Article III, Sections 13 and 14 CASE DIGESTS and BAR QUESTIONS
Section 13: Right to Bail Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After the
Burgos versus CA, G.R. No. 169711, Feb. 8, 2010
Facts: On 1992 assailants attacked the household of Sarah Marie Palma killing Sarah et.al. Four months
after the incident, the police arrested suspects, who pointed two others and respondent Co who allegedly
masterminded the whole thing. After 10 years of hiding, respondent Co surrendered. The prosecution
charged him with two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Upon arraignment, Co
pleaded not guilty to the charges. On September 25, 2002 respondent Co filed a petition for admission to
bail which the RTC granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same prompting petitioner to seek a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for
having been filed without involving the OSG, in violation of jurisprudence and the law, specifically,
Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the CA denied it for lack of merit. Thus, this case is about the legal standing of the
offended parties in a criminal case to seek, in their personal capacities and without the Solicitor General’s
intervention, reversal of the trial court’s order granting bail to the accused on the ground of absence of
strong evidence of guilt.
Issue: Do private offended parties have legal standing, without Solicitor General’s intervention, to seek
reversal of trial court’s order granting bail to the accused?
Ruling: No. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state. Only the state, through its
appellate counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the
Supreme Court. As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in the OSG.
Thus it is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the Solicitor General,
in this case, the unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal proceedings. The Court is
firmly convinced that considering the spirit and the letter of the law, there can be no other logical
interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to
“represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. For the
above reason, actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not initiated by the Solicitor General,
are, as a rule summarily dismissed. The Court denies the petition and affirms the Court of Appeals.
Dipatuan vs. Judge Mangotara, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23, 2010
Facts: In December 28, 2007, Mangotara issued the disputed Decision in Criminal Case No. 3620-01 and
found both accused Abdul and Dipatuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentenced them to imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able
to establish that Abdul and co-accused Dipatuan acted in conspiracy in shooting and killing the victim
Elias Ali Taher. The court, likewise, increased the accused’s bail bond from P75,000.00 to P200,000.00.
Issue: Where the accused has been sentenced to reclusion perpetua, does the Judge have discretion to
increase the bail instead of cancelling it?
Ruling: No. The rule is very explicit as to when admission to bail is discretionary on the part of the
respondent Judge. It is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles and possessed
sufficient proficiency in the law. In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, the accused has no
right to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, as the accused in Criminal Case No. 3620-01 had
been sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the bail should have been cancelled, instead of increasing it as
respondent Judge did.
Trillanes vs. Pimentel, G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008
Facts: At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in
Oakwood incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup
d’etat. Four years later, petitioner ran and won a seat in the Senate. Petitioner requested before the RTC
that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate, to set up a working area in his detention
place, to give interviews, and to receive reporters and other members of the media. The trial court denied
all the requests; hence, this petition.
Issue: Pending trial of an accused charged of a capital offense where evidence of guilt is strong, is bail a
matter of right or discretion?
Ruling: Neither. Circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining
the reasonable amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. In cases involving non-
bailable offenses, such as coup d’etat, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion.
Leviste vs. People, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010
Facts: Petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of
homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and
claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
was denied. Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail,
considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present.
Issue: After conviction by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, and
pending appeal, does the constitutional right to bail end?
Ruling: Yes. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.[46] From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial
discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only
for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail
pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong
support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial determination that the accused should
be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent
effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often
separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the
accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or
other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and
time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.
Atty. Gacal versus Judge Infante, A.M. RTJ- 04-1845, October 5, 2011
Facts: This is in connection to Criminal Case No. 1136-03, where Provincial Prosecutor Alfredo
Barcelona, Jr. filed in the RTC information for murder, but with a recommendation for bail in the amount
of P400,000.00. Consequently, Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail and the other releasing
accused, Ancheta, from custody. Upon hearing of the orders, Atty. Gacal filed Motions to correct the
alleged errors of judgement. By June 20, 2003, when no order regarding the matter of bail was issued,
Atty. Gacal sought the inhibition of Judge Infante on the ground of his gross incompetence manifested by
his failure to exercise judicial power to resolve the issue of bail.
Issue: Is bail hearing still needed if the judge will fix a bailbond of an accused charged of a capital
offense, upon recommendation by the prosecutor?

Ruling: The fact that the public prosecutor recommended bail for Ancheta did not warrant dispensing
with the hearing. The public prosecutor’s recommendation of bail was not material in deciding whether to
conduct the mandatory hearing or not. For one, the public prosecutor’s recommendation, albeit persuasive,
did not necessarily bind the trial judge, in whom alone the discretion to determine whether to grant bail or
not was vested. Whatever the public prosecutor recommended, including the amount of bail, was non-
binding. Nor did such recommendation constitute a showing that the evidence of guilt was not strong. He
ought to have remembered, then, that it was only through such hearing that he could be put in a position to
determine whether the evidence for the Prosecution was weak or strong. Hence, his dispensing with the
hearing manifested a gross ignorance of the law and the rules.
1989 BAR
May an alien invoke the constitutional right to bail during the pendency of deportation proceedings?
ANSWER:
No, an alien may not invoke the constitutional right to bail during the pendency of deportation
proceedings. In Harvey vs. Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, it was held that the constitutional guarantee to bail
may not be invoked in deportation proceedings, because they do not partake of the nature of a criminal
action.
2005 BAR
1. State with reason(s) whether bail is a matter of right or a matter of discretion in the following cases:
a. The imposable penalty for the crime charged is reclusion perpetua and the accused is a minor.
b. The imposable penalty for the crime charges is life imprisonment and the accused is a minor.
c. The accused has been convicted of homicide on a charge of murder and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from 8 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum to 12 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. A minor charged with a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua is entitled to bail as a matter of
right. Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, in case of conviction the penalty would be one
degree lower than reclusion perpetua. This rules out reclusion perpetua. [Bravo v. Borja, 134 SCRA
466 (1985)]
b. Bail is a matter of discretion for a minor charged with an offense punishable with life imprisonment,
because Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code is inapplicable and he is not entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance under it. [People v. Lagasca, 148 SCRA 264 (1987)]
c. Bail is a matter of discretion for an accused convicted of homicide on a charge of murder, because
an appeal opens the whole case of review. There is a possibility that he may be convicted of murder,
which is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. His conviction shows the evidence of his guilt
is strong. [Obosa v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 281 (1997)].
2008 BAR
JC, a major in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is facing prosecution before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City for the murder of his neighbor whom he suspected to have molested his (JC’s) 15-year old
daughter. Is JC entitled to bail? Why or why not?
ANSWER:
Article III, Sections 13 and 14 CASE DIGESTS and BAR QUESTIONS
Bail is a matter of right unless the evidence of his guilt is strong (Art. III, Sec. 13 of the Constitution).
Whether or not JC is entitled to bail will depend on whether the court, after a bail hearing, finds that the
evidence against him is strong. If the evidence is not strong, he is entitled to bail.
2009 BAR
William, a private American citizen, a university graduate and frequent visitor to the Philippines, was
inside the U.S. embassy when he got into a heated argument with a private Filipino citizen. Then, in front
of many shocked witnesses, he killed the person he was arguing with. The police came, and brought him
to the nearest police station. Upon reaching the station, the police investigator, in halting English,
informed William of his Miranda rights, and assigned him an independent local counsel. William refused
the services of the lawyer, and insisted that he be assisted by a Filipino lawyer currently based in the U.S.
The request was denied, and the counsel assigned by the police stayed for the duration of the investigation.
William protested his arrest. If William applies for bail, claiming that he is entitled thereto under the
“international standard of justice” and that he comes from a U.S. State that has outlawed capital
punishment, should William be granted bail as a matter of right? Reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
William should not be granted bail as a matter of right. He is subject to Philippine criminal jurisdiction,
therefore, his right to bail must be determined on the basis of Section 13, Article III of the Constitution.
2012 BAR
All persons charged shall, before conviction, be bailed by sufficient sureties, except those charged with
a. Offenses punishable by death when evidence of guilt is strong;
b. Offenses punishable by life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is strong;
c. Offenses punishable by death when evidence of guilt is weak;
d. Offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong.
Section 14: Criminal Due Process
Presumption of Innocence
People vs. Gatlabayan, G.R. No. 186467, July 13, 2011
Facts: Accused Jaime Gatlabayan was found guilty of violating Section 5 (1), Article II of RA 9165. RTC
rendered its judgment rejecting the defense of frame-up proffered by the accused and declared that the
same fell flat in the face of the affirmative testimony of prosecution witnesses, PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro
III, who categorically and forthrightly testified that he was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the accused on the basis of the testimony of PO1 Antonio and
PO1 Jiro, III which it found credible and sufficient to sustain a conviction. The CA was of the view that
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was not sufficiently controverted by him.
Issue: Can the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty overcome the presumption of
innocence?
Ruling: According to the Supreme Court, any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance and
should make the presumption unavailable. It must be emphasized that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The weakness of the defense of the accused, mere denial and frame-up,
cannot justify his conviction. The burden is always on the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and not on him to prove his innocence. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by
the prosecution failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused. What is
required is that there be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused
committed the crime. It is only when the conscience is satisfied that the crime has indeed been committed

by the person on trial that the judgment will be for conviction. Although the courts are committed to assist
the government in its campaign against illegal drugs, a conviction can only be obtained after the
prosecution discharges its constitutional burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, this
Court is duty-bound to uphold the constitutional presumption of innocence. Accused must therefore be
acquitted.
People vs. Alejandro, G.R. No. 176350, August 10, 2011
Facts: This is an appeal of the May 31 CA decision which found Jhon-Jhon Alejandro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). The accusatory portion of the Information states that on September 1,
2002 SPO1 Tan received a call from a confidential informant alias “Nog-nog” about illegal drug activities
at M. Dela Cruz Street in Pasay City. That after conducting surveillance in the place, SPO2 Banzuela,
SPO1 Tan, SPO1 Sangalang, PO1 Mengote, PO3 Cachapero conducted a buy-bust operation where they
found and accused Alejandro without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver 0.06 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). The appellant
pleaded not guilty during the pre-trial. However, the RTC convicted him of violating Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 and the CA upheld the decision.
Issue: Did the prosecution establish the required quantum of evidence to overcome the presumption of
innocence?
Ruling: No. The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of
innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In doing so, the prosecution must rest its case
on its own merits and cannot merely rely on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet
the required quantum of evidence, the defense does not even need to present any evidence in its behalf; the
presumption of innocence prevails and the accused should be acquitted. Hence, the court reverse and set
aside the previous ruling of CA and acquitted Alejandro for the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, and was released from detention unless he is confined for another lawful cause.
Right to Be Heard
Lejano vs. People, G.R. No. 176389, December 14, 2010
Facts: Petitioner is one of the accused tried in the Vizconde Massacre. The trial court thought little of the
denials and alibis that the accused set up for their defense. After four years of hearing, the trial court
rendered judgment, finding the accused guilty as charged. On the initial deliberation of the case, the Court
issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken
from the victim’s caver, but the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen.
This prompted Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the government fails to preserve
vital evidence and results in the denial of his right to due process.
Issue: Were the accused denied due process by prosecution’s failure to produce the semen specimen for
DNA testing?
Ruling: NO. The U.S. Court in Arizona vs. Youngblood held due process does not require the State to
preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show
bad faith on the part of the prosecution or police. Webb is not entitled to acquittal and so are the other
conspirators. When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist in the
country as it did not have the technology for conducting the test and no Philippine precedent had as yet
recognized its admissibility as evidence.
Marquez vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 187912-14, January 31, 2011
Article III, Sections 13 and 14 CASE DIGESTS and BAR QUESTIONS
Facts: Petitioner Joey P. Marquez (Marquez) assailed issuance on the SB-5th Division’s denial on his
Motion to Refer Prosecution’s Evidence for Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). As a result of the Report on the Audit of Selected Transactions
and Walis Ting-ting for the City of Parañaque, conducted by the Special Audit Team of the Commission
on Audit (COA), several anomalies were discovered involving Marquez, then City Mayor and Chairman
of the Bids and Awards committee of Parañaque City; and Ofelia C. Caunan (Caunan), Head of the
General Services Office of said city. Before arraignment, on November 24, 2003, alleging discovery of the
forged signatures, Marquez sought referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and
authorization requests to the NBI and the reinvestigation of the cases against him. But the request of
Marquez that the questioned documents be referred to the NBI was not acted upon. Thereafter, on July 4,
2008, Marquez filed the subject Motion to Refer Prosecution’s Evidence for Examination by the
Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation. In his motion, he again insisted
that his purported signatures on the vouchers were forged. The motion for reconsideration of Marquez was
likewise denied. Aggrieved, Marquez interposed this petition for certiorari
Issue: Was Marquez denied the opportunity to be heard and to produce evidence of his choice in his
defense?
Ruling: Yes. Marquez was denied of the opportunity to be heard and to produce evidence of his choice in
his defense. One of the most vital and precious rights accorded to an accused by the Constitution is due
process, which includes a fair and impartial trial and a reasonable opportunity to present one’s defense. It
is well settled that due process in criminal proceedings requires that (a) the court or tribunal trying the
case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction
is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be
heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. It means that the accused should be
allowed reasonable freedom to present his defense if the courts are to give form and substance to this
guaranty. Should the trial court fail to accord an accused reasonable opportunity to submit evidence in his
defense, the exercise by the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this amounts to a denial of
due process. Marquez should be allowed to adduce evidence of his own choice. The court should not
control how he will defend himself as long as the steps to be taken will not be in violation of the rules.
Right to Be Informed
People vs. Noque, G.R. No. 175319, January 15, 2010
Facts: Accused Joselito Noque was caught in a buy-bust operation conducted by SPO4 Norberto Murillo
on January 30, 2001. Two Informations were filed before the RTC of Manila docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 01-189458 and 01-189459 charging of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of a regulated
drug. The trial court convicted the accused on both charges. The trial court held that while the
Informations alleged methamphetamine hydrochloride as the drug seized from the appellant, the drug
actually confiscated which was ephedrine, which by means of chemical reaction could change into
methamphetamine. Thus, the trial court ruled that the appellant can be convicted of the offenses charged,
which are included in the crimes proved. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. The CA held that the
designations and allegations in the informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
regulated drugs. Hence, the accused appealed the case before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Was the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations violated when he
was convicted of a lesser crime after being charged with a specific crime?
Ruling: No. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, can be applied by analogy in convicting the
appellant of the offenses charged, which are included in the crimes proved. Under these provisions, an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. At any rate, a minor variance between the
information and the evidence does not alter the nature of the offense, nor does it determine or qualify the
crime or penalty, so that even if a discrepancy exists, this cannot be pleaded as a ground for acquittal. In
other words, his right to be informed of the charges against him has not been violated because where an

accused is charged with a specific crime; he is duly informed not only of such specific crime but also of
lesser crimes or offenses included therein.
People vs. Janjalani, G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011
Facts: On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route Navotas to Alabang,
two men were onboard of the said bus. The two passengers alighted of the bus at Ayala Avenue. Moments
after, the bus exploded killing a passenger and wounding several passengers. This was known as the
“Valentine’s day bombing” perpetuated by the Abu Sayyaf Group. Accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN
News Network an exclusive interview sometime after the incident, confessing his participation in the
Valentine’s Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan
likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview,
confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus
conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who
had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February. In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial
court asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their "not guilty" pleas to
the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled "guilty" to the heavier charge of
multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with
accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused
acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information
was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.
Issue: Is the requirement of conducting a searching inquiry applicable to cases of re-arraignment?
Ruling: Yes. Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense;
reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf. The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of
re-arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's original plea was "not
guilty," the trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to
"guilty. According to the Court: the stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt,
especially in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room
for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea. Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed
satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a "guilty" plea to
the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still an
improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had
explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the
accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been
intimidated, bribed, or threatened. We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a
searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that
the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the
significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory.
The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge multiple
murder based on the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further
notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other
confessions of guilt -one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated
by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the
foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the "searching inquiry" in
this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was
not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration.
Patula vs. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012
Article III, Sections 13 and 14 CASE DIGESTS and BAR QUESTIONS
Facts: Accused was convicted with the crime of estafa in the RTC with allegations in the Information
including that accused collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of said
company under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to
the company, that she failed to comply with her obligation to remit the same despite repeated demands
and the passage of a reasonable amount of time, and that she wilfully unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit. It was
claimed in the presentation of facts that accused erased some collection receipts in the accounting books
and that her customers who had fully paid receivables remained outstanding in the records. Upon trial, it
was noted by the company auditor that in the course of the audit the amounts appearing on the original
copies of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on the
duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office. As the defense did not present their
evidence, the trial court deemed the Prosecution’s case unrefuted and uncontroverted.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to allege the falsification of the duplicate
receipts issued by petitioner to her customers violated petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation?
Ruling: NO, the failure of the information for estafa to allege the falsification of the duplicate receipts
issued by petitioner to her customers did not violate petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. The court noted that the importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature
and cause of the accusation in the information should never be taken for granted by the State. An accused
cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict
him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of the
Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. As such, the accused cannot
be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or necessarily included in the
information filed against him. In the case at hand, Prosecution duly proved that petitioner committed the
falsification of documents in order to conceal her misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the
falsification was not an offense separate and distinct from the estafa charged against her, the Prosecution
could legitimately prove her acts of falsification as the means of establishing her misappropriation or
conversion as an essential ingredient of the crime duly alleged in the information. In that manner, her right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not infringed or denied to her.
Thus, there was no necessity for the information to allege the acts of falsification by petitioner because
falsification was not an element of the estafa charged.
Astillero vs. Casimero, G.R. No. 190569, April 25, 2012
Facts: This case pertains to the criminal charge filed by Private Inspector Ariel S. Artillero, the Chief of
Police of the Municipal Station of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Ajuy, Iloilo. According to him,
the municipal station received information that successive gun fires had been heard in Barangay Lanjagan,
Ajuy Iloilo. Thus, petitioner immediately went to the area to investigate and spotted two persons walking
towards them, wobbling and visibly drunk. He further noticed that one of them, Aguillon, was openly
carrying a rifle, and that its barrel touched the concrete road at times. Petitioner disarmed Aguillon.
Thereafter, Aguillon was detained at the police station, but was released from custody the next day, after
he posted a cash bond. Aguillon executed an Affidavit swearing that petitioner had unlawfully arrested
and detained him for illegal possession of firearm, even though the former had every right to carry the rifle
as evidenced by the license he had surrendered to petitioner. Aguillon further claims that he was duly
authorized by law to carry his firearm within his barangay. In a Resolution dated 17 February 2009, the
Office of the Ombudsman, ruled that the evidence on record proved that Aguillon did not commit the
crime of illegal possession of firearm since he has a license for his rifle. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) of the 17 February 2009 Resolution, but it was denied through an Order dated 23
July 2009. Thus, on 8 December 2009, he filed the present Petition for Certiorari. According to petitioner,
he was denied his right to due process when he was not given a copy of Aguillon’s Counter-affidavit. He
thus claims that the assailed Resolutions were issued “contrary to law, and/or jurisprudence and with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.” Petitioner insists that Section 3(c),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, was created “in order not to deprive party litigants
of their basic constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them.”

Issue: Can complainants invoke the right to be informed?
Ruling: Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that no person shall be held liable for a
criminal offense without due process of law. It further provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This is a right that cannot
be invoked by petitioner, because he is not the accused in this case. Wherefore the petition was once again
dismissed. The court affirmed the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dated 10
September 2008, as well as the Resolution and the Order of the Office of the Ombudsman dated 17
February 2009 and 23 July 2009, respectively.
People vs. Arcillas, G.R. No. 181491, July 30, 2012
Facts: AAA, allegedly Arcillas’ step-daughter, brought a complaint dated May 22, 2000 for qualified rape
against him. After due proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate ultimately filed on
August 29, 2000 an information charging him with qualified rape in the RTC, averring: That on or about
May 12, 2000 at more or less 11:00 o’clock in the evening thereof, at Brgy. Magsaysay, Municipality of
Uson, Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the step-father of AAA, with deliberate intent, with lewd design and by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with his own step-daughter, AAA, a 13-year-old girl, against her will. However, it was later proven that
Arcillas was only the common-law husband of the victim’s mother.
Issue: Arcillas’ being the common-law husband of BBB at the time of the commission of the rape, as
established during the trial, could it be appreciated even if the information did not specifically allege it as
a qualifying circumstance?
Ruling: No. An accused cannot be found guilty of qualified rape unless the information alleges the
circumstances of the victim’s over 12 years but under 18 years of age and her relationship with him. The
reason is that such circumstances alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty; hence, they
are special qualifying circumstances. As such, both the age of the victim and her relationship with the
offender must be specifically alleged in the information and proven beyond reasonable doubt during the
trial; otherwise, the accused would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against
him.
Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
Jacob vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010
Facts: A petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners, Monico V. Jacob (Jacob) and Celso L.
Legarda (Legarda), President and Vice-President of Petron, respectively, for the nullification of the
resolution by the SandiganBayan Fourth Division setting aside the order of Justice Nario, chairman of the
SandiganBayan Fourth Division, on dismissing the Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939. The criminal case
involves Tax credit certificates (TCCs) used by Petron to pay to the BIR its tax liabilities which was first
accepted by the said department. However, the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the office
of the ombudsman found that the TCCs were irregular and violative of the memorandum agreement
between BOI and DOF. The resolution was rooted to the fact that the prosecution was still not able to
produce the resolutions of the motions for reconsideration despite the many times the court has given it
extensions. It has reached for more than one year already. The Dismissal of the case was later on set aside
upon motion for consideration by the prosecution, hence, this petition.
Issue: Was the accused’s right to speedy, impartial, and public trial violated?
Ruling: No. The court ruled that "In determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy trial was
violated, the delay should be considered, in view of the entirety of the proceedings. Indeed, mere
Article III, Sections 13 and 14 CASE DIGESTS and BAR QUESTIONS
mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be
regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum." Further expounded by the
court using the Corpuz case, "The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the
case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by
mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a
speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied
such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term
and must necessarily be a flexible concept."
Additional info. May be omitted: In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a
speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay;
(b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
Mari and People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011
Facts: Petitioner AAA alleged that she was raped by private respondent. Private respondent voluntarily
surrendered after a warrant of arrest in which he was incarcerated. Private respondent then filed a motion
to bail, was released and issued dismissal for failure of the prosecution to appear on more than one
occasion. Petitioners filed a Motion for reconsideration but it was denied, hence the petition for certiorari
alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
precipitately dismissing the rape case. RTC counter that there was no grave abuse of discretion and added
that setting aside the dismissal would place private respondent in double jeopardy.
Issue: Was the dismissal of the case consistent with the accused’s right to speedy, impartial, and public
trial?
Ruling: Yes. Indeed as aptly observed by the RTC, petitioners showed recalcitrant behavior by
obstinately refusing to comply with the RTC’s directives to commence presentation of their evidence.
Petitioners did not even show proper courtesy to the courts by filing motion for cancellations of the
hearings on the very day of the hearing and not even bothering to appear on the date they set for hearing
on their motion. The prosecution appeared to be intentionally delaying and trifling with court process. As
a result, the private respondent had been deprived of his liberty on two occasions. First, during the
preliminary investigation before the MCTC, when he was incarcerated for period of almost four months;
then again, when an Information had been issued and since rape is a non-bailable offense, he was
imprisoned for a period of over 6 months. Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for any
duration of time is quite oppressive. Because of private respondent's continued incarceration, the Supreme
Court found the RTC’s dismissal of the case proper and consistent with the accused’s right to speedy,
impartial, and public trial.
In Re- Live Coverage of Maguindanao Trial, AM Nos. 10-11-5-SC, etc., Oct. 23, 2012
Facts: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed
while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010,
relatives of the victims, as well as media and academic members filed a petition before th Supreme Court
praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, and
reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of recording devices.
President Aquino also wrote to then Chief Justice Corona that he supports the petition for Live Coverage
of the Trial.
Issue: In case of conflict between the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of the press & the right to
public information –and- the fundamental rights of the accused, which one should prevail?
Ruling: Neither. In determining that the live coverage of the trial does not violate right of the accused, it
must pass the "totality of circumstances" test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto,

where 1) the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, 2) that pervasive
publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and 3) that there must be
allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only means that the court must be able to accommodate those who
wish to come and observe the trial process. The sheer number of the accused and the families of the
victims, along with their witnesses already posed a problem about accommodation. The remedy to this is
to allow a live coverage of the trial to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial. The
petition, however, is only partially granted and is Pro Hac Vice.
Right of Confrontation
Ho Wai Pang vs. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011
Facts: The accused were found guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. They denied any
knowledge about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their traveling bags which
were provided by the travel agency. Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and
understand what the witnesses testified to. According to him, only a full understanding of what the
witnesses would testify to would enable an accused to comprehend the evidence being offered against him
and to refute it by cross-examination or by his own countervailing evidence. The OSG countered that
petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when
his counsel cross-examined them. It is petitioner’s call to hire an interpreter to understand the proceedings
before him and if he could not do so, he should have manifested it before the court.
Issue: With the absence of an interpreter, was the accused denied the right to confrontation?
Ruling: No. As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of
the prosecution’s evidence. Moreover, it has not been shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly
prejudiced him. Still and all, the important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully
cross-examine the witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially just a
guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution.
Go vs. People, GR No. 185527, July 18, 2012
Facts: Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The
said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Highdone Company Ltd. represented by Li
Luen Ping, the prosecution’s complaining witness. Upon arraignment, the accused (petitioners) pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his
home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004. On 2005,
the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging
that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that,
upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines. Notwithstanding petitioners'
Opposition, the MeTC granted the motion. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MeTC in
allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping.
Issue: Can the conditional examination of the prosecution witness defeat the rights of the accused to
public trial and confrontation of witness?
Ruling: No. The CA overlooked fundamental considerations that the Constitution secures to the accused,
i.e., the right to a public trial and the right to confrontation of witnesses according to Section 14(2), Article
III of the Constitution. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face confrontation in a
public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a witness in a
foreign place outside the courtroom in the absence of a trial judge. In the case of People vs. Estenzo, the
Court noted the significance of a witness testifying in an open court thus: “It is only when the witness
testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may
confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will
Article III, Sections 13 and 14 CASE DIGESTS and BAR QUESTIONS
reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal
clues to his character.” The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to
criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the
testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of
witnesses. The Court explained in People v. Seneris that the constitutional requirement “insures that the
witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge. x x x”
Trial in Absentia
People vs. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009
Facts: On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano (Joven),
Armando de Grano (Armando), and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused
Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo). Duly
arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty" to the crime as charged; while their co-
accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large. After the presentation of the parties’
respective sets of evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision dated April 25, 2002, finding several accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation
despite due notice to the other respondents. Respondents, thru counsel, then filed a Joint Motion for
Reconsideration dated May 8, 2002, praying that the Decision dated April 25, 2002 be reconsidered and
set aside and a new one be entered. In its Opposition, the prosecution pointed out that while the accused
jointly moved for the reconsideration of the decision, all of them, except Estanislao, were at-large. Having
opted to become fugitives and be beyond the judicial ambit, they lost their right to file such motion for
reconsideration and to ask for whatever relief from the court.
Issue: Does the right on trial in absentia allow the accused to be absent at the trial and at all stages of the
proceedings?
Ruling: No. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the
accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and
plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and
(c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear
by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be
waived. Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available
in the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the accused
may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion
the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice.
(MAY BE OMITTED – FOR STUDY PURPOSES ONLY) Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the Rules applicable at the time the Decision was promulgated, provides: Section
6. Promulgation of judgment. –The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused
and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or
outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court. If the accused is
confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge
of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of
the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to
accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court. The proper clerk of court shall
give notice to the accused, personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be
present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or
escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address. In case the accused fails
to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be

made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel.
1988 BAR
Norberto Malasmas was accused of estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. After the trial, he
was found guilty. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. After the records of his
case had been remanded to the Regional Trial Court for execution, and after the latter Court had set the
date for the promulgation of judgment, the accused filed a motion with the Court of Appeals to set aside
the entry of judgment, and to remand the case to the Regional Trial Court for new trial on the ground that
he had just discovered that “Atty. Leonilo Maporma” whom he had chosen and who had acted as his
counsel before the trial court and the Court of Appeals, is not a lawyer. Resolve the motion of the accused
with reasons.
ANSWER:
The motion should be granted and the entry of judgment should be set aside. An accused is entitled to be
heard by himself or counsel (Art. III, Sec. 14 [2]). Unless he is represented by an attorney, there is a great
danger that any defense presented in his behalf will be inadequate considering the legal requisite and skill
needed in court proceedings. There would certainly be a denial of due process. [Delgado v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 357 (1986)]
2000 BAR
Charged by Francisco with libel, Pablo was arraigned on January 3, 2000. Pre-trial was dispensed with
and continuous trial was set for March 7, 8 and 9, 2000. On the first setting, the prosecution moved for its
postponement and cancellation of the other settings because its principal and probably only witness, the
private complainant Francisco, suddenly had to go abroad to fulfill a professional commitment. The judge
instead dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Would the grant of the motion for postponement have
violated the accused’s right to speedy trial?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The grant of the motion for postponement would not have violated the right of the accused to speedy trial.
As held in People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238 (1996), since the motion for postponement was the first one
requested, the need for the offended party to attend to a professional commitment is a valid reason, no
substantial right of the accused a fair opportunity to prosecute its case, the motion should be granted.
ALTERNATE ANSWER:
Since continuous trial of cases is required and since the date of the initial hearing was set upon agreement
of all parties, including the private complainant, the judge properly dismissed the case for failure to
prosecute.
2001 BAR
For the death of Joey, Erning was charged with the crime of homicide before the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela. He was arraigned. Due to numerous postponements of the scheduled hearings at the instance
of the prosecution, particularly based on the ground of unavailability of prosecution witnesses who could
not be found or located, the criminal case was pending trial for a period of seven years. Upon motion of
accused Erning who invoked his right to speedy trial, the court dismissed the case. Eventually, the
prosecution witnesses surfaced, and a criminal case for homicide, involving the same incident was filed
anew against Erning. Accused Erning moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of double jeopardy.
The prosecution objected, submitting the reason that it was not able to present the said witnesses earlier
because the latter went into hiding out of fear. Resolve the motion.
Article III, Sections 13 and 14 CASE DIGESTS and BAR QUESTIONS
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion should be granted. As held in Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54 (1989),
the dismissal of a criminal case predicated on the right of the accused to a speedy trial amounts to an
acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt and bars his subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.
2004 BAR
OZ lost five head of cattle which he reported to the police as stolen from his barn. He requested several
neighbors, including RR, for help in looking for the missing animals. After an extensive search, the police
found two head in RR’s farm. RR could not explain to the police how they got hidden in a remote area of
his farm. Insisting on his innocence, RR consulted a lawyer who told him he has a right to be presumed
innocent under the Bill of Rights. But there is another presumption---of theft arising from his unexplained
possession of stolen cattle---under the penal law. Are the two presumptions capable of reconciliation in
this case? If so, how can they be reconciled? If not, which should prevail?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The two presumptions can be reconciled. The presumption of innocence stands until the contrary is
proved. It may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon human experience. The presumption
that RR is the one who stole the cattle of OZ is logical, since he was found in possession of the stolen
cattle. RR can prove his innocence by presenting evidence to rebut the presumption. The burden of
evidence is shifted to RR, because how he came into possession of the cattle is peculiarly within his
knowledge (Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA 63 [1994])
2012 BAR
Criminal trial may proceed, notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified, and his failure to appear is unjustifiable, after:
a. Preliminary investigation
b. Arraignment
c. Sentencing
d. Prosecution has rested its case
2012 BAR
The requisites of a valid trial in absentia exclude:
a. Wherein his/her failure to appear is unjustifiable;
b. Wherein he/she allows himself/herself to be identified by the witness in his/her absence, without
further unqualifiedly admitting that every time a witness mentions a name by which he/she is known,
it shall be understood to refer to him/her;
c. Wherein he/she has been duly notified of the trial;
d. Wherein the accused has already been arraigned.
2012 BAR
The trial court proceeded as follows: “Court: ---to the accused: Q: “Do you have an attorney or are you
going to plead guilty?” A: “I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty.” Accused was then arraigned, pleaded
guilty, was found guilty and sentenced. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The accused was deprived
of his:
a. Right to cross-examination
b. Right to be presumed innocent
c. Right to counsel
d. Right to production of evidence