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ELEONORA PAPALEONTIOU-LOUCA
Frederick Institute of Technology, Cyprus
Introduction
Psychology in general and developmental psychology in particular are
presently awash in a ‘meta’ flood (metacognition, metamemory,
metaperception, metalanguage, and so on). It seems that these constructs
reflect a relatively new, stimulating and very attractive research perspective as
suggested by a number of review articles (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982;
Wellman, 1983; Schneider, 1985; Brown, 1987; Koutselini, 1995; Flavell, 1999;
Hacker, n.d.) During the last 30 years metacognition has become one of the
major fields of cognitive developmental research. Research activity in
metacognition began with John Flavell, who is considered to be the ‘father of
the field’ and thereafter a considerable amount of empirical and theoretical
research dealing with metacognition can be registered. Moreover, a number of
strategies aiming to enhance children’s metacognitive abilities have been
suggested, which teachers through all educational levels can apply in their
instruction. Such strategies are set out in the relevant section of this article
dealing with the development of metacognition in practice and contribute to
both the promotion of critical thinking in education and staff development.
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Eleonora Papaleontiou-Louca
The Concept of Metacognition
‘Metacognition’ is a concept that has been used to refer to a variety of
epistemological processes. Metacognition essentially means cognition about
cognition; that is, it refers to second-order cognitions: thoughts about
thoughts, knowledge about knowledge or reflections about actions. So if
cognition involves perceiving, understanding, remembering, and so forth, then
metacognition involves thinking about one’s own perceiving, understanding,
remembering, etc. These various cognitions about cognitions can be labeled
‘metaperception’, ‘metacomprehension’ and ‘metamemory’ with
‘metacognition’ remaining the superordinate term.
Flavell (1978) referred to it as ‘knowledge that takes as its object or
regulates any aspect of any cognitive endeavor’ (p. 8). Moore (1982) defines it
as ‘an individual’s knowledge about various aspects of thinking’ and it has also
been described as ‘the abilities of individuals to adjust their cognitive activity in
order to promote more effective comprehension’ (Gavelek & Raphael, 1985,
pp. 22-23).
Gradually, the concept has been broadened to include anything
psychological, rather than just anything cognitive. For instance, if one has
knowledge or cognition about one’s own or someone else’s emotions or
motives, this can be considered metacognitive. In fact, the recent literature
completes the term by adding to its cognitive domain the emotional one –
referring to the emotions that accompany the cognitive processes and the
person’s ability to monitor them as well as the domain of cognitive habits
(Matsaggouras, 1994). Similarly, Flavell (1979), when trying to define the
concept of metacognition, refers to all those conscious cognitive or affective
experiences that accompany and pertain to an intellectual enterprise.
Moreover, a definition of ‘metacognition’ according to Paris & Winograd
(1990) ‘captures two essential features …: self-appraisal and self-management
of cognition’ (p. 17). Self-appraisals are people’s personal reflections about
their own knowledge states and abilities, and their affective states concerning
their knowledge, abilities, motivation, and characteristics as learners. Such
reflections answer questions about ‘what you know, how you think, and when
and why to apply knowledge strategies’ (Paris & Winograd, 1990, p. 17). Self-
management refers to ‘metacognition in action’, that is, mental processes that
help to ‘orchestrate aspects of problem solving’ including ‘the plans that
learners make before tackling a task’, ‘the adjustments they make as they
work’, and ‘the revisions they make afterwards’ (p. 18). It is important to note,
here, that ‘theoreticians seem unanimous – the most effective learners are self-
regulating’ (Butler & Winne, 1995, p. 245). Key to effective self-regulation is
accurate self-assessment of what is known or not known (Schoenfeld, 1987).
Only when students know the state of their own knowledge can they
effectively self-direct learning to the unknown.
Recently, the definition of metacognition has been broadened and
includes not only ‘thoughts about thoughts’ as it was previously considered,
but the following notions as well: knowledge of one’s knowledge, processes,
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CONCEPT AND INSTRUCTION OF METACOGNITION
and cognitive and affective states; and the ability to consciously and
deliberately monitor and regulate one’s knowledge, processes, and cognitive
and affective states.
Although metacognition may turn out to be a fuzzy concept with
indistinct boundaries, key distinctions can be made and a scheme offered that
will be useful for organizing and assessing the experimental literature.
First, we can distinguish between knowledge and skills – between
‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’, the old distinction between theory and
practice, between competence and performance. One person may ‘know that’
they should distinguish relevant from irrelevant information in a problem, and
another person has the ability to do this in practice, perceiving what is relevant
in a ‘noisy’ environment. Similarly, one person may know that different
strategies can be applied in different problems, and another person has the
ability to select the suitable strategy, when needed, to resolve a problem.
Ann Brown (1987) distinguishes between knowledge about cognition,
and regulation of cognition. Knowledge about cognition can be ‘stable, stable
but fallible, or late developing’ information that human thinkers have about
their own cognitive processes, which usually remains relatively consistent
within individuals. Regulation, on the other hand, can be ‘relatively unstable,
rarely stable, and age independent’. Regulation of cognition refers to the
activities used to regulate and oversee learning. One may show self-regulatory
behavior in one situation but not another, and a child may show self-
regulatory behavior where an adult does not. Regulation may be also affected
by patterns of arousal (anxiety, fear, interest) and self-concept (self-esteem,
self-efficacy). These processes include planning activities (predicting outcomes,
scheduling strategies and various forms of vicarious trial and error, etc.) prior
to undertaking a problem; monitoring activities (monitoring, testing, revising,
and re-scheduling one’s strategies for learning) during learning; and checking
outcomes (evaluating the outcome of any strategic actions against criteria of
efficiency and effectiveness) at the end (Brown et al, 1983, in Flavell &
Markman, 1983).
Kluwe (1982) brought further definition to the concept of metacognition,
describing activities referred to as metacognitive: ‘(a) the thinking subject has
some knowledge about his own thinking and that of other persons; and (b) the
thinking subject may monitor and regulate the course of his own thinking, i.e.
may act as the causal agent of his own thinking’ (p. 202). Moreover, Kluwe
uses the term ‘executive processes’ to denote both monitoring and regulating
strategies. Executive monitoring processes involve one’s decisions that help: (a)
to identify the task on which one is currently working; (b) to check on current
progress of that work; (c) to evaluate that progress; and (d) to predict what the
outcome of that progress will be. Executive regulation processes are those that
are ‘directed at the regulation of the course of one’s own thinking’ (p. 212).
They involve one’s decisions that help (a) to allocate his or her resources to
the current task; (b) to determine the order of steps to be taken to complete
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Eleonora Papaleontiou-Louca
the task; and (c) to set the intensity or (d) the speed at which one should work
at the task (Hacker, n.d.)
Flavell (1981) makes a second important distinction between
metacognitive experiences and metacognitive knowledge. Metacognitive
experiences are conscious feelings during some cognitive activity that relate to
the process – for example, during a communication task, feeling that you do or
do not understand; or feeling hesitant about the choice you have made.
Metacognitive knowledge, on the other hand, is described by Flavell (1981) as
‘that part of your accumulated world knowledge that has to do with people as
cognitive agents and their cognitive tasks, goals, actions and experiences’.
Some examples of this kind of metacognition are: when you are able to
describe your understanding of what goes on, to explain and recognize feelings
of uncertainty or confusion in some people, etc. (These distinctions will be
elaborated in detail, later in this article.)
Briefly, ‘metacognition’ refers to all processes about cognition, such as sensing
something about one’s own thinking, thinking about one’s thinking and responding to
one’s own thinking by monitoring and regulating it. As for whether the term
‘metacognitive’ should be used to describe thoughts that were once
metacognitive but have since become non-conscious and automatic remains a
debatable issue. Nevertheless, many researchers adopt a convention that
reserves the term ‘metacognitive’ for conscious and deliberate thoughts that
have as their object other thoughts (e.g. Bracewell, 1983; Paris & Winograd,
1990; Borkowski & Muthukrishna, 1992; Carr et al, 1994; Davidson et al, 1994).
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CONCEPT AND INSTRUCTION OF METACOGNITION
solving functions, with the child taking initiative and the adult correcting
and guiding when s/he falters. Finally, the adult cedes control to the child
and functions primarily as a supportive and sympathetic audience. (Brown
& French, 1979, cited in Brown et al, 1983, p. 122)
In time, children become mature thinkers who provide conflict trials for
themselves, question their own basic assumptions, provide counterexamples
to their own rules, etc. In short, although a great deal of thinking and leading
may remain a social activity, through the process of internalization children
become capable of providing the supportive other role for themselves. In this
way, progressively, children learn not only how to get a particular task done
independently, but also how to set about learning new problems. In other
words, children learn how to learn. ‘Learning to learn’, of course, is not content-
free, neither does it refer to all learning, but it is specific to certain contexts.
It is important, however, to note here that metacognition is not equated
with learning or development, but the conscious and deliberate regulation of that
learning and development. Moreover, Vygotsky’s theory of language plays an
important role in thinking, mediating and directing the individual’s cognitive
endeavors. Together with this mediating role of language, Vygotsky’s
emphasis on social interactions stresses the sociocultural basis of self-
regulation and leads to the fourth metacognitive issue discussed by Brown
(1987): ‘the transference from other-regulation to self-regulation’ (pp. 88-103).
As to the question of how the individual eventually reaches both
reflective awareness (knowledge about cognition) and deliberate control of his
own cognition (regulation of cognition), Vygotsky’s theory (1986) focuses our
attention on verbalized self-observation (introspection). This implies that the
child perceives his own cognitive processes as meaningful. This view of a close
connection between knowledge about cognition and control of cognition is
made clearer in his study Mind in Society (1978).
What is apparent, however, is that many topics discussed in
contemporary metacognitive research are integral parts of Vygotsky’s (1978,
1986) theory of cognitive development; undoubtedly he pioneered an
approach to metacognition that cannot be easily disputed.
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Eleonora Papaleontiou-Louca
The first two have already been mentioned earlier, but will be analyzed in
detail below. As for the last two, Flavell states that goals (or tasks) refer to the
objectives of a cognitive enterprise, while actions (or strategies) refer to the
cognitions or other behaviors employed to achieve them.
Flavell’s (1981, p. 40) model of cognitive monitoring is illustrated in
Figure 1.
Let us now turn our attention to the analysis of metacognitive knowledge and
metacognitive experience, as proposed by their introducer, Flavell.
Metacognitive Knowledge
This refers to the segment of acquired world knowledge that has to do with
cognitive matters. It is the knowledge or beliefs accumulated through
experience and stored in long-term memory that concern the human mind and
its doings. Some of this stored knowledge is declarative (‘knowing that’) and
some of it is procedural (‘knowing how’), for example, your declarative
knowledge of how and when to supplement poor memory by the use of
shopping lists and other external memory aids (cf. Chi, 1984, in Flavell, 1985).
One’s knowledge of any given metacognitive item, could, of course, be both
declarative and procedural. For example, one might both know as a
verbalizable fact that writing a shopping list is a good memory strategy and
also ‘know how’ to write them on appropriate occasions.
As already made clear, metacognitive knowledge consists primarily of
knowledge or beliefs about what factors or variables act and interact to affect
the course and outcome of cognitive enterprises. These factors or variables fall
into three major categories: person, task and strategy.
The person category encompasses everything that you might believe about
the nature of yourself and other people as cognitive processors. It can be
further categorized into beliefs about intraindividual differences,
interindividual differences, and universals of cognition. An example of the first
subcategory would be one’s belief that one person remembers more easily
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CONCEPT AND INSTRUCTION OF METACOGNITION
than another; of the second, a belief that one can learn most things better by
listening than by reading; of the third subcategory, the ascertainment that we
usually forget many of the things we have learned as time passes.
The second category is knowledge of task variables. The individual learns
something about how the nature of the information encountered affects and
constrains how one should deal with it. An example would be the knowledge
that it is easier to learn the essence or gist of something, such as a story, than it
is to learn it verbatim.
Strategy variables are about what strategies are likely to be effective in
achieving which goals in which sorts of cognitive undertakings. A child may
come to believe, for example, that one good way to learn and retain
information is to pay particular attention to the main points and try to repeat
them to him/herself in his/her own words.
Finally, most metacognitive knowledge actually concerns interactions or
combinations among two or three of these three types of variables. To
illustrate a combination involving all three, one might believe that a pupil
(unlike his/her brother – person variable) should use strategy A (rather than
strategy B – strategy variable) in task X (as contrasted with task Y – task
variable) (Flavell, 1979, 1987).
Metacognitive knowledge can have a number of concrete and important
effects on the cognitive enterprises of children and adults. It can lead
somebody to select, evaluate, revise and abandon cognitive tasks, goals, and
strategies. Furthermore, it can lead to any of a wide variety of metacognitive
experiences and help us interpret the meaning and behavioral implications of
these metacognitive experiences.
Metacognitive Experiences
The other major conceptual entity in the taxonomy is metacognitive
experiences. Metacognitive experiences can be fully or less fully conscious and
verbalizable, brief or lengthy, simple or complex in context. What makes them
metacognitive experiences rather than experiences of another kind is that they
have to do with some cognitive (and often affective) endeavor or enterprise,
most frequently a current, ongoing one. For example, if one suddenly has the
anxious feeling that one does not understand something and wants and needs
to understand it, that feeling would be a metacognitive experience.
One is having a metacognitive experience whenever one has the feeling
that something is hard to perceive, comprehend, remember or solve; if there is
a feeling that one is far from the cognitive goal. Metacognitive experiences are
especially likely to occur in situations that stimulate a lot of careful, highly
conscious thinking, and provide many opportunities for thoughts and feelings
about your own thinking to arise. They may also occur at any time before,
during or after a cognitive endeavor; may be more apt to occur when the
cognitive situation is something between completely novel and completely
familiar; and when attentional and mnemonic resources are not wholly
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Eleonora Papaleontiou-Louca
preempted by more urgent subjective experiences, such as pain, anxiety, or
depression. Thus, a metacognitive experience can be any kind of affective or
cognitive conscious experience that is pertinent to conduct in an ongoing
cognitive situation or enterprise (Flavell, 1979, 1987).
Metacognitive experiences can have very important effects on cognitive
goals or tasks, metacognitive knowledge and cognitive actions or strategies.
First, they can lead somebody to establish new goals or revise old ones.
Experiences of puzzlement or failure, for example, can have any of these
effects. Second, metacognitive experiences can affect one’s metacognitive
knowledge store by adding to it, deleting from it, or revising it, as in Piaget’s
(Nelson, 1992) model of assimilation and accommodation. Finally,
metacognitive experiences can activate strategies aimed at either cognitive or
metacognitive goals. As an example of the former, one senses (metacognitive
experience) that one does not yet know a certain chapter in a text well enough
to pass tomorrow’s exam, so one reads it through once more (the cognitive
goal here is to improve one’s knowledge). As an example of the latter, one
wonders (metacognitive experience) whether one understands the chapter
well enough to pass tomorrow’s exam, so one tries to find out by asking
oneself questions about it and noting how well one is able to answer them (the
metacognitive goal here is to assess one’s own knowledge).
Adding to the concept of metacognition, Efklides (2002) introduces
another aspect of it, one that serves the control of cognition, namely,
metacognitive skills. Since the components of metacognition serve the
monitoring rather than the control of cognition (Brown, 1978), one could refer
to this new aspect of metacognition as one which serves the control of
cognition. Metacognitive skills refer to conscious control processes such as
planning, monitoring of the progress of processing, effort allocation, strategy
use and regulation of cognition.
Before ending up with this model it must be noted that metacognitive
knowledge, metacognitive experiences and metacognitive skills form partially
overlapping sets. Some experiences have the same knowledge as their content
and some do not. Some knowledge may become conscious and comprise such
experiences and some may never do so.
Moreover, metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive experiences and
metacognitive skills complement and enrich each other. For example, not only
does some kind of metacognitive knowledge seem to be needed for one to
interpret properly and act upon metacognitive experience, but conversely,
metacognitive experience also contributes information about persons, tasks,
and strategies to one’s developing store of metacognitive knowledge. The
ideas and feelings one experiences while watching or playing, say, tennis,
might contribute to the knowledge of tennis.
To put it simply, it seems likely that metacognitive knowledge,
metacognitive experience, and metacognitive skills are constantly informing
and eliciting one another during the course of a cognitive task.
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CONCEPT AND INSTRUCTION OF METACOGNITION
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Eleonora Papaleontiou-Louca
– encourage the student to generate questions before, during and after the
elaboration of a subject;
– help the student to perceive entities, connections, relations, similarities
and differences;
– enable the student to become aware of the criteria for assessment.
In their effort to promote metacognitive development in students, teachers
should also offer them opportunities for the fostering of metacognitive
experiences, which, in turn, will provide input to permanent metacognitive
knowledge.
Two important metacognitive experiences that have to be promoted are
consciousness and introspection. Teachers can engage children in cognitive
enterprises that should produce specifiable metacognitive ideas and feelings.
They can try to get them to attend to these ideas and feelings; to help them
understand their meanings and implications for subsequent cognitive action;
and to teach them how to generate metacognitive experiences, as well as to
respond appropriately to them. In communicative situations, students can
acquire self-control and monitoring when they keep exchanging roles as
speakers and listeners or when they have to analyze messages as cognitive
objects in order to understand each other, and so on. Research has also
proposed a range of various strategies aiming to develop children’s
metacognition and lead them to learn how to learn (Costa, 1987; Flavell, 1987;
Blakey & Spence, 1990; Koutselini, 1995; Trilianos, 1997).
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CONCEPT AND INSTRUCTION OF METACOGNITION
Generating Questions
Almost by definition, learner-generated questions involve a high degree of
metacognitive involvement because the learner is acting independently in
monitoring and regulating his or her own comprehension. They actually serve
two important metacognitive functions: the monitoring of learners’ current
understanding and seeking of information in situations where the necessary
information is not available or part of their knowledge store. The ability to
determine the presence, absence, and completeness of information required
for one’s own individual comprehension is metacognitive in nature. By asking
their own questions, students frequently pause and think about whether, for
instance, they know main characters or events, if they are grasping the
concept, if they can relate it to what they already know, if they can give other
examples, and whether they can use the main idea to explain other ideas or
predict what may come next (Costa, 1987; Koutselini, 1995; Trilianos, 1997).
All these help students become more self-aware and take conscious
control of their own studying; and as is often said: ‘Teach somebody how to
ask questions and she or he will learn how to learn for the rest of his/her life’
(Costa, 1987; Koutselini, 1995; Trilianos, 1997).
Choosing Consciously
Teachers can promote metacognition by helping students explore the
consequences of their choices and decisions, prior to the decision, during the
act of deciding and after the decision. Students will then be able to perceive
causal relationships among their choices, their actions, and the results they
achieve. Providing non-judgmental feedback to students about the effects of
their behaviors and decisions on others and on their environment helps them
become aware of their own behaviors (Costa, 1987; Koutselini, 1995; Trilianos,
1997).
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Eleonora Papaleontiou-Louca
reasons for their decisions, remind the child where she or he is with respect to
the goal, call his or her attention to relevant perceptual or conceptual facts and
arrange the environment in such a way that she or he can deal with each step
in the problem separately (Trilianos, 1997).
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CONCEPT AND INSTRUCTION OF METACOGNITION
say in order to communicate effectively and at the same time they enhance
their level of thinking (Costa, 1987; Koutselini, 1995; Trilianos, 1997).
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Eleonora Papaleontiou-Louca
Role Playing
Role playing can promote metacognition because when students assume the
roles of other persons, they consciously maintain the attributes and
characteristics of that person. Dramatization serves as a hypothesis or
prediction of how that person would think, feel or react in a particular
situation. Taking on another role contributes to the reduction of egocentric
perceptions (Costa, 1987; Trilianos, 1997).
‘Thinking Aloud’
One of the most effective ways of helping students to organize and enhance
their thoughts is to invite them to ‘think aloud’ while they are working,
especially during problem solving processes. Talking about thinking is
important because students need a thinking vocabulary. Besides, inviting
students to describe their thinking (goals, plans, strategies, means to be used,
etc.), and explain their choices, seems to produce more thinking. This strategy,
as suggested by Vygotsky’s ‘egocentric speech’, not only facilitates thought
and accelerates the problem solving process, but also enables the individual to
induce more deliberate planning, helping the learning process, as well as the
transfer of the rules applied to similar situations (Brown, 1987; Garner, 1987;
Blakey & Spence, 1990).
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CONCEPT AND INSTRUCTION OF METACOGNITION
Modeling
Of all the instructional techniques suggested, the one which probably
influences most students is that of teacher modeling. During planning and
problem solving situations, teachers should think aloud so that the students
can follow demonstrating thinking processes. Since students learn best by
imitating the adults around them, the teacher who publicly demonstrates
metacognition will probably produce students who metacogitate. One way to
make strategy thinking public is for the teacher to render the covert cognitive
and metacognitive processes in overt form by thinking aloud while modeling
task completion. Some other indicators of teachers’ public metacognitive
behavior might be: sharing their planning, describing their goals and objectives
and giving reasons for their actions; seeking feedback and evaluation of their
actions from others; admitting they do not know an answer but designing
ways to produce one, and so on. Besides, modeling offers the vocabulary
students need for thinking and talking about their own thinking.
Metacognitive strategies are already in teachers’ repertoires. We must
become alert to these strategies, and consciously model them for students
(Costa, 1987; Blakey & Spence, 1990; Trilianos, 1997).
In the long run, all these strategies tend to develop self-awareness, self-
control and self-regulation; that is, they aim to make students independent
learners and enable them to learn how to learn:
Surprisingly, metacognitive awareness is not uniformly developed in
students. In reading, even college age students are unaware of how they
can approach texts, plan their studying, or work through problems that
have stumped them. In writing, inexpert writers follow one procedure
again and again without flexibility, even in the face of persistent failure.
However, teachers can promote awareness of strategies for thinking by
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Eleonora Papaleontiou-Louca
engaging their students in activities that require reflection. Students can
keep and share a ‘process log’ where they write about the processes they
employ in writing, reading, or problem solving generally. As students
share their entries, they gain an awareness of alternatives to their own
processes, and the teacher can direct them to consider specific strategies.
Teachers, as expert readers and writers, can also make their thinking
strategies explicit by ‘thinking-aloud’ with students as they read and write
together. Group work or discussion time can also regularly include a
‘process observer’, namely a participant who agrees to pay attention to
how the interaction progresses and to report to the group an analysis of its
process. Activities like these, that require students to make the sometimes
invisible work of thinking visible and explicit, help all students to
understand that as thinkers, they are in charge. (School Improvement in
Maryland, n.d.)
However, in order to reach the stage of self-regulation, according to Vygotsky,
the individual should be able to control his or her own cognition with the help
of inner speech, through the process of internalization. To reach this stage,
one has to experience first the stage of egocentric speech, which ‘serves mental
orientation, conscious understanding; it helps overcoming difficulties; it is
speech for oneself, intimately and usefully connected with the child’s thinking’
(Vygotsky, 1986, p. 228).
This is the reason why teachers at school should – and often do –
encourage students to think aloud; for talking to oneself not only facilitates
and organizes thinking, but also helps students internalize the principles they
verbalize and make them an integral part of their own cognition. There is
satisfactory evidence that language facilitates and enhances metacognition,
though the contrary is probably also true. This is apparent not only in the
thinking aloud strategy, but in other metacognitive strategies as well where
language is inevitably involved; such as generating questions by the learners,
justifying the choices and decisions one makes, describing the steps one
follows in a problem solving situation, identifying and correcting the errors
made, evaluating the process of thinking, the strategies followed and the
results, role playing activities and so on. This is also true in topics such as ‘oral
communication, oral persuasion, oral comprehension, writing, language
acquisition, problem solving, social cognition and various types of self-control
and self-instruction’ (Flavell, 1979, p. 906). In all these activities language is
being both fostered and developed, and at the same time, it is fostering such
abilities as self-awareness and self-control, that is, it develops metacognition.
This is also true in all those activities encouraged by schools where students
are asked to express their thoughts either orally or in writing.
Expressive talking and expressive writing require their producers to tap into
their memory, establish what they know, review the information they have
generated and translate it into inner or verbalized speech (or print), organize
main ideas into logical sequences, discover specific support for those main
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CONCEPT AND INSTRUCTION OF METACOGNITION
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Eleonora Papaleontiou-Louca
organism should need to plan ahead and critically evaluate alternative plans.
Fifth, if it has to make weighty, carefully considered decisions, the organism
will require metacognitive skills. Finally, it should have a need or
proclivity for inferring and explaining psychological events in itself and
others, a penchant for engaging in those metacognitive acts termed social
cognition. Needless to say, human beings are organisms with just these
properties. (p. 27)
Flavell (1979) also states:
I find it hard to believe that children who do more cognitive monitoring
would not learn better both in and out of school than children who do
less. I also think that increasing the quantity and quality of children’s
metacognitive knowledge and monitoring skills through systematic
training may be feasible as well as desirable. (p. 910)
The above seems especially true, if we consider that students at school cannot
plan ahead, choose the right strategy every time to solve a particular task,
monitor and evaluate the acts and results of their work, and so on, unless they
have mastered some kind of metacognitive ability. More importantly,
metacognitive development leads students to independent learning, more
permanent knowledge, motivation for learning and higher achievement
(Koutselini, 1995) as shown in Figure 2.
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CONCEPT AND INSTRUCTION OF METACOGNITION
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Eleonora Papaleontiou-Louca
learned. Besides, this is the great advantage of metacognition: it enables
learners to know what and how they know, and to apply this knowledge
across different settings, without having to relearn it, in every context.
In the 1980s, teaching for thinking (cognition) and its development was
presumably the most important educational discovery (Calfee, 1981, cited in
Koutselini, 1995). For the new century, metacognition has been an indicator of
the ‘educated intellect’ in which we place most of our expectations for
effective teaching and learning, and for the development of active, creative and
independent lifelong learners. This is what children require and is a pressing
need for the new century.
Correspondence
Eleonora Papaleontiou-Louca, 4 Ag. Frangiskou-Assizis, CY-6050 Larnaca,
Cyprus (eleonoralouca@hotmail.com).
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