C.

OTHER RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

SARMIENTO vs. MISON

FACTS:
Salvador Mison was appointed Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by
then-President Corazon Aquino in 1987 without going through the Commission on
Appointments. The petitioners in this case, both attorneys and constitutional law
professors, submitted the instant petition for ban on the grounds that the
aforementioned appointment was in violation of Section 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution of 1987. The nomination of a bureau head, petitioners said, should be
subject to the Commission on Appointments' approval.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs require the confirmation of CA?

RULING:
No, the appointment of Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
does not require the confirmation of CA.

It is the clear and expressed intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that
presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16,
Article VII, are NOT subject to confirmation by the CA. It is a rule in statutory
construction that an express enumeration of subjects—as it is so in the first sentence
of Sec 16, Art VII—excludes others not enumerated. Considering the historical
background that the 1935 Constitution transformed the CA into a venue of “horse-
trading” as almost all presidential appointments required the consent of the CA and
that the 1973 Constitution placed the absolute power of appointment in the President
with hardly any check on the part of the legislature, it can be inferred that the framers
of the 1987 Constitution struck “middle ground” with requiring only the first group to
be confirmed by the CA. Such is also manifest in the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission. In said deliberations, it was even explicit that the
appointments of the heads of bureaus be excluded from the requirement of
confirmation by the CA.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora

FACTS:
Invoking his Commander-in-Chief duties under Section 18, Article IX of the
Constitution President Ejercito Estrada directed the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Chief of the Philippine National Police to coordinate
their deployment and use of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence under Article VII of the Constitution. The
Marines' participation in the anti-crime operation, according to the President, is only
temporary and for a reasonable amount of time, until the situation has improved. The
Philippine Integrated Bar filed a petition seeking to have the deployment of the
Philippine Marines declared null and void as well as unlawful. Petitioner lacks legal
standing, according to the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not IBP has legal standing to assail constitutionality of calling the
AFP to assist PNP to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion?

RULING:
IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration the IBP asserts no other
basis in support of its locus standi. While undoubtedly true it is not sufficient to merit
standing. However, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public,
the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. The Court relaxed the rules on
standing and resolved the issue now.

MARCELINO vs. CRUZ

FACTS:
Marcelino was arrested and accused with rape before CFI Rizal. The accused
rested its case on August 4, 1975, and the trial was over. Both sides' attorneys asked
for more time to deliver their separate memorandums. The request was granted, and
the parties were given 30 days to present their arguments, which they did on
September 4, 1975. Judge Cruz submitted his ruling in the matter with the deputy
clerk of court for publication. The accused's counsel claimed that the trial court had
lost jurisdiction since the matter had not been decided within 90 days of its
submission for judgment.

The petitioner contends that the 3-month time prescribed in Section 11(1) of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution is mandatory in nature, and that failure to comply
with it results in the court losing jurisdiction over outstanding issues.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Section 11(1) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution is mandatory.

HELD:
The petition is hereby dismissed.

Undisputed is the fact that on November 28, 1975, or 85 days from September
4, 1975 the date the case was deemed submitted for decision, respondent judge filed
with the deputy clerk of court the decision in the criminal case. He had thus veritably
rendered his decision on said case within the three-month period prescribed by the
Constitution. There is no doubt that the constitutional provision cited by the petitioner
refers to the rendition of judgment and not to the promulgation thereof.

Furthermore, the use of “shall” in Section 11(1) of Article X should be

construed as directory. The established rule is that constitutional provisions are to be
construed as mandatory, unless by express provision or by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest. To the Court, the constitutional provision in question
indicates that it falls within the exception rather than the general rule. By the phrase
“unless reduced by SC”, it is evident that the period prescribe therein is subject to
modification by the Court in accordance with its prerogative under the Constitution.

There can be no doubt that said provision, having been incorporated for
reasons of expediency relates merely to matters of procedure. Constitutional
provisions are directory, and not mandatory, where they refer to matters merely
procedural.

The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often

determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the
general public by disregarding than by enforcing the letter of the law. Statutes
requiring the rendition of judgment forthwith/immediately after the trial/verdict have
been held by some courts to be merely directory so that non-compliance with them
does not invalidate the judgment, on the theory that if the statute had intended such
result, it would clearly have indicated it.

D. AIDS IN INTERPRETATION

LEGASPI vs. MINISTER OF FINANCE

FACTS:
Legaspi, then a member of the temporary Batasang Pambansa, petitioned in
1982 to declare Presidential Decree 1840 illegal, claiming it granted tax amnesty and
required the submission of a listing of assets and obligations, among other things. He
said that the proclamation was issued despite the fact that the Constitution states that
"The Legislative authority shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa," and that the
President may only grant amnesty "with the approval of the Batasang Pambansa."

In this case, the IBP did not give its approval. Legaspi said that now that
martial law has been removed, the president can no longer make legislation at will. At
the same time, Legaspi claimed that Amendment No. 6, which gives Marcos
legislative powers, is null and void because the ML is no longer in effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1973 Constitution as amended by Plebiscite-Referendum
of 1976, retained the same amendments,more particularly Amendment No. 6, after it
was again amended in the Plebiscite held on April 7, 1981?

RULING:
No.Constitutional interpretation not only requires literal application. It is also
important to take the intention of the laws with respect to their historical background.
The legislature that Secs 1-2 Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution refers to is the interim
Batasang Pambansa created by Amendment 2; Amendments 3 and 4 are inseparable
from Amendment 2 as it made adjustments to it. The 1981 plebiscite’s reference to
Amendment 2 has no intention to convert or upgrade the interim Batasan into aregular
Batasang Pambansa.

Therefore, the Batasan is still interim Legaspi misunderstood Amendment 6.

He believed that it vested legislative powers only upon the President/Prime Minister,
and since the 1981 removed the position of President/Prime Minister, nobody in the
government can exercise legislative powers. Amendment 6 allows the President to
exercise legislative power during emergencies or whenever the interim BP fails to act
adequately in the President’s judgment. The purpose of Amendment 6 was to allow
the President to exercise emergency powers without the need to declare martial law
nationwide.
 DE CASTRO V JBC
FACTS:
The presidential election of 2010 is trying to approach. C.J. Puno will step
down on May 17, 2010, seven days after the presidential election. The JBC began
accepting applicants for the position of C.J. in January 2010. Meanwhile, there are
several strong objections to Pres. C.J. was appointed by GMA. Puno's successor was
born.

As a result, applications challenging her jurisdiction to select a new C.J. were

filed. in light of the presidential appointment ban enacted by Section 15, Article VII
of the Constitution two months before to the next presidential election and lasting
until the conclusion of the President's tenure. This viewpoint appears to conflict with
Section 4(1) of Article VIII, which states that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must
be filled within 90 days of its occurrence, and Section 9 of Article VIII, which states
that the President must make appointments to the Judiciary within 90 days of the
JBC's submission of a list of nominees.

It is also maintained that appointing the next Chief Justice is unnecessary since
Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 may still deal with the circumstance of having
the future President pick the successor. It stipulates that in the event of a vacancy in
the office of the Chief Justice, the C.J. Until such handicap is removed, or another
C.J. is appointed, they shall descend upon the Associate Justice who is first in
precedence  is lawfully appointed and qualified. It is also maintained that the
incumbent President does not need to nominate C.J.'s successor during the prohibition
period.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.

HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to
fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section
15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4.
(1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in
that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is
absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14
and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary,
the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.