MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

FACTS:
Respondent GSIS planned to sell 30 percent to 51 percent of respondent
MHC's issued and outstanding shares through public auction in accordance with
Proclamation No. 50's privatization program. The winning bidder, or eventual
strategic partner, will provide managerial skills and/or a worldwide
marketing/reservation system, as well as financial assistance, to help the Manila Hotel
improve its profitability and performance. Only two bidders competed in a close
bidding war: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51 percent of MHC, or 15,300,000 shares, at P41.58 per share,
and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid.

Petitioner matched the bid price offered by Renong Berhad pending Renong
Berhard's announcement as the successful bidder. Concerned that respondent GSIS
had ignored the matching bid tender and that the sale of 51 percent of the MHC may
be rushed by respondent GSIS and completed with Renong Berhad, petitioner sought
prohibition and mandamus from this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.

RULING:
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except
by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties,
and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered
into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and
effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles.
Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of
the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different
departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and
inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such
as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means
of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred
and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to

enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore
and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.
That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather

than non self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions
of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give
the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute.

Guingona v. Carague
Facts:
Guingona challenged the automatic appropriation for foreign debt service in
the 1990 budget as illegal. According to petitioners, the three presidential decrees
allowing such automatic appropriation violate the Constitution's Sec 29 (1), Art VI,
because they lack the supposed requisite definiteness, certainty, and exactness in
appropriation, and as a result, it is an excessive delegation of legislative power
because the President determines the amount authorized for debt service in advance.

Issue:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget
violative of Art VI, Sec 29 (1) of the Constitution?

Held.
No. Unlike the Nebraska Constitution cited by petitioners, our Constitution
does not require a clear, particular, exact, or "specific appropriation made by
legislation." Our Constitution simply provides that all treasury payments must be
made in accordance with a legislative appropriation. More importantly, our
Constitution does not require any specific language or religious recitals in order for
Congress to issue an authorization or appropriation, other than that it be "made by
law," as the questioned presidential decrees were.
In other words, for the current fiscal year, an appropriation might be made
both implicitly and explicitly. Annual statutes, such as a general appropriations act, or
particular provisions of general or special application laws, such as the questioned
decrees, may contain Congressional authority.

Caltex v Palomar,
FACTS:
 Caltex launched the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest," in which contestants had
to predict the number of liters contained in a shrouded pump. Participants do not
required to buy any Caltex items to participate; instead, they must get entry forms
from their local Caltex station. Three levels of competition would be used to select
winners: dealer, regional, and national. At the first stage, the person who makes the
most accurate predictions about the contents of the hooded pump wins, and the other
two runner-ups receive corresponding prizes. The first prize in the Dealer Contest
advances to the Regional level, where the same mechanics of first, second, and third
awards apply. The Regional Contest's first prize is awarded to the National Contest.

Caltex sought postal authorities to be cleared of several important prohibitions

in the Postal Law, anticipating the scheme's impending mass usage of mail. The
Postal Law lists non-mailable items, enables the issuing of a fraud order, and specifies
the consequences of breaking the law. Advertisements for lottery, gift enterprise, and
other similar schemes are examples of non-mailable things. Caltex's request was
refused by Postmaster Palomar, who said that Caltex's program fell under the category
of lottery advertising, which is not mailable. Caltex requested reconsideration; the
Postmaster repeated his position, adding that if the scam proceeds, a fraud order will
be issued. Caltex requested a court order. And the trial court agreed with them. The
Postmaster has now filed an appeal.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Caltex Hooded Pump Contest violate Postal Law.

RULING:
NO. What is prohibited by the Postal Law is lottery, inter alia. Lottery
necessarily includes consideration, prize, and chance. Caltex’s contest does include
the elements of prize and chance but not consideration as no purchase is required of
participants. Is it a gift enterprise? Still no because no purchase. Lottery is prohibited
if there is consideration; thereby gift enterprise is also prohibited if there is
consideration, following noscitur a sociis. But as demonstrated, neither is Caltex’s
game a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Hence it should be allowed to proceed.

Construction is defined as the “art or process of discovering and expounding

the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a
given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the
fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law”. It applies in this case
in how the ponencia examined the meaning of “lottery” to come to a conclusion.
Specifically, it applied when the court looked into what lottery meant: consideration,
prize, and chance. This allowed for a decisive interpretation of the word in question.