Article 158

FIDEL B. FORTUNO vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

G.R. No. L-1782 February 2, 1948

PARAS, J.:

Facts:

This is a petition for the writ of habeas corpus  in which the petitioner, a prisoner whose
aggregate penalty is more than twenty years of imprisonment counted from October 8, 1941, seeks his
immediate release.

The first ground is that the recommitment order issued by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence
on October 4, 1941, directing the confinement of the petitioner for the unexpired portion of his
maximum sentence in case No. 9587 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (2 years, 4 months and 22
days), was illegal and otherwise premature, because (1) petitioner's one-day trip to Santa Rosa, Laguna,
merely to get money from his relatives, did not constitute a violation of his parole that he was to live in
Manila and not to change his residence during the period of his parole without the prior permission of
the board, and (2) the mere filing against the petitioner of several complaints for estafa, without final
judgment of conviction, did not constitute a violation of another condition of his parole that he was not
to commit any crime and was to conduct himself in an orderly manner. Petitioner's position is
untenable. Without deciding whether or not his visit to Santa Rosa without first securing the consent of
the board was a violation of one of the conditions of his parole, it may safely be held that he broke the
other condition; namely, that he would not commit any crime, since the petitioner was prosecuted for
and finally convicted of the series of estafa committed by him during the period of his parole.
Petitioner's contention that the recommitment order was premature, because it came down before his
convictions, is now rather academic, even assuming that final conviction is necessary in order to
constitute a violation of the condition in dispute.

The second ground is that the additional penalty of 10 years of imprisonment imposed upon the
petitioner in CA - G.R. No. 79, was illegal and in excess of the jurisdiction of the court, because his
conviction for illegal possession of counterfeit bills should not be counted for habitual delinquency
purposes, since said conviction is not for robbery, theft, estafa or falsification. In other words,
petitioner's contention is that his previous conviction for illegal possession of counterfeit bills was
wrongly included. Such mistake, even if true, cannot be corrected in a proceeding for habeas corpus, for
there is virtually no difference between the alleged error and that pointed out in Paguntalan vs. Director
of Prisons, 57 Phil., 140, wherein it was held that the error of counting as separate convictions various
convictions which should be counted as one due to the proximity of the commission of the crimes,
should "have been corrected by appeal, for it was rather an error of judgment and not an undue
exercise of judicial power which vitiates and nullifies the proceeding."
 Petitioner also argues that the information in CA - G.R. No. 79 did not contain any allegation that
he was an habitual delinquent, though it was alleged therein that he was a recidivist. Apart from the
absence of proof on the point, and from the legal presumptions that the court acted lawfully in the
exercise of its jurisdiction and performed its duty regularly (section 69, pars. m and n, Rule 123), the
alleged defect may be likened to that referred to in Domingo y Reyes vs. Director or Prisons, 44 Off.
Gaz., 2201, wherein we said that "the allegation, if true, that the judgment of conviction was rendered
without a plea of guilty properly entered by the accused to the lesser offense of homicide, is merely a
defect of procedure, not of jurisdiction, though it may have the effect of voiding the judgment," and
"cannot be reviewed in habeas corpus proceedings wherein the only issue is whether or not the
petitioner is entitled to release."

The third ground is that the petitioner is entitled to a special allowance of one-fifth of his
aggregate penalty on account of his failure to escape from his place of confinement during the war. Our
ruling on this feature of the case has to be adverse to the petitioner, inasmuch as we have already held
that "the special allowance for loyalty authorized by articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code refers
to those convicts who, having evaded service of their sentence by leaving the penal institution, give
themselves up within two days," and not to those who have not escaped. (Artigas Losada vs. Acenas, 44
Off. Gaz., 2694.)

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the allowance of his aggregate penalty.

Rulings:

The last question propounded by the petitioner is that he is entitled to the allowance of one-
fifth of his aggregate penalty because he did not escape from his place of confinement during the war.
The contention is also rejected by the majority who invoke the decision in Losada vs. Acenas, L-810-813.
Our disagreement with said decision is explained in the opinion which we quote:

The legal controversy in this case centers upon the interpretation and application of articles 98
and 158 of the Revised Penal Code. We are inclined to follow the liberal interpretation adopted by the
lower court and, therefore, to affirm its judgment, dated July 20, 1946, ordering the release of appellees
Manuel Artigas Losada, Santiago Aguda, Getulio Geocada and Francisco Danao.

Under the two above-mentioned articles of the Revised Penal Code, a convict who shall evade
the service of his sentence by leaving the penal institution where he is confined, on the occasion of
disorder resulting from a conflagration, earthquake, explosion, or similar catastrophe, or during a
mutiny in which he has not participated, shall suffer an increase of one-fifth of the period still remaining
to be served under his sentence, or a deduction of one-fifth of his sentence if, in the first case, he shall
fail to give himself up to the authorities or, in the second case, he gives himself up to the authorities
within forty-eight hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the
calamity or catastrophe.
 There is no question that war is a calamity or catastrophe similar to those specifically mentioned
by law. It is a fact that appellees behaved well during the last war and remained loyal to the prison
authorities in spite of the disorder occasioned by the war. As they did not escape, their cases apparently
do not fall within the letter of articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code. But the spirit embodied in
said articles offers no doubt that appellees' cases fall within the substantial purview of the law.

Under the provisions of articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code, the convict who shall
evade the service of his sentence and does not give himself up to the authorities within forty-eight hours
following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity, shall be punished
with an increase in his sentence, but if he gives himself up he will be granted as a reward, a reduction of
his sentence, a reduction that in appellee's cases will entitle them to freedom.

Appellant and the majority of this Court, instead of following the clear intention of the law,
would sacrifice it for the sake of the application ad pedem litere. Such attitude will lead us to absurd
conclusions.

For example, the articles in question contemplate the issuance of a proclamation by the Chief
Executive announcing the passing away of the calamity. In the hypothesis that such a proclamation is
never issued, a convict who shall have evaded service of sentence under the circumstances
contemplated by the law but later gives himself up to the authorities, will not be entitled to one-fifth
deduction. In another hypothesis, a convict who, on the occasion of disorder resulting from a calamity or
catastrophe, had opportunity to evade the service of his sentence, instead of escaping, voluntarily
continues to submit himself under the custody of the authorities who might not have the force to make
effective said custody, will be in a worse situation than the one who evaded his sentence. The absurd
consequences of the narrow-minded interpretation that sticks to the letter of the law, instead of
following the clear intention of the lawmaker, compels us to reject it.

The liberal interpretation adopted by the lower court is in consonance with the modern trend of
the law. That interpretation is in accordance with the spirit which should pervade all criminal laws, that
is, that any doubt or controversy should be resolved in a way that will be more beneficial to the accused.

For all the foregoing, we not to affirm the appealed decision. For all the foregoing, we vote to
grant the petition.
Article 159

ANTONIO INFANTE vs. THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL

G.R. No. L-4164 December 12, 1952

TUASON, J.:

Facts:

It appears that the petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to 17 years, four months
and one day of reclusion temporal, which he recommended to serve on June 21, 1927, and that on
March 6, 1939, after serving 15 years, 7 months and 11 days he was granted a conditional pardon and
released from imprisonment, the condition being that "he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of
the Philippines".

On April 25, 1949, Infante was found guilty by the Municipal Court of Bacolod City of driving a
jeep without license and sentence to pay a fine of P10 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. On July 13, 1950, "by virtue of the authority conferred upon His Excellency, the President, by
section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code", the Executive Secretary ordered Infante re-arrested
and re-committed to the custody of the Director of Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, for breach of the
condition of the aforesaid pardon.

The Executive Secretary ordered the re-arrest and recommitment of petitioner for violation of
the conditions of his pardon. He was arrested and he sued out this writ of habeas corpus. The Court of
First Instance discharged the petitioner on habeas corpus because the term of the pardon in question
did not imply that it was contemplated to have the condition operate beyond the term of his sentence.
The petition having been granted, the Provincial Fiscal has appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner should be detained for violation of his conditional pardon after
his original sentence has already elapsed.

Rulings:

No. The Court thinks that the condition of the pardon which the petitioner was charged with
having breached was no longer operative when he committed a violation of the Motor Vehicle Law. A’s
pardon does not state the time within which the conditions thereof were to be observed. Hence, A had
to observe the conditions of the pardon only within one year, six months and 20 days.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMIGIO PONTILLAS

G.R. No. 45267. June 15, 1938.

Diaz, J.:

Facts:

That on or about the 24th day of December, 1935, in the City of Manila, Commonwealth of the
Philippines, the said accused, having been granted on September 8, 1922, by His Excellency, the
Governor-General, a pardon remitting the unexecuted portion of his sentence of six years and one day
of prision correccional imposed upon him in criminal case No. 21823 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the crime of illegal marriage, which he began to serve on February 14, 1921, subject to the
condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippine Islands, which condition
was accepted by him on September 8, 1922, causing thereby his immediate release on that date from
the Bilibid Prisons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate the conditions of such
pardon, by then and there committing the crime of damage to property thru reckless driving, for which
he was received again in Bilibid Prisons on June 26, 1936, to suffer thirty days’ subsidiary imprisonment
in lieu of P61 fine and P60.30 indemnity imposed upon him by the Municipal Court in criminal case No.
H-47583, by virtue of the judgment rendered by the said court, which judgment has become final and
executory. 

Issue:

Whether or not Remigio Pontillas violate his conditional pardon.

Rulings:

He interposed a demurrer based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute a public
offense and, if true, would exempt him from criminal liability. 

The lower court sustained the demurrer, holding that the penalty of six years and one day of prision
correccional imposed upon the accused on February 14, 1921, of which he was pardoned on September
8, 1922 on condition that he would not again commit another offense, had long prescribed on June 26,
1936, when he was convicted and commenced serving a subsidiary imprisonment of thirty days for
failure to pay a fine of P61 and an indemnity of P60.30 to which he was sentenced for having damaged
another’s property. The opinion of the lower court was that the first penalty imposed upon the accused
having already prescribed when he committed his second offense, he could no longer be prosecuted for
violation of conditional pardon inasmuch as the latter did not mean to impose upon him for life the duty
of fulfilling its conditions, which would be cruel and unusual. The fiscal, however, did not agree with the
resolution of the court, from which he appealed, and now submits the following question:

May a person — who has been conditionally pardoned by the Chief Executive for illegal marriage or
bigamy after he has served nineteen months of the penalty of six years and one day of prision
correccional imposed upon him — be criminally prosecuted for violation of a conditional pardon on the
sole ground that, contrary to the condition that "he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippine Islands", he has committed the crime of damage to another’s property through reckless
imprudence, for which he has been sentenced to pay a fine of P61 and an indemnity of P60.30 with
thirty days’ subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency?

It must first be observed that al manifest error has been committed in describing the penalty imposed
upon the accused for bigamy as "prision correccional" when it was and is clearly prision mayor not only
by reason of the duration of the penalty, which is six years and one day, but also of the crime for which
it had been imposed. The law styles prision correccional all imprisonment above six months, but not
exceeding six years; and prision mayor, all imprisonment above six years, but not more than twelve.
(Article 27, paragraphs 4 and 3, of the Revised Penal Code; and article 28, paragraphs 5 and 3, of the old
Penal Code.) The duration of penalties, and not the term by which they may be designated, is what
determines their nature. And it is known that the crime of bigamy is punished, as it was before the
Revised Penal Code was in force, with prision mayor to its full extent (article 471 of the old Penal Code;
article 349 of the Revised Penal Code). 

The question of whether at the time of the commission by the appellee of the crime of damage to
property, or on December 24, 1935, the penalty of six years and one day imposed upon him for bigamy,
had prescribed, is easily ascertainable by considering the interval between the two occasions. From
February 14, 1921, when said penalty was imposed on him, to December 24, 1935, when he committed
the crime of damage to another’s property, only fourteen years, ten months and ten days had elapsed;
and alike under the provisions of articles 132 and 25 of the old Penal Code and those of articles 92 and
25 of the Revised Penal Code corresponding thereto, the penalties of prision mayor prescribe only in
fifteen years. 

The fact that when his conditional pardon was granted the appellee and accepted by him, he had
already extinguished nineteen months of his penalty of six years and one day, thus leaving only four
years, five months and one day to be served by him, does not alter or change the nature thereof from
prision mayor to prision correccional. Besides, the period of prescription of his penalty of six years and
one day was interrupted by the mere fact of his acceptance of his pardon, which acceptance was
precisely subject to the condition that he could enjoy and would continue to enjoy his liberty without
being obliged to serve the remainder of his sentence so long as he did not violate any of the penal laws
of the country. It is true that article 93 of the Revised Penal Code or article 132 of the old Penal Code
from which the first was derived, which enumerates the causes for the interruption of the period of
prescription of penalties, does not mention conditional pardon as one of said causes; but it is equally
true that by the appellee’s acceptance of his pardon, he was able to avoid serving his sentence, which he
may be said to have done in much the same way as one who cannot be compelled to serve his sentence
because he has fled to a foreign country with which the Government has no extradition treaty. 

In this jurisdiction a conditional pardon is certainly a contract between two parties: the Chief Executive,
who grants the pardon, and the convict, who accepts it. It does not become perfected until the convict is
notified of the same and accepts it with all its conditions. (De Leon v. Director of Prisons, 31 Phil., 60.)
Accordingly, if it is a contract, it cannot be doubted that the pardoned convict is bound to fulfill its
conditions and accept all its consequences, not as he chooses, but according to its strict terms.
Otherwise, he would find himself in the same situation as before he was pardoned and he could be
compelled to serve the remainder of his sentence, which he has not yet served. (People v. Ponce de
Leon, 56 Phil., 386; U. S. v. Ignacio, 33 Phil., 202. 

In the appealed resolution it is stated that the crime of damage to property committed by the appellee is
not one which shows moral perversity on his part, meaning thereby that, strictly speaking, he did not
infringe any condition of his pardon. The above reason has no weight at all because the condition of the
pardon did not consist in that he would not commit any crime, more or less grave, which might denote
perversity, but in any violation of any penal law of the Philippines. The crime of damage to property of
another, through reckless imprudence, is a crime expressly punished and considered as such by article
356 in relation to article 3 of the Revised Penal Code. 

Since the question and the facts before us are different, it is not necessary for us to decide whether an
action may be brought for the purpose of enforcing the service of a part of a sentence, which was not
extinguished on account of conditional pardon, after the usual period of prescription of the penalty. 

In view of all the foregoing, the question raised must be answered in the affirmative. 

Wherefore, the appealed resolution is hereby reversed and it is ordered that the trial proceed in
accordance with law.
Article 160

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NICOLAS LAYSON, CEZAR RAGUB, CEZAR FUGOSO and JOVENTINO
GARCES

G.R. No. L-25177 October 31, 1969

Facts:

In the early morning of that hapless day, at about 4:45 o'clock, the four accused, armed with
bladed weapons, entered the cell where the unsuspecting victim, prisoner Regino Gasang, was. Layson
locked the door of the room. Without warning and acting in concert they then swiftly took turns in
stabbing Gasang. They thereafter barricaded themselves, refusing to surrender to the trustees who had
come to the scene of the crime, agreeing to surrender only to Vicente Afurong, the supervising prison
guard. Afurong arrived, identified himself, and assured them of their safety, whereupon they handed
their weapons through the hole of the barricaded door and surrendered themselves.

Gasang died shortly after being brought to the prison hospital. Death was caused by severe
internal and external haemorrhage and shock, all secondary to multiple stab wounds.

Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that they killed Gasang because the latter urinated on their
coffee cups a number of times. Garces stated that he killed Gasang because the latter spat on him a
week before. The four plotted to kill Gasang a few days prior to the actual slaying.

Issue:

Whether or not the four accused are guilty of murder.

Rulings:

The Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of
murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty in favor of all of them and the aggravating circumstances of recidivism and
having been previously punished for two or more crimes to which the law attaches a lighter penalty with
respect to the accused Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub, the aggravating circumstance of having been
punished with two or more offenses to which the law attaches a lighter penalty with respect to the
accused Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces and the aggravating circumstances consisting of any two of
the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information which are treachery, evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength for one is sufficient to qualify the crime to murder and the special
aggravating circumstance of having committed the crime charged while serving the penalty imposed
upon them for previous offenses as regards all the accused and conformably with Article 160 of the
Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences all of them to DEATH, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs
of the deceased Regino Gasang in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason of the penalty imposed and to pay the costs
proportionately.
 Three of the accused admitted that they harbored ill-feeling against Gasang because the latter
urinated on their coffee cups several times, all these taking place at least ten days before the actual
slaying. Gasang spat on Garces a week before the day of the killing. All of the accused plotted to kill
Gasang a few days before January 17, 1964. In the light of these circumstances, it is evident that
sufficient time had elapsed during which the accused regained their equanimity. They moved their evil
scheme forward to consummation after obtaining weapons from their fellow inmates whose aid they
had solicited. The afore narrated circumstances negate the presence of passion and obfuscation; upon
the contrary, they prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.

The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (art. 160, Rev. Penal Code) was
correctly considered against all the accused, who, at the time of the commission of the offense, were
undoubtedly serving their respective sentences for previous convictions. Quasi-recidivism has for its
effect the punishment of the accused with the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the
new felony, and cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

When they pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, all the accused admitted all the material
facts and circumstances alleged in the information. The crime of murder is punished with reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Because of the attendance of the special aggravating
circumstance of quasi-recidivism, this Court is left with no alternative to affirming the death penalty
imposed by the court a quo.

It was error for the trial judge to consider against the accused the aggravating circumstance of
having been previously punished for two or more crimes to which the law attaches lighter penalties
because the said aggravating circumstance of "reiteracion" requires that the offender against whom it is
considered shall have served out his sentences for the prior offenses. Here all the accused were yet
serving their respective sentences at the time of the commission of the murder.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. ANTONIO YABUT

G.R. No. 39085           September 27, 1933

BUTTE, J.:

Facts:

That on or about the 1st day of August, 1932, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the
accused Antonio Yabut, then a prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison, in said city, did then
and there, with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously, assault, beat and use
personal violence upon one Sabas Aseo, another prisoner also serving sentence in Bilibid, by then
and there hitting the said Sabas Aseo suddenly and unexpectedly from behind with a wooden club,
without any just cause, thereby fracturing the skull of said Sabas Aseo and inflicting upon him
various other physical injuries on different parts of the body which caused the death of the latter
about twenty-four (24) hours thereafter.

That at the time of the commission of this offense, the said Antonio Yabut was a recidivist, he
having previously been convicted twice of the crime of homicide and once of serious physical
injuries, by virtue of final sentences rendered by competent tribunals.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder.

Rulings:

We reject, as unworthy of belief, the testimony of Yabut that it was Villafuerte, not he, who
gave the fatal blow to the deceased Aseo. The testimonies of Santiago Estrada, resident physician of the
Bureau of Prisons and Dr. Pablo Anzures of the Medico Legal Department of the University of the
Philippines, clearly establish that the death of Aseo was caused by subdural and cerebral haemorrhages
following the fracture of the skull resulting from the blow on the head of Aseo. They further confirm the
testimony of the four eyewitnesses that the deceased was struck from behind.

On appeal to this court, the appellant advances the following assignments of error:

1. The lower court erred in applying article 160 of the Revised Penal Code.

2. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence of the defense are contradictory and not
corroborated.

3. The lower court erred in holding that the crime of murder was established by appreciating the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia.

4. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

The English translation of article 160 is as follows:

Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous offense   — Penalty.
— Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been
convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall
be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.

Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be
pardoned at the age of seventy years if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when
he shall complete it after reaching said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he
shall not be worthy of such clemency.

The appellant places much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the English translation
of the headnote of article 160 and would have us accept his deduction from the headnote that article
160 is applicable only when the new crime which is committed by a person already serving sentence is
different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. Inasmuch as the appellant was serving
sentence for the crime of homicide, the appellant contends the court below erred in applying article 160
in the present case which was a prosecution for murder (involving homicide). While we do not concede
that the appellant is warranted in drawing the deduction mentioned from the English translation of the
caption of article 160, it is clear that no such deduction could be drawn from the caption. Apart from
this, however, there is no warrant whatever for such a deduction (and we do not understand the
appellant to assert it) from the text itself of article 160. The language is plain and unambiguous. There is
not the slightest intimation in the text of article 160 that said article applies only in cases where the new
offense is different in character from the former offense for which the defendant is serving the penalty.

It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and unambiguous, there
is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section of
interpretation of the text, especially where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords
or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows. (Cf.  In re Estate of Johnson, 39
Phil., 156, 166.) A mere glance at the titles to the articles of the Revised Penal code will reveal that they
were not intended by the Legislature to be used as anything more than catchwords conveniently
suggesting in a general way the subject matter of each article. Being nothing more than a convenient
index to the contents of the articles of the Code, they cannot, in any event have the effect of modifying
or limiting the unambiguous words of the text. Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to
create doubt.

The remaining assignments of error relate to the evidence. We have come to the conclusion,
after a thorough examination of the record, that the findings of the court below are amply sustained by
the evidence, except upon the fact of the existence of treachery (alevosia). As some members of the
court entertain a reasonable doubt that the existence of treachery (alevosia) was established, it results
that the penalty assessed by the court below must be modified. We find the defendant guilty of
homicide and, applying article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in connection with article 160 of the same,
we sentence the defendant- appellant to the maximum degree of reclusion temporal, that is to say, to
twenty years of confinement and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Sabas Aseo ( alias  Sabas Asayo),
in the sum of P1,000.