Dolly M.E. Filartiga and Joel Filartiga v.

Americo Norberto Peña-Irala

Summary
The Filártiga family, Dolly and Dr. Joel Filártiga, Paraguay nationals, claim
that on 29 March 1976, Dr. Filártiga’s seventeen-year-old son Joelito Filártiga
was kidnapped and tortured to death by the Inspector General of Police in
Asuncion at that time, Américo Norberto Peña-Irala (Peña). They claim that
Joelito was maltreated because his father was a longstanding opponent of the
government of Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner who ruled over the
country since 1954.

In 1978, Joelito’s sister Dolly Filártiga and (separately) Américo Peña came
to the United States. Dolly applied for political asylum, while Peña stayed
under a visitor's visa. Dolly learned of Peña's presence in the United States
and reported it to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, who arrested
and ordered the deportation of Peña for staying well past the expiration of his
visa.
Immediately after, on 6 April 1979, the Filártiga family filed a complaint
before US courts alleging that Peña had wrongfully caused Joelito's death by
torture and seeking compensatory and punitive damages of $ 10,000,000. In
support of federal jurisdiction, the Filártiga family relied on the Alien Tort
Claims Act, a federal statute of 1789. They also sought to enjoin Peña’s
deportation to ensure his availability for testimony at trial. The District Court
for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the case on the grounds that
subject matter jurisdiction was absent and for forum non conveniens, but on
appeal the Filártiga family succeeded: the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit,
ruled that even though the Filártiga family did not consist of US nationals and
that the crime was committed outside the US, the family was allowed to bring
a claim before US courts. It held that torture was a violation of the laws of
nations and that federal jurisdiction was provided.

Procedural history
On 6 April 1979, the Filártiga family, Dolly and Dr. Joel Filártiga, brought
a complaint in the Eastern District of New York against Peña for wrongfully
causing the death of Dr. Filartiga's seventeen-year old son, Joelito. Also
compensatory and punitive damages of 10 million dollar were sought. The
suit was filed under a previously little-used 1789 federal statute, the Alien
Tort Claims Act, which gives foreign nationals the right to sue for wrongful
actions that violate international law.

On 15 May 1979, the District Court dismissed the action for want of subject

matter jurisdiction.
The Filártiga family appealed. On 16 October 1979, the case was heard by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

Related developments
On 10 January 1984, the US District Court for the Eastern District of New
York   entered judgment   against Peña and in favour of the father for
$5,210,364 and in favour of the sister for $5,175,000.

Legally relevant facts

The crimes were committed outside the US, namely in Paraguay. Neither the
plaintiffs nor the defendant were nationals of the US.

Core legal questions

• Does an act of torture violate the law of nations? (p. 2)

• Can a foreign national bring a case before federal courts for civil
redress, for acts, which occurred abroad? (p. 6)

Specific legal rules and provisions

 • Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350

Court's holding and analysis

The Court of Appeal reversed the District Court’s decision, and declared that
foreign nationals who are victims of international human rights violations
may sue their misfeasors in federal court for civil redress, even for acts,
which occurred abroad, so long as the court has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. In particular, the Court held that ‘whenever an alleged torturer is
found and served with process by an alien within our borders, § 1350
provides federal jurisdiction’ (p. 2).
The Court of Appeal further ruled that freedom from torture is guaranteed
under customary international law. The prohibition as such ‘is clear and
unambiguous, and admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens and
citizens’ (p. 5). In addition, the Court of Appeal held that ‘an act of torture
committed by a state official against one held in detention violates established
norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of
nations’ (p. 3).

In respect of perpetrators of torture in general, the Court famously held that

‘for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and
slave trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind’ (p.
9).
United States vs. Fawaz Yunis
FACTS:

On June 11, 1985, appellant and four other men boarded Royal Jordanian
Airlines Flight 402 before its scheduled departure from Beirut, Lebanon.
They wore civilian clothes and carried military assault rifles, ammunition
bandoleers, and hand grenades. Appellant took control and forced the pilot to
take off immediately. The remaining hijackers tied up Jordanian air marshals
assigned to the flight and held the civilian passengers, including two
American citizens, captive in their seats. The hijackers explained that they
wanted the plane to fly to Tunis, where a conference of the Arab League was
under way. The hijackers
further explained that they wanted a meeting with delegates to the conference
and that their ultimate goal was removal of all Palestinians from Lebanon.

After a refueling stop in Cyprus, the airplane headed for Tunis but turned
away when authorities blocked the airport runway. Following a refueling stop
at Palermo, Sicily, another attempt to land in Tunis, and a second stop in
Cyprus, the plane returned to Beirut, where more hijackers came aboard.
These reinforcements included an official of Lebanon's Amal Militia, the
group at whose direction Yunis claims he acted.

The plane then took off for Syria, but was turned away and went back to
Beirut. There, the hijackers released the passengers, held a press
conference reiterating their demand that Palestinians leave Lebanon, blew up
the plane, and fled from the airport. An American investigation identified
Yunis as the probable leader of the hijackers and prompted U.S. civilian and
military agencies, led by FBI to plan Yunis' arrest. After obtaining an arrest
warrant, the FBI put "Operation Goldenrod" into effect. Undercover FBI
agents lured Yunis onto a yacht in the eastern Mediterranean Sea with
promises of a drug deal, and arrested him once the vessel entered
international waters. The agents transferred Yunis to a United States Navy
munitions ship and interrogated him for several days. Yunis was then taken
from there to Washington, D.C. In Washington, Yunis was arraigned on an
original indictment charging him with conspiracy, hostage taking, and aircraft
damage. A grand jury subsequently returned a superseding indictment adding
additional aircraft damage counts and a charge of air piracy.

Yunis filed several pretrial motions, among them a motion to suppress

statements he made while aboard the munitions ship. In United States v.
Yunis (Yunis I), this court reversed a district court order suppressing the
statements, and authorized their introduction at trial. Yunis, at the trial,
admitted participation in the hijacking at trial but offered the affirmative
defense of obedience to military orders, asserting that he acted on instructions
given by his superiors in Lebanon's Amal Militia. The jury convicted Yunis of
conspiracy, hostage taking, and air piracy. However, it acquitted him of three
other charged offenses that went to trial: violence against people on board an
aircraft, aircraft damage, and placing a
destructive device aboard an aircraft. The district court imposed concurrent
sentences of five years for conspiracy, thirty years for hostage taking, and
twenty years for air piracy.
Yunis appeals his conviction and seeks dismissal of the indictment. Yunis
argues that the district court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction to
try him on the charges and that the indictment should have been dismissed
because the government seized him in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act
and withheld classified materials useful to his defense, and that the
convictions should be reversed because of errors in the jury instructions.

ISSUE:
WON the district court has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:

1. Hostage Taking Act The Hostage Taking Act (Section 1203) provides , in
relevant part:
(a) Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, seizes or detains
and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order
to compel a third person or a governmental organization to do or to abstain
from any act ... shall be punished by imprisonment by any term of years or
for life. (b)(1) It is not an offense under this section if the conduct required
for the offense occurred outside the United States unless--
(A) the offender or the person seized or detained is a national of the United
States;
(B) the offender is found in the United States; or
(C) the governmental organization sought to be compelled is the Government
of the United States.

Yunis claims that this statute cannot apply to an individual who is brought to
the United States by force, since those convicted under it must be "found in
the United States." But this ignores the law's plain language. Subsections (A),
(B), and (C) of section 1203(b)(1) offer independent bases for jurisdiction
where "the offense occurred outside the United States." Since two of the
passengers on Flight 402 were U.S. citizens, section 1203(b)(1)(A),
authorizing assertion of U.S. jurisdiction is satisfied. The statute's
jurisdictional requirement has been met regardless of whether or not Yunis
was "found" within the United States under section 1203(b)(1)(B).
Appellant's argument that we should read the Hostage Taking Act differently
to avoid tension with international law falls flat. There is no treaty
obligations of the United States that give us pause. Indeed, Congress intended
through the Hostage Taking Act to execute the International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, which authorizes any signatory state to
exercise jurisdiction over persons who take its nationals hostage "if that State
considers it appropriate."
The district court concluded that two jurisdictional theories of international
law, the "universal principle" and the "passive personal principle,” supported
assertion of U.S. jurisdiction to prosecute Yunis on hijacking and hostage-
taking charges. Under the universal principle, states may prescribe and
prosecute "certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of
aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism," even
absent any special connection between the state and the offense. Under the
passive personal principle, a state may punish non-nationals for crimes
committed against its nationals outside of its territory, at least where the state
has a particularly strong interest in the crime. Relying primarily on the
RESTATEMENT, Yunis argues that hostage taking has not been recognized
as a universal crime and that the passive personal principle authorizes
assertion of jurisdiction over alleged hostage takers only where the victims
were seized because they were nationals of the prosecuting state.

Whatever merit appellant's claims may have as a matter of international law,

they cannot prevail before this court. Yunis seeks to portray international law
as a self-executing code that trumps domestic law whenever the two conflict.
That effort misconceives the role of judges as appliers of international law
and as participants in the federal system. Our duty is to enforce the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, not to conform the law
of the land to norms of customary international law. "Statutes inconsistent
with principles of customary international law may well lead to international
law violations. But within the domestic legal realm, that inconsistent statute
simply modifies or supersedes customary international law to the extent of
the inconsistency." To be sure, courts should hesitate to give penal statutes
extraterritorial effect absent a clear congressional directive. Similarly, courts
will not blind themselves to potential violations of international law where
legislative intent is ambiguous.

2. Antihijacking Act
The Antihijacking Act provides for criminal punishment of persons who
hijack aircraft operating wholly outside the "special aircraft jurisdiction” of
the United States, provided that the hijacker is later "found in the United
States." Flight 402, a Jordanian aircraft operating outside of the United
States, was not within this nation's special aircraft jurisdiction. Yunis urges
this court to interpret the statutory requirement that persons
prosecuted for air piracy must be "found" in the United States as precluding
prosecution of alleged hijackers who are brought here to stand trial. But the
issue before us is more fact-specific, since Yunis was indicted for air piracy
while awaiting trial on hostage-taking and other charges; we must determine
whether, once arrested and brought to this country on those other charges,
Yunis was subject to prosecution under the Antihijacking Act as well.
The Antihijacking Act of 1974 was enacted to fulfill this nation's
responsibilities under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft which requires signatory nations to extradite or punish
hijackers "present in" their territory. This suggests that Congress intended the
statutory term "found in the United States" to parallel the Hague Convention's
"present in [a contracting state's] territory," a phrase which does not indicate
the voluntariness limitation urged by Yunis. Moreover, Congress interpreted
the Hague Convention as requiring the United States to extradite or prosecute
"offenders in its custody," evidencing no concern as to how alleged hijackers
came within U.S. territory. From this legislative history we conclude that
Yunis was properly indicted under section 1472(n) once in the United States
and under arrest on other charges.

The district court correctly found that international law does not restrict this
statutory jurisdiction to try Yunis on charges of air piracy. Aircraft hijacking
may well be one of the few crimes so clearly condemned under the law of
nations that states may assert universal jurisdiction to bring offenders to
justice, even when the state has no territorial connection to the hijacking and
its citizens are not involved. But in any event we are satisfied that the
Antihijacking Act authorizes assertion of federal jurisdiction to try Yunis
regardless of hijacking's status vel non as a universal crime. Thus, we affirm
the district court on this issue. For the foregoing reasons, the convictions are
Affirmed.

PERKINS VS DIZON
FACTS:
 
Eugene Arthur Perkins instituted an action against in the RTC Manila against
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the (1) non-payment of the
shares of stock registered in his name, and (2) recognition of his right to the
control and disposal of said shares.

The company filed its answer alleging that the withholding of the shares and
non-recognition of plaintiff’s right to the disposal and control of said shares is
due to the demand of Idonah Slade Perkins and George H. Engelhard. The
answer prays that the adverse claimants be made parties to the action and
served with notice thereof by publication, and that all such parties be required
to interplead and settle the rights among themselves. The trial court ordered
Eugene Perkins to include in his complaint as parties defendants, Idonah
Perkins and George Engelhard.

The complaint was accordingly amended and in addition to the relief prayed
for in the original complaint, Eugene Perkins prayed that Idonah Perkins and
George Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock.

Thereafter, summons by publication were served upon the non-resident

defendants. Idonah Perkins and George Engelhard, pursuant to the Order of
the trial court, filed an answer to the amended complaint. Idonah Perkins filed
her pleading entitled “Objection to Venue, Motion to Quash, and Demurrer to
Jurisdiction”, wherein she challenged the jurisdiction of the lower court over
her person.

The trial court rejected/overruled Idonah Perkin’s objection, motion and

demurrer, and her motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, Idonah Perkins brought the instant Petition for Certiorari, praying that
the summons of publication issued against her be declared null and void, and
respondent Judge be permanently prohibited from taking any action on the
case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the lower court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Idonah
Perkins as a non-resident defendant;
2.   Notwithstanding the want of jurisdiction,   whether the court
may validly try
the case.

RULING:
(1) The Court noticed that the pleas made by Idonah Perkins over the subject-
matter is not an independent grounds for relief, but merely an additional
arguments to support her contention that the lower court has no jurisdiction
over her person because (1) she is a non-resident, (2) the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; and (3) the issues had already been
decided by the New York court, and are being relitigated in California court.

The court believed that Idonah Perkins has not submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Voluntary appearance cannot be implied from a
mistaken reasoning but from the nature of the relief prayed for.

(2) The amended complaint brought by Eugene Perkins against Idonah

Perkins seeks to exclude her from any interest in a property located in the
Philippines. That property consists of shares of stock in Benguet Consolidate
Mining Company which is organized in the Philippines under the provisions
of Spanish Code of Commerce, with principal office in Manila, and which
conducts mining activities in the Philippines.

The situs of the shares is in the jurisdiction where the corporation is created,
whether the certificate of ownership of shares is within or without that
jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, the Court held that the action brought
is QUASI IN REM.

The action being a quasi in rem, RTC Manila has jurisdiction over the person
of the non-resident. In order to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due
process, summons has been served upon her by publication. The action being
a quasi in rem, the relief that may be granted by the Philippine court must be
confined to the res; it having no jurisdiction to render a personal  judgment
against the non-resident. In the amended complaint file by Eugene Perkins,
no money judgment or other relief in personam is prayed for against Idonah
Perkins. The onl relief sought is that she be declared to be without any
interest/claim or be excluded in the shares in controversy.
LAZARO RAYRAY, plaintiff-appellant, versus CHAE KYUNG LEE,
defendant-appellee G.R. NO. 18176, October 26, 1966]

“A court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for annulment of marriage,
provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the
forum.”

FACTS:

Lazaro Rayray married Chae Kyung Lee in 1952 in Pusan, Korea. Before the
marriage, Lee was able to secure a marriage license which is a requirement in
Korea prior to marrying. They lived together until 1955. Rayray however
later found out that Lee had previously lived with 2 Americans and a Korean.
Lee answered by saying that it is not unusual in Korea for a woman to have
more than one partner and that it is legally permissive for them to do so and
that there is no legal impediment to her marriage with Rayray. Eventually
they pursued their separate way. Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment
of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter's
whereabouts is unknown; summons was served by publication, as provided in
the Rules of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved that defendant be declared in
default, she not having filed an answer, and that a date be set for the reception
of his evidence. In due course, thereafter, the lower court decision was
rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint, without costs, upon the ground: (1)
that the court could not nullify a marriage contracted abroad; and (2) that the
facts proven do not warrant the relief prayed for. A reconsideration of this
decision having been denied, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which certified the case to the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower
court being in issue in the appeal. The court a quo found that it had no
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant,
it having been solemnized in Seoul, Korea. Said conclusion is erroneous. In
order that a given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it must
have jurisdiction over (1) the subjectmatter of the litigation; (2) the person of
the parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject was subject to the jurisdiction before
Philippine trial courts? In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant. However,
unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the
parties. A proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking
to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims
assailed.
HELD:
The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res,
in an action for annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is
domiciled in, or a national of, the forum. Since plaintiff is a Filipino,
domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the lower court had jurisdiction

over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the
parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the
marriage between the parties herein. The lower court is correct in ruling that
Rayray’s evidence is not sufficient to render his marriage with Lee null and
void. Rayray said that the police clearance secured by Lee is meant to allow
her to marry after her subsequent cohabitation/s with the other men – which
are considered bigamous in Philippine law. The SC ruled that the police
clearance is wanting for it lacks the signature of the person who prepared it
and there is no competent document to establish the identity of the same.
Also, through Rayray himself, Lee averred that it is ok in Korea for a person
who cohabited with other men before to marry another man. This is an
indication that Lee herself is aware that if it were a previous marriage that is
concerned then that could be a legal impediment to any subsequent marriage.
Rayray cannot be given credence in claiming that his consent could have
been otherwise altered had he known all these facts prior to the marriage
because he would lie to every opportunity given him by the Court so as to
suit his case. Thus, petition is DENIED with the cost against the plaintiff-
appellant.

G.R. No. 127692 March 10, 2004 FORTUNATO GOMEZ and AURORA
GOMEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ADOLFO TROCINO
and MARIANO TROCINO, respondents.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1975, the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two
parcels of land. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed. The respondent
spouses Trocino sold the property to petitioner’s spouses who in turn,
redeemed the lands from mortgagee. The spouses Trocino, however, refused
to convey ownership of the properties to petitioners; hence, spouses Gomez
sued spouses Trocino for delivery of titles. The husband Trocino died before
the suit was filed, thus his children Adolfo and Mariano impleaded in the suit.
Summons was served and it was only received by Caridad Trocino in behalf
of the children. The RTC rendered judgment against the spouses Trocino and
the heirs.Adolfo and Mariano Trocino petitioned for the annulment of the
judgment of the RTC with the CA alleging that no jurisdiction was acquired
over them. At that time Adolfo Trocino was already residing in Ohio, U.S.A
and Mariano Trocino was in Talibon, Bohol. And both were not found in
Cebu City at the time summons were served.

ISSUE: 1. What was the nature of the complaint, upon which the manner
of the service of summons should be based? 2. Was there a valid service
of summons? 3. If personal service were impossible to comply what
should have been done?

RULING:

1. The action was an action in personam, while it is a real action because it

affects title or possession of the land, it does not automatically follow that the
action is one in rem. But it is an action against a person on the basis of the
personal liability of non delivery of the titles. Thus, personal service of
summons upon the private respondents is essential in order for the court to
acquire jurisdiction over the person. 2. There was no valid summons. In
actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by
tendering it to him. This is specifically provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court. In substituted service, it is mandated that the fact of
impossibility of personal service should be explained in the proof of service.
When the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of
summons within the State is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over
his person.

This cannot be done if the defendant is not physically present in the country,
and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore
cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An exception was
accorded in Gemperle vs. Schenker wherein service of summons through the
non-resident’s wife, who was a resident of the Philippines, was held valid, as
the latter was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed
by the non-resident, and the second case was merely an offshoot of the first
case.

The manner of summons must be distinguished Adolfo Trocino being a

nonresident, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and validly
try and decide the case against him. The action being in personam. On the
other hand, Mariano Trocino has been in Talibon, Bohol not in Cebu City to
validly acquire jurisdiction over his person, summons must be served on him
personally, or through substituted service, upon showing of impossibility of
personal service.

Such impossibility, and why efforts exerted towards personal service failed,
should be explained in the proof of service. The pertinent facts and
circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the
proof of service or Officer’s Return. Failure to do so would invalidate all
subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds. 3. Moreover, inasmuch as
the sheriff’s return failed to state the facts and circumstances showing the
impossibility of personal service of summons upon respondents within a
reasonable time, petitioners should have sought the issuance of an alias
summons. Under Section 5, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, alias summons
may be issued when the original summons is returned without being served
on any or all of the defendants. Petitioners, however, did not do so, and they
should now bear the consequences of their lack of diligence. 
Macasaet etal vs Co

G.R. No. 156759 June 5, 2013

Facts: On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the

Western Police District in Manila, sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of
general circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its Managing Director
Nicolas V. Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet
Bay, Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily
Reyes (petitioners), claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article
petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite. The suit,
docketed as Civil Case No. 0097907, was raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC,
which in due course issued summons to be served on each defendant,
including Abante Tonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing
Corporation, 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana Street
corner A. Soriano Street, Intramuros, Manila. In the morning of September
18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to effect
the personal service of the summons on the defendants. But his efforts to
personally serve each defendant in the address were futile because the
defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. He returned in the
afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the summons, but
he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to
resort to substituted service of the summons, and explained why in his
sheriff’s return dated September 22, 2005.

Issue: Whether or not jurisdiction over the petitioners have been acquired.

Held:   Yes. Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam –the

power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a
particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action – is
an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as
criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the
defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court
acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the
res that is the subject matter of the action. The purpose of summons in such
action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to
satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process.

The distinctions that need to be perceived between an action in personam, on

the one hand, and an action in rem or quasi in rem, on the other hand, are
aptly delineated in Domagas v. Jensen, thusly:

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character.
Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that
matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A
proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and
obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of,
specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in
personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility
or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are
suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to
fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one
which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from
a judgment against the property to determine its state. It has been held that an
action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations;
such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief
are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In
Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce
personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered
adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in
personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons
seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims
assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and
the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the
status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended
to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all
possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties
who joined in the action.

As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who does
not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court;
but when the case is an action in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section
15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case because they have jurisdiction over the res, and
jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. In
the latter instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the
defendant, and such extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose
of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for the purpose of complying with
the requirements of fair play or due process, so that the defendant will be
informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that
property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest
may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can thereby
take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. On the other hand, when
the defendant in an action in personam does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, our courts cannot try the case against him because of the
impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily
appears in court.

As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits

himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing the initiatory
pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person
either by the proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary appearance in
the action.
The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in an
action in personam cannot be overemphasized. The service of the summons
fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and (b) to afford to the
defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him. As to
the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action
through the proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such
proper service, the ensuing trial and judgment are void. If the defendant
knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of
personal jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As to the
latter, the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of his
defense. With the proper service of the summons being intended to afford to
him the opportunity to be heard on the claim against him, he may also waive
the process. In other words, compliance with the rules regarding the service
of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.

Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be
effected on the defendant himself whenever practicable. Such personal
service consists either in handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in
person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to
him. The rule on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in order to ensure
the realization of the two fundamental objectives earlier mentioned. If, for
justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a
reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected either (a)
by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at
his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof. The latter mode of service is known as substituted service because
the service of the summons on the defendant is made through his substitute.

There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the

summons upon each of petitioners in person at their office address, the first in
the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the
same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were “always
out and not available” and the other petitioners were “always roving outside
and gathering news.” After Medina learned from those present in the office
address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of
petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or any other
day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a
reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his
conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect
personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he was
expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should he be unable to
effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what was
a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we
are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to
such strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted service
instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.