Case Brief: Drilon vs.

Gaurana
Facts:

A parcel of agricultural land in Iloilo is covered by Free Patent No. 455943 in

the name of Manuel Drilon, who was then issued Original Certificate of Title
by the Register of Deeds.

In 1970, respondent Gaurana filed a case for annulment of free patent

involving the same land, alleging that he purchased the land from Evangeline
Gaurana, wife of the respondent. Gaurana filed another case for “Forcible
Entry” in the same land, alleging that Drilon “by means of stealth, force, and
strategy,” took possession of the south-east portion of the same land.

Drilon’s motion focused on two grounds: lack of jurisdiction, since the cause of
action of respondent Luis Gaumna was one for recovery of ownership and
possession of real property and not merely one of “forcible entry;” and (b)
pendency of another action for the same cause. Both motions were
dismissed, as “plaintiff did not split his cause of action and the alleged act of
dispossession occurred subsequent to the filing of the complaint, and
therefore, the only issue before him was the question of de facto possession.”
Drilon was then declared in default by the court, and was ejected from the
property.

Drilon then filed a motion, praying that the court had no jurisdiction to try the
case of forcible entry), which was denied as well. Hence, the appeal.

Issues:

Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that there was no splitting of a
single cause of action.

Whether or not the lower court was correct in dismissing the motions due to
the pendency of another action between the same parties.

Held:
It is true that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action (Rule 2, Sec. 3, Revised Rules of Court) and if two or more complaints
are brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the firing of the first
may be pleaded in abatement of the other (Rule 2, Sec. 4. Revised Rules of
Court). However, a forcible entry or unlawful detainer action has an entirely
different subject from that of an action for reconveyance of title. What is
involved in a forcible entry case is merely the issue of material possession or
possession de facto; whereas in an action for reconveyance, ownership is the
issue. So much so that the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title
over the same property does not divest the city or municipal court of its
jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor preclude or
bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the only issue involved
is material possession or possession de facto.

It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is
that, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence
or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution the object of the statute is to
prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from
the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal
would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who,
believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to
gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert
their claims. This is the philosophy at the foundation of all these actions of
forcible entry and detainer which are designed to compel the party out of
possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is
his.

With respect to the second assignment of error, while there may be Identity of
parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and Civil Case No. 8323,
for annulment of free patent and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the
relief prayed for in the said cases are not the same. In the former case, the
legal right claimed is possession, while in the latter case, the legal right
asserted is ownership. SC cannot assent to the proposition that the motion to
dismiss the forcible entry case in view of the pendency of an action for
quieting of title and recovery of possession of the same parcel of land since
the causes of action in the two cases are distinct from each other.
Perez-Rosario v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 140796, [June 30, 2006], 526 PHIL 562-587
People v. Ching Kuan
OZAETA, J.:

Appellant was accused of a violation of section 86 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila in that
on or about the 8th of May, 1941, he constructed a 297-square-meter building of strong materials in the
district of Tondo without the proper permit from the city engineer. He pleaded guilty in the municipal
court and was there sentenced, to pay a fine of P150 and the costs. He appealed to the Court of First
Instance, where he again pleaded guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine of P175, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs. Claiming that the fine imposed on him was excessive,
appellant has further appealed to this Court.

The penalty prescribed by section 1137 of the Revised Ordinances for the violation committed by the
accused is a fine of not more than P200 or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the
discretion of the court. In other words the maximum penalty that the court could have imposed was
imprisonment for six months and a fine of P200.

(1) Appellant urges us to take into consideration his plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance and to
reverse our decisions in People vs. Durano, G. R. No. 45114, and People vs. Roque, G. R. No. 47561, in
which we held that the rules of the Revised Penal Code for the application of penalties when mitigating
and aggravating circumstances concur do not apply to a case where the accused is found guilty of the
violation of a special law and not of a crime penalized by said Code. (2) He also contends that the trial
court erred in taking into consideration his financial ability to pay the fine and that article 66 of the
Revised Penal Code is unconstitutional.

1. As to the first contention, we find it unnecessary to reexamine or disturb the decisions cited, because,
the penalty imposed being only a fine, the rules established in articles 63 and 64 of the Revised Penal
Code concerning the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances could not in any event be
applied herein. If at all, it would be article 66 of the same Code that should be applied. Said article reads
as follows:

"Art. 66. Imposition of fines. In imposing fines the courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law; in fixing the amount in each case attention shall he given, not only to the mitigating
and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit."
2. So we proceed to pass upon appellant's second contention. The trial court said:

"The accused in this case is well-to-do and could afford to pay a fine. According to the attorney of the
accused himself, he has a good business, and for that reason he was able to construct a big building. In
view (hereof, the Court believes that the penalty imposed by the Municipal Court is reasonable."

After quoting from article 66, counsel for the appellant says:

"As a consequence of this provision, when a fine has to be imposed, a poor person will be required to
pay less than one who is well-to-do, notwithstanding the fact that both commit the same degree of
violation of the law. In such case, the above provision creates a discrimination between the rich and the
poor, in the sense of favoring the poor but not the rich, and thus causing unequal application of the law.
Consequently, the above provision is unconstitutional and void as being a law which denies to all
persons the equal protection of the laws. * * *"

It may seem paradoxical but the truth is that the codal provision in question, in authorizing the
imposition of unequal fines, aims precisely at equality before the law. Since a fine is imposed as penalty
and not as payment for a specific loss or injury, and since its lightness or severity depends upon the
culprit's wealth or means, it is only just and proper that the latter be taken into account in fixing the
amount. To an indigent laborer, for instance, earning P1.50 a day or about P36 a month, a fine of P10
would undoubtedly be more severe than a fine of P100 to an officeholder or property owner with a
monthly income of P600. Obviously, to impose the same amount of a fine for the same offense upon
two persons thus differently circumstanced would be to mete out to them a penalty of unequal severity
and, hence, unjustly discriminatory.

This but goes to show that equality before the law is not literal and mathematical but relative and
practical. That is necessarily so because human beings are not born equal and do not all start in life from
scratch; many have handicaps material, physical, or intellectual. It is not within the power of society to
abolish such congenital inequality. All it can do by way oi remedy is to endeavor to afford everybody
equal opportunity.

The sentence appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Yulo, C. J., Moran, Paras, and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. ROMEO
A. JADER
In 1987, Romeo Jader was a 4th year law student at the University of the East. However, he failed to
take the examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given a grade of INC. He enrolled for the
second semester and took the removal exam but he still failed the same. The professor, however, did
not inform Jader that he failed the exam.

When the faculty members and the Dean deliberated on who among the fourth years should be allowed
to graduate, Jader’s name appeared on the tentative list of graduating students. He attended the
graduation ceremony, gave blowout celebrations and took review classes in FEU to prepare for the bar
examination.

However, Jader had to leave the review classes and was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations
when he was informed that his academic requirements were not complete because it appears that his
INC rating was not removed.

Consequently, he sued UE for damages in the RTC, alleging that he suffered moral shock, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, and sleepless nights, when he was not able to take the 1988 bar
examinations arising from the UE’s negligence. UE denied liability by arguing that it never led Jader to
believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included
in the tentative list of graduating students. The RTC ruled in favour of Jader, ordering UE to pay damages
amounting to P35,700.

The CA affirmed the decision but increased the award of damages to P50,000. Upon denial of the MR,
UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review under Rule 45 arguing that it has no liability
to Jader, considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the
latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his
removal exam.

ISSUE:

Whether or not UE is liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that he had satisfied all
the requirements for graduation when such is not the case.

HELD:

Yes, UE is liable for damages. Absence of good faith, which is essential in a suit for abuse of right under
Art. 19, was sufficiently established when UE belatedly informed Jader of the result of the removal
examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams. UE, as
a university engaged in legal education, should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more
specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Article 19.

However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter’s actual
damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. As a senior law
student respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those
pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order

Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for
the latter to inquire from the former. However, Jader should not have been awarded moral damages
though he suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will
not be allowed to take the bar examinations as what CA held because it’s also respondent’s duty to
verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations. As a senior law student, he should have been responsible in ensuring that all his affairs
specifically those in relation with his academic achievement are in order. Before taking the bar
examinations, it doesn’t only entail a mental preparation on the subjects but there are other
prerequisites such as documentation and submission of requirements which prospective examinee must
meet.

*Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

*Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even
though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of
facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.

*Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE (IRRI), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC) AND NESTOR B. MICOSA, respondents.

I. FACTS:

Posed for determination in this petition for certiorari is the question of whether a conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment and corollarily, whether a
conviction of a crime of homicide involves moral turpitude. In 1977, private respondent Nestor B.
Micosa was hired by petitioner IRRI as laborer.

On February 6, 1967, Micosa stabbed to death one Reynaldo Ortega inside a beer house in Los Baños,
Laguna and was subsequently accused of the crime of homicide. Pending his case, Micosa voluntarily
applied for Special Separation Program but IRRI's Director General, Klaus L. Lampe, disapproved the
same because they desire to retain the skills and talents that persons like him possess. On January 23,
1990, the trial court rendered a decision fending Micosa guilty of homicide, but appreciating, however,
in his favor the presence of the mitigating circumstances.

On February 8, 1990, IRRI's Director General personally wrote Micosa that he is appointed as a regular
core employee and is thus protected under the provision of the Labor Code which provides that he:
"may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the
Philippine Labor Code.”

On April 4, 1990, the Laguna Parole and Probation Office informed IRRI that Micosa’s probation was
approved since he "possess desirable social antecedents in his life”. However, Micosa was advised to
resign by IRRI's Human Resource Head, J.K. Pascual on the ground that his previous conviction in the
crime homicide constitute moral turpitude, thus, violating Section I-AA, Par VII, C-2 of the Institute's
Personnel Manual. Micosa was later terminated for the same ground.

On May 29, 1990, Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal and the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment
finding the termination of Micosa illegal and ordering his reinstatement with full backwages. The
petitioner appealed from the above decision but the NLRC affirmed the same. Accordingly, petitioner
filed this instant petition. The basic premise of petitioner is that Micosa's conviction of the crime of
homicide, which is a crime involving moral turpitude, is a valid ground for his dismissal under the
Institute’s Personnel Manual.
II. ISSUE:

Whether all conviction of homicide constitutes moral turpitude?

III. RULING:

NO. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral
turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation
of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.

IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their totality. The facts on record show that
Micosa was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face;
that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the
victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew
a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold
on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention
was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating
circumstances of self- defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating
circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or
unjust.

IRRI failed to show that Micosa possessed a tendency to kill without provocation or that he posed a clear
and present danger to the company and its personnel. On the contrary, the records reveal that Micosa's
service record is unblemished.

In fact, even after his conviction, the IRRI's Director General expressed his confidence in him when he
disapproved his application for special separation and when Micosa was granted with a regular
appointment. Likewise, noteworthy is the fact that Micosa, although found guilty as charged, was also
found worthy of probation. The termination cannot be upheld for it lacked not only a legal basis but
factual basis as well. IRRI simply assumed that conviction of the crime of homicide is conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude.

WHEREFORE, the petition, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an employer may terminate an
employment. Verily, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of these justifiable
causes. Neither may said ground be justified under Article 282 (c) nor under 282 (d) by analogy. Fraud or
willful breach by the employees of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative under Article 282 (c) refers to any fault or culpability on the part of the employee in the
discharge of his duty rendering him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his
position. It cannot be gainsaid that the breach of trust must be related to the performance of the
employee's function.9 On the other hand, the commission of a crime by the employee under Article 282
(d) refer to an offense against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representative.

Analogous causes must have an element similar to those found in the specific just cause enumerated
under Article 282. Clearly lacking in the ground invoked by petitioner is its relation to his work or to his
employer. Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing 10 citing In Re Basa11 and Tak Ng v.
Republic12 as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. As to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine.13 Thus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that
conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude is unwarranted considering that the said
crime which resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim
has not been so classified as involving moral turpitude.

IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their totality. The facts on record show that
Micosa was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face;
that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the
victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew
a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold
on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times.

These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The
appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self- defense and voluntary surrender, plus
the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions
were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust. This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of
homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending
on the degree of the crime.14 Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by
every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.15

While . . . generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibita do not, it, cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by
classifying a crime as malum in seor as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se
and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are
mala prohibita only.16

It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of
which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached. In fine, there
is nothing in this case to show any abuse of discretion by the National Labor Relations Commission in
affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that Micosa was illegally dismissed. For certiorari to
lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the
judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil and common traditions.17 The abuse of
discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily
or despotically. 18

FE J. BAUTISTA and MILAGROS

J. CORPUS, petitioners, vs. HON. MALCOLM G. SARMIENTO, District Judge,
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch I, and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

 Petitioners were charged before CFI Pampanga of the crime of Estafa.

 In the information filed against the accused, it was alleged that accused received jewelries from Dr.
Leticia C. Yap on April 19, 1975 on consignment, and that these pieces of jewelries should be sold by the
accused on commission basis and to pay or to deliver the proceeds thereof to Yap if sold, and if not sold
to return said jewelries.

 In spite of represented demands made on the said accused, said accused failed and refused and still
fails and refuses to return the jewelries or deliver the proceeds thereof to the damage of Yap in the total
amount of P77,300.

 Prosecution presented during the trial the private complainant, Dr. Leticia C. Yap, as its only witness.

 Yap testified that the accused acted as her agents for the sale of the jewelries.

 Petitioners, believing the prosecution failed to prove their guilty beyond reasonable doubt, moved to
dismissal the case by way of demurrer to the evidence.

 They alleged that the jewelries were received by the said accused by virtue of purchase and sale, and
that the prosecution failed to establish the prior demand to prove misappropriation on the part of the
accused.

 CFI denied their motion to dismiss. CFI ruled that the meaning of consignment is not a sale.
Consignment means that the goods sent by one person to another, are to be sold or disposed of by the
latter for and on account of the former. Thus, Agency was present.
 Also CFI found that there was a demand made by Yap through his lawyer, Atty. Gorospe before the
filing of the case.  CFI considered the letter of demand which was subsequently made after several
previous oral demands by Yap.  Hence, this present special civil action of certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction assailing the denial of the motion to dismiss.

 It is the contention of petitioners that the trial court had lost jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of
the case and that they should be acquitted considering the CFI’sfinding in denying their motion to
dismiss that the prosecution established a prima facie case of Estafa on the evidence presented so far on
record.

 Petitioners further argue that in a criminal case, conviction can be had only upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt and not on a mere prima facie case.

ISSUE/RULING WON petitioners were guilty of the crime charged - YES

 Prima Facie case is that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counterbalance the general
presumption of innocence, and warrant a conviction, if not encountered and controlled by evidence
tending to contradict it, and render it improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with it.
Establishment of a prima facie case does not take away the presumption of innocence which may in the
opinion of the jury be such as to rebut and control it.

 There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the accused is established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal. But when the trial court denies petitioners'
motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution had established a
prima facie case against them, they assume a definite burden. It becomes incumbent upon petitioners
to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case against them. This is due
to the shift in the burden of evidence, and not of the burden of proof as petitioners would seem to
believe

 When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar, the
burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom
it is imposed—the prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending
upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence
is met by evidence which balances that introduced by the prosecution. Then the burden shifts back.

 A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of greater
weight. Defendant's evidence which equalizes the weight of plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in
equipoise is sufficient. As a result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof. Should it happen that
at the trial the weight of evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and presumptions operate
against plaintiff who has the burden of proof, he cannot prevail.

 In the case at bar, the order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, required them to present their
evidence. They refused and/or failed to do so. This justified an inference of their guilt. The inevitable
result was that the burden of evidence shifted on them to prove their innocence, or at least, raises a
reasonable doubt as to their guilt.

 Petitioners, likewise, assign as error the order directing them to present their evidence after the denial
of their motion to dismiss. By doing so, they contend that the court would, in effect, be relying on the
possible weakness of the defense' evidence, rather than on the strength of the prosecution's own
evidence in resolving their guilt or innocence.

 The court find this contention utterly devoid of merit. In the case of Arbriol v. Homeres, it was held
therein that if the motion for dismissal is denied, the court should proceed to hear the evidence for the
defense before entering judgment regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved its right to
present evidence in the event its motion for dismissal be denied.

 The reason behind this is that it is the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense
before sentence is pronounced on him. If the accused has no evidence to present or expressly waives
the right to present it, the court has no alternative but to decide the case upon the evidence presented
by the prosecution alone.

WHEREFORE, finding the order complained of to be well-taken and there being no grave abuse of
discretion that attended its issuance, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against petitioners.
The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga where this case is now assigned, is hereby
ordered to continue immediately with the trial of Criminal Case No. 808 until its final disposition. SO
ORDERED.

ISSUE(S): Whether the finding by Judge SARMIENTO that the prosecution established a prima facie case
of estafa against BAUTISTA and Corpus, shifted the burden of proof to the defense.

HELD: NO, when a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, the burden of
proof does not shift to the defense; it remains with the prosecution.

HOWEVER, it is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies
of the case in the course of the trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence is met by evidence
which balances that introduced by the prosecution.

Then the burden shifts back. In the case at bar, the order denying BAUTISTA and Corpis’ motion to
dismiss, required them to present their evidence. They refused and/or failed to do so. This justified an
inference of their guilt. The inevitable result was that the burden of evidence shifted on them to prove
their innocence, or at least, raises a reasonable doubt as to their guilt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
AQUINO MINGOA
Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of Despujols,
Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the provincial
auditor, the defendant Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in
the Court of First Instance of Romblon, and having been found guilty as charged and sentenced to the
corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case here on
the ground that it involved a constitutional question.

Issue: W/N there was violation of the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent?

Held: NO! The fact is that the trial court did not believe defendant’s explanation that the money was
lost, considering it mere cloak to cover actual misappropriation. That is why the court said that “whether
or not the defendant is guilty of malversation for negligence is of no moment…” the presumption of
misappropriation is found on Art. 217 of the RPC which provides that failure of a public officer to have
duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by and duly
authorized officer, shall prima facie evidence that he has put the missing funds or property to personal
use.

The legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proven they shall be prima facie evidence
of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be rational
connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed so that the interference of the
one from the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in
common experience.

The evidence shows that it is not disputed that upon examination of his books and accounts on
September 1, 1949, defendants, as accountable officer, was found short in the sum abovenamed and
that, required to produce the missing fund, he was not able to do so. He explained to the examining
officer that some days before he had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took with
him to show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when he returned. But he did
not testify in court and presented no evidence in his favor. We agree with the trial judge that
defendant's explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot overcome the presumption of guilt
arising from his inability to produce the fund which was found missing.

As His Honor observes, if the money was really lost without defendant's fault, the most natural thing for
him to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release from liability. But this he did not do.
Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse that he preferred to do his
own sleuthing, he even did not report the loss to the police. Considering further as the prosecution
points out in its brief, that defendant had at first tried to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to
examine his accounts, and that for sometime before the alleged loss many teachers and other
employees of the town had not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to believe that defendant
had really malversed the fund in question and that his story about its loss was pure invention.

It is now contended, however, that lacking direct evidence of actual misappropriation the trial court
convicted defendant on mere presumptions, that is, presumptions of criminal intent in losing the money
under the circumstances alleged and presumptions of guilt from the mere fact that he failed, upon
demand to produce the sum lacking. The criticism as to the first presumption is irrelevant, for the fact is
that trial court did not believe defendant's explanation that the money was lost, considering it mere
cloak to cover actual misappropriation.

That is why the court said that "whether or not he (defendant) is guilty of malversation for negligence is
of no moment . . . " And as to the other presumption, the same is authorized by article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides: The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public
funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The contention
that this legal provision violates the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved cannot be sustained.

The question of the constitutionality of the statute not having been raised in the court below, it may not
be considered for the first time on appeal. (Robb vs. People, 68 Phil., 320.) In many event, the validity of
statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now settled matter, Cooley, in his work on
constitutional limitations, 8th ed., Vo. I, pp. 639-641says that "there is no constitutional objection to the
passage of law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary presumption
founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to
overcome such presumption of innocence."

In line with this view, it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may enact that when
certain facts have been proven they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the
accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be rational connection between that facts proved
and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not
unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience. (See
annotation on constitutionality of statutes or ordinances making one fact presumptive or prima facie
evidence of another, 162 A.L.R. 495-535; also, State vs. Brown, 182 S.E., 838, with reference to
embezzlement.) The same view has been adopted here as may be seen from the decisions of this court
in the U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303; U.S. vs. Luling, 34 Phil., 725; and People vs. Merilo, G.R. No. L-3489,
promulgated June 28, 1951. The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain
facts are proved. It makes the failure of public officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper demaand,
any public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use.

The ultimate fact presumed is that officer has malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody,
and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has received them and yet he has failed to
have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from
the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two.
Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima faciepresumption, thus giving the accused an
opportunity to present evidence to rebut it.

Norma De Joya vs. The Jail Warden of

Batangas City G.R. No. 159418-19, December
10, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner, Norma De Joya was charged of two separate violations of BP Blg.22 before the Municipal
Trial Court in cities of Batangas City. During the arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by a counsel
pleaded not guilty. Despite due notice, the petitioner and her counsel failed to appear during the
promulgation of the cases by the MTC and no appeal was filed from any of the said decisions. When the
petitioner was finally arrested after five long years, she filed an urgent motion before the MTC Batangas
City asking the court to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively pursuant to Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code, and to order her release from detention.

The trial court denied the motion on three grounds: (a) its decision convicting the petitioner of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 had long become final and executory; hence, could no longer be amended to change the
penalty imposed therein; (b) the SC Circular should be applied prospectively; and (c) the SC Circular did
not amend B.P. Blg. 22, a substantive law, but merely encourages trial court judges to have a uniform
imposition of fine. Hence, the petition at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled for the writ of habeas corpus?

RULING:
 No. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the writ of habeas corpus is
not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. In this case,
the petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to the final judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of
Batangas City, convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Irrefragably then, the petitioner is not entitled
to a writ of habeas corpus. Her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC
Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit her has no
basis.

First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is
not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to
cases already terminated by final judgment.

Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000
merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It
does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of the
law but also the circumstances of the accused - whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of
fact without taint of negligence - and such other circumstance which the trial court or the appellate
court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed.

The Court thus emphasized that: The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is
not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.

The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P.
Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO ESTRADA,
accused-appellant G.R. No. 1304887, June 19,
2000
This is a review for the imposition of death penalty on the accused-appellant by the Regional Trial Court
in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D. The Supreme Court nullified the proceeding of the RTC and remanded
the case for proper disposition.

FACTS:

On December 29, 1994, Roberto Estrada, accused-appellant, was charged with the crime of murder for
the killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard in Dagupan City, Philippines. The crime happened
in the in the morning of December 27, 1994 at St. John’s Cathedral in Dagupan City during a mass when
the accused-appellant suddenly walked towards the altar and sat on the Bishop’s chair, screaming that
he will not move out no matter what happens. This prompted the churchgoers to summon Rogelio
Mararac, the security guard of the Cathedral. After attempts of stopping Estrada using his nightstick,
Estrada drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him hitting his left throat. Estrada
went over the fallen victim and tried to stab him again but was able to ward him off. Meanwhile, SPO1
Conrado Francisco received a report of the commotion inside the cathedral, where he ran to the
accused-appellant to advise him to the drop the knife which the latter obeyed. Mararac expired a few
minutes upon arrival at the hospital. The autopsy showed the following findings:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, the level of the 2nd intercostal space, left, 1 1/2 “ by 1 ½”
penetrating. The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and pointed

2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, ½ “ x ¼ “ x ½ “. The edge of one side of the
wound is sharp and pointed.

INTERNAL FINDINGS: Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper and lower
lobe of the left lung. The left pulmonary blood vessel was severely cut.

The appellant filed for a “Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination”
because he has been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks but was denied. Instead of taking
a stand, his counsel presented a testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a resident physician in the
Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio general Hospital. She verified that the appellant has been
confined at the BGH where he was diagnosed with “Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type—
schizoprenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type.” The Court found Estrada guilty of murder and
sentenced him to death.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for the crime of murder

RULINGS

The Supreme Court vacated his sentence to death penalty and remanded to the court a quo for the
conduct of proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination to stand trial, and for
further proceedings. The court found that it is not conclusive evidence for his sound mind to stand trial
and assist it in defense. A trial judge is not deemed as an expert in diagnosing mental illnesses and
should not have taken upon them to assume the accused-appellant’s sanity. They should have at least
determined the accused-appellant’s competency to stand trial through an examination, especially with
the fact that the latter has a history of mental illness.

Principles: “Demurrer to Evidence” – motion to dismiss challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
presented by the prosecution during trial

: RTC decision vacated and mental examination of accused remanded. The fact that accused-appellant
was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was
competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. The trial court took it solely upon itself to
determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some
other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person’s mental
health. To determine the accused-appellant’s competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant case,
should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of the latter’s
history of mental illness.t