SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Rule 62 to Rule 71)

Syllabus of Cases

ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION

Must be based on a cause of action
Venue is determined either by the residences
of the parties where the action is personal or
by the location of the property where the
action is real.
May be filed with the MTC or RTC depending
on the amount.
Maybe commenced only by filing a complaint
Cause of action is not necessarily needed in
Declaratory Relief (action is brought before
any breach) and Interpleader (plaintiff files a
complaint even if he has not sustained actual
transgression of his rights.
Not necessarily true, petitions may be
commenced without taking into
consideration the residences of the parties
(Quo Qarranto)
Some actions may be filed ONLY in the MTC,
some cannot be commenced therein.
May be commenced by the filing of a
complaint or petition

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS INITIATED BY SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS INITIATED BY

COMPLAINTS PETITION
Interpleader Declaratory Relief
Expropriation Review of the Adjudication of the
Comelec/COA
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage Certiorari
Partition Prohibition
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer Mandamus
Quo Warranto
Contempt

RULE 62

Interpleader

 The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has

property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly
or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the
persons who claim said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand
compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to
determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not
to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double
vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate
among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled
interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a
 complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint. (Ocampo vs. Tirona, G.R. No.
147812)

 An interpleader complaint may be filed by a lessee against those who

have conflicting claims over the rent due for the property leased. This remedy is for the
lessee to protect him or her from “double vexation in respect of one liability.” He or she
may file the interpleader case to extinguish his or her obligation to pay rent, remove
him or her from the adverse claimants’dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting
claims to litigate among themselves. (Lui enterprises, Inc. vs. Zuellig Pharma
Corporation, G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014)

 The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure provides that the parties in an interpleader action may file counterclaims,
cross-claims, third party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, “as provided by
these Rules.” The second paragraph was added to Section 5 to expressly authorize the
additional pleadings and claims enumerated therein, in the interest of a complete
adjudication of the controversy and its incidents. (Arreza vs. Diaz, G.R. No. 133113,
August 30, 2001)

 At any rate, an adverse claimant in an interpleader case may be declared

in default. Under Rule 62, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a claimant who
fails to answer within the required period may, on motion, be declared in default. The
consequence of the default is that the court may “render judgment barring [the
defaulted claimant] from any claim in respect to the subject matter.” The Rules would
not have allowed claimants in interpleader cases to be declared in default if it would
“ironically defeat the very purpose of the suit.” (Lui enterprises, Inc. vs. Zuellig Pharma
Corporation, G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014)

 Thus, petitioner’s argument that the trial courts writ of execution in the
interpleader case carried with it the corollary right to a writ of possession is without
merit. A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when the right of
possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to
either. The interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue. (Maglente vs.
Baltazar-Padilla, G.R. No. 148182, March 7, 2007) .

 The reason for the interpleader action ceased when the MeTC rendered judgment in
Civil Case No. 6202 xxx. It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is
afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in
respect of one liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims
upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader
who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or
in part is not disputed by the claimants. The decision in Civil Case No. 6202 resolved the
conflicting claims insofar as payment of rentals was concerned. (RCBC vs. Metro
Container Corporation, G.R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001)

 An interpleader may be filed by a lessee against those who have conflicting claims over
the rent due for the property leased. This remedy is for the lessee to protect him or her
 from “double vexation in respect of one ability.” He or she may file the interpleader case
to extinguish his or her obligation to pay rent, remove him ir her from adverse
claimants’ dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting claims to litigate among
themselves. (Lui Enterprise, Inc. Zuellig Pharma Corp., GR No. 193494, March 12, 2014)
 An action of interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but
against double vexation in respect of one liability (RCBC vs. Metro Container Corp., GR
No. 127913, September 13, 2001).

RULE 63

Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

 The purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of

the rights and obligations of the parties under the statute, deed, or contract for their
guidance in the enfocement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues
arising from an alleged breach thereof. (Aquino vs. Municipality of Malay Aklan, GR
No. 211356, September 28, 2014).

 Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief:
first, the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second, the
terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction; third, there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
fourth, there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one
between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and sixth, adequate relief is not available through other means or other
forms of action or proceeding. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Roque, G.R. No. 204603,
September 24, 2013)

 Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are
availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of
the subject EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari
and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper
recourse to assail the validity of EO 7. (Galicto vs. H.E. Aquino, G.R. No. 193978,
February 28, 2012)

 When a court assumed jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory Relief when there was
already a breach of the subject instrument or government regulation, the orders made
by that court would be null and void for want of jurisdiction. (Department of Finance vs.
Dela Cruz, Jr., GR No. 209331, August 24, 2015).
 RULE 64

Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit

 Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise provided by the
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of
a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64)
specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.
This Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for
certiorari, subject to the exception clause except as hereinafter provided. (Pates vs.
Commission on Elections, 591 SCRA 481 [2009])

 On the timeliness of the filing of the petition, the Court holds that the 30-
day reglementary period under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 does not apply. The Court's
power to review decisions of the COMELEC stems from the Constitution itself. The Court
has interpreted Section 7, Article IX-A to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC en banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
The petition herein assails the validity of a COMELEC Resolution which was issued under
its rule-making power, to implement the provisions of BP 881 and RA 7166. Thus, the
period under Rule 64 does not apply. (PADPAO vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
223505, October 3, 2017)

 The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule
64 petition is akin to a petition for review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court;
hence, conformably with the fresh period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition
should also be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration or the motion for new trial. We ruled in Pates vs. Commission on
Elections, 591 SCRA 481 (2009), that the belated filing of the petition for certiorari under
Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period rules hould apply was fatal to the recourse.
As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed
that the fresh period rule per Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005) applied.
Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure. Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed
to prosper. (Fortune Life Insurance Company vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
213525, January 27, 2015)

 Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it

expressly refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive reasons as
discussed below. Procedurally, the most patent difference between the two, i.e., the
exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to is Section 3 which provides for a special
period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC
en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60
days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion
for reconsideration deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh
period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides). (Pates vs. Commission on Elections, 591 SCRA
481 [2009])

RULE 65

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper to correct errors of jurisdiction

committed by the lower court, or grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction. This remedy can be availed of when there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Cunanan vs. CA, GR No.
205573, August 17, 2016).

Certiorari is NOT a Substitute for a Lost Appeal

A basic requisite of the special civil action of certiorari, which is governed by Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, is that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Where appeal is available, certiorari generally does not lie.
Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost or lapsed remedy of appeal. In this
case, an appeal was not only available, but also mandated by Sections 11 and 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 (1939), or the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended.
Notably, in Keswani v. Republic, 524 SCRA 145 (2007), we declared that the remedy
from a decision by the trial court admitting an individual as a Filipino citizen is through
an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Republic vs. Yang Chi Hao, 602 SCRA 220, G.R. No.
165332 October 2, 2009

Exceptions to the Rule that Certiorari is Dismissible when Appeal is Available

The National Power Corporation may have pursued the wrong remedy when it filed a
petition for certiorari instead of an appeal since the ruling on attorney’s fees is already a
ruling on the merits. However, we find that the trial court gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ordered NPC solidarily liable with the
plaintiffs for the payment of the attorney’s fees. The rule that a petition for certiorari is
dismissible when the mode of appeal is available admits of exceptions, to wit: (a) when
the writs issued are null; and, (b) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority. Clearly, respondent has shown its entitlement to the
exceptions. Gubat vs. National Power Corporation, 613 SCRA 742, G.R. No. 167415
February 26, 2010

With respect to the Supreme Court, however, the remedies of certiorari

and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or
prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a
tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of
Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution. (Araullo vs. H.E. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1,
2014)
A petition for certiorari does not normally include an inquiry into the correctness of its
evaluation of the evidence. Errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of
jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civil action for certiorari, which is
merely confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. It is, thus,
incumbent upon petitioners to satisfactorily establish that the NLRC acted capriciously
and whimsically in order that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie. By grave abuse
of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised
arbitrarily or despotically. (Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Villamater, 614 SCRA 182
[2010] cited in Philippine National Bank vs. Gregorio, G.R. No. 194944, September 18,
2017)

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR
issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ
directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist
from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys
or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or
quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a
lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of
justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of
jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate
remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are
performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction
may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a
temporary restraining order. (Holy Spirit Homeowners Association vs. Defensor, 497
SCRA 581 [2006] cited in Ermita vs. Aldecoa-Delorino, G.R. No. 177130, June 7, 2011)

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the

name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board,
or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the
remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of
enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a
proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is
mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if
the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The
writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is
not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to
which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a
mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is
meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following
grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or
person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance
of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and
it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to
enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely
private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in
the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to
enforce a private right against an individual. The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the
execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues
only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a
prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the
redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there
should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other
than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued
only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless
to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its
nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant
of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court. (Uy Kiao Eng vs. Lee,
G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010)

Errors of jurisdiction are reviewable by Certiorai; errors of judgment, only appeal (Tan
Po Chu v. CA, GR No. 184348, April 4, 2016).

Yellow Bus line Employees Union vs. Yellow Bus Line, Inc., GR No. 190876, June 15,
2016 citing Philippine Electric Corporation vs. CA, et.al., GR No. 168612, December 10,
2014 – Exception to the rule, the Court has allowed petitions for certiorari to be filed in
lieu of an appeal “(a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate;
(b) when the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued and null;
and (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.”

The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a
quo to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. (People vs. Valdez, GR No. 216007-09, December 8, 2015).

RULE 66

Quo Warranto

In the case of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998 – A quo
warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the
contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment.

Quo warranto and impeachment are two distinct proceedings, although both may result
in the ouster of a public officer. Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the relief of
"ouster", while impeachment affords "removal."

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person's right or
title to a public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is the proper action
to inquire into a public officer's eligibility or the validity of his appointment. Under Rule
66 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination of
the right to the use or exercise of the office.

Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process undertaken by the legislature to

determine whether the public officer committed any of the impeachable offenses,
namely, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. It does not ascertain the officer's eligibility
for appointment or election, or challenge the legality of his assumption of office.
Conviction for any of the impeachable offenses shall result in the removal of the
impeachable official from office. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Sereno, G.R. No.
237428, June 19, 2018)

In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the
institution of an action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons. Thus, in
Gonzales vs. Chavez, 205 SCRA 816 (1992), the Court ruled:

“Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute discretion in choosing
whether to prosecute or not to prosecute or to abandon a prosecution already started,
our own Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or compromise suits
either with or without stipulation with the other party. Abandonment of a case,
however, does not mean that the Solicitor General may just drop it without any legal
and valid reasons, for the discretion given him is not unlimited. Its exercise must be, not
only within the parameters get by law but with the best interest of the State as the
ultimate goal.”
Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in
the management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the
appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do
everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest
and the policy of the government on the matter at hand. (Topacio vs. SB Justice Ong,
G.R. No. 179895, December 18, 2008)

As early as 1905, the Court already held hat for a petition for quo warranto to be
successful, the suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office.
His failure to establish this right warrants the dismissal of the suit for lack of cause of
action; it is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of
his appointment, continues in the undisturbed possession of his office. (General Vs.
Urro, GR No. 191560, March 29, 2011).

RULE 67

Expropriation

Expropriation or the exercise of the power of eminent domain is the inherent right of
the state and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated to
sondemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation (Republic
vs. Legaspi, Sr., GR No. 177611, April 18, 2012).

The nature of these two stages was discussed in the following wise in the case of
Municipality of Biñan vs. Judge Garcia, (259 Phil. 1058, 1068-69)

For National Infrastructure Projects – The government shall immediately pay the owner
of the property 100% of the market value of the property based on the tax declaration
of the current relevant BIR Zonal Valuation, whichever is higher, and the value of the
improvements using the replacement method (R.A. No. 8974, Republic v. Gingoyon,
G.R. No. 166429, 19 December 2005)

(1) the filing of the complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2)
the deposit of the amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value –
 issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. (Iloilo City vs. Legaspi, G.R. NO.
154614, Nov. 25, 2004)
The period to appeal from an order of condemnation is 30 days counted from notice
thereof and not the ordinary period of fifteen days prescribed for actions in general
(Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576);

The recognized rule is that title to property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation (Republic vs. Mupas, GR No.
181892, 209917, 209696 & 209731, April 19, 2016;

Fery Doctrine; Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan, “When private land is expropriated for a
particular public use, the same does not return to its former owner upon abandonment of
the particular use for which the land was expropriated.

In heirs of Timoteo Moreno; Expropriation (in Lahug Airport), is conditional because of the
rider.

In Lozada case (MCIAA and ATO v. Bernardo Lozada Sr and the Heirs of Rosario Mercado,
G.R No. 176625, Feb. 25, 2010). More particularly, with respect to the element of public
use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in
the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the
proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for
which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be
denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owner’s right to
justice, fairness, and equity.

Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to
particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a
power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and
advance the general welfare. The power of eminent domain is inseparable in sovereignty
being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government. But the exercise of
such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should underlie the
Government's exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a
particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner.
These requirements partake the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with
to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. The landmark case of
Republic vs. Vda. De Castellvi, 157 Phil. 329 (1974) provides an enlightening discourse on
the requisites of taking – “First, The expropriator must enter a private property; Second,
the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; Third, the
entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; Fourth, the
property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.”
(National Transmission Corporation vs. Oroville Development Corporation, G.R. No.
223366, August 1, 2017)
Just compensation must be the value of the property at the time of taking. If there were
other documentary evidence to show the value of the property at a point nearer to the time
of the taking, in this case the year 2004, then consideration of year 2000 documents would
not be fatal. However, if the only documents to support the finding of just compensation
are from a year which is not the year when the taking of the expropriated property took
place, then this would be plainly inaccurate.

Next, while documentary evidence is indeed important to support the finding of the value
of the expropriated property, the commissioners are given leeway to consider other factors
to determine just compensation for the property to be expropriated. xxx.

Moreover, zonal valuation, although one of the indices of the fair market value of real
estate, cannot by itself be the sole basis of just compensation in expropriation cases.
(Evergreen Manufacturing Corporation vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 218628,
September 6, 2017)

RULE 68

Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage

A secured creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action
for the collection of the debt, or a real action to judicially foreclose the real estate
mortgage, or an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage (Act 3135). (Sycamore
Ventures Corp. v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 173183, November 18, 2013)

Judicial foreclosure of mortgage is an action in rem. An action for foreclosure of

mortgage over real property prescribes in 10 years (Nuñez v. GSIS Family Bank, G.R. No.
163988, Nov. 17, 2005).

Extrajudicial Foreclosure – Equity of redemption, not after the registration of the

certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case
shall be more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. (RA 8791,
General Banking Act of 2000). Goldenway Merchandising Corporation vs. Equitable PCi
Bank, G.R. NO. 195540, March 13, 2013.

The Rules NO Longer Prescribe At Least Two Bidders for a Valid Auction Sale
The use of the word “bids” (in plural form) does not make it a mandatory requirement
to have more than one bidder for an auction sale to be valid. A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as
amended, no longer prescribes the requirement of at least two bidders for a valid
auction sale. We further held that “Except for errors or omissions in the notice of sale
which are calculated to deter or mislead bidders, to depreciate the value of the
property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, simple mistakes or omissions are not
considered fatal to the validity of the notice and the sale made pursuant thereto.”
Certeza, Jr. vs. Philippine Savings Bank, 614 SCRA 442, G.R. No. 190078 March 5, 2010

In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-
mortgagee has a single cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the
debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the
institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are
alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself. Thus, if
the creditor-mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action
for the collection of the unpaid debt, except only for the recovery of whatever
deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation of the debtor-mortgagor after
deducting the bid price in the public auction sale of the mortgaged properties.
Accordingly, a deficiency judgment shall only issue after it is established that the
mortgaged property was sold at public auction for an amount less than the outstanding
obligation. (Marilag vs. Martinez, G.R. No. 201892, July 22, 2015)

Accordingly, to enable the extra judicial foreclosure of the REM of the petitioners, the
special power to sell should have been either inserted in the REM itself or embodied in a
separate instrument attached to the REM. But it is not disputed that no special power to
sell was either inserted in the REM or attached to the REM. Hence, the respondent
spouses as the foreclosing mortgagees could not initiate the extrajudicial foreclosure,
but must resort to judicial foreclosure pursuant to the procedure set forth in Rule 68 of
the Rules of Court. The omission of the special power to sell the property subject of the
mortgage was fatal to the validity and efficacy of the extrajudicial foreclosure, and
warranted the invalidation of the entire proceedings conducted by the sheriff. (Sps.
Baysa vs. Sps. Plantilla, G.R. No. 159271, July 13, 2015)

Before anything more, the Court clarifies that the failure of Apolinario Cruz to register
the certificate of sale was of no consequence in this adjudication. The registration of the
sale is required only in extrajudicial foreclosure sale because the date of the registration
is the reckoning point for the exercise of the right of redemption. In contrast, the
registration of the sale is superfluous in judicial foreclosure because only the equity of
redemption is granted to the mortgagor, except in mortgages with banking institutions.
The equity of redemption is the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the
mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the
90-day period after the judgment becomes final, or even after the foreclosure sale but
prior to the confirmation of the sale. In this light, it was patent error for the CA to
declare that: “By Apolinario Cruz’s failure to register the 18 March 1958 Certificate of
Absolute Salein the Office of the Register of Deeds, the period of redemption did not
commence to run.” (Robles vs. Yapcinco, G.R. No. 169568, October 22, 2014).

This is the mortgagor’s equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated, may be
exercised by him even beyond the 90-day period from the date of service of the order,
and even after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it be before the order of
confirmation of the sale. After such order of confirmation, no redemption can be
effected any longer. (Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 339 SCRA 534
[2000] cited in Rosales vs. Sps. Suba, G.R. No. 137792, August 12, 2003)
A mortgage contract may have a provision in which the mortgage is a security for past,
present, and future indebtedness. This clause known as a dragnet clause or blanket
mortgage clause has its origins in American jurisprudence. The Supreme Court ruled that
mortgages given to secure future advancements are valid and legal contracts
(Prudential Bank vs. Alciar, 464 SCRA 353 reiterated in PNB vs. Heirs of Sps. Alonday,
GR No. 171865, October 12, 2016.)

The confirmation of the sale shall divest the rights in the property of all parties to the
action and shall vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption
as may be allowed by law. The title vests in the purchaser upon a valid confirmation of
the sale and retroacts to the date of the sale (Grimalt vs. Vasquez, 36 Phil. 396).

In an action for judicial foreclosure of mortgage, the factual issues to be resolved are:
whether or not the debtor-mortgagor was in default, and whether the mortgagee has
the right to foreclose the mortgage (Mortel vs. Brundige, GR No. 190263, June 15,
2015)

RULE 69

Partition

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-
heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. IF REPUDIATED,
Reconveyance is proper and not Partition, however, prescription lies;

 In the case of Faustino Reyes, et. al. vs. Peter B. Enriquez, et. al.,
G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008, citing Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay vs.
Hon. Roy S. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999, the
Supreme Court ruled that:

“As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the ruling in the case of
Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay v. Hon. Roy del Rosario is applicable in the
case at bar. In the said case, the petitioners therein, claiming to be
the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay filed for
annulment of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of
Golden Bay Realty Corporation on the ground that the subject
properties rightfully belong to the petitioners’ predecessor and by
virtue of succession have passed on to them. In affirming the trial
court therein, this Court ruled:

...(T)he plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said

Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a
semblance of it — except the allegations that they are the legal
heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays — that they have been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple.
 Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings
in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property.

This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance.”

In the complaint for Partition, the plaintiff seeks:

(1) a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties;
(2) the conveyance of his lawful shares. (Vda. De Daffon vs. CA, et. al,
G.R. No. 129017, August 20, 2002);

The plaintiff is a person who is supposed to be a co-owner of the property or estate

sought to be partitioned. The defendants are all co-owners. All the co-owners must be
joined. Accordingly, an action will not lie without the joinder of all the co-owners and
other persons having interest in the property (Reyes vs. Cordero, 46 Phil. 658).

The provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the
properties co-owned. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that “partition in
general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in commonamong
those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value.” As to how
partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that “partition may
be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings.” The law does
not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. (Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson,
GR No. 2044494, July 27, 2016).

Action for partition cannot be barred by prescription as long as co-ownership exists

(Aguirre vs. CA, 421 SCRA 310).

RULE 70

Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

It bears emphasizing that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. However, the issue of ownership
may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining whi is
entitled to possession de facto. Therefore, the provisional determination of
ownership in the ejectment case cannot be closthed with finality. (Bradford
United Church of Christ, Inc. vs Ando, GR No. 195669, My 30, 2016).

The petitioner or respondents may still question the validity of the documents
used by the other party to support their claim of ownership, and to recover
possession and ownership of the subject property in a proper suit. (Baluyo y
Gamora vs. Spouses Dela Cruz, GR No. 197058, October 14, 2015).
 RULE 71

Contempt

Contempt is the disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice
and dignity. (Regalado v. Go, G.R. No. 167988, February 6, 2007);

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically
granted by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed,
there ought to be no question that the courts have the power by virtue of their very
creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their
lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and
insults of pollution. The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments,
orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of
justice. The reason behind the power to punish contempt is that respect of the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of
the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (Lorenzo Shipping Corporation
vs. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, August 31, 2011).