PEÑAFLOR, Jarod Landrix C.

POLSC 101 THY-1

2019-03823 Prof. Miriam Coronel Ferrer
Bachelor of Secondary Education (Social Studies) Reflection Paper 2

The continuing relevance of the 1987 Constitution

The 1987 Constitution is born out of a ‘revolutionary’ government that seized political
power after years of struggle against a dictatorship that plundered and oppressed the Filipino
people. It was branded as the “Freedom Constitution” as it sought to restore the liberties that were
severed under the decades-long strongman rule. However, the discussion on the institutional
features of the Philippine political system this constitution has developed must transcend the issue
of repression and authoritarianism. The 1987 Constitution can be better assessed by juxtaposing
it against the political realities that have long shaped the lives of Filipinos.
The broader sociopolitical structure in the Philippines remains unaltered even after the
overthrow of the Marcos regime. Some political scientists posit that the first Aquino administration
signaled the return of the country to an ‘elite democracy’. Beyond the personality that is the chief
executive who comes from a wealthy landed political clan, the background of key political figures
who served early into Aquino’s term in bodies such as the constitutional commission and the
executive cabinet would reveal that strands of continuity can be gleaned. In this instance, the
challenge posed to the framers of the new constitution is democratizing access to political power
through positions in the government, especially in elective offices.
The representation of single-member constituencies for 80% of the seats in the lower
house may have restored the dyadic alliances in various localities after a long period of dominance
of Marcos allies in the legislative body of the deposed regime. While the new constitution provides
for the limiting of the influence of political dynasties by explicitly stating the prohibition of such, it
is the Congress that shall operationalize this clause through a law. After several administrations,
such a legislation remains absent. Moreover, qualifications for elective offices in local
governments are prescribed in the constitutionally-mandated Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC). However, the code also lacks an anti-political dynasty provision to alter the landscape of
local politics. While some may contend that the imposition of term limits has curbed the capacity
of dynasties to monopolize power in their localities, this did not prevent them to venture into other
elective offices, appoint the family’s successor, or play roulette to know who gets to run in what
position. The failure to realize the intent of the 1987 Constitution on this matter vis-à-vis diffusing
political power is clearly manifested by how the current presidential family holds office in at least
four government positions.
 It must be recognized that a family’s economic base considerably plays a role in their
political fortunes as it is in this well that they draw their resources to employ the “guns, goons,
and gold” strategy in electoral campaigns. Given that land ownership forms a significant part of
the economic base of many political warlords and bosses, the issue of agrarian reform must also
be brought to light. Furthermore, these politicians wield and consolidate power along clientelist
lines by situating state resources and prerogatives within their systems of patronage and spoils.
Looking into these challenges will help us better assess how the constitution either empowered
or constrained the political advancement of the lower levels of governance in the country.
While the 1987 Constitution explicitly mentions the responsibility of the state in ensuring
comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform, peasant groups remain to be displeased
by efforts such as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and its extension. Many still rally
behind the calls for a genuine agrarian reform policy that shall resolutely expand the coverage of
the program, expeditiously distribute lands without forcing farmers to pay or enter alternative
arrangements such as profit sharing or stock distribution, and freely allow peasants to exercise
control over their lands without threats of land-use conversion. As such, land ownership remains
to be concentrated among a few while tenant-farmers languish in economic distress as they
confront neoliberal attacks to their livelihood such as the Rice Tariffication Law without prior
support from the government to enhance their competitiveness and productivity. Lacking
economic security, these farmers are unable to break away from feudal relations that can be
argued as a phenomenon that ultimately subordinates them in patron-client ties, Moreover,
subscription to patronage is still a viable means to access short-term and long-term economic
opportunities. While the Civil Service Commission was established to professionalize the
bureaucracy and address preferential treatment in the hiring process, the ‘padrino’ system has
been transformed through indirect (e.g., ‘recommendation letters’) and direct (e.g., bribes,
creation of additional positions in the local bureaucracy) means. Furthermore, sectoral
representation in national and subnational bodies remains to be not institutionalized as enabling
laws are yet to be enacted on this matter even with the LGC providing for sectoral representation
in legislative bodies and development councils. With the prevalence of patrimonialism, especially
in local governments, constitution-mandated consultation mechanisms are even exploited to
legitimize the implementation of a policy or, more broadly, a particular leader’s rule by only
engaging the clients and allies of those in power. In addition to these, dismantling private armies
remains to be a challenge to the government three decades after the ratification of the constitution.
This case even called for the filing of bills in Congress in the past decade. However, these bills
are yet to be passed into law and the use of intimidation and violence through personal and
dynastic militias during polls season persists, especially in election hotspots.
Coming from virtually a single-party rule under Marcos’s authoritarian command, the 1987
Constitution would have addressed the longstanding issue that is the political party system. Be it
the dominance of Kilusang Bagong Lipunan during the Marcos regime or the dichotomy between
the Nacionalista and Liberal parties during the post-war pre-martial law years, the party system
can be considered problematic at its core. For this point, the challenge is addressing the absence
of a strong and genuine party system or, at least, allowing for the thriving and the substantial
participation of parties that are not ruled by or representative of the elite.
A landmark feature of the new constitution is the allocation of 20% of the total number of
seats in the lower house for party-lists. However, due to subsequent judicial interpretations and
electoral guidelines, parties are not incentivized to coalesce primarily due to the cap of three
seats. Consequently, major alternative parties which shall oppose the loosely-disciplined cliques
of the traditional elite politicians are yet to be developed. While the legal forces of the national
democratic left have offered a programmatic and ideological option to the electorate and have
thus become a mainstay in the Congress, it has been vilified by the state and other political actors
on the grounds of their supposed links to the armed communist insurgents. Moreover, due to the
absence of an anti-political dynasty law and genuine redistribution of wealth that shall democratize
political power, the party-list system has been exploited by prominent clans and major business
interests to further their political influence within and outside the Congress.
Lastly, our country has witnessed the emergence of strong chief executives in various
periods of our history. The consolidation of power under the ‘supreme leader’ goes along with
harsh attempts to expulse “destructive and cancerous” elements that cannot be incorporated into
the body politic. In this case, the constitution must be assessed how it sought to ensure the
restoration of democratic institutions and processes and how it ensured horizontal mechanisms
of constraints within the government.
It cannot be argued that the 1987 Constitution is indeed democratic in theory with
provisions on the separation of powers, checks and balances, and the creation of independent
bodies to prevent excesses in the exercise of authority. Despite this, issues remain due to the
persistence of patrimonial and personalistic politics. First, officials of the constitutional
commissions and judges and justices in the court system are presidential appointees and are
thus, in some way, indebted to those who endowed them with their positions of power. An apt
manifestation of this is how members of the Supreme Court would rule in favor of the interests of
the chief executive who usually has control of the legislature, especially the House of
Representatives where the president consolidates control over the majority after the elections.
Justices are faced with the threats of impeachment if their judicial behavior is unpopular vis-à-vis
the ‘dictates’ of the chief executive and the ruling coalition. Second, despite institutional features
such as the presence of the Sandiganbayan, such safeguards are still prone to politicization as
even public officials who are charged with corruption end up being acquitted or pardoned and are
still able to occupy key posts in the government. Third, even with an emphasis on human rights
as primarily manifested by the creation of the Commission on Human Rights, extrajudicial killings,
enforced disappearances, and torture remain rampant. Despite Filipinos’ being afforded their civil
rights under the constitution, progressive individuals which struggle to emphasize excesses in the
use of power and persistent societal ills are endangered when they uncompromisingly forward
their advocacies and political beliefs. Even the CHR is threatened by the House of
Representatives with a P1,000 budget in 2018 after being critical of the current administration’s
‘war on drugs’—a mere exercise of their constitutionally-mandated responsibility.
The institutional features of the Philippine political system under the 1987 Constitution are
indeed a response to the pressing issues that the country has faced decades prior. However,
much is still to be desired as the goals of this document are yet to be materialized. While it is not
perfect, the constitution must be appreciated as it set forth the guiding principles that shall enable
us to address our needs, interests, and aspirations towards a society that is free, equal, and just.
It is now on the people to fully exercise the rights that the 1987 Constitution has provided to
participate proactively in asserting the direction that we ought to take.