The Legislative Power

TOPIC: ARTICLE VI .
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER

#1 Case Title: KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
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FACTS:
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Student Assigned: RULING:
#2 Case Title: KEY POINTS :

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FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
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RULING:
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POWER OF CONGRESS IN GENERAL

#1 David v. Arroyo, KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
G.R. No. 171396,
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May 3, 2006 The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the following:
GR No. [Insert Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in
Here] implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental
Date Promulgated: operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
[Insert Here] Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to
Topic Discussed: depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
Powers of Congress Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate
in general or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied
Legislative power in memorandum orders.
(Sec. 1) Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which
Student Assigned: the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices
Aguilar, KR of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.
FACTS:
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon AFP and the to prevent and
suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. Permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the
local governments were revoked. Rallyists were dispersed. The police arrested petitioner David and Llamas
without a warrant.
President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
Petitioners filed petitions with the SC, impleading Arroyo, questioning the legality of the proclamation.
ISSUE:
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate “decrees“?
RULING:
No, it is not within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate “decrees”
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Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”
The president is granted an Ordinance power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987). President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. In
the case at bar, she cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081.
Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were
issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the
1973 Constitution.
Also the court compared the difference between Marcos proclamation and Gloria. We all know that it was
PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: “to enforce obedience
to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.”
Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.”
To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
#2 David v. Ople KEY POINTS :

vs. Torres, G.R. No. A.O. No. 308: ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE
127685 July 23, 199 SYSTEM
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to aspects of
GR No. governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders.
Date Promulgated:
Topic Discussed: FACTS:

Powers of Congress Petitioner Ople prays to invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
in general National Computerized Identification Reference System " on two important constitutional
Legislative power grounds: (1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate (2) it impermissibly
(Sec. 1) intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights
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Student Assigned: sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE
SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A
SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE
CONSTITUTION."
Respondent’s counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL
REVIEW.
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF CONGRESS.
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED
AGENCIES.
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY.
Petitioner contends that the establishment of a national computerized identification
reference system requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of
the republic of the Philippines is, therefore, an unconstitutional usurpation of the
legislative powers of the congress of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
WoN the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation of the
legislative powers of the Congress.
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RULING:
Yes, the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers
of the Congress.
Under the law, Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and
repeal them. Congress is vested with the power to enact laws; the President executes the laws. It is generally
defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. The President is granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
In the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative
order. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a
System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national
security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by the government, the choice of policies,
etc. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the
form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe
rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws.
Hence, the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative
powers of the Congress.
COMPOSITION OF CONGRESS
#3 Veteran’s KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Federation v.
COMELEC, G.R. The Case:
No. 13678, October
26, 2000 Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing
(1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in
Election Matter 98-065; and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said
Topic Discussed: disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list
20% of the total representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided
number of under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.
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representatives
including those FACTS:
under the party-list
[Sec. 5(2)] On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national
elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated.
Student Assigned: On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12)
Aniñon, Kristine parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the
Abegail party-list system.
Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes.
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full
Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the
twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under
the Constitution, was mandatory.
It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit
under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners,
short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the
same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA’s Petition
was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These
organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang
Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and
BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting
PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14
already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of
congressional seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%)
percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement
prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system,"
which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived
to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of
Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third,
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"it should encourage [the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but
ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked
Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one representative."
ISSUE:
Whether the twenty Percent (20%) Constitutional Allocation is Mandatory.
RULING:
The pertinent provision15 of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives reads as
follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
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inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list.
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-
list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector."
ANALYSIS:
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the
number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list."
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that the twenty
percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote requirement in RA
7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it mathematically impossible to fill up the
House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple
message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-
list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total
membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list
representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties,
organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast
for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage
could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party,
organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant
portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
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"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
CONCLUSION:
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to apply
the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective,
insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that
must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
#4 BANAT v. KEY POINTS :

COMELEC, G.R.
No. 179271, April FACTS:
21, 2009 The petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before
the Commissions on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim the full number of party list representatives
Date Promulgated: provided by the
Constitution. However, the recommendation of the heard of the legal group of COMELECS’s national board
Topic Discussed: of
Canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and
Student Assigned: declared
Arcenal, Cristina S. Further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then
filed
Petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Was the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec. 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution
mandatory or was it merely a ceiling?
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Was the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941
Constitutional.
RULING:
1. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-
list
Representatives found in the Constitution. Because the Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec. 5 of Art VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20%
allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20%
of the members of the House of Representatives.
2. No, the rule was computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec. 11 (b) of
RA 7941 is unconstitutional.
#5 Ang Bagong KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Bayani v.
COMELEC, G.R. Doctrines:
No. 147613, June
26, 2001 Sec. 21 of RA 7941 mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the
Filipino-style partylist system, which will “enable” the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino
Topic Discussed: citizens who:
Major political 1. belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
parties may 2. lack well-defined constituencies; but
participate and get 3. could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
elected in the party- a whole.
list election
The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
Student Assigned: underrepresented.
Aribas, Christian The persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging to
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marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well- defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
FACTS:
For the 2001 elections, several sectoral parties, organizations and political parties filed petitions for
registration before the Comelec.
Thereafter, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations stating their
intention to participate in the party-list elections.
In its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, Comelec gave due course or approved the
Manifestations (or accreditations) of 151 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others.
Akbayan Citizens Action Party (Akbayan) filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that “the names of
some of herein respondents be deleted from the ‘Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections’.
Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination
against some of herein respondents.
Dissatisfied with Comelec’s pace, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna filed their
respective Petitions before the SC assailing Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. SC ordered the
consolidation of the two petitions. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing
of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further
orders of the Court.
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna objects to the participation or the inclusion of
political parties in the party-list system.
On the other hand, the OSG, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No.
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7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in
fact, open to all “registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.”
ISSUE:
1. WON political parties may participate in the partylist elections. (YES)

2. WON the party-list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and organizations.
(NO)
RULING:
1. YES– Political parties may participate in the partylist elections.
SC: Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides that members of the House of Representatives may “be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.”
· During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom), Christian Monsod pointed out
that the the participants in the party-list system may “be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO2, Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao.” It was also stated that the purpose of the party-list
provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or
fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress.
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered
under the party-list system.
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voter’s registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for “a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, xxx,” and that section 3 expressly states that a “party” is “either
a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.”
More to the point, the law defines “political party” as “an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most
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immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.”
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-
list system.
“For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not
be entitled to participate in the party-list system. xxx
Therefore, political parties—even the major ones—may participate in the party- list elections.
2. NO – The party-list system is NOT exclusive to ‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and
organizations.
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean that any political party or any
organization or group may do so.
The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941.
The constitutional provision (Sec. 5, Art. VI) on the party-list system is not self-executory. Hence, RA 7941
was enacted.
Sec. 5, Art. VI,CONSTI:
“(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 2 of RA 7941 mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the
Filipino-style partylist system, which will “enable” the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino
citizens who:
4. belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
5. lack well-defined constituencies; but
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6. could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well- defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible
“Proportional representation” does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the
party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or
oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the “marginalized and underrepresented” as
exemplified by the enumeration in Sec. 5 of RA 7941, namely: “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.”
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party
must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be “Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.”
Finally, “lack of well-defined constituency” refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral
group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those
with disparate interests identified with the “marginalized or underrepresented.”
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to
those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.
#6 BANAT v. KEY POINTS :

COMELEC, supra FACTS:
GR No. 179271
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the National
Date Promulgated: Board of Canvassers(NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by
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April 21, 2009 the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national
board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc.
Topic Discussed:
Major political BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their
parties may petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. The
participate and get COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties as winners in the
elected in the party- party-list elections in May 2007.
list election
The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine
Student Assigned: the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with the Veterans
Aton, Frexello Federation Party v. COMELEC formula.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision
to use the Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition assailing the
resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling
Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional
Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat is
constitutional
How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not,
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can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?
RULING:
The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more
than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the
party-list elections.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 “ those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes” is unconstitutional. The two
percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats presents an unwarranted obstacle
to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-
list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
16
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. Also, in defining a "party" that participates in
party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in
party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and
R.A. No. 7941. However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly
or indirectly.
#7 Atong Paglaum KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
v. COMELEC, G.R. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, states:
No. 203766, April Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty
2, 2013 members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
Topic Discussed: inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
(reversal of Ang elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Bagong Bayani and Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system
BANAT rulings) prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Student Assigned: Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the
Ceniza election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component
parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they
form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of
the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
17
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations
for political and/or election purposes.
FACTS:
-These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52
party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial
of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
-Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
-In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second
Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political
party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to
apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that
seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented."
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM,
KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this
Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13
petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate
in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941
and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC
disqualified the following groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
-These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,
1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM,
KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE,
18
FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD,
ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory
injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the
printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated
petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their
new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be
applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
RULING:
T - No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this
Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
R - The COMELEC only followed the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT rulings of the
Court in disqualifying the petitioners.
A - The Court said that they cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in
disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed
grave abuse of discretion.
C - Thus, the COMELEC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of
this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
T - No, the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) should NOT
19
be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
R - The Court must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which
states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system
prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component
parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they
form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of
the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations
for political and/or election purposes.
A - Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of
20
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words "national,"
and "regional," separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated
"national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their intention to make
the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the
party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the
three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are
separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2)
regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further
provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No.
7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they
are separate and distinct from each other.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals." The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and
underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not
even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may
"lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in
advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors. They are likewise termed as
“marginalized and underrepresented.”
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by
their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the
21
"marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or
must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented.
The Court declared that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the
criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, the Court suspended their rule that a party may appeal to this
Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion.
C Hence, the criteria laid down in the Bagong Bayani v. BANAT case should NOT be applied by the
COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. They shall adhere to the new parameters
determined by this Court:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and
do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-
defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.
22
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
#8 Ang Ladlad KEYPOINTS

LGBT Party v.
COMELEC, G.R. Enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors in the Constitution is not exclusive and not
No. 190582, April determinative of eligibility for registration in the party-list system;
8, 2010
FACTS:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
Topic Discussed: lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first
Meaning of applied for registration with the COMELEC IN 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the
marginalized and ground that the organization has no substantial membership base.
underrepresented
In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC. However, the COMELEC
Student Assigned: (Second Division) dismissed the petitiom on moral grounds, and held that “ the definition of the LGBT
Cruz, Maricris sector make it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immortality which offends religious beliefs.
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, the COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the
majority, upheld the denie; of Ang Ladlad’s petition for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party list
system. The reasons given were that 1.) it cannot be said that Ladlad’s expressed sexual orientations per se
would benefit the nation as a whole 2) the LGBT group do not present substantial differentiation, the Ladlad
constitutuencies are still males and females, and they will remain either make or female protected by the
same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike. 3.) it would be against generally accepted public morals
4.) the Penal Code (Art 201) makes it punishable for anyone to “publicly expound or proclaim doctrines
openly contrary to public morals. Likewise, the Civil Code (Art 694) considers a nuisance “any act,
omission, or anything else… which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality.
Ang Ladlad filed this petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the
COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation.
Ang Ladlad argues that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Moreover, the Assailed
23
Resolution contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly and equal
protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The COMELEC agrued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not the sectors enumerated in Constitution
and RA 7941 (Party -List System Act).
Respondent-COMELEC also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC
claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the
country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country
ISSUE:
WON THE REQUIREMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION AND REPUBLIC ACT NO 7941 was complied
with and that Ang Ladlad be given accreditation?
CAVEAT: There are lot of issues, above issue disclose relates only to the topic.
RULING:
Petition is granted.
YES, Ang Ladlad complied with the Constitution and Republic Act No 7941.
As to Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
SC ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the for the proposition that only those sectors specifically
enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not
exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
24
As to misrepresentation alleged by the respondents in relation to the application:
SC find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows
that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT
community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100
affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.22 Ang
Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the
Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:"
#9 Philippine KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Guardians Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, provides:
Brotherhood, Inc. v. Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon the
COMELEC, G.R. verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of
No. 190529, April any national, regional, or sectoral party, organization, or coalition on any of the following grounds:
29, 2010 xxxx
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%)
Topic Discussed: of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
Delisting of party- has registered.
list groups
FACTS:
Student Assigned: For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009, Resolution No.
Dara Pearl Dacuyan 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional, or
sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI.
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004, and it did not participate in the
2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others, the misapplication in the
ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC,
showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a legal basis for delisting PGBI.
25
RULING:
No. There is no legal basis for delisting PGBI.

The Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s
delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under
the party-list system.
The law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon the verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional, or sectoral party,
organization or coalition if it: (a)fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b )fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. The word or is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds
cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting, and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-
list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat
in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This is how Section 6(8) of RA
7941 should be understood and applied.
PGBI’s situation as a party-list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and
immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is something that is not covered by
Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a
matter for Congress to address. The Court cannot and does not address matters over which full discretionary
authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend the principle of separation of
powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should bring this concern to the notice of the legislature.
Hence, there is no legal basis for delisting PGBI.
#10 : Abayon v. KEY POINTS :

HRET, G.R. No. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the "members" of that House are:
189466, February Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
11, 2010 members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
26
Topic Discussed: inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
Authority to elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations .
determine the
qualifications of a The members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x who shall be elected from
party-list nominee legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
initially belongs to regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the Constitution’s point of view, it is
the party that the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or organizations. These
nominated him, but representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized
it is for the HRET and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to
to interpret the which such party-list representatives belong.
meaning of the
qualification of a FACTS: In GR 189466, Petitioner Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization
nominee as a “bona that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
fide member of the Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee,
party or petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
organization which Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
he seeks to Respondents pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list
represent” under the nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an
Party-list System incumbent congressional district representative.
Act Petitioner Abayon countered that the COMELEC had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a
national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and
Student Assigned: elderly and that she belonged to the women sector.
Dizon, Icy Marilou Abayon also pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since
it fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of
Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first
nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of
petitioner Abayon.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Palparan is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the
2007 elections. Respondents are members of some other party-list groups.
Respondents filed with HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee. Respondents
alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he
did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims
27
of communist rebels, CAFGUs, former rebels, and security guards. Respondents said that Palparan
committed gross human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the
party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay's nominee and that any
question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be
brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over
the question of petitioner Palparan's qualifications.
Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations.
RULING: Yes, HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan
as nominees of Aangat Tayo andBantay party-list organizations.
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of
party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:
Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write,
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee — the need for him
or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization — in the context of the facts
that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan's relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the
marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as
28
pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than
the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By
analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has
been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and
the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
#11 Lico v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
COMELEC, supra
SECTION 17, ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
Topic Discussed:
Qualification of a FACTS:
party-list Ating Koop was declared as one of the winning party-list groups on December 8, 2010. It earned a seat at
representative vis-à- the House of Representatives, with petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico as its party-list representative. On May
vis his expulsion 14, 2011, Ating Koop introduced amendments to its constitution, which cut short the three-year term of the
from his party-list incumbent members. On Dember 5, 2011, the Interim Central Committee of Ating Koop expelled Lico for
group within the disloyalty. There were allegations of graft and corruption, and Lico’s refusal to honor the term-sharing
jurisdiction of the agreement. The Lico group held a special meeting in Cebu City, while the Rimas group held a Special
HRET National Convention in Paranaque City. The Rimas group filed a Petition with COMELEC praying that
Lico be ordered to vacate his office and to nullify the meeting that happened in Cebu. COMELEC Second
Student Assigned: Division upheld the expulsion of Lico and declared Roberto Mascarina, the elected representative during
the Paranaque meeting, as the duly qualified nominee of the party-list group.
Ganzan, Marivic M.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the expulsion of a member of the House of
Representatives from his party-list organization?
RULING:
No. COMELEC has no jurisdiction over this case. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the
qualifications of members of Congress.
29
ANALYSIS:
In the case at bar, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group – petitioner Lico
took his oath and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. It is the HRET, and not the
COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article
VI of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives.
CONCLUSION:
Therefore, COMELEC has no jurisdiction in this case under Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
#12 Magdalo Para sa KEY POINTS :

Pagbabago v. Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that "seek to
COMELEC, G.R. achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be denied registration. This disqualification
No. 190793, June 19, is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party which seeks to achieve its
2012 goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation."

Eligibility of parties
seeking registration Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Rule 37, Section 1 of the Commission of Elections
under the party-list (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure, in relation to Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
system Resolutions dated 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 issued by the COMELEC in SPP Case No. 09-073
(PP).
Student Assigned:
Francis John P. Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the COMELEC,
Gloria seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital
Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.
COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO where it held
that Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused registration in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5)
of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the partys organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F.
Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala
30
Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This
and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in
employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of
organized societies.
MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc for
resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution dated 23 December 2009, in
which it clarified its intention to participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections as a party-list
group. COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC erred when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO
RULING:
No. The COMELEC did not err when it denied the petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO
Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that "seek to
achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be denied registration. This disqualification
is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party which seeks to achieve its
goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation."
At the bar, to join an electoral contest, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of
registration and accreditation. Based on the participation of the members of MAGDALO in the Oakwood,
employing violence or other harmful means would be inconsistent with the legal effects of amnesty Violence
is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or
fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed
against common right, against laws, and against public liberty. On the other hand, an unlawful act is one
that is contrary to law and need not be a crime, considering that the latter must still unite with evil intent to
exist.
Therefore, the COMELEC did not err in denying the petition for registration, and the petition is
31
dismissed.
#13 Ang Ladlad KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
LGBT Party v.
COMELEC, supra Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, supra
GR No. 190582, April 08, 2010
Topic Discussed:
Eligibility of parties Topic: Eligibility of parties seeking registration under the party-list
seeking registration
under the party-list Case: A petition for Certiorari with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by
ang LadLad against the resolution of the Commission on Elections.
Student Assigned:
Lanzaderas, The roots of the case is on the Refusal of the COMELEC to accredit ang LadLad as a party-list organization
Christian Jee under RA 7941, otherwise known as the party-list System Act.
FACTS:
Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the comelec in 2006, however, it was denied on the ground that
the organization had no substantial membership case.
In 2009, ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC, arguing that the LGBT
community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their
sexual orientation and gender identity.
Moreover, Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party versus Commission on Elections.
Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational
supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
The Comelec dismissed the petition on moral grounds stating that petitioner defines the filipino lesbian, gay,
bisexual and transgender community, this, a marginalized sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity and proceeded to define sexual orientation as a person’s capacity
for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with,
32
individuals of a different gender, of the same gender or more than one gender.
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, three commissioenrs voted to overturn the first assailed
resolution, while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad’s motion for reconsideration. Breaking the
tie, the Comelec Chairman upheld the first assailed resolution.
The Comeleve argues further in its comments that LGBT sectos is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941.
Hence, this petition in Court.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT ANG LADLAD IS ELIGIBLE TO REGISTER UNDER THE PARTYLIST

SYSTEM?
RULING:
Yes, Ang Ladlad is eligible to register under the partylist system.
Section 2 of the partylist law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing
congressional representatives is to enable Filipino Citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a while,
to become members of the House of the Representatives. The ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani provides an
enumeration in the law or related to said sectors that may be registered under the party-list system, however,
such jurisprudence also teachers us that the enumeration of the marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive,
As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party versus Commission on Elections, the
enumeration of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive. The respondent mistakenly
opines that the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically
enumerated shall qualify to register. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated,
but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the constitution and RA 7941.
Hence, Ang Ladlad is eligible to register under the partylist system.
33
FALLO/DISPOSITION:
Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted. The resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November
11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 PL are hereby Set Aside. The Commission on Elections
is directed to Grant Petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.
#14 Macias v. KEY POINTS : Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
COMELEC, G.R. hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
No. L-18684, Sept. apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number
14, 1961 of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
Topic Discussed:
Apportionment and (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
representation [Sec. territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
5(1); Sec. 5(3)] least one representative.
Student Assigned:
Jan Clyd Lim The printed-form, three-day requirement. — The Constitution provides that "no bill shall be passed by either
House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least
three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its
immediate enactment.”
Population Census. — According to the Constitution, "the Congress shall by law, make an apportionment (of
Members of the House) within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise.” The
Census of Population is the first of a series of four censuses which include housing, agriculture and
economics in addition to population. These four censuses together constitute what is known as the Census of
1960. Like population, the housing and agricultural censuses are undergoing processing, while the economic
census is now under preparation.
FACTS:
34
Petitioners request that respondent officials be prevented from implementing Republic Act 3040 that
apportions representative districts in this country. It is unconstitutional and void, they allege, because: (a) it
was passed by the House of Representatives without printed final copies of the bill having been furnished the
Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage; (b) it was approved more than three years after the
return of the last census of our population; and (c) it apportioned districts without regard to the number of
inhabitants of the several provinces.
The respondents aver they were merely complying with their duties under the statute, which they presume
and allege to be constitutional.
Petitioners are four members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis Oriental, and
Bulacan, and the provincial governor of Negros Oriental. They allege, and this Court finds, that their
provinces had been discriminated against by Republic Act 3040, because they were given less representative
districts than the number of their inhabitants required or justified: Misamis Oriental having 387,839
inhabitants, was given one district only, whereas Cavite with 379,902 inhabitants, was given two districts;
Negros Oriental and Bulacan with 598,783 and 557,691 respectively, were allotted 2 representative districts
each, whereas Albay with 515,961 was assigned 3 districts
ISSUE:
Whether or not the apportionment could not legally rest on this report since it is merely "preliminary" and
"may be subject to revision.
RULING:
No. the apportionment could legally rest even if it was merely "preliminary" and "may be subject to revision.
Under the Apportionment of Members. — The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of
the House of Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be
according to the members of their respective inhabitants."
In the case at bar, we held that this provision was violated by Republic Act 3040 because (a) it gave Cebu
seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it gave Manila four
members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; (c) Pangasinan with less inhabitants than
both Manila and Cotabato got more than both, five members having been assigned to it; (d) Samar (with
35
871,857) was allotted four members while Davao with 903,224 got three only; (e) Bulacan with 557,691 got
two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got three, and (f) Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was
given one member only, while Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got two. These were not the only
instances of unequal apportionment. We see that Mountain Province has 3 whereas Isabela, Laguna and
Cagayan with more inhabitants have 2 each. And then, Capiz, La Union and Ilocos Norte got 2 each,
whereas Sulu that has more inhabitants got 1 only. And Leyte with 967,323 inhabitants got 4 only, whereas
Iloilo with fewer inhabitants (966,145) was given 5.
It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of the
legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is properly
brought before it.
Ergo, the apportionment could legally rest even if it was merely "preliminary" and "may be subject to
revision.
#15 Montejo v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
COMELEC, G.R.
No. 118702, March Summary:
16, 1995 Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of
Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the
Topic Discussed: ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner
Apportionment and seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the province.
representation [Sec. Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion of Tolosa
5(1); Sec. 5(3) in his district.
Student Assigned: FACTS:

Lungay, Junrey
Leyte is composed of 5 legal districts. In April 8, 1959, Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte, was
made its sub province by virtue of RA 2141
On Jan 1, 1992, the LGC took effect and pursuant to its sec 462, made Biliran a regular province approved
by a plebiscite on May 11, 1992
36
As a consequence of the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the Third District composed the new
province of Biliran
A further consequence was to reduce the Third District to five (5) municipalities with a total population of
145,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province
of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the
province and other interested parties.
On December 29, 1994, it promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where it rearranged several municipalities
among the diff districts.
Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the attention of respondent COMELEC, among, to the
inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters between the First and Second Districts. He alleged that the
First District has 178,688 registered voters while the Second District has 156,462 registered voters or a
difference of 22,226 registered voters.
To diminish the difference, he proposed that the municipality of Tolosa with 7,700 registered voters be
transferred from the First to the Second District.
COMELEC said that (1) its adjustment of municipalities involved the least disruption of the territorial
composition of each district; and (2) said adjustment complied with the constitutional requirement that each
legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
Montejo said that Sec. 1 of Res. 2736 violates the principle of equality of representation ordained in the
constitution.
However, intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol opposed the petition on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and (2) assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in
accord with the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has constitutional power to transfer municipalities from one legislative
district to another?
RULING:
No, the COMELEC has no constitutional power to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to
another.
37
Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion, thus:
"Within three (3) years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section."
In this case, the COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its
power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But based on the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative
apportionment as the Congress itself exercised such power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the
COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment made. Consistent with the limit of its power
to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the COMELEC any authority to
transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district.
Thus, the COMELEC has no constitutional power to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to
another.
NB: Based on my understanding of this case, this involves apportionment power of the Congress which was
performed by COMELEC. I’m not sure why Sec 5(1) and 5(3) are placed in the outline. Thus, kindly just use
best judgment during the recit if ever ma.ask ni na case. - Junrey
--#16 Aquino v. KEY POINTS :

COMELEC, G.R.
No. 189793, April
7, 2010
FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
Apportionment and ISSUE:
representation [Sec.
5(1); Sec. 5(3)] RULING:
Student Assigned:
QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
38
--#17 Pimentel v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
COMELEC, G.R.
No. 161658, FACTS:
November 3, 2008
Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it mandatory for
Topic Discussed: candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
List of private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other
qualifications is personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the 2004
exclusive synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g) of the said law.
(Companion case to
SJS v. DDB, G.R. ISSUE:
No. 157870,
November 3, 2008) Is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an unconstitutional imposition of additional
qualification on candidates for Senator?
Student Assigned:
Padrigao
RULING:
Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both
in the national or local government undergo a mandatory drug test is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3,
Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for Senator needs only to meet 5 qualifications: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. The Congress cannot validly amend
or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the discharge of
their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
#18 Limkaichong v. KEY POINTS : Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office
COMELEC, G.R. requiring one to be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government
Nos. 178831-32, institution. Proper proceedings must be strictly followed by the proper officers under the law.
39
April 1, 200

Citizenship – On March 26, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
natural born citizen position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.
Student Assigned: Two petitions for her disqualification were instituted before the COMELEC by concerned citizens coming
Silorio from her locality:
1. On April 4, 2007, Napoleon Camero, a registered voter of La Libertad, Negros Oriental, filed the petition
for her disqualification on the ground that she lacked the citizenship requirement of a Member of the House
of Representatives. He alleged that she is not a natural-born Filipino because her parents were Chinese
citizens at the time of her birth.
2. On April 11, 2007, Renald F. Villando, also a registered voter of the same locality, filed the second
petition on the same ground of citizenship.He claimed that when Limkaichong was born, her parents were
still Chinese citizens as the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained
finality due to procedural and substantial defects.
Both petitions prayed for the cancellation of Limkaichong's COC and for the COMELEC to strike out her
name from the list of qualified candidates for the Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.
In her separate Answers to the petitions, Limkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born Filipino since she
was born to a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino mother, who had reacquired her status as
such due to her husband's naturalization. Thus, at the time of her birth on November 9, 1959, nineteen (19)
days had already passed after her father took his Oath of Allegiance on October 21, 1959 and after he was
issued a Certificate of Naturalization on the same day.
She contended that the COMELEC should dismiss the petitions outright for lack of cause of action.
Comelec issued a joint resolution disqualifying her from holding office on May 17, 2007. Limkaichong filed
for a motion for reconsideration.
Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and
40
she was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23, 2007.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification case
RULING:
No, COMELEC should not assume jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Further, corollary thereto is Rule 14 of the 1998
Rules of the HRET, as amended, which states that the tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
In this case, the Court held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends. The House of Representative Electoral Tribunal’s
(HRET) own jurisdiction begins. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a
proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case
involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and
qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of
the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to
its members.
Thus, HRET has the jurisdiction over the disqualification case of Jocelyn Limkaichong.
#19 Vilando v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
HRET, G.R. Nos.
192147 & 192149, FACTS:
August 23, 2011 Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Because of this, her opponent,
Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. They alleged that
Topic Discussed: Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still
41
List of a Chinese and that her mother lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s father.
qualifications is During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, Election day came and votes
exclusive were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing
(Companion case to declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Few days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared
SJS v. DDB, G.R. Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however, notwithstanding their
No. 157870, proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as
November 3, 2008) the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance withResolution No. 8062 adopting the
policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification
Student Assigned: cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved
Tariao, John Mark cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong
D. assailed Paras’ petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which
has the jurisdiction over the matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
ISSUE/S:
WON the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid

WON the HRET already acquired jurisdiction over the case.
WON Limkaichong is qualified to hold an office in the Republic of the Philippines.
RULING:
The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her
motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her
proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the
COMELEC’s Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no
impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held that
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House
of Representatives the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a
winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding
before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the
House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word
42
“sole'' in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the
exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is
the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption
of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros
Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the
contrary. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired
citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father
under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy
and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.Respondent participated in the barangay
elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voter's affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was
elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of election of Philippine
citizenship.
#20 David v. KEY POINTS :

Senate Electoral FACTS:
Tribunal, G.R. No. • Senator Mary Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a foundling that was adopted by the spouses Ronald Allan Poe
221538, September (FPJ) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (Susan Roces).
20, 2016 • 1988, Sen. Poe went to the United States to obtain her college degree. She earned her bachelor’s degree in
Political Science from Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts.
• 1991, Sen Poe and her husband decided to settle in the US with their children. She was naturalized and
Topic Discussed: granted American citizenship on October 18, 2001.
Citizenship – • 2004, during the Presidential election she went back to the Philippines to support his adoptive father FPJ.
natural born citizen When FPJ died, she stayed in the country until February 3, 2005 to attend the settling of his father’s estate.
• July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Student Assigned: • July 10, 2006, Sen. Poe filed a petition for retention and re-acquisition of her Philippines Citizenship
Tompong, Van John through RA 9225. This petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
P. • Sen. Poe made several trips to the USA between 2006 and 2009 using her US Passport. She used her
43
passport after having taken oath of Allegiance to the Republic on July 7, 2006, but not after she had formally
renounced her American citizenship on October 20, 2010.
• October 6, 2010, Sen. Poe was appointed by Pres. Benigno Aquino III as a chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board.
• Sen. Poe ran as Senator in 2013 elections. She won and she was declared as Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.
• David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal a
petition for Quo Warranto against the Sen. Poe.
• November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to
be a natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator.
• Rizalito Y. David, petitioned for a Certiorari to nullify the dismissal of Quo Warranto to unseat private
respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for allegedly not being a natural- born citizen of the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mary Grace Poe- Llamanzares is eligible to sit as a Senator.
RULING:
YES, Mary Grace Poe- Llamanzares is eligible to sit as a Senator.
From the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention on citizenship, it was never the intention of the
framers to exclude foundlings from natural-born citizenship status. “Children or people born in a country of
unknown parents are citizens of this nation” and the only reason that there was no specific reference to
foundlings in the 1935 provision was that these cases “are few and far in between.” Evident intent was to
adopt the concept found in the Spanish Code “wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish
territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son
of a Spaniard.”
Under Art. 14 of the Hague Convention of 1930 (on Conflict of Nationality Laws), a foundling is presumed
to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found until the contrary is proved. Although
the Philippines is not a signatory to said convention, its provisions are binding as they form part of the law of
the land pursuant to the incorporation clause. Senator Roxas in the 1934 Constitutional Convention remarked
“By international law the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens
in this nation is recognized…” By referring to this rule in international law (which was no other than Art. 14
of the Hague Convention of 1930), which was effectively created in the Constitution itself, was an exception
44
to the general rule of natural-born citizenship based on blood descent.
The foundlings (children born in the Philippines with unknown parentage) were, by birth, accorded natural-
born citizenship by the Constitution. “natural-born citizens by legal fiction”The framers of the Constitution
were sufficiently empowered to create a class of natural-born citizens by legal fiction, as an exception to the
jus sanguinis rule. This is evident from Art. 1 (State to determine who are its nationals) and Art. 2 (questions
on nationality to be determined by the law of that State) of the 1930 Hague Convention.
Poe validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic, as required under Section 3, R.A. No. 9225. Before assuming her position as MTRCB Chairman,
Poe executed an affidavit of renunciation of foreign citizenship. This was sufficient to qualify her for her
appointive position, and later, her elective office as R.A. No. 9225 did not require that her Certificate of Loss
of Nationality filed before the U.S. Embassy be first approved in order that she may qualify for office.
Records of the Bureau of Immigration show that Poe still used her U.S. passport after having taken her Oath
of Allegiance but not after she had renounced her U.S. Citizenship.
Therefore, Mary Grace Poe- Llamanzares is eligible to sit as a Senator.
#21 Coquilla v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
COMELEC, G.R. FACTS:
No. 151914, July TEODULO COQUILLA (PETITIONER), a former Filipino citizen, a native of Oras, Eastern Samar, and a
31, 2002 retired US navy, repatriated back to the Philippines and decided to run as mayor in his hometown in Oras,
Eastern Samar. Prior to that, he frequently visited the Philippines, even when he was still active in the US
Topic Discussed: Navy and until his retirement. During one of his visits in the Philippi
Residence
Student Assigned: nes, he secured a residence certificate (cedula) although he continued making several trips to the United
Viarino, Mim States.
In 2000, he settled in the Philippines for good and took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines on November
10, 2000.
In February 2001, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC), and stated therein that he has been a resident
of Oras, Eastern Samar for two (2) years.
45
Incumbent mayor, NEIL ALVAREZ (RESPONDENT), filed a petition seeking for the cancellation of
Coquilla’s candidacy on the ground of insufficient residency requirement of two year. Alvarez further
alleged that Coquilla had only resided in Samar for only about six months starting his repatriation on
November 10, 2000.
COMELEC was unable to render judgment before the conduct of elections. And it was Coquilla who won
the elections. It was only then that COMELEC revisited the petition filed by Alvarez and ordered the
cancellation of Coquilla’s Certificate of Candidacy (COC) on the basis of lack of residency for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Coquilla filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC, but the same was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of Coquilla’s Certificate of Candidacy (COC) on the basis of lack of
residency requirements is justified.
RULING:
Yes, the cancellation of Coquilla’s Certificate of Candidacy (COC) on the basis of lack of residency
requirements is justified.
Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) provides that:
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect.
Moreover, the Supreme Court defined the term “residence” to be understood as “domicile” or legal
residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain. A domicile of origin
is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues
until the same is abandoned by acquisition of a new domicile (domicile of choice).
In this case, Coquilla lost his domicile of original in Oras, Eastern Samar by becoming a U.S. citizen after
46
enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired
Philippine citizenship, Coquilla was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines. He did not
reestablished his residence in the Philippines in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty
elections by securing a Community Tax Certificate and by constantly declaring to his townmates of his
intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. Coquilla can only be held to
have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as
a citizen of the Philippines. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras,
Eastern, Samar.
Therefore, the cancellation of Coquilla’s Certificate of Candidacy (COC) on the basis of lack of residency
requirements is justified.
#22 Co v. Electoral KEY POINTS :

Tribunal, G.R. Nos. In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was proclaimed the
92191-92 July 30, duly elected representative of the 2nd District of Northern Samar. The House of Representatives Electoral
1991 Tribunal (HRET) upheld his election against claims that he was not a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. In sustaining the ruling of the HRET, this Court, citing Faypon v.
Quirino, applied the concept of animus revertendi or "intent to return", stating that his absence from his
Topic Discussed: residence in order to pursue studies or practice his profession as a certified public accountant in Manila or
Residence his registration as a voter other than in the place where he was elected did not constitute loss of residence.
The fact that the respondent made periodical journeys to his home province in Laoag revealed that he
Student Assigned: always had animus revertendi.
Aguilar, KR
FACTS:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural
born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. On May 11, 1987, the
congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held among the candidates who vied for
the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto
Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the
duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests
47
against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born
citizen of the Philippines; and 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
ISSUE:
Whether Ong is a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar?
RULING:
Yes.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
In the case at bar, the petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term
"residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but
also under the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to
the word "residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
xxThe term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person
from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that
person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147
[1966])xx
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang,
Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained
fixed therein even up to the present. The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private
respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the
laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still
in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the
48
case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a
house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or
in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
#23 Marcos v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
COMELEC, G.R.
No. 119976, FACTS:
September 18, 1995
Topic Discussed: On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
Residence District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
Student Assigned: requirement for residency.
Aniñon, Kristine Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution’s one year residency requirement for candidates for the House
Abegail Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Vote Registration Record 94-No 3349772
and in her Certificate of Candidacy.
Mr. Montejo prayed that an order be issued declaring disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy.
Mrs. Marcos COC stated that she was a resident of Leyte for seven months.
In response, Marcos amended her COC changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood". Marcos
claimed that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence." She further claimed
that she is entitled to the correction of her COC on the ground that her original entry of "seven months" was
the result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake".
The COMELEC granted the petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos.
It held that the animus revertendi of Marcos was not Tacloban, but San Juan, Manila, because that is where
she chose to live after she went back to the Philippines after her well-publicized exile in the US. It explained
that while Petitioner grew up in Tacloban, after her graduation, however, she moved to Manila where she
became a registered voter, became a member of the Batasang Pambansa as a representative of Manila and
eventually became Governor of Manila. This, according to the COMELEC, debunks her claim that she was
a resident of Leyte 1st District "since childhood".
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing that she
obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
49
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, MArcos claimed that she was the overwhelming winner of
the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year residency
requirement to be eligible to run as representative.
Whether or not Petitioner lost her domicile after she married and lived with her husband in Ilocos Norte and
in San Juan.
RULING:
Yes, the court is in favor of a conclusion supporting the petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in
the First District of Leyte.
An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different places.
The evidence by Montejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince the court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice was indeed incurred.
No, the petitioner did not lost her domicile after she married and lived with her husband in Ilocos Norte and
in San Juan.
The domicile of origin is not easily lost. To effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
An actual removal or an actual change of domicile

A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one
Acts which correspond with the purpose
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue.
Effect of marriage as to the domicile of origin
Article 110 of the New Civil Code provides:
50
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living
with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to this article or to the concepts of domicile or residence does not suggest
that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband upon marriage.
This article clearly refers to actual residence and not domicile and merely establishes the default rule in
fulfilling the obligation of the spouses "to live together" in the article immediately preceding Art. 110.
When Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged—by virtue of
Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. Mr. Marcos
had several places of residence at the time: San Juan and Ilocos Norte. Assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed
any of these places as the conjugal residence, what the petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence.
She did not lose her domicile of origin.
This rule has changed with the advent of the Family code with the introduction of the common law concept
of "matrimonial domicile". This underscores the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the
Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new
provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision
recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the
choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses.
ANALYSIS:
In the case at bar, Mrs. Marcos filed her COC with 7 months of residence and later on change to since
childhood. Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's
qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 constitution. Domicile
versus Residence
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that for exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations,
the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence. In a past case, the Court took the concept
of Domicile to mean an individual’s “permanent home”, “ a place to which, whenever absent for business or
51
for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose
intent.
Domicile composed of two elements:

The fact of residing/physical presence in a fixed place
Animus manendi- the intention of returning permanently
II. In the case at the bar, the petitioner Imelda Marcos was born, her domicile followed that of her parents.
The domicile of origin was Tacloban. Once acquired, domicile is retained until a new one is gained.
Even assuming that Petitioner's domicile was lost, her acts unequivocally show an intent to reestablish a
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte because Petitioner, as early as in 1992, already obtained her residence certificate
in Tacloban.
CONCLUSION:
The decisions were set aside and the respondent COMELEC was directed to order the Provincial Board
ofCanvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
#24 Aquino v. KEY POINTS :

COMELEC, G.R.
No. 120265,
September 18, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second
Topic Discussed: District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and MateoBedon,
Residence Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner
on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under
Student Assigned: Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the
elections.
Alferez, Aldren
52
ISSUE:
Was the “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
RULING:
Yes, the “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be
a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the
elections.
In the case at bar, the term "residence" has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only
under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. In order that petitioner could qualify
as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established
not just residence but domicile of choice. Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections,
indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident
of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he
was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the
birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of
record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was
Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing
a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioner’s intention
to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of
one’s original domicile. The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where
he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return, and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
Thus, the “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the
53
Term of office (Sec. 4 & 7, Art. VI; Sec. 2, Art. XVIII)
#25 Arnault v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Nazareno, supra
Effect of A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Arnault to relieve him from his confinement in the New Bilibid
overlapping of Prison
terms Arnault was cited for contempt by the Senate. It is because of persistently refusing to reveal the name of
the person to whom he gave a sum of money in connection to the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal
Student Assigned: the Senate was investigating.
Arcenal, Cristina S. The Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates. The entire amount allocated to buy said estates was given to a certain Burt, through his
representative petitioner Arnault.
He was ordered imprisoned and claims to be released as Congress is no longer in session.
ISSUE:
Whether or not contempt of court and its sanction is dependent on the Congress session.
Whether Arnault can be relieved from answering the query by merely declaring that to do so is self-
incriminating?
RULING:
No, the Senate is a continuing body and therefore the incarceration should continue despite the election
of the Lower House.
No, since according to Arnault himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the representative of
Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, there is no basis upon which to sustain his claim that
to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
#26 Neri v. Senate KEY POINTS :

Committee, G.R.
No. 180643, March DOCTRINE:
54
25, 2008 (decision) Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President. It exists to
September 4, 2008 protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that
(resolution) the nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of
information between the President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and
arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution. The
Topic Discussed: confidentiality of the President’s conversations and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the
Effect of confidentiality of judicial delibera
overlapping of tions. It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated by
terms public interest and the constitutionally ordained separation of governmental powers.
Student Assigned: FACTS:

Aribas, Christian
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven
(11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by
the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further
narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and
petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive
privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by requiring him
to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s
testimony on the ground of executive privilege. On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before
respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege. On November 22, 2007,
the respondent Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited
in contempt. On November 29, 2007, in petitioner’s reply to respondent Committees, he manifested that it
was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were
those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege.
He also manifested his willingness to appear and testify should there be new matters to be taken up. He just
55
requested that he be furnished "in advance as to what else" he "needs to clarify." Respondent Committees
found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory and cited petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and
ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would
appear and give his testimony. Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent
Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) on February 1, 2008.
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: first, the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege; and second, respondent Committees
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. Anent the first ground, we considered the
subject communications as falling under the presidential communications privilege because (a) they related
to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, (b) they were received by a close advisor of the
President, and (c) respondent Committees failed to adequately show a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority. As to the second ground, we found that respondent Committees committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the contempt order because (a) there was a valid claim of executive privilege, (b) their
invitations to petitioner did not contain the questions relevant to the inquiry, (c) there was a cloud of doubt as
to the regularity of the proceeding that led to their issuance of the contempt order, (d) they violated Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution because their inquiry was not in accordance with the "duly published rules
of procedure," and (e) they issued the contempt order arbitrarily and precipitately.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications eliceited by the subject three (3) questions are covered by executive
privilege
RULING:
The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive
officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including,
among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This
is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. The claim of executive privilege is highly
recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to
the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the
56
doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality
than others.
There Are Factual and Legal Bases to hold that the Communications Elicited by the three (3) Questions Are
Covered by Executive Privilege.
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power."
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less
executive. "Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated
essence of substance.24 On the other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power or duty cannot be delegated
to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor.25 The power to enter into an
executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.26 Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board,
which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign
loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.
B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive.
The doctrine of "operational proximity" was laid down to limit the scope of the presidential communications
privilege. In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch"
(a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the
Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her
official family.
C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized interest; and in
balancing respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests, the Court did not disregard the
1987 Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information.
The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest in
confidentiality. It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the President’s
communication with her advisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It
was actually a product of the meeting of minds between officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the
President says about the agreement - particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are matters which
China will surely view with particular interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could adversely
affect our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.
US jurisprudence clearly guards against the dangers of allowing Congress access to all papers relating to a
57
negotiation with a foreign power. In this jurisdiction, the the privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
where upheld wherein information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest. The nature of
diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are inherent in executive
action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature.
Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the
President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that
Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her
confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some
vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted consequences
of subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased frequency and
great publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense and
unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decision-making process, which inevitably
would involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet.
#27 Garcillano v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
House of
Representatives, RULE XLIV
G.R. No. 170338, UNFINISHED BUSINESS
December 23, 2008 SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same
status.
Topic Discussed: All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be
Effect of taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.
overlapping of
terms SECTION 21, Art. VI (1987 Constitution) provides that: “[T]he Senate or the House of Representatives or
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
Student Assigned: published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
Aton, Frexello respected.
FACTS:
58
This case is a consolidation of two petitions.
In 2005, respondent House Committees conducted a congressional investigation with regard to the
wiretapped conversations that surfaced between petitioner,former COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano and
former President Arroyo.
In 2007, the Senate conducted its own legislative inquiry where it summoned another petitioner to this case,
Major Sagge, member of the Intelligence Service of theAFP (ISAFP) without the following:
PUBLICATION of the Senate Rules of Procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation
The intended legislation referred to in the preceding number (“in aid of legislation”)
Respondents claimed that their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication was justified by
the fact that the rules have never been amended since 1995.Further, aside from the availability of free
booklets containing the 1995 rules, the
Senate’s internet web page also provided the 1995 rules that serves as the functional equivalent of a written
document with reference to the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000
ISSUE:
WON Sec. 21, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution was violated
RULING:
Petition to issue writ of prohibition GRANTED prohibiting the Senate and any of its committees from
conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation in connection with the“Hello Garci” tapes.
The constitutional provision is CLEAR and UNAMBIGUOUS. The definition of publication is stated in Art.
59
2 of the Civil Code. The Electronic Commerce Act (R.A.8792) merely recognizes the admissibility in
evidence of electronic data messages or electronic documents insofar as they constitute the original copies.
The internet is not the medium for publishing laws, rules, and regulations.
While the Senate as an institution is not completely dissolved with each national election (hence, a
“continuing body” in the institutional sense), the Senate of each Congress however, acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the previous Congress. The Senate is NOT a continuing body in connection to
the conduct of its day-to-day business because the members of the incumbent Congress are not responsible
for the acts and deliberations of the previous Congress which they took no part in.
Hence, until the Senate shall have published its own rules of procedure informing the public on whether or
not they would retain or modify the rules followed by the previous Congresses, the conduct of legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation contemplated in the constitution cannot not be legally conducted.
#28 PHILCONSA KEY POINTS :

v. Jimenez, G.R. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
No. L-23326, Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by
December 18, 1965 law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
Section 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public
Topic Discussed: in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish
Salaries and annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses for each Member.
accounts of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution:
Members of Section 14. The Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided
Congress (Sec. 10 by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and
& 20) other emoluments or allowances and exclusive only of traveling expenses to and from their respective
districts in the case of Members of the House of Representatives, and to an from their places of residence in
Student Assigned: the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take
Ceniza effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand
60
pesos.
Section 21.
No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill.
No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form
furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the President shall have
certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof
shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered on the Journal.
FACTS:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same
allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and
to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to
circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of
office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision
constitutes “selfish class legislation” because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after
twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of
service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other officers
and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a
gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot
exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar
as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their
compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General counter-argued, alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits under
Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute “forbidden
compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in
question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits
under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member”
and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.
ISSUE:
Whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which states:
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Section 14. The Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided
by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and
other emoluments or allowances and exclusive only of traveling expenses to and from their respective
districts in the case of Members of the House of Representatives, and to an from their places of residence in
the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand
pesos.
RULING:
Yes, Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.
The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads:

AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT
NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED
THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Subsection (c), Section twelve of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred eighty-six, as
amended by Republic Act Numbered Thirty hundred ninety-six, is further amended to read as follows:
"(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of age, who has rendered at least twenty years of
service. The benefit shall, in addition to the return of his personal contributions plus interest and the payment
of the corresponding employer's premiums described in subsection (a) of Section five hereof, without
interest, be only a gratuity equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service, based on the highest
rate received, but not to exceed twenty-four months: Provided, That the retiring officer or employee has been
in the service of the said employer or office for at least four years immediately preceding his retirement.
"Retirement is also allowed to a senator or a member of the House of Representatives and to an elective
officer of either House of the Congress, regardless of age, provided that in the case of a Senator or Member,
he must have served at least twelve years as a Senator and/or as a member of the House of Representatives,
and, in the case of an elective officer of either House, he must have served the government for at least twelve
years, not less than four years of which must have been rendered as such elective officer: Provided, That the
gratuity payable to a retiring senator, member of the House of Representatives, or elective officer, of either
House, shall be equivalent to one year's salary for every four years of service in the government and the same
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shall be exempt from any tax whatsoever and shall be neither liable to attachment or execution nor
refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
"This gratuity is payable by the employer or office concerned which is hereby authorized to provide the
necessary appropriation or pay the same from any unexpended items of appropriations or savings in its
appropriations or saving in its appropriations.
"Elective or appointive officials and employees paid gratuity under this subsection shall be entitled to the
commutation of the unused vacation and sick leave, based on the highest rate received, which they may have
to their credit at the time of retirement."
SECTION 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 22, 1963
It is worthy to note that the original salary for the members of the National Assembly (unicameral body) was
fixed at P5,000.00 per annum each. This was raised to P7,200 per annum by the enactment of the 1940
Constitutional amendment, when the unicameral body, the National Assembly, was changed to Congress,
composed of two bodies, the Senate and the House of Representatives. Again, in 1964, by the enactment of
Republic Act 4143, the salary for the Members of Congress was raised to P32,000.00 per annum for each of
them; and for the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to P40,000.00 per
annum each.
When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the
amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum, but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows:
"No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase." In other words, under
the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of
its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the
Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term
compensation "other emoluments." This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the
retirement benefits as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term "other
emoluments."
"Emolument" has been defined as "the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as
compensation for services, or which is annexed to the possession of office, as salary, fees and perquisites;
advantage, gain, public or private." The gain, profit or advantage which is contemplated in the definition or
significance of the word "emolument" as applied to public officers, clearly comprehends, We think, a gain,
profit, or advantage which is pecuniary in character.
63
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of
compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement
benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly
runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution, namely:
1. They may not hold any other office or employment in the Government without forfeiting their respective
seats;
2. They shall not be appointed, during the time for which they are elected, to any civil office which may have
been created or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased while they were members of Congress;
(Section 16, Article VI, Constitution)
3. They cannot be financially interested in any franchise;
4. They cannot appear in any civil case wherein the Government is an adverse party;
5. They cannot appear as counsel before any Electoral Tribunal; and
6. They cannot appear as counsel in any criminal case where an officer or employee of the Government is
accused. (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution)
Therefore, Republic Act 3836 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution.
VII. Parliamentary immunities (Sec. 11)
#29 People v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. Section 11, Article VI states that “ A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in offenses
132875-76, punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
February 3, 2000 session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof

Privilege from Jalosjos, the representative of the First District of Zamboanga Del Norte, was confined at the national
arrest penitentiary awaiting the decision of his appeal on his conviction of two counts of statutory rape and six
counts of acts of lasciviousness.[ Statutory rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua]
Student Assigned:
CRUZ, MARICRIS Jalosjos filed a motion to be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
64
legislative sessions and committee on the ground that:
His absence deprives the electorate of their elected representative, which amounts to taxation without
representation, mocks the mandate entrusted to him by the people, and denies the First District of
Zamboanga Del Norte the opportunity of their voices being heard.
There was a US Ruling that allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of congress
He is bonafide member of Congress, so the Court should respect the Congress mandate having him as a
member
He always followed the conditions/restrictions given when temporarily leaving jail to attend to medical
matters.
ISSUE: WON member of the Congress shall be exempted from the rules and statutes imposed on
incarcerated persons in general.
RULING:
NO. The member of the Congress should not be exempted from the rules and statutes imposed on
incarcerated persons in general.
Section 11, Article VI states that “ A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.
Section 11, Article VI is restricted to minor offenses whose punishments consist of imprisonment of 6 years
or less.
For offenses punishable by more than 6 years imprisonment, there is no immunity from arrest
The Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate
one, such as arrest.
Equal Protection
All prisoners are allowed temporary leaves when there are emergency or compelling reasons (i.e. medical)
To attend legislative sessions and committee meetings are not emergency reasons that would allow a
temporary leave from prison
Jalosjos can perform his duties and functions as a Congressman, albeit to a limited degree, while in prison
To allow Jalosjos to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five days or more in a week
would essentially make him a free man
Being a public official is not a substantial distinction that would separate one from the rest of the regular
65
prisoners
Thus, allowing Jalosjos to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings wood be a violation of
equal protection.
CONCLUSION: Wherefore, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
#30 Osmeña v. KEY POINTS :

Pendatun, G.R. No.
L-17144, October
28, 1960
FACTS:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious
Topic Discussed: imputations of bribery against the President.
The privilege of A special committee, composed of Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen, was
speech and debate created under House Resolution No. 59, to investigate the truth of the charges against the President.
Student Assigned: Osmeña failed to produce evidence in support of his remarks about the President. He was, by Resolution No.
Dara Pearl Dacuyan 175, suspended from office for fifteen months for serious disorderly behavior.
Osmeña submitted to the SC a verified petition for “declaratory relief, certiorari, and prohibition with the
preliminary injunction” against the members of the special committee.
He asked for the annulment of Resolution No. 59 on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary
immunity.
Several respondents challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition and defended the power
of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an infringement of Osmena’s parliamentary privilege of speech
66
RULING:
No. There is no infringement of Osmena’s parliamentary privilege of speech
Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place.
The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member
thereof.
On the question of whether delivery of speeches attacking the President constitutes disorderly conduct for
which Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also
because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can
not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the
Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmena’s conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would
have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate
branch of the government.
67
#31 Jimenez v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Cabangbang, G.R.
No. L-15905, Article VI, Section 15 - The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
August 3, 1966 treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of
the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place.
Topic Discussed:
The privilege of "Speech or debate” used in this provision refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of
speech and debate their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress,
while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not,
Student Assigned: and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in
Dizon, Icy Marilou the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly
authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
FACTS: This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the
recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money,
by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense. Cabangbang caused an open letter addressed to the President of the Philippines to be
published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The said letter stated that there
have allegedly been three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid
of some civilian political strategists.That such strategists had collusion with communists and that the
Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’etat to place him as the president. The planners
allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be
aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in
newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages
and alleging that Cabangbang’s statement was libelous. Cabangbang petitioned the case to be dismissed
because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the
privileged communication rule and that said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privileged communication endowed to members of
Congress
68
RULING: No, the open letter was not covered by privileged communication endowed to members of
Congress.
Under Article VI, Section 15 - The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein,
they shall not be questioned in any other place.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it
was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably
was not in session, and the defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to
be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any
Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication
is not absolutely privileged.
--#32 Pobre v. KEY POINTS :

Defensor-Santiago,
A.C. No. 7399,
August 25, 2009
FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
The privilege of ISSUE:
speech and debate
RULING:
Student Assigned:
69
#33 Trillanes v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Castillo- Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution
Marigomen, G.R. Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
No. 223451, March more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member
14, 2018 shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
Topic Discussed:
FACTS:
The privilege of This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court over public respondent's Order dated
speech and debate May 19, 2015 which denied petitioner's motion to dismiss premised on the special and affirmative defenses
in his Answer, and public respondent's Order dated December 16, 2015 which denied petitioner's Motion for
Student Assigned: Reconsideration, both issued in Civil Case No. R-QZN-14-10666-CV entitled "Antonio L. Tiu v. Antonio F.
Francis John P. Trillanes IV."
Gloria Petitioner, as a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, filed Proposed Senate Resolution No. 826 (P.S.
Resolution No. 826) directing the Senate's Committee on Accountability of Public Officials and
Investigations to investigate, in aid of legislation, the alleged P1.601 Billion overpricing of the new 11-storey
Makati City Hall II Parking Building, the reported overpricing of the 22-storey Makati City Hall Building at
the average cost of P240,000.00 per square meter, and related anomalies purportedly committed by former
and local government officials.
Petitioner alleged that at the October 8, 2014 Senate Blue Ribbon Sub-Committee (SBRS) hearing on P.S.
Resolution No. 826, former Makati Vice Mayor Ernesto Mercado (Mercado) testified on how he helped
former Vice President Jejomar Binay (VP Binay) acquire and expand what is now a 350-hectare estate in
Barangay Rosario, Batangas, which has been referred to as the Hacienda Binay, about 150 hectares of which
have already been developed, with paved roads, manicured lawns, a mansion with resort-style swimming
pool, man-made lakes, Japanese gardens, a horse stable with practice race tracks, an extensive farm for
fighting cocks, green houses and orchards.
Petitioner admitted that during media interviews at the Senate, particularly during gaps and breaks in the
plenary hearings as well as committee hearings, and in reply to the media's request to respond to private
respondent's claim over the estate, he expressed his opinion that based on his office's review of the
documents, private respondent appears to be a "front" or "nominee" or is acting as a "dummy" of the actual
and beneficial owner of the estate, VP Binay.
Denying that he is a "dummy," private respondent alleged that he possesses the requisite financial capacity to
fund the development, operation and maintenance of the "Sunchamp Agri-Tourism Park." He averred that
70
petitioner's accusations were defamatory, as they dishonored and discredited him, and malicious as they were
intended to elicit bias and prejudice his reputation. He further averred that such statements were not
absolutely privileged since they were not uttered in the discharge of petitioner's functions as a Senator, or
qualifiedly privileged under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code,[12] nor constitutive of fair commentaries
on matters of public interest. He added that petitioner's statement that he was willing to apologize if proven
wrong, showed that he spoke without a reasonable degree of care and without regard to the gravity of his
sweeping accusation.
Petitioner averred that private respondent failed to state and substantiate his cause of action since petitioner's
statement that private respondent was acting as a "front," "nominee" or "dummy" of VP Binay for his
Hacienda Binay is a statement of fact.
Petitioner posited that his statements were part of an ongoing public debate on a matter of public concern,
and private respondent, who had freely entered into and thrust himself to the forefront of said debate, has
acquired the status of a public figure or quasi-public figure. For these reasons, he argued that his statements
are protected by his constitutionally guaranteed rights to free speech and freedom of expression and of the
press.
Petitioner contended that his statements, having been made in the course of the performance of his duties as a
Senator, are covered by his parliamentary immunity under Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner's statements in media interviews are covered by the parliamentary speech or
debate" privilege.
RULING:
No. Petitioner's statements in media interviews are not covered by the parliamentary speech or debate"
privilege.
Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution provides that, “A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.”
In the case at bar, settled jurisprudence in the case of Nicanor T. Jimenez v. Bartolome Cabangbang provides
sufficient standards and guidelines by which the trial and appellate courts can address and resolve the issue
71
of parliamentary immunity raised by the petitioner. The Court is, thus, unconvinced that petitioner has
presented an "exceptionally compelling reason" to justify his direct application for a writ of certiorari with
this Court. Even assuming that direct recourse to this Court is permissible, the petition must still be
dismissed. Petitioner's statements in media interviews are not covered by the parliamentary speech or
debate" privilege.
Therefore, the petition is dismissed.
--#34 Adaza v. KEY POINTS :

Pacaña, G.R. No. L-
68159, March 18,
1985
FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
Incompatible and ISSUE:
Forbidden Offices
(Sec. 13) RULING:
Student Assigned:
#35 Liban v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any): Section 13. No Senator or Member
Gordon, G.R. of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
No.175352, July 15, subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
2009 their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Topic Discussed:
Incompatible and FACTS:

Forbidden Offices Petitioners Liban, Bernardo, and Viari filed with the Supreme Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon
(Sec. 13) as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon
City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board
72
Student Assigned: of Governors.
Lim, Jan Clyd During respondent’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of
the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by
accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the
Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a government- owned or controlled
corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v. Drilon, which
held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another
government office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a government-owned
or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
RULING:
No. the office of the PNRC Chairman was not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
Under Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is not government-owned but privately owned. To ensure and
maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the
government.
Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and
does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by
contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized
by its Board of Governors, as provided under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter However, since the PNRC
Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under
the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private
corporation.
Ergo, the office of the PNRC Chairman was not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
73
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
#36 Puyat v. De KEY POINTS :

Guzman, G.R. No.
L-51122, March 25, FACTS:
1982
On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The
election was subsequently questioned by Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly
Topic Discussed: counted – hence he filed a quo warranto proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission on 25
Inhibitions and May 1979.
Disqualifications Prior to Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa
(Sec. 14) purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC
Commissioner de Guzman (from May 25-31 ’79) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao
Student Assigned: Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero.
Lungay, Junrey Puyat argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any
administrative body (such as the SEC).
This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an
Urgent Motion for Intervention in this said SEC case for him to intervene not as a counsel but as a legal
owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation.
The SEC Commissioner granted the motion in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
Puyat then moved to question the Commissioner’s action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without
violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution.
RULING:
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No, Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may not intervene in the SEC case without violating
Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution.
SEC. 11, Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:

No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate
jurisdiction,
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
any government-owned or controlled corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called to act on account
of his office.
In this case, there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in the
SC’s opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an
afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. The Constitution
directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to
accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. SC holds that the intervention of Assemblyman
Fernandez falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Sec 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Thus, Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may not intervene in the SEC case without violating
Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution.
Maxim: “What cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly.”
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--#37 Belgica v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before
208566, November any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
19, 2013 Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
Topic Discussed: including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He
Inhibitions and shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
Disqualifications may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
(Sec. 14)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before
Student Assigned: another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual
legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the
Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his
PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-
case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators
and the Executive department, through the former‘s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of
impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork
Barrel System‘s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging
five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints
are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
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project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for
the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad
from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other similar Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws are unconstitutional for violating the principles of/constitutional
provisions on
(d) accountability;
RULING:
Insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed unconstitutional.
The principles of the Constitution, to which instrumentalities of government should exercise their functions
in harmony with, embodies public trust. Public trust connotes accountability. An accountability mechanism
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with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of congressional oversight.
The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes
it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law. Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office
(d) Public Accountability. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators,
who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they
themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section
14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
--#38 Avelino v. KEY POINTS :

Cuenco, G.R. No.
L-2821, March 4, CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Physical presence during session is required. The attendance of the session
1949 (decision); showed that majority of the members were present thereby constituting quorum. The “walk out” done did not
March 14, 1949 affect such quorum.
(resolution)]

Officers of each During the session on February 21, 1949, Senator Tanada had been granted the right to speak in session to
House [Sec. 16(1)] talk about charges he drew up against Senate President Avelino.
Senate had reached quorum but the session did not start because Avelino had not yet opened the session.
Student Assigned: Before opening it, he read the written resolution of Tanada and Senator Sanidad on his charges. When he
Padrigao finally did, he used a lot of dilatory tactics to postpone Tanada’s speech.
Disorderly conduct happened so Senator David filed a motion for adjournment but it was opposed by Senator
Sanidad.
Avelino banged his gavel and immediately left the session hall followed by Senator David, Senator Tirona,
Senator Francisco, Senator Torres, Senator Magalona, Senator Clarin.
Session continued with Senator Arranz as Senate President Pro-tempore.
Resolution 68 (ordering the investigation of charges filed against the Senate President, Jose Avelino) and 67
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(declaring vacant the Senate President chair and designating Mariano Cuenco as acting Senate President)
were approved by the remaining senators present.
Mariano Cuenco took an oath and was recognized by the president of the Philippines.
Jose Avelino filed for a petition to declare himself the rightful Senate President and to oust Mariano Cuenco.
ISSUE:
Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
If it has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
Should the petition be granted?
RULING:
NO. In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46
Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant
to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken
over, by the judiciary. Senators have the liberty to select their officers and/or reinstate the
YES. The session was not adjourned validly and there was a majority of each House to constitute a quorum
to do business despite the number of senators who walked out of the session hall so resolutions were
approved validly.
NO. Because all the procedures to put a new Senate President in place are in order and recognized by the
president of the Philippines so petition for quo warranto will not prosper.
ISSUE(S): WON the 12 Senators who installed Cuenco as the Acting President of the Senate constituted a
quorum? HELD: YES
YES. Supreme Court held that there is a quorum that the 12 senators being the majority of 23 Senators.
Resolution Nos. 67 and 68 are valid. Sen. Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President.
PETITION DISMISSED. If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly
constituted? In other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the
business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say
so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including
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Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas
Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators. When the Constitution
declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute aquorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the
members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed.
[U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number
than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore
than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the
absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco
would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one
abstained.
NOTE: Quorum has been defined as that number of person of the body, which legally assembled in their
proper places, will enable the body to transact its lawful business, or, in other words, that number that makes
the lawful body and gives it power to pass a valid act. Unless otherwise validly provided, it ordinarily refers
to one-half plus one of the entire membership of the body. (Agpalo, 2005.) Although the Supreme Court’s
initial findings that there was no quorum originally constituted, the Supreme Court finds light in the
dissenting opinions of the Justices that even if a new quorum were to be established, Sen. Cuenco would still
be elected Senate President because of the 12 Senators supporting him and only 11 Senators supporting Sen.
Avelino.
1) Was the session of the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty
two Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice
Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held,
as they do, that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on
those four on those sub-questions.1
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other words,
was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice
Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the
beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and
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thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators
constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators.
When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does
not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". There is a difference
between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute
majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate
for the purpose of a quorum
Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have
ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no
doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be
eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained
#39 Santiago v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any): While the Constitution is explicit
Guingona, G.R. No. on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner
134577, November of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. In this regard, the Constitution vests in each
18, 1998 house of Congress the power "to determine the rules of its proceedings."

Officers of each During the election of officers in the Senate, Senator Marcelo Fernan and Senator Tatad were both
House [Sec. 16(1)] nominated to the position of Senate president. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly
elected Senate president.
Student Assigned:
Silorio Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other
member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had
voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing
nominee, belonged to the “minority.”
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However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party, seven of them, and, thus, also a minority,
had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader.
Thus, Senators Santiago and Guingona filed this case for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator
Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate
minority leader
RULING:
No, there was no actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate minority leader.
While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting
more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for
him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or
regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. In this
regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine the rules of its
proceedings." In the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of
any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto.
Thus, there was no actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate minority
leader.
#40 Baguilat v. KEY POINTS :

Speaker Alvarez,
G.R. No. 227757,
July 25, 2017 FACTS:
Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas and Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep. Atienza) had an interchange before the
Plenary, wherein the latter elicited the following from the former: (a) all those who vote for the winning
82
Topic Discussed: Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for the other candidates shall belong to the
Officers of each Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of the Minority; and (c) the
House [Sec. 16(1)] Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the Minority. The Elections for the Speakership were
held, "with 252 Members voting for Speaker Alvarez, eight (8) voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven (7) voting for
Student Assigned: Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and one (l) registering a no vote,"4 thus, resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the
Tariao, John Mark duly elected Speaker of the House of Representatives of the 17th Congress. Petitioners filed the instant
petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be recognized as the Minority Leader in light of:
(a) the "long-standing tradition" in the House where the candidate who garnered the second (2nd)highest
number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the irregularities
attending Rep. Suarez's election to said Minority Leader position. For his part, Rep. Suarez maintains that the
election of Minority Leader is an internal matter to the House of Representatives. Thus, absent any finding of
violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot interfere with such internal
matters of a coequal branch of the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the voting for minority leader is the 2nd highest number of votes garnered for speakership.
Whether or not may be compelled via a writ of mandamus to recognize Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader
of the House of Representatives.
RULING:
No. Rep. Fariñas referred to Section 8 of the Rules of the house on membership to the Majority and the
Minority. He explained that the Members who voted for the winning candidate for the Speaker shall
constitute the Majority and shall elect from among themselves the Majority Leader. while those who voted
against the winning Speaker or did not vote at all shall belong to the Minority and would thereafter elect their
Minority Leader.
No. The Court explained that the peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued
only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and
speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.
The Court finds that petitioners have no clear legal right to the reliefs sought. Logically speaking, the
foregoing circumstances would show that the House of Representatives had effectively adopted Rep. Farinas'
proposal to enact the new rules regarding the membership of the Minority, as well as the process of
determining who the Minority Leader would be
. As stated under Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its
83
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members. Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire membership. Said provision also states that
the House of Representatives may decide to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and
manner as to how these officers are chosen is something within its sole control. The Court is hard-pressed to
find any attending grave abuse of discretion which would warrant its intrusion in this case. By and large, this
case concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of government which, absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise would not only embroil this
Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the separation of powers doctrine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
XI. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
#41 Aquino v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
COMELEC, G.R. FACTS:
No. 120265, • The petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for
September 18, 1995the new Second Legislative District of Makati City.
Topic Discussed: • Move Makati (Political Party) and Mateo Bedon (Chairman of the LAKAS¬-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay
Jurisdiction Cembo, Makati City) filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the
residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987
Student Assigned: Constitution.
Tompong, Van John • COMELEC conducted a hearing wherein the petitioners testified and presented evidence. The COMELEC
decided to dismiss the instant petition for Disqualification against respondent Agapito Aquino and declared
him eligible to run for the Office of Representative in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
• Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution with the COMELEC.
• Aquino garnered more votes against Agusto Syjuco. Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad
Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner, and Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the
COMELEC's Second Division resolution.
• The petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to
Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation". The issue of whether or not the determination of the
qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
• The COMELEC reversed the resolution of the second division COMELEC. The Motion for reconsideration
of the resolution of the second division was granted. Agapito Aquino is declared ineligible and thus
disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
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• Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari assailing the orders and, as well as the resolution issued by the
COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has a jurisdiction to determine and adjudge the disqualification issue
involving congressional candidates even after the elections.
RULING:
YES, the COMELEC has a jurisdiction to determine and adjudge the disqualification issue involving
congressional candidates even after the elections.
Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provided that “the Senate and the House of Representatives
shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of their respective Members.” It is also provided under Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 that “any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.”
The electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and
qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become members of either
the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken
his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section 17 of
Article VI of the Constitution.
Based from the Section 6 of RA 6646, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to
continue after the election but his obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or
termination of the proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. This means that the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC in this case is not yet ousted, not until the candidate becomes an official
member of the Senate or House of Representative.
Hence, the COMELEC has a jurisdiction to determine and adjudge the disqualification issue involving
congressional candidates even after the elections.
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KEY POINTS :
#42 Limkaichong v. FACTS:
COMELEC, G.R. This case covered two consolidated petitions on the issue regarding Jocelyn Limkaichong’s qualifications to
Nos. 178831-32, run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge the position as Representative of the 1st District of Negros
April 1, 2009 Oriental.
The parties who sought for her disqualification contended that she is not a natural-born citizen because her
parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They also claimed that the proceedings for the
Topic Discussed: naturalization of her father (Julio Ong Sy) never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.
Jurisdiction With these contentions, Jocelyn Limkaichong lacks the citizen requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
Student Assigned: In May 17, 2007, the COMELEC issued a Joint Resolution which granted the petition of the contending
Viarino, Mim parties and declared Jocelyn Limkaichong as disqualified from her candidacy.
But events have already transpired after the COMELEC had rendered its Joint Resolution. Jocelyn
Limkaichong was proclaimed as the winning candidate, she had taken her oath of office, and she was
allowed to officially assume the office also in 2007.
In 2009, Jocelyn Limkaichong’s petition for certiorari was granted, dismissed all other petitions, and revised
the Joint Resolution issued by COMELEC.
The Supreme Court also ruled that the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no longer
the COMELEC, should now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal) should assume jurisdiction over the
disqualification case.
RULING:
Yes, the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal) should assume jurisdiction over the
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that “The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. xxx”
86
Moreover, in a jurisprudence, the Court held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath and assumed office as a Member of the HoR, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
In this case, Jocelyn Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her
oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23, 2007. This followed then that
Limkaichong’s proclamation divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the
time of the proclamation, and that the parties questioning her qualification should now present the case in a
proper proceeding before the HRET –the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case
involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and
qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of
the Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election
contests relating to its members.
Therefore, the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal) should assume jurisdiction over the
#43 Fernandez v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
HRET, G.R. No.
187478, December FACTS:
21, 2009
Petitioner, Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez, filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District
Topic Discussed: of the Province of Laguna in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, private respondent Jesus L. Vicente filed
Jurisdiction a "Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification"
before the
Student Assigned: Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna which was forwarded to the Commission on
Aguilar, KR Elections (COMELEC).
On June 27, 2007 petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Laguna
having garnered a total of 95,927 votes, winning by a margin of 35,000 votes over the nearest candidate.
On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET on the grounds of the
87
petitioner lacked the required one-year residency requirement provided under Article VI, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution which he further argued that petitioner falsely declared under oath: (1) His alleged Sta.
Rosa residence wherein private respondent presented a testimony stating that petitioner is not from the
alleged Sta. Rosa residence but a resident of Barangay Pulo, Cabuyao, Laguna as well as the respective
testimonies of Barangay Balibago Health Workers who attested that they rarely, if ever, saw respondent in
the leased premises at the alleged Sta. Rosa residence; and other witnesses who testified that contrary to the
misrepresentations of petitioner, he is not a resident of the alleged Sta. Rosa residence. A witness testified
that petitioner attempted to coerce some of the other witnesses to recant their declarations and change their
affidavits. Finally, private respondent presented as witness the lawyer who notarized the Contract of Lease
dated March 8, 2007 between petitioner as lessee and Bienvenido G. Asuncion as lessor.
ISSUE:
Whether the HRET had jurisdiction over the case?
RULING:
Yes.
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the HRET and the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear
and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these
Tribunals,which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the proclamation of the
winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office
cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives.
In the case at bar, the petitioner was a member thus private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition
for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping
even if, as in this case, the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial
proceedings the issue of the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was
still a candidate.
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#44 Reyes v. KEY POINTS :
COMELEC, G.R.
No. 207264, June
25, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone district of
Topic Discussed: Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed
Jurisdiction before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the
respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material
Student Assigned: misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship.
Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a manifestation
with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on
the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en
banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5, 2013 took
her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of
June 30, 2013.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Status Quo Ante Order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not HRET has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
The HRET does not have jurisdiction over the case.
Section 17 of Article VI provides that, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all
89
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of the Members of the House of Representatives.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a
proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
In this case, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because,
primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a
Member of the House of Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election.” Until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction. In her attempt to comply with the second
requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath Of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5
June 2013. However, this is not the oath of office which confers membership to the House of
Representatives. Because, in Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. Members shall take their oath or
affirmation either collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session. Consequently, before there
is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there
is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and, it remains unclear whether the
required oath of office was indeed complied with.
Thus, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over the case.
#45 Lico v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
COMELEC, G.R.
No. 205505, FACTS:
September 29, 2015
Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba or Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization registered
Topic Discussed: under the Party-List System.
Jurisdiction The rival factions in the said organization are the Lico group on the one hand and the Rimas group on the
other.
Student Assigned: Ating Koop was declared as one of the winning party-list groups on December 8, 2010. It earned a seat at the
House of Representatives, with petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico as its party-list representative. On
Aniñon, Kristine May 14, 2011, Ating Koop introduced amendments to its constitution, which cut short the three-year term of
90
Abegail the incumbent members.
On December 5, 2011, the Interim Central Committee of Ating Koop expelled Lico for disloyalty. There
were allegations of graft and corruption, and Lico’s refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement. The Lico
group held a special meeting in Cebu City, while the Rimas group held a Special National Convention in
Paranaque City.
Atty. Lico filed a motion for reconsideration with the Interim Central Committee but to no avail.
During the pendency of Atty. Lico’s appeal before the Interim Central Committee, his group held a special
meeting in Cebu City, were new members and officers of the Central Committee were elected.
On 21 January 2012, the Rimas Group held a Special National Convention in Parañaque City, at which a
new Central Committee and a new set of officers were constituted.
On 16 March 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to represent Ating Koop, filed with COMELEC a Petition
against petitioner praying that Atty. Lico was ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of
Representatives, and for the succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina.
In a Resolution the COMELEC Second Division upheld the expulsion of Atty. Lico from Ating Koop and
declared Mascarina as the duly qualified nominee of the party-list group. The Second Division characterized
the issue of the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop as an intra-party leadership
dispute, which it could resolve as an incident of its power to register political parties.
The Rimas group filed a Petition with COMELEC praying that Lico be ordered to vacate his office and to
nullify the meeting that happened in Cebu. COMELEC Second Division upheld the expulsion of Lico and
declared Roberto Mascarina, the elected representative during the Paranaque meeting, as the duly qualified
nominee of the party-list group.
ISSUE:
Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction over the expulsion of a member of the House of Representatives from
his party-list organization?
RULING:
No. COMELEC has no jurisdiction over this case.
Under the law, Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of
Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification
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case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as
member of the House of Representatives.
ANALYSIS:
In the case at the bar, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group – petitioner Lico
took his oath and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the
COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI
of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives.
CONCLUSION:
Therefore, it has no jurisdiction to expel Atty Lico from Congress, considering that his expulsion from
Ating Koop affected his qualification as member of the House, and therefore, it was the HRET that had
jurisdiction over the petition.
It also recognized the Rimas Group as the legitimate representative of Ating Koop
#46 Tañada v. KEY POINTS :

Cuenco, G.R. No.
L-10520, February
28, 1957 FACTS:
The petitioners pray that a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to respondents
Topic Discussed: Mariano J. Cuenco, Francis A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido
Composition Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp, exercise the said public offices respectively being
occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him
Student Assigned: from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placid Reyesm
Arcenal, Cristina S. pending this action.
Petitioners likewise prayed that judgment be rendered ousting respondents from the aforementioned
public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the
preliminary injunction permanent.
ISSUE:
92
Whether or not was the dispute regarding the Election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal in the nature of political questions that will divest the Court of jurisdiction?
RULING:
No, because the term “ political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. In other word in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum it refers to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
--#47 Abbas v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Senate Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate
83767, October 27, Electoral Tribunal denying, petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their MR
1988
Summary: Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were being asked to inhibit themselves in
Topic Discussed hearing SET Case No. 002- 87 in considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process
Composition as they are considered interested parties
. The proposed solution of petitioners is to amend SET’s Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being
decided by only 3 Members of the Tribunal therefore leaving the Senate Electoral Tribunal senateless, and
all remaining members coming from the judiciary. The SC dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of
Student Assigned: merit and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself,
rather, just let them refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his
personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. Under Art 6Sec
17 of the Constitution, it is clear that the SET/HRET shall be composed of 3 Justices and 6
Senators/Representatives. Thus, the SET cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of
Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the 3 JusticesMembers alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
93
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”
FACTS:
 Petitioners filed before the SET an election contest (SET Case No. 002-87) against 22 candidates of the
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the
Comelc. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators,
namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman). Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo
E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr.,
Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.
 Petitioners thereafter filed with the SET a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-
Members from the hearing and resolution of the SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are
interested parties to said case as respondents.
o NOTE that Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself from participating
in the hearings and deliberations of the SET. (add’l fact, not impt.)
o Petitioners argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process
imperatively require the mass disqualification sought.
o This doctrine of necessity may be solved by amending the SET’s Rules of procedure so as to permit the
contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
 The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules under Section 24 — requiring the concurrence of five (5)
members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than four (4)
members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3)
including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
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o Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context
of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices
of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought
ISSUE:
Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due consideration.
Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators (six of which are sitting in the tribunal)
RULING:
No, the proposal could not be given due consideration,. The most fundamental objection to such a proposal
lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the
Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial" and "legislative" components commonly share the
duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators.
The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial
election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be
misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates,
refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or
biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
The Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all
24 Senators-elect, 6 of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment. Yet the Constitution provides no
scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the
Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and
95
hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal (both justices &
senators)
What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its
entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members
alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest. The charge that the respondent
Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the
circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or
inhibition filed by herein petitioners.
DECISION: Instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
#48 Bondoc v. KEY POINTS :

Pineda, G.R. No.
97710, September FACTS:
26, 1991
Marciano Pineda of LDP won against his rival Dr. Emigdio Bondoc of NP causing the latter to file a protest
in the HRET. A decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of 23 votes.
Topic Discussed: Hence, the LDP members in the tribunal insisterd on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some
Residence precincts resulting to the increase of Bondoc’s lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura coated
with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc as the winner of the contest. Camasura
Student Assigned: later on revealed to his chief, notified the Chairman of the Tribunal to withdraw the nomination and to
Aton, Frexello rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET and seeks to cancel the promulgation of the tribunal’s decision
in Bondoc v. Pineda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representatives could change its representatives in the HRET at the request of
the dominant party.
96
RULING:
NO. If the HRET would reserve the interest of the party in power, the independence of the Electoral
Tribunal, as embodied in the Constitution, will no longer be protected. The resolution of the House of
Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the HRET for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast
his vote in the favor of NP’s candidate, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the HRET
to the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the HRET would reduce the
Tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the 3 Justices of the SC
and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all
hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
As judges, the members of the Tribunal must be nonpartisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality and independence – even independence from the political party to which
they belong. Hence, “disloyalty to a party” and “breach of party discipline” are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the Tribunal.
In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by
the Tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a
violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is therefore null and
void.
#49 Angara v. Electoral KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Commission, G.R. No.
97
L-45081, July 15, 1936 1987 Constitution:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
Topic Discussed: respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
Independence from the be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
House concerned Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered
Student Assigned: under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Ceniza Chairman.
FACTS:
In the elections of September 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor
were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly in the first district of
Tayabas.
The petitioner was proclaimed member-elect for the said district for receiving the most number of votes
and thereafter took his oath in office. A Motion of Protest was filed by Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner. The petitioner countered this with a Motion to Dismiss the Protest which was denied by the
Electoral Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy
upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative.
RULING:
Yes, the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as “the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
98
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments,
not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in
the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments
of the government.
The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created
for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the
reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it
were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and
agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate
cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of
99
our constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect
by the judicial department.
Hence, the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as “the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”
--#50 Co v. Electoral Keypoints:

Tribunal, supra
Facts:
The petitioners come to this court asking for the setting aside and reversl of a decision of the House of
Topic Discussed: Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
Independence from the
House concerned The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong Jr, is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
Student Assigned:
CRUZ, MARICRIS May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held among the
candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar
are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1. Jose Ong Jr is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and
2. Jose Ong Jr us not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989 found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however,
100
denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989. Hence, these petition fir certiorari.
Issues:
1. WON the case necessitates judicial review?
2. WON JOSE ONG Jr, is a resident of the second district of Northern Samar?
RULING:
1.)No. The Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET
which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole
emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
2.)Yes. Under Section 6 of Article VI, no person shall be a member of the House of Representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least 25 years if
age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the District in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
In the case at bar, the domicile of origin of Ong, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at
Laoang, Samar (in the district). Although no merit was found in the petitioners’ argument that Ong does
not even have property in the district, the Court nonetheless held, for the sake of argument, that did it is
not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile because
that would tantamount to a property qualification. It is enough that he should live in the municipality.
Although he studied in Manila and practiced his profession therein, the periodical journeys made to his
home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.
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#51 Bondoc v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Pineda, supra
FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
Independence from On May 11, 1987, the petitioner (NP) and Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates for Congressman of the
the House Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed the winner, having garnered a total of 31,700 votes
concerned compared to Bondoc’s 28,400 votes. The petitioner filed a protest with the HRET, composed of 9 members,
3 Justices of the Supreme Court, 6 members of the House chosen based on proportional representation from
Student Assigned: political parties. A decision was reached declaring Bondoc as the winner by 23 votes, another recount was
Dara Pearl Dacuyan insisted by the LDP members of the tribunal, which increased Bondoc to 107 votes more than Pineda’s.
Congressman Camasura (LDP), along with the Justices, voted to proclaim Bondoc as the winner. Thereafter,
Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was expelled from the LDP for allegedly
helping organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and inviting LDP members to join. The House
voted for Cong. Cmasura’s removal from the HRET and that his vote is withdrawn.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered to interfere with election protests in the HRET
by reorganizing the representation of the majority party in the HRET?
RULING:
No.
Pursuant to Sec. 17 of Art. VI, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests in relation to the election, returns,
and qualification of their members. It is created as a non-partisan court to provide an independent and
impartial tribunal for the determination of contests. The House cannot just shuffle and manipulate the
political component for their benefit and interests.
To be able to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction, the tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction is not to be
shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts. They must discharge their functions with complete
independence—even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence “disloyalty to party”
and “breach of party discipline” are no valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.
102
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of
Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition
of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of
the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election contest
between Pineda and Bondoc.
#52 Angara v. KEY POINTS :

Electoral
Commission, supra
FACTS:
Topic Discussed: In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted
Authority to for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct
promulgate rules of 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district. On
procedure November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session
assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly
Student Assigned: against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral
Aribas, Christian Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a
resolution, Par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made
by the National Assembly. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the National Assembly
proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs
and that the EC can taele cognizance of the election protest and that the EC can not be subject to a writ of
prohibition from the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly
103
RULING:
NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election
by resolution of the National Assembly.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming
to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara,
and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election
protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the
rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In this case at bar, the Electoral Commission,, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose,
namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly. The Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the
exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral
Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.The doctrine of implications means that “that which
is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed”.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implieddenial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to
limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. Where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance
of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure
104
to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
--#53 Lazatin v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
HRET, G.R. No.
84297, December 8, FACTS:
1988
Topic Discussed: Petitioner, Mr. Camelo F. Lazatin filed an instant petition before the Supreme Court assailing the jurisdiction
Authority to of the COMELEC annulilng his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and
promulgate rules of discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga.
procedure
The petitioner claims that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC is the sole
judge of all election contests referring to the provision of law under (Sec. 7Article 6 of the 1987
Student Assigned: Constitution).
Candidates and respondents, Francisco Buan, Jr., and Lorenzo Timbol alleged that the instant petition has
become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final and
executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. They also allege that the COMELEC hastily
proclaimed the petitioner Lazatin without first resolving the separate written protest against the election
returns in Pampanga, docketed as SPC Nos. 87-234, 87-358, 87-351. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he
alleges that the instant petition should be given due course because the proclamation was valid.
The Telex Order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if
warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code,” was in effect a grant of authority by the
COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the
COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply
corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of
candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns.
105
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction over the case?
RULING:
Yes, the HRET has Jurisdiction over the case.
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal, which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Petitioner’s reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 applies only to
petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, or
any regional, provincial, or city official. Furthermore, Sec. 250 should be read together with Sec. 249 of the
same code which provides that the COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective regional, provincial
and city officials," reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. 2(2) of the 1973 Constitution.
That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987
Constitution is readily apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the legislative
power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 171. The exclusive original jurisdiction
of the COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to election regional,
provincial and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay offices
[Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].
106
Yes. The SC resolved to give due course to the petition in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987. The
petition bears substantive merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional
elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as
Congressman (therefore passing jurisdiction to respective ET).
For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the
House Electoral Tribunal, contradicting Sec. 17 of Art 6. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation despite
alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates,
is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe
the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical precedents and
jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself
#54 Co v. Electoral KEY POINTS :

Tribunal, supra
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election,
Topic Discussed: returns, and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to
Judicial review of review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they
decisions of have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Electoral Tribunals
FACTS:
Student Assigned: Petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the Hose of
Gloria Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Northern Samar Northern Samar for voting purposes. On 1987, the
congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.Among the candidates who vied
for the position of representative... are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong,... Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar.
petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
107
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review decisions made by the HRET.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review decisions made by the HRET.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution) The Supreme Court
under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of
the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the
bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Here, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing
that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for
the HRET alone to decide.
Ergo, the Court can only review the jurisdiction of the decision is within the constitutional limits and not the
decision.
--#55 Aznar v. Aznar v. HRET, G.R. No. 65000, January 1, 1990

HRET, G.R. No.
65000, January 1, KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
1990
Topic: Judicial review of decisions of Electoral Tribunals
Topic Discussed:
108
Question: What is the status of one who is a holder of an Alien Certificate of Registration while at the same
Judicial review of time a holder of a valid Philippine passport? Answer: He is still a Filipino, eventhough he is a holder of an
decisions of Alien Certificate, he possessed both nationalities and citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation
Electoral Tribunals needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied”.
Student Assigned:
FACTS:
1) On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with
the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local
elections.
2) On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman filed
with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is
allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
3) On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then
Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is
an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively.
(Annex "B-1")
.
4) During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging:
that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio
Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March
25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the
country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.
5) Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for
not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Hence, the petition for Certiorari.
109
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent Osmena has lost his Filipino Citizenship and thus be disqualified as a
candidate for the Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.
RULING:
NO. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino
remains.It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not a
person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us here.
The respondent did not lose his Filipino Citizenship and thereby qualified as a candidate for the Provincial
Governor of Cebu Province.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino
remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine
citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact
The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino Citizenship by any of
the modes provided under C.A. No. 63 namely: (1) By naturalization in a foreign country; (2) By express
renunciation of Citizenship; and (3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country.
Thus, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three
mentioned herein above or by any other mode of losing Philippine Citizenship.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United
States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the
110
electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate.
#56 Lerias v. KEY POINTS : Judicial review refers to the power of the courts to test the validity of governmental acts in
HRET, G.R. No. light of their conformity of the higher norm (e.g. the constitution).
97105, October 15,
1991 Expression of Constitutional Supremacy: Judicial review is not an assertion of superiority by the courts over
the other departments, but merely an expression of the supremacy of the constitution. Constitutional
supremacy produced constitutional review, which in turn led to the accepted role of the court as “the
Topic Discussed: ultimate interpreter of the constitution”.
Judicial review of
decisions of Under the best evidence rule, "there can be no evidence of a writing, the contents of which are the subject of
Electoral Tribunals inquiry, other than the original writing itself" except only in the cases enumerated in Rule 130, Sec. 2 of the
Rules of Court.
Student Assigned:
Jan Clyd Lim In an election contest where the correctness of the number of votes is involved, the best and most conclusive
evidence are the ballots themselves; where the ballots can not be produced or are not available, the election
returns would be the best evidence.
FACTS:
In the 1987 elections, Lerias campaigned as the official candidate of the UPP-KBL for the position of
representative for the district of Southern Leyte.
During the counting of votes for the congressional candidates, the candidates who received the 2 highest
number of votes were Mercado and Lerias.
However,if the provincial board's copy of the certificate canvass would be the one to be included in
canvass,Lerias would have received 35,939 votes against Mercado's 35,793 votes, thus, giving Lerias a
winning margin of 146 votes.
The provincial board of canvassers however, stated that their copy of the cert. of canvass contained erasures,
alterations and therefore, cannot be used as basis of the canvass.
Thereby,the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Mercado, as the winning candidate with 35,793
111
votes.
Due to the discrepancies of the canvass of votes, Lerias filed a petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may take cognizance of the ruling of the HRET dismissing the
authenticity of the election returns given that HRET is the “Sole judge” of all contests concerning election
returns.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court may take cognizance of the ruling of the HRET dismissing the authenticity of the
election returns even if HRET was the “sole judge” of all contests concerning election returns.
Under Art.6, Sec.17 of the Constitution, the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. The Constitution however also provides
under the doctrine of expanded judicial review that the SC may have jurisdiction over any acts of any branch
or instrumentality of government provided that there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
This expanded power of judicial review includes the HRET.
In this case, the Court held that HRET (the majority opinion) acted with grave abuse of discretion in the
dismissal of the authenticity of the election returns. HRET declared the election returns to be inadmissible as
evidence --doubting on the authenticity of the election returns on the following grounds:
●The Comelec found that the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass is "regular, genuine and authentic
on its face" and said finding of the Comelec had been sustained by the Supreme Court;
●Lerias agreed on the pre-proclamation proceedings to the use of the Comelec copy of the cert. of canvass;
and
●The authenticity of the election returns from the four (4) disputed precincts had not been established.
112
Ergo, The Supreme Court may take cognizance of the ruling of the HRET dismissing the authenticity of the
election returns even if HRET was the “sole judge” of all contests concerning election returns.
XIII. The Commission on Appointments (Sec. 18 & 19)

#57 Sarmiento v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Mison, G.R. No.
79974, December FACTS:
17, 1987 Petitioners, Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcilla, contend that the respondent Salvador Mison
appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Topic Discussed: The respondent, on the other hand, maintains the constitutionality of Mison's appointment without the
Jurisdiction confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall
Student Assigned: appoint:
Lungay, Junrey
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
ISSUE:
113
Whether or not the President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent
Salvador Mison, as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
RULING:
Yes, the President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador
Mison, as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission
on Appointments for confirmation.
Section 18, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution establishes the Commission on Appointments and its
composition; and
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads
of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint
.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress
In this case, the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those
appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The appointment of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, an appointment she is
authorized by law to make, and such appointment no longer needs confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
114
Thus, the President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador
Mison, as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission
on Appointments for confirmation.
--#58 Cunanan v. KEY POINTS :

Tan, G.R. No. L-
19721, May 10,
1962
FACTS:
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan was extended an ad interim appointed by the President as acting Deputy
Topic Discussed: Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. He
Manner of election qualified and assumed the duties and functions of said office. However, six (6) Senators and seven (7)
of members members of the House of Representatives, purporting to act as the Commission on Appointments, rejected
said ad interim appointment. Respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was designated by the President as Acting Deputy
Student Assigned: Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and
performed the function of said office without the consent of petitioner herein. Petitioner commenced the
present quo warranto proceeding against respondent, contending that the latter's designation is invalid, the
office of Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, not being vacant when he was designated thereto, because the aforesaid rejection of petitioner's
ad interim appointment is invalid for several reasons.
ISSUE:
WON the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr. is valid
RULING:
No, the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr. is not valid.
Commission on Appointments is independent of Congress because the Commission’s powers come, not from
Congress, but from the Constitution. Therefore, it is not an agent of Congress. The determination of this
issue depends upon: (1) the legality of the resolution of the House of Representatives declaring the seats of
115
its twelve (12) members in the Commission on Appointments vacant; and (2) the legality of the action of the
House of Representatives in reconstituting the membership of the Commission on Appointments for said
House.
With respect to the first question, we hold that the same should be resolved in the negative. The Commission
on Appointments is it creature of the Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members of
Congress, said Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from
Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress.
In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature. In order that the members of the
Commission could properly discharge their duties as such, it is essential that their tenure therein be provided
with a certain measure of stability to insure the necessary freedom of action.
The resolution of the second question is in the negative too. A shifting of votes at a given time, even if due to
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called
"Allied Majority", does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for
said House. Otherwise, the Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift
from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to thus place
a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of Congress.
Therefore, the designation of respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. when said office was not vacant, is null and void.
116
--#59 Daza v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Singson, G.R. No.
86344, December Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:
21, 1989 Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex
officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
Topic Discussed: House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote,
Manner of election except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session
of members days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members.
Student Assigned:
Padrigao FACTS:
The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political parties represented in
that chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized,
resulting in a political realignment in the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing
their former party to only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the CoA by
withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the
chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and
including therein Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of his seat by
the Singson. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, SC
issued a TRO that same day to prevent both Daza and Singson from serving in the CoA.
Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto is permanent. He
claimed that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent
political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political
stability.
117
ISSUE:
Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on Appointments
RULING:
No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of
the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is
involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments.
The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality, of a particular measure.
Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows: Sec. 18.
118
There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary
alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. The Court holds that the respondent has
been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in
that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution
Yes. The Court resolve the issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representative to change its
representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in
the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not
include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
The clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to give the right of
representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political parties who are duly registered with the
Comelec. In this case, the LDP was granted its registration as a political party by the COMELEC. Thus,
shattering the argument of the petitioner that registration is required.
#60 Coseteng v. KEY POINTS : The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments is based on
Mitra, G.R. No. proportional representation of the political parties in the House.
119
86649, July 12,
1990

Manner of election
of members The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the House of Representatives of the
candidates of diverse political parties, Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate
Student Assigned: elected under the banner of KAIBA.
Silorio
On September 22, 1987, upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque
Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the twelfth member of the Commission on Appointments, representing the Coalesced
Minority in the House.
A year later, on September 16, 1988, the "Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity) was
organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated
with the LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in the Commission on
Appointments, had to be reorganized.
Petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she
be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal.
On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs praying this Court to declare as null and void the election of respondent.
Respondent in their collective Comment alleged the following: (1) that the legality of the reorganization of
the Commission on Appointments is a political question, 2) that in any case, the reorganization was "strictly
in consonance with Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
120
RULING:
Yes, the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of
Constitution.
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio
Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each House on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI,
1987 Constitution.)
In the case at bar, the composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based
on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the
House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent
(80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be
rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP
(respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent
Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the
House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties therein."
Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng)
represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12
House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the
Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e.,
it should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen.
Thus, the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of
Constitution.
121
#61 Guingona v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Gonzales, G.R. No.
106971, October 20, FACTS:
1992
As a result of national elections in May 1992, the Senate was composed of the following parties: LDP – IS,
Topic Discussed: NPC – 5, Lakas – 3. Applying the mathematical formula agreed by parties they are entitled to twelve seats.
On the organization of the Senate, Majority Floor Leader Romulo nominated eight senators for Commission
Manner of election on Appointments. Senator Guingona objected to the nomination of Osmeña. Petitioner Guingona filed a
of members petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit the recognition of Senators Romulo and Tañada
as the member of the CA as it is a violation of the rule of proportional representation.
Student Assigned:
Tariao, John Mark ISSUE:
Whether or not the Constitution requires the election and presence of 12 senators in the Commission?
RULING:
No. The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve (12) senators in order that the
Commission may function
Wherefore, the Court declared the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tañada as
members of the Commission on Appointments as null and void for being in violation of the rule on
proportional representation under Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
The Supreme Court finds the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by
nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the
requirements that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the resulting
fractional membership of the political parties represented therein
122
To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the CA by adding together 2 halves
to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added
member in the CA by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of
half a representation. The provision of Sec. 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and
does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on
proportional representation.
Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said respondents Senator Romulo and
Senator Tañada to desist from assuming, occupying and discharging the functions of members of the
Commission on Appointments; and ordering the respondents Senate President Neptali Gonzales, in his
capacity as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, to desist from recognizing the
membership of the respondent Senators and from allowing and permitting them from sitting and participating
as members of said Commission.
XIV. Sessions, Adjournments, & Quorum [Sec. 15; Sec. 16(2) & 16(5)]); Read also Sec. 4, 10 & 23, Art. VII
#62 Avelino v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Cuenco, supra
FACTS:
The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the
Topic Discussed: rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco.
Attendance and In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then
quorum Senate President Avelino was approved.
Student Assigned: With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and
Tompong, Van John prevent Tanada from delivering his speech.
123
The Senate President with his supporters employed delaying tactics, then tried to adjourn the session then
walked out.
Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator
Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the
President of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Whether or not the resolutions no. 68 and 67 validly approved.
RULING:
(1st Issue)
The court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the three branches of the government are kept separate. Our
constitution provided that the Senate has the power to elect its own president, which power should not be
interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.
In the case at the bar, the controversy is political in nature. The court decided to abstain because the selection
of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of
the Senators want the petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme
Court.
Hence, the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(2nd Issue)
Section 10, Sub-sec. 2 of Article VI of 1987 Constitution provides that a majority of each house shall
constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
124
attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may provide." The
House does not mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the House (Missouri
Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239).
There is a difference between a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the House",
the latter requiring less number than the first. In the case at bar, Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon said
that there was a majority required by the constitution for the transaction of the business in the Senate. Firstly,
because the minutes say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen
senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the
country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three
senators. Therefore, an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate, less one (23), constitutes a
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
The said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby
place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
Hence, the resolutions no. 68 and 67 were validly approved.
YES. Supreme Court held that there is a quorum that the 12 senators being the majority of 23 Senators.
Resolution Nos. 67 and 68 are valid. Sen. Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President.
PETITION DISMISSED. If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly
constituted? In other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the
business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say
so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including
Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas
Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators.
When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute aquorum, "the House: does
not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs.
Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter
requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less
125
one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
NOTE: Quorum has been defined as that number of person of the body, which legally assembled in their
proper places, will enable the body to transact its lawful business, or, in other words, that number that makes
the lawful body and gives it power to pass a valid act. Unless otherwise validly provided, it ordinarily refers
to one-half plus one of the entire membership of the body. (Agpalo, 2005.) Although the Supreme Court’s
initial findings that there was no quorum originally constituted, the Supreme Court finds light in the
dissenting opinions of the Justices that even if a new quorum were to be established, Sen. Cuenco would still
be elected Senate President because of the 12 Senators supporting him and only 11 Senators supporting Sen.
Avelino.
1) Was the session of the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty
two Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice
Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held,
as they do, that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on
those four on those sub-questions.1
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other words,
was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice
Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the
beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and
thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators
constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators.
When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does
126
not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". There is a difference
between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute
majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate
for the purpose of a quorum
eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained
#63 People v. KEY POINTS :

Jalosjos, supra
Attendance and
quorum ● ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROMEO JALOSJOS is a full-pledged member of Congress who was
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is
Student Assigned: pending appeal.
Viarino, Mim ● Romeo Jalosjos filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
● His primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will". He argued, among others,
That the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative
in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he had the duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman;
That it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases;
That his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wanted their voices to be heard and that
since he was treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urged a co-equal branch
127
of government to respect his mandate; and
That the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and
that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congressman Jalosjos can be compelled to attend sessions of the Congress
RULING:
NO, Congressman Jalosjos cannot be compelled to attend sessions of the Congress.
Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides that a Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. Moreover, Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution states that a
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day
to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such
House may provide.
In this case, Congressman Jalosjos is charged with statutory rape which is punishable for more than six years
imprisonment. He has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11,
Article VI of the Constitution. In relation to this, the members of Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months has constitutional foundations. One
rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense.
Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.
When a warrant for Jalosjos’ arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues
in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities.
Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially rejected which Jalosjos is invoking to justify his
present motion.
Furthermore, allowing Jalosjos to attend congressional sessions and committee meeting for five (5) days or
more in a week will virtually make him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates Jalosjos' status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
128
purposes of the correction system.
Hence, Congressman Jalosjos cannot be compelled to attend sessions of the Congress.
#64 Trillanes v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Pimentel, G.R. No.
179817, June 27, FACTS:
2008 A group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the
Topic Discussed: resignation of the President and key national officials. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued
Attendance and Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed
quorum Forces to suppress the rebellion. Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades,
with coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court
Student Assigned: (RTC) of Makati. Petitioner, who has remained in detention won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term
Aguilar, KR commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007,
petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an “Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests” By Order of July 25, 2007, the trial court denied
all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Pimentel is allowed to Attend senate sessions and related requests?
RULING:
No, Trillanes is not allowed to attend senate sessions and related requests.
Under our Constitution, “All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”
129
in People v. Hon. Maceda
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody
of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless
he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in
any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention.26 (Underscoring supplied
In the case at bar, the case against the petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term"
to speak of.The Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases.
Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge.
xxxxxThe performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its membersxxxxx
On the generality and permanence of his requests alone, petitioner’s case fails to compare with the species of
allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:
x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days
or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such
an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.51
#65 Kida v. Senate, KEY POINTS :

G.R. No. 196271,
130
October 18, 2011
FACTS:
Topic Discussed: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by
Attendance and Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first
quorum regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and refined
the basic ARMM structure. It also reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Student Assigned: Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. It
likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054, which was successfully held on August 14, 2001. RA No.
9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the
same date every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.
But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013
to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. RA No. 10153 originated in the
House of Representatives as House Bill No. 4146, which the House passed on March 22, 2011 with 191 (of
the 285) Members voting in its favor. The Senate adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756, on June 6,
2011. 13 (of the 23) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative
concurred with the Senate amendments and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted
through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)." The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the
regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its
ratification.
Thereafter, RA No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM under R.A.
6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9333 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the
131
ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on
August 8, 2011. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.
But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to
coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. With the enactment into law of
RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections.
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus originating from different parties
arose as a consequence of the passage of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 questioning the validity
of said laws. On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of
ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their
term on September 30, 2011.
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these
laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become
effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure
to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution; also
cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as
the failure to adhere to the "elective and representative" character of the executive and legislative
departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power
to appoint Officers in Charge (OICs) to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until
the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily,
they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the
ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Sections
1 and 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine [prohibiting] irrepealable laws?
132
RULING:
Yes. Supermajority voting requirement [under RA No. 9054] VIOLATES Section 16(2), Article VI for
giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law.
Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote,
provided there is quorum.
In this case, requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than
the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very
principle which we sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon,
and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures. We also highlight an important point raised by Justice
Antonio T. Carpio in his dissenting opinion, where he stated: "Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a
high vote threshold for each House of Congress to surmount, effectively and unconstitutionally, taking RA
9054 beyond the reach of Congress’ amendatory powers. One Congress cannot limit or reduce the plenary
legislative power of succeeding Congresses by requiring a higher vote threshold than what the Constitution
requires to enact, amend, or repeal laws. No law can be passed fixing such a higher vote threshold because
Congress has no power, by ordinary legislation, to amend the Constitution.”
Thus, supermajority voting requirement [under RA No. 9054] VIOLATES Section 16(2), Article VI for
giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law.
XV.Discipline of members [Sec. 16 (3)]

#66/67 Osmeña v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Pendatun, supra
FACTS:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to the Supreme Court a verified petition for
133
Topic Discussed: "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada K.
Discipline of Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by
members [Sec. 16 House Resolution No. 59.
(3)]
The Special Committee was created to investigate the truth of the bribery charges against the President of the
Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960. Congressman
Student Assigned: Osmeña refused to produce evidence to substantiate such charges. On July 18, 1960, the Special Committee
issued House Resolution No. 175 finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior and
suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Osmeña contended in his petition that, among others, (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary
immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech
constituted no disorderly behavior for which he could be punished; (3) supposing he could be questioned and
disciplined therefor, the House had lost the power to do so because it had taken up other business before
approving House Resolution No. 59; and (4) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend
one of its members.
Respondent Congressmen filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain
the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension and upheld House
Resolution No. 175
ISSUE:
Issue
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the authority to determine whether delivery of speeches attacking the
Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which petitioner Osmeña may be disciplined
Whether or not Osmeñas speech constitutes disorderly behavior?
RULING:
No, the House [Congress] is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the House [Congress] knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white
134
for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
In sec. 200. Judicial interference with legislature. The principle is well established that the courts will not
assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature
since each department is equally independent within the power conferred upon it by the constitution.
In this case, Congress is also empowered by the Constitution to adopt their own rules of procedure for the
orderly conduct of business, and as security against hasty action. Congress may also waive or disregard their
own house rules without court interference. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this
court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. The court refuses to disregard the allocation of
constitutional functions which is their special duty to maintain.
Thus, the Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.
Yes, the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior because the Constitution conferred it
jurisdiction, and because the matter at hand depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House
knows best.
If the court assumed power to decide this, it would be deemed to have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which
the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government.
Doctrine: Discipline of members of the House of Representatives
ANALYSIS:
In the case at bar, Osmeña in his privilege speech as a Governor, accused the President for bribery. House
of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 59 creating a special committee to investigate this, which
they see as an assault on the Office of the President. Osmeña filed this petition to annul HR#59, invoking his
parliamentary immunity.
CONCLUSION:
135
Therefore, when the House has exclusive power, the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.
#66 (DUPLICATE) KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Alejandrino v.
Quezon, G.R. No. FACTS:
22041, September
11, 1924 Jose Alejandrino, a senator appointed by the Governor-General to represent the 12th district, was declared
Topic Discussed: guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate.
.Discipline of Alejandrino assaulted another senator for the words the latter uttered during a debate regarding the
members [Sec. 16 credentials of the former.
(3)] Through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators, the petitioner
was deprived of all prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from the
Student Assigned: first of January 1924.
The petitioner asserted that the resolution is unconstitutional. He then prayed to the Court to:
Aniñon, Kristine Issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution
Abegail To declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void and
Consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the respondents
ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he enjoy all
of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments, and prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner from
exercising the rights of his office, and from carrying the order of suspension into effect.
Attorney-General, in representation of the respondents, objected to the jurisdiction of the Court, and later by
demurrer, pressed and same point.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the Supreme Court may by mandamus and injunction annul the suspension of Senator
Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position.
RULING:
136
No, Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their
legislative powers by any judicial process.
The Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular
action. The Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition for mandamus and injunction
The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained. As it is
unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed without costs.
ANALYSIS:
In the case at bar, Petitioner and the citizens representing were deprived of their rights, privileges,
prerogatives and emoluments by an actual act or resolution of the Senate, which is contrary to the law.
The Court is not only justified, but authorized and compelled under the duties and powers conferred upon it,
to take jurisdiction of the petition for the purpose of examining into the questions whether or not the
petitioner has been deprived of any rights granted to him under the Constitution of the Philippine Islands.
CONCLUSION:
Therefore, the court should take jurisdiction for the purpose of determining and making pronouncements
upon the legality and constitutionality of the resolution made by the Senate.
#67 Alejandrino v. KEY POINTS :

Quezon, G.R. No.
22041, September
11, 1924 FACTS:
Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges
Topic Discussed: of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente de Vera.
.Discipline of He was deprived of all of his prerogatives, privileges,and emoluments of being a senator.
members [Sec. 16 He filed a mandamus and injunction against respondent Senate President Manuel Quezon from executing
(3)] the said resolution and declared the said resolution null and void.
137
Arcenal, Cristina S. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition prayed for.
RULING:
The judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power. It would hardly be appropriate for the
judiciary to assume the role of either a credulous inquisitor, a querulous censor, or a jaunty knight, who
passes down the halls of legislation and of administration.
#68 U.S. v. Pons, KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
G.R. No. L-11530,
August 12, 1916 Doctrine:
When the legislative journals show with certainty the time of adjournment of the Legislature and are clear
Topic Discussed: and unambiguous, respecting the same, they are conclusive; and extraneous evidence cannot be admitted to
Legislative journals show a different date of adjournment.
and records [Sec.
16(4)]
FACTS:
Student Assigned:
Aribas, Christian Juan Pons (Respondent) and Gabino Beliso were opium trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer
Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain containing 25 barrels of wine which were delivered to Beliso.
Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, customs authorities noticed that
said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one).
Thereafter, customs officers conducted an investigation thus discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually
contained tins of opium. Pursuant to Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and
fraudulently importing and introducing opium to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that
Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. His witnesses claim
that the said law was passed/approved on March 1, 1914. However, according to the legislative journal of the
special session of the Commission, said session was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is
the case, Pons argues that Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE:
138
Whether or not the court can look to legislative journals as poof of when adjournment of Legislature
happened?
Whether or not the Court can go beyond the recitals in the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed
made a law on February 28, 1914.
RULING:
1. YES. Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of the "official acts of the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of the Philippine Islands . . . shall be
judicially recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon
any of the subjects in this section stated, when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and may
resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence."
The Court had held that the (a) law (Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 275) and (b) adjudicated case (Herron v
Smith, a U.S. case) make it their duty to take judicial notice of legislative journals of the special session of
the Philippine Legislature of 1914.
a) The Law: Section 275 of Code of Civil Procedure – "Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2)
The proceedings of the Philippine Commissions, or of any legislative body that may be provided for the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journal of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order: Provided,
That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature when there is in
existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and the secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive
proof of the provisions of such Act and of the due enactment thereof."
b) U.S. Adjudicated Case: Herron v. Smith – “While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction
(Philippines) upon the exact question whether the courts may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it
is well settled in the United States that such journals may be notice by the courts in determining the question
whether a particular bill became a law or not.”
139
2. NO. The Supreme Court looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but refused to go
beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals.
The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the
Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the Court has said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the
letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature.
Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the
legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles
the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The Supreme Court passed
upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
#69 Arroyo v. De KEY POINTS :

Venecia, G.R. No.
127255, August 14, FACTS:
1997
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against the respondents
charging them violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so
Topic Discussed: that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The present petition also challenges the
Legislative journals validity of RA No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by
and records [Sec. imposing so-called *sin taxes” (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
16(4)]
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading
Student Assigned: on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain
Aton, Frexello amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At
11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he
was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate.He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head
count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. Rep.
140
Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation
of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in
the order. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on
the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed
by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into
law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the passage of RA No. 8240 is in violation of the rules of the House, hence making it null
and void.
RULING:
NO. First, it is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of
R.A. No 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for
the enactment of a law, i.e. Article VI, Secs. 26-27.
The Constitution provides that “each House may determine the rules of its proceedings. The prevailing view
is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with their observance. They may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the
effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The
above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation
of constitutional provisions is shown.
Second, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
141
President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed
on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Where there is no evidence to the contrary, the
Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a
proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on the courts."
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the
House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which
became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution,
Art. VI, §16(4). The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the
Constitution to be recorded therein. As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the
Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
XVII. Specific powers of Congress

#70 Fabian v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Desierto, G.R. No.
129742, September Section 27 of RA 6770 was assailed on the ground that it provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court from
16, 1998 decisions in administrative cases decided by the Ombudsman. It is contended that the provisions goes against
Topic Discussed: Section 30 of Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution which states that “no law shall be passed increasing the
Legislative power appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and consent.”
(power to enact
statutes)
FACTS:
Student Assigned:
Ceniza The herein petitioner in this case, Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and President of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in the construction business while the private
respondent Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District. In the
meantime,
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PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects, and private respondent,
reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their
affair lasted for some time, in the course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works
contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried to
terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of
employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against
private respondent.
Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension without
pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the
private respondent’s new counsel had been his classmate and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself.
Hence, the case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from
the administrative charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court may appeal from decisions of the Ombudsman?
RULING:
Section 27 of RA 6770 can not validly authorize an appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription of Section 30
Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
prohibition which was intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate jurisdiction, otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Supreme Court.
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that: In all
administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
143
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
It cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was
intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise,
the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden
the Court.
#71 Tolentino v. KEY POINTS :

Secretary of Section 24 Article VI, All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
Finance, G.R. No. of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
115455, August 25, Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
1994
Section 26 Article VI- (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the Title thereof.
Topic Discussed: (2) No bill passed by either House shall become law unless it has passed three
exclusive readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its members
origination rule three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
Student Assigned: allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
CRUZ, Maricris journal.
FACTS:
Petitioner, including nine others in separate motions, filed for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the
constitutionality of RA No 7716, otherwise known as The Expanded Value Added Tax Law. Petitioners
contend that the RA did not “ originate exclusively” in the House of Representative (HoR) as required by
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution. The Senate allegedly did not pass it on second and third readings,
instead passing its own version. Petitioners contend that it should have amended the House Bill by striking
144
out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of its own bill, so as to conform with the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON Republic Act 7716 is unconstitutional for having “originated” from the Senate and not from
HoR?
RULING:
NO. The enactment of the Senate bill has not been the first instance where the Senate, in the exercise of its
power to proposed amendments to bills (required to originate in the House), passed its own version
. An amendment by substitution (striking out the text and substituting it), as urged by petitioners, concerns a
mere matter of form,and considering the petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it would make
is Senate applied such substitution in the case, it cannot be applied to the case at bar. While the
aforementioned Constitutional provision states that bills must “originate exclusively from HoR” it also
adds,” but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments”.
The Senate may then propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. Petitioner erred in assuming the
Senate version to be an independent and distinct bill. Without the House bill, Senate could not have enacted
the Senate bill, as the latter was a meere amendment of the former. As such, it did not have to pass the Senate
on second and third readings.
#72 Abakada Guro KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
v. Ermita, G.R. No.
168056, September FACTS:
1, 2005 RA 9337, an act amending certain sections of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, is questioned by
Topic Discussed: petitioners for being unconstitutional. Procedural issues raised by petitioners are the legality of the bicameral
EXC: exclusive proceedings, exclusive origination of revenue measures, and the power of the Senate concomitant thereto.
origination rule
Also, a substantive issue was raised with regard to the undue delegation of legislative power to the President
Student Assigned: to increase the rate of value-added tax to 12%.
Dara Pearl Dacuyan
145
Petitioners also argue that the increase to 12%, as well as the 70% limitation on the creditable input tax, the
60- month amortization on the purchase or importation of capital goods exceeding P1,000,000.00, and the
5% final withholding tax by government agencies, is arbitrary, oppressive, and confiscatory and that it
violates the constitutional principle on progressive taxation, among others.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendments are a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
RULING:
NO.
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution reads:

Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.
In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that initiated the
move for amending provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added tax. Upon transmittal of
said House bills to the Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No. 1950 proposing amendments not
only to NIRC provisions on the value-added tax but also amendments to NIRC provisions on other kinds of
taxes. Is the introduction by the Senate of provisions not dealing directly with the value-added tax, which is
the only kind of tax being amended in the House bills, still within the purview of the constitutional provision
authorizing the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the
House?
The foregoing question had been squarely answered in the Tolentino case, wherein the Court held, thus:
. . . To begin with, it is not the law – but the revenue bill – which is required by the Constitution to "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in
the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole. . . . At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may
146
be produced. To insist that a revenue statute – and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law – must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny
the Senate’s power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to
violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact, make the House
superior to the Senate.
Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the
Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included
provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes.
Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent
of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.

v. Jimenez, supra
Topic Discussed: FACTS: Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., a non-profit civic organization, instituted a suit
The “one-subject, petitioning for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines and
one-bill” rule [Sec. the disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress from passing in audit the vouchers, and from
26(1)] countersigning the checks from treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or former Member
of the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act 3836
Student Assigned:
Dizon, Icy Marilou R.A. 3836 allows a Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives and an elective officer of either
House of Congress to retire regardless of age.
To be eligible for retirement, he must have served for at least 12 years as Senator and/or Member of the
House of Representatives. For an elective officer of either House, he must have served the government for at
least twelve years, of which not less than four years must have been as an elective officer of either House.
The gratuity payable by the employer is equivalent to one year’s salary for every four years of service in the
147
government. Such gratuity is exempt from taxation, not liable to attachment or execution, and not refundable
in case of restatement or reelection of the retiree
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 3836 falls within the prohibition embodied in Article VI Section 14 of the
Constitution.
Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the act.
RULING: Yes, R.A. 3836 falls within the prohibition embodied in Article VI Section 14 of the Constitution
.
Section 14 Article VI states that “The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless
otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each
including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of traveling expenses to and
from their respective districts in the case of the Members of the House of Representatives and to and from
their places of residence in the case of Senators, while attending sessions in the Congress. No increase shall
take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and Members of the
House of Representative approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen
thousand pesos.
In this case, Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the retirement benefits of Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963.
The constitutional provision of Section 14 Article VI includes in the term compensation, “other
emoluments”. Other authorities and decided cases regarded emolument as profit arising from office or
employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an
office as salary, fees and perquisites. The aforementioned constitutional provision puts R.A. 3836 within the
purview of “other emoluments”. The retirement benefits which were made immediately available without
awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and Members of the House of
Representatives approving such request, clearly runs counter to the prohibition under Section 14 Article VI
which embodies a proviso which reads “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of
148
such increase”.
paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill.
With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:
The Constitutional requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect their contents is
satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title, and it is not necessary that the
title be a complete index of the content. (People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535)
The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should be
reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation. It
should be given a practical, rather than technical, construction. It should be a sufficient compliance
with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are
germane to that general subject. (Sumulong v. The Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291)
It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12, subsection (c)
of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 660 and. 3096, the retirement benefits are
granted to members of the Government Service Insurance System, who have rendered at least twenty years
of service regardless of age. This paragraph is related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No.
186.
On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of Congress and to
elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide
149
retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter which is not germane to
Commonwealth Act No. 186.
In other words, this portion of the amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and elected
officers, such as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each House) is not related in any manner to the
subject of Commonwealth Act 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which
provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its members.
In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the title of said Republic Act
3836 is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the aforementioned paragraph 1,
section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: first, the prohibition regarding
increase in the salaries of Members of Congress; second, the equal protection clause; and third, the
prohibition that the title of a bill shall not embrace more than one subject.
#74 Tolentino v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Secretary of
Finance, supra
The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision dismissing the petitions
Student Assigned: for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners.
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the
150
VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is
averred, “even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional”, citing
in support of the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand, asserts that R.A. No.
7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without
reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall
“evolve a progressive system of taxation”.
Additionally, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to adopt adefinite
policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on
cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded Value-Added Tax
Law (RA 7716) is unconstitutional?
RULING:
No. With the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law
could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. By granting exemptions, the State
does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
ANALYSIS:
In this case, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have long
ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the
press because “even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional.”
The Court was speaking in that case (Murdock v. Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary
tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on
the exercise of its right. The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise
of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or
properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To
subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay
151
income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
The first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though such taxation may affect
particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of another, or may
impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid unless
prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its
true legal sense. It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the
sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no
exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential. The sale of food items, petroleum, medical
and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and services was already exempt under Section 103,
pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that
R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions while subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of
the VAT. Finally, it is contended that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides that
“The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation”. Nevertheless, equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property
of the same class be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and
natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or
ordinance applies equally to all persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar situation. Furthermore, the
Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive.
What it simply provides is that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation.”
CONCLUSION:
Therefore RA 7716 is constitutional. Provision has been interpreted to mean simply that “direct taxes
are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized.” The mandate to
Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system.
#75 Lidasan v. KEY POINTS :

COMELEC, G.R.
No. L-28089, Constitutional requirement, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
October 25, 1967 one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
152
The “one-subject, The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections, is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which
one-bill” rule [Sec. is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which
26(1)] includes barrios located in another province — Cotabato — to be spared from attack planted upon the
constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
Student Assigned: which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the
Gloria present original petition for certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now
in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are
separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same
province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of
the municipality shall be in Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen
hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon,
Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of
Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions
of which are:
For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes, the
Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall
comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos,
and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and
153
Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-
bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of
Parang, also of Cotabato.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 4790 meets the constitutional requirement that one bill one subject matter.
RULING:
No. RA 4790 is unconstitutional.
A bill has a constitutional requirement, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." The test of the sufficiency of a title is
whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be
stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain
that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry
as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or
scope of the act, is bad.
In the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives where the bill, being of local application,
originated. When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one
barrios — not nine barrios — was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by
the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig,
which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato.
And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive
community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that
the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality, what
with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their
own feet with the income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and
other corporate obligations?
154
This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these
problems, or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to
impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic
considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population and sufficient income, we may not now
say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine — of the original twenty-one — barrios, with a
seat of government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of
congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes the
judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of powers, we
may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally
intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of
Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will.
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.
#76 Fariñas v. Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003
Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
147387, December
10, 2003 Topic: The “one-subject, One-bill” Rule
Topic Discussed: Case: Two petitioner seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of the Republic Act No. 9006, The
The “one-subject, Fair Election Act, insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambanda Bilang 881 (The Omnibus
one-bill” rule [Sec. Election Code)
26(1)]
At the time of the filing of the petition, the petitioners were members of the minority blocking the House of
Student Assigned: Representatives.
Lanzaderas,
Christian Jee FACTS:
Petitioners come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of RA 9006, insofar as it repeals Section
155
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
in RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of RA 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the
omnibus election code, on the other. RA 9006 primarily deals with lifting of the ban on the use of media for
election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are
holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso factor resigned therefrom upon filing of the
certificate of candidacy . The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the
title nor germane to the subject matter of Republic Act No 9006.
The petitioners assert that RA 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into
law. The Law, not only section 14, should be declared null and void.
Finally the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law, hence, should
not have been repealed.
ISSUE:
is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law
to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
RULING:
does not violate the "one subject-one title" rule
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.
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To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an
act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere
details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as
surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its
subject finding expression in its title.33
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful
and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides not only the
declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof:
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to
include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the
said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of
its content.36
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on
elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep.
Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not
violate the "one subject-one title" rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject,
indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.37
157
FALLO/DISPOSITION:
The petitions are dismissed. No Pronouncement as to costs
#77 Remman KEY POINTS : SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
Enterprises, Inc. v. shall be expressed in the title thereof.
PRBRES, G.R. No.
197676, February 4,
2014 FACTS:
R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was signed into law
on June 29, 2009 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims to professionalize the real estate service
Topic Discussed: sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and... supervision of real estate service
The “one-subject, practitioners (real estate brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the country. Prior to
one-bill” rule [Sec. its enactment, real estate service practitioners were under the supervision of the Department of Trade and
26(1)] Industry (DTI) through... the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in the exercise
of its consumer regulation functions. Such authority is now transferred to the Professional Regulation
Student Assigned: Commission (PRC) through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES)... created
Lim, Jan Clyd under the new law.
The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated by the PRC and PRBRES
under Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010.
Petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Association
(CREBA) instituted a Civil Case in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioners sought to declare as void
and... unconstitutional the following provisions of R.A. No. 9646
According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because (1) it violates Article VI, Section 26
158
(1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that "[e]very bill passed by Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the... title thereof"; (2) it is in direct conflict with Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 648 which transferred the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority (NHA)
to regulate the real estate trade and business to the Human Settlements Commission, now the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which authority includes the issuance of license to sell of subdivision
owners and developers pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957; (3) it violates the due process clause
as it impinges on the real estate developers' most basic ownership... rights, the right to use and dispose
property, which is enshrined in Article 428 of the Civil Code; and (4) Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 9646
violates the equal protection clause as no substantial distinctions exist between real estate developers and the
exempted group mentioned... since both are property owners dealing with their own property.
ISSUE:
Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject" rule under Article VI,
Section 26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution
RULING:
No, R.A. 9646 was constitutional and not violating the "one title-one subject" rule under Article VI, Section
26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution.
One-Title One-Subject Rule Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution states:

SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an
act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that Constitutional provisions relating to the
subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a...
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of that... object.
In the case at bar, the rule was sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include
159
the general object which the statute seeks to effect. The new law extended its coverage to real estate
developers with respect to their own properties. The inclusion of the real estate developers is germane to the
law’s primary goal of developing “a corps of technically competent, responsible, respected professional real
estate service practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and well
promote the growth of the real industry”.
Ergo, R.A. 9646 was constitutional and not violating the "one title-one subject" rule under Article VI,
Section 26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution.
#78 Tatad v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Secretary, G.R. No.
124360, November FACTS:
5, 1997
Petitioners assailed section 5(b) and section 15 of R.A. No. 8180, the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation
Topic Discussed: Act of 1996.
The “one-subject,
one-bill” rule [Sec. Section 5(b) of the law provided that “tariff duty shall be imposed . . . on imported crude oil at the rate of
26(1)] three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) . . .” On the
other hand, section 15 provided that “[t]he DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full
Student Assigned: deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall
Lungay, Junrey time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are
declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable . . .”
Petitioners argued that section 5(b) on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiring
every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
They also contended that the phrases “as far as practicable,” “decline of crude oil prices in the world market”
and “stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar” are ambivalent, unclear and in concrete since they
do not provide determinate or determinable standards that can guide the President in his decision to fully
deregulate the downstream oil industry.
160
ISSUE:
Whether or not section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates the one title — one subject requirement of the
Constitution.
RULING:
No, section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 8180 did not violate the one title — one subject requirement of the
Constitution.
Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that “Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”
In this case, the Supreme Court (SC) did not concur the petitioner’s contention. As a policy, SC has adopted
a liberal construction of the one title — one subject rule. SC has consistently ruled that the title need not
mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law
. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may
be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject. SC holds that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A.
No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway
prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.
Thus, section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 8180 did not violate the one title — one subject requirement of the
Constitution.
--#79 Tobias v. KEY POINTS :

Abalos, G.R. No.
114783, December SUMMARY. Petitioners assail the constitutionality and validity of RA 7675 “An Act converting
8, 1994 Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City”. The law provided for the division of the
161
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Petitioners argue, among others,
Topic Discussed: that the plebiscite should have included the residents of San Juan.
The “one-subject,
one-bill” rule [Sec. DOCTRINE. The inhabitants of San Juan, which used to be part of the congressional district together with
26(1)] Mandaluyong, were properly excluded from the plebiscite on the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city since the matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto
Student Assigned:
FACTS:
 Feb 9 1994: Ramos signed RA 76751 “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as City of Mandaluyong”
 April 10 1994: Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held asking the people of
Mandaluyong whether they approved of the conversion of the municipality into a city.
 The turnout was 14.41% of the voting population. 18,621 voted “yes” whereas 7,911 voted “no”. RA 7675
was deemed ratified by virtue of these results
 Petitioners now assail the constitutionality and validity of RA 7675 on the grounds that: o Art VIII, Sec 49
of RA 76752 violates the one subject-one bill rule3 . The inclusion of which in the subject law resulted in the
latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
The second is not germane to the subject matter of RA 7675 since the title expresses the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a city.
o The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the
assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that
provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution4 .
o Furthermore, said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities
have attained the minimum population requirements. There is no mention in the assailed law of any census to
show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to
162
justify their separation into two legislative districts
o Sec 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to
Sec. 5 (4) of the Constitution5
o [RELEVANT] The people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No.
7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district
o RA 7675 has resulted in “gerrymandering” (practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular
candidate or party)
ISSUE:
WON RA 7675 is unconstitutional- NO
RULING:
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from
the subject of its conversion into a city but is a natural and logical consequence thereof. The title of RA 7674
necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Sec 49 on the creation of a separate
congressional district.
The creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is in compliance with the “one
city-one representative” in Art VI, Sec 5(3) of the Constitution, which reads: “x x x Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative”
(Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Moreover, we ruled that the one subject-one bill rule should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject
163
--#80 Tolentino v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Secretary of
Finance, supra FACTS:
Topic Discussed: The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision dismissing the petitions
Procedure in the for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added
passage of bills Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners.
[Sec. 26(2), Art. VI]
GR: three-readings- The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the
on-separate-days VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is
rule; EXC: bill averred, “even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional”, citing
certified as urgent in support of the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.
Student Assigned:
Padrigao Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand, asserts that R.A. No.
7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without
Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that the legislature was to adopt a definite
cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded Value-Added Tax
Law should be declared unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a
164
privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is
simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which
other businesses have long ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does
not discriminate against the press because “even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed
freedom is unconstitutional.” The Court was speaking in that case (Murdock v. Pennsylvania) of a license
tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional
because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license
tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale,
barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties
purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any
more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom
under the Constitution.
--#81 Kida v. KEY POINTS :

Senate, supra
Topic Discussed:
GR: three-readings- FACTS:
on-separate-days The case assails the Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act
rule; EXC: bill (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the
certified as urgent regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be
held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the
Student Assigned: President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the
Silorio expiration of the terms of the elected officials.
ISSUE:
Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local
elections?
RULING:
YES. Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections
165
The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and
local elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and
local elections, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which state:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be
simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members
of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under
this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall
serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.
The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the
heading “Local Government” indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions
as one of the forms of local governments.
WON the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. NO. o
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must pass
through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the
necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the
effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:
o The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading
the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law:
[i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved.
166
o In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings
requirement.
--#82 Abakada KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Guro v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 168056, FACTS:
September 1, 2005
(decision); October Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
18, 2005 prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
(resolution) amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4
imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of
goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These
questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the
Topic Discussed: Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have
The no- been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.
amendment rule Petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is a virtual
abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not within the purview of
Student Assigned: Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution
Tariao, John Mark
ISSUE:
RULING:
#83 Tolentino v. KEY POINTS :
167
Secretary of FACTS:
Finance, supra
The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision dismissing the petitions
for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added
Topic Discussed: Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners.
Minimum vote The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the
requirement for VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is
passage of bill averred, “even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional”, citing
in support of the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.
Student Assigned: Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand, asserts that R.A. No.
Tompong, Van John 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without
Additionally, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to adopt adefinite
cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional policy
•House of Rep. filed House Bill 11197 (An Act Restructuring the VAT System to Widen its Tax Base and
Enhance its Admin., Amending for these Purposes…)
•Upon receipt of Senate, Senate filed another bill completely different from that of the House Bill
•The Senate finished debates on the bill and had the 2nd and 3rd reading of the Bill on the same day.
•Bill was deliberated upon in the Conference Committee and became an enrolled bill which eventually
became the EVAT law.
ISSUE:
What is the minimum vote requirement to re-passed a bill?
RULING:
A two-thirds vote of all members of the constitutional assembly is needed to repassed the bill.
Under Section 24, Article VI of 1987 Constitution, all bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills,
168
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the Assembly, but the Senate may
In case of disapproval by the Senate of any such bills, the Assembly may repass the same by a two-thirds
vote of all its members, and thereupon, the bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted to
the President for corresponding action. In the event that the Senate should fail to finally act on any such bills,
the Assembly may, after thirty days from the opening of the next regular session of the same legislative term,
reapprove the same with a vote of two-thirds of all the members of the Assembly. And upon such reapproval,
the bill shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted to the President for corresponding action.
Hence, a two-thirds vote of all members of the constitutional assembly is needed to re-passed the bill.
#84 Arroyo v. De KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Venecia, supra FACTS:
Republic Act No. 8240, amending certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-
Topic Discussed: called “sin taxes” (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes, originated in
The enrolled bill the House of Representatives as House Bill No. 7198, which was approved on third reading and transmitted
doctrine to the Senate, which also approved it with certain amendments on third reading.
Student Assigned: A bicameral conference was formed to reconcile disagreeing provisions of both Houses. The bicameral
Viarino, Mim committee then submitted its report to the House of Representative on November 21, 1996.
Eventually, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed
into law by President Ramos the following day, November 22, 1996.
PETITIONERS ARROYO, LAGMAN, OSMEÑA, TAÑADA AND ZAMORA, who are all members of the
House of Representatives, filed a petition before the Court challenging the validity of Republic Act No.
8240. They claimed, among others, that there was a blatant violation of the standing rules of the House,
which they deemed are constitutionally-mandated, and violating these rules led them to likewise conclude
169
that this was tantamount to violating the Constitution.
Petitioners further urged the Court not to feel bound by the declaration by the certification of the Speaker of
the House that the law had been properly passed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the signing of House Bill No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses Congress are conclusive of its due enactment.
RULING:
Yes, the signing of House Bill No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the
certification by the secretaries of both Houses Congress are conclusive of its due enactment.
The enrolled bill doctrine provides that the enrolled copy of a bill (that is, signed and certified by the Senate
President and the Senate Secretary on one hand the Speaker of the House and the House Secretary General)
is CONCLUSIVE of its PROVISIONS (text); and of its DUE ENACTMENT. Regarding matters not
expressly required by the Constitution to be entered on the legislative Journals, that is, the yeas and nays on
any question, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
In this case, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of House Bill No. 7198 by the presiding officers and
certification by the secretaries of both Houses that it was passed on November 21, 1996 is conclusive of its
due enactment. When there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court will respect the certification of the
presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
To disregard the enrolled bill doctrine would be to disregard the respect due the other departments of the
government. Petitioners have not advanced any argument that warrants departure from the doctrine. The due
enactment of the law is likewise confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows
that the conference committee report on House Bill No. 7198 which became Republic Act No. 8240 was
approved on that day.
The keeping of the Journal is required by Section 16 Article VI of the Constitution. The Journal is regarded
170
as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With
respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded
conclusive effect.
Therefore, the signing of House Bill No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses Congress are conclusive of its due enactment.
#85 Fariñas v. KEY POINTS :

Executive
Secretary, supra Enrolled bill doctrine.
FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
The enrolled bill A petition was filed seeking the Court to declare unconstitutional Section 14 of RA 9006 or “The Act to
doctrine Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections Through Fair Election
Practices” as it repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code mandating the ipso jure resignation from
public office of one who filed his certificate of candidacy, except for President and Vice-President.
Student Assigned: It is the petitioners’ contention that the repeal of Section 67 is a rider on the said law, the same embracing
Aguilar, KR more than one subject, inconsistent to what the constitution mandates. Further, it violated the equal
protection clause since the said law didn’t repeal provision relating to appointive officials. Appointive
officials would still be considered ipso jure resigned upon filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
ISSUE:
Whether the enrolled bill doctrine is applicable in this case?
RULING:
Yes.
Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President
and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment.
In the case at bar, A review of cases reveals the Court’s consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no
171
reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly
involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by
the House.
This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or
Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern.Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its
favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia,viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to
inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in
the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the
courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’ Consequently, ‘mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when
the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.’"
#86 Casco KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Philippine Chemical
Co. v. Jimenez, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609
G.R. No. L-17931, The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one
February 28, 1963 hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the
Topic Discussed: following:.
The enrolled bill
doctrine XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported
by and for the exclusive use of end-users.
Student Assigned:
FACTS:
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Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in
the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are "urea and formaldehyde" which are
both being imported abroad. Pursuant to R.A. 2609 Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, The Central Bank
issued Circulars fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. The bank also issued
memorandum establishing the procedure for the applications for exemption from the payment of said fee as
provided by R.A. 2609. Petitioners paid the required margin fee with their 2 import transactions. In both of
their transactions through R.A. 2609 they wanted to avail the exemption from the payment of said fee as
provided by RA. 2609. Petitioners filed a refund request to the Central Bank and the Central Bank issued the
vouchers but was not accepted by the Auditor of the Bank. The refusal was also affirmed by the Auditor
General. The refusal was based on the fact that the separate importation of "urea and formaldehyde" is not in
accord with the provisions of R.A. 2609. Becuase section 2 of R.A. 2609 clearly provides “Urea
formaldehyde” and not “urea and formaldehyde” Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde"
appearing in this provision should be construed as "urea and formaldehyde". Petitioner contends that the bill
approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and
"formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde"
separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde",
not the latter as a finished product.
Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought the refund of the margin fees
relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines
fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank
refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioner’s separate importations
of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent
portion of this statute reads: “The margin established by the Monetary Board … shall be imposed upon the
sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: “XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the
manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee.
RULING:
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No, "urea" and "formaldehyde" are not exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee.
Citing National Institute of Science and Technology defines urea formaldehyde is the synthetic resin formed
as a condensation product from definite proportions of “urea and formaldehyde” under certain conditions
relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and
extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low-cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of
plywood. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea
and formaldehyde”.
In this case, RA 2609 only exempts urea formaldehyde and not the separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde as they are different, the former being a finished product. The enrolled bill which uses the term
“urea formaldehyde” is conclusive upon the courts. The courts cannot speculate that there had been an error I
printing of the bill as this shall violate the principle of separation of powers. Shall there have been any error
in the printing, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by a judicial decree.
Thus, "urea" and "formaldehyde" are not exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee.
What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled
bill — which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon
the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation
of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree
The enrolled bill rule is a principle of judicial interpretation of rules of procedure in legislative bodies.
Under the doctrine, once a bill passes a legislative body and is signed into law, the courts assume that all
rules of procedure in the enactment process were properly followed.
#87 Morales v. KEY POINTS :
174
Subido, G.R. No. L-
29658, November FACTS:
29, 1968 (decision);
February 27, 1969 Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not
(resolution) possess a bachelor’s degree.
Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant
Topic Discussed: colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the
The enrolled bill resignation of the former Chief, Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same
doctrine time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila.
Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but
Student Assigned: rejected his appointment for “failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility
requirements for the said position.” Instead, Subido certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido
Aniñon, Kristine invoked
Abegail
Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be appointed chief of a
city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as
chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain
or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the
Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police department of a city
…” can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated
upon, the approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served
either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of
any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school
graduate who has served the police department of a city orwho has served as officer of the Armed Forces for
at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the
175
bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the
phrase “or has served as chief of police with exemplary record.”
Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum
which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to
the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look
searchingly into the matter.
RULING:
No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that
Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing.
ANALYSIS:
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened.
The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of
what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise
the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did
happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered in the journal
of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such
matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being
confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide.
CONCLUSION:
Therefore, the Supreme Court is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must
yield to the enrolled bill. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered
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in the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
#88 Astorga v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Villegas, G.R. No.
L-23475, April 30, FACTS:
1974
Topic Discussed: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senador Arturo
The enrolled bill Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of
doctrine said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and
attested to the bill.
Student Assigned:
Arcenal, Cristina S. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that
the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was the wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the
amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President
withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 is invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the
presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.
RULING:
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signature therein, the court
declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.
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ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE
The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect due to coequal and independent departments. which
requires the judicial department to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated. If the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may
resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment.
That attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of due enactment of the law cannot
apply in this case because the Senate President himself had already declared his signature on the bill to be
invalid. Thus, the enrolled bill doctrine cannot apply.
The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal.

An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bill due
enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such.
Where the journal discloses that substantial amendments were introduced and approved and were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature.
The court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become law.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding
officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect
already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential.
#89 Philippine KEY POINTS :

Judges Association The enrolled bill rule is a principle of judicial interpretation of rules of procedure in legislative bodies.
v. Prado, G.R. No. Under the doctrine, once a bill passes a legislative body and is signed into law, the courts assume that all
105371, November rules of procedure in the enactment process were properly followed.
11, 1993
FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
The enrolled bill Republic Act No. 7354 was approved on April 30, 1992 titled “An Act Creating the Philippine Postal
178
doctrine Corporation, defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry
and for Other Purposes connected therein”
Student Assigned:
Aribas, Christian • Philippine Postal Corporation consequently issued Circular NO. 9228 to implement provisions of RA 7354
• Section 35. Repealing Clause of RA No. 7354 states “All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders.
Instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or
modified accordingly. All franking privileges authorized by law are repealed, except those provided for
under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059.
The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that
of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use
thereof.”
• Section 35 withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional
Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Register of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
• The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common
cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as the sending of requisite notices in registration cases,
affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
• Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA NO. 7354 on various grounds.
• The Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily
not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and
must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon
this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness.
ISSUE:
WON RA No.7354 is unconstitutional based on the following grounds:

1. Its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purpose contrary to Article VI, Sec 26(1)
of the Constitution which states that, “Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”
2. It did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final
form were not distributed among the members before its passage
179
RULING:
1. The petitioners' contention is untenable.
We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution. It has been held that if the title
fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated
to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did
not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover
every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and
reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. In the case at bar, the repealing clause
which includes the withdrawal of franking privileges is merely the effect and not the subject of the statute;
and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title.
2. These arguments are unacceptable

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. It has a broader function.
We shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of
the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure
was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
While a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the
House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. It may propose an entirely new provision. The
180
court also added that said the bill in question was duly approved by the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
It was enrolled with its certification by Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives. It was
then presented to and approved by President the President. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the
Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of
Congress. An enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary. The court therefore declined to look into the
petitioners' charges. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted. The court is bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government.
# 90 Belgica v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Executive
Secretary, supra FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
Approval of bill The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
into law [Sec. Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
27(1)] using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging
five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Student Assigned: Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints
Aton, Frexello are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the
181
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for
the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad
from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto
are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation
of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910, relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
RULING:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress's Role must be confined to
mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
182
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which
the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any
other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.”
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED
PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE
PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM
CALAMITIES.
(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES
THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW
DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE
THE SAME.
#91 Bolinao KEY POINTS :

Electronics v. Case Doctrine:
Valencia, G.R. No.
L-20740, June 30, Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item or items
1964 of an appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or
Topic Discussed: more items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same
183
The President’s veto time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20)
power
FACTS:
Student Assigned: This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary injunction
Ceniza filed by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network,Inc., and Monserrat
Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and operators of radio andtelevision stations enumerated therein,
against respondents Secretary of Public Worksand Communications and Acting Chief of the Radio Control
Division.
Later the Republic Of the Philippines, as operator of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, sought and was
allowed to intervene in this case, said intervenor having been granted a construction permit to install and
operate a television station in Manila. Section 3 of Act 3846 provides that no application for renewal of
station or operator license shall be disapproved without a proper hearing and as well as provides for the letter
format in which the licensees must be informed of such hearing.
However, the only reason the respondent relied upon the disapproval of the application is it’s alleged
lateness. Petitioners then assailed this saying that their violation of has ceased to exist when the
respondents issued a circular on July 24, 1962 which states that late submissions of late
documents shall only be until August, 10, 1962 and they have submitted all their deficiencies before
the said date. Respondents’ claim that they have no authority to condone or pardon violations of the radio
control regulations but the court stated that under specific provision of law, 1 the respondent Department
Secretary is given the discretion either to "bring criminal action against violators of the radio laws or the
regulations and confiscate the radio apparatus in case of illegal operation; or simply suspend or
revoke the offender’s station or operator licenses or refuse to renew such licenses; or just reprimand
and warn the offenders."
Being that the aforementioned circular was issued by the respondents means it falls squarely
within the law. The next issue is whether there was abandonment or renunciation by petitioner CBN ofits
right to operate on Channel 9. There was no express agreement in this matter. Respondents made
reference to the remarks appearing in the construction permit No.793, issued to the Philippine Broadcasting
Service, that "construction of this station shall be begun after DZXL- TV (Channel 9) Manila of
Chronicle Broadcasting Network’spermit to transfer is approved.” As explained by petitioner, it was made
to understand that the assignment of Channel 10, in connection with the planned transfer of its station to
Baguio, was to be effective upon the final transfer of the said station. This was necessary to avoid
184
interference of its broadcast with that of the Clark Air Force base station in Pampanga which is operating
on Channel 8. In other words, Channel 10would be assigned to petitioner only when the Baguio station
starts to operate. The intervenor also claimed for damages for petitioner’s refusal to give up operations of the
said channel.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the investigation being conducted by respondents, in connection with petitioners’ applications for
renewal of their station licenses, has any legal basis;
2. Whether or not there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle Broadcasting

Network (CBN) of Channel 9 in favor of PBS; and
3. Whether or not Philippine Broadcasting Service can legally operate Channel 9and is entitled to damages,
for CBN’s refusal to give up operations thereof.
RULING:
1. No. Because of the circular issued by the respondents, the lone reason given for the investigation of
petitioners’ application, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect,
ceased to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation. Its continuation will
serve no useful purpose in contemplation of the law authorizing investigations inconnection with
applications for renewal of permit.
2. No. In the first place, as admitted by respondents, the clause "ChronicleBroadcasting
Network’s permit to transfer is approved" was merely placed by respondents' personnel after erasing the
original words written therein. And, it does not appear what were really written there before the erasure. In
the second place, CBN had no participation in the preparation of said permit. Insofar as petitioner is
concerned, it is an inter alios acta which can not bind it. And finally,
the fact that CBN was allowed to continue and did continue operating on Channel9 even after the approval of
its proposed transfer, is proof that there was no renunciation or abandonment of that channel upon the
approval of its petition to transfer.
185
3. No. The Appropriations Act, provided that no portion of this appropriation shall be used for the
operation of television stations in Luzon or any part of thePhilippines where there are television
stations.
In State v. Holder, the court said that the executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike
out conditions or restrictions. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect
whatsoever, and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
No. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation.
Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting
Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the
Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon.
Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are
expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim
damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act,
such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the
same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore,
remains.
--#92 Bengzon v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Drilon, G.R. No.
103524, April 15, FACTS:
1992 Petitioner are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving
Topic Discussed: pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of
The President’s RA 1797 which authorized adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of
veto power the AFD. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the
pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not RA 1797 was
186
Student Assigned: restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned
CRUZ, MARICRIS provisions in 1992 GAA were in attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the
veto now challenged in this petition.
ISSUE: WON the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment
of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid?
RULING:
NO, the questioned veto is invalid and the provisions of 1992 GAA are valid and subsisting.
cause the Judiciary has fiscal autonomy. Moreover, the reasoning the Justices are unduly favored is
unfounded. There are more members of the armed forces than the Justices. Should there be an issue on
delimitation, authorities should begin with the armed forces.
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the judiciary of its funds
should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the
Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. Any
argument which seeks to remove special privilege given by law to former Justices on the ground that there
should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired Justices ignores these
provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections
for the Judiciary be repealed.
The petition was granted.

v. Enriquez, G.R.
No. 113105, August
19, 1994
187
FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
The President’s Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or the General Appropriations Act of 1994.
veto power GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of Congress the REalignment of Allocation for
Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Student Assigned: Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones
Dara Pearl Dacuyan authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional
conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under the
Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
No.
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said
remedy, however, is available only when the presidential veto is based on policy or political considerations
but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra vires.
Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is the power given to the
President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI,
Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of
money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit (Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the
Executive, 31 Temple Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).
188
#94 Gonzales v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Macaraig, G.R. No.
87636, November FACTS: Gonzales together with 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of President Cory’s veto of
19, 1990 Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill. Gonzales averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto
power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she
Topic Discussed: exceeded her authority when she vetoed Sec 55 and Sec 16; (2) When the President objects to a provision of
The President’s an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-
veto power veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be
legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article
Student Assigned: VI, Sec. 25 (5) of the 1987 Constitution has to be provided for by law and therefore, Congress is also vested
Dizon, Icy Marilou with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution or
differently put, does the President has the power to veto “provisions” of an Appropriation Bill
RULING: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more
properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be
treated as “item”, which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went
one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to
veto, and Sec 55 and Sec 16 were not treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
Article 6 Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution has 2 parts: (a) President generally can veto the entire bill as an
exercise of her power and (b) president shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue of tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
KEY POINTS :
--#95 Abakada
Guro v. Purisima,
G.R. No. 166715, FACTS:
August 14, 2008
189
Topic Discussed:
“Legislative veto” ISSUE:
and post-enactment
congressional Whether the creation of the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers
oversight under the Constitution
Ganzan, Marivic M. YES.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 having approved the IRR formulated by the DOF,
DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC on May 22, 2006, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the
issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be
considered moot and academic.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect.
As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-
turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to
an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or
structure of the Constitution‘s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying
or implementing its own laws.
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they
are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Congress, in the guise of assuming
the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without
disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to
approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the
provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in
190
this Court by the Constitution.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or
its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby partially granted. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining
provisions of RA 9335 is upheld.
#96 : Belgica v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Secretary, supra
SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the
Topic Discussed: operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the
The legislative budget shall be prescribed by law.
power of
appropriation (Sec. SECTION 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
25 & 29) a. by law.
Definitions;
meaning of "An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
“appropriation Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money
made by law” and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and
purpose stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or
Student Assigned: apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent
Gloria to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or
191
religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be
‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as Congress
wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same.
FACTS:
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

The
term “pork barrel”, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to
an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and
secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative’s district.
The
earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044,
otherwise known as the Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release
of funds and realignment of unexpended portions of an item or appropriation
were subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the
House of Representatives.
In
1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people,
also became involved in project identification.
The
pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared.
It
reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (“GAA”)
called “Support for Local Development Projects” (“SLDP”). SLDP started the
giving of lump-sum allocations to individual legislators. The SLDP also began
to cover not only public works project or “hard projects” but also covered
“soft projects” such as those which would fall under education, health and
livelihood.
After
the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork barrel
was revived through the “Mindanao Development Fund” and the “Visayas
Development Fund”.
192
In
1990, the pork barrel was renamed “Countrywide Development Fund” (“CDF”). The
CDF was meant to cover small local infrastructure and other priority community
projects.
CDF
Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to
implementing agencies subject to the submission of the required list of
projects and activities. Senators and congressmen could identify any kind of
project from “hard projects” such as roads, buildings and bridges to “soft
projects” such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
In
1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be
made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by
individual legislators. This was also the first time when the Vice-President
was given an allocation.
The
CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department of
Budget and Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases made
from the funds.
Congressional
insertions (“CIs”) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside from
the CDF. Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the
Congressional Initiative Allocations, and the Public Works Fund, among others.
The
allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with
the representative of the legislative district concerned and the legislators
had the power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be
spent.
In
1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of
CIs: (i) Food Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and
(iii) Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained
193
a provision requiring prior consultation with members of Congress for the
release of funds.
In
2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”) appeared in the GAA.
PDAF required prior consultation with the representative of the district before
the release of funds. PDAF also allowed realignment of funds to any expense
category except personal services and other personnel benefits.
In
2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list
of general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF
project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. This was
retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.
It
was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of
non-governmental organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was
introduced.
The
PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for
individual legislators.
In
2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum
amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also
contained a provision on realignment of funds but with the qualification that
it may be allowed only once.
The
2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies.
Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects outside of his
legislative district. Realignment of funds and release of funds were required
to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.
MALAMPAYA
FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND
The
194
use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the
President such as the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (“PSF”).
The
Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential
Decree (“PD”) No. 910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.
The
PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (“PAGCOR”), as amended by PD
No. 1993. The PSF is managed and administered by the Presidential Management
Staff and is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.
PORK
BARREL MISUSE
In
1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of
money regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
In
2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the
Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding
illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks.
In
July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a
syndicate defrauded the government of P10 billion using funds from the pork
barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost
projects.
In
August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year audit
investigation detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007
to 2009.
Whistle-blowers
also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had gone into
a dummy NGO.
195
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes. The 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional.
SECTION 29 provides that, “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.”
The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated. That the power to appropriate
must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that: ― No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.
Therefore, the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional.
--#97 Tolentino v. KEY POINTS :

Secretary of
Finance, supra

Exclusive
origination rule
(Sec. 24) ISSUE:
#98 Abakada Guro KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
196
v. Ermita, supra SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
Topic Discussed: may propose or concur with amendments.
Exclusive
origination rule FACTS:
(Sec. 24) Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education, increased
emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits were the reasons why
R.A. 9337 was enacted. Reasons, the wisdom of which, the Court even with its extensive constitutional
Student Assigned: power of review cannot probe.
Lim, Jan Clyd The petitioners in these cases, however, question not only the wisdom of law, but also perceived
constitutional infirmities in its passage.RA 9337 is a consolidation of three (3) legislative bills namely, HB
3555 and 3705, and SB 1950. Because of the conflicting provisions of the proposed bills, the Senate agreed
to request the House of Representatives for a committee conference.
The Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill recommended the approval of its
report, which the Senate and the HOR did.On 24 May 2005, the President signed into law the consolidated
House and Senate versions as RA 9337. Before the law took effect on 1 July 2005, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of
petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
ISSUE:
Procedural – Whether RA 9337 violated the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 24
RULING:
No. R.A. 9337 was not violative of the provision of the constitution particularly Article VI, Section 24 of the
Constitution.
SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.
In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that initiated the
move for amending provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added tax.Upon transmittal of said
House bills to the Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No. 1950proposing amendments not only to
197
NIRC provisions on the value-added tax but also amendments to NIRC provisions on other kinds of taxes.
What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the
House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House
can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who
are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views
are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
Ergo, R.A. 9337 was not violative of the provision of the constitution particularly Article VI, Section 24 of
the Constitution.
--# 99 Guingona v. KEY POINTS :

Carangue, G.R. No.
1991 The 1990 GAA (RA 6831) amounts to a total of P233.5 Billion, P86.8 Billion of which was automatically
appropriated for debt service while the appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
Topic Discussed: (DECS) amounts to only P 27 B. Thus it is evident that the automatic appropriations especially to debt
Phases/stages service exceeds the supposed to be assigned with the highest budgetary priority, the DECS.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by:
Student Assigned: a) P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight
Lungay, Junrey Hundred Sixty,
b) As Amended by P.D. No. 1177 (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), entitled "Revising the Budget Process in
Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and
c) By P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic
of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating
Funds for the Purpose.”
Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos
became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the one-man
legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2,
1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress
providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; and
thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on
no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.
198
Petitioners contend that decrees are inconsistent with Section 24 and violate Section 29(l) of Article VI of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation of P86.8 Billion for debt service violates section 24 and 29(I) of
RULING:
No, the automatic appropriation of P86.8 Billion for debt service did not violate section 24 and 29(I) of
Article VI of 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
In this case, an examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that the amounts
needed to cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those guaranteed by
the national government, should be made available when they shall become due precisely without the
necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor, since both the periods and
necessities are incapable of determination in advance. The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility
for the effective execution of debt management policies.
Thus, the automatic appropriation of P86.8 Billion for debt service did not violate section 24 and 29(I) of
199
#100 Araullo v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Aquino, G.R. No.
209287, July 1, FACTS:
2014
ISSUE:
Topic Discussed: RULING:

Prohibitions
GR: transfer of
appropriation; EXC:
power of
augmentation
[Sec.25(5)]
Student Assigned:
--# 101 Demetria v. KEY POINTS :

Alba, G.R. No.
71977, February 27,
1987 FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the
Topic Discussed: constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the
Prohibitions "Budget Reform Decree of 1977".
GR: transfer of Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National
appropriation; EXC: Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest
power of common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayer... whose vital interests may be affected by the
augmentation outcome of the reliefs prayed for"
[Sec.25(5)] Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were allegedly
merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no... justiciable controversy fit for resolution
Student Assigned: or determination. He further contended that the provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to
Padrigao Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that at any rate, prohibition will not lie from... one
200
branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere
of responsibility.
Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss, setting forth as ground therefor the abrogation of
Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom
Constitution of March 25, 1986, which has allegedly rendered the instant petition moot and academic. He
likewise cited the "seven pillars" enunciated by Justice Brande is in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936)
[4] as basis for the petition's... dismissal.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Said paragraph 1
of Section 44 provides:
"The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department,... bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment."
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:.
"Sec. 16[5] No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the
Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized... to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the
1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of
the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility... In the use of public funds and resources, the
constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting
an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body
concerned.
The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were
specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made
only if there are savings from another item... in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional
body.
ISSUE:
constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the
"Budget Reform Decree of 1977".
201
RULING:
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void for being
unconstitutional.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under said Section
16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to... any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or
not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken,... or
whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It
does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes... beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
"For the love of money is the root of all evil: x x x" and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e. public
funds, provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently, was
foremost in the minds of the framers of the... constitution in meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the
appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release of money from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the... restrictions
on the use of public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an
item to another [Sec. 16(5)] and the requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all
safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the... expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts
all these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority
bestowed upon the President, "x x x Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment... of
unfunded appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for
budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well expand [sic]
public money not on the basis of development priorities but on... political and personal expediency."[5] The
contention of public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant to
Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.
202
--#102 KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
PHILCONSA v.
Enriquez, supra FACTS:

Prohibitions
GR: transfer of
appropriation; EXC: RULING:
power of
augmentation
[Sec.25(5)]
Student Assigned:
Silorio
--#103 Gonzales v. KEY POINTS :

Macaraig, supra
(read also the
dissents of JJ.
Gutierrez, Cruz and FACTS:
Padilla)

Prohibitions
GR: transfer of RULING:
appropriation; EXC:
power of
augmentation
[Sec.25(5)]
Student Assigned:
Tariao, John Mark
203
#104 Garcia v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Mata, G.R. No. L- FACTS:
33713, July 30, Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed an action for
1975 mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his rank and pay
emoluments.
Topic Discussed: Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is a violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion of
officers with at least 10 years of service.
against riders [Sec. On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or
25(2)] pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law
for 1956-57).
Student Assigned:
Tompong, Van John ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?
RULING:
NO, Section 11 of RA 1600 is unconstitutional.
Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 15 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines which provided that "No bill which may
be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to
any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11
refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of
reserve officers in the AFP.
Hence, it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in
violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a
new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA.
It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of
the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as
expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.
Hence, Section 11 of RA 1600 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.
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#105 Gonzales v. KEY POINTS :
Macaraig, supra FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino vetoed provisions in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1989 and 1990 –
Topic Discussed: Section 55 (Fiscal Year 1989) and Section 16 (Fiscal Year 1990).
against riders [Sec. The reason cited by President Aquino was that both provisions restrict or prevent the President, the Senate
25(2)] President, the Speaker of the House, the heads of the constitutional commissions and the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court from RESTORING OR INCREASING items of appropriation recommended by the
President, which recommendations have already been REDUCED OR DISAPPROVED by Congress
through the assailed GAAs. [In other words, these provisions prohibited the RESTORATION OR INCREASE
Student Assigned: via the power of augmentation (that is, using that savings from other items of appropriations) of an item of
Viarino, Mim appropriation that the President recommended but which Congress has DISAPPROVED OR REDCUED.]
In effect, these provisions nullify the statutory and constitutional authority of the aforesaid officials to
augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from savings in other items of their appropriations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President’s veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989 and Section 16 of the GAA of 1990—
both of which prohibited the RESTORATION or INCREASE via the power of augmentation (i.e., using the
savings from other items of appropriations) of an item of appropriation that the President recommended but
which Congress has disapproved or reduced—was unconstitutional
RULING:
No, the President’s veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989 and Section 16 of the GAA of the 1990 was NOT
unconstitutional.
Section 25(2) of the Constitution provides that “a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate
specifically to some ‘particular appropriation’ therein.
In this case, the vetoed provisions –Section 55 of Republic Act No. 6688, the GAA of 1989 and Section 16
of RA 6831, the GAA of 1990 –feel short of the requirement provided in Section 25(2), and were, therefore,
inappropriate provisions (riders).
Therefore, the President’s veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989 and Section 16 of the GAA of the 1990
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was NOT unconstitutional.
Additional Note: Subject provisions NOT beyond the President’s item-veto power under Section 27(1),
Article VI: Assuming arguendo that they were beyond the executive power to veto (for being NOT items of
appropriation), they were, nonetheless, NOT provisions in the budgetary sense of the term. (IMPLICATION:
They were unconstitutional riders); thus, the President may veto them for being INAPPROPRIATE
PROVISIONS.
**DISSENTING OPINION: (GUTIERREZ, JR., J.)

The provisions vetoed by the President were NOT inappropriate riders.
Here, there can be no dispute that Congress has the power to reduce the budgetary proposals prepared by the
Executive. If Congress abolishes, removes, or reduces a project, function, or activity by cutting the funds
proposed for it, a provision enforcing that abolition, removal, or reduction is appropriate and germane to the
part thus stricken out. It would be absurd to require that it should appear in separate legislation. In fact, the
vetoed provisions of the 1989 and 1990 Appropriation Acts are not only germane to these Acts but are
precisely authorized under Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. x x x As stated by the majority
opinion, the power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. When Congress exercises
that dormant power and by law authorizes these officials to augment items, certainly it has the power to also
state what items may not be augmented. I fail to see how the exercise of this power can be termed an
inappropriate rider.
#106 Aglipay v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Ruiz, G.R. No. L-
45459, March 13, FACTS:
1937 The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that he would order the issuance of
Topic Discussed: postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress celebration in the City
appropriation for of Manila. The said event was organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the
sectarian purpose petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is a
[Sec. 29(2) member of the Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the President. The said stamps in consideration were
actually issued already and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the
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stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress
RULING:
No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling the commemorative postage
stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which contemplates no religious purpose in view,
giving the Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the issuance of new postage stamps would be
“advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not
authorize the violation of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not
intended by Ruiz to favor a particular church or denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman
Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of
issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage of an international event considered to be a great
opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to the country. In
evaluating the design made for the stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines instead of showing a Catholic
chalice. The focus was on the location of the City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription that reads “Seat
XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In considering these, it is evident that there is
no violation of the Constitution therefore the act of the issuing of the stamps is constitutional.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.
#107 Garces v. KEY POINTS :

Estenzo, G.R. No.
L-53487, May 25,
1981
FACTS:
Topic Discussed: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
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appropriation for a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided
sectarian purpose for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the
[Sec. 29(2)] said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of
Student Assigned: San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his
successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saint’s
feast day.
These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was
temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio
Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s property since
church funds were used in its acquisition.
Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest
for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the
case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres
Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of
the constitution was violated.
ISSUE: WON BARANGAY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR PURCHASE OF SAINT'S

IMAGE WITH PRIVATE FUNDS IN CONNECTION WITH BARANGAY FIESTA,
CONSTITUTIONAL|
RULING:
NO.
Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some
religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of
worship and banning the use of public money or property.|||
Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional socio-
religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint
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of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the
construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained through the
"selling of tickets and cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge
religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was
purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular
matter. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the
patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with
religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the
image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing
unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity
intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot
be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is
an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the
masses.|||
#108 PHILCONSA KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
v. Enriquez, supra
FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
The “pork barrel” Congress passed the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) of 1994 which was was later signed into the
system General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1994 by the President specifying the provisions of the bill she vetoed
and on which he imposed certain conditions. Congress did not override such vetoes.
Student Assigned:
The petitioners filed a writ of prohibition to declare the GAA as unconstitutional and void on the following
Amac, Archie grounds:
(a) The President's line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover
provision/s;
(b) When the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto
power but should veto the entire bill;
(c) The item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that
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would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and,
(d) The power of augmentation provided under the Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore,
Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Did the Congress exceed its authority in the enactment of the 1994 GAA of 1994?
RULING:
No.Congress did not encroach on the Executive power when it proposed and identified projects and activities
to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund.
The Court held that under the Constitution, the “power of the purse” belongs to Congress subject only to the
veto power of the President. The President may propose the budget but the final say on the matter of
appropriations is settled with Congress. Such power carries with it the power to specify the project or activity
to be funded under the appropriation law. However, these proposals and identifications are merely
recommendatory for it is still the President who shall implement them.
#109 LAMP v. KEY POINTS :

Secretary, G.R. No.
2012 For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of
the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act
Topic Discussed: (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
The “pork barrel” Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together
system with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country, also sought
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Secretary
Student Assigned: of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) from making, and, thereafter, releasing budgetary
allocations to individual members of Congress as "pork barrel" funds out of PDAF. LAMP likewise aimed to
stop the National Treasurer and the Commission on Audit (COA) from enforcing the questioned provision.
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Special Provision
Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority programs and
projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreign-assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That
such amount shall be released directly to the implementing agency or Local Government Unit concerned:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein may be realigned to any expense class, if
deemed necessary: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the authorized
allocations by district may be used for procurement of rice and other basic commodities which shall be
purchased from the National Food Authority.
According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation
of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower
individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of
PDAF.
In its memorandum, LAMP insists that "[t]he silence in the law of direct or even indirect participation by
members of Congress betrays a deliberate intent on the part of the Executive and the Congress to scrap and
do away with the ‘pork barrel’ system." In other words, "[t]he omission of the PDAF provision to specify
sums as ‘allocations’ to individual Members of Congress is a ‘casus omissus’ signifying an omission
intentionally made by Congress that this Court is forbidden to supply." Hence, LAMP is of the conclusion
that "the pork barrel has become legally defunct under the present state of GAA 2004."
LAMP further decries the supposed flaws in the implementation of the provision, namely: 1) the DBM
illegally made and directly released budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favor of individual Members of
Congress; and 2) the latter do not possess the power to propose, select and identify which projects are to be
actually funded by PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and,
thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an
executive function.
For their part, the respondents contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual grounds. Although
they admit that PDAF traced its roots to CDF, they argue that the former should not be equated with "pork
barrel," which has gained a derogatory meaning referring "to government projects affording political
opportunism." In the petition, no proof of this was offered. It cannot be gainsaid then that the petition cannot
stand on inconclusive media reports, assumptions and conjectures alone. Without probative value, media
reports cited by the petitioner deserve scant consideration especially the accusation that corrupt legislators
have allegedly proposed cuts or slashes from their pork barrel.
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Issue/s:
1) WON the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case
2) WON the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress violates the doctrine of separation of
powers.
RULING:
Yes. The petition is subject for judicial review.
Anent locus standi, "the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."
In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as
citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the
Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the law’s
flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds.
Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of
unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause
injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords "ripeness" to the present controversy.
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in
taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
No. The congress did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature, subject to the
requirement that appropriation bills originate exclusively in the House of Representatives with the option of
the Senate to propose or concur with amendments. While the budgetary process commences from the
proposal submitted by the President to Congress, it is the latter which concludes the exercise by crafting an
appropriation act it may deem beneficial to the nation, based on its own judgment, wisdom and purposes.
Like any other piece of legislation, the appropriation act may then be susceptible to objection from the
branch tasked to implement it, by way of a Presidential veto. Thereafter, budget execution comes under the
212
domain of the Executive branch which deals with the operational aspects of the cycle including the allocation
and release of funds earmarked for various projects. Simply put, from the regulation of fund releases, the
implementation of payment schedules and up to the actual spending of the funds specified in the law, the
Executive takes the wheel. "The DBM lays down the guidelines for the disbursement of the fund. The
Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may
be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted
are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive." This demonstrates the power given
to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of
Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. Although the possibility of this unscrupulous
practice cannot be entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to
strike down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority granted the
Members of Congress to propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa. This remains as valid
case law. The Court sees no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case. So long
as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the
constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
#110 Belgica v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Executive
Secretary, supra
FACTS:
Topic Discussed: The NBI began its probe into allegations that the government has been defrauded by a syndicate using funds
from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects. The
The “pork barrel” investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation
213
system (Janet Lim Naples) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for ghost projects using dummy
Student Assigned: NGOs. Thus, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Whistle-blowers alleged
that at least P900 Million from the royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas projects off Palawan
province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were
lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional
RULING:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the
following principles:
a. Separation of Powers.
Since the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The
executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of.
Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that,
after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF
funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle
of separation of powers. This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will
still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. That being, legislative power cannot be
delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
214
Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged
in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the
power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances.
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that
once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his
PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy.
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the House of Representatives,
what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied
in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system
but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid. The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential
pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution
which provides: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.” Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related
ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance
energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct; (ii) PD 1869, as
215
amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund
(the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects. These are sufficient
laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation
contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in
the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

v. Enriquez, supra
FACTS:
Topic Discussed: This Court is called upon to rule on the conflicting claims of authority between the Legislative and the
The concept of Executive in the clash of their powers. The focus for the contest between the President and the Congress over
impoundment control of the national budget are the four cases at bench. Judicial intervention is being sought by a group of
concerned taxpayers on the claim that Congress and the President have impermissibly exceeded their
Student Assigned: respective authorities, and by several Senators on the claim that the President has committed grave abuse of
discretion or acted without jurisdiction in the exercise of his veto power.
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by
both houses of Congress.
As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget
previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify
projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress
presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
The President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663,
entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994).
On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill
he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done
through the 1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic,
are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as
216
reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law
(R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the
Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the
release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the
“Specific Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization Fund “shall not be used for payment of six
(6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers”
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity
funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.
ISSUE: WON the directive of the President that the deactivation of CAFGU should be done in accordance to
his timetable was tantamount to an administrative embargo of the congressional will to implement the
Constitution's command to dissolve the CAFGU's arguing that the President cannot impair or withhold
expenditures authorized and appropriated by Congress when neither the Appropriations Act nor other
legislation authorize such impounding.
RULING:
No.
Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by
Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type.
Those who deny to the President the power to impound argue that once Congress has set aside the fund for a
specific purpose in an appropriations act, it becomes mandatory on the part of the President to implement the
project and to spend the money appropriated therefor. the President has no discretion on the matter, for the
Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute the laws.
217
In refusing or deferring the implementation of an appropriation item, the President in effect exercises a veto
power that is not expressly granted by the Constitution. As a matter of fact, the Constitution does not say
anything about impounding. The source of the Executive authority must be found elsewhere.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the authority of the President.
Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second is the
executive power drawn from the President's role as Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution
Clause which ironically is the same provisions invoked by petitioners herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President desist from
implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An example given is when through
efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly
to expect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law.
We do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that
Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate
11,000 CAFGU members all at one in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the
proper vehicle for such a purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law
considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation
of the CAFGU to be amended. Again we state: a provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal
or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758
--#112 Tolentino v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Secretary of
Finance, supra The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation. [Section 28 (1), Article VI, Constitution]

- House of Rep. filed House Bill 11197 (An Act Restructuring the VAT System to Widen its Tax Base
Rule in taxation: and Enhance its Admin., Amending for these Purposes…)
uniformity (as - Upon receipt of Senate, Senate filed another bill completely different from that of the House Bill
opposed to equal), - Senate finished debates on the bill and had the 2nd and 3rd reading of the Bill on the same day
equitability, and - Bill was deliberated upon in the Conference Committee and become enrolled bill which eventually
218
progressiveness became the EVAT law.
[Sec. 28(1)] - PPI contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those
Student Assigned: granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 impairs the
Manaig, Fatima obligations of contracts, and violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress
shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation”.
- CUP argues that legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives
that the present Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT
would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7716 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
No, RA 7716 is not unconstitutional.
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation. [Section 28 (1), Article VI, Constitution]. Regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to
enforce. What Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to “evolve a progressive system of taxation.”
This is a directive to Congress, just like the directive to it to give priority of the enactment of law for the
enhancement of human dignity. The provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation,
not as judicially enforceable rights. Progressive system of taxation v. regressive system of taxation;
• A progressive system of taxation means that tax laws shall place emphasis on direct taxes rather than on
indirect taxes, with ability to pay as the principal criterion.
• A regressive system of taxation exists when there are more indirect taxes imposed than direct taxes.
• No regressive taxes in the Philippine jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to
which other businesses have long ago been subject. The VAT is not a license tax. It is imposed purely for
revenue purposes. Equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of
the same class be taxed at the same rate. It is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all
persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar situation.
Therefore, RA 7716 is not unconstitutional.
--#113 Abakada KEY POINTS :

Guro v. Ermita,
219
G.R. No. 168056, The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
September 1, 2005 taxation. [Section 28 (1), Article VI, Constitution]
(decision) Section 8, amending Section 110 (B) of the NIRC, imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be
credited against the output tax.
Rule in taxation: Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition
uniformity (as for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
opposed to equal), amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4
equitability, and imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of
progressiveness goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These
[Sec. 28(1)] questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have
Student Assigned: been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.
Manaig, Fatima Hereafter, a petition for prohibition was filed on June 29, 2005, by the Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers,
Inc., et al., assailing the following provisions of R.A. No. 9337:
1) Section 8, amending Section 110 (A)(2) of the NIRC, requiring that the input tax on depreciable goods
shall be amortized over a 60-month period, if the acquisition, excluding the VAT components, exceeds One
Million Pesos (₱1, 000,000.00);
2) Section 8, amending Section 110 (B) of the NIRC, imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be
credited against the output tax; and
3) Section 12, amending Section 114 (c) of the NIRC, authorizing the Government or any of its political
subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including GOCCs, to deduct a 5% final withholding tax on gross
payments of goods and services, which are subject to 10% VAT under Sections 106 (sale of goods and
properties) and 108 (sale of services and use or lease of properties) of the NIRC.
Petitioners contend that these provisions are unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive, excessive, and
confiscatory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 70% limit is anything but progressive, violative of Article VI, Section 28(1) of the
Constitution.
RULING:
No, it is not violative.
220
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 110(B) of the NIRC imposes a limitation on the amount of
input tax that may be credited against the output tax. It states, in part: "[P]rovided, that the input tax inclusive
of the input VAT carried over from the previous quarter that may be credited in every quarter shall not
exceed seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: …"
Input Tax is defined under Section 110(A) of the NIRC, as amended, as the value-added tax due from or paid
by a VAT-registered person on the importation of goods or local purchase of good and services, including
lease or use of property, in the course of trade or business, from a VAT-registered person, and Output Tax is
the value-added tax due on the sale or lease of taxable goods or properties or services by any person
registered or required to register under the law.
In the case at bar, petitioners claim that the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input tax
that may be claimed. In effect, a portion of the input tax that has already been paid cannot now be credited
against the output tax.
Petitioners’ argument is not absolute. It assumes that the input tax exceeds 70% of the output tax, and
therefore, the input tax in excess of 70% remains uncredited. However, to the extent that the input tax is less
than 70% of the output tax, then 100% of such input tax is still creditable.
More importantly, the excess input tax, if any, is retained in a business’s books of accounts and remains
creditable in the succeeding quarter/s. This is explicitly allowed by Section 110(B), which provides that "if
the input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters." In
addition, Section 112(B) allows a VAT-registered person to apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate
or refund for any unused input taxes, to the extent that such input taxes have not been applied against the
output taxes. Such unused input tax may be used in payment of his other internal revenue taxes.
The non-application of the unutilized input tax in a given quarter is not ad infinitum, as petitioners
exaggeratedly contend. Their analysis of the effect of the 70% limitation is incomplete and one-sided. It ends
at the net effect that there will be unapplied/unutilized inputs VAT for a given quarter. It does not proceed
further to the fact that such unapplied/unutilized input tax may be credited in the subsequent periods as
allowed by the carry-over provision of Section 110(B) or that it may later on be refunded through a tax credit
certificate under Section 112(B).
On the other hand, it appears that petitioner Garcia failed to comprehend the operation of the 70% limitation
on the input tax. According to petitioner, the limitation on the creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-
registered establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, which violates the principle that tax
collection and revenue should be for public purposes and expenditures
As earlier stated, the input tax is the tax paid by a person, passed on to him by the seller, when he buys
goods. Output tax meanwhile is the tax due to the person when he sells goods. In computing the VAT
221
payable, three possible scenarios may arise:
First, if at the end of a taxable quarter the output taxes charged by the seller are equal to the input taxes that
he paid and passed on by the suppliers, then no payment is required;
Second, when the output taxes exceed the input taxes, the person shall be liable for the excess, which has to
be paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);69 and
Third, if the input taxes exceed the output taxes, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or
quarters. Should the input taxes result from zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transactions, any excess over
the output taxes shall instead be refunded to the taxpayer or credited against other internal revenue taxes, at
the taxpayer’s option.70
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337 however, imposed a 70% limitation on the input tax. Thus, a person can credit
his input tax only up to the extent of 70% of the output tax. In layman’s term, the value-added taxes that a
person/taxpayer paid and passed on to him by a seller can only be credited up to 70% of the value-added
taxes that is due to him on a taxable transaction. There is no retention of any tax collection because the
person/taxpayer has already previously paid the input tax to a seller, and the seller will subsequently remit
such input tax to the BIR. The party directly liable for the payment of the tax is the seller.71 What only needs
to be done is for the person/taxpayer to apply or credit these input taxes, as evidenced by receipts, against his
output taxes.
Therefore, the petitioners issue that the 70% limit is anything but progressive, violative of Article VI, Section
28(1) of the Constitution is not meritorious and is not violative to the Constitution.
--#114 Abakada KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Guro v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 168056, The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
September 1, 2005 taxation. [Section 28 (1), Article VI, Constitution]
(decision) Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,provides:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and may impose, tariff
Topic Discussed: rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
GR: Non- framework of the national development program of the government.
delegability of FACTS:
power of taxation; Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition
222
EXC: power to for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
tariff rates, import amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4
and export quotas, imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of
tonnage and goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These
wharfage dues, and questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the
other duties or Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have
imposts may, by been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.
law be delegated to Petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is a virtual
the President [Sec. abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not within the purview of
28(2)] Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution
ISSUE:
Student Assigned: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the
Manaig, Fatima Constitution.
RULING:
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law.
The general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following recognized limitations or
exceptions:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when
it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex
economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment
of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The
legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact
or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of
the control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the
word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a
statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.Where the law is clear
223
and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it
that the mandate is obeyed.
Therefore, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law.
--#115 Lladoc v. KEY POINTS :

Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, Facts:
G.R. No. L-19201, Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin
June 16, 1965 Ruiz, then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of herein petitioner, for the
construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose
Topic Discussed: intended. On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor’s gift tax return. Under date of
to religious, April 29, 1960, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for donee’s gift tax
charitable and against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax
educational amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges, interests of 1% monthly from May 15, 1958 to June 15, 1960,
institutions [Sec. 28 and the compromise for the late filing of the return. Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment and
(3)] requested the withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion for reconsideration presented to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals on
Student Assigned: November 2, 1960. In the petition for review, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc claimed, among others, that at
Manaig, Fatima the time of the donation, he was not the parish priest in Victorias; that there is no legal entity or juridical
person known as the “Catholic Parish Priest of Victorias,” and, therefore, he should not be liable for the
donee’s gift tax. It was also asserted that the assessment of the gift tax, even against the Roman Catholic
Church, would not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of the provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is liable for the assessed donee’s gift tax on the donated for the construction of the
Victorias Parish Church.
RULING:
Yes, the petitioner is liable for the assessed donee’s gift tax on the donated for the construction of the
Exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
224
buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the
payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra distinguished from
excise taxes.
In the present case, what the Collector assessed was a donee’s gift tax; the assessment was not on the
properties themselves. It did not rest upon general ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the
properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties (Phipps vs. Com. of Int. Rec. 91 F
2d 627). Manifestly, gift tax is not within the exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift tax
is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the
imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment
of the Constitution. As well observed by the learned respondent Court, the phrase “exempt from taxation,” as
employed in the Constitution (supra) should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes.
And there being no clear, positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the
exemption herein must be denied.
Therefore, the petitioner is liable for the assessed donee’s gift tax on the donated for the construction of the
--#116 Lung Center KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
v. Quezon City,
G.R. No. 144104, FACTS:
June 29, 2004
The petitioner files a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Topic Discussed: The petitioner is a non-stock and non-profit entity established on January 16, 1981 and a registered
to religious, owner of a parcel of land located at Quezon Avenue corner Elliptical Road, Central District, Quezon City.
charitable and Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines. A big
educational space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small store spaces, and to medical
institutions [Sec. 28 or professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics for their patients whom they charge for
(3)] their professional services. Almost one-half of the entire area on the left side of the building along Quezon
Avenue is vacant and idle, while a big portion on the right side, at the corner of Quezon Avenue and
Student Assigned: Elliptical Road, is being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise.
Manaig On June 7, 1993, both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were assessed for real
225
property taxes in the amount of P4,554,860 by the City Assessor of Quezon City. On August 25, 1993, the
petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption that it is a charitable institution. The petitioners request was denied,
and a petition was, thereafter, filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-
LBAA) for reversal. The petitioner alleged that under Section 28, paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the
property is exempt from real property taxes. It averred that a minimum of 60% of its hospital beds are
exclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity
patients. The petitioner contends that it is a charitable institution and, as such, is exempt from real property
taxes. The QC-LBAA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and holding the petitioner liable for real
property taxes.
The QC-LBAAs decision was, likewise, affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals of Quezon City (CBAA) which ruled that the petitioner was not a charitable institution and that its
real properties were not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes; hence, it was not
entitled to real property tax exemption under the constitution and the law. The petitioner sought relief from
the Court of Appeals, which rendered judgment affirming the decision of the CBAA.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and the 1973 and 1987
Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160.
2.Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.
RULING:
1.The Court ruled that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987
Constitution.
Under PD No. 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the provisions
of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President with the Ministry of Health and the
Ministry of Human Settlements. The purpose for which it was created was to render medical services to the
public in general including those who are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity. Under
Presidential Decree No. 1823, petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even if the gift or donation is in the
form of subsidies granted by the government.
2.Partly No. The petition was partly granted. The respondent Quezon City Assessor was directed to
determine the precise portions of the land and the area thereof which are leased to private persons, and to
compute the real property taxes due thereon as provided for by law.
Under PD No. 1823, the petitioner does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its real
properties as well as the building constructed thereon.The property tax exemption under Section 28(3),
Article VI of the Constitution is for the property taxes only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of
226
RA No. 7160 which provides that in order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner must be able to
prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for
charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt from
real property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.
#117 NPC v. KEY POINTS :

Province of Lanao
del Sur, G.R. No. Art. VI, sec. 28(4) provides that, “No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
96700, November concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.”
19, 1996
FACTS:
Topic Discussed: Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) is the owner of certain real properties situated in
needs concurrence Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur, more particularly described in Tax Declarations issued by the Office of the
of majority of all Provincial Assessor of Lanao del Sur. Said properties comprise petitioner's Agus II Hydroelectric Power
members (absolute Plant Complex. Petitioner was assessed real estate taxes on said properties in the amount of one hundred fifty
majority) of four million one hundred fourteen thousand eight hundred fifty four pesos and eighty two centavos
Congress [Sec. (P154,114,854.82) covering the period from June 14, 1984 to December 31, 1989, allegedly because
28(4)] petitioner's exemption from realty taxes had been withdrawn.
Two demand letters was sent by respondent provincial treasurer to the petitioner for the payment of real
Student Assigned: property taxes due on the properties. With the second demand letter issuing a warning that unless the
Gloria obligation was settled, legal remedies would be resorted to by the respondent province.
On December 14, 1990, a Notice of Auction (Sale) covering the subject properties was served on petitioner.
A copy of said notice was posted for one month from December 17, 1990 to January 17, 1991 at the main
entrance of the provincial capitol building in Marawi City and at the plant site in Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur. It
was also published in the issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and of the Lake Lanao Times in various
dates.
The auction sale was scheduled to be held at 10:00 A.M. of January 22, 1991 at the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer in Marawi City.
On January 18, 1991, petitioner filed directly with the Court the instant petition for prohibition with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On January 21, 1991, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from proceeding with and conducting the auction
227
sale of the subject properties.
The auction sale was however held as scheduled with the Province of Lanao del Sur as the sole bidder. A
certificate of sale was immediately issued and registered with the Register of Deeds of the province at 1:30
p.m. of the same day.
At 2:30 and 3:00 p.m. of the same day, respondents provincial governor and provincial treasurer respectively
received telegraphic notices of this Court's restraining order.
Respondents submitted their comment on February 14, 1991 to which petitioner filed its reply on April 29,
1991. Rejoinder was submitted on October 25, 1993. Thereafter, the Court gave due course to the petition
and the parties thus filed their respective memoranda.
ISSUE:
1. WON petitioner has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges, including its exemption from
payment of real property taxes.
2. WON respondent province and provincial officials can validly and lawfully assess real property taxes for
the period June 14, 1984 to December 31, 1989 against, and thereafter sell at public auction, the subject
properties of petitioner to effect collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such taxes.
RULING:
It cannot then be successfully argued that petitioner's tax-exempt status was revoked in 1977 by PD 1177.
Besides, repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed, unless it is manifest that the
legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with It cannot then be successfully argued that
petitioner's tax-exempt status was revoked in 1977 by PD 1177. Besides, repeals by implication are not
favored, and will not be decreed, unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed
to be passed with
1. Although Section 1 of PD 1931 withdrew all tax exemptions presumably including those of petitioner,
Section 2 thereof authorized and empowered the President and/or the Minister of Finance to restore the same
to deserving entities. In order to reinstate the petitioner's tax exemptions, Hon. De Roda, Jr., in his
concurrent capacities as Acting Minister of Finance and as Acting Chairman of FIRB, signed FIRB
Resolution No. 10-85 which was made effective as of June 11, 1984, the promulgation date of PD 1931, until
June 30, 1985. On the other hand, by virtue of FIRB Resolution No. 1-86, Hon. Virata fully restored the tax
exemption as of July 1, 1985, to continue for an indefinite period. He also signed the same in his dual
capacities as Minister of Finance and as Chairman of the FIRB. The resolution specifically provided that:
2. The NPC as a government corporation is exempt from the real property tax on land and improvements
228
owned by it . . . pursuant to the provisions of Section 40 (a) of the Real Property Tax Code, as amended.
While EO 93 again withdrew the tax exemption of petitioner, through its Section 1, as follows:
Sec. 1. The provisions of any general or special law to the contrary notwithstanding, all tax and duty
incentives granted to government and private entities are hereby withdrawn, except:
xxx xxx xxx
f) those approved by the President upon the recommendation of the Fiscal Incentives Review Board.
nevertheless, it also stated:
Sec. 2. The Fiscal Incentives Review Board created under PD 776, as amended, is hereby authorized to:
(a) restore tax and/or duty exemptions withdrawn hereunder in whole or in part; (emphasis supplied)
Pursuant thereto, FIRB Resolution No. 17-87 restored the tax exemption privileges of the petitioner effective
March 10, 1987. Again, the resolution was signed by De Roda, Jr. in his dual capacities as Acting Secretary
of Finance and as Chairman, FIRB. This resolution was confirmed and approved by then Acting Executive
Secretary Macaraig, by the authority of the President.
Considering the entire chain of events, it is clear that petitioner's tax exemptions for the period in question
(1984-1989) had effectively been preserved intact by virtue of their restoration through FIRB resolutions.
There can thus be no question that petitioner's tax exemptions withdrawn by PD 1931 were validly restored
by FIRB Resolutions Nos. 10-85 and 1-86. Again withdrawn by EO 93, they were once more restored by
FIRB Resolution No. 17-87, effective as of March 10, 1987. Moreover, this Court, in the same case of
Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr., reaffirmed the determination in Albay that EO 93 along with PDs 776 and were
1931 were all valid, and that FIRB Resolution No. 17-87 and the tax exemptions restored thereunder were
"valid and effective." The Court in Maceda also held —
True it is that the then Secretary of Justice in Opinion No. 77, dated August 6, 1977 was of the view that the
powers conferred upon the FIRB by Sections 2(a), (b), (c) and (d) of Executive Order No. 93 constitute
undue delegation of legislative power and is therefore unconstitutional. However, he was overruled by the
respondent Executive Secretary in a letter to the Secretary of Finance dated March 30, 1989. The Executive
Secretary, by authority of the President, has the power to modify, alter or reverse the construction of a statute
given by a department secretary.
and laid emphasis on the fact that EO 93 constituted a valid delegation of legislative power to the FIRB,
thus:
The latest in our jurisprudence indicates that delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its
non-delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of modern life and many technical
fields of governmental functions as in matters pertaining to tax exemptions. This is coupled by the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of
229
society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot
be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of
the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let
alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
The inescapable conclusion is that the tax exemption privileges of petitioner had been validly restored and
preserved by said FIRB resolutions.
The Court has consistently held that "(r)epeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed,
unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation
and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a
statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to same matter, unless the
repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing
necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or
unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed. Hence, every effort must be used to
make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not
operate as a repeal of the earlier."
2.
Main Issue: Subject Properties Exempt From Realty Taxes
The Court held that the exemption is not only legally defensible, but also logically unassailable. The
properties in question comprise the site of the entire Agus II Hydroelectric Power Plant Complex, which
generates and supplies relatively cheap electricity to the island of Mindanao. These are government
properties, wholly owned by petitioner and devoted directly and solely for public service and utilized in the
implementation of the state policy of bringing about the total electrification of the country at the least cost to
the public, through the development of power from all sources to meet the needs of industrial development
and rural electrification. It can be noted, from RA 6395, PD 380 and PD 938, that petitioner's non-profit
character has been maintained throughout its existence, and that petitioner is mandated to devote all its
returns from capital investment and excess revenues from operations to its expansion. On account thereof,
and to enable petitioner to pay its indebtedness and obligations and in furtherance of the state policy on
electrification and power generation, petitioner has always been exempted from taxes.
Consequently, the assessment and levy on (as well as the sale of) the properties of petitioner by respondents
were null and void for having been in made in violation of Section 10 of P.D. 938 and Section 40 (a) of the
Real Property Tax Code.
The Court hastened to point out that the foregoing ruling is solely with respect to the purported realty tax
liabilities of petitioner for the period from June 14, 1984 to December 31, 1989. The Court, in this Decision,
230
however, did not rule upon the effect (if any) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, upon petitioner's tax-exempt status; it merely make mention of the fact that the
exemption claimed by petitioner is partly based on PD 464 which, though repealed by the Local Government
Code in its paragraph (c), Section 534, Title Four of Book IV, was still good law during the period the
exemption was being claimed in the instant case.
Nullity of the Auction Sale of Petitioner's Properties
Inasmuch as the realty tax assessment levied against and auction sale of petitioner's properties had been
premised on respondents' erroneous belief that FIRB Resolutions Nos. 10-85, 1-86 and 17-87 are void, the
judicial declaration of the validity of said resolutions ipso jure renders such assessment and sale void.
The assessment of realty tax being void, petitioner never became delinquent in the payment of said taxes to
respondent province, and the latter never acquired any right to sell nor to purchase the said properties at
auction. In short, there were never any taxes, delinquent or otherwise, to satisfy. This is borne out by Section
65 of the Real Property Tax Code, by virtue of which respondent Provincial Treasurer was authorized to sell
real property at auction:
Sec. 65. Notice of delinquency in the payment of the real property tax. — Upon the real property tax or any
installment thereof becoming delinquent, the provincial or city treasurer shall immediately cause notice of
the fact to be posted . . .
Such notice shall specify the date upon which the tax became delinquent, and shall state . . . that unless the
tax and penalties be paid before the expiration of the year for which the tax is due, or the tax shall have been
judicially set aside, the entire delinquent real property will be sold at public auction, and that thereafter the
full title to the property will be and remain with the purchaser, subject only to the right of the delinquent
taxpayer or any other person in his behalf to redeem the sold property within one year from the date of sale.
As clearly spelled out above, the power to sell at public auction is premised on the real property tax or any
portion thereof first becoming delinquent. The properties in this case being exempt from payment of realty
taxes, no such delinquency was possible to begin with.
Further, Section 73 of the Real Property Tax Code, as amended, excludes properties of the petitioner from
advertisement of real properties to be sold at public auction. Section 73 provides in part:
Sec. 73. Advertisement of sale of real property at public auction. — After the expiration of the year for
which the tax is due, the province or city treasurer shall advertise the sale at public auction of the entire
delinquent real property, except real property mentioned in subsection (a) of Section forty hereof , to satisfy
all the taxes and penalties due and the costs of sale. . . .
The fact that the telegraphic temporary restraining order issued by this Court was received by the respondent
governor of Lanao del Sur at 2:30 p.m. and by respondent provincial treasurer at 3:00 p.m. of January 22,
231
1991, or an hour and an hour and a half, respectively, after the registration of the sale with the Register of
Deeds of the province, and several hours after the close of the auction sale, is of no moment. Ordinarily, this
Court would have been overjoyed to hear about said Register of Deeds (or any government functionary for
that matter) moving with blinding speed, except that in this case, it is more than patent that such precipitate
action was prompted not in the least by respondents' anticipation that this Court was about to act on
petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The
respondents' all-too-obvious attempt at rendering nugatory and inutile any injunctive relief this Court may
grant is useless and brings them only rebuke and condemnation. Clearly, legally and equitably rooted in and
proceeding from the foregoing discussion is the ineludible conclusion that the auction sale and registration of
subject properties are totally bereft of any legal basis and therefore null and void, and cannot vest title over
the said real properties nor the hydroelectric power plant complex built upon them, in favor of respondent
province.
C. Power of Legislative Inquiry and Question Hour (Sec. 21 & 22)

#118 In re Camilo KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
L. Sabio, G.R. No.
174340, October 17, Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be
2006 countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption.
Topic Discussed:
Who exercises
power FACTS:
Student Assigned: Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG was invited as one of the resource persons in the public meeting for
Manguilimotan, the investigation of the anomalous losses incurred by the POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC due to the alleged
Ritchie improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. Sabio refused to appear invoking
Sec. 4(b) of Executive Order (EO) No. 1 issued by former President Corazon Aquino, which exempts all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding. Hence, he
was arrested for contempt of the Senate. Because of this, Sabio filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging
that the respondent Senate committees disregarded Section 4(b) of EO No. 1.
232
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 4(b) of EO No. 1, which limits the Senate’s power to conduct legislative inquiry, has
been repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
YES. Section 4(b) of EO No. 1 is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution. Section
4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress' power
of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and
officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this
class.
In this case, certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress,
in the absence of any constitutional basis.The Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is "the basic and
paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials
of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the
Constitution." Consequently, the Court has no recourse but to declare Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by
the 1987 Constitution.
Hence, the Senate’s power to conduct legislative inquiry, has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
#119: Senate v. KEY POINTS :

Ermita, G.R. No.
169777, April 20, Congress has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If
2006 the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must assert it and state
233
Topic Discussed: the reason therefore and why it must be respected.
Persons covered
FACTS:
Student Assigned:
Manguilimotan, The Senate invited several executive officials as resource speakers for public hearings involving the alleged
Ritchie overpricing of the North Rail Projects and the massive electoral fraud in the presidential elections of May
2005. Thereafter, the President issued Executive Order No. (EO) 464 which requires that all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of Congress. Because of the EO, many of those who were invited were not
able to go to the inquiry because of lack of approval from the President. Hence, the Senate of the Philippines
filed a petition to the Supreme Court to question the validity of EO 464.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 464 is void on the ground that it contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
RULING:
Sections 2(b) and 3 of EO 464 are void while sections 1 and 2 (a) are valid.
Congress has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must
assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected.
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all officials mentioned in Sec. 2 (b) to obtain the consent of the
president before they can appear before congress. This enumeration is broad and when the officials
concerned invoke this as a basis for not attending the inquiries there is already an implied claim of privilege.
Executive privilege is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories
of person.
In this case, Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are void because they are too broad and would
frustrate the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation because it allows the executive
branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and
234
or pro-offering its reasons therefore.
Hence, EO 464 is void on the ground that it contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
--#120 Senate v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Ermita, G.R. No.
2006
Scope – GR: any
matter relevant to
the intended RULING:
legislation; EXC:
executive privilege
Student Assigned:
Lim, Jan Clyd
#121 Akbayan v. KEY POINTS :

Aquino, G.R. No.
170516, July 16, While the Court should guard against the abuse of executive privilege, it should also give full recognition to
2008 the validity of the privilege whenever it is claimed within the proper bounds of executive power.
Topic Discussed:
Scope – GR: any FACTS:
matter relevant to
the intended Petitioners sought to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
legislation; EXC: Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process
executive privilege and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
Student Assigned: Petitioners asserted that the refusal of the government to disclose the documents bearing on the JPEPA
235
Manguilimotan, negotiations violates their right to information on matters of public concern and contravenes other
Ritchie constitutional provisions on transparency, such as that on the policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest. Respondents only claimed that from the nature of the JPEPA as an
international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern and that diplomatic negotiations are covered
by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the
policy of full public disclosure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered by the
doctrine of executive privilege.
RULING:
YES. The information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered by the doctrine of
executive privilege.
It is well-established in jurisprudence that neither the right to information nor the policy of full public
disclosure is absolute, there being matters which, albeit of public concern or public interest, are recognized
as privileged in nature.The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this
jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held
that information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements
may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest. Even earlier, the same privilege was
upheld in Peoples Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapus wherein the Court discussed the
reasons for the privilege in more precise terms.
In PMPF v. Manglapus, the petitioners were seeking information from the President's representatives on
the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the
petition, stressing that secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional
provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information. Verily, while the
236
Court should guard against the abuse of executive privilege, it should also give full recognition to the
validity of the privilege whenever it is claimed within the proper bounds of executive power, as in this case.
Otherwise, the Court would undermine its own credibility, for it would be perceived as no longer aiming to
strike a balance, but seeking merely to water down executive privilege to the point of irrelevance.
Hence, the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered by the
doctrine of executive privilege.
#122 Neri v. Senate KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Committee, supra
Topic Discussed: The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation extends even to executive officials and the
only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.
Scope – GR: any
matter relevant to
the intended FACTS:
legislation; EXC:
executive privilege Petitioner Romulo Neri, as the former Director of NEDA, was invited by the respondent Senate Committees
Student Assigned: to appear and testify on matters involving the controversial ZTE-NBN deal. Neri testified that he was
Manguilimotan, offered a bribe to accept the deal, but did not accept such as instructed by the President. When he was further
Ritchie asked on the details of the matters he discussed with the President about the NBN Project, Neri, invoking
executive privilege, refused to answer particularly three questions: (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve. When called again to testify in another hearing, Neri refused upon orders of the
President, invoking executive privilege. Thus, he was arrested for contempt of the Senate.
ISSUE:
Whether the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege.
RULING:
237
Yes, the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of
the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the
President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the
proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct thereto is
the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is
imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that
the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected. The power extends even to
executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.
Hence, the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions are covered by executive
privilege.
--#123 Romero v. KEY POINTS :

Estrada, G.R. No.
174105, April 2,
2009
FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
Scope – GR: any
matter relevant to
238
the intended ISSUE:
legislation; EXC:
executive privilege
Student Assigned:
Manguilimotan, RULING:
Ritchie
--#124 Garcillano v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
House of
Representatives FACTS:
Committees, G.R.
No. 170338, ISSUE:
December 23, 2008
Topic Discussed:
Governing rules – RULING:
duly published rules
of procedure of
either House
Student Assigned:
#125 De la Paz v. KEY POINTS :

Senate, G.R. No. FACTS:
184849, February October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to attend an Interpol
13, 2009 GA. De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled GA, de la Paz is also scheduled to
retire.
Topic Discussed: After the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the departure area for he was carrying with him €105,000.00
Governing rules – (P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him €45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00).
duly published rules He failed to declare in writing that he is carrying such an amount and this is in violation of the United
of procedure of Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
239
either House Organized Crime.
De La Paz and his group were later released but the €s were confiscated by the Russians. Upon arrival in the
Student Assigned: Philippines, De La Paz was issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the
Tompong, Van John investigation it was to conduct involving the Moscow incident.
De La Paz averred that the said committee does not have jurisdiction of the case. De La Paz argued that the
Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve
state to state relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
(Senate Rules).
They further claim that the respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant
of arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of the respondent Committee.
They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as required by the
Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation involving them relative to the
Moscow incident.
ISSUE:
Whether the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter.
RULING:
YES, the said committee has jurisdiction over the matter.
Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: “Each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings.”
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of
Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. The challenge to the jurisdiction of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to
inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a
political question. Also, the signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by the approval of the Senate
president and it is shown that the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with the Rules. It is also shown
that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation were also published in two newspapers
of general circulation.
Hence, the said committee has jurisdiction over the matter.
240
--#126 Senate v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Ermita, supra
FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
Basic limitation – ISSUE:
rights of persons
appearing in, or
affected by, such RULING:
inquiries shall be
respected
Student Assigned:
Viarino, Mim
#127 In Re Camilo KEY POINTS :

L. Sabio, supra
Topic Discussed:
Power of legislative FACTS:
inquiry under §21 Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455(Senate Res. No. 455),
repeals inconsistent "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
provisions of law Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
Student Assigned: PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Aguilar, KR Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.
Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo
L. Sabio of the
PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting
jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on
Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455. However,
Chairman Sabio refused to appear, invoking Section 4(b) of EO No., provided as follows:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial
241
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of EO No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution?
RULING:
Yes. Section 4(b) of EO No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff information
and other data in aid of its power to legislate. A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not
within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.
Significantly, Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or Revoked.
The clear import of this provision is that all existing laws, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and
other executive issuances inconsistent or repugnant to the Constitution are repealed.
The Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must
conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be
valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution. Consequently, this Court has no
recourse but to declare Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
F. Emergency powers clause [Sec. 23(2)
242
--#128 David v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Arroyo, supra
FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
Declaration of ISSUE:
state of emergency
vs. actual exercise
of emergency RULING:
powers
Student Assigned:
--#129 Araneta v. KEY POINTS :

Dinglasan, G.R. No.
L-2044, August 26,
1949 (NOTE:
OUTDATED) FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
Duration of ISSUE:
emergency powers:
as Congress RULING:
provides; Congress
may withdraw
power by mere
resolution at any
time; by operation
of law upon the next
adjournment of
Congress
Student Assigned:
243
#130 Rodriguez v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Gella, G.R. No. L-
6266, February 2, FACTS:
1953 (NOTE:
OUTDATED) On August 26, 1949, this court had already passed upon the status of Commonwealth Act No. 671,
Topic Discussed: approved on
Duration of December 16, 1949. Five members held that the Act ceased to be operative in its totality when the Congress
emergency powers: convened in special session. Herein, petitioners seek to invalidate EO Nos. 545 and 546 appropriating the
as Congress sum of
provides; Congress 37,850, 500 for urgent and essential public works and setting aside the sum of 11, 367, 600 for relief from
may withdraw typhoons, floods, and other calamities. Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but was
power by mere vetoed by the President.
resolution at any
time; by operation ISSUE:
of law upon the next
adjournment of Whether or not EO 545 and 546 are still operative.
Congress
RULING:
Student Assigned:
Arcenal, Cristina S. Act 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency whereby the consent of the agent is necessary
only in the
sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust. In the same way, the principal cannot be forced to keep
the relation in eternity or the will of the agent.
The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the power lasted only during the
emergency resulting from the last world war.
That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was contemplated by
the members of the National Assembly.
244
Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President should be allowed to exercise emergency
powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people because we
have the Constitution designed to establish a government under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,
and since our government is based on the system of separation of powers. Wherefore, EO Nos. 545 and 546
are declared null and void.
-END-
245

The Legislative Power

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The Legislative Power

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TOPIC: ARTICLE VI .

THE LEGISLATIVE POWER

Topic Discussed: ISSUE:

Student Assigned: RULING:

#2 Case Title: KEY POINTS :

Student Assigned: ISSUE:

DEADLINE: OCTOBER 24, 2021 12:00 NOON

POWER OF CONGRESS IN GENERAL

No, it is not within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate “decrees”

#2 David v. Ople KEY POINTS :

Topic Discussed: FACTS:

#4 BANAT v. KEY POINTS :

1. WON political parties may participate in the partylist elections. (YES)

#6 BANAT v. KEY POINTS :

Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional

How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?

#8 Ang Ladlad KEYPOINTS

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a legal basis for delisting PGBI.

No. There is no legal basis for delisting PGBI.

#10 : Abayon v. KEY POINTS :

#12 Magdalo Para sa KEY POINTS :

Topic Discussed: FACTS:

WHETHER OR NOT ANG LADLAD IS ELIGIBLE TO REGISTER UNDER THE PARTYLIST

Yes, Ang Ladlad is eligible to register under the partylist system.

Hence, Ang Ladlad is eligible to register under the partylist system.

Student Assigned: FACTS:

--#16 Aquino v. KEY POINTS :

QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Topic Discussed: FACTS:

WON the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid

#20 David v. KEY POINTS :

Whether or not Mary Grace Poe- Llamanzares is eligible to sit as a Senator.

Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) provides that:

#22 Co v. Electoral KEY POINTS :

Whether Ong is a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar?

An actual removal or an actual change of domicile

Effect of marriage as to the domicile of origin

Article 110 of the New Civil Code provides:

Domicile composed of two elements:

#24 Aquino v. KEY POINTS :

#26 Neri v. Senate KEY POINTS :

Student Assigned: FACTS:

PUBLICATION of the Senate Rules of Procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation

WON Sec. 21, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution was violated

#28 PHILCONSA KEY POINTS :

The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads:

Topic Discussed: FACTS:

CONCLUSION: Wherefore, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

#30 Osmeña v. KEY POINTS :

No. There is no infringement of Osmena’s parliamentary privilege of speech

--#32 Pobre v. KEY POINTS :

--#34 Adaza v. KEY POINTS :

Incompatible and FACTS:

#36 Puyat v. De KEY POINTS :

SEC. 11, Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:

Maxim: “What cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly.”

--#38 Avelino v. KEY POINTS :

Topic Discussed: FACTS:

Topic Discussed: FACTS:

#40 Baguilat v. KEY POINTS :

No. COMELEC has no jurisdiction over this case.

#46 Tañada v. KEY POINTS :

Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due consideration.