G.R. No.

L-9010            March 28, 1914 (Articles 2176, 2184, and 2194, Civil Code)

J. H. CHAPMAN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JAMES M. UNDERWOOD, defendant-appellee.

DOCTRINE: An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue
in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself
responsible for such acts: Article 2184 in relation to 2176 and 2194 on solidary liability.

This is a 1914 Case. Petitioner Chapman while in the process of boarding a streetcar got bumped by
the defendant’s-UNDERWOOD car being driven by his chauffeur. The chauffeur was found to be
negligent being on the wrong lane but the issue is:

Issue: Whether the defendant-CAR OWNER-Underwood is solidarily liable with his driver? (Article
2184)

Held: No, that there was no appreciable time for Underwood to have corrected the negligent
actions of his driver….for the owner to be solidarily liable with the driver, there must be established
“a reasonable opportunity for the owner to observe and consequently to correct the driver’s negligent
acts”.

The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length a time that
the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own. (MEANING THRU AN
APPRECIABLE AMOUNT OF TIME, UPON EXPOSURE TO DRIVERS NEGLIGENT ACTS, THE
OWNER IS DEEMED IN AGREEMENT/IN ACQUIESCENCE WITH HIS DRIVER)

In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time the automobile took the
wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give the
defendant an opportunity to correct the act of his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness
that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the
accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

(What is a streetcar? The streetcar is a mode of public transportation that is having
a major comeback. It involves running short electric trains along tracks in the roadway:
www.vox.com) 

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902 Spanish Civil Code)

Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former,
who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. This article (drafted
by Code Commission Chairman Bocobo) is intended to cover only the owners of private motor
vehicles for private use

Article 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)

FACTS:

The plaintiff-CHAPMAN after visiting his friend, passed from the gate into the street for the purpose
of signaling and boarding the streetcar. In the process, he was bumped from behind by the
defendant’s car.

The defendant was following a street car(train) bound from Manila to Santa Ana being immediately
in front of him, he followed along behind it. Just before reaching the scene of the accident the street
car which was following took the switch — that is, went off the main line to the left upon the switch
lying alongside of the main track. Defendant, not following the street car, kept straight ahead on the
main street-car track or a bit to the right.

The street car which the plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite
direction to that in which the defendant was going. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car, the
one the plaintiff attempted to board, was almost in front of the defendant's automobile, defendant's
driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff, as above described.

The judgment of the trial court was for the defendant.

ISSUE: Whether the defendant’s driver is guilty and whether the defendant-UNDERWOOD is
solidarily liable with his chauffeur driver?

HELD: The defendant's driver was guilty of negligence. He was passing an oncoming car upon the
wrong side. (COUNTERFLOW) The plaintiff, in common out to board the car, was not obliged, for his
own protection, to observe whether a car was coming upon him from his left hand. He had only to
guard against those coming from the right. He knew that, according to the law of the road, no
automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side of the car. He needed
only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted to
pass upon that side of the street car.

The defendant-BOSS OWNER-UNDERWOOD, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his
driver, in unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to
give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist
therefrom.

As we have said in the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the driver does not fall within
the list of persons in article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be
responsible. (2180)

An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation
of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to
observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such
acts.

The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length a time that
the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.

In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time the automobile took the
wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give the
defendant an opportunity to correct the act of his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness
that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the
accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver.