G.R. No.

132601 January 19, 1999

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of
petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the
submission of public respondents that:

1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its
execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on
that sphere of executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous
precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because there is
always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To
be certain, whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty
Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this
Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks
forward while the judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in
issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to
the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty
has become nil, to wit:
1. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto
any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
2. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are
against the repeal of the law;
3. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only
bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents

attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled
"Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representative to reject any move to
review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty,
notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the
House of Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means
under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was
concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.

In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the
scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on
congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution
was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters
involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from
challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital
punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all
the various resolutions and bills filed before it.

Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are
not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on
automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this
case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection
Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this
reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set
Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance
of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in
the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by
the Solicitor General.

We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.

First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this
Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the
execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final
judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important
that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation."    To
1

start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate
to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that
became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment
in this case, viz:

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case
was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed
statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections
17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are
concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No.
7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection
Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential,
hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel.
Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No.
8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement
Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in
accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is hereby
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.

Manila, Philippine.

Clerk of Court
 By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP

Acting Chief

Judicial Records Office

The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the
Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where
he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in
compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a
Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said
Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline
that the Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A.
No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations
to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and
implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A.
No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was not altered a whit
by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of
judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same
judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence
on this issue as
follows: 
2

x x x           x x x          x x x

the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the
case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.   There is a difference between the jurisdiction of
3

the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of
enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final.   . . .
4

For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which
can render the execution unjust or impossible. 5

In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As
aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled
in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance,   viz: 6

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute
jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment,
as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has
been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it
performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this
cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause
that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive.
The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the
judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the
judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except
to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution
of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date
can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set
or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death.
Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By
command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the
law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible that
assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial
court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for
postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even
after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that
after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . and its
part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and
there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement.
Then the question arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution ought
to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and so to who has
jurisdiction to make the investigation.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It
cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution   vests the entirety of
7

judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process
of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the
parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent
unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have
been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders
to make them conformable to law and justice.   For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135
8

provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of
such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit
of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the
execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of
supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular
misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress. 1âwphi1.nêt

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this
Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the
independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts
have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this
unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These
rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and
incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions.
Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120
governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court
to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without
independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the
maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice."   Hence, our Constitutions
9

continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the
1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative
power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its
Section 13, Article VIII provides:

Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to
the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress have the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface.
In In re Cunanan   Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme
10

Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of
1953   which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations
11

after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court
struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . .
. the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment promulgated by this
Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although
this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that
may do so. Any attempt on the part of these department would be a clear usurpation of
its function, as is the case with the law in question."   The venerable jurist further ruled:
12

"It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for
the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress
to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure,
and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For
the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed,
altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section
5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

x x x           x x x          x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of
the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the
integration of the Bar. 
13

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among
others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII
provides:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

 x x x           x x x          x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was
given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove
rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the
1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more
so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the
independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this
Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power
conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.

To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this
Court to control and supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As
aforestated, our Decision became final and executory on November 6, 1998. The records
reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary
of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent
Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104,
Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated
November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of death convict Leo
Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the
execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." The relevant
portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice
beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:

x x x           x x x          x x x

5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however, herein

respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that
the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital
information necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders
nugatory the constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to information of
public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief.

6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital

information necessary for the exercise of his power of supervision and control over the
Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the
enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of
seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully
observed.

7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the precise day
of execution limits the exercise by the President of executive clemency powers pursuant
to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and
Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the death
sentence shall be carried out "without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
executive powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied) For instance, the President cannot
grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain (People v.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The
exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of the
convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable statute as when the
date at execution set by the President would be earlier than that designated by the court.

8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of execution to

herein respondent and the public violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section
28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which read:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development shall, be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.

9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the rules by means of

which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford
access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may
be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any
ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the
Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded
which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28).
However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the
Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and
enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme
Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].

The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of
petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998.
He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's right to information. The
Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion
on the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of
Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the
counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not a
whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now estopped from
contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of
this Court does not depend on the convenience of litigants.

II

Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this
case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of
authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has
in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function."   Public respondents cite as
14

their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.

The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the
public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by
final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however,
cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their
decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final
judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final
conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity.   As observed by Antieau,
15

"today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from
executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of
execution."   The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of
16

judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its
effects is the same — the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In
the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659
by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment
is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the
exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of
the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted expressly
granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has
been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant
reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can
protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of
co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

III

Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be
put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who
make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of
TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1)
that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that
members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or
repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's
resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment
be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President
Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would seek
a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of
capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35)
other congressmen are demanding review of the same law.

When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess
and would only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario
Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1991   at 10. a.m. to
17

deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to
resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had
the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in
Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To
the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not immediately
dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted that
petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized in
the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a
new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views
on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different
from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal
Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's
allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify petitioner's
allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was
impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority
did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining
the execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary — "until June 15, 1999,
coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless
it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made."
The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that
any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any
further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to
constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it
needed the certainty that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It
was believed that law and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the
State to take the life of one its citizens.

The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the
crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment.
The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate
beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law.
He names these supervening events as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

1. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law
imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
2. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the
repeal of the law;
3. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his
signature and that of Senator Pimentel.  18

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General
cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution
expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A.
No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the
Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative
on this matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to
immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113
congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended up
3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of
Representative with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an
overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House ". .
. does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has
stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the
prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's
TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.

A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of
capital punishment had been the subject of endless discussion and will probably never
be settled so long as men believe in punishment."   In our clime and time when heinous
19

crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital
punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith
of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To
be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a
democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that
wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of
this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As
Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution — and
particularly the Bill of Rights — to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach
of temporary political majorities."   Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than
20

the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of
reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be
ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The
business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only
when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society.  21

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts
the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.

The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the
convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court,
without further delay.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing,
Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.

Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659,
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the
Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who hold similarly, have
consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of death sentences
imposed by Regional Trial Courts.

In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered
petition a temporary restraining order ("TRO") because, among other things, of what had
been stated to be indications that Congress would re-examine the death penalty law. It
was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of the government, i.e., to
reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the Court to grant, after
deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.

The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its
judgment convicting the accused or recall the imposition of the death penalty.

The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and
executory, nothing else is further done except to see to its compliance since for the Court
to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to litigations The rule notwithstanding, the
Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment
conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of
the petition assailing before it the use of lethal injection by the State to carry out the
death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of final
and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for
instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the
higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.  Certainly, this
1

extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right
to life is the issue at stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First
Instance of Cavite,  should be instructive. Thus —
2

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute
jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court can not
change or after its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo,
according to the classical phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been
returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it
performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this
cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause
that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the executive.
The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the
judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the
judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except
to provide for carrying out the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution
of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date
can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that,
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set
or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death.
Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By
command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the
law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible the
assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial
court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for
postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even
after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that
after the Court of First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the
execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises
that ought to delay the execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the
emergency and to order a postponement . . ..

In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the
power of the President to grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of
Congress to repeal or modify the law that could benefit the convicted accused are not
essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally incompatible and may each be
exercised within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution
issued by the Court would not prevent either the President from exercising his pardoning
power or Congress from enacting a measure that may be advantageous to the adjudged
offender.

The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of 15
June 1999, "coeval with the duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it
"sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made."
The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of the Solicitor General states
that as of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to
the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become
nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet expect any chance for a timely  re-examination
3

by Congress of the death penalty law, then I can appreciate why the majority of the
Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.

I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a
most thorough and dispassionate re-examination of the law not so much for its
questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second look at the conditions sine qua
non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death penalty. In People vs.
Masalihit,  in urging, with all due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination
4

of the death penalty law, I have said:

The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial instance, with
the law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions that
the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That there must be compelling reasons to
justify the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must involve
a heinous crime. It appears that the fundamental law did not contemplate a simple
'reimposition' of the death penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in the Revised
Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it. The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate
to me that there must first be a marked change in the milieu from that which has
prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which
exists at the enactment of the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand,
that would make it distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death penalty.
Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the 'heinous nature' of the
crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty must be
spelled out with great clarity in the law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Court
from exercising its power of judicial review given the circumstances of each case. To
venture, in the case of murder, the crime would become 'heinous' within the
Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the victim is unnecessarily subjected to a
painful and excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party is
callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused. The indiscriminate imposition
of the death penalty could somehow constrain courts to apply, perhaps without
consciously meaning to, stringent standards for conviction, not too unlikely beyond what
might normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue exculpation
of offenders to the great prejudice of victims and society.

Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are
clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree, most respectfully, with
my colleagues in the majority who continue to hold the presently structured Republic Act
No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue that is fundamental, constant and
inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and, like the instant
petition, to the legal incidents pertinent thereto.

Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like
everyone else, however, must respect and be held bound by the ruling of the majority.

 
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to issue
the disputed Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its
well-reasoned disquisition. I write only to explain my vote in the context of the larger
issue of the death penalty.

Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA
7659 during its current session which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the
President will veto any such repeal or amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be
deemed lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of the death penalty
transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.

I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as
some parts thereof prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of
"heinousness" and "compelling reasons" prescribed by the Constitution of the
Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinion in various death
cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on this matter on
January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated
on February 7, 1997.

Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding
and enforcement of law (or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with all due
respect, is unconstitutional and therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my
humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise unconstitutional since it
merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to
implemented.

Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the
ruling of the Court that both RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that death
penalty should, by majority vote, be implemented by means of lethal injection.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for
Reconsideration.

G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.

Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration

SEPARATE OPINION

Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration   dated August 22, 1996 filed by his
1

newly-retained counsel,   the accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his
2

defense: that Republic Act. No. 7659, the law reimposing the death penalty, is
unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for Reconsideration filed by his previous
counsel,  this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon
3

by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death.
4

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)

The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written
in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the
imposition   of the death penalty "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
5

Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed" to reclusion
perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the
penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty
of imprisonment).

This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend
the imposition of the death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute
books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion perpetua of any death
penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the
conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist
in our penal laws and thus may longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the
framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed,  "(t)he majority voted for the
6

constitutional abolition of the death penalty."

Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate,
Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera emphasized,   "It is thus clear that when Fr.
7

Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what
he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death
penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the Constitution when they approved the
provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise,
restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an
exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the people.  In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no
8

presumption of constitutionality.

The Constitution Strictly Limits

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from
the then existing statutes but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to
enable or empower courts to reimpose it on condition that it (Congress)  finds "compelling
9

reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution is emphatic (even if
"awkward" ): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is
10

strictly limited:

1. by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became

effective; and
2. to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as
"heinous."

The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the
existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it
could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake,
may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes;
and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659   to "provide for
11

it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal
Code;   (2) by incorporating a new article therein;   and (3) by amending certain special
12 13

laws. 14

But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal
Code and in the special laws. It merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its
provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general terms) discuss or justify
the reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or
individually for each of them.

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty
had been imposed until February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows:
(1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the commission of which was
accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.

The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited
authority granted it by the Constitution? More legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did
Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very limited power or
jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.

Heinous Crimes

To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death
penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning of
"heinous". Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some
existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not give a
standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the
heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too well aware of its
constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the
preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society.

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or

characterization of what a heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain
crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no
useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of
heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not
a substitute for an objective juridical definition. Neither is the description "inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as blue
does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not
arm it with thorns.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to

show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor
restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text.   In this case, it cannot be the
15

authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.

As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the
maximum imposable penalty once the court appreciates the presence or absence of
aggravating circumstances.  16

In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already
punishable with death prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible
exception of plunder and qualified bribery,  no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659.
17

The offenses punished by death under said law were already to punishable by the
Revised Penal Code   and by special laws.
18

During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina,
in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said:  19

So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing
special laws which, before abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the
maximum penalty.

By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already
penalized with death prior to the charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its
specific and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional Commission intended merely
to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it would not have
written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily,
the intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its
restoration possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is evident not only
from the language of the Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.

The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an
amendment introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes
could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or
"brutal murder of a rape victim".   Note that the honorable commissioners did not just say
20

"murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While
the debates were admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the available information shows
that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional Commission did not have in
mind the offenses already existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that
the heinousness clause requires that:

1. the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have
an inherent quality, degree or level of perversity, depravity or viciousness
unheard of until then; or
2. even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient
like "organized" or "brutal" is added to show their utter perversity,
odiousness or malevolence; or
3. the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried
out evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme violence, evil, cruelty,
atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its heinousness.  21

For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify
the crime as "heinous", in the same manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide
aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.

Compelling Reasons

Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also
directs Congress to determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty.
It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 7659   made some attempt at
22

meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It
should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and
should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the
compelling reasons and the characterization of heinousness cannot be done wholesale
but must shown for each and every crime, individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of
Comm. Monsod, "in the future, circumstances may arise which we should not preclude
today . . . and that the conditions and the situation (during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons" requiring the return
of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.

In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman
Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to
explain these compelling reasons:  23

MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker? . . .

MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker.
That is one.

MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to
justify or serve as an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death penalty is
the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that is one the
compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular "compelling reason," may we
know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly
elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice was not
obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling reason
should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives
in an organized society governed by law, justice demands that crime be punished and
that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense committed.

MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks
of the compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons
which would supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he
submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty for the offense
committed, was not obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty
and the people ratified it?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present
conditions, because of the seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time,
justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who have
committed heinous crimes.

x x x           x x x          x x x
In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace
and order" and "justice". With all due respect I submit that these grounds are not
"compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that
these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police
show that the crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital
offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between 1987, the date when the
Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted. Witness the
following debate   also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:
24

MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.

Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the
crime of murder in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.

MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform
us the volume of murder in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988.

Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the abolition of the death penalty
was reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the
PC.

MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death
penalty? May we know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.

MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.

MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty.
Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me. Mr. Speaker that the

volume of robbery cases declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to
16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are reading now from
the same document.
MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of
22 percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the
Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I
would not want to say that the Gentleman is misreading the document that I have here.

MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.

When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the
number of persons arrested in regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as
compared to 1991:  25

Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.

In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was
abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the figure
dropped to 2,686 in 1988.

By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still
decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.

But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are
concerned, the figure continued a downward trend, and there was no death penalty in
this time from, 1988 to 1991.

In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty
argue that its reimposition "would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous
crimes."   However no statistical data, no sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have
26

been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship between the
prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-
commission thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and on,   in the same
27

manner that another proposition — that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of
immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without unnecessary risk,
expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses — can be argued
indefinitely.   This debate can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but
28

it would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the
"heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.

Other Constitutional Rights

Militate Against RA 7659

It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included
in our Bill of Rights. As such, it should — like any other guarantee in favor of the accused
— be zealously protected,   and any exception thereto meticulously screened. Any doubt
29

should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the right pertains to persons
accused of crimes.   Here the issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!
30

So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos,
guarantee that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law."   This primary right of the people to enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in
31

dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its
other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights,   expressly 32

prohibits any form of torture   which is arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes
33

the individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from
the moment of conception   and establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced
34

ecology and education.  35

This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for people more
than the state, and for life more than mere existence augurs well for the strict application
of the constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as the final and irreversible
exaction of society against its perceived enemies.

Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech. assembly and
even religion. But the most basic and most important of these rights is the right to life.
Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and expression.

This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death
penalty militates against the poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of
165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal Assistance Group   highlights this
36

sad fact:

1. Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons   have been
37

sentenced to death. At the end of 1994, there were 24 death penalty

convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven
(7) convicts per month; double the monthly average of capital sentences
imposed the prior year. From January to June 1996, the number of death
penalty convicts reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost
double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed in 1995.
2. Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one percent (21%) earn
between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while approximately twenty seven
percent (27%) earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning
above P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn
between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to
P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those
earning between P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only four percent (4%),
those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%). Approximately
thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately two
percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five percent (5%)
earning variable income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know
how much they earn in a month.
3. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn
below the government-mandated minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten
(10) of these earn below the official poverty line set by government.
Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly,
indicating they belong to the middle class; only one (1) earns P30.000.00
monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a percentage
or allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not know or are unsure of their
monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.
4. In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are
agricultural workers or workers in animal husbandry; of these thirty (30),
or almost one-fifth thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in
the transport and construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction
workers or workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting, welding) while
twenty seven (27) are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic,
tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen percent
 (18%) are in clerical, sales and service industries, with fourteen (14) sales
workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice vendors), twelve
(12) service workers (butchers, beauticians, security guards, shoemakers,
tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4) clerks
(janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk) About four percent (4%) are
government workers, with six (6) persons belonging to the armed services
(AFP, PNP and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee
and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent (9%) are
unemployed.
5. None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication. About
forty four percent (44%), or slightly less than half speak and understand
Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and
understand Cebuano. The rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano,
Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a
foreign national and speaks and understand Niponggo.
6. Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty
seven percent (47%) finished varying levels of elementary education with
twenty seven (27) graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent
(35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with
more than half of them graduating from high school. Two (2) convicts
finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all.

The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently
demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated against the poor and the powerless in society
— those who cannot afford the legal services necessary in capital crimes, where
extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are required. The best
example to shoe the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial
issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the proceedings in the trial court and
even before this Court until the Free legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.

To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a
strange, incomprehensible language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves
complicated, intimidating and damning. The net effect of having a death penalty that is
imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the
latter, a sense — unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal
balance of the scales of justice.

Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the
statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense prone to be misleading, and that
regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law reviving capital punishment
does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the
underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the
law would still be complex and written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and
judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate penalty involved
be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the whole controversy is that, whatever the
penalties set by law, it seems to me that there will always be certain class or classes of
people in our society who, by reason of their poverty, lack of educational attainment and
employment opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working and subsisting in
less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as
themselves, and are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or
perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving the
death penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more precise,
such law may even be said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a
much stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the
situations of the poor and the non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what
they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of protection and assistance from
our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that in spite of
themselves, they can be empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The
basic postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately wants to
better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to any significant degree if
we are unable to advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of
the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively
inflicts the ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and disadvantaged in the
greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly
permanent, erases all hope of reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no
place in our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament.

Epilogue

In sum, I respectfully submit that:

(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not
merely suspend or prohibit its imposition.

(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right against the death
penalty, which is really a species of the right to life.

(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused because such a stature denigrates the Constitution,
impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal justice to the underprivileged.

(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored,
cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.

(5) Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:

1. First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the

prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the
elements of the crime and itself. Congress must explain why and how
these circumstances define or characterize the crime as "heinous".
2. Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific
reasons which arose after the effectivity of the Constitution compelling the
enactment of the law. It bears repeating that these requirements are
inseparable. They must both be present in view of the specific
constitutional mandate — "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes." The compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of the
offense.

(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons
must be set out for each and every crime, and not just for all crimes generally and
collectively.

"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest
of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe in Almighty God.   While the Catholic
38

Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong, acknowledges the power of
public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only
to "cases of extreme
gravity."   To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to
39

Life),   "punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not to go
40
to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other
words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . . (which is) very rare,
if not practically non-existent."

Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably
abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the
primacy of human life over and above even the state which man created precisely to
protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment
only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly
permits it only reasons of "absolute necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity",
which are very rare and practically non-existent.

In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply
discharged its constitutional burden of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to
prescribe death against well-defined "heinous" crimes?

I respectfully submit it has not.

WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the

Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the
decision of the trial court by deleting the words "DEATH", as provided for under RA
7659," and substitute therefore reclusion perpetua.

I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of

death for the crimes mentioned in its text.

Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;

Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659,
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the
Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who hold similarly, have
consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of death sentences
imposed by Regional Trial Courts.

In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered
petition a temporary restraining order ("TRO") because, among other things, of what had
been stated to be indications that Congress would re-examine the death penalty law. It
was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of the government, i.e., to
reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the Court to grant, after
deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.

The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its
judgment convicting the accused or recall the imposition of the death penalty.

The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and
executory, nothing else is further done except to see to its compliance since for the Court
to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to litigations The rule notwithstanding, the
Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment
conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of
the petition assailing before it the use of lethal injection by the State to carry out the
death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of final
and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for
instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the
higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.  Certainly, this
1

extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right
to life is the issue at stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First
Instance of Cavite,  should be instructive. Thus —
2

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute
jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court can not
change or after its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo,
according to the classical phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been
returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it
performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this
cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause
that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the executive.
The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the
judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the
judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except
to provide for carrying out the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution
of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date
can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that,
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set
or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death.
Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By
command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the
law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible the
assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial
court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for
postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even
after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that
after the Court of First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the
execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises
that ought to delay the execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the
emergency and to order a postponement . . ..

In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the
power of the President to grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of
Congress to repeal or modify the law that could benefit the convicted accused are not
essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally incompatible and may each be
exercised within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution
issued by the Court would not prevent either the President from exercising his pardoning
power or Congress from enacting a measure that may be advantageous to the adjudged
offender.

The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of 15
June 1999, "coeval with the duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it
"sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made."
The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of the Solicitor General states
that as of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to
the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become
nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet expect any chance for a timely  re-examination
3

by Congress of the death penalty law, then I can appreciate why the majority of the
Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.
I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a
most thorough and dispassionate re-examination of the law not so much for its
questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second look at the conditions sine qua
non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death penalty. In People vs.
Masalihit,  in urging, with all due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination
4

of the death penalty law, I have said:

The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial instance, with
the law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions that
the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That there must be compelling reasons to
justify the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must involve
a heinous crime. It appears that the fundamental law did not contemplate a simple
'reimposition' of the death penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in the Revised
Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it. The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate
to me that there must first be a marked change in the milieu from that which has
prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which
exists at the enactment of the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand,
that would make it distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death penalty.
Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the 'heinous nature' of the
crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty must be
spelled out with great clarity in the law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Court
from exercising its power of judicial review given the circumstances of each case. To
venture, in the case of murder, the crime would become 'heinous' within the
Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the victim is unnecessarily subjected to a
painful and excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party is
callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused. The indiscriminate imposition
of the death penalty could somehow constrain courts to apply, perhaps without
consciously meaning to, stringent standards for conviction, not too unlikely beyond what
might normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue exculpation
of offenders to the great prejudice of victims and society.

Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are
clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree, most respectfully, with
my colleagues in the majority who continue to hold the presently structured Republic Act
No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue that is fundamental, constant and
inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and, like the instant
petition, to the legal incidents pertinent thereto.

Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like
everyone else, however, must respect and be held bound by the ruling of the majority.

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to issue
the disputed Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its
well-reasoned disquisition. I write only to explain my vote in the context of the larger
issue of the death penalty.

Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA
7659 during its current session which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the
President will veto any such repeal or amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be
deemed lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of the death penalty
transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.
I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as
some parts thereof prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of
"heinousness" and "compelling reasons" prescribed by the Constitution of the
Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinion in various death
cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on this matter on
January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated
on February 7, 1997.

Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding
and enforcement of law (or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with all due
respect, is unconstitutional and therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my
humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise unconstitutional since it
merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to
implemented.

Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the
ruling of the Court that both RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that death
penalty should, by majority vote, be implemented by means of lethal injection.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for
Reconsideration.

G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.

Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration

SEPARATE OPINION

Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration   dated August 22, 1996 filed by his
1

newly-retained counsel,   the accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his
2

defense: that Republic Act. No. 7659, the law reimposing the death penalty, is
unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for Reconsideration filed by his previous
counsel,  this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon
3

by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death.
4

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)

The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written
in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the
imposition   of the death penalty "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
5

Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed" to reclusion
perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the
penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty
of imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend
the imposition of the death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute
books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion perpetua of any death
penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the
conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist
in our penal laws and thus may longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the
framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed,  "(t)he majority voted for the
6

constitutional abolition of the death penalty."

Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate,
Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera emphasized,   "It is thus clear that when Fr.
7

Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what
he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death
penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the Constitution when they approved the
provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise,
restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an
exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the people.  In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no
8

presumption of constitutionality.

The Constitution Strictly Limits

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from
the then existing statutes but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to
enable or empower courts to reimpose it on condition that it (Congress)  finds "compelling
9

reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution is emphatic (even if
"awkward" ): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is
10

strictly limited:

1. by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became

effective; and
2. to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as
"heinous."

The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the
existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it
could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake,
may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes;
and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.

In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA

7659   to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the
11

Revised Penal Code;   (2) by incorporating a new article therein;   and (3) by amending
12 13

certain special laws.  14

But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal
Code and in the special laws. It merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its
provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general terms) discuss or justify
the reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or
individually for each of them.

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty
had been imposed until February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows:
(1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the commission of which was
accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.

The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited
authority granted it by the Constitution? More legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did
Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very limited power or
jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.

Heinous Crimes

To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death
penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning of
"heinous". Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some
existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not give a
standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the
heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too well aware of its
constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the
preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society.

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or

characterization of what a heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain
crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no
useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of
heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not
a substitute for an objective juridical definition. Neither is the description "inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as blue
does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not
arm it with thorns.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to

show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor
restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text.   In this case, it cannot be the
15

authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.

As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the
maximum imposable penalty once the court appreciates the presence or absence of
aggravating circumstances.  16

In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already
punishable with death prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible
exception of plunder and qualified bribery,  no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659.
17

The offenses punished by death under said law were already to punishable by the
Revised Penal Code   and by special laws.
18

During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina,
in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said:  19
So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing
special laws which, before abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the
maximum penalty.

By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already
penalized with death prior to the charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its
specific and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional Commission intended merely
to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it would not have
written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily,
the intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its
restoration possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is evident not only
from the language of the Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.

The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an
amendment introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes
could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or
"brutal murder of a rape victim".   Note that the honorable commissioners did not just say
20

"murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While
the debates were admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the available information shows
that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional Commission did not have in
mind the offenses already existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that
the heinousness clause requires that:

1. the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have
an inherent quality, degree or level of perversity, depravity or viciousness
unheard of until then; or
2. even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient
like "organized" or "brutal" is added to show their utter perversity,
odiousness or malevolence; or

3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried out evinces a
degree or magnitude of extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to
demonstrate its heinousness.  21

For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify
the crime as "heinous", in the same manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide
aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.

Compelling Reasons

Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also
directs Congress to determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty.
It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 7659   made some attempt at
22

meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It
should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and
should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the
compelling reasons and the characterization of heinousness cannot be done wholesale
but must shown for each and every crime, individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of
Comm. Monsod, "in the future, circumstances may arise which we should not preclude
today . . . and that the conditions and the situation (during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons" requiring the return
of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman
Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to
explain these compelling reasons:  23

MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker? . . .

MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker.
That is one.

MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to
justify or serve as an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death penalty is
the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that is one the
compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular "compelling reason," may we
know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly
elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice was not
obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling reason
should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives
in an organized society governed by law, justice demands that crime be punished and
that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense committed.

MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks
of the compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons
which would supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he
submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty for the offense
committed, was not obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty
and the people ratified it?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present
conditions, because of the seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time,
justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who have
committed heinous crimes.

x x x           x x x          x x x

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace

and order" and "justice". With all due respect I submit that these grounds are not
"compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that
these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police
show that the crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital
offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between 1987, the date when the
Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted. Witness the
following debate   also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:
24

MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.

Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the
crime of murder in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.

MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform
us the volume of murder in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988.

Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the abolition of the death penalty
was reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the
PC.

MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death
penalty? May we know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.

MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.

MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty.
Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me. Mr. Speaker that the

volume of robbery cases declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to
16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are reading now from
the same document.

MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of
22 percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the
Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I
would not want to say that the Gentleman is misreading the document that I have here.

MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.

When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the
number of persons arrested in regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as
compared to 1991:  25

Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.

In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was abolished — the persons
arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.

By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still
decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.

But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are
concerned, the figure continued a downward trend, and there was no death penalty in
this time from, 1988 to 1991.

In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty
argue that its reimposition "would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous
crimes."   However no statistical data, no sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have
26

been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship between the
prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-
commission thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and on,   in the same
27

manner that another proposition — that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of
immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without unnecessary risk,
expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses — can be argued
indefinitely.   This debate can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but
28

it would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the
"heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.

Other Constitutional Rights

Militate Against RA 7659

It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included
in our Bill of Rights. As such, it should — like any other guarantee in favor of the accused
— be zealously protected,   and any exception thereto meticulously screened. Any doubt
29

should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the right pertains to persons
accused of crimes.   Here the issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!
30

So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos,
guarantee that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law."   This primary right of the people to enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in
31

dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its
other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights,   expressly 32

prohibits any form of torture   which is arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes
33

the individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from
the moment of conception   and establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced
34

ecology and education.  35

This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for people more
than the state, and for life more than mere existence augurs well for the strict application
of the constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as the final and irreversible
exaction of society against its perceived enemies.

Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech. assembly and
even religion. But the most basic and most important of these rights is the right to life.
Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and expression.

This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death
penalty militates against the poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of
165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal Assistance Group   highlights this
36

sad fact:

1. Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons   have been
37

sentenced to death. At the end of 1994, there were 24 death penalty

convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven
(7) convicts per month; double the monthly average of capital sentences
imposed the prior year. From January to June 1996, the number of death
penalty convicts reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost
double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed in 1995.
2. Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one percent (21%) earn
between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while approximately twenty seven
percent (27%) earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning
above P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn
between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to
P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those
earning between P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only four percent (4%),
those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%). Approximately
thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately two
percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five percent (5%)
earning variable income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know
how much they earn in a month.
3. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn
below the government-mandated minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten
(10) of these earn below the official poverty line set by government.
Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly,
indicating they belong to the middle class; only one (1) earns P30.000.00
monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a percentage
or allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not know or are unsure of their
monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.
4. In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are
agricultural workers or workers in animal husbandry; of these thirty (30),
or almost one-fifth thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in
the transport and construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction
workers or workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting, welding) while
twenty seven (27) are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic,
tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen percent
(18%) are in clerical, sales and service industries, with fourteen (14) sales
workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice vendors), twelve
(12) service workers (butchers, beauticians, security guards, shoemakers,
tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4) clerks
(janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk) About four percent (4%) are
government workers, with six (6) persons belonging to the armed services
(AFP, PNP and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee
and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent (9%) are
unemployed.
5. None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication. About
forty four percent (44%), or slightly less than half speak and understand
 Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and
understand Cebuano. The rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano,
Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a
foreign national and speaks and understand Niponggo.
6. Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty
seven percent (47%) finished varying levels of elementary education with
twenty seven (27) graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent
(35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with
more than half of them graduating from high school. Two (2) convicts
finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all.

The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently
demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated against the poor and the powerless in society
— those who cannot afford the legal services necessary in capital crimes, where
extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are required. The best
example to shoe the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial
issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the proceedings in the trial court and
even before this Court until the Free legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.

To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a
strange, incomprehensible language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves
complicated, intimidating and damning. The net effect of having a death penalty that is
imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the
latter, a sense — unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal
balance of the scales of justice.

Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the
statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense prone to be misleading, and that
regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law reviving capital punishment
does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the
underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the
law would still be complex and written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and
judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate penalty involved
be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the whole controversy is that, whatever the
penalties set by law, it seems to me that there will always be certain class or classes of
people in our society who, by reason of their poverty, lack of educational attainment and
employment opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working and subsisting in
less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as
themselves, and are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or
perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving the
death penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more precise,
such law may even be said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a
much stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.

However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the
situations of the poor and the non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what
they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of protection and assistance from
our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that in spite of
themselves, they can be empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The
basic postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately wants to
better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to any significant degree if
we are unable to advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of
the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively
inflicts the ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and disadvantaged in the
greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly
permanent, erases all hope of reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no
place in our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament.

Epilogue

In sum, I respectfully submit that:

1. The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did
not merely suspend or prohibit its imposition.
2. The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right against the
death penalty, which is really a species of the right to life.
3. Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused because such a stature denigrates the
Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal justice to the
underprivileged.
4. Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored,
cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.
5. Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:

1. First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the

prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the
elements of the crime and itself. Congress must explain why and how
these circumstances define or characterize the crime as "heinous".

Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific reasons which arose
after the effectivity of the Constitution compelling the enactment of the law. It bears
repeating that these requirements are inseparable. They must both be present in view of
the specific constitutional mandate — "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
The compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of the offense.

1. In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons
must be set out for each and every crime, and not just for all crimes generally
and collectively.

"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest
of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe in Almighty God.   While the Catholic
38

Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong, acknowledges the power of
public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only
to "cases of extreme
gravity."   To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to
39

Life),   "punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not to go
40

to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other
words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . . (which is) very rare,
if not practically non-existent."

Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably
abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the
primacy of human life over and above even the state which man created precisely to
protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment
only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly
permits it only reasons of "absolute necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity",
which are very rare and practically non-existent.

In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply
discharged its constitutional burden of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to
prescribe death against well-defined "heinous" crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.

WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the

Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the
decision of the trial court by deleting the words "DEATH", as provided for under RA
7659," and substitute therefore reclusion perpetua.

I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of

death for the crimes mentioned in its text.