŚŝůŝƉD͘ƌĞĞĚůŽǀĞ͕EdK͛Ɛ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞůůŝĞĚŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ
ƵƌŽƉĞ͕ǁĂƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞůĂĐƵŶĂŝŶƚŚĞůůŝĂŶĐĞ͛ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-ŝŶƚĞƌƌĞŐŶƵŵ͕ǁŝƚŚŚŝƐŶĞǁ͞dŚĞĂƚĞƌ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͘͟ 451 tƌŝƚƚĞŶ
ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞĂĞŐŝƐŽĨŚŝƐĚƵĂů-hat rŽůĞĂƐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌŽĨh͘^͘&ŽƌĐĞƐŝŶ
ƵƌŽƉĞ͕ƚŚŝƐĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌĂŶĞǁ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͞ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚŚĞ
ξξσ ĂƐĞĚŽŶEdK͞WŽůŝƚŝĐĂů'ƵŝĚĂŶĐĞ͟ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚŝŶμκκπ͕ƚŚĞůĂƐƚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚǁĂƐ͗
͞^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ͗dŚĞĞĨĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞDĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚƚůĂŶƚŝĐdƌĞĂƚǇ
KƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ͕͟ĚŽƉƚĞĚďǇ,ĞĂĚƐŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞĂŶĚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂƚƚŚĞEdK^Ƶŵŵŝƚ͖>ŝƐďŽŶ͕WKZ͗
EdK,ĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ͕λσ-μκEŽǀ͘μκλκ͕ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂƚ
фŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ŶĂƚŽ͘ŝŶƚͬŶĂƚŽͺƐƚĂƚŝĐͺĨůμκλξͬĂƐƐĞƚƐͬƉĚĨͬƉĚĨͺƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐͬμκλμκμλξͺƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĐŽŶĐ
ĞƉƚ-2010-ĞŶŐ͘ƉĚĨх͘
450 ͞dŚĞďĞƐƚǁĂǇƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐŝƐƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞŵĨƌŽŵŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐ͘EdKǁŝůůĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůůǇ
ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌĂŶĚĂŶĂůǇǌĞƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƚŽĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĐƌŝƐĞƐĂŶĚ͕ǁŚĞƌĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ͕
ƚĂŬĞĂĐƚŝǀĞƐƚĞƉƐƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞŵĨƌŽŵďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐůĂƌŐĞƌĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐ͘tŚĞƌĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ
ƉƌŽǀĞƐƵŶƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů͕EdKǁŝůůďĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚĂŶĚĐĂƉĂďůĞƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞŽŶŐŽŝŶŐŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐ͘EdK
ŚĂƐƵŶŝƋƵĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƵŶƉĂƌĂůůĞůĞĚĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚĞƉůŽǇĂŶĚ
ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶƌŽďƵƐƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚ͘͟Ibid͕͘Ɖ͘π͘
451 'EƵƌƚŝƐ^ĐĂƉĂƌƌŽƚƚŝ͕͞^hZ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ĐĂƉĂƌƌŽƚƚŝZĞŵĂƌŬƐĂƚ^hZŚĂŶŐĞŽĨŽŵŵĂŶĚ
ĞƌĞŵŽŶǇ͕͟ĞĨĞŶƐĞDĞĚŝĂ͕;ξDzμκλπͿ͕Ăƚ
фŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚǀŝĚƐŚƵď͘ŶĞƚͬǀŝĚĞŽͬξπλσπξͬƐĂĐĞƵƌ-ŐĞŶĞƌĂů-ƐĐĂƉĂƌƌŽƚƚŝƌĞŵĂƌŬƐ-ƐĂĐĞƵƌ-ĐŚĂŶŐĞ-
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ-ĐĞƌĞŵŽŶǇη͘sǌYμ/πǀĨĐх͘
λσν
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ͙Ă
ƌĞǀĂŶĐŚŝƐƚZƵƐƐŝĂ͘͟ 452 ƌĞĞĚůŽǀĞ͛ƐƌĞƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚ͕'ĞŶĞƌĂůƵƌƚŝƐD͘
^ĐĂƉĂƌƌŽƚƚŝ͕ŝŶĐĂůůŝŶŐƚŚŝƐ͞ĂƉŝǀŽƚĂůŵŽŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
ŽŵŵĂŶĚĂƌĞĂŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂƐŝƚĨĂĐĞƐŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐƚŚƌĞĂƚƐĂŶĚ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ͕͟ 453 ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚƚŚĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŽĨĂ͞ƌĞƐƵƌŐĞŶƚ
ZƵƐƐŝĂ͟ĂŶĚƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚ͞ƚŽĨŝŐŚƚŝĨĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞĨĂŝůƐ͕͟ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ
͞'ĞŶĞƌĂůƌĞĞĚůŽǀĞ͛ƐƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶĨŽƌĐĞ͘͟ 454
ZĞĐŽŐŶŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞdŚƌĞĂƚĂŶĚZĞĂĨĨŝƌŵŝŶŐ>ŝďĞƌĂůsĂůƵĞƐ
ĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌ͕ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽ
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞŝŶƵƌŽƉĞƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚĨŝǆĨŝƌŵůǇŝŶƚŚĞ
ƉĂƐƚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚďƌŽƵŐŚƚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐƚǁŝĐĞƚŽ
ƵƌŽƉĞƚŽƚŝƉƚŚĞƐĐĂůĞƐŽĨĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚǇƌĂŶŶǇ͘dŽƐĞĐƵƌĞƚŚŝƐŶĞǁ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ͕ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĚĂEŽƌƚŚƚůĂntic
dƌĞĂƚǇKƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ;EdKͿƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚĚĞŵĂŶĚƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƌĞǀĂŶĐŚŝƐƚ
ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ͘ƐƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞǆƉĞƌƚ͕ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌŽŶŶĞůůǇ͕ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ
ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͕ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŽďǀŝŽƵƐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨEdKǁĂƐƚŚĂƚŝƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŚĞĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶǁƌŽƵŐŚƚďǇƚŚĞǁĂƌƐ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂŶĚ&ƌĂŶĐĞ͘dŚŝƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞEdKĨŽƌŵƵůĂǁĂƐ
ĞǀĞŶƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚŝŶDŽƐĐŽǁĂƐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶĞŶƚĞƌĞĚŝƚƐĚĞĂƚŚ
ƚŚƌŽĞƐ͕ǁŚĞŶŝƚǁĂƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚƚŚĂƚĨƵƚƵƌĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ;ƚŽ
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂͿǁĂƐ ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƵƉŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ
452 dŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌŽĨĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶďĞŝŶŐ͗͞ŵĂƐƐŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ͕ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ
ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚĨŝŐŚƚĞƌƐ;&d&ͿƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƵƌŽƉĞ͕ĐǇďĞƌ-ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ͕ƚŚĞůŝŶŐĞƌŝŶŐĞĨĨĞĐƚƐĨƌŽŵĂ
ŐůŽďĂůĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĐƌŝƐŝƐ͕ĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌĨƵŶĚĞĚĚĞĨĞŶƐĞďƵĚŐĞƚƐĂůůũĞŽƉĂƌĚŝǌĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕͟Ibid.,
Ɖ͘λ͘
453 ŚĞƌǇůWĞůůĞƌŝŶ͕͞ƵĐŽŵEŽŵŝŶĞĞ^ĐĂƉĂƌƌŽƚƚŝdĞƐƚŝĨŝĞƐĞĨŽƌĞ^ĞŶĂƚĞWĂŶĞů͕͟ŽEĞǁƐ͕;μλ
WZμκλπͿ͕ĂƚфŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ͘ŐŽǀͬEĞǁƐ-ƌƚŝĐůĞ-sŝĞǁͬƌƚŝĐůĞͬρξκκοξͬĞƵĐŽŵ-ŶŽŵŝŶĞĞ-
ƐĐĂƉĂƌƌŽƚƚŝ-ƚĞƐƚŝĨŝĞƐ-ďĞĨŽƌĞ-ƐĞŶĂƚĞ-ƉĂŶĞůх͘
454 'EƵƌƚŝƐ^ĐĂƉĂƌƌŽƚƚŝ͕͞^hZ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ĐĂƉĂƌƌŽƚƚŝZĞŵĂƌŬƐĂƚ^hZŚĂŶŐĞŽĨŽŵŵĂŶĚ
ĞƌĞŵŽŶǇ͕͟ĞĨĞŶƐĞDĞĚŝĂ͕;ξDzμκλπͿ͕Ăƚф
ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚǀŝĚƐŚƵď͘ŶĞƚͬǀŝĚĞŽͬξπλσπξͬƐĂĐĞƵƌ-ŐĞŶĞƌĂů-ƐĐĂƉĂƌƌŽƚƚŝ-ƌĞŵĂƌŬƐ-ƐĂĐĞƵƌ-ĐŚĂŶŐĞ-
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ-ĐĞƌĞŵŽŶǇη͘sǌYμ/πǀĨĐ х͘
λσξ
ĂŶĚƵƉŽŶŬĞĞƉŝŶŐŵĞƌŝĐĂĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ͘ 455 hŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇ͕ƚŚĞ
ǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨ͞ĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚZƵƐƐŝĂ– ŵŽƌĞĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ͕ŚŽƉĞĨƵů͕ŵŽƌĞ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ͕ŽŶĞĂƚƉĞĂĐĞǁŝƚŚŝƚƐĞůĨĂŶĚǁŝƚŚŝƚƐŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌƐ͟ 456 – ŽŶůǇ
ůĂƐƚĞĚƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƌŝƐŝƐŽĨλσσν͘ ξορ KŶĐĞƚŚĞ
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶƌĞĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŽŶƚŚĞ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŝŶDŽƐĐŽǁ͛ƐƌĞĚƵĐĞĚĚŽŵŝŶŝŽŶƐ͕ƚŚĞĚŝĞǁĂƐĐĂƐƚŝŶ
ǁŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŵĞĂŶƵŶĂǀŽŝĚĂďůĞĐůĂƐŚŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĞƐ͘
tŚĞŶsůĂĚŝŵŝƌWƵƚŝŶĨŝƌƐƚďĞĐĂŵĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝŶλσσσŚĞŝŶŚĞƌŝƚĞĚĂŶ
ŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŚĂĚĂĐƋƵŝĞƐĐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƐŵĞŵďĞƌŵĞŶƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŚĂĚůĂďŽƌĞĚĨŽƌŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƐĞǀĞŶƚǇǇĞĂƌƐƚŽ
ƌĞƐƚŽƌĞDŽƐĐŽǁ͛ƐĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĞƐƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚŝŶƚŚĞλσλς
dƌĞĂƚǇŽĨƌĞƐƚ->ŝƚŽǀƐŬ͘ 458 ĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚƚŽ ƵŶĚŽǁŚĂƚŚĞƐĂǁĂƐ͞ƚŚĞ
455 ^ĞĞWŚŝůůŝƉ͘WĞƚĞƌƐĞŶ͕͞dŚĞŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽ^ŽǀŝĞƚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ͗ŶŵĞƌŐŝŶŐsŝƐŝŽŶŽĨ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕͟ ŝŶ Jane’s NATO Handbook 1990-91͕ ĞĚŝƚĞĚ ďǇ ƌƵĐĞ 'ĞŽƌŐĞ͕ ƉƉ͘ νμν-ννξ͖
WĞƚĞƌůŵŽŶĚ͕͞^ŽǀŝĞƚĞŵƉŝƌĞǁŝůůĨĂůů͕WĞŶƚĂŐŽŶĞǆƉĞƌƚƉƌĞĚŝĐƚƐ͕͟The Washington Times͕DĂƌĐŚ
λμ͕λσσκ͕Ɖ͘π͖:ŽƐĞƉŚ&ƌŝƚĐŚĞƚƚ͕͞ƵƌŽƉĞ͗h͘^͘DĂƉKĨDŽƐĐŽǁ͛Ɛ,ŽƉĞƐ͕͟International Herald-
Tribune͕DĂƌĐŚμπ͕λσσκ͖ĂŶĚZĞŝŶĞƌ<͘,ƵďĞƌĂŶĚWŚŝůůŝƉ͘WĞƚĞƌƐĞŶ͞ĠũăsƵůůKǀĞƌŐĂŝŶ͗
,Žǁ ŶĚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽůĚ tĂƌ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ sŝĞǁƐ WŽƌƚĞŶĚĞĚ WƵƚŝŶ͛Ɛ WůĂŶƐ ĨŽƌ ŝƐŵĂŶƚůŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
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DĂƌĐŚλρ͕μκλρ͕Ɖ͘λρ͘
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ŝŶ ƚŚĞ KĐƚŽďĞƌ λσσν ƐŚŽǁĚŽǁŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ zĞůƚƐŝŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-
ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĐŽŵƉůĞǆ͕ĂĐƚŝŶŐŝŶƵŶŝƐŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂĐǇ͘ƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ͕ƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚƐŽĨKĐƚŽďĞƌ
ǁĞƌĞ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ Ă ǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ ŽĨ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ͕ Ă ƌĞŵŽǀĂů ŽĨ ŽďƐƚĂĐůĞƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƚŚ ƚŽƌĞĨŽƌŵ͘ /ƚ ŶŽǁ
ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞǆĂĐƚĞĚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐďĞĨŽƌĞďĂŝůŝŶŐŽƵƚzĞůƚƐŝŶďǇƐƚŽƌŵŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ͘ dŚĞ ǀĞƌǇ ĚĂǇ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ŝŶƐƵƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ͕ zĞůƚƐŝŶ
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ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞƚŚĂƚĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌh͘^͘^͘Z͘
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͞ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ZĞĨŽƌŵ /ƐĞĂĚ – ĂĐŬ ƚŽ ĞŶƚƌĂů WůĂŶŶŝŶŐ͕͟Foreign Affairs͕ sŽůƵŵĞ ρν͕ EƵŵďĞƌ μ͕
DĂƌĐŚͬƉƌŝůλσσξ͕Ɖ͘μν͘/ŶĨĂĐƚ͕͞dŚĞĂƐŝĐWƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽĐƚƌŝŶĞŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
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ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌŵǇŚĂĚŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚŝƚƐŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ͕ƚŚĞƌŵǇƐƚŽƌŵĞĚƚŚĞ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞĂƌůǇ ŵŽƌŶŝŶŐ ŚŽƵƌƐ ŽĨ KĐƚŽďĞƌ ξth͕ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŽƵŶĐŝů ŵĞƚ ĂŐĂŝŶ ŽŶ π
KĐƚŽďĞƌ ƚŽ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĂůŝǌĞĚ ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ŽŶ μ
EŽǀĞŵďĞƌλσσν͘^ĞĞThe Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,
λσσν͕Ɖ͘λ͘
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ƚƌĞĂƚǇŽĨƌĞƐƚ->ŝƚŽǀƐŬǁĂƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚ͘ǇƚŚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂůŽƐƚνξƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨŚĞƌ
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ͕νμƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨŚĞƌĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůůĂŶĚ͕ςοƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨŚĞƌďĞĞƚ-ƐƵŐĂƌůĂŶĚ͕οξ ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ
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ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĨŽĐƵƐĞĚƵƉŽŶĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚĚƌĂǁƵƉŽŶ
ƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ͞ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚ͟ǁĂƌŝŶDŽůĚŽǀĂ͛Ɛ
dƌĂŶƐĚŶŝĞƐƚĞƌƌĞŐŝŽŶĂŶĚ͕ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ͕ŝŶ'ĞŽƌŐŝĂ͛ƐƌĞŐŝŽŶƐŽĨďŬŚĂǌŝĂ
ĂŶĚ^ŽƵƚŚKƐƐĞƚŝĂ͘ ξοσ
tŚŝůĞWƵƚŝŶĂŶĚŚŝƐƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƐǁĞƌĞƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĚĂƚƚŚĞůĂĐŬ
ŽĨĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵŽĨŵĂŶǇŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞĨŽƌŚŝƐμκλξŶƐĐŚůƵƐƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶDŽƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚ͕͞ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĂĐŽŶĐĞĂůĞĚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ͟ǁĂƐǁĞůů
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KGB ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ͘ZĞďĞůůŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞƵŶŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĚŝĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞŐĞŶƵŝŶĞƚŽ
ďĞƉĞƌƐƵĂƐŝǀĞůǇƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŽĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞƐƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽďĞĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĞĚďǇ
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ƵƌŽƉĞ͛ƐĐŽŵŵŽŶŚŽŵĞŝŶĂƐŚŽǁĚŽǁŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂƐƵƉĞƌƉŽǁĞƌ
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ůŽŶŐĞƌĐĂŶZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐƌĞǀĂŶĐŚŝƐƚĐůĂŝŵƐ ĂŶĚĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉŽƐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
ďĞĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚĂƐŽŶůǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚŝƐƉůĂǇƐ– ƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞƚĂŬĞŶƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐŚŽǁŶƚŽůĞĂĚƚŽǁĂƌ͘
ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨƌŝŵĞĂŝŶĂƐƵĚĚĞŶfait accompli͕ƵƚŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ĐŽǀĞƌƚĂŶĚůŽǁĞƌŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐŽĨEĞǁ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌƚŽ
ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĂŶĚĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƌĂďŝĚĨŽƌŵŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ͕ƚŚĞŶĨŽůůŽǁĞĚďǇůĂƌŐĞ-
ƐĐĂůĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĂƚƚĂĐŬďǇĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ-ĂƌŵƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŚŝŐŚ-ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇ
ĐŽŵďĂƚ͕ĂŶĚǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĨŽƌŵƐŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌƚŚƌĞĂƚƐŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨ
ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĨƌŽŵ ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚWŽůĂŶĚĂƌĞŶŽƚŝŵŵƵŶĞ͘
dŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚWŽůĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚWƵƚŝŶŵĞĂŶƐǁŚĞŶŚĞ
ƚĂůŬƐĂďŽƵƚZƵƐƐŝĂĂƐĂ͞ĐŝǀŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂƚĞ͟ƐƚƌƵŐŐůŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ
ŚĞƌŝƚĂŐĞŽĨůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ-ƐƚĂƚĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ
ƐƵďŵĞƌŐĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞĨĞƵĚĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĞďĞĨŽƌĞ͘WŽůĂŶĚ͕
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ŝƐŽĨƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐŝǌĞƚŽƉůĂǇŝƚƐŽǁŶŐĂŵĞŝŶƌĞũĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐ
ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ͕ĂŶĚŝƚƐĨĞĂƌŽĨďĞŝŶŐĂďĂŶĚŽŶĞĚĂƐŝƚǁĂƐŝŶλσνσŚĂƐǇĞƚƚŽ
ŽĨŚĞƌŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬŝŶŐƐ͕ĂŶĚςσƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨŚĞƌĐŽĂůŵŝŶĞƐ͘͟:ŽŚŶt͘tŚĞĞůĞƌ-ĞŶŶĞƚƚ͕
Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March 1918͕EĞǁzŽƌŬ͗t͘DŽƌƌŽǁΘŽŵƉĂŶǇ͕λσνσ͕Ɖ͘
μπσ͘
ξοσ &ŽƌĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĞůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŵĂĚĞŝŶƚŚŝƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ͕ƐĞĞŝĞŐŽ͘ZƵŝǌWĂůŵĞƌ͕
͞ĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ͍ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐŚǇďƌŝĚǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ͕ĂŶĚŽůĚtĂƌ
ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐ͕͟NATO Research Paper͕EƵŵďĞƌλμκ͕ZŽŵĞ͗EdKĞĨĞŶƐĞŽůůĞŐĞ͕KĐƚŽďĞƌμκλο͘
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ƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨĂƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞŝŶEdK͛ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ďƵƚƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨ
EdK͛ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝŶŚĞůƉŝŶŐƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞEŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞ͘/ƚŝƐŝŶ
ĂƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ͛ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽŝƚƐ
ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂůǀĂůƵĞƐĂŶĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĞǁŝůůďĞǁŽŶŽƌůŽƐƚ͘/ƚŝƐƚŚĞ
ƉĞŽƉůĞƐŽĨEŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞǁŚŽŚĂǀĞŝƐƐƵĞĚƚŚĞĐĂůůƚŽĂƌŵƐ͘dŚĞ
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚŶĞĞĚĂŶƐǁĞƌƐĂƌĞλͿǁŚĂƚĚŽĞƐEdKŶĞĞĚŝŶƚŚĞǁĂǇŽĨ
ĨŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ͖ĂŶĚμͿŚŽǁŵƵƐƚEdKŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞƚŽŵĞĞƚƚŚĞƐĞ
ŶĞǁĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ͍
Perceptions and Misperceptions in a Baltic Net Assessment
ƐƉĂƌƚŽĨŝƚƐŶĞƚĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐZĞŐŝŽŶ͕dŚĞ
WŽƚŽŵĂĐ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚƐĞǀĞƌĂůĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ-ĂƐƐŝƐƚĞĚĂůƚŝĐ
ĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ^ŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇďĂůĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ͘dŚĞƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶdŚĞ
WŽƚŽŵĂĐ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ͛ƐƉƌŽƉƌŝĞƚĂƌǇ,'DKEƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵĂŶĚ
ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ͘,'DKEŝƐĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚŽŶ'ŽŽŐůĞĂƌƚŚŝŶƚĞƌĨĂĐĞ͖
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĂƚƚƌŝƚŝŽŶĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĚŝƌĞĐƚĨŝƌĞ͕
ŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĨŝƌĞ͕ĂŝƌĂƚƚĂĐŬ͕ĂŶĚĂŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ͖ĂŶĚĞŵƉůŽǇƐĂŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ
ĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŽƌƚŚĂƚƚĂŬĞƐŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŚŽǁƚĞƌƌĂŝŶŝŶŚŝďŝƚƐĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ;ŝ͘Ğ͕͘ƚĂŶŬƐ͕ƚŽǁĞĚĂŶĚƐĞůĨ-
ƉƌŽƉĞůůĞĚĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ͕ĂŶĚǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƚǇƉĞƐŽĨŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐͿ͘dŚĞĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ĂƌĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚďǇƉůĂǇĞƌƐǁŚŽŝƐƐƵĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĐŽŵďĂƚŽƌĚĞƌƐĨŽƌ
ĞĂĐŚƚƵƌŶƚŽƚŚĞƵŶŝƚƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ͘ůůƵŶŝƚŽƌĚĞƌƐĂƌĞ
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĨŽƌĞĂĐŚŵŽǀĞƚŽƚŚĞƵŵƉŝƌĞ͕ǁŚŽĂĚũƵĚŝĐĂƚĞƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ
ĐŽŵďĂƚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ͘ůůŽƌĚĞƌƐĂƌĞƐƵďŵŝƚƚĞĚĂŶĚĞǆĞĐƵƚĞĚ
ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ͘
^ŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞƌƵŶƚǁŝĐĞĞĂĐŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ͛ƐĨĂĐŝůŝƚǇŝŶsŝƌŐŝŶŝĂ
ǁŝƚŚĂŶĞĂƌůǇĨƵůůĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚŽĨtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ-ďĂƐĞĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƚƚĂĐŚĠƐ
;ĞǆĐůƵĚŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂĂŶĚĞůĂƌƵƐͿĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͕ĂŶĚŝŶZţŐĂ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞĞĨĞŶƐĞDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ͖ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŽŶĐĞĞĂĐŚŝŶdĂƌƚƵ͕ƐƚŽŶŝĂĨŽƌƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
λσρ
ĞĨĞŶƐĞŽůůĞŐĞ͕ĂŶĚŝŶtĂƌƐĂǁ͕WŽůĂŶĚĂƚƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ƚĂĚŝƵŵǁŝƚŚ
ƚŚĞWƵųĂƐŬŝ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ͘ĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞŐĂŵĞŝƐĚǇŶĂŵŝĐ͕ĂŶĚĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇ
ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƵƉŽŶŚŽǁƚŚĞƉůĂǇĞƌƐƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽƚŚĞĐƌŝƐŝƐďĞŝŶŐĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚ͕
ĞĂĐŚƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚƐŽŵĞƵŶŝƋƵĞ͞ůĞƐƐŽŶƐůĞĂƌŶĞĚ͘͟ĂĐŚŐĂŵĞ
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞ͕ŝŶƚŚĞĞŶĚ͕ƚŚĞ
EŽƌƚŚƚůĂŶƚŝĐdƌĞĂƚǇKƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ;EdKͿŝƐĂĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ
ƐƚĂƚĞƐǁŝƚŚǀĂƌǇŝŶŐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ͘ůůƚŚĞƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚ
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƉůĂǇĞƌƐĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐďŽƚŚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚEdKƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨĂƌŵĞĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐƌĞŐŝŽŶ͕ĂŶĚ
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽĂŐƌĞĞƵƉŽŶƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ͕ƉůĂŶƐ͕ƌƵůĞƐŽĨĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ͕
etc. ĨŽƌŚŽǁƚŚĞDĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞůůŝĂŶĐĞƐŚŽƵůĚĂĐƚƚŽŵĞĞƚƚŚĞŝƌƌƚŝĐůĞ
οŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ͘ 460 dŚĞƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂůƐŽ
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƚŽĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƐĞŶŝŽƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐƚŚĂƚ,'DKE
ŵĂǇďĞƵƐĞĨƵůĨŽƌƚŚĞĞǆƉůŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĂũŽƌĨŽƌĐĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŝƐƐƵĞƐ͕
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇŚŽǁƚŽĂůůŽĐĂƚĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŵŽƐƚĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇĨŽƌďŽƚŚ
ƐŚŽƌƚƚĞƌŵĂŶĚůŽŶŐƚĞƌŵĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŶĞĞĚƐ͘
WĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚůĞƐƐŽŶůĞĂƌŶĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ,'DKE
ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ-ĂƐƐŝƐƚĞĚĂůƚŝĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ^ŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĂƐƚŚĂƚǇĞĂƌƐŽĨ
ŶĞŐůĞĐƚŽĨEdK͛ƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĐŽŵŵĂŶĚŽĨĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ĞǀĞŶĂƚĂ
ĐŽƌƉƐůĞǀĞů͕ŚĂǀĞƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶĂƚŽƚĂůůŽƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŵĞŵŽƌǇŝŶ
ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ-ĂƌŵƐƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĂƚƚŚŝƐůĞǀĞů͘dŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĨĞůƚ
ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƐƚƌŽŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘tŝƚŚĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽŽƐŵĂůůƚŽ
faĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƐĐĂůĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůůǇ͕ĂŶĚ
ǁŝƚŚǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇŶŽĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŝŶƉƵƚĨƌŽŵEdK͕ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƉůĂŶƐĂƌŽƵŶĚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚůĞĨƚĂůůŝĞĚƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ
ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ͘461 dŚĞƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇŵĂĚĞ ĐůĞĂƌƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇĨŽƌĂ
460 /ƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐŝŶ ƚŚĞƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐĐĂůůĞĚĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ

ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŝŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶŚĂƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚ͕ƚŽƐŽŵĞĞǆƚĞŶƚ͕
ŵŝƚŝŐĂƚĞƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĞ^ǁĞĚĞŶĂŶĚ&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂƌĞŶŽƚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨEdK͘dŚƵƐ͕ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚWŽůĂŶĚŚĂǀĞĂĐůĞĂƌƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĞǆƉĞĐƚƚŚĂƚŶŽĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂ
ƐƚĂƚĞ͕ĞǆĐĞƉƚZƵƐƐŝĂŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ͕ǁŽƵůĚƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚŽŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶǁĂŐĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
ƚŚĞŵ͘
461 /ƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ͕ŚĂǀŝŶŐŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚŚŽǁƚŚĞƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĞŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ
ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂĐƌŽƐƐƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůďŽƌĚĞƌƐŝŵƉĂĐƚƵƉŽŶŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶƐ͕ƚŚĞ
λσς
ƐŝŶŐůĞ͕ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ͕ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ-ĂƌŵƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞ
ĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚWŽůĂŶĚ͘>ĂƚǀŝĂ͕>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂĂŶĚƐƚŽŶŝĂ– ƚŚƌĞĞƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶ
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐǁŝƚŚĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚďŽƌĚĞƌƐ– ĂƌĞĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝǌĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨĂƐŽŶĞŐĞŽƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƐƉĂĐĞŽĨůŽǁ-ůǇŝŶŐƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ
ĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂĐŽĂƐƚƚŚĂƚƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞƐZƵƐƐŝĂĨƌŽŵ͞ǁĂƌŵǁĂƚĞƌ͟
ƉŽƌƚƐĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĨƌŽŵ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚOblast͘,ĂǀŝŶŐĂůĂŶĚĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌƚŽ
<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚǁŝƚŚĂŶĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƌĂŝůĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ĂŶĚƌĞƐƚŽƌŝŶŐ
ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇŽǀĞƌǁĂƌŵǁĂƚĞƌƉŽƌƚƐŽŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂĂƌĞƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƉůĂŶŶĞĚZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘
:ƵƐƚĂƐďĂƐŝĐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĞŵĞƌŐĞĚĂƐĂĐĞŶƚƌĂůŵĂƚƚĞƌƚŚĂƚ
EdKŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝĞƐǁŝůůŶĞĞĚƚŽĞŝƚŚĞƌůĞĂƌŶŽƌƌĞůĞĂƌŶ͕ƐŽŝƚĂůƐŽďĞĐĂŵĞ
ĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚďĂƐŝĐcoalition warfare ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐŵƵƐƚĂůƐŽďĞůĞĂƌŶĞĚŽƌ
ƌĞůĞĂƌŶĞĚ͘/ŶƚŽĚĂǇΖƐĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶEdKĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ͕ƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůEdKŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĂůůŝĂŶĐĞĂƌĞ
ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚďǇDŽƐĐŽǁĂƐŵŽƌĞƉƌĞĐĂƌŝŽƵƐƚŚĂŶĞǀĞƌďĞĨŽƌĞ 462 ĂŶĚŶŽ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŚĂƐŶĞĂƌůǇƚŚĞĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂƚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨĂƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚĂƐWŽůĂŶĚ͘WŽůŝƐŚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŶŽǁĚƌŝǀĞĚĞďĂƚĞƐŝŶďŽƚŚĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŝƌĐůĞƐ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚEdK͕ĂŶĚWŽůĂŶĚΖƐƌŽůĞŝŶĂĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶƐƚŝŐĂƚĞĚďǇĐůĂƐŚĞƐŝŶ
ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐǁŝůůďĞĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƚŽŚŽǁƚŽĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĚĞĨĞŶƐĞďŽƚŚ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂůůǇĂŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘
EdKǁŝůůŶŽƚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇǁŝƚŚŝŶŽƌǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞůůŝĂŶĐĞƵŶƚŝůŝƚ
ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐPoland as the center of gravity for stability in Eastern
Europe. dŚĞWŽůĞƐŚĂǀĞĐŽŵĞƚŽƌĞĂůŝǌĞƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĂďŝŐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƚĂƚĞ
ĂŶĚǁŝůůďĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂƐĂƐƚĂƚĞǁŝƚŚŝƚƐŽǁŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĂŶĚĐĂƉĂďůĞ
ŽĨƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚůǇ͘/ŶĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ ,'DKE
^ŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁĂƐƉůĂǇĞĚďǇWŽůĞƐ;ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ
ĞĨĞŶƐĞDŝŶŝƐƚƌŝĞƐŽĨƐƚŽŶŝĂ͕>ĂƚǀŝĂ͕ĂŶĚ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŚĂǀĞƐŝŶĐĞŵĂĚĞƐƚƌŝĚĞƐƚŽŵŝƚŝŐĂƚĞƚŚĞ
ŐůĂƌŝŶŐŽŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĨĂŝůŝŶŐƚŽĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌŝŶŐĂůůŝĞƐ͘
462 EŽŵŽƌĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŶĞĞĚďĞƐŝƚĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŝŶZapad-μκκσ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨƉůĂǇĞĚ&ƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂƐƌĞĨƵƐŝŶŐƚŽŚŽŶŽƌƚŚĞŝƌƌƚŝĐůĞοĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐ͘
ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚǁĂƐŶĞǀĞƌƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͘
λσσ
ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚďƵƚǁŝƚŚĐůŽƐĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐďǇ
WŽůĞƐĨƌŽŵŝŶƐŝĚĞƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚͿ͕ĂŶĚŝƚǁĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽŽďƐĞƌǀĞĂ
ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶŽĨďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌƚŚĂƚƐŚŽƵůĚƐĞƌǀĞĂƐĂǁĂƌŶŝŶŐƚŽWŽůĂŶĚ͛ƐĂůůŝĞƐ͘/Ŷ
ĞĂĐŚƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞWŽůĞƐĚĞůĂǇĞĚ;ŽƌƌĞĨƵƐĞĚͿƚŽƚĂŬĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ
ĂŶĚͬŽƌƚŽŽŬĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚůǇǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĐŽŶƐƵůƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĂůůŝĞƐƚŚĂƚ
ƌĂŝƐĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌEdKĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
ĂƚƚĂĐŬ͗
1. 'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨtĂƌƐĂǁƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚ͕ƐŚŽƵůĚ
ZƵƐƐŝĂƐƚĂƌƚĂǁĂƌ͕ƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚďĞ͞ŶŽƐŵĂůůǁĂƌ͕͟ŚŽǁǁŝůů
EdKƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͍
2. 'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ tĂƌƐĂǁƚŽĚĞƐƚƌŽǇƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵǇ
ŝĨDŽƐĐŽǁƐƚĂƌƚƐĂǁĂƌŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐZĞŐŝŽŶ͕ŚŽǁǁŝůůEdKĨŝŐŚƚƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵǇ;ŝ͘Ğ͕͘ǁŝůůEdKĐŽŶĚƵĐƚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇ͞ĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ͟
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽƌǁŝůůŝƚĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞůǇĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-ŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞǇŽŶĚEdKDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐͿ͍
ŶƐǁĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐǁŝůůĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶĂůŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ
EdK͛ƐƉůĂŶƐƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚŝƚƐDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚ͕ĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ͕ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ
ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞŝƚƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚĞƚĞƌDŽƐĐŽǁĨƌŽŵĞŝƚŚĞƌǁĂƌŽƌĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
ĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĂĐƌŝƐŝƐ͘
dŚĞ,'DKE^ŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶĚŝĨĨĞƌƐĨƌŽŵŽĂƌĚtĂƌ'ĂŵĞƐŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚŚĂƐ
ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐ;ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŝĂůͿŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ͕ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐ
ĚĞŐƌĂĚĞĚŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ͕ĂŶĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĞ͞ŵƵůƚŝ-ĚŽŵĂŝŶ͟ĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚŝĞƐŽĨ
ŝƌͬŝƌ-ĞĨĞŶƐĞͬEĂǀĂůͬůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐtĂƌĨĂƌĞͬ>ŽŐŝƐƚŝĐƐĂŶĚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŝŶ
ůĞǀĞůŽĨƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ͘ dŚĞ^ŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐŽŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶĂŶĚƚƌĂĨĨŝĐĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚƋƵĂĚƌĂŶƚŽĨWŽůĂŶĚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƐĞƚƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͘ĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞƚƌĂĨĨŝĐĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞ
ŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŝƐĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌ
200
ƚŚĞĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĞǆƉŽƐĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽ
ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶďǇŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĨŝƌĞƐĂŶĚĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ͘dŚĞŐĂŵĞŵĂŬĞƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚ
EdKĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐůŽǁĞƌƚŚĞƚĞŵƉŽŽĨĂŶǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŽ
ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĞŶĞĞĚŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐĨŽƌůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐƐ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂŶĚ͕ĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ͕ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶŐ
ĨŽƌĐĞƚŽůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐƐŝŶƚĞƌĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ͘DĂŬŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐƐƚŽƉĂƚĂƐŵĂŶǇ
ƌŝǀĞƌůŝŶĞƐĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĨŝŶĚŽƌĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĂǁĂǇŽǀĞƌƚŚĞǁĂƚĞƌďĂƌƌŝĞƌ
ŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚĨƵĞůŝƐďĞŝŶŐĐŽŶƐƵŵĞĚƚŚĂƚŵƵƐƚďĞƚƌƵĐŬĞĚĨƌŽŵZƵƐƐŝĂ͘
&ƵĞůŝƐŵŽǀĞĚďǇƐŽĨƚ-ƐŬŝŶŶĞĚǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƚŽ
ĨŝƌĞƐ͕ďƵƚŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞĞƐĐŽƌƚĞĚ– ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐƚŚĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇ
ƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚǁŝƚŚĨŝƌƐƚĞĐŚĞůŽŶĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘tŽƌŬŝŶŐǁŝƚŚůŽĐĂů
ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐŵĂĚĞĐůĞĂƌƚŽWŽƚŽŵĂĐ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ^ƚĂĨĨƚŚĂƚŵƵĐŚǁŽƌŬŶĞĞĚƐ
ƚŽďĞĚŽŶĞƚŽƉƌĞ-ĐŚĂŵďĞƌďƌŝĚŐĞƐĨŽƌĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŽŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞƚŚĞ
ƚĂƐŬƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƉƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐƚŽƚƵƌŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐŝŶƚŽĂŚĞĚŐĞŚŽŐ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽƐĂƉZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĂŶĚďƌĞĂŬƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵŽĨ
ĂŶĂƚƚĂĐŬŽƌĞǆƉŽƐĞƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌĞĂƌƚŽĂƚƚĂĐŬŝĨďǇƉĂƐƐĞĚ͘
Importance of Terrain
tŚŝůĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŝƐƌĞƉůĞƚĞǁŝƚŚĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŽĨƐŵĂůůĞƌĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐĚĞĨĞĂƚŝŶŐ
ůĂƌŐĞƌĨŽƌĐĞƐĚƵĞƚŽĂŵŽƌĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƵƐĞŽĨƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ͕ŵŽƐƚďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨ
ĨŽƌĐĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐ– ĂŶĚ͕ŝŶĨĂĐƚ͕ŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞďŽĂƌĚŐĂŵĞƐĞǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐĂ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇďĞĐŽŵĞƐŽ
ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ– ďĞŐŝŶǁŝƚŚ ĂŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇďĂůĂŶĐĞĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶŶƵŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚƌŽŽƉƐ
ĂŶĚǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƚǇƉĞƐŽĨĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĂŶĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ͘463 ǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂůƚŝĐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐďǇdŚĞ
WŽƚŽŵĂĐ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƵƐŝŶŐŝƚƐƉƌŽƉƌŝĞƚĂƌǇ,'DKE^ŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
ƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵǁŚŝĐŚĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶĚĂƚĂ͕ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
^ƚĂƚĞƐĂƌĞǀĞƌǇĚĞĨĞŶƐŝďůĞ͖ĂŶĚƉƌŽƉĞƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ
ƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇĂůƚĞƌƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌƚŚĞƚǇƉĞŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
463^ĞĞ͕ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕ĂǀŝĚ͘^ŚůĂƉĂŬĂŶĚDŝĐŚĂĞů:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ͕Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s

Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics͕^ĂŶƚĂDŽŶŝĐĂ͕ĂůŝĨŽƌŶŝĂ͗ZE
ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ͕μκλπ͖ĂŶĚZŝĐŚĂƌĚ^ŽŬŽůƐŬǇ͕The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications
for European Security͕ĂƌŶĞŐŝĞŶĚŽǁŵĞŶƚĨŽƌ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWĞĂĐĞ͗dĂƐŬ&ŽƌĐĞŽŶh͘^͘WŽůŝĐǇ
dŽǁĂƌĚZƵƐƐŝĂ͕hŬƌĂŝŶĞ͕ĂŶĚƵƌĂƐŝĂƉƌŽũĞĐƚ͕DĂƌĐŚλν͕μκλρ͘
201
ĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŽŶĂƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞ͘ dŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌƐ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŵƉĞůĂ
ĨŽƌĐĞŝŶǀĂĚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂƐƚƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞŽŶŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇƐŵĂůů
ĂǆĞƐŽĨĂĚǀĂŶĐĞǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶďĞďůŽĐŬĞĚŽƌĂŵďƵƐŚĞĚ͘hŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇ͕
ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐŝǌĞŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞũƵƐƚƚŽŽŵĂŶǇ
ĂǆĞƐĨŽƌůŽĐĂůůŝŐŚƚ-ŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚĂƚŶŽƚǀĞƌǇŵŽďŝůĞƚŽĐŽƉĞ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ͘;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞμξͿ
'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŽĨƚŚĞƚŚĞĂƚĞƌ͕ƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂů
ƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞŝŵƉĂĐƚƵƉŽŶďŽƚŚEdKĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŵŽĚĞƌŶƚĂŶŬƐƌĞŵĂŝŶĂƐƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ
ĨŽƌĐĞŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚ͕ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚŝŶƐŽŵĞƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƐ
ďǇƚŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶƵƉŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇĨŝŐŚƚ͘tŚŝůĞƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ
ŽŶůǇ ρκйŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ&ĞĚĞƌĂůZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ;&Z'Ϳ
ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ͕ǁŚĞŶŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŶŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚ
ƋƵĂĚƌĂŶƚŽĨWŽůĂŶĚƚŚŝƐEdKƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇƚŚĞ
ƐĂŵĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇEdKƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚŝƚƐĞůĨƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞ
ĐĞŶƚƌĂůĨƌŽŶƚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ͘tŚĞŶŽŶĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂůŽŶĞ͕ƚŚĞĚĞŶƐŝƚǇŽĨƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƉĞƌƐƋƵĂƌĞ
ŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ŝƐĂďŽƵƚμ͘οƚŝŵĞƐůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶǁĂƐƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ&Z'͘
KŶƚŚĞƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ͕ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ͕ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŚŝŐŚ-ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇ
ĂƌŵŽƌĞĚǁĂƌĨĂƌĞĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ&Z'͕ŝƚ
ŵŝŐŚƚďĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞƚŽĂůƐŽĞǆƉĞĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĚĞŶƐŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ
ĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐǁŽƵůĚĂůůŽǁĨŽƌƚĂŶŬǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŽŶĂƐĐĂůĞĞǀĞŶŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ͘^ƵĐŚ
ĂĨĂůƐĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůǁŝƐĚŽŵƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
ĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂƌĞŝŶĚĞĨĞŶƐŝďůĞ– ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇůĂĐŬƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĚĞƉƚŚ
ƚŽĂďƐŽƌďĂŶŝŶŝƚŝĂůĂƐƐĂƵůƚ͘
^ŽĨƚŐƌŽƵŶĚ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐƐǁĂŵƉƐŽƌŵĂƌƐŚĞƐ͕ĐĂŶĐĂƵƐĞƚĂŶŬƚƌĞĂĚƐƚŽ
ďĞĐŽŵĞŵŝƌĞĚ͕ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐĂ ƚĂŶŬŝŵŵŽďŝůĞ͘ĞŶƐĞĨŽƌĞƐƚƐ͕
ƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽƚŚŽƐĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐƌĞŐŝŽŶ͕ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚĂŶŬĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌ
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝǌĞĚǀĞŚŝĐůĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ͕ĐĂƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƚŽďĞĐŚĂŶŶĞůĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĐůĞĂƌŝŶŐƐŽƌĂůŽŶŐŽƚŚĞƌƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨǁĂǇ͘ZŝǀĞƌƐĐĂŶďĞĐŽŵĞ
ďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐƚŽŵĞĐŚĂŶŝǌĞĚǀĞŚŝĐůĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŝĨĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌŝƐĚĞĞƉ
202
ĞŶŽƵŐŚŽƌŝĨŝƚƐĞŵďĂŶŬŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞƚŽŽƐƚĞĞƉ;Žƌ͕ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ͕ƚŽŽ͞ƐŽĨƚ͟Ϳ
ĨŽƌĂǀĞŚŝĐůĞƚŽĐůŝŵďŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌŽŶĐĞŝƚŝƐĐƌŽƐƐĞĚ͘ƌŝĚŐĞƐĂĐƌŽƐƐ
ƐƵĐŚďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐĐĂŶƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂƌŽƵƚĞĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞďĂƌƌŝĞƌ͕ďƵƚƚŚĞ ďƌŝĚŐĞƐ
ŵƵƐƚďĞĂďůĞƚŽƐƵƌǀŝǀĞƚŚĞǁĞŝŐŚƚŽĨĂŵŽĚĞƌŶďĂƚƚůĞƚĂŶŬ͕ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶ
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚπς-ƐŚŽƌƚƚŽŶƐ;ĂůŵŽƐƚπμŵĞƚƌŝĐƚŽŶƐͿ͘ 464 dŚƵƐ͕ƚŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶǁŝůů
ĚŝĐƚĂƚĞƚŚĞƌŽƵƚĞƐƚŚĂƚĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌŝĞƐŵƵƐƚƵƐĞƚŽŝŶǀĂĚĞƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͘tŚŝůĞƐŽŵĞŚĂǀĞĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚďŽĂƌĚŐĂŵĞƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚ
dĂůůŝŶŶĂŶĚZţŐĂŵŝŐŚƚďĞĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚŝŶĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶμ-νĚĂǇƐ͕ 465 ƚŚĞ
ƚƌĂĨĨŝĐĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶĨŽƌĂƌŵŽƌĞĚǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐĂƐĂĨĂĐƚŽƌŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ͕ĂƚƚŚĞǀĞƌǇůĞĂƐƚ͕͞ĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇ͘͟/ƚŵĂǇďĞĞĂƐǇƚŽŵŽǀĞĂƌŽƵŶĚ
ďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐŽŶĂůĂƌŐĞ-ƐĐĂůĞŵĂƉĚƵƌŝŶŐĂďŽĂƌĚŐĂŵĞ͕ďƵƚĚŽŝŶŐƐŽŽŶ
ƚĞƌƌĂŝŶĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇĨŽƌĞƐƚƐĂŶĚǁĂƚĞƌďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐŝƐƋƵŝƚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ͘
ŵĂũŽƌ͞ƚĂŬĞ-ĂǁĂǇ͟ĨƌŽŵĞǀĞƌǇƌƵŶŽĨƚŚĞ,'DKEĂůƚŝĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ
^ŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĚĂƚĞŝƐƚŚĂƚ͕ĞǀĞŶǁŚĞŶůŝƚƚůĞEdKƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĐĐƵƌƐ͕
ƚǁŽǁĞĞŬƐŽĨĐŽŵďĂƚĂƌĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽĚĞĨĞĂƚƚŚĞĨŽƌĐĞƐĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͘dŚĞĂůƚŝĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ^ŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƌƵŶƚŽĚĂƚĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂƌĞǀĞƌǇĚĞĨĞŶƐŝďůĞĂŶĚ͕ǁŝƚŚĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞEdK
ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ;ĂƉŽŝŶƚƚŚĂƚZEŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŵĂŬĞƐŝŶŝƚƐďŽĂƌĚŐĂŵĞ
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚͿ͕ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĚĞĨĞĂƚŽĨƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵǇǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞŽĨ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚĂŶĚƌĞŐŝŵĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶ
DŽƐĐŽǁ͘
dŚĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŶŽƌƚŚ-ĞĂƐƚ
ƋƵĂĚƌĂŶƚŽĨWŽůĂŶĚĞǆƉůĂŝŶǁŚǇƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶπth ƌŵǇŚĂƐĨĞǁĞƌƚĂŶŬƐ
ĂŶĚŵŽƌĞŚĞůŝĐŽƉƚĞƌƐƚŚĂƚĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƌŵǇ͘;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞμμͿƵƚ
ƚŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚĂĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶƚŚŝƐƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ
ǁŽƵůĚŶ͛ƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞŚŝŐŚ-ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘hŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇ͕ƌĞĐĞŶƚĚĞĐĂĚĞƐ
ŽĨĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐŝŶƐƵƌŐĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞDŝĚĚůĞĂƐƚŚĂǀĞĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚĞĚĂŶǇ
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŵĞŵŽƌǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƵƚŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ
ŵŽĚĞƌŶĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĐŽŵďĂƚ͘hŶĂƌŵŽƌĞĚŽƌůŝŐŚƚůǇĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐĐĂŶŶŽƚ
ƐƚĂŶĚƵƉƚŽĂŶĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĂƐƐĂƵůƚĨŽƌůŽŶŐ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐŚĂǀĞŶŽƚ
464dŚĞǁĞŝŐŚƚŽĨĂZƵƐƐŝĂŶd-ρμDĂŝŶĂƚƚůĞdĂŶŬĞǆĐĞĞĚƐξκŵĞƚƌŝĐƚŽŶƐ͘
465
^ĞĞĂǀŝĚ͘^ŚůĂƉĂŬĂŶĚDŝĐŚĂĞů:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ͕Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank:
Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics͕^ĂŶƚĂDŽŶŝĐĂ͕ĂůŝĨŽƌŶŝĂ͗ZEŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ͕μκλπ͘
203
ĨŽƌŐŽƚƚĞŶƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨĂĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚĂŶŬƐ;ĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌ͞ƐŚŽĐŬ͟ĞĨĨĞĐƚͿ
ĂŶĚŵĞĐŚĂŶŝǌĞĚĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ;ĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƐƵƉƉƌĞƐƐŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐ
anti-ƚĂŶŬǁĞĂƉŽŶƐͿŽŶƚŚĞďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚ͘ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚďǇZŝĐŚĂƌĚ^ŽŬŽůƐŬǇ͕
ƚŚĞƚĂďůĞŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƵŶŝƚƐ
ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞĨĂƌŵŽƌĞĐŽŵďĂƚƉŽǁĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŝƌEdKĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚƐ͘ In
ŐĞŶĞƌĂů͕^ŽŬŽůƐŬǇŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ͕
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐĐĂŶĞŵƉůŽǇĨĂƌŵŽƌĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĂŶĚŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚ
ĨŝƌĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕ǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚƐĞǀĞƌĞůǇƐƚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ
EdKĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽŚĂůƚZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂůĂƐƐĂƵůƚĂŶĚŚŽůĚ
ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ͘ZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂƐƚĞŶĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞ
tĞƐƚĞƌŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ͕ĂŶĚŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŚĂǀĞ
ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƌĂŶŐĞĂŶĚƌĂƚĞƐŽĨĨŝƌĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŝƌEdK
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚƐ͘/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ͕ĨŝǀĞƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ-to-ƐƵƌĨĂĐĞŵŝƐƐŝůĞ
;^^DͿďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶƐďĂĐŬƚŚĞƐĞĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘/Ŷ
ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ͕EdKĨŽƌĐĞƐƐƵĨĨĞƌĨƌŽŵĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĚĞĨŝĐŝƚŝŶ
ƚƵďĞĚĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ͕ƌŽĐŬĞƚůĂƵŶĐŚĞƌƐ͕ĂŶĚ^^DƐ͘/ŶƐŚŽƌƚ͕
EdKůŝŐŚƚĞƌĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƌĞŽƵƚŐƵŶŶĞĚďǇZƵƐƐŝĂ͘ 466
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ͕ƚŽ͞Ĩŝǆ͟WŽůŝƐŚĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨtĂƌƐĂǁƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
ŵŽǀŝŶŐŶŽƌƚŚƚŽďŽůƐƚĞƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ͕ZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂƐ
ƌĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚƚŚĞλƐƚ 'ƵĂƌĚƐdĂŶŬƌŵǇŽŶƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌŽĨĞůĂƌƵƐ͘;^ĞĞ
&ŝŐƵƌĞμμͿ
/ŶƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶdŚĞĂƚĞƌŽĨ
^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐDŝůŝƚĂƌǇKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ;TVDͿ͕ƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐ
ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇǀĞƌǇĐůĞĂƌĂŶĚĐĂŶďĞĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚŝŶĂĨĞǁŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐĞƐ͗
466ZŝĐŚĂƌĚ^ŽŬŽůƐŬǇ͕The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European Security,

ĂƌŶĞŐŝĞŶĚŽǁŵĞŶƚĨŽƌ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWĞĂĐĞ͗dĂƐŬ&ŽƌĐĞŽŶh͘^͘WŽůŝĐǇdŽǁĂƌĚZƵƐƐŝĂ͕hŬƌĂŝŶĞ͕
ĂŶĚƵƌĂƐŝĂƉƌŽũĞĐƚ͕DĂƌĐŚλν͕μκλρ͘
204
• ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƌĞŽǀĞƌĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ͕ĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌ-
ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚƌĂŝŶĞĚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐǀĞƌƐƵƐĐŽŶƐĐƌŝƉƚƐ͖
ƚŚĞǇĐĂŶŽŶůǇĂƚƚĂĐŬŽŶŽŶĞ&ƌŽŶƚǁŝƚŚĨƵůůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂƚŽŶĞ
ƚŝŵĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĚĞŶƵĚŝŶŐŽƚŚĞƌǀŽůĂƚŝůĞĂƌĞĂƐŽƌƚĂŬŝŶŐŵŽŶƚŚƐ
ƚŽŵŽďŝůŝǌĞĂŶĚƚƌĂŝŶƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐ͖
• EdK͛ƐĂƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶdŚĞĂƚĞƌĂĐƚƵĂůůǇŚĂƐƚŚƌĞĞ&ƌŽŶƚƐ͗
• tŚĞĂůƚŝĐ&ƌŽŶƚǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚƌĞĂƚ͖
• ƚŚĞhŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶͬůĂĐŬ^ĞĂ&ƌŽŶƚǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƵŶĚĞƌĂƚƚĂĐŬ͖
• ƚŚĞĞŶƚƌĂů&ƌŽŶƚ– WŽůĂŶĚĂůŽŶŐŝƚƐďŽƌĚĞƌǁŝƚŚĞůĂƌƵƐ
;ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĚŽƌŵĂŶƚƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŽ--hŬƌĂŝŶĞtĂƌďĞŐĂŶͿ͘
• dŚĞĞŶƚƌĂů&ƌŽŶƚŝƐƚŚĞĐĞŶƚĞƌŽĨŐƌĂǀŝƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞ
dŚĞĂƚĞƌ͕ĂŶĚĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇĂĨĨĞĐƚƐďŽƚŚƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĂŶĚ
hŬƌĂŝŶŝĂŶͬůĂĐŬ^ĞĂ&ƌŽŶƚƐĂƐǁĞůů͘
• ZƵƐƐŝĂĐĂŶŶŽƚŝŶǀĂĚĞƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐƐƚĂƚĞƐƌĂƉŝĚůǇĂŶĚǁŝƚŚĨƵůů
ĨŽƌĐĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĨŝƌƐƚĚĞƉůŽǇŝŶŐŝŶƚŽĞůĂƌƵƐ͘EdKĐĂŶŶŽƚ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĂĚĚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŽĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
ŽƌƐŽƵƚŚĞƌŶĨƌŽŶƚƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚWŽůĂŶĚ͘
• EdKŶĞĞĚƐƚŽŵĂŬĞĞǀĞƌǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽƚƌǇ
ƚŽĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĞůĂƌƵƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚŝŶŝƚƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƚŽďĞĂ
ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŽƌŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚ͕ĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ͕ĂƚĂƌŐĞƚŽĨ
EdKŝŶƚĞƌĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ͘
• EdKŶĞĞĚƐƚŽƌĞĂůŝǌĞƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂǁŝůůŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇǀŝĞǁWŽůĂŶĚ
ĂƐƚŚĞtĞƐƚ͛ƐĐĞŶƚĞƌŽĨŐƌĂǀŝƚǇ ĨŽƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨĂƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞ͕
ĂŶĚǁŝůůĚŽĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĚŝƐƐƵĂĚĞŽƌĚĞŶǇŝƚĨƌŽŵ
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇĨƵůĨŝůůŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƌŽůĞ– ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŶƵĐůĞĂƌŝŶƚŝŵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ͘
• hŬƌĂŝŶĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂǀĂůƵĂďůĞĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĨŽƌďŽƚŚEdK͛Ɛ
ĐĞŶƚƌĂůĂŶĚƐŽƵƚŚĞƌŶƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ͖ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚŝŶEdK͛ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƚŽ
ƐĞĞhŬƌĂŝŶĞĚĞĨĞĂƚĞĚďǇĚŝƌĞĐƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽƌďůĞĚƚŽ
ĚĞĂƚŚĚƵĞƚŽĂůĂĐŬŽĨƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞDŝŶƐŬ//
ĐĞĂƐĞĨŝƌĞ͘
205
ĂƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞŽŶůǇEdKƚŚĞĂƚĞƌŶŽƌƌĞŐŝŽŶǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐŝƐƐƵĞƐ– it ŝƐ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞŽŶůǇĂƌĞĂǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĐůĞĂƌ
ĂŶĚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ͘ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚďŽŵďĂƐƚŝĐŶƵĐůĞĂƌƚŚƌĞĂƚƐŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞ
ƚƌĞĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƚŚĞǇĚĞƐĞƌǀĞ– ŝŐŶŽƌĞĚƉƵďůŝĐůǇďƵƚƚĂŬĞŶ
ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝůǇ͕ǁŝƚŚĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ͕ƌŝƚŝƐŚ͕ĂŶĚ&ƌĞŶĐŚ
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ͘
EdKƵƌŐĞŶƚůǇŶĞĞĚƐƚŽƌĞ-ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝǌĞŝƚƐƵƐĞŽĨĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚ
ƌĞĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůĐŽƌĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĚĞƐƚƌŽǇŝŶŐůĂƌŐĞƚĂŶŬĂƌŵŝĞƐŽŶ
ƚŚĞŚŝŐŚ-ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚ͘dŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƐƌĞůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐŚŽǁƚŽŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨŚŝŐŚ-ĂƚƚƌŝƚŝŽŶďĂƚƚůĞƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĐŽŵďĂƚĂŶƚƐĐŽƵůĚůŽƐĞ
ŵŽƌĞƚĂŶŬƐƚŚĂŶŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƌEdK^ƚĂƚĞƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇŚĂǀĞŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ
ĂĐƚŝǀĞĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘/ƚĂůƐŽŵĞĂŶƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ŚŽǁƚŽŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĨŽƌĐĞƐĨŽƌƐƵĐŚĐŽŵďĂƚ͕ĂŶĚŚŽǁƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
ƐƵĐŚĨŽƌĐĞƐůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ͘
KǀĞƌƚŚĞƉĂƐƚĐŽƵƉůĞŽĨǇĞĂƌƐƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶŶŽƐŚŽƌƚĂŐĞŽĨƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ
͞ƚŚŝŶŬƚĂŶŬ͟ĂŶĚĞǆƉĞƌƚƐƚƵĚŝĞƐĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽ
ĂůƚŝĐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͘ ξπρ ĞƐƉŝƚĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ͕ƚŚĞŝƌ
ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĂǀĞĂ
ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚŵĞƐƐĂŐĞŽĨƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŵďĂůĂŶĐĞĂŶĚ͕ŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů͕ĂƌĞŝŶĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŽŶ
ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƵƌŐĞŶƚƌĞŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶ͘
• ůƚŚŽƵŐŚĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŚĂǀĞƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇŵĂĚĞ
ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽĞǆƉĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚ
ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝǌĞƚŚĞŝƌĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůůǇŶŽƌŝŶĐŽŶĐĞƌƚĐĂŶ
ξπρ^ĞĞ͕ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕͞^ĞĐƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞEŽƌĚŝĐ-ĂůƚŝĐƌĞŐŝŽŶ͕͟NATO Review,
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ŶĂƚŽ͘ŝŶƚͬĚŽĐƵͬZĞǀŝĞǁͬμκλπͬůƐŽ-in-μκλπͬƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ-ďĂůƚŝĐ-ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ-
ŶĂƚŽͬEͬŝŶĚĞǆ͘Śƚŵ
206
ƚŚĞǇŵĂƚĐŚƚŚĞƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů
ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ&ƌŽŶƚǁŝƚŚƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐ͕
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞƉƚŚ͕ƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐĂŶĚƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌĂĐƌĞĚŝďůĞ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĂĐƌŽƐƐĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ͘
• ĚũĂĐĞŶƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƌŵŽƌĞĚĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ-ĂƌŵƐĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕
ĐŽŵƉůŝŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐĂŝƌ͕ƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ-to-ƐƵƌĨĂĐĞŵŝƐƐŝůĞ͕
air-ĂƐƐĂƵůƚ͕ŶĂǀĂů͕ĂŵƉŚŝďŝŽƵƐĂŶĚƐƉĞĐŝĂůŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƐƐĞƚƐ
ŽĨĨĞƌƚŚĞĂůůƵƌĞŽĨƉƌĞĞŵƉƚŝǀĞŽƉƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĂƚƚĂĐŬ͘
• tŚŝůĞƚŚĂƚŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞĨŽƌĐĞŵĂǇŶŽƚďĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ
ƚŽĐŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚĞĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ– ĂŶĚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
ĂƌĞĂƐ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐƐƚĂƚĞƐ͕ĂƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽ
ŽĨĨĞƌĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ– ZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂƐĂůĂƌŐĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
ŝŶƚĞƌŝŽƌŵŝŶŝƐƚƌǇƚƌŽŽƉƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚƚŽĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĂŶƚŝ-ƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶ
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͘
• dŚƵƐ͕ĂůƚŝĐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĚĞƉĞŶĚƐƵƉŽŶĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞůůŝĂŶĐĞŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚďŽƚŚƚŚĞŝƌƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂů
ŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞĂĞƌŝĂůĂŶĚŶĂǀĂůĚŽŵĂŝŶƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐ͘͞DƵĐŚŽĨEdK͛ƐƉŽƐƚ-μκλξĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞĨŽƌŝƚƐ
ĂƐƚĞƌŶŵĞŵďĞƌƐŝƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĂƚƌŝƐŬĐŽƵůĚďĞƌĂƉŝĚůǇƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĚ͕͟ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕
ZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐƋƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐǁŚĞŶ
ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚŽŶƚŚŝƐĨƌŽŶƚ͞ĐĂŶŝŵƉĞĚĞĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽ͕ĂŶĚ
ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐƌĞŐŝŽŶ͟ĂŶĚ͞ƌĂŝƐĞƐ
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚŝƐƉůĂŶĂƐ ǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞůůŝĂŶĐĞ͛ƐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ
ŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ͘͟468 /ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ͕ƚŚĞĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ^-ξκκĂŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ͕ƚŚĞ/ƐŬĂŶĚĞƌ^^-26
ƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ-to-ƐƵƌĨĂĐĞŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ͕ ξπσ ĂŶĚƐŚŽƌĞďĂƐĞĚĐƌƵŝƐĞ
ŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐŝŶƚŽ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚOblast ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƚŽŝŶŚŝďŝƚEdK
468ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŽĨ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ͕:ŽŚŶŚŝƉŵĂŶ͕ƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶ͞ĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ
ŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ͛ƐĂƌŵĂŵĞŶƚƐŝŶ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚƌĞŐŝŽŶůŝŵŝƚƐEdK͛ƐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ͕͟TASS͕;κσ͘κμ͘μκλπͿ͕Ăƚф
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬƚĂƐƐ͘ƌƵͬĞŶͬĚĞĨĞŶƐĞͬ
ςοοολλх͘
ξπσ͞ƵƌŝŶŐĂƐŶĂƉĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŝŶĞĂƌůǇμκλο͕DŽƐĐŽǁŵŽǀĞĚ/ƐŬĂŶĚĞƌ-DƐŚŽƌƚ-ƌĂŶŐĞďĂůůŝƐƚŝĐŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐ
ŝŶƚŽ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͘Ibid.
μκρ
ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĚŝǀĞƌƚĂŶĚůŝŵŝƚ
ƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨtĞƐƚĞƌŶĂŝƌĂƐƐĞƚƐ͘
• tĞĂŬŶĞƐƐĞƐŝŶůŽĐĂůĂŶĚƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐĂŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŝƌĂƚƚĂĐŬŵƵƐƚ͕ĂƚůĞĂƐƚ
ŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇ͕ĐŽŵĞĨƌŽŵEdKĐŽŵďĂƚĂŝƌƉĂƚƌŽůƐǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶďĞ
͞ŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵĞĚďǇƐŚĞĞƌŶƵŵďĞƌƐ͘͟/ŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚĂŝƌƐƉĂĐĞ͕
ĂĚũĂĐĞŶƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŝƌĨŽƌĐĞĂŶĚĂƌŵǇĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶŐƌŽƵŶĚĂƚƚĂĐŬ
ĂƐƐĞƚƐĂƌĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůƚŽƌĞƐŝƐƚEdK͛ƐƋƵĞƐƚĨŽƌĂŝƌ
ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇĨŽƌƐĞǀĞƌĂůĚĂǇƐ– ͞ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ͚ďƵďďůĞƐ͛ŝŶƐƉĂĐĞĂŶĚ
ƚŝŵĞƚŽůĂƵŶĐŚŵĂƐƐĞĚǁĂǀĞƐŽĨĂŝƌĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ͟ ξρκ – ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐ
ŝŵƉĞĚĞďŽƚŚƚŚĞƐƵƌǀŝǀĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐůŝŐŚƚŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇĂƐ
ǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŚĞĂǀŝĞƌƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘
/ŶƐƵŵŵĂƌǇ͕ƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞĂůƚŝĐƐƚĂƚĞƐĚŽŶŽƚŚĂǀĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ͞ƌĞĂĚǇ͟ĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ƚŽĐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌĂŶĚƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĚĞĞƉƉĞŶĞƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƐŚŽƌƚ-ǁĂƌŶŝŶŐ
ĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ͖ƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚĂƐůŝŐŚƚ-infantry
ĂŶĚŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŚĂǀĞƚŚĞĂƌŵŽƌŶŽƌƚŚĞĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇĂƐƐĞƚƐƚŽŚŽůĚŽƵƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
ƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐ͖ĂŶĚEdK͛ƐƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƌĞƚŽŽůĂƚĞŝŶ
ĂƌƌŝǀŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŽŽǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞŝŶĚƌŝǀŝŶŐŶŽƌƚŚƵƉƚŚĞŶĞĂƌůǇλ͕κκκ
ŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌ>ŝŶĞŽĨŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ;ƐĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞμξͿƚŚĂƚůŝŶŬƐƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨƚŚĞůůŝĂŶĐĞ͕ĂŶĚƚŽŽĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽŶĂ ůĞǀĞůŽĨ
ĂŝƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĂƚŵĂǇŶŽƚďĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ͘
dŚĞƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƐƚƵĚŝĞƐĂůƐŽĐůƵƐƚĞƌŶŝĐĞůǇŝŶ
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌĞŵĞĚŝĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞƚĂŬĞŶƐŽŽŶĞƌ͕
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶůĂƚĞƌ͗
• ƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŵƵůƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŶŐĂůů
ƚŚĞĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ
ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŶŐĂ͞ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ͕ĨĂƐƚ-ŵŽǀŝŶŐ͕ŚŝŐŚůǇĨůƵŝĚĂŝƌůĂŶĚ
ξρκ ^ŚůĂƉĂŬĂŶĚ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ͕Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank, op. cit.͕Ɖ͘σ͘
208
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ͕͟ŽŶĞ͞ƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞƐĂĨĞůǇďĞůĞĨƚƚŽĂƉŝĐŬƵƉƚĞĂŵ;ƚŽ
ĚŽŽŶƚŚĞĚĂǇͿ͖ŝƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐĐĂƌĞĨƵůƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ͟– ĂŶĚ
ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐďĞĂƚƚŚĞŽƌƉƐůĞǀĞů͖ ξρλ
• ǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĂůƚŝĐĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚǁŝƚŚůůŝĞĚ
ĂƐƐĞƚƐŽĨ͞ĂƚůĞĂƐƚƚŚƌĞĞŚĞĂǀǇďƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ͟ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚŚĞŶ͕ŽŶůǇ
ǁŚĞŶŝƚŝƐ͞ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ͕ĂŝƌĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐ͕ĂŶĚ
ůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐƐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ͕ŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚĂŶĚƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĨŝŐŚƚĂƚƚŚĞ
ŽŶƐĞƚŽĨŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂƉƉĞĂƌƐĂďůĞƚŽĂǀŽŝĚůŽƐŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂƌǁŝƚŚŝŶ
ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĨĞǁĚĂǇƐ͖͟ ξρμ
• ŽƚŚƚŚĞůŽĐĂůĂŶĚƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞĂƵŐŵĞŶƚĞĚ
ǁŝƚŚĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌŵŽƌĂŶĚĨŝƌĞƉŽǁĞƌƚŽĂůůŽǁƚŚĞŝƌŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌ
ďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶƐƚŽĂǀŽŝĚďĞŝŶŐŽǀĞƌƌƵŶďǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚĂŶŬƐŽƌ
ŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵĞĚďǇŵƵůƚŝƉůĞďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶƐŽĨƚƵďĞĂŶĚƌŽĐŬĞƚ
ĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ͘
ͻ͞ŶŝŶĐƵƌƐŝŽŶďǇĂŶŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƉŽǁĞƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂEdKDĞŵďĞƌ
ǁŝůůďĞƚŝŵĞĚĨŽƌǁŚĞŶƚŚĂƚDĞŵďĞƌĂŶĚEdKĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞĂƌĞ
ůĞĂƐƚƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ͘dŽďĞƚƚĞƌĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚƚŚŝƐ
ĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇ͕EdKŵƵƐƚĞŵƉŽǁĞƌƚŚĞ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞůůŝĞĚ
ŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ͕;^hZͿǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇƚŽĐĂůů
ƐŶĂƉĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĂůůŝĂŶĐĞƚŽƚĞƐƚĂŶĚďƵŝůĚƚŚĞ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ͛ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶĐƌŝƐŝƐ͘͟ ξρν
^ƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐůǇ͕ĂƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĂƐƚŚĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ͕ƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽ
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŝƐŶŽƚŽƵƚŽĨƌĞĂĐŚŝĨƚŚĞůůŝĂŶĐĞƚĂŬĞƐĂ
ξρλ ^ŚůĂƉĂŬĂŶĚ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ͕Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank, op. cit.͕Ɖ͘σ͘^ŵŝƚŚĂŶĚ

,ĞŶĚƌŝǆ͕ƌĞƉŽƌƚŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŚĂƚ͗͞KŶůǇďǇǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌŽŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚďĂƐŝƐĐĂŶƚŚĞǇůĞĂƌŶƚŽ
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ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞǁŝŶƐŽƌůŽƐĞƐŽŶƚŚĞŵĂƌŐŝŶ͘>ŽĐĂůǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐĂŶĚEdK inaction
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;ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ&Z'ĂŶĚƚŚĞEĞƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚƐͿĂŶĚƚŽďĞĂƐĐůŽƐĞĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽ
ĞƌůŝŶƚŽŐŝǀĞĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞŝĨŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ͘ ξρξ dŚƵƐ͕ƚŚĞĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƌŝƐŝŶŐ
ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚƌĞĂƚĂŶĚĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚWŽůĂŶĚ
ĂƌĞŶŽƚĂůůƚŚĂƚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ
ũŽŝŶŝŶŐEdKŝŶλσοξĂŶĚďĞŝŶŐƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽĨŽƌŵĂŶĂƌŵǇŝŶλσοο͘
ξρξEdK– EĞǁƐ͗͞&ŽƌǁĂƌĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ͗͟EdKƌĐŚŝĞǀĞƐƐĞŵŝŶĂƌŽŶEdK͛ƐĂƌůǇDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
WůĂŶŶŝŶŐĨŽƌĞŶƚƌĂůƵƌŽƉĞ͕κσ-ĞĐ͘-2013,
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ŶĂƚŽ͘ŝŶƚͬĐƉƐͬĞŶͬŶĂƚŽŚƋͬŶĞǁƐͺλκσκξν͘Śƚŵ͍ƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚ>ŽĐĂůĞсĞŶ
210
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ďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞƚƌŽŽƉƐŝŶĐŽŶƚĂĐƚƚŽĂƐĨĂƌŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇΖƐƌĞĂƌĂƐŽƵƌƚĂƌŐĞƚ
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ΗƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŽĂŵĂŶĂŐĞĂďůĞƌĂƚŝŽ͘͘͘ƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĞŶĞŵǇĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƌƌŝǀŝŶŐĂƚ
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ZƵƐƐŝĂŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇďƵŝůĚƵƉ͕&K&ǁĂƐĞŶǀŝƐŝŽŶĞĚĂƐĂŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ
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ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ͘&ŝƌƐƚĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚŝŶ:ĂŶƵĂƌǇλσπσ͕ZĞĨŽƌŐĞƌ
ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŽĨĂƐŵĂŶǇĂƐλμο͕κκκƚƌŽŽƉƐ͘ŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐĂƐ
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ƵƌŽƉĞŝŶƚŚĞEĞƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚƐ͕ĞůŐŝƵŵĂŶĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ͕ƚŚĞĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚǁĂƐ
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Operation Reforger ŝĨŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ͘dŚŝƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƉƌĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ
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WŽůĂŶĚ͘ ξρρ
͞ZŽůůŽǀĞƌ͟ŝƐĂůƐŽŶŽŐƌĞĂƚŵǇƐƚĞƌǇ͕ƐŝŶĐĞŝƚǁĂƐǁŚĂƚǁĂƐĚŽŶĞĂƚƚŚĞ
ĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞƌĂ͕ǁŚĞŶĚŽǁŶƐŝǌŝŶŐEdKDĞŵďĞƌƐƚƵƌŶĞĚƚŚĞŝƌ
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ξρο ĞƌŶĂƌĚt͘ZŽŐĞƌƐ͕͞&ŽůůŽǁ-ŽŶ&ŽƌĐĞƐƚƚĂĐŬ͗DǇƚŚƐĂŶĚZĞĂůŝƚŝĞƐ͕͟NATO Review͕EƵŵďĞƌπ͕

ĞĐĞŵďĞƌλσςξ͕Ɖ͘μ͘
ξρπ >ŝĞƵƚĞŶĂŶƚŽůŽŶĞůDŝĐŚĂĞů:͘ŝǀĞƌ͕NATO’s Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) Concept: Past,
Present and Future͕h^tEdKĞĨĞŶƐĞŽůůĞŐĞ&ĞůůŽǁƐŚŝƉWƌŽŐƌĂŵWĂƉĞƌ͕ZŽŵĞ͗EdK

ĞĨĞŶĐĞŽůůĞŐĞ͕λ:ƵůǇλσσκ͕Ɖ͘λ͘
ξρρ dŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝŶEŽƌǁĂǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƚŽƌĂŐĞĚĞƉŽƚƐĨŽƌĂh͘^͘D;DĂƌŝŶĞŵƉŚŝďŝŽƵƐ
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ξρς The Military Balance 2015͕>ŽŶĚŽŶ͗ZŽƵƚůĞĚŐĞ͕&Ğďƌuary 2015.

ξρσ ŵŝƚƌǇ<ŝĞƐĞůĞǀ͕ĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶWĞƚĞƌWŽŵĞƌĂŶƚƐĞǀ͕͞/ŶƐŝĚĞWƵƚŝŶ͛Ɛ/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶtĂƌ͕͟POLITICO
Magazine, January 4, 2015.
480 ZŽďĞƌƚ͘<ĂƉůĂŶ͕͞ŶƵŶƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ͕͟The Washington Post͕EŽǀĞŵďĞƌλν͕μκλπ͕Ɖ͘
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212
APPENDIX I
DATABASE OF FORCES
Nicholas Myers with Charles Long and Joven Maranan
The following is a breakdown of the forces available to each nation as reported

in IISS’ The Military Balance, 2016. This excludes dismounted infantry, whose
manning numbers tend to be classified. In addition, a list of formations,
generally at brigade or wing level, is given; maritime forces are not included in
this list.
1. Belarus
Ground Forces
Main Battle Tanks T-72 446
T-80 69
Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles BMP-2 875
BRM-1 136
Armored Tracked MT-LB 50
Personnel Wheeled BTR-70 39
Carriers BTR-80 153
Artillery Self-Propelled 2S1 (122-mm) 198
2S3 (152-mm) 108
2S5 (152-mm) 116
2S19 (152-mm) 12
Towed D-30 48
2A36 (152-mm) 48
2A65 (152-mm) 132
Multiple Rocket BM-21 (122-mm) 126
Launch 9P140 Uragan (220-mm) 72
9A52 Smerch (300-mm) 40
Polonez (300-mm) 4
Mortars 2S12 (120-mm) 61
Anti-Tank Self-Propelled 9P148 Konkurs 126
9P149 Shturm 110
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot) Unknown
9K113 Konkurs (AT-5
Spandrel)
9K114 Shturm (AT-6
213
Spiral)
9K115 Metis (AT-7
Saxhorn)
Air Defense Self-Propelled 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly) Unknown
S-300V (SA-12A Gladiator)
9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13
Gopher)
9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko)
S-300PS (SA-10B
Grumble)
9K332 Tor-M2E (SA-15
Gauntlet)
Fixed S-200 (SA-5 Gammon) Unknown
Missiles Tactical 9M79 Tochka (SS-21 36
Scarab) 60
Scud
Helicopters Attack Mi-24 Hind 5
Transport Mi-26 Halo 5
Mi-8 Hip 8
Mi8MTV-5 6
No Belarusian Navy – Landlocked Country
Air Force
Superiority 4th Generation MiG-29S/UB Fulcrum 24
Fighters
Attack Fighters 4th Generation Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot A/B 12
Transport Heavy Il-76 Candid 2
Medium An-12 Cub 3
Light An-24 Coke 1
An-26 Curl 4
Tu-134 Crusty 1
Maneuver Combat Support Air Formations

Mechanized Artillery Ground Attack
6th Guards Mechanized 231st Mixed Artillery 61st Assault Regiment
Brigade (Hrodna) Brigade (Borovka) (Baranovichi)
11th Guards Mechanized 116th Guards Assault
Brigade (Slonim) Regiment (Lida)
19th Guards Mechanized
Brigade (Zaslonovo)
50th Mechanized
214
Brigade (Baranovichi)
120th Guards
Mechanized Brigade
(Minsk)
Air Assault Engineer Fighter-Bombers
38th Mobile Brigade 7th Engineering 50th Mixed Air Regiment
(Brest) Regiment (Barysau) (Machulishchy)
103rd Mobile Brigade
(Polotsk)
Attack Helicopter Special Forces
181st Combat Helicopter 5th Spetsnaz Brigade
Regiment (Pruzhany) (Maryina Horka)
Electronic Warfare
1st Signals Brigade
(Minsk)
83rd Signals Brigade
(Minsk)
2. Denmark
Ground Forces
Main Battle Tanks Leopard 2A4/5 34
Recce Vehicles Eagle IV 84
Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles CV9030 Mk II 44
Armored Tracked M113 235
Personnel Wheeled Piranha III 79
Carriers Protected Patrol Cougar 40
Vehicles
Artillery Self-Propelled M109 (155-mm) 12
Mortars Soltam K6B1 (120-mm) 12
Anti-Tank MANPATS TOW Unknown
Carl Gustav 186
Air Defense MANPAD FIM-92A Stinger Unknown
Helicopters Naval Super Lynx Mk90B 6
MH-60R Seahawk 3
Multirole AS550 Fennec 8
Transport AW101 Merlin 13
Navy
Surface Destroyers Iver Huitfeldt-class 3
Combatants Frigates Thetis-class 4
215
Patrol and Coastal Knud Rasmussen-class 2
Agdlek-class 1
Diana-class 6
Mine Warfare Mine MSF MK-I 4
Countermeasures Holm 2
Air Force
Superiority 4th Generation F-16AM Fighting Falcon 34
Fighters F-16BM Fighting Falcon 10
Transport Medium C130J-30 Hercules 4
Light CL-604 Challenger 4

Mechanized Artillery Fighter-Bombers
1st Brigade (Harderslev) 1st Artillery Battalion Fighter Wing
2nd Brigade (Slagelse) (Oksbol) (Skrydstrup)
Engineer
Engineering Center
(Skive)
Electronic Warfare
2nd CIS Battalion
(Frederica)
Electronic Warfare
Company (Frederica)
Special Forces
Special Operations
Command (Aalborg)
3. Estonia
Ground Forces
Armored Wheeled XA-180 Sisu 56
Personnel XA-188 Sisu 80
Carriers BTR-80 15
Protected Patrol Mamba 7
Vehicles
Artillery Towed D-30 (H 63) (122-mm) 42
FH-70 (155-mm) 24
Mortars B455 (81-mm) 41
NM 95 (81-mm) 10
M252 (81-mm) 80
216
2B11 (120-mm) 14
M/41D (120-mm) 165
Anti-Tank MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin Unknown
Milan Unknown
IMI MAPATS Unknown
M40A1 (106-mm) 30
Carl Gustav (84-mm) Unknown
PV-1110 (90-mm) 130
Air Defense MANPAD Mistral Unknown
Helicopters Transport R-44 Raven II 4
Navy
Surface Patrol and Coastal Ristna 1
Combatants
Mine Warfare Mine Tasuja-class 1
Countermeasures Admiral Cowan-class 3
Air Force
Transport Light An-2 Colt 2

Motorized Special Forces
1st Infantry Brigade Special Operations Task
(Tapa) Force (Tallinn)
Infantry
2nd Infantry Brigade
(Luunja)
4. Finland
Ground Forces
Main Battle Tanks Leopard 2A4 100
Leopard 2A6 20
CV90 102
Armored Tracked MT-LBu 40
Personnel MT-LBV 102
Carriers Wheeled XA-180/185 Sisu 260
XA-202 Sisu 101
XA-203 Sisu 48
AMV (XA-360) 62
Artillery Self-Propelled 2S1 (PsH 74) (122-mm) 36
217
Towed D-30 (H 63) (122-mm) 234
M-46 (K 54) (130-mm) 36
K 83/GH-52 (K 98) (155- 54
mm)
Multiple Rocket M270 (227-mm) 22
Launch
Mortars KRH 92 261
XA-36A AMOS 4
Anti-Tank MANPATS Spike Unknown
TOW 2
Air Defense Self-Propelled ASRAD (ITO 05) 16
Crotale NG (ITO 90) 20
NASAMS II FIN (ITO 12) 24
9K37 Buk-M1 (ITO 96) Unknown
ItK 95/ZU-23-2 (ItK 61) Unknown
MANPAD FIM-92 Stinger (ITO 15) Unknown
RBS 70 (ITO 05/05M) Unknown
Helicopters Multirole Hughes 500D 5
Hughes 500E 2
Transport NH90 TTH 20
Navy
Surface Patrol and Coastal Rauma-class 4
Combatants Hamina-class 4
Jehu-class 10
Mine Warfare Mine Katanpää-class 3
Countermeasures Kiiski-class 4
Kuha-class 3
Minelayers Hameenmaa-class 2
Pansio-class 3
Amphibious Landing Platform Kampela-class 1
Air Force
Superiority 4th Generation F/A-18C Hornet 62
Fighters F/A-18D Hornet 7
Intelligence, Surveillance, F-27-400M 1
Reconnaissance
ELINT C-295M 1
Transport Light C-295M 2
Learjet 35A 3
PC-12NG 5
218
Armored Special Forces Fighter-Bombers
Armored Brigade Utti Jaeger Regiment 11th Fighter Squadron
(Parloannummi) (Utti) (Ravaniemi)
21st Fighter Squadron
(Tampere-Pirkkala)
31st Fighter Squadron
(Kuopio)
Motorized
Pori Brigade (Sakyla)
Mechanized
Karelia Brigade
(Vekaranjavi)
Light Infantry
Kainuu Brigade (Kajaani)
Jaeger Brigade
(Sodankyla)
5. Germany
Ground Forces
Leopard 2A7 20
Recce Vehicles Fennek 166
Wiesel 25
Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles Marder 1A2/A3/A4/A5 390
Puma 88
Wiesel 87
Armored Tracked Bv-206D/S 194
Personnel M113 259
Carriers Wheeled Boxer 272
TPz-1 Fuchs 531
Protected Patrol Dingo 2 316
Vehicles Eagle IV 495
Eagle V 176
Artillery Self-Propelled PzH 2000 (155-mm) 99
Multiple Rocket 227-mm 38
Launch
Mortars Tampella (120-mm) 86
Anti-Tank Self-Propelled Wiesel 64
MANPATS Milan Unknown
219
Air Defense Self-Propelled ASRAD Ozelot 10
Towed MIM-104F Patriot PAC-3 30
C-RAM MANTIS 12
Helicopters Attack Tiger 42
Naval Lynx Mk88A 22
Sea King Mk41 21
Multirole Bo-105M/P1/P1A1 83
Transport NH90 48
Bell 205 (UH-1D Iroquois) 39
H135
H145M 14
2
Navy
Submarines SSK Type-212A 6
Surface Destroyers Brandenburg-class 4
Combatants Sachsen-class 3
Frigates Bremen-class 3
Braunschweig-class 5
Patrol and Coastal Bad Bramstedt-class 3
Bredstedt-class 1
Sassnitz-class 2
Prignitz-class 5
Rettin-class 1
Mine Warfare Mine Frankenthal-class 10
Countermeasures Kulmbach-class 2
Ensdorf-class 2
Seehund-class 18
Amphibious Landing Platform Type-520 2
Air Force
Superiority 4th Generation Eurofighter Typhoon 121
Fighters
Multirole 4th Generation Tornado IDS 68
Fighters
Intelligence, Surveillance, AP-3C Orion 8
Reconnaissance
Electronic Warfare Tornado ECR 20
Tankers A310 MRTT 4
Transport Heavy A400M Atlas 1
Medium C-160D Transall 40
Light Do-228 2
A310 1
220
A340 2
A319 2
Global 5000 4

Armored Artillery Fighter Bombers
9th Armored Brigade 325th Artillery 31st Tactical Air Wing (Boelcke
(Munster) Battalion Norvenich)
21st Armored Brigade (Munster) 33rd Tactical Air Wing (Buchel)
(Augustdorf) 345th Artillery 51st Tactical Air Wing
12th Armored Brigade Battalion (Idar- (Immelmann Schleswig)
(Amberg) Oberstein) 73rd Tactical Air Wing (Steinhoff
Rostock-Laage)
74th Tactical Air Wing
(Neuburg)
Mechanized Special Forces Air Defense
41st Mechanized Special Forces 1st
Infantry Brigade Command (Calw) Flugabwehrraketengeschwader
(Neubrandenburg) (Hussum)
37th Mechanized
Infantry Brigade
(Frankenberg)
Mountain
23rd Mountain Infantry
Brigade (Bad
Reichenhall)
Airborne
26th Airborne Brigade
(Saarlouis)
Attack Helicopters
36th Attack Helicopter
Regiment (Muellheim)
6. Latvia
Ground Forces
Recce Vehicles FV107 Scimitar 9+
Armored Tracked FV103 Spartan 6+
Personnel FV105 Sultan 2+
Carriers
221
Artillery Towed K-53 (100-mm) 23
Mortars L16 (81-mm) 28
M120 (120-mm) 25
Anti-Tank MANPATS Spike-LR Unknown
Carl Gustav (84-mm)
Pvpj 1110 (90-mm)
Air Defense Towed L/70 24
MANPAD RBS-70 Unknown
Helicopters Multirole Mi-17 Hip H 4
Transport PZL Mi-2 Hoplite 2
Navy
Surface Patrol and Coastal Skrunda-class 5
Combatants Astra-class 1
KBV 236 5
Mine Warfare Mine Imanta-class 5
Countermeasures Vidar-class 1
Air Force
Transport Light An-2 Colt 4

Motorized Special Forces Air Defense
Mechanized Infantry Brigade (Adazi) Special Tasks Unit (Suzi) Air Defense Wing
(Lielvarde)
17th Air Defense
Battalion (Riga)
Light Infantry Engineer
1st National Guard Brigade (Liepaja) 54th Engineer Battalion (Ogre)
2nd National Guard Brigade (Rezekne)
3rd National Guard Brigade (Riga)
7. Lithuania
Ground Forces
Armored Tracked M113A1 234
Personnel
Carriers
Artillery Towed M101 (105-mm) 18
Mortars 2B11 5
M/41D 10
M113 15
222
Anti-Tank Self-Propelled M1025A2 HMMWV 10
with Javelin
MANPATS Javelin Unknown
Carl Gustav (84-mm)
Air Defense MANPAD RBS-70 Unknown
Stinger
Helicopters Multirole AS365M3 Dauphin 3
Transport Mi-8 Hip 3
Navy
Surface Patrol and Coastal Zematis-class 3
Combatants Selis-class (Ex- NOR 1
Storm)
Mine Warfare Mine Suduvis-class 3
Countermeasures Skulvis-class 2
Jotvingis-class 1
Air Force
Transport Medium C-27J Spartan 3
Light L-410 Turbolet 2

Motorized Engineer Air Defense
Iron Wolf Mechanized Juozas Vitkus Engineer Air Defense Battalion
Brigade (Rukla) Battalion (Prienai) (Siauliai)
4 unknown Mech
battalion
1 artillery bn
Light Infantry Special Forces
1 unknown MOT bde Special Forces Unit
2 MOT INF Bn (Kaunas)
King Mindaugas Motor
Infantry Battalion
(Panevezys)
Grand Duchess Birute
Motor Infantry Battalion
(Alytus)
Grand Duke Butigeidis
Motor Infantry Battalion
(Klaipeda)
223
8. Norway
Ground Forces
Recce Vehicles TPz-1 Fuchs NBS Unknown
Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles CV9030N 116
Personnel Wheeled XA-186 Sisu/XA-200 Sisu 75
Carriers Protected Patrol Dingo II 20
Vehicles IVECO Unknown
Artillery Self-Propelled M109A3GN (155-mm) 18
Mortars M106A1 (81-mm) 24
M125A2 (81-mm) 12
L-16 (81-mm) 150
Anti-Tank MANPATS Javelin Unknown
Carl Gustav (84-mm)
Air Defense Towed NASAMS II Unknown
Helicopters Naval NH90 NFH 6
Multirole Bell 412HP 6
Bell 412SP 12
Navy
Submarines SSK Ula-class 6
Surface Destroyers Fridtjof Nansen-class 5
Combatants Patrol and Coastal Skjold-class 6
Mine Warfare Mine Alta-class 3
Countermeasures Oskoy-class 3
Amphibious Landing Platform S90N 16
Air Force
Multirole 4th Generation F-16AM Fighting Falcon 47
Fighters F-16BM Fighting Falcon 10
Intelligence, Surveillance, P-3C Orion 4
Reconnaissance P-3N Orion 2
Electronic Warfare Falcon 20C 3
Transport Medium C-130J-30 Hercules 4

Mechanized Electronic Warfare Fighter-Bombers
Northern Brigade EW Battalion 331st Squadron (Bodo)
(Bardufoss) (Setermoen) 338th Squadron (Orland)
Motorized Air Defense
224
King’s Guard (Oslo) 132nd Air Defense
Squadron (Bodo)
138th Air Defense
Squadron (Orland)
9. Poland
Ground Forces
Leopard 2A5 105
PT-91 Twardy 233
T-72/T-72M1D/T-72M1 505
Recce Vehicles BRDM-2 237
BWR 37
WD R-5 92
Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles BMP-1 1,268
Rosomak 700
Armored Tracked
Personnel Wheeled
Carriers Protected Patrol Cougar 40
Vehicles M-ATV 45
Maxxpro 30
M-77 Dana (152-mm) 111
Krab 2
Towed
Launch RM-70 (122-mm) 30
WR-40 Langusta (122- 75
mm)
Mortars M-98 (98-mm) 89
M120 (120-mm) 95
Anti-Tank Self-Propelled
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Unknown
Sagger)
9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot)
Spike-LR
Air Defense Self-Propelled 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) 20
9K33 Osa-AK (SA-8 64
Gecko)
ZSU-23-4 8
225
ZSU-23-4MP Biala 20
S-125 Neva SC (SA-3 Goa) 17
Fixed S-200C Vega (SA-5 1
Gammon)
Towed ZU-23-2 252
ZUR-23-2KG/PG 72
MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail) Unknown
GROM
Missiles Anti-Ship NSM 6
Silo
TEL
Helicopters Attack Mi-24D/V Hind D/E 28
Naval Mi-14PL Haze 7
SH-2G Super Seasprite 4
Multirole Mi-8MT Hip 7
Mi-17 Hip H 3
Mi-17AE Hip 1
Mi-17-1V Hip 5
PZL Mi-2URP Hoplite 16
PZL W-3W/WA Sokol 24
PZL W-3PL Gluszec 8
Transport Mi-8 Hip 9
Mi-8T Hip 7
PZL Mi-2 Hoplite 25
PZL W-3A Sokol 1
PZL W-3T Sokol 2
PZL W-3AE Sokol 2
Navy
Submarines SSBN
SSN
SSK Sokol-class 4
Orzel-class 1
Surface Fixed-Wing Carriers
Combatants Rotary Carriers
Cruisers
Destroyers
Frigates Pulaski-class 2
Patrol and Coastal Kaszub-class 1

Orkan-class 3
Mine Warfare Mine Project 890-class 1
226
Countermeasures Kontraadmiral Xavery 1
Czernicki-class
Mamry-class 4
Krogulec-class 3
Goplo-class 1
Gardno-class 12
Minelayers
Amphibious Landing Platform
Landing Ship Heavy Lublin-class 5
Landing Ship Other Deba-class 3
Air Force
Superiority 5th Generation
Fighters 4th Generation MiG-29A Fulcrum 26
MiG-29UB Fulcrum 6
rd
3 Generation
Multirole 5th Generation
Fighters 4th Generation F-16C Block 52+ Fighting 36
Falcon
F-16D Block 52+ Fighting 12
Falcon
3rd Generation Su-22M-4 Fitter 12
Su-22UM3K Fitter 6
th
Attack Fighters 5 Generation
4th Generation
3rd Generation
Intelligence, Surveillance, An-28TD Bryza 2
Reconnaissance M-28B Bryza 2
ELINT
Airborne Early Warning & Control
Search & Rescue
Electronic Warfare
Tankers
Transport Heavy
Medium C-130E Hercules 5
Light C-295M 16
M-28 Bryza TD 23

Airborne Engineer Naval Aviation
6th Airborne Brigade 1st Engineer Regiment 28th Naval Aviation
227
(Krakow) (Brzeg) Squadron (Gydnia)
2nd Engineer Regiment 1st Naval Aviation
(Kazun) Squadron (Gdynia)
5th Engineer Regiment
(Szczecin)
Armored Electronic Warfare Air Defense
10th Armored Cavalry 8th EW Battalion 4th Air Defense
Brigade (Swietoszow) (Grudziadz) Regiment (Czerwiensk)
34th Armored Cavalry 9th Signal Battalion 8th Air Defense
Brigade (Zagan) (Bialobrzegi) Regiment (Koszalin)
1st Warsaw Armored 15th Air Defense
Brigade (Wesola) Regiment (Goldap)
9th Armored Cavalry
Brigade (Braniewo)
Mechanized Artillery Multirole Fighters
17th Mechanized Brigade 23rd Artillery Regiment 1st Tactical Air Wing
(Miedzyrecz) (Boleslawiec) (Swidin)
2nd Legion Mechanized 5th Lubusz Artillery 2nd Tactical Air Wing
Brigade (Zlocieniec) Regiment (Sulechow) (Poznan)
12th Mechanized Brigade 11th Artillery Regiment
(Szczecin) (Wegorzewo)
15th Mechanized Brigade
(Gizycko)
20th Mechanized Brigade
(Bartoszyce)
Attack Helicopters Special Forces
1st Aviation Brigade Jednostka Wojskowa
(Inowroclaw) Formoza (Gdynia)
Air Assault
25th Air Cavalry Brigade
(Tomaszow Mazowiecki)
Motorized
7th Coastal Defense
Brigade (Slupsk)
Mountain
21st Podhale Rifles
Brigade (Rzeszow)
228
10. Russian Federation
Russia’s forces are arranged in four military districts (West, South, Central, and
East). The first table lists units from all four districts together, but the
formations thereafter are separated into the Western and Central Military
Districts.
Ground Forces
Main Battle Tanks T-72B/BA 1,100
T-72B3 800
T-80BV/U 450
T-90/T-90A 350
Recce Vehicles BRDM-2/2A 1,000
BRM-1K 700
BMP-2 3,000
BMP-3 500
BTR-80A 100
BTR-82A/AM 800
BMD-4 30
BMD-4M 12
Armored Tracked BMO-T Unknown
Personnel MT-LB 3,500
Carriers
Wheeled BTR-60 800
BTR-70 200
BTR-80 1,500
BPM-97 Dozor 100+
2S3 (152-mm) 800
2S5 (152-mm) 100
2S19 (152-mm) 450
2S33 (152-mm) 36
2S7M (203-mm) 60
Towed 2A65 (152-mm) 150

Launch 9P140 Uragan (220-mm) 200
TOS-1A Unknown
9A52 Smerch (300mm) 100
Mortars 2B14 (82-mm) 800+
2S12 (120-mm) 700
229
2S4 (240-mm) 40
Anti-Tank Self-Propelled BMP-T Unknown
9P149 Unknown
9P149/M Unknown
9P157-2 Unknown
BTR-RD 100
MANPATS 9K111M Fagot (AT-4 Unknown
Spigot)
9K113-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Unknown
Spandrel)
9K115 Metis (AT-7 Unknown
Saxhorn)
9K115-1 Metis-M (AT-13 Unknown
Saxhorn 2)
9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Unknown
Spriggan)
Air Defense Self-Propelled S-300V (SA-12 240
Gladiator/Giant)
S-300V4 (SA- Unknown
23)
96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 430
Greyhound)
9K317 Buk-M1/M2 (SA-11 Unknown
Gadfly/SA-17 Grizzly) 420
9K33M3 Osa-AKM (SA-8B 120
Gecko) 250
9K35M3 Strela-10 (SA-13 350+
Gopher)
9K330/1/2 Tor-M (SA-15 Unknown
Gauntlet)
2K22M Tunguska (SA-19 400
Grison) Unknown
ZSU-23-4 (23-mm)
Towed ZU-23-2 (23-mm) Unknown

S-60 (57-mm) Unknown
MANPAD 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Unknown
Gimlet)
9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
9K333 Verba
230
9K338 Igla-S (SA-24
Grinch)
9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14
Gremlin)
Missile Defense 53T6 (ABM-3 Gazelle) 68
Missiles Tactical 9K79-1 Tochka-U (SS-21B 48
Scarab) 72
9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26
Stone)
Silo RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) 54
RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) 30
RS-12M Topol (SS-25 ~90
Sickle)
RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS- 60
27M1)
RS-24 Yars (SS-27M2) 67
TEL RS-12M (SS-25 Sickle) 108
RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS- 18
27M1)
Helicopters Attack Ka-52A Hokum B 90+
Mi-24D/V/P Hind 100
Mi-28N Havoc B 90+
Mi-35 Hind 60+
Naval Ka-27 Helix 63
Mi-14 Haze A 20
Mi-8 Hip J 8
Ka-31R Helix 2
Ka-27PS Helix D 16
Mi-14PS Haze C 40
Transport Mi-26/Mi-26T 32
Mi-8/Mi-8MT/Mi- 306
8MTSh/Mi-8MTV-5
Navy
Submarines SSBN Kalmar-class (Delta III) 3
Delfin-class (Delta IV) 6
Akula-class (Typhoon) 1
Borey-class 3
SSGN Antyey-class (Oscar II) 8
Yasen-class (Graney) 1
SSN Schuka-B-class (Akula II) 2
231
Schuka-B-class (Akula I) 9
Kondor-class (Sierra II) 2
Barracuda-class (Sierra I) 1
Schuka-class (Victor III) 3
SSK Paltus-class (Kilo) 16
Varshavyanka-class (Kilo) 6
Lada-class 1
Surface Fixed-Wing Carriers Orel-class (Admiral 1
Combatants Kuznetsov)
Cruisers Orlan-class (Krov) 2
Atlant-class (Slava) 3
Destroyers Sarych-class 5
(Sovremenny))
Fregat-class (Udaloy I) 8
Fregat-class (Uddaloy II) 1
Komsomolets Ukrainy- 1
class (Kashin)
Frigates Admiral Grigorovich-class 2
(Krivak IV)
Jastreb-class 2
(Neustrashiny)
Steregushchiy-class 1
(Project 20380)
Steregushchiy-class 3
(Project 20381)
Gepard-class 2
Burevstnik-class (Krivak I) 1
Burevestnik M-class 1
(Krivak II)
Patrol and Coastal Grad Sviyazhsk-class 5
(Buyan-M)
Sivuch-class (Dergach) 2
Ovod-class (Nanuchka III) 12
Albatros-class (Grisha III) 1
Albatros-class (Grisha V) 19
Astrakhan-class (Buyan) 3
Parchim II-class 6
Molnya-class (Tarantul II) 3
Molnya-class (Tarantul 18
III)
Grachonokclass 12
232
Raptor-class 8
Mangust-class 2
Vekhr-class (Matka) 3
Sokol-class (Mukha) 1
Mine Warfare Mine Rubin-class (Gorya) 2
Countermeasures Akvamaren-class (Natya) 10
Agat-class (Natya II) 1
Yakhont-class (Sonya) 21
Project 1258 2
Sapfir-class (Lida) 8
Malakhit-class (Olya) 1
Amphibious Landing Platform Dyugon-class 5
Project 11770 12
Landing Ship Heavy Project 775 (Ropucha I/II) 12
Project 775M (Ropucha 3
III) 4
Tapir-class (Alligator)
Landing Ship Other Akula-class (Ondatra) 9
Pomornik-class (Zubr) 2
Air Force
Superiority 4.5 Generation MiG-31B/BS Foxhound 12
Fighters MiG-31BM Foxhound 20
Su-33 Flanker D 18
th
4 Generation MiG-29 Fulcrum 90
MiG-29KR Fulcrum 19
MiG-29KUBR Fulcrum 4
Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker 18
Multirole 4.5 Generation Su-30M2 14
Fighters Su-30SM 9
Su-34 Fullback 57
Su-35S Flanker 36
th
4 Generation MiG-29SMT Fulcrum 28
MiG-29UBT Fulcrum 6
Su-24M Fencer 41
Su-27SM2 Flanker 47
Su-27SM3 Flanker 14
th
Attack Fighters 4 Generation Su-25 Frogfoot 80
Su-25SM/SM3 Frogfoot 100
Su-25UB Frogfoot 15
Su-25UTG Frogfoot 5
Bombers Tu-160 Blackjack 32
233
Tu-95MS/MSM Bear H 120
Tu-22M3/MR Backfire C 63
Intelligence, Surveillance, Tu-142MK/MZ Bear F/J 12
Reconnaissance Tu-142MR Bear J 10
Be-12PS Mail 3
Il-18D 17
Il-38 May 16
Il-38N May 6
Su-24MR Fencer E 12
ELINT Il-20M Coot A 15
Il-20RT Coot A 2
Il-22 Coot B 5
Il-22M Coot B 12
Airborne Early Warning & Control A-50 Mainstay 15
A-50U Mainstay 3
Search & Rescue An-12PS Cub 3
Tankers Il-78 Midas 5
Il78M Midas 10
Transport Heavy An-124 Condor 9
An-22 Cock 2
Il-76MD/MF Candid 100
Medium An-12BK Cub 65
Light An-24RV Coke 1
An-26 Curl 115
An-72 Coaler 25
An-140 5
An-148 9
Tu-134 Crusty 54
Tu-154M Careless 18
L-410 27
L-39 Albatross 150
Yak-130 Mitten 81
Western Military District

Motorized Missiles Air Superiority
138th Guards Motor 26th Missile Brigade 159th Fighter Regiment
Rifle Brigade (Kemenka) (Luga) (Besovets)
25th Guards Motor Rifle 448th Missile Brigade 14th Fighter Regiment
Brigade (Vladimirskyy (Kursk) (Kursk)
234
Lager) 112th Guards Missile
27th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Shuya)
Brigade (Vidnoe)
2nd Guards Motor Rifle 9th Guards Artillery 98th Joint Aviation
Division (Kalininets) Brigade (Luga) Regiment
9th Motor Rifle Brigade 288th Artillery Brigade (Monchegorsk)
(Nizhny Novgorod) (Mulino) 7000th Joint Aviation
79th Guards Reactive- Regiment (Voronezh)
Artillery Brigade (Tver) 790th Fighter Regiment
(Tver)
Armored Electronic Warfare Air Defense
4th Guards Tank 132nd Communications 5th AD Brigade
Division (Naro-Fominsk) Brigade (Agalatovo) (Nenimyaki)
6th Tank Brigade 232nd ELINT Battalion 202nd AD Brigade (Naro-
(Mulino) (Ostrov) Fominsk)
82nd ELINT Brigade 53rd AD Brigade (Kursk)
(Vyazma) 49th AD Brigade (Yelnya)
16th EW Brigade (Plavsk) 1st AD Brigade
(Severomorsk)
2nd AD Brigade
(Khvoynyy)
Air Assault Special Forces Helicopters
76th Guards Air Assault 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade 549th Army Air Force
Division (Pskov) (Promezhits) Base (Pushkino)
16th Spetsnaz Brigade 378th Army Air Force
(Tambov) Base (Smolensk)
15th Army Air Force
Brigade (Ostrov)
Airborne Engineers
98th Guards Airborne 45th Guards Engineering
Division (Ivanovo) Brigade (Nikolo-
106th Guards Airborne Uryupino)
Division (Tula)
Central Military District

Air Assault Missiles Air Defense
31st Air Assault 92nd Missile Brigade 8th AD Brigade (Samara)
Commando Brigade (Totskoe) 9th AD Brigade
235
(Ulyanovsk) 119th Missile Brigade (Novosibirsk)
(Elanskyy) 297th AD Brigade
(Alkino)
61st AD Brigade (Yurga)
28th AD Brigade
(Chebarkul)
Mechanized Artillery Helicopters
21st Guards Motor Rifle 385th Guards Artillery 562nd Army Air Force
Brigade (Totskoye) Brigade (Zvezdny) (Novosibirsk)
35th Guards Motor Rifle 120th Artillery Brigade 48th Army Air Force
Brigade (Aleisk) (Yurga) (Kamensk Uralsky)
74th Guards Motor Rifle 232nd Reactive-Artillery
Brigade (Yurga) Brigade (Chebarkul)
201st Motor Rifle Division
(Tajikistan)
28th Motor Rifle Brigade
(Yekaterinburg)
Motorized Special Forces Air Superiority
15th Guards Motor Rifle 3rd Guards Spetsnaz 6980th Guards Air
Brigade (Roshchinskyy) Brigade (Tolyatti) Regiment (Chelyabinsk)
23rd Guards Motor Rifle 24th Spetsnaz Brigade
Brigade (Samara) (Novosibirsk)
32nd Motor Rifle Brigade
(Novosibirsk)
Armored Electronic Warfare Multirole Fighters
7th Guards Tank Brigade 18th EW Brigade 999th Air Regiment
(Chebarkul) (Nizhneudinsk) (Kant)
179th Communications
Brigade (Yekaterinburg)
39th ELINT Brigade
(Orenburg)
Engineers
12th Guards Engineer
Brigade (Alkino)
41st Engineer-Sapper
Regiment (Achinsk)
11. Sweden
Ground Forces
Main Battle Tanks Leopard 2A4 (Strv-121) 9
236
Leopard 2A5 (Strv 122) 120
Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles CV9040 (Strf 9040) 354
Armored Tracked Pbv 302 281
Personnel BvS10 Mk II 150
Carriers Wheeled XA-180 Sisu (Patgb 180) 34
XA-202 Sisu (Patgb 202) 20
XA-203 Sisu (Patgb 203) 148
XA-360 (Patgb 360) 113
Protected Patrol RG-32M 360
Vehicles
Artillery Self-Propelled Archer (155-mm) 8
Mortars 212M/86 (80-mm) 212
84M/41D (120-mm) 84
Anti-Tank MANPATS RB-55 Unknown
Carl Gustav (84-mm)
Air Defense Towed RBS-97 Unknown
MANPAD RBS-70 Unknown
Helicopters Transport UH-60M Black Hawk 15
(Hkp-16)
NH90 TTH (Hkp-14) 13
AW109 (Hkp-15A) 12
AW109M (Hkp-15B) 8
Navy
Submarines SSK Gotland-class 3
Sodermanland-class 2
Surface Patrol and Coastal Visby-class 5
Combatants Göteborg-class 2
Stockholm-class 2
Tapper-class 9
Mine Warfare Mine Koster-class 5
Countermeasures Sparö-class 2
Sam-class 2
Sokaren-class 1
Amphibious Landing Platform Trossbat-class 8
Combatboat 90E/H/HS 129
Griffon 8100TD 3
Air Force
Multirole 4th Generation JAS-3C/D Gripen 97
Fighters
ELINT Gulfstream IV SRA-4 2
(S102B)
237
Airborne Early Warning & Control S-100B Argus 1
S-100D Argus 2
Tankers KC-130H Hercules (Tp- 1
84)
Transport Medium C-130H Hercules (Tp-84) 5
Light Saab 340 (OS-100A/Tp- 2
100C) 1
Gulfstream 550 (Tp-
102D)

Light Infantry Engineers Air Defense
Livgardet (Kungsangen) Engineering Regiment AD Regiment
(Eksjo) (Halmstad)
Airborne Multirole Fighters
31st Airborne Battalion 17th Fighter Wing
(Karlsborg) (Kallinge)
21st Fighter Wing (Kallax)
Armored
Skaraborgs Regiment
(Skovde)
Mechanized
Sodra Skanska Regiment
(Revingehed)
Norrbottens Regiment
(Boden)
12. United Kingdom
Ground Forces
Main Battle Tanks Challenger 2 227
Recce Vehicles Jackal 197
Jackal 2 110
Jackal 2A 130
Scimitar 201
Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles FV510 Warrior 466
FV511 Warrior 88
Armored Tracked Bulldog Mk 3 880
Personnel FV103 Spartan 275
Carriers BvS-10 Mk 2 Viking 99
238
Protected Patrol Foxhound 398
Vehicles Mastiff (6x6) 421
Ridgback 168
Artillery Self-Propelled AS90 Braveheart (155- 89
mm)
Towed L118 Light Gun (105-mm) 108
Multiple Rocket M270B1 MLRS (227-mm) 35
Launch
Mortars L16A1 (81-mm) 360
Anti-Tank Self-Propelled Exactor Unknown
MANPATS Javelin Unknown
Air Defense Self-Propelled FV4333 Stormer 60
Towed Rapier FSC 14
MANPAD Starstreak (LML) Unknown
Helicopters Attack AH-64D Apache 50
Naval AW159 Wildcat HMA2 28
Lynx HMA8 10
AW101 ASW Merlin HM2 30
Sea King AEW7
8
Multirole AS365N3 5
AW139 1
AW159 Wildcat 34
Lynx AH9A 21
SA341B Gazelle AH1 34
Bell 412EP Griffin HAR-2 4
Transport AW109E 2
AW109SP 1
Navy
Submarines SSBN Vanguard-class 4
SSN Trafalgar-class 4
Astute-class 3
Surface Destroyers Daring-class (Type-45) 6
Combatants Frigates Norfolk-class (Type-23) 13
Patrol and Coastal River-class 4
Archer-class 16
Scimitar-class 2
Mine Warfare Mine Hunt-class 8
Countermeasures Sandown-class 8
Amphibious Landing Platform Albion-class 2
Ocean-class 1
239
Air Force
Multirole 5th Generation F-35B Lightning II 4
Fighters 4th Generation Tornado GR4/GR4A 65
Typhoon FGR4/T3 138
Intelligence, Surveillance, Sentinel R1 5
Reconnaissance Shadow R1 6
ELINT RC-135W Rivet Joint 2
Airborne Early Warning & Control E-3D Sentry 6
Tankers A330 MRTT Voyager 14
KC2/3
Transport Heavy A400M Atlas 11
C-17A Globemaster 8
Medium C-130J Hercules 10
C-130J-30 Hercules 14
Light BN-2A Islander 3
Beech 200GT King Air 2
Beech 200 King Air 5
Bae-146 CC2/C3 4

1st Armored Infantry 1st Artillery Brigade No. 1 Squadron
Brigade (Tidworth) (Bristol) (Lossiemouth)
12th Armored Infantry No. 11 Squadron
Brigade (Bulford) (Coningsby)
20th Armored Infantry No. 3 Squadron
Brigade (Westfalen) (Coningsby)
No. 29 Squadron
(Coningsby)
No. 6 Squadron
(Lossiemouth)
No. 15 Squadron
(Lossiemouth)
No. 9 Squadron
(Marham)
No. 31 Squadron
(Marham)
Air Assault Engineers Air Defense
16th Air Assault Brigade 8th Engineer Brigade Joint AD Command
(Essex) (Dorset) (Berkshire)
240
Electronic Warfare
1st Signal Brigade
(Bristol)
13. United States
This estimates the total volume of equipment deployed in EUCOM units

combined with Operation Atlantic Resolve forces left in Poland and the Baltic
States. Some of the logistical equipment in Europe is omitted. The estimate
does not reflect all units of the United States and these could be reinforced
with additional U.S. forces either from CONUS or from other forces deployed
around the world; in particular, naval assets change routinely depending on
the momentary demands of the United States and would likely be reinforced if
a crisis was foreseen (below is listed the general minimum allocations to U.S.
Sixth Fleet).
The United States also possesses a nuclear deterrent, including some tactical
nuclear weapons at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, that would likely play a
significant role in the event of U.S. intervention in a conflict in the Baltic region.
Ground Forces
Main Battle Tanks M1A2SEPv2 Abrams 29
Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles M2A2/A3 Bradley 39
Personnel Wheeled M1126 Stryker Infantry 280
Carriers Carrier 27
M1128 Stryker Mobile Gun
System
Artillery Self-Propelled M119A2/A3 (105-mm) 16
Towed M777A1/A2 (155-mm) 24
Mortars M252 60
M1064 4
Anti-Tank MANPATS Javelin Unknown
Air Defense Self-Propelled MIM-104 Patriot 5
Helicopters Attack AH-64D Apache 12
Navy
Submarines SSN Los Angeles-class 3+
Surface Cruisers Ticonderoga-class (Aegis) 2+
Combatants Destroyers Arleigh Burke-class 3+
Amphibious Landing Platform LCAC 10+
241
Landing Ship Wasp-class 3
Heavy
Air Force
th
Superiority 4 Generation F-15C Eagle 12
Fighters
Multirole 4th Generation F-15E Strike Eagle 24
Fighters F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 36
Airborne Early Warning & Control E-3 Sentry 3

Mechanized Engineer Multirole Fighters
2nd Stryker Cavalry 18th Engineer Brigade 31st Fighter Wing (Aviano,
Regiment (Vilseck, (Schweinfurt, Germany) Italy)
Germany) 48th Fighter Wing
(Lakenheath, UK)
480th Fighter Squadron
(Spangdahlem, Germany)
Airborne AWAC
173rd Airborne BCT 606th Air Control
(Vicenza, Italy) Squadron
(Gelsenkirchen,
Germany)
Armored
Operation Atlantic
Resolve Teams (EST,
LVA, LIT, PL)
Attack Helicopters
12th Combat Aviation
Brigade (Ansbach,
Germany)
The following is a breakdown of the forces available to each nation as reported

in IISS’ The Military Balance, 2016. This excludes dismounted infantry, whose
manning numbers tend to be classified. In addition, a list of formations,
generally at brigade or wing level, is given; maritime forces are not included in
this list.
242
APPENDIX II
THE IMPACT OF TERRAIN UPON
RUSSIAN MILITARY OPTIONS IN
THE BALTIC REGION
Phillip A. Petersen with Nicholas Myers and
Wojciech Zalewski
The Potomac Foundation
243
APPENDIX II – Table of Contents
The Initial Operational-Strategic Objective……......…………..………… 245
The Probable Main Operational Direction………………………………… 246
Tactical Axes in Latgale……………………………………………………………. 249
Initial Tactical Axis: Pskov – µǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤʹ49
Initial Tactical Axis: Moscow-µǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥ……... 252
Initial Tactical Axis: Minsk – Daugavpils…………………………………… 255
ǣµekne – ÄǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤǤʹͷ7
The Probable Main Operational Direction……………………..….………. 263
Operational-Strategic Regions of Estonia………………………………….. 273
Tallinn…………………………………………………………….………………………. 273
Saaremaa………………………………………………………………………………… 275
Other Operational Directions in the Baltic States………………………..285
The Narva – Tallinn Operational Direction……………………………….. 285
The Pskov – Äon…………………….……………… 288
The Daugavpils – Änal Direction………………...………….. 309
The Vilnius – Kaunas Axis and Ï

ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤǤǤǤ͵29
Strategic Offensive War-Termination Operation……………………….. 331
The Western (Vistula) Arm of Encirclement…..…………………………. 333
The Eastern (Bug) Arm of Encirclement………………………..………….. 350
The Iron Triangle – Holding Warsaw Hostage…………………..………. 361
A Preliminary Operational-Strategic Assessment……………..……….. 364
The Russia Invasion of Poland in 1920……………………………………... 365
Russian Air Operations…………………………………………………………….. 371
244
Analyses of Zapad operational-strategic scale military exercises
run by the Russian General Staff in 1999, 2009 and 2013 suggest
the vulnerability the Russians feel about the exposed operational
position of their military forces in the geo-strategic space they
refer to as Kaliningrad Oblast. In all three of these military
exercises the Russian General Staff trained for the relief of their
forces stationed in this exclave territory unilaterally incorporated
into the Soviet Union after the end of the Second World War. If
one accepts the establishment of a land corridor between Russia
proper and Kaliningrad as being of the highest strategic value
during any potential conflict in north-east Europe today, and
applying General Staff planning norms to the geography of the
region (including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland), it
becomes possible to identify the probable main operational axes
of advance within the Western Strategic Direction of the
European TVD (Theater of Strategic Military Action) during
Russian offensive operations.
The Initial Operational-Strategic Objective

In a perfect Muscovite world, Russian security forces would seize
Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius in a single operation and “persuade”
their respective parliaments to request that Moscow accept their
states as constituent parts of the empire, much as it was done in
1939 when the chambers of these august bodies were filled with
armed Soviet soldiers. This is also not unlike what transpired in
the Crimean Parliament during Vladimir Putin’s 2014 coup in
Simferopol.
Despite having executed this type of scenario during Stalin’s rule
and now during the rule of Putin, Moscow understands that such
an operation would not succeed a second time in the Baltic
States. Furthermore, the Russian General Staff understands that
with a dramatically reduced force, it would have to establish a
secure land corridor to its Kaliningrad garrison before it is
245
destroyed by NATO. 1 If Putin’s war against the European Union
and NATO requires overt military aggression against the Baltic
States, a land corridor to Kaliningrad must be established and
access to the Baltic Sea must be denied to Western forces.
Once overt combat has commenced, an inability to deny access
to and use of the Baltic Sea to Western forces would expose the
Black Sea Fleet and Kaliningrad garrison to destruction. If the
glacis of Kaliningrad is neutralized, Russian military forces could
be quickly pulled down, and the regime’s destruction threatened
in a way that its top figures would be scrambling to save
themselves from “being brought to justice for crimes against
international law and humanity, and for grand corruption.” 2
Thus, the question arises for Russian planners as to the type of
asymmetrical actions can Moscow employ to nullify Western
advantages in armed combat. 3
The Probable Main Operational Direction

The Latgale region of Latvia prominently figures in Russian
calculations, 4 and much preliminary effort by Russia has been
dedicated to prepare the region for the “non-military
asymmetric warfare to establish favorable socio-economic and
political environment” called for by the General Staff’s New
Generation Warfare. 5
1 It appears that the Russians would have to complete a land bridge to Kaliningrad
within ten days, as that constitutes the region’s natural gas storage reserves. See Vadis
Kuzmins, “Kaliningrad Oblast: Bridgehead for Aggression or Captive Island,”
PowerPoint Briefing, National Defence Academy of Latvia, Center for Security and
Strategic Research, 2016.
2 Sergei Guriev, “Russia, after Putin,” The Washington Post, June 12, 2015, p. A15
3 General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation,
Military-Industrial Courier, February 27, 2013.

4 See NewsBalt, 16 April 2015. Russian trolls have already proposed a flag for this
“people’s republic.” See Andrew Higgins, “Latvian Region Has Distinct Identity, and
Allure for Russia,” The New York Times, May 20, 2015.
5 Col. S.G. Chekinov and LTG S.A. Bogdanov, “On the Character of New Generation
Warfare,” Voyenna mysl’, October 2013.
246
Most likely, the Russian 6th Army would be supporting the
“introduction of armed insurgents” 6 in order to avoid “overt
intervention to occupy territory and suppress any remaining
resistance” 7 in Latgale (See Figure 26).
Figure 26: Russian 6th Army Support of Armed Insurgency in

Latgale
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
247
However, once overt intervention has commenced, one could
expect the main tactical axes into Latgale to follow the three
main roads with parallel railroad lines into Latgale—one from the
North and two from the East. (See Figure 27)
Figure 27. Each of these tactical axes of advance meets the

Russian General Staff’s definition for a Main Axis as all three
involve a highway and a parallel rail line.
248
Tactical Axes in Latgale
There are three tactical axes comprising the Latgalian
Operational Axis: 1) Pskov – ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ Tactical Axis; 2) Moscow –
ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ Tactical Axis; and 3) Smolensk – Daugavpils Tactical Axis.
Initial Tactical Axis: Pskov – ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ Tactical
Just south of the Latvian – Russian border the ZţƚƵƉĞ River in
front of Karsava offers an opportunity to immediately slow an
advance by destroying the three road and one rail bridge over
the ZţƚƵƉĞ River. (See Figure 28) The main risk for being
outflanked in the defense of Karsava is the P45 highway that
runs from very near the Russian border on the left bank of the
ZţƚƵƉĞ͘ Regardless of this vulnerability, the terrain offers the
defenders a concrete opportunity to force early delays upon the
advance detachment of attacking forces just south of the Russian
border. (See Figure 29)
Figure 28: The easiest way to outflank the principal water-

barriers in front of <ĈƌƐĂǀĂ are to cross into Latvian territory
west of the ZţƚƵƉĞ River, although doing so would not resolve
the necessity of bridging the river for logistic purposes should
the Latvians take the bridges over the ZţƚƵƉĞ down.
249
Figure 29: ZţƚƵƉĞ River at the Route 13/E262 bridge from Pskov,
Russia, just east of <ĈƌƐĂǀĂ͕ in Latgale. Note that the soft banks
of the river make it difficult to get into and out from the water.
Further south, near ĤƌǌŐĂůĞ͕ the terrain offers another

opportunity to force advancing forces to deploy off the A13
highway, with limited maneuver room for mechanized vehicles
to press an attack. (See Figure 30) Water barriers just to the
north of ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ and the city itself offer major opportunity for
the defender to impose significant delay on attacking forces.
(See Figure 31)
250
Figure 30: This map illustrates the numerous water-barriers that
practically encircle the city of ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ and the approach to
Daugavpils from the north.
251
Figure 31: The officers of an American SOF company of 3rd BN,
75th Ranger Regiment training with the Latvian National Guard
studying the potential water-barriers that could be employed to
defense ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ͘
Initial Tactical Axis: Moscow-ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ

The main road and rail transit (See Figure 32) from the Russian
border to ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ must transit a natural arc of water barriers
that run from the north west to south of Ludza. If the city is
evacuated and the buildings used for defensive positions, Ludza
could be turned into a “hard point” which could be employed to
impose significant delays upon the attacking forces. The main
requirement to support the defense of Ludza would be to
employ small forces to intercept small units attempting to
circumvent Ludza through the extensive lakes that run from the
city all the way to ZĈǌŶĂƐ ezers (See Figure 30).
252
Figure 32: The A12 highway and the rail line from Russia to
ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ occupies a narrow band of terrain between a series of
lakes that canalize movement from east to west. This photo was
taken looking east only a few kilometers west of Luda.
If adequate counter-battery capability and terminal air defenses

are sufficient to keep attacking forces form pounding the
defenses into submission, the terrain will not allow the attacking
forces to bring sufficient forces to bear that would require
withdrawal from Ludza or ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ͘ The two airfields (one
abandoned) to the north west of ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ should be considered
as possible airmobile assault insertion points that might be
employed by the attacker to press the defender from behind, as
well as cut off resupply and withdrawal. A reserve force, to
include some limited numbers of tanks, should be considered a
prerequisite to facilitating withdraw from defensive lines along
the A13 highway to the north of ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ and from Ludza, as well
as to neutralize any air mobile assault and withdrawal from
ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ itself should it become necessary.
253
The broad belt of lakes running from Dagda in the east almost to
Preili in the west provide a final defensive zone some 20
kilometers to the northeast of Daugavpils that could be
employed to impose additional days of delay on attacking forces.
(See Figures 33 and 34) Given the widely dispersed nature of
infantry battles required to secure passage through this tactical
zone, communications, off-road transportation, and air defense
would be essential. The definition of movement in this terrain is,
for the most part, foot and heliborne. Forcing mechanized forces
off the A13 highway prevents movement and exposes the stalled
forces to interdiction so long as the attacker’s artillery can be
prevented from suppressing the defense along the highway.
Figure 33: This photograph is illustrative of the “choke points”

created by the numerous water barriers between ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ and
Daugavpils. This one is created by the E262/A13 highway passing
between two lakes through the forest and over the Rušenica
River, which itself constitutes a significant water-barrier because
its banks inhibit easy entry and exit (See Figure 34).
254
Figure 34: The Rušenica River, essentially a swampy drainage-
way between two lakes over which passage between even more
challenging water-barriers must be negotiated. Since without
engineering, bridging equipment can be used only at the
locations at the prepared sites of demolished bridges, the
crossing-sites present easily-identifiable locations for targeting
fire-strikes.
Initial Tactical Axis: Minsk – Daugavpils

The tactical axis against Daugavpils from Belarus is mainly
centered upon <ƌĈƐůĂǀĂ (See Figures 35 and 36). The taking of
this city is essential to success on this axis, and clearly the terrain
favors the defender. There is, however, a secondary axis on this
direction that would facilitate an attack upon Daugavpils, which
comes along the P68 route from Brasaw to the left bank of the
Daugava River opposite the city of Daugavpils. The most
defensible terrain on this secondary tactical axis is near the
border with Belarus, where a number of lakes and forested
terrain constrict the attacker’s ability to maneuver its forces.
255
Figure 35: The floodplain of the Daugava River is wide, indicating
that at least during some periods of the year, crossing the river
would be rather challenging. Note that the Soviets had
emplaced permanent abutments for a pontoon bridge on either
side of the Daugava (See Figure 36).
Figure 36: At a number of places, it was apparent that the

Soviets had expected the interdiction of bridges and had, as a
result, placed abutments for pontoon bridges (as was the case at
<ƌĈƐůĂǀĂ near the A6 bridge over the Daugava River) or concrete
beds in the river to support movement in the event that bridges
were made unusable in the course of conflict.
256
Subsequent Tactical Axis: ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ-Riga Axis
tŚĂƚŵĂŬĞƐƚŚĞĂǆŝƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶZĤǌĞŬŶŝ and the Latvian capital
important is the parallel rail line. While the axis provides an
alternative direction from which the Russians could approach
ZţŐĂ͕ŵŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇ͕ŝƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐEdKĂĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵǁŚŝĐŚ
to threaten any Russian control over the critical rail junction at
ZĤǌĞŬŶŝ͘/ĨŽŶůǇĨŽƌƚŚŝƐůĂƚƚĞƌƌĞĂƐŽŶĂůŽŶĞ͕ƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐǁŽƵůĚ
ƵŶĚŽƵďƚĞĚůǇĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞZĤǌĞŬŶŝďǇƐĞŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞDĂůƚĂ
ZŝǀĞƌůŝŶĞĂƚsŝůĈŶĂ͘KŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ͕ƚŚĞƵƚŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚŝƐĂǆŝƐ
along the E22/A12 highway as a means ŽĨƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐŽŶ:ĤŬĂďƉŝůƐŝƐ
threated by some twenty-ĨŝǀĞŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐĞĂƐƚŽĨsŝůĈŶĂďǇ
swampy terrain running some thirty-five kilometers
perpendicular to the axis (See Figures 37 and 38). Further west
along the E22/A12 highway from this swampy terrain several
small swampy streams (See Figure 40) provide NATO forces the
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽĨŽƌĐĞĚĞůĂǇƐŽŶĂŶǇĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŽŶ:ĤŬĂďƉŝůƐ͘
Figure 37: dŚĞdĞŝēŝ^ƚƌŝĐƚEĂƚƵƌĞZĞƐĞƌǀĞƚŽƚŚĞ north side of

ƚŚĞμμͬλμŚŝŐŚǁĂǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶZĤǌĞŬĞĂŶĚ:ĤŬĂďƉŝůƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂ
significant barrier to movement. The E22/A12 highway has to
transit a ten-kilometer stretch between the Reserve the north
side and forests (See Figure 39) that are bounded on their south
by additional swampy terrain.
257
Figure 38: ƉŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚŽĨƚŚĞdĞŝēŝ^ƚƌŝĐƚEĂƚƵƌĞZĞƐĞƌǀĞƚĂŬĞŶ
from ground-level.
Figure 39: Photograph taken looking West along E22/A12. Note

ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǁĂƚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞdĞŝēŝ^ƚƌŝĐƚEĂƚƵƌĞZĞƐĞƌǀĞĐŽŵĞƵƉƚŽ
nearly to the road, with forested terrain on both sides of the
highway.
258
Figure 40: Note the bridge in the background provides the only
crossing point to what amounts to a river draining swampy
terrain.
Furthermore, either side could cause major delays on this axis

just by destroying tŚĞĚĂŵŽŶ>ƵďĈŶƐ>ĂŬĞǁŚŝĐŚůŝĞƐƐŽŵĞ
ĞŝŐŚƚĞĞŶŵŝůĞƐŶŽƌƚŚŽĨsŝůĈŶĂ͕ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚĨůŽŽĚƚŚĞĂƌĞĂ
Furthermore, either side could cause major delay on this axis just
ďǇĚĞƐƚƌŽǇŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĂŵŽŶ>ƵďĈŶƐ>ĂŬĞǁŚŝĐŚůŝĞƐƐŽŵĞĞŝŐŚƚĞĞŶ
ŵŝůĞƐŶŽƌƚŚŽĨsŝůĈŶĂ͕ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚ flood the area.
Even a cursory assessment of the terrain of Latgale quickly leads

to the conclusion that the terrain is easily defendable if the
defender has a minimum number of tanks to conduct small-scale
counter-attacks and support withdrawals, air defense, even a
modest amount of counter-battery capacity, and the secure
communications capability to control widely dispersed forces.
259
Regardless of whether Latgale can be “liberated” prior to
commitment of Russian regular forces through Lavian territory
into Lithuania, the Russian 6th Army would be prepared to follow
an axis of advance Pytalovo – ZĤǌĞŬŶĞ – Dugavpils, and then
phase lines betwen Roskiškis and Zarasa, Kupiškis and Utena,
WĂŶĞǀĦǎǇƐ and hŬŵĞƌŐĦ, and Siauliai and <ĦĚĂŝŶŝĂŝ. The axis
would then likely pivot at <ĦĚĂŝŶŝĂŝ͕ to sweep through Raseiniai
and across the A1/E85 highway to link up at Taruage with forces
coming out of Kaliningrad and a major operation to cross the
Nemunas River to destroy the root of the NATO line of
communications into the Baltic States along the Polish border.
The geology of the theater is one in which water-dominated
terrain runs south from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Peipus
through Latgale and eastern Lithuania to northern Poland and
west to the Baltic Sea (See Figure 41). This terrain is not “good
tank country,” featuring ubiquitous water-barriers and forests,
and can be easily defended by indigenous forces without heavy
equipment.
260
Figure 41: The “boggy” terrain is reflected in Russian regional
force structure, which features more helicopters and fewer tanks
that would otherwise be found in Russian units. The Russian
formations in this region also are predominately “tracked” as
opposed to wheeled, again reflecting the poor trafficability of
the terrain for off-road movement.
By entering Lithuania from Latvia, and keeping to the north-west

of this low terrain, Russian armored forces could avoid having to
transit some thirty kilometers of this lake-dominated terrain (See
Figures 42 and 43) in Lithuania prior to reaching higher and less-
forested territory more suitable to high-speed operations by
tanks and other heavier military weapons systems.
261
Figure 42: This photograph was taken on the A6/E262 highway
at the northwest outskirts of Utena looking in the direction of
Daugvpils, Latvia. Utena sits in the middle of lake country that
grows ever more watery and forested closer toward the Latvian,
Russian, and Belarus borders.
Figure 43: The city of Zaraskai is four kilometers from the

Lithuanian-Latvian border and fewer than twenty kilometers
southwest of Daugavpils City and the Daugavpils River. Only the
route straight west from Daugavpils City along the rail line avoids
the water barriers along the Lithuaian border areas. Defending
light infantry should be capable of performing well in this area of
Lithuania.
262
The Probable Subsequent Main Operational Direction
While the most important issue for Russian operational-strategic

planning in the Western Strategic Direction of the European
Theater of Strategic Military operations is the role that Poland
chooses to play in a Russian confrontation with NATO, the most
likely objective in any conflict in this Strategic Direction would be
a secure land link between Russian territory and the exclave of
Kaliningrad. The most direct land link passes through Vilnius and
Kaunas to Kaliningrad, it is probably the easiest access for NATO
to defend given that the two cities could be turned into
fortifications, and that there would be numerous water-barriers
to negotiate. Furthermore, such an axis would still not be a
directly connection with Russian territory, as it would transit
through Belarus. These circumstances make a more northerly
route, also further away from NATO’s ability to interdict, is
therefore more likely.
The most likely Main Operational Axis to link up with Kaliningrad,

is likely to be one that transits a route from Daugavpils in Latvia
ƚŽƚŚĞ>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂŶĐŝƚŝĞƐŽĨZŽŬŝƐŬŝƐ͕<ƵƉŝƓŬŝƐ͕WĂŶĞǀĦǎǇƐ͕aŝĂƵůŝĂŝ,
dĂƵƌĂŐĦ͕ĂŶĚƚŽ^ŽǀĞƚƐŬŝŶ<ĂůŝŶŝŶŐƌĂĚ͘An offensive into
Lithuania from Daugavpils should be expected to coincide with
the crossing of the Nemunas River at Sovetsk (See Figures 44 and
45), and movement north along E77/A12 highway.
Securing this axis would effectively divide the Baltic States into
two. Except for occasionally heavy-wooded terrain (See Figure
46), the only operationally significant defensive positions for
NATO forces on this axis would be at the Daugava River line at
Daugavpils (See Figures 47, 48, and 49ͿĂŶĚĂƚdĂƵƌĂŐĦ (See
Figure 50Ϳ͘dŚĞ:ƻƌĂZŝǀĞƌ͕ŝƚƐĞůĨ͕ĐŽƵůĚďĞĂǀŽŝĚĞĚďǇĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐŝƚƐ
tributary, Akmena River, to the south-ĞĂƐƚŽĨdĂƵƌĂŐĦ͕ĂŶĚ
allowing for the city to be assaulted from the west and the north.
tŚŝůĞĐĂƉƚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŝƚǇŽĨaŝĂƵůŝĂŝŝƐǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞŵĂŶĚĂƚŽƌǇƚŽ
seize this axis, it would probably me required to defend it, and
the city does have a number of water-barriers to the south and
east.
263
Figure 44: Sovetsk as seen from over the Nemunas River from
Lithuania (looking up river, i.e., east).
Figure 45: The rail bridge over the Nemunas River crosses to the
west of Sovetsk (looking down river, i.e., west).
Figure 46: Heavily wooded terrain along Highway E77/A12 some

20 kilometers south-ǁĞƐƚŽĨaŝĂƵůŝĂŝ͕>ŝƚŚƵĂŶŝĂ͘
264
Figure 47: The bridge over the Daugava River at the City of
Daugavpils, as seen from the left bank (south from Daugavpils).
Figure 48: The rail bridge over the Daugava River at Daugavpils
(right side of bridge is city side and right bank of river).
Figure 49: About 10 kilometers northwest of Daugavpils – a third

bridge over the Daugava River carries both road and rail spans.
This photograph is taken from the right bank (west side of the
river).
265
Figure 50: dŚĞ:ƻƌĂZŝǀĞƌĐƌŽƐƐĞƐƚŚĞλρͬλμŚŝŐŚǁĂǇŝŶĨƌŽŶƚŽĨ
dĂƵƌĂŐĦ͘dŚĞ:ƻƌĂŝƐŶŽƚĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚďĂƌƌŝĞƌ͕ďƵƚƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ
in heights of the two banks (the city side is significantly higher)
would slow down an attack and leave it exposed to direct fire
weapons as it attempted to leave the river and enter the city.
Utena, Ukmerge, and Jonava might well all be bypassed to the

northwest. As the General Staff attempted to widen the
territory south and east of the rail line, it would undoubtedly
attempt to use the tributaries to the Nemunas River as barriers
to secure the flank of this axis. Eventually, the operation would
seek to employ the Nemunas River west of Kaunas as a barrier to
counterattack. At some point in the operation, the Russians
would seek to seize the bridge over the Nemunas River at
Jurbakas (See Figure 51), probably with airmobile troops out of
Kaliningrad. The bridge at Jurbakas is not critical to crossing the
Nemunas River, as the river posses no particular barrier (See
Figure 52). Getting down to the Nemunas from the high plain on
the northern side of the river and then back up on to the high
plain on the southern side would constitute the main challenge
(See Figures 53 and 54).
266
Figure 51: The bridge over the Nemunas River at Jurbarkas is
indicative of the height of the plains on both sides of the river.
Figure 52: The Nemunas River with a depth of 3-5 meters is, in
most places, easy to enter and exit.
267
Figure 53: This photograph taken from the north side of the
Nemunas River illustrates the challenge of getting down to the
river. This challenge would likely cause bottlenecks at access
points down to the river that would provide ample targets of
opportunity for NATO airforces.
Once south of the Nemunas River, Russian tank and mechanized

forces would find themselves on a plateau seventy-five
kilometers long north to south, and twenty to thirty kilometers
wide east to west, and running all the way to Lithuania’s border
with Poland.
Polish ground forces coming to the assistance of Lithuania across
this open terrain would be threatened with an attack out of
Kaliningrad on their left flank. The operational axis east from
Kaliningrad City has a parallel high-speed road and rail line to
support movement of ammunition and fuel, although more
roads on the plateau south of the Nemunas run north-to-south
than east-to-west.
268
Figure 54: The terrain on both, the north (left) or the south side
of the Nemunas River (right), supports maneuver warfare.
The Polish right flank would remain relatively secure by the

nature of the terrain (See Figure 55), although it would be to the
advantage of the Poles to have combat assault helicopters to
provide flexible (mobile) anti-tank assets to reinforce forces
defending southeast Lithuania.
Between the Nemunas River west of Kaunas and DĂƌŝũĂŵƉŽůĦ
City is a forest (Kazlu ZƻĚŽƐ Miškai) with limited access. From
the Belarus border to DĂƌŝũĂŵƉŽůĦ City the terrain may be
notionally divided into two belts, the first along the border
consisting of forested terrain with limited access (See Figure 56),
and a second area largely dominated by lakes (See Figure 57) and
the Nemunas River as it snakes its way across the terrain on its
path from northwestern Belarus (See Figure 58). The forested
terrain along the border with Belarus severely restricts
269
movement by armored forces, making it easily defended with
light infantry. The lake country to the northwest canalizes
movement, making transiting armored forces vulnerable to
interdiction.
Figure 55: Forested terrain west of Kaunas and south of the

Nemunas River restricts maneuver as far south as DĂƌŝũĂŵƉŽůĦ
(photo taken looking east to west). From there water barriers
protect the eastern flank of NATO forces moving north in support
of Lithuania. To the east of the numerous lakes in the south, all
along the Belarus-Lithuanian border in the southeast forested
terrain with few roads further restricts east-to-west access north
of the Polish border.
270
Figure 56: This photo (looking west from the east side of the
Nemunas) taken from the A4/Route 133 bridge over the
Nemunas just after the Merkys River had merged, illustrates the
density of the forested terrain along the Lithuanian-Belarus
border.
Figure 57: Numerous lakes, streams, and swamps dominate the

terrain west and south from DĂƌŝũĂŵƉŽůĦ City all the way into
Poland. Pictured here is Lake Metelys as seen from near
Meteliai, some fifty kilometers southeast of DĂƌŝũĂŵƉŽůĦ City
271
Figure 58: This photo of the Nemunas River at Prienai (looking
east from the city on the west bank of the river) demonstrates
that the Nemunas provides as substantial barrier that could be
used to shield the right shoulder of NATO line of communications
(LOC) from Poland north to the Baltic States.
The Russian General Staff would, undoubtedly, think of the

plateau to the south of the Nemunas River much as a beachhead
in an amphibious landing. The challenge is to get enough forces
up onto the plateau south of the Nemunas to hold the bluffs
overlooking the river, since gaining the plateau makes maneuver
of forces difficult until enough of it has been seized to provide
depth against counterattack. Thus, a supporting attack from
Kaliningrad into the West flank of the defending forces may
prove critical, especially if it comes south of the aĞƓƵƉĦ River and
adds yet another tactical challenge to supporting NATO forces
attempting to destroy unsupported Russian forces on the south
side of the Nemunas.
NATO attack helicopters (i.e. Apache) and low-flying fixed-wing
ground-attack aircraft (i.e. A-10 Warthog) operating from Polish
airfields would pose a serious challenge for the Russian General
Staff. Such missions would focus on attacking Russian forces
attempting to make the difficult transit down from the plateau
north of the Nemunas, and then, back up onto the plateau south
272
of the Nemunas, as well as exiting the battlefield over their own
ground forces.
If the Russian drive south is defeated at the Nemunas, the Polish
forces operating west of DĂƌŝũĂŵƉŽůĦ would be able to launch a
counter-offensive against forces attacking east from Kaliningrad
and take advantage of the same high-speed axis of advance. In
this case, the objective would be to conduct a drive deep into the
oblast.
Adding further to the nightmare for the Russian General Staff,
the Nemunas River could serve to secure the right shoulder of
any such attack by Polish forces toward Kaliningrad City. Any
NATO units landing at the Estonian port of <ŝĞƉĈũĂ and the
Lithuanian port of <ůĂŝƉĦĚĂ could end up not only reinforcing the
defense of the two countries, but could even be directed south
to aŝůƵƚĦ͕ and from there attack Kaliningrad Oblast from the
north.
Operational-Strategic Regions of Estonia
While it would be understandable that the Baltic States might

consider their respective capitals to be initial Strategic
Objectives, so long as the Main Operational Objective remains
the relief of Kaliningrad Region, the capitals are likely to be
considered secondary objectives in the planning of the

Ǥ
ǡ
of operational-strategic significance: Tallinn, Saaremaa, and
southeastern-most Estonia. The later operational region will
be discussed in the context of its importance to the secondary
operational axis directed toward the Latvian capital of RÄga.
Tallinn
As the capital of Estonia, Tallinn offers the possibility for

decapitating armed resistance of Russian reoccupation of the
country. If the 3,070 meter-long and 45-meter wide runway at
Lennart Meri Tallinn Airport is taken through a sudden
273
airborne assault and naval infantry landed in Tallinn’s
harǡ

be compelled to withdraw from NATO and “invite” Russian
peacekeepers. Complete surprise would be required for such
an operation to succeed, and the risks of failure to attain
surprise could be catastrophic.
A small assault force with several main battle tanks could

ǡ
paratroops or airmobile forces landing to secure the airport
for the subsequent air-landing of its combat vehicles and
heavy weapons would be unable to hold the airport long
enough to get its fixed-wing heavy transport aircraft onto the
ground and successfully unloaded.
An amphibious assault would be more difficult to defeat given

the number of places naval infantry could land in the Tallinn
area. Considering the combat assault training of Russian
naval infantry, only an elite and well-armed standing force
would be capable of successfully resisting a surprise
amphibious assault landing.
Success from the Russian perspective, however, would not be

assured by the success of the landing, as the purpose of such a
high-risk operation would be to capture the Estonian political
leadership. Knowing where a sufficient number of key senior
officials are located in order to create a legal fiction that

NATO would be essential. Just a few senior officials diverting
from their usual work schedule and daily itineraries could
spell failure to an otherwise successful operation. Under such
circumstances, the “little green men” would need to be quickly
withdrawn or reinforced in what would clearly be understood
as an undeniable act of aggression.
274
Saaremaa
To protect the flank of Russian forces moving southwest from
Russia on this main strategic direction from air attack by
NATO or other Western airpower, it is likely that the Russian

of the islands in the Estonian archipelago.
The island of Saaremaa has played a central role in the

ȋ
59).
Figure 59: -14th Century by the

ǡnes in the mid-16th
Century and the Swedes in the mid-17th Century, Kuressaare
Castle lost its strategic value to Russia once Russia had
%ȋ
60) and the Russian garrison withdrew from Kuressaare.
During the Cold War, Saaremaa defended the approaches to

St. Petersburg (Leningrad), forming a central link in a chain of
air defense
275
that covered the entire length of NATO’s northern flank or the
Soviet Union’s Northwestern TVD. Without this location in
the Estonian archipelago, today’s Russian ground-based air
defenses in Kaliningrad and Russia are unable to deny NATO
aviation the critical role of providing protection and fire
support to NATO and NATO Partner country ground forces.
Figure 60: Branklint Ǥ

%

Bothnia, and came into the Russian Empire via the 1809
ȋ Ȍ Ǥ
hope of transforming Åǲ
the North,” the

Russian control over much of the Baltic. When the British and
ͳͺͷͶǡ
the Crimean War, the main fort was defended by only 120
guns and only three of its 14 planned defensive towers had
been completed. The joint British-
10,000 troops reduced the fortress. The lesson the Russians
learned was that the fortification hadn’t been completed in
time.
276
While there has been much speculation on the possibility of
ǯ
ǯ

ground-based air defenses, these are most probably “a island
too far” in terms of Russian capability. Though most certainly
not impossible – ǡǡ
these island during some exercises – the indispensable island
is Saaremaa.
During the Cold War, the Soviets had two surface-to-air

missile (SAM) sites locaȋ ͸ͳ
͸ʹȌǡ
near-ȋ ͸͵ȌǤ
Figure 61: Phil Petersen in front of one of the bunkers

constructed by the Soviets for the crew and SAM TELS at
Karuujärve in northwest Saaremaa.
277
Figure 62: A command bunker for the former SAM site
located at Oriklüla, on Saaremaa Island.
Figure 63: Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) complex near the

town of Piiri, on the island of Muhu. Note that the SAM TEL
bunker was equipped with a pillbox, anticipating an attack by
ground forces.
278
The larger Saaremaa, measuring 2,673 square kilometers
(1,032 square miles) makes for the ideal target in that it is too
large for the sparsely populated Estonia to defend. The island,
itself only has a population of slightly over 30,000 with
approximately half of this number residing in the city of
ȋ e 64) on the southern side of the island.
ȋ ͸ͷ
66) is only three kilometers from the city and with two
asphalt runways – one at 2,000 meters (6,562 feet) and a
second at 799 meters (2,621 feet). The port facilities and the
airport near the shore make for a temping amphibious assault
Ǥ ǡ
Oriküla is no more than a 45-minute drive from the airport
ȋ ͸͹ȌǤcient
ȋ ͸ͺȌ
formidable position from which to defend the city.
Figure 64: No fewer than three of the islands in the Estonian

Soviet occupation with Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) and
anti-ship missiles.
279
Figure 65: The city of Kuressaare with its “star” fortress and
airport.
Figure 66: The airfield at Kuressaare was initially

constructed during the first half of the 1930s. The airport was
officially opened in March 1955, yet didn’t get electricity until
1958. The current terminal building was built in 1962, and
ʹͲͲ͹ǡʹͲǡͲͲͲ
passengers per year.
280
Figure 67: The SAM Site at Oriküla, Sarramaa Island, Estonia
had bunkers for missile launchers and crew in case of a
surprise attack. The deployment circles are still evident
within site of the top of the
command bunker.
Figure 68: Kuressaare Castle sits between the city itself and
the sea, with low and thick walls and several towers to
provide good observation of approach from the south.
281
ȋ ͸ͻȌ
the island near Leisi also offers a point at which to land SAM
batteries that could be moved into the former missile site at
¡ȋ ͹ͲȌǤ ǡ
given the causeway connecting Saaremaa with Muhu (See
͹ͳȌǡasily relocate a SAM
battery ȋ ͹ʹȌ
further disperse assets for protection. By destroying the ferry
ȋ ͹͵Ȍǡ
isolate themselves from Estonian counterattack. Although the
Russian forces on the islands would be isolated, their mission
of shielding the forces attacking into the Baltic States could
prove critical to success in their reoccupation of the Baltic
States.
Figure 69: The ferry from Trigi on the northern shore of

Saaremaa runs to Sõru, on the southern tip of Hiiumaa. While
the structures do not in any way compare to those located on
the southern shore near Kuressaare, they still provide a
ready-made facility for offloading large weapons systems.
282
Figure 70: The former command bunker at Karujärve is still
in use by those wanting to get out of the rain and party.
Figure 71: While maps tend to depict Saaremaa being

connected by Muhu by a bridge, it is actually a causeway that
has been constructed through marshland between the two
islands. Therefore, this land transportation link would be far
more difficult to cut than it would be to take down a bridge.
Another implication is that it is impossible to travel via water
directly from the
of Ä and the Väinameri.
283
Figure 72: A “pill box” defensive position at the SAM site
near Piiri indicates that the Soviets feared the possibility of a
ground assault on the complex.
Figure 73: The ferry facility at Kuivastu, Muhu.
284
Other Operational Directions in the Baltic States
Russian strong predisposition toward selecting parallel main road and

rail routes to opposing national capitals would suggest two additional
operational axes directed from Russian territory to Tallinn and RƯJD.
The Narva – Tallinn “Coastal” Operational Direction
The Narva – Tallinn Operational Direction is one with which Moscow is

unpleasantly familiar. During the Second World War along this coastal
axis from 26 July to 10 August 1944 the Soviets fought the Battle of the
Blue Mountains at the Tannenberg Line as a German defense in depth
response to the Soviet’s attack in depth. The Tannenberg Line was a
subsequent defensive line behind the Panther Position (based on the
Narva River and Lake Peipus), and was only surrendered after the
Soviets turned their focus from the coastal axis to one directed from
south of Lake Peipus towards Tartu. The focus on southeastern Estonia
led the Germans to withdraw from the Blue Mountains (See Figure 74A)
as part of their general approach of strategic defense and tactical
offense directed at attriting Soviet forces while trading space for time.
This strategy was so successful at the Tannerberg Line that a force of 24
volunteer infantry battalions from East Prussia, Denmark, Flanders, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Wallonia numbering 22,250 men held off
135,830 Soviet troops. As the Soviet forces were constantly reinforced,
the casualties mounted to 170,000 dead and wounded, and the loss of
more than 150 tanks. 1
1 For an excellent review of the coastal axis during the Second World War, see Major
Andrew Michael Del Gaudio, United States Marine Corps, Operational Art and the Narva
Front 1944, Sinimäed and Campaign Planning, a thesis submitted in accordance with the
requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy, August
31, 2012. The authors are grateful to Dr. Kaarei Piirimäe for calling our attention to this
outstanding work.
285
Getting its forces across the border is the first challenge for a Russian
attack on the Narva-Tallinn axis (See Figure 74B). Considering the
swampy terrain between Narva and Lake Peipus, the Russians might
attempt to “swim” the river north of the city itself. There are places
where it is possible to drive into the river on the Russian side and drive
out of the river on the Estonian side (See Figure 75) with amphibious
vehicles. Given Soviet-era plans to “swim” to Denmark at low tide, it
should not be dismissed outright that contemporary Russian planning
might include an attempt to enter Lake Peipus near Skamja and come
out of the lake at any or all of the eight beaches between Russia and the
Estonian city of Alajõe.
Figure 74A: The hills west of Narva are referred to as the "blue
mountains" much as the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia are refer to
because of the "blue" appearance when viewed from a distance. These
hills in the northwestern Estonia dominate the east-west axis between
the Gulf of Finland and the swamps to the south.
Several hard-surface roads and a spur rail line could be employed to

speed forces north to Johvi (See Figure 76). Combined with the seizure
of one or more of the roll-on/roll-off ports to the north of Johvi, the
Russians could attempt to trap Estonian forces defending against a
frontal attack at Narva.
The terrain along the coastal axes in Estonia is not conducive to even
tactical amphibious assault landings (See Figure 77), so tactical
286
envelopment on this access would require a series of port facilities to
keep the defenders fighting in multiple directions. Moscow is also well-
versed in the challenges of conducting an amphibious landing on this
axis, since they attempted on in February 1944 in the area of Meküla.
Only three soldiers in the landing actually survived to link up with
friendly forces. 2
Figure 74B: The bridge between Narva with its Hermann Castle (on the
left) and Ivangorod Castle (on the right).
Figure 75: As can be seen in this photograph of the mouth of the Narva
River, low but solid terrain along the banks of the river allows for a
reasonably easy access in and out.
2 See, Del Gaudio, Operational Art and the Narva Front 1944, Sinimäed and Campaign
Planning, pp.211-217.
287
Figure 76: Highways from the north coast of Lake Peipus, along with a
spur rail line from south of Mäetaguse, would speed Russian forces
moving on Jõhvi to cut off the retreat of Estonian defenders from Narva.
Figure 77: This photograph looking east from near Aseri, illustrates that
the Estonian coast on the Gulf of Finland does not facilitate sea landings
and movement ashore.
The Pskov – ZţŐĂ Operational Direction
Examination of the terrain and infrastructure of Latvia allows for easy

identification of the probable main Operational Direction against Rţga
within parameters of Russian General Staff planning for the
reoccupation of the three Baltic States. From staging areas near the
288
Estonian border where the rail line from Pskov crosses the border on its
way to Võru, and where the E77 highway crosses the same border,
Russian troops would be directed to seize the rail line as far as Valga
(Estonia)/Valka (Latvia), as well as seize control of the E77/Route 7
highway across the southeastern tip of Estonia. (See Figure 78)
Figure 78: The Pskov – ZţŐĂKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶis comprised of two

tactical axes with a railline alternating between them.
Transit through the southeastern corner of Estonia is complicated by the

hilly terrain and the extensive water barriers created by streams, lakes,
and swamps. Immediately after crossing the border at Petseri (Petšorõ),
the road west toward Võru and the rail lines to Võru and Tartu all merge
close enough for a single large demolition to cause significant delays in
movement (See Figure 79). Further south along the Estonian-Russian
border on E77, the town of Misso sits halfway between the Russian
border and the Latvian border smack in the middle of a line of water
barriers nearly ten kilometers long, running north to south and
perpendicular to the E77 highway (See Figure 80). This potential
defensive line has a natural picket line along the Pedejä River one to two
kilometers in front the defensive line, and two withdrawal routes across
289
the Kuura River (See Figure 81) that can be employed to contain pursuit.
Even attempting to outflank the defenders to the north of this set of
water barriers funnels the attacker between two more lakes. A final
“fall-back” position forcing the attacking forces between yet two more
lakes presents itself before the Russians could enter into Estonia on the
Route E77 axis to Rţga.
Figure 79: Approximately five kilometers west of the Estonian-Russian

border at Petseri (Petšorõ), the rail lines both north to Tartu and the rail
line and road to the north of the Puisa River merge to present an
attractive target for destruction.
290
Figure 80. The seizure of southeast Estonia is critical to secure the
operational axes Pskov – ZţŐĂ, as this terrain would make it a potentially
difficult task to accomplish against well-equipped and well-trained
defenders.
Figure 81: The Kuura River is more of a channel through a swamp that is
impossible to cross without engineering if two roads are destroyed.
291
The rail line to Võru runs to the south of the city and Vagula Lake, which
makes seizing the city an advantage to protecting the line from
counterattack. This route south of Vagula Lake is through challenging
terrain that could be difficult to defend (i.e., keep open and working)
from special opeations forces (See Figure 82).
Figure 82: The terrain in southeast Estonia, although sometimes hilly,

seems always to be wet. Get off engineered surface, and one always
seems to be in a swamp.
Numerous water barriers such as that in front (on the east side) of
Antsla (See Figure 83) could be used to both delay the attacker and
make difficult the movement of logistics. The Russian objective would
be to get to and secure the railyard at Valga (See Figure 84), and seizing
Valka would be a means of securing it against attack from Latvia.
Moving north along highway E264/Route 3 to seize the bridge over the
Väike Emajogi (See Figure 85) would provide some security against a
major attack from the direction of Tartu.
292
Figure 83 The city of Antsla sits both astride and at the center of the road and
rail axes from sƃƌƵ and Valga. With water barriers dominating the approaches
to the city from every direction, whomever controls it will determine the fate
of the rail junction at Valga.
Figure 84: The rail junction at Valga would serve as a major logistics
supply hub for the Pskov – Rţga Operational Direction.
293
Figure 85: The E264/Route 3 bridge (as seen from west side – north
bank to the left) over the Vaike Emajogi. The river and its banks at this
point would pose a significant barrier.
Advancing south from Valga/Valka, the Russians would undoubtedly

move on three axes: 1) the E264/A3 highway; 2) the rail line toward
^ƚƌĞŶēŝ͖ĂŶĚνͿƐŽƵƚŚŽŶƚŚĞZŽƵƚĞWμξ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵĞ86). The main axis for
this advance would be along the E264/A3 highway and the rail line,
which actually cross each other near Saule before crossing back over
each other near Strenēi, Latvia. The purpose of the advance south on
P24 would be to deny Latvian forces the opportunity of
counterattacking into the rear of the Russian forces on the main axis
(See Figure 87).
294
Figure 86: The Pskov – ZţŐĂ Operational Direction is dominated by the
Gauja River, referred to as a “deceitful” river because it tends to change
its bed, depth, and speed rapidly – characterized as a “non-
homogeneous watercourse.”
Figure 87: Route P24 over the Gauja River as seen from the south side
of the road and northwestern side of the river.
295
On the secondary axis within the Pskov – ZţŐĂ Operational Direction,
along the E77/A2 highway, the Russian General Staff would likely
attempt to employ airmobile forces. This would be done to preemptively
seize or attack any force holding the defensible terrain formed by the
twisting and turning of river lines near Vireši by landing forces in the
open agricultural terrain on either side of the E77/A2 bridge over the
Gauja River approximately six miles west of Vireši (See Figures 88 and
89) and some 48 kilometers south of the Estonia border.
Should they lose the defensive stronghold that can be constructed in the
twisting and turning river terrain west of Vireši, the Latvian National
Guard can use the E77/A22 bridge over the Vecpalsa River
approximately 5 kilometers further west to at least slow the Russian
advance (See Figure 80) to cover the Latvian withdrawal.
Figure 88: The confluence of the Vizla and Vecpalsa streams with the
Gauja River provides an opportunity to construct a “hard point” on top
of the high-speed axis within the Pskov – ZţŐĂ Operational Direction
296
.
Figure 89: Lower left, looking north, downriver; upper left, looking
north; upper right and lower right, looking upriver.
Figure 90: While the Vecpalsa River cannot be considered a significant

barrier, its banks offer specific points of entry and exit. As a result, the
Vecpalsa could provide a targeting opportunity when individual vehicles
are compelled to stop or slow down at designated crossing points.
If the Russians can get to the intersection of E77/A2 and Route P27
about 6 kilometers southeast of Smiltene (See Figure 91), their forces
297
may attempt to seize the city both to protect the right (north) flank of
this secondary axis and, if possible, gain the possibility to support
movement along the E264/A3 Axis by outflanking defending Latvian
National Guard forces. Such combat actions could move northward
from the E77/A2 Axis on three main roads, plus a number of secondary
roads: 1) Route P24 in an attempt to trap Latvian National Guard forces
defending the bridge over the Gauja River (See Figure 92); 2) Route P25
in support of an assault against ^ƚƌĞŶēŝ (although this route would
require crossing the Gauja River at ^ƚƌĞŶēŝ (See Figure 93) – no easy task
(See Figures 94, 95, and 96) – the important contribution would be to
assist in the securing of the rail line to R ţga where it crosses the Gauja
River (See Figures 97 and 98) to move south to parallel the E77/A2
highway; and 3) along Route P18 to seize that part of the city of Valmiera
on the southeast side (left bank) of the Gauja River (See Figure 99) –
which is critical because the rail line passes through this part of the city.
The Route P18 highway bridge, itself, passes over the Gauja River to the
south of the city (See Figures 100 and 101).
Figure 91: Highway E77/A2 over Route P27, looking northwest toward
Smitene, some six kilometers from the intersection.
298
Figure 92: Only two insignificant tributaries cross the terrain north from
Smiltene for approximately 23 kilometers along Route P24 toward the
forested terrain along the Gauja River cross. For the most part, it is an
open agricultural land.
Figure 93: The Route-WμοďƌŝĚŐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂZŝǀĞƌĂƚ^ƚƌĞŶēŝĂƐƐĞĞŶ

from left bank.
299
Figure 94: dŚĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽ^ƚƌĞŶēŝĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚǁĞƐƚƐŝĚĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂZŝǀĞƌĂƌĞŝŶƐŽŵĞƉůĂĐĞƐƐŝŵƉůǇŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĨŽƌǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ
ŽĨĨ-ƌŽĂĚ͘
Figure 95: >ŽŽŬŝŶŐƵƉƌŝǀĞƌŽŶƚŚĞ^ƚƌĞŶēŝ-ƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞ

ďĂŶŬƐŽĨƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂZŝǀĞƌŝŶŵŽƐƚƉůĂĐĞƐŵĂŬĞŐĞƚƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŽĂŶĚ
ŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ͘
300
Figure 96: >ŽŽŬŝŶŐĚŽǁŶƐƚƌĞĂŵŽŶƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌ
ĨƌŽŵ^ƚƌĞŶēŝ͕ƚŚĞďĂŶŬƐŽĨƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶŵĂƌƐŚǇ
ĂŶĚƐƚĞĞƉ-ďĂŶŬĞĚƉŽƐŝŶŐĂĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽĂƌŝǀĞƌ-ĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝĨƵŶĚĞƌĨŝƌĞ͘
Figure 97: The ƌĂŝůůŝŶĞ ƚŽ^ƚƌĞŶēŝ— ĂƐƐĞĞŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞůĞĨƚďĂŶŬŽĨ

'ĂƵŬĂ—ŝƐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚŽŶǁŚĂƚĂŵŽƵŶƚƐƚŽĂĐĂƵƐĞǁĂǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
301
ĨŽƌĞƐƚĞĚƐǁĂŵƉǇƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ͘ƌŝĚŐĞŝŶďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶ
&ŝŐƵƌĞσς͘
Figure 98: dŚŝƐƉŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚŽĨƚŚĞƌĂŝůůŝŶĞ ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂZŝǀĞƌ as

ƐĞĞŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞůĞĨƚďĂŶŬ͘
302
Figure 99: dŚĞsĂůŵŝĞƌĂŝƚǇƌŝĚŐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ'ĂŝũĂZŝǀĞƌ͘EŽƚĞ
ƚŚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŚĞŝŐŚƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽĞŵďĂŶŬŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞƐƚĞĞƉŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĐůŝŶĞŽŶďŽƚŚƐŝĚĞƐ͘
Figure 100: sŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞZŽƵƚĞ-Wλς ďƌŝĚŐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂZŝǀĞƌ

ĨƌŽŵƵƉƌŝǀĞƌƐŚŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞŚĞŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽĞŵďĂŶŬŵĞŶƚƐ͘
303
Figure 101: dŚŝƐƉŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚ– ůŽŽŬŝŶŐĚŽǁŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ– ƚĂŬĞŶĨƌŽŵ
ƚŚĞZŽƵƚĞ-WλςďƌŝĚŐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂZŝǀĞƌŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞ
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŽĨŐĞƚƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞǁĂƚĞƌŽŶƚŚĞůĞĨƚďĂŶŬĂŶĚŽƵƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞǁĂƚĞƌŽŶƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚďĂŶŬ͘ TŚĞ'ĂƵũĂZŝǀĞƌŵĂŬĞƐĂƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶ
ƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽƚŚĞƌĂŝůůŝŶĞ͕ǁŚŝĐŚƐŚŝĨƚƐ ĨƌŽŵƉĂƌĂůůĞůŝŶŐƚŚĞμπξͬν
ŚŝŐŚǁĂǇƚŽƉĂƌĂůůĞůŝŶŐƚŽρρͬμŚŝŐŚǁĂǇ͘dŚŝƐƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶŵĂŬĞƐ
ƚŚĞƚŽǁŶŽĨĤƐŝƐ͕ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƌĂŝůůŝŶĞƉĂƐƐĞƐ͕ĂŬĞǇ
ĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ͘
ƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇπŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐŶŽƌƚŚŽĨĤƐŝƐ͕ƚŚĞƌĂŝůůŝŶĞĐƌŽƐƐĞƐ
ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞZĂƵŶĂZŝǀĞƌŽŶĂǀĞƌǇŚŝŐŚďƌŝĚŐĞ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞ102) that
ǁŝůůƉƌŽďĂďůǇďĞĂŵĂũŽƌŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨĂƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůĂŝƌŵŽďŝůĞĂƐƐĂƵůƚ
ďǇƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐto ƉƌĞĐůƵĚĞŝƚƐĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ͘
304
Figure 102: The Valka-Rţga Rail line over the Rauna River is, even
in peacetime, considered a “sensitive” object – with a permanent
watchman with dogs to “shoo” trespassers away from
approaching the bridge. See enlargement below.
dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƐŵĂůůƌŽƵƚĞƐďǇǁŚŝĐŚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ŵŽǀŝŶŐƐŽƵƚŚǁĞƐƚĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞρρͬμŚŝŐŚǁĂǇĐĂŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ
ŶŽƌƚŚǁĞƐƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĤƐŝƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐĂƌĞĂƚŽƚŚĞǁĞƐƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂZŝǀĞƌ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞ103Ϳ͘&ŽƌƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉĂƌƚ͕ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ
ŝŶƚĞƌƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞρρͬμŚŝŐŚǁĂǇĂŶĚZŽƵƚĞWμρĂŶĚƚŚĞƚŽǁŶ
ŽĨ^ŝŐƵůĚĂ;ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƌĂŝůůŝŶĞƉĂƐƐĞƐͿ͕ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶŽ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŶĂƚƵƌĂůďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞ>ĂƚǀŝĂŶ
EĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƵĂƌĚĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽĨŝŵƉŽƐŝŶŐĚĞůĂǇƐƵƉŽŶƚŚĞ
ĂĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘KŶĐĞ^ŝŐƵůĚĂŝƐƐĞĐƵƌĞĚ͕ƚŚĞρρͬμ
ďĞĐŽŵĞƐĂŚŝŐŚ-ƐƉĞĞĚĨŽƵƌ-ůĂŶĞŚŝŐŚǁĂǇǁŝƚŚŶŽŶĂƚƵƌĂůďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐ
ƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞŚŝŐŚǁĂǇĂŶĚƌĂŝůůŝŶĞŚĂǀĞƚŽĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ-
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐǁĂƚĞƌďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞǁĞƐƚŽĨRţga ŝƚƐĞůĨ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞ
104Ϳ͘ ƚƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚƚŚĞĐŝƚǇŽĨRţga͕ŝƚƐĞůĨ͕ǁŽƵůĚďĞƵŶĚĞƌƐŝĞŐĞ͘
305
Figure 103: dŚĞZŽƵƚĞ-WλξďƌŝĚŐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂZŝǀĞƌĨƌŽŵ
ĞƐŝƐƚŽƚŚĞμπξͬνŚŝŐŚǁĂǇ͘dŚĞĂŶŬƐŽĨƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂZŝǀĞƌĂƚ
ĞƐŝƐ;ƐŝƚƚŝŶŐĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞůĞĨƚďĂŶŬŽĨƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌŽŶĂŚŝůůƚŽƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚ
ŝŶƚŚŝƐƉŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚůŽŽŬŝŶŐƵƉƌŝǀĞƌͿĂƌĞŶŽƚĂƐĚĂƵŶƚŝŶŐĂƐƚŚĞǇ
ĂƌĞŝŶŵĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘
Figure 104: KŶƚŚĞWƐŬŽǀ-Rţga KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƚĞƌ

ďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĞŶƚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŝƚǇŝƚƐĞůĨ͘
νκπ
ĨƚĞƌƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĂǆŝƐǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞWƐŬŽǀ-Rţga KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ
ƉĂƐƐĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞμπξͬνŚŝŐŚǁĂǇƚŽƚŚĞρρͬμŚŝŐŚǁĂǇĂƚ
^ƚƌĞŶēŝ͕ƚŚĞμπξͬνŚŝŐŚǁĂǇĐƌŽƐƐĞƐĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨǁĂƚĞƌďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐ
ƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚďĞƚƵƌŶĞĚŝŶƚŽƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůďŽƚƚůĞŶĞĐŬƐĞǆƉŽƐŝŶŐ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƚƌŽŽƉ ĐŽůƵŵŶƐƚŽĂŝƌĂƚƚĂĐŬ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞλκοͿ͘dŚĞĨŝŶĂů
ůŝŶŬƵƉŽĨƚŚĞμπξͬνŚŝŐŚǁĂǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŶŽǁŵĂŝŶĂĐĐĞƐƐĂůŽŶŐ
ƚŚĞρρͬμŚŝŐŚǁĂǇĂŶĚƌĂŝůůŝŶĞǁĞƐƚŽĨ^ŝŐƵůĚĂǁŽƵůĚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ
ƐĞŝǌƵƌĞŽĨǇĞƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌďƌŝĚŐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂZŝǀĞƌ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞ
λκπͿ͘
3κρ
Figure 105: ,ŝŐŚǁĂǇμπξͬν
WĂƐƐĞƐŽǀĞƌƐĞǀĞƌĂůƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů
ĂƌƌŝĞƌƐĂƐŝƚŵŽǀĞƐƐŽƵƚŚǁĞƐƚĨƌŽŵ^ƚĞŶēŝZţŐĂ͘dŚĞ
ƉŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚƚŽƚŚĞůĞĨƚŝƐƚŚĞ
ƐǁĂŵƉǇƚĞƌƌĂŝŶůŽŶŐƚŚĞ>ţēƵƉĞ
ŶĞĂƌWůĈĐŝƐ͖ƚŚĞƵƉƉĞƌůĞĨƚŝƐƚŚĞ
ďƌŝĚŐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ<ƌąēƵƉĞ͖ĂďŽǀĞ
ŝƐƚŚĞŚŝŐŚǁĂǇĂƐŝƚƉĂƐƐĞƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ
DĞůůƵƉĞ͘ůůŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƐƚƌĞĂŵƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŶĂƚƵƌĂůďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞ
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚƚŽĚĞůĂǇĂĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƚŚĞŵƚŽĞǆƉĞŶĚĨƵĞů͘
Figure 106: μπξͬν ďƌŝĚŐe ŽǀĞƌ 'ƵĂũĂ ZŝǀĞƌ ũŽŝŶŝŶŐ that ŚŝŐŚǁĂǇ
ǁŝƚŚ the ρρͬμ ;ĂƐ seen ĨƌŽŵ the ůĞĨƚ ďĂŶŬͿ͘
νκς
The Daugavpils – Rţga Operational Direction
In a scenario contingent where Latgale has been secured by so-called
pro-Russian forces, Russian forces can attempt to flank the defenders of
ZţŐĂ by advancing down the Daugavpils River on both the right (north)
and left (south) bank.
Although the rail line that parallels the Daugavpils River runs along the
north side of the river, a spur line crosses the river downstream
(northwĞƐƚͿŽĨ:ĤŬĂďƉŝůƐ (See Figure 107), running to Jelgava, where yet
another line runs north to ZţŐĂ.
ǀĞŶďĞĨŽƌĞ:ĤŬĂďƉŝůƐ͕ƚŚĞĂǆŝƐĐĂŶbe ďůŽĐŬĞĚĂƚ>ţǀĈƉŝĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞƵďŶĂ
River. dŚĞĐŝƚǇŽĨ>ţǀĈƉŝŚĂƐ three bridges: 1) the E22/A6 highway bridge
(See Figure 108); a rail bridge (See Figure 109) and a pedestrian bridge
(See Figure 110Ϳ͘dŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĞƌƐŽĨ>ţǀĈƉŝ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ŵƵƐƚƌĞŵĂŝŶ
sensitive to the possibility of being outflanked by Russian forces moving
ĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞZĤǌĞŬŶĞ-:ĤŬĂďƉŝůƐĂǆŝƐ͘dŚĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ>ţǀĈƉŝĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǁest
also provides some opportunity to use the Dubna (See Figure 111) and its
tributary Oša (See Figures 112 and 113) to delay an advance by ground
forces.
ĨƚĞƌ>ţǀĈƉŝ͕:ĤŬĂďƉŝůƐĂŶĐŚŽƌƐƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽŶƚŚĞKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůǆŝƐĂůong
the Daugavpils River toward ZţŐĂ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞƐλλξĂŶĚλλο). To the
north-ǁĞƐƚŽĨ:ĤŬĂďƉŝůƐ͕ƚŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ Aiviekste River (See
Figures 116 and 117) and the P37 Highway connecting Plavinas, Madona,
and Gulbenes form a natural barrier that would funnel Russian forces
over a limited number of roads (See Figure 118). Furthermore,
ĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇƚǁĞŶƚǇƚŽƚŚŝƌƚǇŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƚŽƚŚĞǁĞƐƚ, a second
line of natural defensive positions could be established from Plavinas to
"ƌŐůƵ;&ŝŐƵƌĞ 119) to Vecpiebalga to Jaunpiebalga to the P27 highway
connecting Gulbene with Smiltene.
&ƌŽŵ"ƌŐůƵƚŽŶŽƌƚŚŽĨsĞĐƉŝĞďĂůŐĂƚǁŽůŝŶĞƐŽĨůĂŬĞƐĐĂŶĂůŝǌĞeast-west
transit (See Figure 122), and even the main north-south Route P33
connecting the two cities offers a number of opportunities to create
obstacles by taking down bridgĞƐŽǀĞƌƐƚƌĞĂŵƐ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞƐλμν͕λμξ͕ĂŶĚ
λμο). Even north of Vecpiebalga, as Route P33 makes its way to
309
Jaunpiebalga features evident of the difficulty of off-road trafficability
are abundant (See Figure 126). At Jaunpiebalga, one encounters the
Gauja River (See Figures 127 and 128) that forms a major barrier
throughout the north of Latvia (See Figures 129, 130, and 131).
Should this second defensive line from Latgale be breached, Latvian

forces defending on the Main Pskov-ZţŐĂ KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůǆŝƐǁŽƵůĚďĞ
outflanked and the roads to ZţŐĂ from Latgale would need to be
destroyed to slow the Russian rate of advance on ZţŐĂ itself.
Figure 107: ZĂŝůƐƉƵƌďƌŝĚŐĞŽǀĞƌμμͬπĨƌŽŵ:ĤŬĂďƉŝůƐƚŽ:ĞůŐĂǀĂ

before crossing Daugava River.
Figure 108: dŚĞπ,ŝŐŚǁĂǇƌŝĚŐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƵďŶĂZŝǀĞƌĂƚ>ţǀĈƉŝ͕

looking up river from the Daugavpils River.
310
Figure 109: The railďƌŝĚŐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƵďŶĂZŝǀĞƌĂƚ>ţǀĈŶŝ͕ĂƐseen from
the E22/A6 Highway Bridge and looking upriver from the Daugavpils
River.
Figure 110: A pedestrian bridge over the DubŶĂZŝǀĞƌĂƚ>ţǀĈŶŝůŽŽŬŝŶŐ

downriver toward the Daugavpils River. This photograph gives an
indication of the terrain which, at a minimum, would require tracked
vehicles to cross in the absence of bridging.
311
Figure 111: :ƵƐƚǁĞƐƚŽĨZŽǎƵƉĞ͕ƚŚĞμμͬλμŚŝŐŚǁĂǇĨƌŽŵWƌĞŝůŝƚŽ
>ţǀĈƉŝĐƌŽƐƐĞƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƵďŶĂZŝǀĞƌ͕ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂŶŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽĨŽƌĐĞ
an opponent to pause and look for crossing points suited to particular
types of vehicles. This would offer the defense a window to bring fires
upon halted forces.
Figure 112: Bridge over Oša looking west; the stream itself is not
intimidating.
312
Figure 113: While the banks of the Oša might present an obstacle to
some wheeled vehicles, the stream should pose no challenge to tracked
vehicles.
Figure 114: Daugavpils – ZţŐĂKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ͘
313
Figure 115: The E22/A6 Highway Bridge over the Daugava River at
:ĤŬĂďƉŝůƐ͘WŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚƚĂŬĞŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚ;ŶŽƌƚŚͿďĂŶŬŽĨƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌ͕
looking south-east toward Daugavpils City.
Figure 116: The E22/A6 Highway over the Aiviekste River as seen from
the right bank of the river. The Aiviekste runs into the Daugava River
east of Plavinas and can serve as a defensive barrier in front of the city.
νλξ
Figure 117: This photograph of the rail bridge over the Aiviekste River
(looking upriver and taken from the E22/A6 bridge over the same river)
provides a good idea of the barrier that the river could constitute if
adequate preparations were put in place.
Figure 118: Possible tactical axes of advance, looking westward from

Latgale.
315
Figure 119: The bridge over the Ogre ZŝǀĞƌĂƚ"ƌŐůŝŝƐĂŵĂũŽƌĐŚŽŬĞpoint
to advancing west from Latgale toward ZţŐĂ. Without engineering
support, the steep banks make getting down to the river and back up on
ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐŝĚĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĨŽƌĂůůƚǇƉĞƐŽĨǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ͘tĞƐƚŽĨ"ƌŐůŝŽŶZŽƵƚĞ
P4, there are two additional stream crossings that could be employed to
force delays in a Russian advance toward ZţŐĂ from Latgale (See Figures
120 and 121).
Figure 120: Fewer than seven mileƐǁĞƐƚŽĨ"ƌŐůŝŽŶZŽƵƚĞWϰƚŚĞ

ŵĂƌƐŚǇƚĞƌƌĂŝŶĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞsŝŵďƵƉţƚĞoffers an ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽƐƚƌŝŬĞ
ĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƐƚŚĞy slow down to cross the stream.
316
Figure 121: Approximately sŝǆƚĞĞŶŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐǁĞƐƚŽĨ"ƌŐůŝ͕ƚŚĞ>ţēƵƉĞ
would provide a much greater barrier if the Route P4 bridge over the
stream is destroyed.
Figure 122: Looking north-west, lakes canalize east-west traffic

ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ"ƌŐůƵĂŶĚsĞĐƉŝĞďĂůŐĂ͘
317
Figure 123: About ƐĞǀĞŶŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐŶŽƌƚŚŽĨ"ƌŐůŝ͕ZŽƵƚĞWννĐƌŽƐƐĞƐ
ƚŚĞƐŵĂůůƐƚƌĞĂŵsĂůŽůĂŝŶĂŶĂƐƚǇďŝƚŽĨƚĞƌƌĂŝŶŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐďŽŐŐǇďĂŶŬƐ
and steep slope down to and up from the stream.
Figure 124: ZŽƵƚĞννĐƌŽƐƐĞƐƚŚĞ^ĈƌƚƵƉţƚĞĂďŽƵƚƚĞŶŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐŶŽƌƚŚ

ŽĨ"ƌŐůŝ͘dhis stream has the “channel through a swamp” appearance
that even tracked vehicles would be wise to avoid.
318
Figure 125: The P33 bridge doesn’t look like it would carry too much
weight over the Orge River near Cirsti. The banks of the river are soft
and marshy, making fording by any vehicles difficult.
Figure 126: dŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶĚƌĂŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞƐƚƌĞĂŵdƵůŝũĂĂďŽƵƚĨŝǀĞ

kilometers north-ĞĂƐƚŽĨsĞĐƉŝĞďĂůŐĂ͘
319
Figure 127: dŚĞZŽƵƚĞWμσďƌŝĚŐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂZŝǀĞƌĂƚ:ĂƵŶƉŝĞďĂůŐĂ
is one of two bridges in ƚŚĞĐŝƚǇďǇǁŚŝĐŚƚŽĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂĂŶĚŵŽǀĞŝŶ
the direction of the E77/A2 axis.
Figure 128: dŚĞŽůĚĐŝƚǇďƌŝĚŐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂZŝǀĞƌĂƚ:ĂƵŶƉƉŝĞďĂůŐĂŝƐ

not capable of taking a significant amount of heavy traffic. The banks of
ƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂƉŽƐĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂnt challenges to ease of entry and exit from the
river itself.
320
Figure 129: dŚĞďƌŝĚŐĞĂƚ'ĂƵũĂƌĤǀĞůŝŝƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚƌĞĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂ
ZŝǀĞƌ;ĂƐƐĞĞŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞůĞĨƚŶŽƌƚŚďĂŶŬͿďĞƚǁĞĞŶ:ƵŶƉŝĞďĂůŐĂĂŶĚƚŚĞ
Wμρ,ŝŐŚǁĂǇ͘
Figure 130: dŚĞ'ĂƵũĂZŝǀĞƌŶĞĂƌZĤǀĞů.
321
Figure 131: ǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞ'ĂƵũĂZŝǀĞƌƚĂŬĞŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞWμρďƌŝĚŐĞǁŚŝĐŚ
ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƉŽƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌĂŶĚŝƚƐďĂŶŬƐ͘
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ŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞƐλνμ͕λννĂŶĚλνξͿ
322
Figure 132: dŚĞWĂůƐĂ͕ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŶŽƚĂŵĂũŽƌǁĂƚĞƌďĂƌƌŝĞƌ͕ƉƌŽďĂďůǇ
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Figure 133: dŚĞaĞƉŬĂŝƐŵŽƌĞŽĨĂŶŝŶĐŽŶǀĞŶŝĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚĂďĂƌƌŝĞƌ͕

ƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚǁŽƵůĚƐůŽǁƚŚĞĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŽĨŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘
323
Figure 134: dŚĞZĂƵǌĂŝƐǇĞƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŽĨƚŚŽƐĞ͞ŝŶĐŽŶǀĞŶŝĞŶĐĞƐ͟ that
ĐŽƵůĚďĞƵƐĞĚƚŽƐůŽǁƚŚĞĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŽĨĂŶŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞ͕ŵĂŬĞƚŚĞŵ
ĚĞƉůŽǇĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨŵŽƐƚǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐĂŶĚ͕ƚŚĞƌĞďǇ͕ŽĨĨĞƌĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ
ĂŶĚĂŝƌƉŽǁĞƌůƵĐƌĂƚŝǀĞƚĂƌŐĞƚƐŝĨĐĂƵŐŚƚŝŶƚŚĞŵŝĚĚůĞŽĨŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ͘
dŽƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚ͕ĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞĂƵŐĂǀƉŝůƐZŝǀĞƌ͕ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ,ŝŐŚǁĂǇ
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>ĂƚǀŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƌĞƉƵƚƚŝŶŐƵƉƚŽŽŵƵĐŚƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ͕ƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚĚĞƐƚƌŽǇ
ƚŚĞƐĞĚĂŵƐĂŶĚĨůŽŽĚZţŐĂŝŶĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽďƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŽ
ƐƵďŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ͘dŚĞƌŽĂĚƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƐĞĚĂŵƐĂƌĞĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
ƐŽƵƚŚƚŽŶŽƌƚŚƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĞĚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĞĚ͘
νμξ
Figure 135: ƚ<ŽŬŶĞƐĞ͕ĨŝĨƚǇŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐďǇƌŽĂĚǁĞƐƚŽĨ:ĤŬĂďƉŝůƐĂŶĚ
thirty kilometers west of Plavinas, a new high-ƐƉĞĞĚŚŝŐŚǁĂǇŚĂƐďĞĞŶ
constructed north of the Daugava River axis avoiding much of the
congestion that would ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞŝŶŚŝďŝƚƌĂƉŝĚŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƚŽǁĂƌĚ ZţŐĂ͘
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Three subsequent river-ĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐƐǁŽƵůĚŽĨĨĞƌŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐƚŽĨŽƌĐĞ
ĚĞůĂǇƐƚŽĂŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƵƉŽŶZţŐĂĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞĂƵŐĂǀƉŝůƐ– ZţŐĂKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů
Direction (See Figures 136, 137, 138).
Figure 136: P80 Bridge over the Lobe River.
νμο
Figure 137: P80 Bridge over the Ogre River.
Figure 138: P80 Bridge over the Aviekste River.
326
Figure 139: Aizkraukle Dam, which carries Route P87 over the top.
Figure 140: Kegums Dam, which carries Route P8 over the top.
327
Figure 141: Lake-side view of road over Kegums Dam.
Figure 142: The dĂŵĂƚ^ĂůĂƐƉŝů͕ŽŶƚŚĞŽƵƚƐŬŝƌƚƐŽĨZţŐĂ, which carries a

road across the Daugava.
328
The Vilnius-<ĂƵŶĂƐǆŝƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ƵǁĂųŬŝ'ĂƉ
The potential operational direction of Vilnius-Kaunas which straddles

the main east-west road and rail route to Kaliningrad, would constitute
an extremely high risk operation. Given that Vilnius is the current
Lithuanian capital and Kaunas was the pre-Soviet Occupation capital of
Lithuania, it is unlikely that the Lithuanians would declare the two cities
as “open” to avoid them becoming active combat zones. Fortified, the
two cities would most certainly be able to hold out for longer than the
ten days of energy supply in Kaliningrad, thereby denying Moscow its
most likely purpose for launching an invasion of Lithuania. As
mentioned earlier, from Vilnius south to the border with Poland, the
terrain constitutes a forested barrier penetrated by few roads (See
Figure 143), and backed by numerous water barriers once the terrain
does open up. This particular terrain feature of forests backed by water
barriers continues into eastern Poland south for nearly 100 kilometers
Figure 143: Even in the forests along the Lithuanian border with
Belarus, rivers constitute an additional complexity to movement. This
photograph is of the Nemunas River at Druskininkai, near where the
Lithuanian, Polish, and Belarus border meet. Photo taken from the right
bank, just west of the city.
329
ƚŽŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ͘dŚĞŝƚǇŽĨ^ƵǁĂųŬŝ͕ůǇŝŶŐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶοκŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐǁĞƐƚŽĨ
the Belarus border behind challenging terrain, when considering the
consequences of provoking a direct conflict with Poland, therefore, is an
unlikely objective. The limited transportation network connecting the
Baltic States with the remainder of NATO that runs through the so-called
^ƵǁĂųŬŝ'ĂƉ͕ďĞŝŶŐŽŶůǇλκκ kilometers (60 miles) wide, however, would
leave logistics flowing north from Poland vulnerable to fires (See Figure
144).
Figure 144: The city of ^ƵǁĂųŬŝĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƌŽĂĚĂŶĚƌĂŝůŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŽĨ

north-east Poland. Heavily forested terrain and significant water-
ďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐůŝĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ^ƵǁĂųŬŝ and the Belarus border. This challenging
terrain also provides the opportunity of defending against the Russians
doing an “end run” of the Lithuanian-Belarus border. Further to the
south, the same challenges would allow for the Poles to offer a stiff
defense of Augustow.
330
Strategic Offensive War-Termination Operation
There are indications that the Russian General Staff understands
that it cannot defeat NATO in the classic terms of destroying the
armed forces of the NATO alliance and subjugation of its
members to occupation. The General Staff’s task, therefore,
must be to, first of all, not lose a war with NATO such that
regime change can be imposed upon Moscow. Secondly, the
General Staff is motivated to compel NATO and any of its
cobelligerent states to enter into negotiations on terms
favorable to Russia.
Whereas the Federal Republic of Germany was the center of
gravity (COG) for conflict in the central region during the Soviet
era, the new COG is Poland. If Poland could be forced from the
NATO alliance during any conflict in the region today, Russia
could hope to escape defeat and, perhaps find victory. Without
Poland, the Baltic States cannot be held, and failure to
successfully defend the Baltic States would likely mark the end
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The challenge for the
Russian General Staff is how to plan a strategic offensive
operation that would neutralize Poland.
Applying Russian General Staff planning norms to the geography
of the region, it becomes possible to identify two additional
operational axes of advance within the Western Strategic
Direction of the European TVD and speculate on how a Russian
strategic offensive operation might be conducted (See Figure
145).
331
Figure 145: Although a risky operation given the current balance
of forces between Russia and NATO, encirclement is the
traditional operation of preference for the General Staff. So-
called battles of penetration that usually amount to a twenty-
four hour operation and involve moving as deep as 50 kilometers
into an enemy’s defensive depth, are expensive – usually costing
up to one-half of all losses suffered in the encirclement
operation. The goal is to fight only one battle of penetration and
destroy the defending force before it can withdraw to reestablish
a new defensive line.
332
Given the Muscovites’ historical propensity for encirclement
operations, it is possible to anticipate how such an operation
might be planned by the Russian General Staff should a sizable
portion of the Polish ground forces successfully be diverted to
southwest Lithuania and northwest Poland.
If one divides contemporary Poland into geographic quadrants
along a general north to south line from 'ĚĂŷƐŬ to >ſĚǍ and
along a general west to east line from Poznaŷ to Warszawa
(Warsaw) — the tŝƐųĂ (Vistula) and Bug Rivers form barriers that
could serve as secure shoulders for operational arms of
encirclement south from Kaliningrad and west from Belarus. The
convergence of the two rivers twenty kilometers to the north of
Warsaw means that the Polish capital would be outside occupied
territory, but within the range of Russian artillery. Holding a
substantial portion of Polish ground forces and the nation’s
political center hostage would substantially improve Moscow’s
negotiating position in terminating the conflict on favorable
terms.
The Western (Vistula) Arm of Encirclement
On the Vistula arm of the encirclement, the initial operational
objective would involve the cities of Elblag and Olsztyn and the
barrier between the two cities formed by the S7/E77 highway,
the Elblaski Kanal, and the numerous small lakes that run to
within fifteen kilometers of the Vistula itself. To the north of this
natural defensive terrain, the Poles have garrisoned forces at
Bartoszyce and Braniewo, the headquarters of which would be
immediate tactical objectives in any Russian offensive since they
are fewer than 10 kilometers from the Kaliningrad border. (See
Figure 146)
333
Figure 146: The Poles have garrisoned forces at Braniewo and
Bartoszyce along the border of Kaliningrad Oblast, where their
barracks and equipment are in range of Russian artillery.
Braniewo and Bartoszyce both lie on small streams that would
constitute no more than tactical obstacles (See Figures 147 and
148). The Elblaski Kanal and the numerous small lakes between
Elblag and Olsztyn are the only operational-scale defensive line
between the Kaliningrad border and the Vistula River. North of
this line the terrain alternates between open and broken (See
Figures 149 and 150).
The subsequent tactical objective would likely be the Nogat River

line between the Baltic Coast and the Vistula River, and from that
point south along the Vistula to Bydgoszcz, which will be
necessary to protect the subsequent operational rear of Russian
forces advancing in a southeasterly direction toward Warsaw.
The tactical objectives on this immediate operational axis of
334
Figure 147: The city of Braniewo, with its population of 18,000
lies on the WĂƐųħŬĂ River about 5 kilometers from the Vistula
Lagoon, about 35 kilometers northeast of Elblag, 55 kilometers
southwest of Kaliningrad City, and only six kilometers from the
border with Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast.
Figure 148: As can be seen from the above photo, the BǇŶĂ River
at Bartoszyce – with a population of more than 25,000 – poses
no particular difficulty as even a tactical-scale barrier.
335
Figure 149: Broken terrain north of Dobre Miastro,
approximately halfway between the Kaliningrad border and
Olsztyn.
Figure 150: Open terrain approximately twenty kilometers north

of Olsztyn.
advance would include six bridges so as to prevent counterattack

from Polish or other NATO forces from the West. The terrain
between the Nogat and Vistula Rivers consists of rivers, canals,
and swampy terrain that could become a “sink-hole” for troops
sorely needed elsewhere, so for the Russians there is little need
to accomplish more than control the Route 7 and Route 22
bridges and the ferry over the Nogat.
336
While the Route 7 bridge over the Nogat (See Figure 151) could
be destroyed easily, the three bridges (road, rail and pedestrian)
located at Malbork present a more challenging task because the
city lies on the right bank, thereby making the bridges easier to
protect by defending forces (See Figure 152). This is not to
preclude that the attacker wouldn’t seek to neutralize the Route
7 (See Figure 153) and Route 22 bridges (See Figue 154) and ferry
(See Figure 155) over the Vistula River. It is simply important to
understand that doing so would be unnecessary and pose a drain
on limited resources.
Figure 151: Route 7 between Elblag and 'ĚĂŷƐŬ over the Nogat
River, ten kilometers west of Elblag.
337
Figure 152: The three bridges over the Nogat River at Malbork
include a road (lower left), a pedestrian bridge (seen in front of
the rail bridge on the lower right), and a rail bridge (seen in the
upper photograph). It is important to note that the three bridges
over the Nogat which runs along the West side of the city, are
especially defensible because the old Tutonic castle in the city
could be turned into a fortress from which to defend the bridges.
Thus, Malbork constitutes a potential bridgehead from which
Polish or NATO forces could launch a counterattack deep in the
rear of the Vistula arm of encirclement. As a result, Malbork
must be captured or destroyed for a Russian encirclement
operation to be successful.
338
Figure 153: The Route 7 bridge between Elblag and 'ĚĂŷƐŬ over
the Vistula River.
Figure 154: The Vistula River is not particularly wide where

Route 22 crosses over it, but it has an enormous floodplain that
could make the river impassable without the bridge.
339
Figure 155: The ferry at the mouth of the Vistula ferries vehicles
both across the river, as well as to and from the city of 'ĚĂŷƐŬ͘
South of the confluence of the Nogat with the Vistula, the

Russians would have to seize, or at least destroy, four crossing
points over the Vistula before the river turns eastward toward
Warsaw – at Kwidzyn (See Figure 156), Grudziadz (See Figure
157), Chelmno (See Figure 158), and at Bydgoszcz (See Figure
159). Only Grudziadz “shields” its bridge over the Vistula from an
attack from East. However, since the city of Bydgoszcz would not
be a critical objective, this tactical axes wouldn’t require
extensive forces. Once the prepared West-East crossing points
have been secured, not only the river lines themselves, but the
North-South E75/A1 highway would constitute a contributing
obstacle to mounting a West to East assault against the
Vistula/Nogat river line.
340
Figure 156: Route 90 bridge over the Vistula River
approximately eight kilometers West of Kwidzyn.
Figure 157: Road and rail bridge over the Vistula River at
Grudziadz.
341
Figure 158: Route 91 bridge over the Vistula River three
kilometers West of Chelmno.
Figure 159: This bridge across the Vistula River into Bydgoszcz
would the final objective on this tactical axis designed to secure
the right flank of the Vistula Operational Axis.
342
Once the western flank of the axis of advance is secured, the
subsequent operational objective would be the bridges over the
Narev River. As Russian ground forces advance south-east from
a line approximating Route 16 between Grudziadz and Ostróda,
the right flank of the offensive will have to be secured by seizure
of the bridges over the Vistula River. This would require not less
than four tactical operations to seize Vistula river crossings along
the subsequent operational axis of advance on this operational
direction.
The first of these tactical axis, directed at dŽƌƵŷ, poses a
particularly difficult challenge for a Russian operation because,
except for the E75/A1 highway bridge over the Vistula that
crosses the river southeast of dŽƌƵŷ͕ the other three bridges over
the Vistula lay between the city and the river (See Figures 160-
163). This means that unless the bridges are seized with air-
mobile forces in envelopment, the city itself can be used to
defend the bridges. Leaving the bridges in the control of Polish
forces would mean providing a bridgehead for a counterattack
into the flank and rear of Russian forces that would be ever more
extended as the Russian offensive moves further Eastward
toward Warsaw. Thus, not capturing dŽƌƵŷ might well require
more forces to secure against a breakout by NATO forces from
the city and a counterattack against Russian forces than would
be required to fight into the city.
Figure 160: Western-most bridge in Torun city; photo taken from

right bank, looking west.
343
Figure 161: Rail bridge in Torun city; phototaken from right
bank, looking east.
Figure 162: Newest road bridge in Torun (population of

200,000), is the eastern-most bridge within the city.
344
Figure 163: The E75/A1 highway bridge is not screened from the
north by the city of dŽƌƵŷ itself and, as a result, might have to
be taken down to prevent a crossing by Russian forces that
could threaten to encircle the city.
The second tactical axis, directed against WųŽĐųĂǁĞŬ͕ would be

difficult to defend because the city is on the left bank of the river
which is significantly lower than is the right bank of the Vistula.
Furthermore, the approaches to the bridge (See Figure 164) and
over the dam on the Vistula at tųŽĐųawek (See Figure 165) are
not particularly heavily forested terrain.
345
Figure 164: The city of tųŽĐųĂǁĞŬ as seen from the right bank
(north side) of the Vistula River.
Figure 165: The dam (with road across the top) just east of and
upriver from tųŽĐųĂǁĞŬ as seen from the left bank (south side)
of the Vistula River. The woods that can be seen on the far side
of the river in this photograph quickly gives way to open terrain.
346
The third tactical axis would be directed against WųŽĐŬ͕ and much
like at dŽƌƵŷ͕ the city itself can be turned into a bulwark in
defense of the three bridges (note that rail and road beds transit
across the same span) over the Vistula. Leaving WųŽĐŬ in the
hands of Polish forces would be even more dangerous than
leaving dŽƌƵŷ in their control because of the extended lines of
communication of a Russian advance at that point in the
operation. Having secured the three bridges over the Vistula
behind the city itself, Allied forces would have rail and road
infrastructure to rapidly move forces and ammunition in support
of a counterattack against the right flank of the Russian
operational axis. The city and its bridges would be a major
Russian objective in any attempt to encircle Polish forces in the
northwestern quadrant of the country and bring pressure on
Warsaw to withdraw from the Alliance. Should the Poles be able
to hold WųŽĐŬ and its bridges, there is little in the way of tactical
barriers upon which Russian forces could organize a line of
defense for the right flank of its advance toward the Narev River
bridges (See Figures 166 and 167).
The fourth tactical axis is focused in the direction of Warsaw. It
would have to cover a frontage of some 60-70 kilometers in
order to seize the bridges over the Vistula between Wyszgrod
and the confluence of the Narew and Bug Rivers. The Russian
General Staff might view this access as relatively easy because of
an expectation that Polish forces would assume a defensive
posture in front of the capital but behind the Vistula-Bug river
line.
While the four tactical axes described above would secure the
flank of the operation, the operation itself would not be directed
at capturing Warsaw. The goal of this arm of the operation
would be to close the encirclement on the Narew River. In
addition to the bridge over the Narew River near its confluence
347
Figure 166: Built-up areas of WųŽĐŬ could be employed in the
defense of the two spans (one carrying both road and rail) over
the Vistula. Note the open farmland to the north and east of the
city, which would provide ample opportunity for conducting a
counter-offensive from the city.
Figure 167: This photograph provides a useful perspective on

how much higher the terrain is on the north side (right bank on
left in this photograph) at WųŽĐŬ͘ The city has a population of
more than 125,000.
348
with the Bug River, seizing bridges at WƵųƚƵƐŬ and ZſǏĂŶ probably
would be objectives for the forces of this arm of the
encirclement (See Figure 168). The bridges further up-river
would most likely be assigned to be seized from the forces
operating on the Bug River arm of encirclement (See Figure 169).
Figure 168: From upper left to upper right to lower right, and
moving from south to north up the Narew River.
349
Figure 169: Bridges over the Narew River at KƐƚƌŽųħŬĂ͘ The
photographs of both the new (left) and old (right) bridges provide an
accurate impression of the challenges of a forced river crossing
presented by the swampy ďĂŶŬƐ of the Narew ZŝǀĞƌ͘
The Eastern (Bug) Arm of Encirclement

ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ would be the initial operational objective for the eastern arm
of ĞŶĐŝƌĐůĞŵĞŶƚ͘ While the city itself only lies slightly deeper than the
50-ŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌ depth of the tactical zone of engagement, the city
dominates this ĂǆŝƐ͘
There are only three main axes within the tactical zone (See Figue 170):
1) Route 19 between Hrodna and ŝĂųyƐƚŽŬ͖ 2) Route 65, which is the
shortest route between the Belarus border and ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ͖ and 3) Routes
66 and 19 from the direction of ƌĞƐƚ͘ On the northern-most route,
open terrain along the rail line from Belarus ŵĂŬĞƐ a movement to the
south toward ^ŽŬſůŬĂ relatively easy, with only a single small stream to
ĐƌŽƐƐ͘ The relatively open terrain on the approach to SŽŬſůŬĂ directly
from the East provides maneuver room to a depth of about 20
ŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐ from the Belarus border (See Figure 172Ϳ͘ Furthermore, the
stretch of the first ten ŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐ southwest from ^ŽŬſůŬĂ toward
ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ consists of rolling terrain interspersed with the occasional
350
wooded area (See Figure 173Ϳ͘ However, for the next twenty ŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐ͕
the terrain toward ^ŽŬſůŬĂ is heavily wooded and swampy, ŵĂŬŝŶŐ off-
road maneuver ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ͘
The route directly west from Belarus toward ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ has to traverse
wooded terrain that would be relatively easy to defend with troops
familiar with it͘ Either way – from the northwest or west – as one
moves closer to ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ͕ the terrain gets more wooded and
occasionally swampy complicating off-road maneuvering (See Figure
174Ϳ͘
Figure 170: ŝĂůǇƐƚŽŬ is a critical rail junction (See Figure 171) controlling
rail movement in six directions: in three directions from the east as well
as in three directions further into the depth of WŽůĂŶĚ͘ Should the
^ŽŬſůŬĂ (population of nearly 19,000 of which a sizable minority are
Tatars) railyard be captured by the Russians, it would undoubtedly serve
as a logistical hub for the entire Bug River operational arm of
ĞŶĐŝƌĐůĞŵĞŶƚ͘
351
Figure 171: Three rail lines run between Belarus and Warsaw via
ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ͘ Photograph ůŽŽŬƐ eastward toward ĞůĂƌƵƐ͘
Figure 172: This photograph is representative of the terrain moving

south from ^ŽŬſůŬĂ͘ It is forested to the West and more open to the
ĂƐƚ͘
352
Figure 173: Rolling terrain southwest from ^ŽŬſůŬĂ͕ ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ toward
ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ͘
Figure 174: Forests and swampy terrain shield ŝĂųƐƚŽŬ from every
direction, except from the southern approach (from the direction of
Brest), but even the southern approach has to cross the Narew River͘
An ĂƚƚĂĐŬ from the direction of Brest, Belarus, would easily be the most
threatening to the defense of ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ because this axis would contain
parallel high-speed road and rail transit, and would come at the city
from the most open terrain (See Figures 174 and 175Ϳ͘ To fix the
defenders at ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ͕ the General Staff would most ůŝŬĞůǇ attempt to
capture the Narew River line and isolate the defenders in the city (See
353
Figure 177)͘ Once encircled, the defenders at ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ would face
significant challenges because the terrain West from the city does not
favor rapid movement that would facilitate ǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů͘ South and west
of the Narew the terrain is more open for a rapid advance westward͘
Figure 175: The terrain from Brest, Belarus is much more open than the
swampy and forested lands laying along the Belarusian border west of
ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ͘ Just ůŝŬĞ the two more northerly axes, the southern axis
enjoys both road and rail to support movement into the depth of Polish
ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐ͘
354
Figure 176: While the terrain toward ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ from Brest is more open,
it remains low and appears to be subject to occational ĨůŽŽĚŝŶŐ͘
Figure 177: The Narew River

drains the swamps that run
along the Polish-Nelarus
ďŽƌĚĞƌ͘ The lowand swampy
terrain depicted in these
photographs were observed
in June 2015, after what was
considered a very dry ǁŝŶƚĞƌ͘
355
Figure 178: The advance westward to a ůŝŶŬ-up with the Russian forces
moving eastward in the direction of Warsaw would cut across relatively
open ƚĞƌƌĂŝŶŐ͘
Behind ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ͕ the city of KƐƚƌſǁ DĂǌŽǁŝĞĐŬĂ would be ŬĞǇ to

preventing the encirclement from being closed (See Figure 178)͘ If
Russian forces gain control of KƐƚƌſǁ DĂǌŽǁŝĞĐŬĂ͕ they would be able
to move in all directions against the Narew river ůŝŶĞ͘ The left ĨůĂŶŬ of
this arm of encirclement would also hedge on seizing and holding the
road bridges over the Bug River – seven of them (See Figures 179-186) –
as well as the one ferry landing and three rail bridges – between the
Belarus border and the confluence of the Bug and Narew Rivers to
protect the forces moving along this operational axis from ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂƚƚĂĐŬ
by Polish forces operating south of the Bug ZŝǀĞƌ͘
356
Figure 179: The first of three bridges needed to secure the rear of
Russian forces ĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶŐ ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ from the ƐŽƵƚŚ͘ Bug River at Zƚ͘ 19,
indicating the difficulty of getting into and out from the marshy ƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ͘
Figure 180: Route 62 crosses the Narew River twice – ŵĂŬŝŶŐ it the
second and the seventh of the seven road bridges on the left ĨůĂŶŬ of
the Russian encirclement ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͘ Although the ďĂŶŬƐ were firm at
this crossing point in June 2015 the height of the ďĂŶŬƐ could pose
prolems with attempts to ford the Bug ZŝǀĞƌ͘
357
Figure 181: Route 63 over the Bug River near Nur, Poland is the third
bridge from the Belrusian border͘ If this bridge is secured by Russia
forces, it would complicate the relief of ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ from the south in a
timely ŵĂŶŶĞƌ͘ Low water level resulting from the dry 2014-15 winter
exposes a very wide flood ƉůĂŝŶ͘
358
Figure 182: Seizing the bridges over the Bug River at ƌŽŬ and
DĂųŬŝŶŝĂ Gorna-dƌĞďůŝŶŬĂ is made easier by the open terrain from
the north-ĞĂƐƚ͘
Figure 183: What ŵĂŬĞƐ the bridge at DĂųŬŝŶŝĂ 'ſƌŶĂ-dƌĞďůŝŶŬĂ Bridge

(Route 677) over the Bug River – the fourth bridge – so critical for the
Russian General Staff is the opportunity to cut the parallel rail line to
E67/Route 8 to ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ͘
359
Figure 184: ƌŽŬ Bridge (Route 50) over the Bug River is the fifth bridge͘
Left photo is swampy terrain on sourth side (left ďĂŶŬͿ͖ Right photo is
right ďĂŶŬ of river as seen from ƌŽŬ͘ Seizing the bridge over the Narew
River at ƌŽŬ not only secures the left ĨůĂŶŬ of the encirclement arm, but
also isolates KƐƚƌſǁ DĂǌŽǁŝĞĐŬĂ from relief from across the left ďĂŶŬ of
the EĂƌĞǁ͘
Figure 185: The sixth bridge over the Bug River is the E67 Bridge East of
tǇƐǌŬſǁ͘ While there is not much in the way of built-up areas around
the bridge, its approach on the left ďĂŶŬ – south side of the river – is
360
nearly impossible͘ Destroying this new highway bridge to the east of
tǇƐǌŬſǁ would be prioritized to preclude rapid movement of Polish
forces north to prevent the closing of encirclement from the ĞĂƐƚ͘
Figure 186: The Route 62 bridge at tǇƐǌŬſǁ͕ the seventh road

bridge over the Bug River (photograph ƚĂŬĞŶ from the right ďĂŶŬ
– west side of river – upon which the city ƐƚĂŶĚƐͿ͘ For the
Russians, this bridge may be of greater interest to capture, if
they assume that the Poles would not counter-ĂƚƚĂĐŬ to avoid
civilian casualties in the ĐŝƚǇ͘ tǇƐǌŬſǁ could provide the
Russians with a fortified point on the riverline that could
facilitate ĂƚƚĂĐŬ on Warsaw from the ŶŽƌƚŚ͘
The Iron Triangle – Holding Warsaw Hostage

Once the operational-strategic encirclement along the Narew
River is closed, only one ƚĂƐŬ would remain – placing the Polish
capital of Warsaw under direct ƐŝĞŐĞ͘
To tighten the political grip on Poland by threatening an armed
assault on Warsaw itself, the Russian General Staff would need
to seize the five bridges (See Figures 187-190) over the Vistula-
Bug riverline running some 20-30 ŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐ to the north of the
city ĐĞŶƚĞƌ͘ This would also place the new Warsaw airport in the
hands of the ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ͘ Closing the operational-strategic
3͸ͳ
encirclement along the Narew River would occupy approximately
one-quarter of Polish territory, hold hostage a sizeable portion of
the Polish Army, and place the Polish capital of Warsaw within
range of Russian ĂƌƚŝůůĞƌǇ͘ If the Russian General Staff had not
yet employed nuclear weapons, this would be the point at which
Russian forces would be stretched so thin as to almost require
Russia to use nuclear weapons in the event Poland refuses to
terminate ŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐ͘
Figure 187 The bridges over the Vistula and Bug Rivers north of
Warsaw clustered, with three (two road and one rail) in the West
and two (one over the top of a dam and one over the reservoir it
creates) in the East.
362
Figure 188: River crossings to tĂƌƐĂǁ͘ Route E77/7 (bottom
and upper right as seen from Route 630 Bridge – on upper left) is
a high-speed access that delivers its traffic directly to the
Warsaw left ďĂŶŬ͘ Route 630 ǁŽƌŬƐ its way south along the
Vistula right ďĂŶŬ͘
Figure 189: The Narew River

ZĞƐĞƌǀŽŝƌĂŵĐĂƌƌŝĞƐZƚ͘πνμ
ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌ͘
363
Figure 190: The causeway over the Bug River Reservoir would
constitute a high-speed axis directly aimed at the Warsaw right
bank.
A Preliminary Operational-Strategic Assessment

Once the initial operational-tactical defenses of ŝĂųǇƐƚŽŬ and the
line between Elblag and Olsztyn have been breached or
bypassed, the natural environment would provide no especially
defensible features within the terrain through which an
encirclement operation in northwest Poland would have to
traverse. Russia, however, would not be able to successfully
underatake such an operational-strategic offensive without using
the territory of Belarus. The Belarus Government has made clear
364
that it will do everything possible to avoid being pulled into a
Putin war with Europe, but that, in the end, Belarus cannot avoid
being with Russia. 1
The Russian Invasion of Poland in 1920
Examining the Bolsheviks effort in 1920 to make Poland the

bridge over which communism would pass to Berlin and points
west, 2 General Mikhail Tukhachevsky perceived a frontal assault
in the Brest – Warsaw Operational Direction as key to fixing
Polish forces in defense of the capital, while an encirclement
operation directed between the Narew and Bug Rivers would
cross the Vistula River from the north and destroy the Polish
Army when attacking from the northwest. While a single Russian
army was to attack Warsaw from the south side of the Bug River,
having its left flank secured by a single corps along the north
bank of the Wieprz River, three Russian armies would capture
the right bank of the Vistula River downstream from Warsaw
ĂŶĚ͕ĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞsŝƐƚƵůĂŶĞĂƌtųŽĐůĂǁĞŬ͕ǁĞƌĞƚŽƐĞŝǌĞtĂƌƐĂǁ
from the northwest. With 24 divisions in four armies under the
command of Tukachevsky, the Bolsheviks intended to duplicate
the 1831 Imperial Russian maneuver of Ivan Paskevich, who had
ĐƌŽƐƐĞĚƚŚĞsŝƐƚƵůĂĂƚdŽƌƵŷĂŶĚƌĞĂĐŚĞĚtĂƌƐĂǁĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǁĞƐƚ
almost unopposed to crush the Poles. The terrain today still
ĨĂǀŽƌƐƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂƌĂƉŝĚĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞƌĦƐƚ–
1 “’Let’s be sincere. Europe cannot replace Russia for us, at least not today. We
understand that in difficult times, we will always be with Russia,’ Belarusian Foreign
Minister Vladimir Makel said in an interview.” Michael Birnbaum, “Belarus president,
‘Europe’s last dictator,’ flirts with the West,” The Washington Post, May 26, 2015, p. A4.
2 General Mikhail Tukhachevsky's order of the day, 2 July 1920 read: "To the West!
Over the corpse of White Poland lies the road to worldwide conflagration. March
on Vilno, Minsk, Warsaw!" and "onward to Berlin over the corpse of Poland!"
365
Warsaw axis, but the Pilica and Wieprz tributaries to the Vistula
south of Warsaw also still constitute significant barriers that
would both support a counterattack against such an attack upon
Warsaw from the east, as well as provide a significant barrier to
any attack upon Warsaw from the south.
In 1920, the German territory of East Prussia to Poland’s north

meant that Tukachevsky planned to isolate the Polish Army from
ďĞŝŶŐƌĞƐƵƉƉůŝĞĚǀŝĂ'ĚĂŷƐŬ– the only port open to shipments of
arms and ammunition – by driving west as far as Grudziadz.
Today, with Russian forces stationed in Kaliningrad Oblast and,
thereby, able to attack Warsaw from the northwest, the attack
from the east only has to traverse half the distance that
Tukachevsky had planned to cover. To keep Polish forces fixed in
front of Warsaw south of the Bug River it is entirely possible that
the Russians might move forces westward along the south side
of the Bug as did Russian General Nikolai Sollohub with the 16th
Army in 1920. If this options was executed, within this Tactical
Direction south of the Bug, one could expect the Russians to
attempt to force the Poles to split their forces along three axes:
λͿƚŚĞůŝŶĞŝĂųĂWŽĚůĂƐŬĂ– Miedzyrzec Podlaski – Siedlce –
Warsaw, more-or-less along the 192κĂǆŝƐ͖μͿƚŚĞůŝŶĞŝĂųĂ
Podlaska – Miedzyrzec Podlaski – BƵŬſǁ– 'ſƌĂ<ĂůǁĂƌŝĂ
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ͖ĂŶĚνͿƚŚĞŝĂųĂWŽĚůĂƐŬĂ– Miedzyrzec Podlaski –
ħďůŝŶ– Kozienice direction. The last point on this Tactical
Direction south of the Bug at which the rail lines of all three
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŵĞĞƚŝƐĂƚBƵŬſǁ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞλσλͿ͕ƐŽŵĞŶŝŶƚǇ
kilometers from the Belarus border.
tŚŝůĞƚŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶŝŶƚŚĞƌĦƐƚ– Warsaw Tactical Direction south

of the Bug River is flat, it also has frequent forested areas that
prohibit dispersal laterally during movement. The first point on
this direction that could create logistical challenges to the
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐŝƐƚŚĞƚŽǁŶŽĨŝĂųĂWŽĚůĂƐŬĂ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƉƌŽďĂďůǇĂĚĂǇ͛Ɛ
366
Figure 191: dƌĂŝŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĞĂƐƚĂƚBƵŬŽǁ͕ŚĞĂĚŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞďƌŝĚŐĞ
over the sŝƐƚƵůĂZŝǀĞƌĂƚħďůŝŶ.
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĞůĂƌƵƐďŽƌĚĞƌĨƌŽŵƌĦƐƚ͘tŚŝůĞƚŚĞĐŝƚǇŽĨ
approximately 60,000 could easily enough be by-passed to both
the north and the south, the critical rail line passes directly
ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ͘ŝĂųĂWŽĚůĂƐŬĂǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞƉĞƌĨĞĐƚƉůĂĐĞĨŽƌ
Polish Territorial Forces to fortify the city and use it to inhibit
logistics support of a Russian attack on Warsaw. Further to the
west on this same northern axis of the three under discussion
here, Siedlce with its population of over 75,000 and yet another
day’s movement away from the Belarus border, could also be
turned into a strong point by Territorial Forces.
The southern-most axis within the Brest – Warsaw Tactical

ŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽƵƚŚŽĨƚŚĞƵŐ͕ZĂĚǌǇŷWŽĚůĂƐŬŝ͕ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚƐ
population of some 16,000 might not suggest that its
infrastructure would be conducive to such a plan, since the city
has a number of institutional buildings that easily be turned into
ĨŽƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞλσμͿŝƚƚŽŽĐŽƵůĚĂůƐŽďĞĐŽŵĞĂŚĂƌĚ
point around which to organize a general defensive plan.
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚZĂĚǌǇŷWŽĚůĂƐŬŝŝƐŶŽƚƐŝƚƚŝŶŐŽŶĂƌĂŝůůŝŶĞ͕ŝƚĚŽĞƐ
dominate a road junction and retaining control of the city would
prevent the Russians from turning it into defensive position
367
during a Polish counterattack. Further south-west on this same
ĂǆŝƐ͕ƚŚĞdǇƑŵŝĞŶŝĐĂZŝǀĞƌ;ĂƚƌŝďƵƚĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞtŝĞƉƌǌZŝǀĞƌͿĂŶĚ
one of its tributaries, the Bystrzyca, create a string of water
ďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐŝŶĨƌŽŶƚŽĨ<ŽĐŬ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞλσνͿ͘ŶŽƚŚĞƌξοŬŝůŽŵĞƚĞƌƐ
ǁĞƐƚǁĂƌĚ͕ƚŚĞĐŝƚǇŽĨħďůŝŶ͕ǁŝƚŚits road and rail bridges over
the Vistula, would be a critical river-ĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚƚŽĨŽƌƚŝĨǇ;^ĞĞ
Figure 194). As was demonstrated during the January 2017
HEGEMON Simulation in Warsaw, however, even if the Russians
ŵĂŶĂŐĞĚƚŽĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞsŝƐƚƵůĂĂƚħďůŝn, turning north to close on
Warsaw from the south would be no easy task. During the
January Simulation, Polish officers managed to defeat Russian
forces at the PIilica River, which is a significant barrier because of
ƚŚĞƐǁĂŵƉǇƚĞƌƌĂŝŶĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌ;êe Figure 195).
Figure 192: ĐŽƵƉůĞŽĨůĂƌŐĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĂƚƐŚŽǁŶŝŶ

ƚŚĞƉŚŽƚŽŐƚĂƉŚĂďŽǀĞŝŶZĂĚǌǇŷWŽĚůĂƐŬŝ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚĂƌŽƵŶĚ
ĐŽƵƌƚǇĂƌĚƐ͕ĂŶĚǁŝƚŚŽƉĞŶĨŝĞůĚƐŽĨĨŝƌĞĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞŵ͕ǁŽƵůĚŽĨĨĞƌ
ĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůĨŽƌĐĞƐĂŶĚĚŝƐŵŽƵŶƚĞĚŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
ĚĞŶǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂƚƚĂĐŬ͘
368
Figure 193: dŚŝƐƉŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚ͕ůŽŽŬŝŶŐŶŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚŽŶZŽƵƚĞϭϵŝŶ
ĨƌŽŶƚŽĨ<ŽĐŬ͕ŐŝǀĞƐĂŶĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇŽĨĂ
ƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨǁĂƚĞƌďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐ ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞǀŝůůĂŐĞŽĨƐŽŵĞϯ͕ϱϬϬ
ƉĞŽƉůĞĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĂůŽŶŐZŽƵƚĞϰϴĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŶŐ<ŽĐŬƚŽħďůŝŶƚŚĂƚ
ǁŽƵůĚŵĂŬĞŽĨĨ-ƌŽĂĚŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐŽŶƚŚŝƐĂǆŝƐ͘
Figure 194: dŚĞZŽƵƚĞϰϴďƌŝĚŐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞsŝƐƚƵůĂZŝǀĞƌĂƚħďůŝŶ͘

dŚĞƌĂŝůďƌŝĚŐĞĂƚħďůŝŶĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶƚŚĞďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ͘
The central axis within the Brest – Warsaw Tactical Direction

ǁŽƵůĚƌŝĚĞƚŚĞďĂĐŬŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚƌĂŝůůŝŶĞǁĞƐƚĨƌŽŵƌĦƐƚ͕
369
ĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞsŝƐƚƵůĂZŝǀĞƌŶĞĂƌ'ſƌĂ<ĂůǁĂƌŝĂǁŝƚŚďŽƚŚƌĂŝůĂŶĚ
ƌŽĂĚďƌŝĚŐĞƐ;^ĞĞ&ŝŐƵƌĞλσπͿ͘dŚĞ ĐŝƚǇŽĨ'ſƌĂ<ĂůǁĂƌŝĂ͕ǁŝƚŚŝƚƐ
population of 11,000 residents, sits high overlooking the western
bank of the Vistula River, providing a dominant defensive
position to oppose a river-crossing from the east.
While it would be foolish to state unequivocally that the Russians

wouldn’t attempt to repeat the what General Sollohub
attempted in 1920 with the 16th Army, the January 2017
HEGEMON Simulation in Warsaw suggested that the result
Figure 195: dŚĞWŝůŝĐĂZŝǀĞƌ͕ĂůĞĨƚ-ďĂŶŬƚƌŝďƵƚĂƌǇŽĨƚŚĞsŝƐƚƵůĂ

ZŝǀĞƌ͕ƉŽƐĞƐĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŝŶĨƌŽŶƚŽĨtĂƌŬĂ͕ĂĐŝƚǇǁŝƚŚ
ĂƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶϭϭ͕ϬϬϬŽŶŚŝŐŚŐƌŽƵŶĚďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞ
ƌŝǀĞƌǁŚĞŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚ͘dŚĞWŝůŝĐĂŚĂƐĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨ
͞ďĂĐŬǁĂƚĞƌƐ͟;ĂƐƐĞĞŶŝŶƚŚŝƐƉŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚͿƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŶŽƚƉĂƌƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĨůŽǁŽĨƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶĂƌŝǀĞƌ͞ĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐ͟
ĚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŶŐĂĨŽƌĐĞŶŽƚŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌ͕ďƵƚŽŶĂ
ƉĞŶŝŶƐƵůĂŽƌĞǀĞŶĂŶŝƐůĂŶĚ͘dŚĞƚĞƌƌĂŝŶĐŽƵůĚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂŵƉůĞ
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇĨŽƌ͞ĚŝƐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŶŐ͟ĂƌŝǀĞƌ-ĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚo a
series of small-ƐĐĂůĞĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐůĞĂǀŝŶŐĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƵŶĂďůĞƚŽŵĂŶĞƵǀĞƌŚŝƐĨŽƌĐĞƐ
ƚŽĂĨĨĞĐƚĂƉƌĞ-ƉůĂŶŶĞĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͘
370
would likely be similar. Again, Moscow doesn’t have sufficient
forces to adequately screen such an attack from counterattack
from the south or, if the Russian force would successfully cross
the Vistula south of Warsaw, close on Warsaw from the south.
Still, such a tactic might be aimed, not at capturing Warsaw, but
drawing off enough Polish forces south of Warsaw as to allow
the forces moving south from Kaliningrad Oblast to control the
bridges over the Vistula River downstream from Warsaw.
Figure 196: dŚĞďƌŝĚŐĞƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞsŝƐƚƵůĂZŝǀĞƌĂƚ'ſƌĂ<ĂůǁĂƌŝĂ͕

ůŽŽŬŝŶŐƵƉ-ƌŝǀĞƌ;ŝ͘Ğ͕͘ůĞĨƚďĂŶŬŝƐŽŶƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐŝĚĞŝŶƚŚĞƉŚŽƚŽ͘
EŽƚĞŚŽǁůŽǁƚŚĞsŝƐƚƵůĂǁĂƐŝŶ:ƵŶĞϮϬϭϳ͘&ŽƌĂůůŝŶƚĞŶƚƐĂŶĚ
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ͕ƚŚĞŝƐůĂŶĚŽǀĞƌǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƌĂŝůďƌŝĚŐĞƉĂƐƐĞƐŽŶƚŚĞůĞĨƚ
ƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚŝƐŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌĂŶŝƐůĂŶĚ͘ƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƚŚĞ
ƉŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚǁĂƐƚĂŬĞŶ͕ƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌďĂƌƌŝĞƌǁĂƐŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌ͕
ďƵƚƚŚĞĨůŽŽĚ-ĐŽŶƚƌŽůĚŝŬĞƐŽŶĞŝƚŚĞƌƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌ͘WŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚ
ƚĂŬĞŶďǇŚĂƌůŝĞ>ŽŶŐǁŝƚŚWŽƚŽŵĂĐ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĚƌŽŶĞ͘
Russian Air Operations
While the Russian General Staff is likely to attempt to suppress

NATO airpower during the first days of the overt employment of
its combat forces, this effort would be very challenging given the
ability of NATO forces to operate air assets away from main
bases.
371
During the Soviet era, its combat potential modelers assessed
that one-half of NATO’s combat potential was air-based. This is
why the Soviets planned to conduct an air operation ;̨̱̹̦̏̔̌́̚
̶̨̛̪̖̬̌́) to prevent NATO’s air power from being a factor
during the initial 3-5 days of a conflict in central Europe. In
anticipation of such an effort, NATO planners should aim to
disperse airpower as well as associated ground support aircraft
and command-and-control.
Survivability and usability of NATO airpower during the first

days of any overt Russian strategic offensive operation would
likely determine the outcome of the conflict. This reality has
motivated the Russian General Staff to not only give thought to
the necessity for increasing the density of ground-based air
defenses in Kaliningrad, but to the important contribution that
could be made by extending air defenses north of Kaliningrad out
into the Baltic Sea. Thus, the defense against possible assault
landings by Russian airborne forces on the Estonian islands of
Saaremaa and Hiiumaa should be accorded a special
consideration.
Although it would probably be “an island too far,” and a low-

probability scenario, the Russian ability to seize and hold the
Swedish island of Gotland – even for a short period of time –
could prove decisive in preventing a timely Western response to
the occupation of the Baltic States and the launching of an
attempt to take Poland out of the conflict.
372

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BALTIC SECURITY

Dr. Phillip A. Petersen

Tartu, January, 2018

Printed by: Ecoprint AS

ISBN 978-9949-88-322-6 (pdf)

^ĞĐŽŶĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ: January 2018

Chapter 1: Assessment at the Operational Level of Opposing Forces….. 1

Summary of Regional Military Assets………………………..…….……….…… 2

States on the Baltic Sea………………………………….…………….…. 3

Relevant Non-Baltic Sea States………………………………….…… 32

Quantitative and Qualitative Weapons Systems……………………………. 40

Logistics and Sustainability………………………….……………………………… 41

The Threat Perspective………………………………………..…………………….. 46

Chapter 2: Operational Assessment…………………………..………………..… 48

Military Doctrine …………….……………………………….………….. 50

The Conceptual Framework Applied……………………………………………. 54

The System of Strategic Leadership……………….………………………….... 57

Post-Soviet Operational-Strategic Planning and Exercises………….…. 63

Ethnic and Religious Divisions………………………………….…... 67

Transformation to Highly Mobile

and Rapidly Reconfigurable Forces………………………………... 78

4th Generation Nuclear Weapons……………………………………. 85

Asymmetries in Opposing Operational Concepts……….….... 90

Snap Exercises…………………..……………………………………….. 115

NATO and Partner Exercises………………….…………………….…………... 116

Information Warfare Scenarios……………………………………………….... 117

Chapter 3: Assessment of the Range of Threat Contingencies…....…….. 122

The Theoretical Development of Russian New Generation Warfare. 132

Asymmetric Warfare……………………………………………….….. 139

Low-Intensity Conflict………………………….…….….…………… 141

6th Generation Warfare…………………………………….………….. 145

Network Centric Warfare………………………………………….…. 146

Reflexive Control…………………………………………….……..….. 149

The Initial Stage of War: Context as the Key…………………………….... 154

Evaluation of the Threat Relative to Local Force Capabilities

and Terrain Limitations……………………………………………………………. 157

Terrain as the Context…………………………………………………. 159

Maneuver by Fires…………………………………….………………… 165

Areas Where US Military Aid is Critical……..…………..…………………… 166

NATO Operations in a Russian Coalitional Warfare Context………… 168

Establishing a Favorable Socio-Economic

and Political Environment………………………………………………………… 170

Special Operations to Misdirect Elites…………………….………………….. 172

Intimidation, Fraud, and Bribery……………………………………………….. 174

Destabilization Operations and

Organization of Militant Opposition…………………………………………… 175

Introduction of Armed Insurgents………………………….………………….. 175

Clandestine Military Intervention……………………………………………… 176

Use of Electronic Warfare and Reconnaissance Assets………………... 177

Overt Military Intervention and Occupation……………..………………… 178

Nuclear Threats…………………………………………………….……………….… 178

Joint vs. Combined-Arms Planning and Operational Approaches.… 180

Joint Operational Approach………………………………………………………. 181

Combined Arms Operational Approach…………………….……………..... 182

Clash of Joint and Combined Arms Operational Approaches……..… 185

Observations from Baltic Campaign Simulations………………………… 186

The Russian Threat…………………………..…………………………. 187

Belarus Threat…………..………………………………………...…….. 188

Baltic Defense……………..……………………………………………… 188

The Contributions Provided by Poland………………………………….……. 189

Tactical Nuclear Weapons…………………………………………………………. 189

Conclusions on the Tactical and

Technological Needs for a Credible Defense…………………..…………… 190

Tactical Needs………………………….…………………………………. 190

^ĞĐŽŶĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ: January 2018

Initial Tactical Axis: Pskov – 5ŋ]HNQH««««««««««. 249

6XEVHTXHQW7DFWLFDO$[LV5ŋ]HNQH– 5ŝJD…………….…..…. 257

The Vilnius – Kaunas AxiVDQGWKH6XZDáNL*DS««««« 329

1ZĞĂĚ͗͘^ůŝǁĂ͕>͘ůĂŬ͕The Suwalki Gap – NATO’S fragile hot spot, dŚĞ^ĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐYƵĂƌƚĞƌůǇEŽμ

Defence of the Baltics, ZEŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ͕^ĂŶƚĂDŽŶŝĐĂμκλπ͕Ɖ͘ξ͘

ρ ͘,ĂǇŶĞƐ͕Nato has no plan if Russia invades, warns ex-general, The Times͕^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌλσ͕

Case of Estonia, ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚWĂƉĞƌ EŽλμξ͕EdKĞĨĞŶĐĞŽůůĞŐĞZŽŵĞĞĐĞŵďĞƌμκλο͕Ɖ͘μ͘

DR. ,. /^>t^>/t

νŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ λƌŝŐĂĚĞ λŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ μƌŝŐĂĚĞƐ

25 ͞tĞƐƚĞƌŶĞĨĞŶƐĞ͗ZƵƐƐŝĂƚŽĨŽƌŵνŶĞǁĂƌŵǇĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŝŶμκλπ͕͟RT; January 12, 2016,

ορ ͞ĞŶŵĂƌŬ͕͟The Military Balance, 2016͘/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŽĨ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ͖Ɖ͘ςσ͘

68 sŝŬƚŽƌ^ƵǀŽƌŽǀ͕͛͞KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĠƚĞŶƚĞ͕͛͟Inside the Soviet Army͕DĂĐŵŝůůĂŶWƵďůŝƐŚŝŶŐŽ͕͘/ŶĐ͘

Security at the Turn of the Century͕ĞĚ͘ŝƌŽůůŝŽƚƚŽƉƉŽ͕'ƌĞĞŶǁŽŽĚWƌĞƐƐ͕λσσσ͕Ɖ͘λκμ

͞/ŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞĂůƚŝĐ^ĞĂ͕͟The Baltic Course͕ςEŽǀĞŵďĞƌμκλρ͕