CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CLASS 2022-2023

CASE DIGEST

General Principles

Case No. 1
People vs. Lacson
400 SCRA 267, G.R. No. 149453 April 1, 2003

Concept: Criminal procedure regulates the steps by which one who committed a crime is to be
punished.

Facts:

The petitioners filed before the Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the May
28,2002 Resolution remanding the case where the respondent and his co-accused were
charged with multiple murders for the killing of eleven persons believed to be members of
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang to the Regional Trial Court for the determination of several
factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of the cases. The Court ruled that the provisional
dismissal were the express consent of the respondent and Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect.

Petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly
consented to a provisional dismissal, and all of the heirs were notified of the respondent’s
motion before the hearing thereon, the two-year bar in Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively, and not retroactively against
the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent
and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair,
reduce, and diminish the State’s substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple
murder.

Respondent, Panfilo Lacson, on his part, asserts that the new rule under Section 8
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since
there is no substantive right of the State that may be impaired by its application to the
criminal cases; as Penal Laws, either procedural or substantive, may be retroactively
applied as long as they favor the accused.

Issue:

Whether or not Procedural Laws may be applied retroactively?

Ruling:

Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As
applied to Criminal Law, Procedural Law provides or regulates the steps by which one who
has committed a crime is to be punished.
 In Tan Jr. vs Court of Appeals, the Court held that Statutes regulating the procedure
of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The
fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor
is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The
reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws. It has been held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a
litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of
any other than the existing rules of procedure.

A construction of which a statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, and injurious consequence; the Court
should not adopt an interpretation of a statute which produces absurd, unreasonable,
unjust, or oppressive results if such interpretation could be avoided. Remedial legislation, or
procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and implement the
constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or
prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new rule, its
purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective application will further in operation, the
particular conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of
justice and of criminal laws in particular.

Case No. 2
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Republic
686 SCRA 472, G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012

Jurisdiction: Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by the consent or acquiescence
of any or all of the parties

Facts:

Petitioner Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. served as a public officer during the Marcos
Administration. He acquired assets, funds and other property grossly and manifestly
disproportionate to his salaries, lawful income and income from legitimately acquired
property.

Taking advantage of his association, connection and influence, he embarked upon

devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of the Filipino
people. He manipulated the purchase of by Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA) 72.2%
outstanding capital stock of the First United Bank (FUB); He coveted the coconut levy funds
as a cheap, lucrative and risk-free source of funds under his exclusive control. He irregularly
used and diverted government funds and caused the former President Marcos to issue PD
755 declaring that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered special and fiduciary and
trust funds and do not form part of the general funds of the National Government. He also
managed and controlled the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as the President for 5
years and gets one out of every nine shares given to PCA.

Then came the 1986 EDSA revolution. Former President Aquino revolutionary
government prioritized the recovery of ill-gotten wealth reportedly amassed by the Marcos
Family and his close relatives, associates and nominees. Thereat, she issued EO 1, 2 and 14,
as amended by E.O. 14-A, all series of 1986. E.O. No. 2 asserted that the ill-gotten assets
and properties come in the form of shares of stocks, etc., while E.O. No. 14 conferred on
the Sandiganbayan exclusive and original jurisdiction over ill-gotten wealth cases, with the
proviso that "technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be applied strictly" to the
civil cases filed under the EO.

Pursuant to these issuances, the PCGG issued sequestration, among which shares of
stocks of UCPB purportedly owned by the petitioner. On 2003, the Sandiganbayan ruled in
favor of the respondent Republic and held that the coconut levy funds are special public
funds of the Government, belonging to the Republic of the Philippines as the true and
beneficial owner. Cojuangco Jr. moved for partial consideration but was denied.

Issue:

Whether the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case?

Ruling:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case.

The Court citing Regalado and settled jurisprudence, stressed the following
interlocking precepts: Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties. In turn, the issue on whether a suit comes within
the penumbra of a statutory conferment is determined by the allegations in the complaint,
regardless of whether or not the suitor will be entitled to recover upon all or part of the
claims asserted.

In the case, the Court has upheld the Sandiganbayan’s assumption of jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the case. Judging from the allegations of the petitioner’s illegal acts
thereat made, it is fairly obvious that the case, in the context of EO Nos. 1, 2 and 14, series
of 1986, the nature of ill-gotten wealth suits. Both deal with the recovery of sequestered
shares, property or business enterprises claimed, as alleged in the complaints, to be ill-
gotten assets of President Marcos, his cronies and nominees and acquired by taking undue
advantage of relationships or influence and/or through or as a result of improper use,
conversion or diversion of government funds or property. Recovery of these assets -
determined as shall hereinafter be discussed as prima facie ill-gotten - falls within the
unquestionable jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

There was no actual need for the Republic, to adduce evidence to show that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaints as it leaned on
the averments in the initiatory pleadings to make visible the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the ill-gotten wealth complaints. A perusal of the allegations easily
reveals the sufficiency of the statement of matters disclosing the claim of the government
against the coco levy funds and the assets acquired directly or indirectly through said funds
as ill-gotten wealth.

Moreover, the Court finds no rule that directs the plaintiff to first prove the subject
matter jurisdiction of the court before which the complaint is filed. Rather, such burden falls
on the shoulders of defendant in the hearing of a motion to dismiss anchored on said
ground or a preliminary hearing thereon when such ground is alleged in the answer.

Case No. 3
Soller vs. Sandiganbayan
357 SCRA 677, G.R. Nos. 144261-62 May 9, 2001

Jurisdiction: To ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law
should be inquired into; In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law
at the time of the commencement of the action.

Facts:

Municipal guard Jerry Macabael was shot and killed while driving a motorcycle
together with Vincent Soller, son of herein petitioner. Jerry’s body was brought to a
medical clinic located in the house of petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller, the Municipal Mayor.
The incident was reported and investigated by petitioner SPO4 Mario Matining. An autopsy
was conducted on the same night.

On the basis of the above incident, a complaint was filed against petitioners by the
widow of Jerry with the Office of the Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy to
mislead the investigation of the fatal shootout and by altering Jerry’s wound, concealing his
brain, falsely stating in the police report number of gunshots and falsely stating no
presence of blackening around Jerry’s wound when in fact there is. Spouses Soller on their
part denied having tampered the cadaver and claimed that Jerry was brought to their
private medical clinic because he was rushed there by his companions, and Mayor Soller,
assisted his wife, Dr. Preciosa Soller, Municipal Health Officer, in conducting the autopsy
with consent obtained from Mrs. Macabael’s.

The office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an information for

obstruction of justice and two informations before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners filed a
motion to quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
the offenses charged. Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground that the accusation
involves the performance of duties of at least one (1) of the accused public official, the
Municipal Mayor. Motion for reconsideration was filed on the premise that conducting
autopsy was not among the function of the mayor, which could not put him under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, the motion is denied.

Issue:

Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try the case?

Ruling:

No, The Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction. In criminal
cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law at the time of the
commencement of the action. The provisions of the law should be inquired into to ascertain
whether a court has jurisdiction or not. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must
appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or
implied.

The Court has interpreted that an offense be committed in relation to the office to
mean that the offense cannot exist without the office or that the office must be a
constituent element of the crime; The offense must be intimately connected with the office
of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance, though improper or
irregular of his official functions. In the case, the informations fail to allege that the
petitioners had committed the offense charged in relation to their offices neither any
specific allegations of facts to show the intimate connection between the altering and
suppressing of the gunshot wound of the victim or of giving false or fabricated information
in the autopsy report and police report in the performance official function.

The phrase “committed in violation to public office” that appears in the information
is not controlling; what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is the specific
factual allegation in the information that would indicate close intimacy between the
discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged in
order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. For these
reasons, failure to show in the informations that the charges were intimately connected
with the discharge of the official functions of accused Mayor Soller, the offenses charged in
the subject criminal cases fall within the exclusive original function of the Regional Trial
Court, not the Sandiganbayan.

Case No. 4
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
301 SCRA 298, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999
Jurisdiction: The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute, and the
elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain
which court has jurisdiction over a case
Facts:

Ombusdman Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate the killings of

eleven persons believed to be members of the organized crime syndicate, Kuratong
Baleleng Gang by the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). The
ABRITG was composed of police officers from TMC led by Francisco Zubia Jr., petitioner –
intervenor; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission – Task Force Habagat (PACC- TFH),
headed by petitioner Panfilo Lacson, CPDC, and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC)
headed by petitioner-intervenor Romeo Acop. Later, this panel absolved all PNP officers
from any criminal liability and held that it was a legitimate police operation.

However, a review board led by Ombudsman Villa modified the previous panel’s
finding and recommend the indictment for multiple murders against the petitioners.
Petitioner Lacson was charged as principal and intervenors Acop and Zubia as accessories
after-in-the-fact. The Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of
the Ombudsman’s action. After reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended
information, now charging Lacson, Acop and Zubia as accessory.

Accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,

asserting that under the amended information, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the
RTC since the only highest-ranking principal accused has the rank of Chief Inspector and no
salary equivalent to SG 27. Thereafter, in a resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
cases transferred to the Quezon City RTC. However, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
moved for reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain in the Sandiganbayan.

While the motions for reconsideration was pending, Republic Act 8249, an act
furthering the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was signed into law. Sandiganbayan
denied the motion of the Special Prosecutor and issued an addendum of its initial
resolution and retained the jurisdiction to try the cases. Petitioner questions the statute as
it was made precisely to suit the situation in which petitioner’s case were in at the
Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction and violating his right to procedural due process.

Issue:

Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction of the case and whether the offense of
multiple murder committed by the petitioners is in relation to their office?

Ruling:

No, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the
case.
 The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of
that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court
has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial.

In the case, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls
under Section 4 (b) of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be
committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have
jurisdiction over it. The jurisdictional requirement is in accordance to the Constitution.

In People vs Montejo, an offense is said to have been committed in relation to office

if the offense is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while
he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimate relation between the
offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the informations.

A reading of the information states that the principal accused committed the crime
of murder in relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts
that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the
discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does
not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the
latter while in their custody. Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of
herein petitioner and intervenors as among the
accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused,
the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.

Case No. 5
People vs. Buissan
105 SCRA 547, No. 54419, July 15, 1981
Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction of a court determined by extent of the penalty to be imposed;
Jurisdiction once acquired by the court can no longer be removed, although the evidence
proves only a lesser offense than that charged in the information.

Facts:

A complaint for the crime of simple seduction was filed by Araceli Medel against
Paterno Santiago in the Court of First Instance in Zamboanga City. Santiago pleaded not
guilty during arraignment. During the trial, Santiago moved to quash the information for
failure to allege lewd design.

The petitioner, People of the Philippines filed an opposition. Presiding Judge

Dimalanes Buissan of CFI Zamboanga City denied the motion and remanded the case to
the City Court of Dapitan on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the penalty for the
crime of simple seduction was Arresto Mayor. Motion for reconsideration was further filed
by the petitioner alleging that City Courts has no jurisdiction over the case. Judge Buissan
still denied the motion. City Judge Wilfredo Martinez, set the hearing for trial.

Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari against Judge Buissan and Judge
Martinez who acted in grave abuse of discretion by remanding the case to the City Court
and for assuming jurisdiction of the case and setting it for trial.

Issue:

1. Is the crime of simple seduction which is penalize by law by arresto mayor comes
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the city court?

2. Whether the CFI has jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling:

1.
No, The Supreme Court ruled that jurisdiction over a simple seduction case,
although with a penalty of not more than 6 months, lies with the CFI, not to the inferior
court.

As early as 1911, a justice of the peace court is divested of jurisdiction over a case for
simple seduction. Section 44 (f) Republic Act No. 296, as amended, provides that Courts of
First Instance have original jurisdiction of all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by
law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos
and section 87 (b) of the same Act provides that Justice of the Peace and Municipal Courts
have original jurisdiction over all offenses in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for not more than two hundred pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment.

If upon conviction, the court will have to impose only a term of imprisonment as a
penalty of not more than six (6) months, there would be no doubt that only the inferior
court, a city or municipal court, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance, has
jurisdiction to try and decide a case for simple seduction. But together with the
imprisonment, a judgment of conviction would require the court to order the
acknowledgment by the accused of the offspring, if any, and to give him support, aside
from the indemnification of the offended woman, the acknowledgment of, and the giving
of support to, the offspring are matters beyond the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace
or Municipal Courts.

2.

Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of First Instance has the jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction of a court is determined by extent of the penalty to be imposed;

Jurisdiction once acquired by the court can no longer be removed, although the evidence
proves only a lesser offense than that charged in the information.

As respondents themselves admit, in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court

is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the
result of the evidence that would be presented during the trial, but by the extent of the
penalty which the law imposes, together with other legal obligations, on the basis of the
facts as recited in the complaint or information constitutive of the offense charged, for
once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the information is filed, it is there retained
regardless of whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the
information.
.

Case No. 6
People vs. Lagon
185 SCRA 442, G.R. No. 45815, May 18, 1990

The subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measured by the
law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action rather than by the law in
effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged

Facts:

A criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City, charging
respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code. The information charged that the accused had allegedly issued a
check as payment of goods or merchandise purchased, without having sufficient funds to
cover the check, which thereafter subsequently bounced.

The trial ensued. However, presiding Judge of the City Court of Roxas, Judge Isidro
Barrios, dismissed the information on the ground that the penalty prescribed by the law for
the offense charged was beyond the court’s authority. Further, the judge held that the
jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of
the institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of
the crime. At the time the criminal information was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code had already been amended and the imposable penalty was beyond
the City Court’s jurisdiction. The petitioner, People of the Philippines filed a petition for
review arguing that the City Court has jurisdiction over the case and it had erred in issuing
its order.

Issue:

1. Whether the City Court has jurisdiction over the case?

2. Whether the doctrine is in disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws?

Ruling:

1.

No. The Supreme Court ruled that City Courts has no jurisdiction over the case
considering the increased imposable penalty for the offense charged to a level in excess of
the maximum penalty which a city court could impose

It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal
law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of
a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the
offense charged.

At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 1976, the penalty
imposable for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 had been increased by P.D.
No. 818 (effective 22 October 1975) to prision mayor in its medium period. Thus, in
accordance with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then
Court of First Instance of Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased the
imposable penalty for the offense charged in the criminal case to a level in excess of the
maximum penalty which a city court could impose.

2.

No. The Supreme Court held that the subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is
determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the
applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal information.

In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not

determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial or even by the result of
the evidence that would be presented at the trial but by the extent of the penalty which the
law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the facts
recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that
the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume
jurisdiction.
 In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense charged is heavier
than the penalty provided for the same offense originally imposed by paragraph 2(d) of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Should the criminal information be refiled in the
proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial Court, that court may not impose that more
onerous penalty upon the respondent.
But the Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subject matter jurisdiction to try and
decide the (refiled) case even though the penalty properly imposable, given the date of the
commission of the offense charged. The circumstance that P.D. No. 818 would be
inapplicable to the refiled case would not result in the Regional Trial Court losing subject-
matter jurisdiction, nor in the case falling back into the City Court's exclusive jurisdiction.

Case No. 7
Asistio vs. People
G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015

The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in
relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the
penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission.

Facts:

Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio, Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini

Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative entered into an exclusive
dealership agreement with Coca-Cola products for her personal interest, to the damage
and prejudice of the school. The school principal directed Asistio to submit her financial
reports during her tenure. However, instead of submitting the reports, she claimed that the
principal has no business and authority to require her to produce the documents and the
said financial reports had been posted in the school bulletin board. An audit committee was
created and it later found out that Asistio defrauded the cooperative and its members for
three years and misappropriated Php103,456.00. Despite repeated demands, Asistio
refused to return the funds.

An information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) charging Asistio of
violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines or Republic Act No. 6938.
Upon arraignment she pleaded not guilty. After the prosecutor’s presentation and offer of
evidence, petitioner moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer of Evidence with prior
leave of court, arguing that the RTC does not have jurisdiction of the case as the crime
charged does not carry with it a sanction for which she can be held criminally liable. The
RTC dismissed the case considering that the lower court have exclusive jurisdiction. People
of the Philippines appealed the order of dismissal to the court of appeals, which the CA
reversed the RTC decision and remanded the case records back to the RTC for further
proceedings.

Issue:
 Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to try the case?

Ruling:

Yes, the Supreme Court affirm the CA ruling that the RTC, not the MeTC has
jurisdiction over the case.

In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the
complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the
complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the
time of its commission. Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended, provides that MeTC has
exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years,
irrespective of the amount of the fine. Offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding
six years, irrespective of the amount of fine, fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
(Sec. 20, B.P. Blg. 129, as amended).

In the case, petitioner failed to present any compelling reason to warrant departure
from the CA ruling that RTC has jurisdiction over her criminal case for violation of Section
46 of RA 6938. Section 46 does not provide for penal sanction, an application of Section 124
(3), which provides imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than 10 years or
both at the discretion of the court should follow as the said provision evidently refers to the
penal sanction of erring directors, officers and committee members. The Court in order to
carry the intent of the legislature, may correct clerical errors, mistakes or misprints,
which in uncorrected, would render the statute meaningless, empty or nonsensical or
would defeat or impair its intended operation, so long as the meaning intended is apparent
on the face of the whole enactment and no specific provision is abrogated. Section 124(3)
should thus refer to Section 46, following this interpretation, violation of section 46,
therefore is punishable by a fine not less than 5,000 or imprisonment of not less than five
years but not more than 10 years or both at the discretion of the court, which under B.P.
Blg. 129, shall be within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Case no. 8
David vs. Agbay
753 SCRA 526, G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance

Facts:

Petitioner Renato David, a Canadian Citizen by naturalization, filed a Miscellaneous

Lease Application over the land he purchased before the DENR. In the said application, he
indicated that he is a Filipino Citizen. Editha Agbay (respondent) opposed the application
on the ground that petitioner is disqualified to own the land and filed a criminal complaint
for falsification of public documents against the petitioner.

Renato averred that on the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship and the CENRO officer assured that he could declare himself
as Filipino. The Office of the Prosecutor issued its resolution finding probable cause to
indict petitioner. Renato challenged the resolution in a petition before the Department of
Justice (DOJ). The DOJ denied the petition and consequently an information for
Falsification of Public Documents was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was
issued.

Petitioner filed an urgent motion for re-determination of probable cause. The MTC
denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused on the ground that
Renato was a Canadian Citizen at the time he committed the allege crime. Motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the MTC. Petitioner elevated the case
to the RTC via a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion of MTC asserting
that jurisdiction over the person of an accused cannot be pre-condition for the
determination of probable cause by the court who issued the warrant of arrest. However,
RTC denied the petition.

Issue:

Is the MTC correct in denying the motion of the petitioner for re-determination of
probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused?

Ruling:

Yes, the MTC erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.

As enunciated in the case of Santiago vs Vasquez, jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. As a general rule, one who
seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. The
voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to
quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover,
appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the
same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either
by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-
determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction
over his person.

Case No. 9

Miranda vs. Tuliao

486 SCRA 377, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

Facts:

A criminal complaint for murder was filed against the petitioners, Jose Miranda,
Alberto Dalmacio, Romeo Ocon by the respondent, Virgilio Tuliao, for the deaths of
Vicente Bauzon and his son Elizer Tuliao. On June 25, 2001, Acting Presiding Judge
Tumalian then issued warrant of arrests against petitioners. Four days later, petitioners
filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, reinvestigation and recall
and/or quash the warrants of arrest. During the hearing of the urgent motion, the
petitioners were absent, the presiding Judge denied the motions on the ground that the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Meanwhile, the petitioners appealed
the resolution of the State Prosecutor to the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On August 17, 2001, new Presiding Judge Anastacio Anghad took over the case and
issued a joint order reversing the previous joint order of Judge Tumalian, and ordered the
cancellation of the warrant of arrests issued against the petitioners. The respondent and
the state prosecutor moved for the reconsideration and prayed for the inhibition of Judge
Anghad, but it was denied. Respondent filed before the Supreme Court petition for
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, and prayer of Temporary Restraining Order
Enjoining Judge Anghad to hear the case, which was granted. Shortly, Judge Anghad
dismissed the two informations.

Respondent filed with the Court a motion to cite Judge Anghad contempt for his
deliberate action. The Court referred the appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) which granted
the petition and ordered the reinstatement of the criminal cases as well as the issuance of
the warrants of arrest. CA held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be
acquired either through compulsory process or through voluntary appearance. Thus, an
accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on
his petition for judicial reliefs. Petitioner argue that jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is required only in application for bail.

Issue:

Whether jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required to adjudicate a motion to
quash a warrant of arrest?

Ruling:

No, the Supreme Court held that Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over
the body of the accused.
 As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court. In the case of Santiago vs Vasquez, seeking an affirmative
relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

However, not all acts seeking affirmative relief would constitute a voluntary
appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Making a special appearance in
court to question the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused is not a
voluntary appearance as when in a criminal case a motion to quash is filed precisely on that
ground. There is likewise no submission to the jurisdiction of the court when the accused
files a motion to quash the warrant of arrest because it is the very legality of the court process
forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash
a warrant of arrest.

In cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the
court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused nor custody
of the law.

In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise

incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights
enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights, demanding that
due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.