NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, JODHPUR

___________________________________________________________________________
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 AND LIMITATION ACT, 1963

MID-TERM ASSIGNMENT

(Assignment towards fulfilment of assessment in the subject of Civil Procedure Code, 1908
and Limitation Act, 1963)

TOPIC: EFFECT OF LEGAL DISABILITY ON LIMITATION PERIOD

Submitted to:
Mr. Amitesh Deshmukh
(Faculty of Civil Procedure Code, 19088 and Limitation Act, 1963)
National Law University, Jodhpur

Submitted by:
UG SEMESTER III
One thousand eight hundred and twenty-one (1821)
One thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight (1778)
B.A.LL.B.
Semester III

Date of Submission: 5th October, 2020.

 AKNOWLWDGEMENT

We would like to express my special thanks and gratitude to our Professor of Code of Civil

Procedure, Mr. Amitesh Deshmukh for his able guidance and support in the completion of

my project for the mid-terms.

Then, I would like to thank my parents and friends who have helped me with their valuable

suggestions and guidance. This has been helpful in various phases of the completion of the

project.

Last but not the least, I would like to thank my classmates who have helped me a lot.

2
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................4

STATUTORY PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO LEGAL DISABILITY IN LIMITATION

ACT, 1963..................................................................................................................................6

STATUTORY PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO LEGAL DISABILITY IN CIVIL

PROCEDURE CODE, 1908....................................................................................................10

TYPES OF LEGAL DISABILITY - AN OVERVIEW..........................................................12

RELEVANT CASE LAWS PERTAINING TO LEGAL DISABILITIES.............................15

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................16

3
 INTRODUCTION

“Imagine if someone else was making decisions for you. They could decide to take you away,

lock you up, not listen to you, give you medication, block you from doing your work and

living your life with your body and mind the way they are. WOULD YOU WANT THIS TO

HAPPEN TO YOU?”

- International Disability Caucus, Comprehensive and Integral International

Convention on and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities.

The word LIMITATION itself signifies what it means. In its literal sense, the term means a

restriction or the rule or circumstances which are limited. The ‘Law of Limitation’ prescribes

the time limits for different suits. Within the time period prescribed in the act, the aggrieved

person can approach the court to take any legal action for redressal. If the suit is filed after

the expiry of the time period according to the limitation act, the same is struck down and is

not taken into consideration. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, it has been observed

by the court that there are three different reasons to impose limitation on the filing of the suit:

1. Those long dormant claims have more cruelty than justice in them.

2. That a defendant might have lost the evidence to dispute the State claim.

3. That person with good causes of actions should pursue them with.

Furthermore, the main object of this is to give effect to the maxim of ‘interest reipublicae ut

sit finis litium’, which basically means that if it is required by the state to take action to limit

the litigation to an extent, in its interest, it can take actions in consonance of it. Also, if there

is a disturbance in the rights, which may have been acquired by the concepts of justice and

equity, or the deprivation of the same due to the long enjoyment of the rights of filing the

4
suit, then the brunt of the plaintiff’s own inaction, negligence or laches should not be borne

by the defendant.1 Thus, statutes of limitations are designed to aid defendants.

However, the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. It is

founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. 2 The

underlying principle behind this statute is the welfare of the people. Therefore, in certain

exceptional circumstances, a plaintiff can prevent his right of filing a suit even after the

expiry of the time period stipulated in the Limitation Act. He can do so by seeking a toll to

the statute. By this the computation of a certain time period is not regarded until some event

specified by the law takes place.

There are a myriad of instances mentioned as the exceptions to the limitation period, one of

which is the LEGAL DISABILITY.

According to the Disabled Persons Act, a disabled person is, “a person with a physical,

mental or sensory disability, including a visual, hearing or speech functional disability which

gives rise to physical, cultural or social barriers inhibiting him or her from participating at an

equal level with other members of society in activities, undertakings or fields of employment

that are open to other members of society.” Thus, various conventions and legislations all

over the world realise and protect the rights of such persons. The rationale behind such laws

is to provide equal opportunities, prevent abuse and unjust treatment against the people of

this community. On similar lines, the concept of legal disability has been incorporated in the

Civil Laws of India and various provisions are made so as to ensure fulfilment of principles

of equity and the prevention of maladministration of justice merely on the basis of a legal

disability. In this context, it is important to understand that a person who is a minor, an

incompetent or incapacitated person, or an unborn individual is considered to be under legal

1
Rajendra Singh v. Santa Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 705.
2
N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123.
5
disability. A child, a person with a mental illness or an idiot is regarded as a person who

cannot bring an action for the suit on their own behalf. For their convenience and to provide

them with adequate opportunity, the limitation period is tolled unless their disability has

ceased to exist and they have become both mature and rational to take the decisions by

themselves. Thus, this legal concept can be termed as some kind of eligibility criteria that

allows/disallows parties from contesting their legal claims due to the existence of some

extraordinary circumstances. For instance, in the case of a minor, once he reaches the age of

majority the computation of the limitation period resumes.

Section 3 of the Limitation Act is a very important section. It deals with the different time

periods that are to be allowed to parties to file cases, beyond which the concept of limitation

debars parties from filing any suits. However, it is to be noticed that this section also provides

for some exceptions in cases of extraordinary situations that lie in sections 4-24 of the

Limitation Act.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO LEGAL DISABILITY IN

LIMITATION ACT, 1963

As discussed earlier the object behind the limitation of the institution of legal action is to fix

the time span for the redress of a legal remedy. However, there can be circumstances where

due to a person’s physical or mental disability he/she is unable to file a claim or make an

application. In such cases the law must not be the same and special privileges and relaxation

must be given to the persons undergoing legal disability. Thus, the concept of legal disability

can be described as some kind of cooling off period wherein individuals or their legal

representatives of any form cannot file suits due to the legally induced disability- either

insanity, idiocy or minor age. The period of limitation is said to resume once the disability

ceases to exist. The provisions of legal disability are enshrined in Section 6 of the Statute of

6
Limitation Act, 1963. It also extends to other sections 7, 8 and 9 which play an essential role

in the understanding and interpretation of this concept.

Minority, idiocracy and insanity are the different grounds under sections 6 and 7 of the act

that allow parties to file suits after the time period when the disability is over. Section 6 is an

enabling section, enabling persons under disability to exercise their legal rights within a

certain time and it should be construed liberally.3

Section 6 does not provide for a fresh starting point of limitation. It means that the person

under disability is entitled to an extension of time till the expiry of the period mentioned in

the schedule calculated from the cessation of disability. The disability has to compulsorily

exist at the time from which period of limitation is supposed to begin. In this regard it is

important to know about the combined effect of Sections 6, 7 and 8, whereby they should be

read together. Sections 6, 7 and 8 form a group, they supplement each other and are not

mutually exclusive.4 The combined effect of section 6 and 8 is that where the ordinary period

of limitation expires before the cessation of the disability, for instance before the attainment

of the majority, the minor will no doubt be entitled to a fresh starting point of limitation from

the attainment of his majority subject to concession on limitation to a maximum period of 3

years5. Thus, Section 8 makes it amply clear that the concept or pre-emptive action does not

exist in this case and that the time period for limitation is three years after the death of such a

person or the ceasing of his disability.6 It is ancillary to and restrictive of the concession

granted in sections 6 and 7, and does not confer any substantial privilege but is of the nature

of a proviso to these sections.7 The sub-sections practically reproduce, extend and help in the

interpretation of Section 6 in a broader context, such as the explanation offered by the section
3
Kurgodigowda v. Nanjangowda , (1917) ILR 41 Bom 625 .
4
Rati Ram v. Niadar , (1919) ILR 41 All 435 : AIR 1919 All 209 .
5
Ponnamma Pillai v. Padmanabhan Channar , AIR 1969 Ker 163.
6
Darshan Singh v. Gurdev Singh , AIR 1995 SC 75.
7
Rangaswami v. Thangavelu, 42 Mad 637, Janardan v. Nilkantha, AIR 1952 Ori. 31.
7
that brings a child in the womb within the purview of the term ‘minor’ setting at rest a

conflict of decisions on the above aspect. It is also important to note that as per section 6(2),

where several disabilities co-exist concurrently or where the plaintiff is affected by another

disability before recovery from earlier disability, time will not commence till both the

disabilities have ceased.8 The Halsbury laws of England also recognise a similar legal

position. After such a time period has already begun, no subsequent disability can lead to

resetting of this clock as per section 9 of the Limitation Act.

A person under disability may sue within the same period after the disability has ceased as he

would otherwise have been allowed under the statute (third column of the schedule), but

subject to the special limitation as mentioned in Section 8. Thus, if the ordinary period of

limitation expires more than three years after cessation of disability, the plaintiff is not

entitled to any extension.9

Since Section 6 expressly states that extension under the section is related to the period of

limitation specified in the third column of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, it is clear that

Section 6 cannot apply to periods of limitation fixed under any other law. 10

APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 6 ON OTHER PROCEEDINGS-

Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable only to suits and applications for the

execution of a decree.11 The section makes no mention of appeals. Its provisions are therefore

unavailable to minor or insane appellants. 12 The current section 6 is narrower as compared to

the corresponding section of the Act 15 of 1877, as it does not apply, for instance, to an

8
Harek Chand v. Bejoy Chand Mahatab , (1905) 9 CWN 795.
9
Nannekhan v. Sanpat AIR 1954 Hyd 45 (FB), I.S. Mohammad v. N.A.N. Mohammad, AIR
1984 Guj. 126.
10
Shiva Prasad v. Shidal Nath , AIR 1955 VP 43.
11
Johnson v. Mad Railway Co. , (1905) ILR 28 Mad 479 .
12
Ramnath v. Chatterpalman , (1915) 30 IC 521 (A).
8
application for the passing of a final decree in a mortgage suit, or to an application for

restoration of a suit or of an appeal dismissed for default, or to an application to set aside an

ex parte decree, or to an application for setting aside an execution sale. But it applies to

applications under Section 144, Civil Procedure Code, as restitution applications have been

held to be in the nature of applications for execution. 13 This section also applies to

proceedings under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1 of 1951 and are

applicable to claims for compensation under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.

In a similar context it is important to note that concurrently, the status quo of the Limitation

Act is that it does not extend to tribunals. Therefore, the rule established is that the Act is

solely intended to be brought before the courts or judicial authorities, and not quasi-judicial

bodies such as tribunals, unless expressly stated in the Statute itself. In this regard there are

two approaches. In the case of Union of India v Namit Sharma,14 it was defended that

Tribunals are vested with the powers to adjudicate and determine the disputes between the

parties which fall within the scope and ambit of its jurisdiction, the Tribunal is a part of an

ordinary hierarchy in the administration of justice and is akin to a Court. The Supreme Court

has also held that though the independence of judiciary, strictly applied to the Court system,

by necessary implication, it would also apply to Tribunals whose functioning is quasi-judicial

and akin to the Court system. The liberal approach towards the applicability of provisions of

Limitation Act have been analysed through the case of M.P. Steel Corporation v

Commissioner of Central Excise, The status quo laid down was that no exemption was

possible under section 14 due to its inapplicability as a tribunal. Justice Nariman, in the face

of this, put forward an expansive approach to viewing Section 14. Explaining that while

Section 14 may not find its place in the face of tribunals, it would be beneficial to scrutinize

the principles on which the section was based. Principles which would further the cause of
13
Mahjibhai Mohanbhai Barat v. Patel Manibhai , (1965) 2 SC J 29.
14
Union of India v Namit Sharma Petition (C) No. 210 of 2012.
9
justice, and would apply, regardless of lex. Reason and justice, after all, was the crux of law.

Section 14 as a result, could be liberally interpreted to include tribunals under the umbrella of

the term ‘court’. In addition to this, he noted that Section 6 of the Limitation Act was of

similar nature, and was backed with case law supporting the argument for a liberal

understanding of the Act. Thus, these questions of laws and their implications have a great

role to play in understanding about the applicability of section 6 on various other

proceedings.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO LEGAL DISABILITY IN CIVIL

PROCEDURE CODE, 1908

There are some provisions pertaining to legal disability in the Civil Procedure Code of 1908.

Some of these sections are

1. Under order 8 rule 5(1) of the CPC, it has been said that if a specific charge has not been

denied specifically or not admitted by a defendant then it would be admitted specifically

except against those persons suffering from legal disabilities15 .

2. Section 6 (3) of the limitation act of 1963 empowers legal representatives to file a suit after

the death of a person suffering from legal disability15, this provision is supported by order 22

rule 3 (1) of the CPC that makes legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff party to a suit.16

3. Under rule 4A of order 22, the court can appoint an administer General or an officer of the

court as it thinks fit to represent the estate of the deceased person, in case there are no legal

representatives left17.

15
The Code of Civil Procedure 1908, order 8 rule 5 (1).
16
The Code of Civil Procedure 1908, order 22 rule 3 (1).
17
The Code of Civil Procedure 1908, order 22 rule 4 A.
10
4. Under rule 1 (1) of order 23 of the CPC, a suit where the plaintiff is a minor or any other

person to whom rules 1 to 14 of order 31 extend, then a suit can be withdrawn only after the

court has been satisfied as explained in rule 3 of order 23 on the grounds of formal defect or

existence of grounds to file a fresh suit. In the case of Joannala Sura Reddy V. Tiyyagura

Srinivasa18, it was said that no fresh suit can be filed if the previous suit has not been

withdrawn after taking the court’s consent under rules 1 and 3 of order 23.

5. Under rule 12 of Order 32 of CPC, which deals with suits filed by minors on them

attaining majority, it was said in the case of Vidya Wati v. Hans Raj 19 that under the specific

provision mentioned above no dismissal of the suit is needed in case a minor has decided not

to pursue the matter after attaining majority.

6. The provisions of Section 48 of CPC have been deleted and have been incorporated in

Section 17(2) of the Limitation Act. Earlier, if the minor made an application for execution

and thus obtained a decree, the provision of Section 11 and 12 of the then Limitation Act of

1859[79], did not prohibit their application to the provisions of CPC, with regard to the

periods prescribed by that code. If the period provided by that code is of one year, Section 11

and 12 are to be applied. But the provisions of the present Section 6 have been limited to the

periods mentioned in the statute itself.

In Moro Sadashiv v. Visaji Raghunath 80 the Bombay High Court held that the period of 12

years prescribed by Section 230 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Section 48 of the present

Code) may be extended by the “general principle of law” so that time does not run against a

minor. This was further held in the subsequent judgement to be in consonance with the

principles of natural justice. [82] In Lolit v. Janaky ,[84] the Calcutta High Court assumed

18
Joannala Sura Reddy V. Tiyyagura Srinivasa, AIR 2004 AP 222; Universal’s Bare Act with
Short Notes, 2014-The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, page 16.
19
L.Rs. V. Hans Raj, AIR 1993 Del 187; Id., page 186.
11
that Section 7 of Act 15 of 1877 would be applicable to the 12 years period of limitation

prescribed by Section 230 of the old Code of Civil Procedure and observed that such period

could not (as provided by the section) be extended, if the disability arose subsequently to the

date the decree from which the period was to be reckoned.

TYPES OF LEGAL DISABILITY - AN OVERVIEW

MINOR

This disability pertains to the age of the individual. Under Section 3(1) of the Indian Majority

Act,187520 as a person attains majority when that person completes the age of eighteen years.

The computation of the age of the minor is discussed in Section 3(2) of the Indian Majority

Act, 1875-

1. The day on which a child is born is to be computed as a full day.

2. The child is said to have attained majority on the occurrence of the eighteenth

anniversary of that day.

This Majority act applies to all the people in India. If any of the personal law specifically

considers the age of majority as to be something else, only then can it be something other

than 18 years of age.21 The act specifies the situations in which the court can take

superintendence over the life and property of the minor and thus can appoint a guardian for

that purpose. In such cases, the age of minority extends to the age of 21 years. 22 A child in a

mother’s womb is also termed as a minor.

INSANE

20
The Indian Majority Act, 1875, Section 3(1).
21
Bajpai, Asha, “Who is a child?”, <www.infochangeindia.org> 2007.
22
The Limitation Act, 1963, Page 7.
12
The second criterion for applying the bar of legal disability is that of insanity. This concept is

explained in great detail in the case of S.K.Yadav V State of Maharashtra 23 that was contested

in the Supreme Court. In this case the court dealt with the concept of insanity in our legal

system at great length. It stated that courts only recognized legal insanity and not medical

insanity and that there were substantial differences between the two. Even if insanity has

been previously proved medically or in a lower court of law, it has to be proved in the higher

court. Furthermore, it is to be noticed that no such specific tests lie to prove legal insanity.

Behaviours, antecedent, attendant and subsequent to the event, are to be taken into account

while considering if a said person is to be termed insane or not.

In India, insanity defence law, Section 84 IPC is solely based on the Mc Naughten rules and

no changes so far have been made since it is drafted. Section 84 of IPC deals with the “act of

a person of unsound mind.” “Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the

time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the

act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law”. Indian legal system is

concerned with legal insanity and not with medical insanity. 24 Section 84 IPC, clearly

embodies a fundamental maxim of criminal jurisprudence that is, (a) “Actus nonfacit reum

nisi mens sit rea” (an act does not constitute guilt unless done with a guilty intention) and (b)

“Furiosi nulla voluntas est” (a person with mental illness has no free will) 25. The Apex Court

in its judgment reported that though accused suffered from certain mental instability of mind

even before and after the incident but one cannot infer on a balance of preponderance of

probabilities that the appellant at the time of the commission of the offense did not know the

nature of his act; that it was either wrong or contrary to law, hence rejected insanity

defence. In the context of burden of proof the court in State of M.P. v. Ahmadullh 26, states

23
Hari Singh Gond V State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 321 of 2007
24
Ibid.
25
Bapu @ Gajraj Singh vs State of Rajasthan. Appeal (crl.) 1313 of 2006.
26
State of M.P. v. Ahmadullh, AIR 1961 SC 998.

13
that “under law, every man is presumed to be sane and assumed to possess a sufficient degree

of reason to be responsible for his acts unless the contrary is proved”.

IDIOT

The legal disabilities mentioned in section 6 include minor, insane and idiot. We have

discussed the legal disabilities of minors and insane, now let us have a look at the rationale

behind the legal disability of an idiot. In the case of Hari Singh Gond v. State of Madhya

Pradesh27, it was said that there were four sub-types of non-compos mentis, of which idiot

was one. In this case, idiocy is considered as “natural insanity” rather than an “acquired

insanity” as it is present since birth. Thus, an idiot is one who from birth is benefited on

account of perpetual infirmity of memory power and understanding, and includes a deaf-

mute. In common law a person born deaf and dumb was held to be in the same state as an

idiot, because being incapable of understanding he was supposed to be lacking in all those

senses which furnish the human mind with ideas.28

RELEVANT CASE LAWS PERTAINING TO LEGAL DISABILITIES

1. Darshan Singh V Gurdev Singh29 - Section 6 allows the minor to extend the limitation to

some more time and entitles the minor, insane or idiot to institute the suit or make the

application within the same period prescribed in the third column of the Schedule to the

Act after the said legal disability has come to an end. Special limitation explained in

Section 8 of the act has explained that extended period after cessation of the disability

will not cover beyond three years of the death of such legally disabled person or

cessation of his said legal disability. In each case, the plaintiff is considered to be

empowered by section 8 to a fresh starting period of limitation from the date of cessation

27
Hari Singh Gond v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 321 of 2007.
28
Karuppa Goundan v. Periaswani Goundan , (1960) 1 MLJ 360.
29
Darshan Singh V Gurdev Singh, 1995 AIR 75, 1994 SCC (6) 585.
14
 of disability, which is consequently subject to the condition that the period of such

extension under Section 6 or 7. The plaintiff can thus file a suit within this time period

before limitation debars it.

2. Udhavji Anandji Ladha and Ors. Vs Bapudas Ramdas Darbar 30 - Section 6 does not

cover in any way any “intervening” kind of legal disability. When a legal disability is in

existence, only then can section 6 be successfully applied. But if a person cannot be

termed to be suffering from any kind of legal disability when such a limitation time-line

begins, he cannot in any way avail the relaxation of standards offered by section-6.

While reading Section 3, the period of limitation for suits has to be considered by reading

Schedule 1 with Sections 4 to 25of the Limitation Act; and, therefore prescribed for a

suit by a minor cannot be the period mentioned in Schedule 1, but a special period that is

described in Section 6 of the Act. Therefore, in the case of a minor it cannot be said that

the period for filing suits under section 6 has expired without taking into account the

provisos involved. This ensures that the right of minors to contest suits is not taken away,

without offering them any reasonable time period to do so accordingly.

3. Lalchand Dhanalal vs Dharamchand and Ors.31 - This case stated that cause of action or

grievance must take place when the plaintiff (in this particular case the administratrix)

dies and the period of limitation is thus initiated with no subsequent disability leading to

reset of that clock as per section 9 of the Limitation Act. A plaintiff can only rightfully

claim benefit only if such a right existed due to a legal disability as and when the period

of limitation began. Any subsequent disability on his part will not stop the running of

limitation. Consequently, he will be governed by the same period of limitation as the

earlier limited owner, but such a disability can come into his defence if his claims are

independent of the earlier claimant’s plea.

30
Udhavji Anandji Ladha and Ors. vs Bapudas Ramdas Darbar, AIR 1950 Bom 94.
31
Lalchand Dhanalal vs Dharamchand and Ors. , AIR 1965 MP 102.
15
4. Bapu Tatya Desai vs Bala Raojee Desai - This case stated the purpose of section 7 of the

Limitation act is to regulate the supposed indulgence that is available to minors to ensure

that the benefit of section 6 of the Limitation act does not extend to a correspondingly

long period of time but only till the eldest of the lot does not end up as a major.32

CONCLUSION

The statutory provisions of Limitation Act, 1963, as under sections 6,7,8 respectively talk

about the legal disability of a person and the effect of such disability on the limitation period.

The various developments that have taken place for the protection of the rights of the legally

disabled persons for filing the suits help us in understanding the judicial machinery, as well

as the scope of proceedings under Sections 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the limitation Act. The concept of

legal disability can be described as some kind of cooling off period wherein individuals or

their legal representatives of any form cannot file suits due to the legally induced disability-

either insanity, idiocy or minor age. The period of limitation is said to resume once the

disability ceases to exist. The combined effect of Sections 6, 7 and 8 of limitation act has

been discussed in great detail, which helps us in analysing the relevant case laws and

ascertaining the true legal position as regard to the limitation period if a person is legally

disabled. It is however, important to note that the law in regard to legal disability is still

evolving.

32
Bapu Tatya Desai vs Bala Raojee Desai, (1920) 22 BOMLR 1383, Pg. No. 3.
16