Models and Experiments

Rev Chem Eng 2016; aop
Nilambar Bariha, Vimal Chandra Srivastava* and Indra Mani Mishra
Theoretical and experimental studies on hazard

analysis of LPG/LNG release: a review
DOI 10.1515/revce-2016-0006 BLEVE boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion
Received January 27, 2016; accepted September 11, 2016 CAM congestion assessment method
CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety
Abstract: The purpose of this study is to analyze the failure
CEBAM computational explosions and blast
and associated hazards of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
analysis model
and natural gas (NG) vessels during handling, storage,
CFD computational fluid dynamics
and transport. The leakage of LPG and NG from the ves-
EBU eddy break-up
sels creates major hazards with the loss of containment. In
EDC eddy dissipation concept
case of fire, an extensive damage to the property (such as
FDF filtered density function
building and plants) and the population also occurs. This
FLACS flame acceleration simulator
review is focused on several areas where the work done
LES large eddy simulation
in the literature is scarce and missing, such as the failure
LNG liquefied natural gas
modes of LPG or NG vessels during storage and transport
LPG liquefied petroleum gas
and the estimation of the amount of the leakage and igni-
MHIDAS Major Hazard Assessment Unit of the
tion time during these situations. This paper describes
Health and Safety Executive
the different possible events such as jet fire, fireball, and
PDF probability density function
vapor cloud explosion (VCE) and their mechanisms and
PHAST process hazard analysis software tool
the blast effects on the population or the environment. In
QRA quantitative risk analysis
this paper, all the experimental studies on pool fire, jet
R&D research and development
fire, boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion, and VCE
RANS Reynolds-averaged Navier Stokes
associated with LPG/LNG have been analyzed. Moreover,
RNG renormalization group
modeling approaches and their corresponding equations,
RSM Reynolds stress model
computational fluid dynamic approaches, and software
SCOPE Shell Code for Overpressure Prediction in
used have also been reviewed.
Gas Explosion
Keywords: accident; explosion; jet fire; LNG; LPG; pool SST shear stress transport
fire; road and rail tanker. TNT trinitrotoluene
VCE vapor cloud explosion
WHAZAN World Bank Hazard Analysis
Abbreviations
ALOHA area locations of hazardous atmospheres
API American Petroleum Institute
1 Introduction
ArcGIS geographic information system software
The demand of energy has led to an ever-increasing con-
BFETS blast and fire engineering for topside
sumption and utilization of petroleum products such as
structures
diesel, petrol, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and natural
gas (NG), which includes liquefied natural gas (LNG) and
*Corresponding author: Vimal Chandra Srivastava, Department compressed natural gas (CNG), coal, and biomass. The
of Chemical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee, energy requirement of India and most developing coun-
Roorkee-247667, Uttarakhand, India, e-mail: vimalcsr@yahoo.co.in; tries is met mainly by energy sources such as petroleum
vimalfch@iitr.ac.in products, NG, and coal. For developing countries, the
Nilambar Bariha: Department of Chemical Engineering, Indian
demand of clean fuels such as LPG and NG for domestic
Institute of Technology Roorkee, Roorkee-247667, Uttarakhand, India
Indra Mani Mishra: Department of Chemical Engineering, Indian
and transport sectors will increase steadily. Both LPG and
Institute of Technology (Indian School of Mines), Dhanbad-826004, NG are very flammable gases and may cause explosion if
Jharkhand, India released into the atmosphere unabated.
Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services

Authenticated
Download Date | 12/8/16 9:17 AM
2 N. Bariha et al.: Hazard analysis of LPG/LNG release
LPG is an important and widely used domestic fuel network. The usage of NG/CNG and petroleum gas (PG) as
that is transported and stored under pressurized condi- fuel sources has increased exponentially because of the
tions in fully refrigerated form inside a pressure vessel in ease of their bulk transportation and distribution at low
petroleum storage and dispensing plants. LPG is a mixture pressures and comparatively much cleaner combustion
of butane and propane. In some countries, LPG is referred characteristics in comparison to solid/liquid fuels. The
to as the liquefied propane gas, as it is either a pure NG requirement in India is met from the domestic NG pro-
propane gas or it has very high percentage of propane. duction and from the imported LNG, which is regasified at
Overall, the composition of LPG varies from one country the receiving offshore terminals. A number of companies
to another, as also from one refinery to another, depend- in India deal with NG as shown in Figure 2. India is the
ing on the purification steps, crude fractionation, crack- 13th largest NG consumer at ~ 165 million metric stand-
ing, hydrogen processing, and refining. Various types ard cubic meters per day (MMSCMD) and 5th largest LNG
of vessels such as road tanker, rail wagons, and large importer at ~ 46 MMSCMD in the world (Balyan 2015).
bullets or spheres are used for the storage and transpor- Today, NG covers 30% of the energy requirement of India,
tation of LPG (Leslie and Birk 1991, Mishra et al. 2013). A with a consumption of ~ 360 MMSCMD. There are at
large number of accidents involving fire and explosion present only seven LNG terminals with a total capacity of
have been reported recently during handling, storage, 32.5 million metric tons per annum (MMTPA). LNG import
and transport of LPG. The failure of LPG container takes to India is from various countries such as Qatar, Egypt,
place under mechanical damage or due to the overfilling Oman, Algeria, Australia, Trinidad, and Malaysia through
of storage, which may cause cracks in the vessel and weld large LNG ships. The NG sector in India is divided into five
failure, or due to mechanical impact. Loading and unload- parts (such as production, suppliers, transport, gas distri-
ing are the most hazardous operations during handling of bution, and marketing), which are run by various govern-
LPG (Mishra et al. 2014). LPG accidents generally happen ment and public agencies as shown in Figure 2.
in storage depots and process plants and during transpor- The release of both these gases, LPG and NG, into
tation (Figure 1). the environment is fraught with serious consequences.
NG is being used as a fuel in the transport and power Fire and explosion cause loss of life and property. Con-
sectors and for the manufacture of a number of chemicals sequently, the management of LPG and NG installations-
in India. It is also being used as a domestic fuel in certain storages, handling devices and operations, transport,
urban areas that are covered by a pipeline and distribution and uses require mandatory procedures to be adopted. A
large number of LPG/NG accidents occur during road/rail
transportation. During rail or truck accidents, the most
frequent cause is impact, which is followed by mechanical
or structural failure and human errors. The mechanical or
p Fatigue Co structural failure occurs because of poor maintenance of
Cree rro
sio
n storage or transportation tanks [tank trucks (TT) or rail
im era low
ct re
tankers (RT)] because of which corrosion, fatigue, or creep

pa tu
p /
De ver tu
m h
te Hig
/o
Structural
ra rn
develops in the vessels. The derailment or overturn of RT

ilm
failure
en
occurs when the train wheels skid from the track while
t
c
crack by
i
ph
passing over the curved track at a speed higher than its

corro ss
ing
ro
sion
st
Stre
critical value. During derailments or overturns, the LPG/

ta
Truck/wagon
Crush
Ca
accidents
LPG accidents LNG tank gets punctured because of collision with other
nearby objects. In all scenarios, human factors or human
ure
faults are most commonly encountered. Released LPG/

pre
He
Ov ure
nct
at
ss
er
LNG forms vapor cloud or pool fire or fireball depending

r
Pu
ad
i
at
g
Fillin n on the situation and weather conditions (Seeto and Bowen
io
Fa es va
ct
tio
ilu su lve
pr ief
e r a 1983, Bariha et al. 2014, 2016a). Although the analysis

pa
op
re
re re
l
Im
of
Ru
p nic
al of fire and explosion hazards of LPG/LNG in the various
tan ture cha
k
Over Me mage operation modes are extensively covered, a number of
pressurization da
areas are still not covered satisfactorily and need the
attention of researchers. The prediction of hazardous situ-
Figure 1: Various possible incidents during handling of LPG. ations and incidents and control of hazards to protect life

Authenticated
N. Bariha et al.: Hazard analysis of LPG/LNG release 3
Private agencies
Government agencies
LNG
production
PIL
ONGC
Suppliers RIL
OIL
BG India
Transport
GAIL
Cairn energy
BPCL Gas
distribution Shell
IOCL
Niko/GSP
Marketing
Figure 2: Contribution to the NG sector by private and government agencies in India.
and property are challenging objectives for emergency 2 C

omparative analysis of
planning, risk analysis, risk assessment, and manage-
ment (van der Voort et al. 2007). It is essential to carry properties, storage conditions,
out hazard analysis in LPG or LNG plants to determine and mechanism of release of LPG
the potential of accidental releases of flammable materi-
als and thus evaluate the damage area. The hazard analy- and LNG
sis helps in identifying the major hazards, the degree of
severity, and the remedial actions to be taken (World Bank 2.1 Properties of LPG and NG
1985).
The aim of the present review is to identify the knowl- NG is a hydrocarbon gas mixture comprising essentially
edge gaps for the risk assessment during LPG or NG methane (CH4), which is first extracted from the oil well
storage and transport. It also aimed to identify the most and transported to a prerefining unit at the site where it
critical gaps so that the recommendations can be made on is purified by removing any condensate such as water,
research priorities that can improve the risk assessment of oil, and mud as well as other saturated hydrocarbons,
LPG/NG on affected population or environment by storage water vapor, carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrogen, and hydro-
and transportation. The objective of the present study is gen sulfide and trace amounts of rare gases. NG contains
to evaluate the work carried out in recent years and to nitrogen as well as carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulfide,
identify the critical areas that need immediate attention. which are toxic and corrosive and need to be removed
In this paper, experimental studies on pool fire, jet fire, (Saeid et al. 2006, Vianello and Maschio 2011). LNG is the
boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE), and liquid form of NG and owing to its high density takes up to
vapor cloud explosion (VCE) associated with LPG/NG have 600 times less space than that of the gas (at room temper-
been analyzed. Moreover, the modeling approaches and ature and atmospheric pressure). This makes the storage
corresponding theoretical equations, computational fluid and transportation of LNG easy and convenient (Bernatik
dynamic (CFD) approaches, and software used have also et al. 2011). The composition of LNG varies depending on
been reviewed. Based on the critical review of the exist- the source of NG and processing done before distribution.
ing open literature, future priority areas of the research It typically contains predominantly 85%–99% methane
are identified. and the rest is ethane, propane, some butane, and trace

Authenticated
amounts of heavier hydrocarbons and inert nitrogen pressure of LPG is more than that of NG; therefore, LPG has
(N2). NG is condensed into a liquid (LNG) by cooling it a tremendous domino effect. The vapor density (1.93 kg/m3
to approximately – 162°C (– 260°F) at atmospheric pres- at 318 K) of LPG is higher than that of atmospheric air.
sure. The temperature required to condense NG depends When released to the atmosphere, either due to an accident
on its composition and it is typically between – 120°C and or otherwise, it leads to the development of denser than air
– 170°C at a pressure of 50 to 150 psig. Thus, LNG can be clouds, whose dispersion and dilution is lower than that
transported without high compression. LNG and NG have of passive atmospheric air. Such dense clouds may settle
almost similar physical properties; however, they have down, stay, and persist at the ground level corresponding
significant difference in relative density (Vianello and to the level of human breathing (Pandya et al. 2012).
Maschio 2011). The heating value of NG is ~ 38 MJ/m3 and
its flammability composition range in air varies from 5%
(LFL) to 15% (UFL). These flammability limits are also con- 2.2 Storage conditions of LPG and NG
sidered to be the explosion limits [lower (LEL) and upper
(UEL)] of the gas. The gas has its ignition temperature of Modern LNG storage tanks are typically full containment
612°C–622°C with 9.78 m3 of air required per cubic meter type having double walls with prestressed concrete outer
of NG for its complete combustion. The maximum flame wall and a high-nickel steel inner tank, with extremely
temperature of the gas flame is 1964°C. efficient insulation and vacuum in the annular space to
LPG is a mixture of C3 and C4 hydrocarbons and is an maintain the temperature (Interim 2001). Large storage
environmentally benign fuel with minute sulfur content, tanks are cylindrical in nature with low height-to-diame-
thus rendering the flue gas emissions almost sulfur-free. ter ratio with dome-shaped steel or concrete roof. Expen-
However, for sensing even small leakage, LPG is spiked with sive underground bullets are also used for LNG storage.
a smelling chemical such as mercaptan. Its lower and upper The storage pressure in these tanks is less than 10 kPa
flammability limits (LFL and UFL) are 1.8% and 9.8% (v/v of above atmospheric pressure. For storing LPG up to 700 m3,
gas in air), the autoignition temperature is ~ 410°C–580°C, pressure vessels (vacuum-jacketed, vertical, or horizon-
and the heating value is ~ 50 MJ/kg (IS 4576:1996). Because tal) having pressure in the range of 50–1700 kPa are used
of its very low boiling point (– 20°C to – 27°C) and very low (Chen et al. 2004).
LFL, LPG is extremely hazardous (Bariha et al. 2016b). LNG is kept cold (so that it remains as a liquid)
The physical properties of LPG and NG are given in by storing it at its boiling point for the pressure (most
Table 1 (Luketa-Hanlin 2006, Saeid et al. 2006, Vianello often atmospheric pressure) at which it is stored. At this
and Maschio 2011). It may be observed that the critical condition, LNG is termed as a “boiling cryogen” and a
Table 1: Physical properties of LPG and NG (Luketa-Hanlin 2006, Saeid et al. 2006, Vianello and Maschio 2011).
Physical properties LPG Methane (NG)
Chemical formula C3H6/C3H6-C4H10 CH4

Boiling point (°C) at 101.3 kPa – 22 – 162
Liquid density (kg/m3) at 15°C 510 422
Flash point (°C) – 65 – 189
Upper explosive limit (vol.%) 9.1 15
Lower explosive limit (vol.%) 1.9 5
Autoignition temperature (°C) 488–502 535
Calorific value (kcal/kg) 11,840 ~ 12,000
Vapor density (kg/m3) – 0.68
Critical temperature (°C) – 97 – 83
Critical pressure (bar) 43 46
Critical density (kg/m3) – 162.7
State Colorless, odorless Colorless, odorless
Corrosivity Bitter, corrosive Noncorrosive and nontoxic
OSHA hazards Flammable gas, moderate skin and eye irritant Flammable gas, moderate skin and eye irritant
Reactivity Causes fire and explosion hazards at high Evaporates rapidly with visible cloud that may
temperatures, in open flames, sparks, cause VCE hazards in high congested areas
welding, smoking, and other ignition sources and in the presence of ignition sources
Warning properties Odor and dense appearance of gas cloud Odor and dense appearance of gas cloud

Authenticated
phenomenon termed as autorefrigeration because the there will not be an explosion should the gas be ignited in
heat required by the phase change during vapor boil-off the outer periphery of LNG vapor cloud (Beale 2006). It is
cools the remaining liquid. As long as the steam (LNG well understood that thermal radiation (heat) flux from the
vapor boil-off) is allowed to leave the tank, the tempera- burning vapor generated from an LNG pool depends on the
ture remains constant. If the vapor is not drawn off, then size of the pool. However, if the size of the fire is large, the
the pressure and temperature inside the vessel will rise. mixing of air in the vaporizing NG becomes difficult and
However, even at 100 psig or 6.7 barg, LNG temperature there is incomplete combustion. For explosion to occur from
will still be only about – 129°C (or – 200°F). The boil-off an LNG vapor cloud, its concentration in the whole cloud
gas is typically compressed and fed to NG pipeline net- must be in the range of 5%–15% and that the cloud must
works or it is reliquefied and returned to storage. Some be confined in an enclosed space and then ignition should
LNG carriers use boil-off gas for fuel. occur. Overall, there is a negligible probability of NG/LNG
LNG is transported through TT having a capacity of explosion in an unconfined open environment (Beale 2006).
56.5 m3 with storage pressure of 1 bar and temperature of LNG regasified gas is lighter than air having a specific
– 160°C. Most vehicles using NG instead of diesel fuel run gravity of about 0.6–0.8 at the ambient conditions, and
on CNG, which is typically stored in cylindrical steel tanks the formation of the flammable gas cloud leading to explo-
at pressures up to 3600 psi. LPG is stored in liquid form sion (i.e. vapor or gas cloud explosion) is more imminent.
in the TT at a pressure of 17.24 bar and a temperature of LPG is, however, heavier than LNG and air. Both LNG and
– 21.3°C. Due to the high compression and expansion rate LPG, when released, flash to vapor form and settles down
of LPG, it is never filled to full capacity and a vapor space is in the low lying areas and may get ignited. LPG release
maintained above the liquid to allow for vapor expansion. may cause flash fire or pool fire on the ground. There-
fore, LPG is more hazardous than LNG, although both are
flammable. LPG or LNG, when released in the form of a
2.3 M
echanism of release of NG and LPG pool, boils vigorously by virtue of heat being transferred
to it when in contact with the underlying water or ground
LNG weighs less than half that of water, actually about 45% surface. If the vapor evolving from the pool gets ignited,
as much. When vaporized, LNG burns only in concentra- pool fire ensues above the spreading liquid fuel and the
tions of 5%–15% when mixed with air (i.e. NG must be mixed thermal radiation from pool fire will heat and vaporize the
with 85–95% air to ignite). When LNG is released from its liquid fuel. In case of pool fires in cryogenic LNG spills,
vessel because of an accident or some other reason, there both processes occur in parallel, thereby increasing the
is no mixing, as the vapor is boiling off directly from LNG rate of vaporization (Fay 2003).
and is thus 100% gas (Beale 2006). The NG cloud (released LPG (consisting of ~ 30% propane and 70% butane)
after an accident) is usually visible due to entrainment and when vaporized under ambient temperatures and pres-
consequent condensation of water vapor in the atmosphere. sure has a volume 250 times greater than the liquid
Depending on the cloud size and the atmospheric stability, form. Thus, LPG vapor at 5% concentration in air will
it propagates speed less than or equal to the prevailing wind create approximately 5000 liters of inflammable and
speed. Because of the higher vapor density of NG compared potentially explosive mixture corresponding to approxi-
to air, NG clouds have very low height-to-lateral dimension mately 6945 liters of gas/air mixture under stoichiomet-
ratio. As the mixing takes place with air at the periphery of ric conditions.
the cloud, density decreases and temperature increases at A sudden or immediate release of LPG from a vessel
the periphery, whereas the cloud’s inner core has highest failure creates an initial flash vaporizing cloud. Marshall
density and lowest temperature (Luketa-Hanlin et al. 2007). (1982) suggested that due to liquid entrainment about
As the gas warms (after the release from a cryogenic vessel), ≈ 35% of the liquid contributes to the initial vapor cloud.
rises, and is moved by the wind, mixing with air takes place. The remaining unevaporated LPG forms a liquid pool,
At the innermost part of the cloud, the gas composition is which in turn forms a plume analogous to a continuous
well over 15% and thus cannot ignite. At the outermost layer, release (Marshall 1982, Rose 1984). However, the cloud
there is too little gas and it also cannot ignite. The region developed from pool evaporation covers a smaller area
within the cloud where the gas composition is within the than the cloud formed by the initial flash vaporization.
5%–15% range. NG can ignite if an ignition source is present Pool evaporation is usually ignored in hazard evaluations
and VCE could occur. of sudden releases (van Aerde et al. 1988). Most vessel
It is known that the burning methane in an open envi- failures occur when the vessel gets engulfed in fire or is
ronment has a very slow flame speed (~ 4 mph); therefore, externally heated or the vessel insulation is damaged by

Authenticated
the condensate/liquid seepage or accident or the safety the tank increases the temperature in the tank leading to
relief valve is defective. In this case, the increased liquid vaporization and simultaneous pressure build-up (Jones
temperature results in a much higher vapor pressure such 2015). The pressure may cause loss of containment analo-
that the container bursts violently, vaporizing the entire gous to an autoclave and the term BLEVE is used. There is,
liquid mass in the container that gets ignited immediately however, an important point of contrast with the BLEVE
(because the ignition energy of NG and LPG is minute, behavior of LNG with that of LPG, where the equilibrium
< 0.5 mJ). A continuous discharge from the leakage or vapor pressure at ambient temperature is quite sufficient
failure of the vessel, if the safety relief valve fails, relieves for an expanding vapor to be generated without heating
the excess pressure in the container. During continuous (Jones 2015). Table 2 shows the comparison of conditions
liquid release of LPG, flash vaporization and pool evapo- during different types of accidents.
ration may occur (van Aerde et al. 1988). Although LNG is stored or transported in the cryogenic
liquid phase, the vessel used is slightly pressurized so that
the discharge rate is not high in case of leak or failure.
2.4 D
ifferent stages in the failure scenarios Therefore, mostly pool fires take place during an LNG acci-
dent. LPG is stored and transported in a liquid phase in
Different stages in the failure scenarios depend on a tanks that are highly pressurized. In case of an incident,
number of factors such as the discharge rate, spill volume, an abrupt tank unsealing may release a large quantity of
surface (i.e. land and water), and the duration of LPG or evaporating LPG and energy that has a destructive effect
LNG incidents. For a storage/truck tank, the release rate on the tank and its surroundings (Stawczyk 2003). The
depends on the TT/tank hold size and configuration, disadvantage of LNG is that its boil-off causes excessive
the hole or crack or rupture size and the location of the pressure build-up inside the storage vessels or transporta-
vessel’s failure opening, and the state of the release (i.e. tion tankers. LPG is heavier than air under atmospheric
whether liquid or vapor/gas or both phases). condition; therefore, it builds up its concentration at the
Raj and Kalelkar (1974) and Raj (1979) reported the ground level when released from the tanks. However, NG
effect of spill duration of LNG on the determination of fire is lighter than air; therefore, when LNG leaks, liquid spills
behavior. For LNG release of short duration, the spill may down in a pool form, evaporates into gas, and gets dis-
be considered instantaneous and the pool fire burning persed in an upward direction and dilutes in air easily
rate can be determined by the spill volume and the fuel than the vapors emanating from LPG.
properties. For long spill discharge, pool fire characteris- LPG evaporates at normal temperature and pressure.
tics can be determined by the volumetric discharge rate. Because of this, LPG is stored in pressurized steel bottles.
The removal of liquid from LNG pool is affected by vapori- For the release of LPG from small or pin hole in any phase,
zation, which occurs via two mechanisms: (i) heat transfer it gets dispersed in the form of a jet, gets ignited, and
from the substrate surface to the pool and (ii) heat transfer forms jet fire. If released for a long duration, the size of the
from the flame to the pool if the pool is ignited. hole may increase, and because of which, cloud formation
If the vapor (in equilibrium with liquid) builds up may take place, leading to VCE.
sufficient pressure for the sudden loss of containment, In comparison to NG (5–15%), LPG has a slightly much
LNG explosion may occur. LNG is initially in a cryogenic narrower combustibility region (1.9–9.1%). However, it is
state with its vapor pressure of about 1 bar. The heating of important to note that LPG has an LFL of only 1.9%; thus,
Table 2: Comparative analysis of various conditions during different types of accidents.
Scenario Discharge rate State of material Dispersion Duration Causes

released of ignition
Pool fire Low Liquid Liquid vaporization, Delayed Overfilling or leakage through hole
vapor/gas dispersion
Jet fire High Gas, liquid or Gas Immediate Leaks due to corrosion (i.e. of pipelines or high
two-phase pressurized vessels, a flange, or a broken pipe)
Fireball Instantaneous Gas Biphasic (liquid/vapor) Immediate Instantaneous depressurization, overfilling, runway
liquid vaporization reaction, overpressure, and external heating
VCE Liquid vaporizes Gas Heavy vapor cloud Delayed Spillage due to overfilling, leakage through hole,
and loading/unloading

Authenticated
it can be ignited with significantly lower concentrations LPG in bulk tube cylinders is done in the range of 200–
in air than NG (5%). LPG has a lower ignition temperature 400 km from the refinery, and the small LPG cylinders are
(~ 500°C) compared to NG (535°C). Clearly, the fuel with transported from the refilling plant to the consumer in the
the lowest ignition temperature has the highest poten- range of 50–150 km. Transportation of LPG in TT over a
tial for finding an ignition source. However, both will not large distance is considered very hazardous.
ignite on its own at normal temperature. Unlike NG, LPG A large number of accidents have been reported
when released inside a confined space spreads along the during transportation of LPG. Haastrup and Brockhoff
floors because of its higher density than air. It accumu- (1990) analyzed these accidents and concluded that the
lates in lower places, such as basements that can cause majority of the accidents occurred during rail and road
explosion hazards. Overall, the lower LFL of LPG (1% in transportation. A number of accidents, however, have
comparison to 5% for NG) and its heavier nature than that been reported involving LPG/LNG pipelines and ships.
of air makes LPG more dangerous than NG. Recent surveys and compilation of LPG/LNG accidents are
scarce. Accidents and their impact during transportation
of LPG/LNG depend on the number of trips, total length of
3 P
ossibility of accidents during the trip, quantity of LPG/LNG released, accident rate, and
handling of LPG/NG population density and other engineering or commercial

assets around the accident site (Bubbico et al. 2000).
LPG road tanker accidents depend on the degree of
3.1 A
ccidents during handling of LPG filling of the tanker, road traffic, and population density.
There are many possible leakage points in the road tanker
3.1.1 A
ccidents during transportation of LPG as reported in the literature, such as relief valve, flange,
hose, pump seal, and pipe-work crack or rupture (EPA
Figure 3 shows the complete chain of distribution from 2013). Various types of failures are possible during trans-
LPG production to distribution to the consumer. It may be portation of LPG, but some common failures in highly
seen that transportation is one of the major parts of LPG pressurized vessels are encountered such as punctures,
handling. LPG is transported all over the world using dif- rupture, catastrophic or sudden failure, and fire engulfed
ferent modes of transportation, although it is mainly trans- tank. There are mainly two types of failure scenarios
ported through roads and railways. At present, LPG is also during transportation of LPG by road tanker, such as a cat-
transported through long pipelines that are more conveni- astrophic failure and engulfment of the tanker by the fire
ent and much safer. In India, LPG is imported using large from the external source. The majority of LPG road tanker
ships due to the shortage of LPG production in Indian accidents are due to high impact, collision, overturn, and
refineries to meet the supply demand. Transportation of failure of the vehicle. The main causes of accident are
LPG transfer through pipelines

Refinery plant
LPG storage
through sphere LPG storage
through bullet
LPG bottling
plants
LPG transfer
Import LPG through railway
gas in ship Refinery storage
Crude oil in tank farm LPG
well LPG distribute distributor
through tanker
LPG transfer through pipelines
LPG storage LPG storage

through sphere through bullet
LPG bottling
plants
Refinery plant
Figure 3: Chain diagram of LPG production to distribution.

Authenticated
operator error, construction or design defect, and bad 3.1.2 Accidents during storage/installation of LPG
road condition. Bubbico et al. (2000) used the database
of the Major Hazard Assessment Unit of the Health and LPG produced from the fractional distillation of crude oil
Safety Executive (MHIDAS), United Kingdom, to conclude in a petroleum refinery is stored in large spheres. Because
that a majority of LPG accidents in the database belong other industries use LPG for heating applications, many
to road and rail transport. Stewart and Van Aerde (1990) accidents have been reported during LPG storage. The
predicted the frequency of LPG tanker incident as 44% risks of LPG leakage are relatively dependent on the
for collision, 11% for overturn, 11% for collision/over- storage capacity of the vessel and the inventory. The
turn, 22% for fitting/valve failure, and 11% for negligence, location of refineries with respect to its proximity to the
respectively, during transportation on road. The frequency human population becomes highly important in case of
of LPG tanker puncture during transport is 4.8 × 10−10 per large-scale fire and explosion accident. The complexity
year per tanker km (HSE 1991). Goh et al. (1995), based on of pipelines in the refinery and their failure increase the
past records, reported the frequency of incidents in LPG probability of blast overpressure with thermal radiation
tankers in Singapore, leading to the release of small (< 150 (Clay et al. 1988). Shebeko et al. (1995) performed theo-
kg), medium (150–1500 kg), and large (> 1500 kg) amounts retical investigations and carried out experiments on the
of LPG as 3.25 × 10−10 per year per tanker kilometer. Nearly, fire and explosion hazards of the large storage LPG vessel.
14% BLEVE took place due to the mechanical failure of They validated the mathematical models by conducting
LPG road tankers. Overfilling was the main cause of tanker large-scale experiments on the evaporation of LPG from
failure. The frequency of fire and explosion as a conse- the pool and the distribution of thermal radiation inten-
quence of the formation of BLEVE during transport of LPG sity on the surface of LPG storage vessel near the pool fire.
road TT was found to be 48% (Salla et al. 2006). Holmstrom et al. (2010) investigated a case study of
The sequence of events that occur during LPG road propane release from the propane deasphalting unit in
tanker accidents can be divided into four phases: accident the Valero McKee Refinery near Sunray, TX, on February
phase, release phase, ignition phase, and hazard phase. 16, 2007. This release resulted in VCE, and four people
Table 3 shows the comparative analysis of the studies were seriously burnt with complete damage to the unit.
reported on the actual and theoretical LPG accidents Jet fires of pressurized LPG release in this event caused
during transportation by road tanker. Large differences high thermal radiation, which damaged the unprotected
in information details can be observed in the literature, structural steel and other equipment of the unit. Many
varying with the software and the models in the accident LPG spheres got damaged. Chlorine containers also burst
modeling. Table 3 compares the accidents in terms of sce- due to high thermal radiation.
nario of LPG accidents, types of models used, software Table 5 compares the studies reported on actual LPG
used, and main observations. accidents and theoretical studies during storage or installa-
Bulk LPG transport is also carried out through RT up to tion in the refinery and bottling plant. Several major indus-
the storage or the refilling station/retail outlet of the refin- trial LPG accidents such as Flixborough (1974), Seveso
ery. The capacity of LPG in a single tanker is higher than (1976), Spain (1978), Mexico City (1984), Texas (1989),
that of the road tanker; therefore, the hazards of release India (1997), Kuwait (2000), Lincolnshire (2001), Shan-
and impact area are also much more (Bubbico et al. 2000). dong (2003), (El-Harbawi et al. 2004), and India (2012) are
The rail accident takes place due to puncture or rupture, reported in the literature. These fire and explosion accidents
including collision, rollover or derailment, and mishan- caused loss of the property and resulted in a large number
dling or failure of the tanker equipment. During railway of fatalities. Pietersen (1988) reported an LPG accident in
transport, the major cause of accidents is the derailment Mexico City, which occurred during installation. Clay et al.
of rail due to high-speed or mischievous public issues. The (1988) discussed about the risk assessment during installa-
frequency of puncture of rail wagon is 6.3 × 10−8 per tank tion of the bulk LPG storage aboveground. They developed
wagon kilometer and equipment failure or leak is 83 × 10−10 their own procedure for consequence analysis of all types
per wagon km journey. Purdy et al. (1988) reported 80 of potential accidents such as fireball, jet fire, and flash fire.
incidents of LPG release due to equipment failure, leak, Ames and Crowhurst (1988) reported 100 LPG accidents
and puncture. Generally, the RT accident taking place in involving the explosion of domestic cylinders in the United
the curved rail line is due to high speed. As discussed in Kingdom. Shebeko et al. (1995) proposed and validated new
Table 4, only a few papers are published on LPG railway models for various scenarios such as pool fire, VCE, and
accidents (Purdy et al. 1988, Purdy 1993, Lautkaski 2009, dispersion of LPG from a storage tank. Roberts et al. (2000)
Manca and Brambilla 2010, Landucci et al. 2011). studied the effects of external fire impinging on the LPG

Authenticated
Table 3: Comparative analysis of studies reported on the actual and theoretical LPG accidents during transportation by road tanker.
Scenario Causes Types of model used Software used Main observations Reference
(a) Actual accidents

Most frequent accident types 41 gasoline and 9 LPG truck Release and risk – Comprehensive data needed to be Stewart and
for LPG tanker: fitting failure, accidents in 1.7 years analysis collected on the spill type, frequency Van Aerde
overturn, collision, and both for each accident type, and size of 1990
collision/overturn release for each spill type
Accident occurred during Accident occurred in Italy, Fireball, BLEVE, and – Results validated with available Bubbico and
transfer of LPG: tank filling with a total volume of 13 m3 pool fire experimental data that give the Marchini
from road tanker to the fixed containing 4200 kg LPG accurate model for complex physical 2008
storage tank phenomena
(b) Theoretical analysis

Accidental release of LPG – Spill, pool fire, LPG-1 model Release of LPG during transportation van Aerde
during transportation, fireball, and vapor software mainly from three events: (1) et al. 1988
description of typical incident cloud shock wave continuous release due to mechanical
events such as material model failure, (2) sudden release due to
release, cloud dispersion, and mechanical failure, and (3) external
ignition properties heating of the vessel
Arc geographic information – TNT, fireball, and ArcGIS 9.3.1 Complete events are estimated with Rashid et al.
system (ArcGIS) is used to probit model the thermal hazards up to 252 m, 2010
model the incident of LPG second-degree burn from radiation
release and its impact on the and fragments fly up to 588 m, which
surroundings affected the surrounding
LPG road tanker accidents – VCE and BLEVE – Leakage and ignition of LPG during Zhang et al.
inside a road tunnel in China, transportation; possible incidents 2011
studied with QRA analyzed in a road tunnel
Accidental release from storage – k-ε turbulence and ANSYS FLUENT – Tauseef et al.
or transportation RSM models 2011

Authenticated
storage vessel, thereby raising the pressure inside the LPG
Purdy et al.
Manca and
et al. 2011
Reference
Lautkaski
Brambilla
Landucci
vessel and weakening its strength. Shebeko et al. (2000)
1988
2009
2010
performed theoretical and experimental studies on the
protection of a vessel against fire using safety relief valve,
intumescent fire retardant, and thermal isolation. They

Simulated the behavior of tank wagon loaded

made for formulating specific regulations and
possible implementation of safety devices in
developed simple mathematical models that incorporated
approximately for 77 s after the derailment,
where explosions occurred. No time for any

gas cloud reached at a number of locations
with petrol or crude oil and engulfed in fire
emergency response plan or action to take
Accident analyzed and recommendations

any mitigation and prevention measures
various parameters such as temperature, pressure, mass of
LPG, and thermal protection layer. Demichela et al. (2004)
briefly discussed the real industrial LPG storage accident
Dispersion of LPG cloud spread
due to release from a tanker and used the TNO multienergy

model in the analysis.
Main observations
the LPG rail wagon

3.2 Accidents during handling of NG
The NG pipeline network for transport and distribution

plays an important role in the infrastructure develop-
ment of energy source-deficient countries. CNG and NG
Software used
PROTRAM 2 and
ENGULF II code
FLUENT 6.3 and
are transported through pipelines from LNG terminals

CHLORTRAM2
TWODEE (gas
(evaporation
and delayed
(after heating, evaporation, and compression) or liquefac-

dispersion)
ignition)
tion plants and gas fields after pretreatment, with booster

PHAST
AXIM
compressors at intervening distances along the pipelines

to supply gas at specified pressures at user nodes.
NG is transported in gas phase through the pipeline

spreading/evaporation,
and burning of pool fire
dense gas dispersion,
to consumers while in liquid phase by filling LNG tankers.

Types of model used
Flash fire, VCE, torch
Release phase, two-

Pool fire and BLEVE
Dispersion and k-ε
The network of NG pipelines are considered to be critical

phase jet stream,
Table 4: Comparative analysis of studies reported on LPG accidents during transportation by RT.
fire and BLEVE
infrastructure and their failure can cause loss to engineer-

ing assets and the environment including injury and fatal-
ity to people (Vianello and Maschio 2011). These pipelines
model
are generally laid underground, buried at a depth from the

ground surface as prescribed by the law, and pass through

30 accidents recorded in the
In Viareggio, Italy, on June 29,
the wide area. The American Petroleum Institute (API)

northwest of Pisa (Tuscany) on
last 33 years (1967–1999) in
LPG wagon derailed while it
1102 provides the procedure for the calculation of the safe

June 29, 2009 at 11:48 PM
was passing to the station
of Viareggio, a coastal city
A freight train loaded with
depth of ground cover for uncased pipelines for crossing

17 different countries
(API 2008). A depth of 1–2.5 m underground for the NG

pipeline is considered safe from external loads.
Actual accident
Great Britain
The installation, operation, and maintenance of the

pipeline network is a complex affair for the transporta-
2009
tion and distribution of gas in the localities in the highly

populated and dense areas, having narrow and laby-
rinthine lanes. If any accident (such as a crack/hole or

Risk arising during rail transport of LPG

near the residential zone and Viareggio
station with derailment and overturn of
rupture in the pipeline) occurs, which causes leakage

the flame; formation of BLEVE within
Liquefied gas containers exposed to
Failure of rail wagon in a congested
Massive release of LPG and spread
or NG spills, it may cause considerable loss to the local

economy and may also result in a number of injuries and
fatalities to humans, cattle, and other living species in
its vicinity. Therefore, it is important to study the safety
aspects of the NG pipeline and to do due diligence in
the operation and maintenance of the gas pipeline. The
train wagons
characteristics/properties and the consequences associ-

8–30 min
Scenario
ated with such failures/accidents of the pipelines should

area
be considered to take effective preventive measures to

Authenticated
Table 5: Comparative analysis of studies reported on the actual and theoretical LPG accidents during storage.
Scenario Actual accident Types of Software used Main observations Reference

model used
(a) Actual accidents

LPG installation disaster in Mexico City Nearly 500 people died and Fireball, – Nine explosions recorded where the Pietersen
7000 seriously injured during BLEVE, and second and seventh explosions were 1988
release and ignition of LPG VCE most severe
followed by explosions; five
persons killed and two injured
during handling of LPG at the site
Leakage and ignition of LPG from small It records nearly 100 accidents of BLEVE – Studied the mechanism of leakage of LPG Ames and
domestic cylinders causing the potential LPG and domestic cylinder in the (experimental Crowhurst
hazard to life and property UK during 1982–1984 simulated) 1988
Industrial LPG storage accident due to In LPG depot of Paese (Treviso), Pool fire, TNO’s effects Two main causes of accident: lack of Demichela
release of propane from a storage tank an accident occurred on March fireball, and maintenance procedure, which does not et al. 2004
15, 1996, in which two died, five jet fire prevent the LPG leakage, and lack of plant
firemen were seriously injured instrumentation consisted only a flow
and damage up to ~ 300 m meter without any indication of pressure
Massive leak of LPG followed by An accident took place at the BLEVE and – Lack of maintenance, water curtains were Park et al.
catastrophic explosions Bucheon LPG filling station, pool fire not installed in the unloading area. 2006
Korea, on September 11, Safety distances of loading arms of hoses
1998 due to leak from a faulty and filling area were small
connection of a hose to the LPG
tank lorry
Massive release of propane in refinery On February 16, 2007 at Valero VCE and jet – Failure of pipeline occurred due to the Holmstrom
occurred in the failure of elbow in pipeline McKee Refinery, Sunray, TX fire water frozen in dead leg during cold et al. 2010
cracked and from VCE which damaged the weather
propane deasphalting unit (PDA)
Huge blast, fire, explosions from storage On October 29, 2009 in Indian Pool fire, VCE PHAST 6.51 Simulation of VCE and estimates of Sharma et al.
tanks of petroleum products in an oil Oil Corporation Ltd. (depot), amount and rate of release, dispersion 2013
depot in Jaipur, India Sitapura Industrial Area, Jaipur, modeling of cloud
Rajasthan, India; led to huge
fires, explosions-VCE, tank
fragments strewn away up to 2
km from the terminal; loss of
industrial assets and injuries
(b) Theoretical analysis
Quantified risk assessment of – Fireball, flash – Consequence analysis of potential Clay et al.
installations of LPG station that had fire, jet fire, accidents calculated and implemented 1988
bulk storage of LPG in the bullets above VCE, and on interconnection with microcomputers
ground probit and mainframe computers for the

Authenticated
development of the program
Table 5 (continued)
Scenario Actual accident Types of Software used Main observations Reference

model used
Investigation of thermal radiation – Pool fire and – Mathematical models were validated and Shebeko et al.
intensity and distribution around the VCE new models were purposed for various 1995
surface of tank from pool fire hazards such as dispersion of vapor
cloud, VCE, and behavior of LPG tank
Fire impingement on a storage vessel – BLEVE, – The vessel failed in 5 min of jet fire Roberts et al.
containing LPG, increased the pressure fireball, and impingement and at a pressure ranging 2000
inside the vessel and weakened the jet fire from 16.5 to 24.4 barg when the tank
vessel leading to catastrophic failure was filled up to 40%, 60%, and 85%,
respectively
Explosion effect in LPG storage sphere – Multienergy ANSYS – Leal and
method and Santiago 2004
VCE
Consequence analysis of fire and – Pool fire, SLAB and CAM2 – Pula et al.
explosion in offshore fireball, VCE, 2006
and BLEVE
LPG storage tank in Tianjin industrial area – Pool fire FDS FDS simulation result for pool fire to study Zhang et al.
the flame shape, smoke production rate, 2013
and thermal radiation
Petrochemical enterprise of 50,000 m3 of – Pool fire FDS Simulation result of FDS on pool fire Li et al. 2013
LPG storage tank farm in Tianjin industrial development and environmental impact
area assessment with design of safety in the
LPG storage area

Authenticated
improve safety and reduce the risks associated with the Jaffee et al. 2009, Liu and Liu 2009). The QRA method
transport of the NG. used on grid difference of the pipeline sections defines the
Some NG pipeline accidents have been reported in the pipeline fatal length and analyzes the gas network acci-
literature. For example, in Paraguay, a conflagration resulted dent probability and the consequence of unconfined VCE
in more than 250 deaths in 2004, which was caused by NG (UVCE), fireball combustion, and jet flame (Ma et al. 2013).
leakage. On April 20, 2004, NG leakage led to an explosion In the literature, most research articles have been
in Naxi District, Luzhou City, Sichuan Province in China, published on the mathematical modeling of the acciden-
causing 5 deaths and 35 injuries (Ma et al. 2013). In 2006, 10 tal gas releases through a hole in the pipeline. Only one
persons died and several persons were injured due to explo- experimental research article was published on the NG
sion caused by gas pipeline rupture in Sichuan Province. pipeline leakage (Montiel et al. 1996, Jo and Ahn 2003, Jo
On April 6, 2007, an NG pipeline in Shenyang, China, was and Crowl 2008, Cleaver and Halford 2015). Table 6 shows
broken during an excavation, which caused a widespread the comparative analysis of studies reported on the NG
suspension of the gas supply (Cheng et al. 2015). In Moscow, pipeline failure.
Russia, an explosion caused by gas leakage induced the The release of NG from the storage vessel and during
greatest conflagration in 2009 ever since the Second World its handling can cause VCE due to rapid phase transition
War (Han and Weng 2010, Cheng et al. 2015). On March 15, (RPT), pool fire, deflagration, and detonation hazards in
2010, an NG explosion resulting from the road construction NG terminal plants. The potential hazards associated with
of the Huangpu Road in Wuhan damaged the main NG pipe- NG handling including transport are varied. A spill of LNG
lines, set nearby residents’ houses on fire, and interrupted causes cryogenic tissue damage to the humans (Luketa-
NG supply to 4000 households. On June 8, 2010, an NG pipe- Hanlin 2006). A large amount of NG release can displace
line explosion in Lipscomb County, a small town in northern air, which causes asphyxiation causing damage to the
Texas on the border with Oklahoma, caused two deaths and lungs of humans. The formation of a larger vapor cloud of
serious injuries to three persons (Ma et al. 2013). Therefore, NG generates an atmosphere that is rich with flammable
it is important to study the risk of accidental releases of NG gases and can cause flash fire followed by explosion. NG
being transported through pipelines. induces embrittlement of materials, such as carbon steel
The risk analysis of the NG pipeline is carried out by and rubber, and thus causes the formation of cracks in
various methods such as fault tree analysis (FTA), quantita- storage vessels or pipelines (Bernatik et al. 2011). If LNG
tive risk analysis (QRA), and grid difference of pipeline sec- gets released and ignited immediately, pool fire ensues.
tions (GDPS). As for NG pipeline, the QRA method of the If the ignition is delayed, LNG will rapidly gasify and
long-distance transmission pipeline has been used by many produce a visible cloud that settles down in low-lying
investigators to analyze the urban gas pipeline network areas (Luketa-Hanlin 2006). However, this scenario does
(Montiel et al. 1998, Joel and Duncan 2003, Metropolo not seem to be physically valid as the density of NG is
and Brown 2004, Muhlbauer 2004, Jo and Ahn 2005, Skla- lower than that of atmospheric air; therefore, the NG cloud
vounous and Rigas 2006, Jo and Crowl 2008, Xu et al. 2008, must get buoyed upward and get diluted and dispersed.
Table 6: Accidents due to LPG and NG pipeline failure (1993–2015).
Date (yy/mm/dd) Place Causes Fatalities References
1989/06/04 Siberia, Russia Leakage in PG 462 fatalities and Sklavounous and Rigas
706 injuries 2006
1993/09/19 Las Tejerias, Venezuela Pipeline rupture during installation of 50 fatalities and Sklavounous and Rigas
telephone fiber optic cables 40 injuries 2006
1994/03/24 New Jersey, USA Pipeline failure due to fatigue One fatality and Sklavounous and Rigas
50 injuries 2006
2004/07/30 Ghislenghien, Belgium During construction of pipeline 15 fatalities Wilkening and Huld 1999
2007/11/01 Carmichael, MS Rupture of propane liquid line with Two fatalities and PHMSA 2015
release and ignition seven injuries
2010/09/09 San Bruno, CA Rupture in the NG transmission Eight fatalities and Hayes 2015
pipeline several injuries
2014/07/28 Nagaram, India Pipeline failure due to corrosion 18 fatalities and The Times of India 2014
40 injuries
PHMSA means Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration.

Authenticated
4 LPG/LNG experimental studies 4.1.1 Experimental studies on pool fire
The modeling of accidents involving LPG/LNG depends Most experimental tests on LPG/LNG spill have been
on the failure of containers and the quantity of LPG/LNG carried out on land (contained within a dike) and in limited
released from the vessels. Pinhasi et al. (2005) reviewed numbers on water (fixed pool pond). Only a few experi-
studies on the modeling of flash behavior during two- ments have been carried out on LPG pool fire. Burgess
phase flow and sudden depressurization of a compressed and Zabetakis (1962) studied the thermal radiation of
liquid. The failure of highly pressurized storage vessel (i.e. LNG fire and compared the results obtained with other
LPG and LNG) due to abrupt depressurization of confined fuels. Some experimental details of LPG/LNG fire and
liquid was also reviewed. Crocker and Napier (1988) sug- their results were published later on (May and McQueen
gested various types of failure for LPG vessels such as 1973, AGA 1974, JGA 1976, Raj et al. 1979, Minzer and Lyre
catastrophic failure, mechanical pressurization, collision 1982, Nedelka et al. 1989). May and McQueen (1973) con-
or excavation, external heating, failure of relief valve, and ducted experiments in an irregularly shaped trench (70 m
depressurization of the vessel. long, 25 m wide, and 5 m deep) of LNG pool fire on land.
Several physical models have been proposed and used LNG used comprised approximately 72% methane and
to calculate and predict the impact of fire and explosion 23% ethane and propane. The minimum fire test with a
during an accident. In the consequence modeling, various square dimension of 2 × 2 m was conducted by the Japan
parameters such as the rate of release in case of formation Gas Association (JGA) in 1976. Later on, several experi-
of a hole/crack in the vessel, thermal radiation, and over- mental tests on LNG pool fire were performed (see Table 7;
pressure generated due to explosion are calculated. The Steckler et al. 1982, Gregory et al. 1989, Koseki and Mul-
most important parameters during fire and explosion of holland 1991, Sinai and Owens 1995, Weckman and Strong
LPG vapor/LNG vapor depend on the flammability in the 1996, Chatris et al. 2001, Tieszen et al. 2004, Woods et al.
atmosphere (mixture of LPG/LNG and air), source of igni- 2006, Attar et al. 2013).
tion, and location (congested or uncongested). This eventu- The largest LNG pool fire on land, the Montoir series
ally results into pool fire, jet fire, BLEVE, fireball, and VCE. test, was performed as a joint program by Shell, British
Gas, and British Petroleum and was conducted by Gaz de
France (GdF; Nedelka et al. 1989, Malvos and Raj 2006). A
4.1 Pool fire series of tests of 35-m-diameter LNG pool fire under differ-
ent spill and environmental conditions were performed in
Pool fire can be defined as a turbulent diffusion-vapor igni- an insulated concrete. The objectives of the tests were to
tion leading to fire above a horizontal pool of vaporizing flam- investigate the burning characteristics [i.e. flame length,
mable liquid under conditions where the flammable material flame height, flame tilt, and surface emissive power (SEP)]
has zero or very low initial momentum (Cowley and Johnson and the radiant heat flux from large LNG/LPG pool fires.
1992, CCPS 1999, Pula et al. 2006). The probability of pool fire Table 8 shows the general information on the experimen-
on an offshore platform is high due to the continuous han- tal parameters and the results from the tests of pool fire.
dling of hydrocarbon liquid fuels such as propane, butane, The experimental data available in the literature on pool
and NG. During loading and unloading operations, the fire are classified based on burning rate, flame diameter
storage tanks and the pipelines are the most significant loca- and height, flame tilt in the presence of wind, thermal
tions where liquid release generally takes place and where radiation, and emissive power and are detailed in Table 9
pool fire may ensue. When LPG is accidentally released due (Thomas 1963, Mudan 1984, Babrauskas 1986, Pritchard
to overfilling of the storage tanks or due to the rupture of and Binding 1992).
pipes and tanks, it creates a pool on the surface, which starts
vaporizing, gets ignited if an ignition source is available, and
results in pool fire (Pintaric 2007). If the mass evaporation 4.1.2 Modeling of pool fire
rate is higher than the rate of mass released, the size of any
existing pool will decrease (Cormier 2008). Domino effects of Tables 9 and 10 shows various correlations that are used
pool fires have been reported in many parts of the world such in the modeling of pool fire. Various parameters of pool
as the 1998 incident at Bucheon LPG filling station (Korea), fire such as burning rate, fire shape, pool surface, flame
the 2005 incident at Buncefield (United Kingdom), the 2009 height, SEP, thermal radiation intensity, and atmospheric
incident at Puerto Rico (United States), and the 2009 catas- transmissivity were studied by researchers. Thomas
trophe at Sitapura, Jaipur Industrial Area (India). (1963), van Aerde et al. (1988), and Bubbico and Marchini

Authenticated
Table 7: Comparative analysis of studies reported on LPG/LNG pool fires.
Objectives of the study Detail of experiment Fuel used Parameter studied Remarks Reference
To study the flow characteristics Area: 2.8 × 2.8 × 2.8 m; no. of test: 45; Methane Entrainment height: ± 8% to Flow rate of fire strength Steckler
of pool fire developing in a condition: steady state; diameter of pool: ± 50%; density of gas: 1.22–0.82 through fixed-door opening, et al. 1982
compartment such as mass flow 30 cm; burning time: 30 min; strength: 31.6, kg/m3; temperature of liquid: it increases the upper layer
rate, geometry of fire, strength, 62.9, 105.3, and 158 kW; experiments were 290–448 K temperature from 85°C to 289°C
and fire plume entrainment rate conducted in a 2.8 × 2.8 × 2.8 m of compartment and flow increased by 54%–
in steady-state condition; the diameter of 68%; entrainment fires near
porous plate diffusion is 30 cm placed in walls are free from free standing
the center of room and ignited for 30 min to plume model; complete
establish steady state; 45 experiments were temperature distributions
conducted with different five strengths (31.6, between the measured and
62.9, 105.3, and 158 kW) idealized flows are shown
To study the effect of Area: 9.1 × 18.3 × 0.9 m; JP-4 aviation fuel Average flame temperature: Due to the large calorimeter, Gregory
thermal radiation and flame condition: steady state; pool size: 1.4 m 1065–1320 K at 142 cm and the variation of heat flux and et al. 1989
temperature in the presence of diameter and 6.4 m height; burning time: 3 h; 810–1270 K at 262 cm above from fluctuation of nonuniform
wind of large pool fire mass of fuel: 10,000 kg; wind effect: 2.0 ± 0.9, pool surface; heat flux: smaller temperature is form due to the
1.2 ± 0.8, and 1.5 ± 0.8 m/s; a series of pool fire calorimeter 160–200 kW/m2; wind effects also; different
test were conducted in a 9.1 × 18.3 × 0.9 m of larger calorimeter 100–160 kW/ sizes of calorimeters are used
concrete pool for 3 h; a mild steel calorimeter m2 to calculate the variation of heat
having 1.4 m diameter and 6.4 m length with a flux; the average heat flux of
mass of 10,000 kg is placed, which is supported 1.4 m calorimeter is 130 kW/
by a steel stand such that the bottom was 0.9 m m2 about 80% and 0.1–02 m
above from the initial level of the fuel calorimeter is 164 kW/m2;
average flame temperature of
the eight location is around
1065–1320 K at a height of
142 cm and above initial pool
surface temperature is 810–
1270 K at a height of 262 cm
To measure the burning Area: 24 × 24 × 20 m; condition: steady state; Light crude oil, Burning rate: 4 mm/min of Thermal radiation increases Koseki and
rate, thermal radiation, pool size: 0.6, 1, and 2 m diameter circular pan heptane, toluene, 10–20 m diameter of pan with the increasing pan size Mulholland
concentration (carbon dioxide and 2.7 m square pan; burning time: 3 h; mass and kerosene size; concentration: CO2 about that means thermal radiation 1991
and monoxide) above the flame of fuel: 10,000 kg; fuels are burned in a open 0.3–0.5% and CO about increases with diameter of pool
at tip, smoke emission, and area (24 × 24 m) at a ceiling height of 20 m 50–500 ppm; radiative fraction: fire; emission of smoke and
characteristics of crude oil pool where a pan was placed at the center; circular 0.3–0.4; efficiency: 90% for 1 m carbon monoxide yield increases
fire pans of different diameters (0.6, 1, and 2 m) and diameter of pool fire and 75% for with pool fire diameter; after the
square pan (2.7 m) are used for the burning pool 2.7 × 2.7 m pan fire combustion process, splashing
fire test and water boiling were observed
in a test pan that is called as

Authenticated
thin-layer boil-over
Table 7 (continued)
Objectives of the study Detail of experiment Fuel used Parameter studied Remarks Reference
To study the flame geometry Pool size: 20 m diameter; wind velocity: Kerosene – k-ε turbulence models having Sinai and
in the presence of wind 4.52 m/s; temperature: 280.5 K; mass flow rate: buoyancy terms show the Owens
condition and validated using 10.7 kg/s; energy: 476 MW; simulation time: satisfactory results for 1995
CFDS FLOW3D code through 10 h; a 20 m diameter of circular pool fire was unconfined fires with crosswind
experimental data used for burning kerosene as a fuel and subject condition
to having 4.52 m/s velocity crosswind condition
To investigate the theoretical Pool size: 10 × 10 and 15 × 15 m LPG Safety distance from LPG vessels: Evaporation intensity drops Shebeko
and experimental studies of cylindrical 26–78 m and spherical rapidly with time because of et al. 1995
the fire and explosion in large 34–84 m by considering different cooling of the solid surface
LPG storage vessels; to verify volumes of storage (i.e. 1000– on which the spill was made;
the mathematical model of 40,000 m3) the value of evaporation
thermal radiation intensity and increases with the elevation of
distribution across the side air temperature and decrease
surface of cylindrical vessel of evaporation area; thermal
radiation intensity decreases
rapidly with an increase in the

distance from pool fire to the
storage vessel
To investigate the turbulence Pool size: 0.3 m diameter and 0.01 m height; Methane Maximum mean temperature: Near fire region high turbulent Weckman
structure of a medium-scale feed rate: 1.35 cm3/s; heat release rate: centerline at 1330 K, radial kinetic energy is produced in and Strong
methanol pool fire; complex 24.6 kW; burning time: 10 min position at 1200 K above the fuel the flame front region; turbulent 1996
physical phenomena are surface; radial velocity: 0.5–0.8 flow is almost every region
studied such as drive mixing, times corresponding velocity on domain with only a limited
entrainment of fire, and region where laminar diffusion
development of fire flow region up to 10 cm height
To study the burning rate Pool size: 1.5, 3, and 4 m diameter; pool area: Gasoline and diesel Burning rate: 0.057 kg/m2 s diesel – Chatris
by variation of fuel level; to 1.8, 7.1, and 12.6 m2 in circular; burning time: oil and 0.077 kg/m2 s for gasoline; et al. 2001
analyze the fire development 40–50 s for gasoline and 60 s for diesel oil flame temperature: 40°C axially
and fire extinction in transient and 1200°C radially
period, the average burning rate
at steady-state is determined
To study the effect of mass Area: 6.1 × 6.1 × 6.1 m; pool size: 1 m diameter; Methane and Temperature: 1200–1600 K Heat of combustion and Tieszen
flux of fuel on the flow field of mass flux: 0.04–0.066 kg/m2 s; heat release hydrogen stoichiometric results in et al. 2004
methane pool fire using particle rate: 2.1 MW; no. of test: 24; hydrogen fire; methane with hydrogen; the
image velocimetry; to compare mass flux: 0.022 kg/m2 s; heat release rate: velocity of hydrogen is 3.4
the results with hydrogen fire 2.1 MW times higher than methane fire

Authenticated
To study the effects of Pool size: square (7.5 × 7.5)–(30 × 30) Methanol Flame length: 10–20 cm methanol Burning rate of small square Woods
transverse air flow on the cm, rectangular (15 × 15) cm; wind speed: and 5–20 cm gasoline pool fires increases with the et al. 2006
burning rate of square and 0–5.5 m/s larger pool fire; flame length
rectangular pool fires increases gradually with the
wind speed longitudinal
(2008) predicted correlations of the diameter of pool fire
Higher heat flux onto the liquid Attar et al.

Reference
by considering different parameters.
surface, which results in higher 2013

Table 9 shows the comparative analysis of models
proposed for calculating radiation intensity for evalu-
ating pool fire scenarios. Thomas (1963) proposed the
vaporization rate of liquid pool
correlations and theoretical models of pool fire with

and without wind conditions. Mudan (1984) proposed a
and larger pool flames
model for estimating the thermal radiation from pool fire

with important parameters such as burning rate, physi-
cal or geometric characteristics of pool fire, and its radi-
ation characteristics. Thomas (1963) and Bubbico and
Remarks
Marchini (2008) considered the decrease in the released

liquid flow rate and the liquid level for calculating the
diameter of pool fire. van Aerde et al. (1988) considered

of kerosene, gasoline, and TBPB is

1.71 m, respectively; flame height
safety distance by experimental
only the volumetric flow rate and the amount of material

kerosene, gasoline, and TBPB
gasoline, tert-butyl 1110–1321 K, gasoline 990–
Flame temperature: kerosene
1250, and TBPB 1345–1603;
evaluated as 0.86, 0.64, and
0.6, 0.8, 1.6 m, respectively
involved in the pool fire scenario for developing model

is 0.95, 0.79, and 2.07 m,
respectively; on CFD, it is
equations. Among the parameters, burning rate depends

on the flammable material that forms pool fire. Three
Parameter studied
types of mass burning method have been proposed in

the literature: (i) Zabetakis-Burgess method (Zabetakis
and Burgess 1961), (ii) Burgess-Strasser-Grumer method
(Burgess et al. 1961), and (iii) Mudan method (Mudan
1984). Each burning rate method has its own signifi-
cance according to the parameters used in the calcula-
peroxybenzonate
tion. However, the Zabetakis-Burgess method is the most

widely used method for calculating the burning rate of
Kerosene,
Fuel used
any flammable fuel.

(TBPB)
Figure 4 shows the schematic diagram of the solid

flame model of pool fire and its characteristic burning fuel
parameters (Schonbucher et al. 2009). The fire is consid-
ered as a solid vertical entity in the shape of a cylindrical
flame. Thermal radiation is emitted from its flame surface.
Therefore, it requires an estimation of the diameter and
height of the cylinder including the SEP (Schonbucher
et al. 2009, Yang et al. 2012). The shape and size of pool
Pool diameter: 0.06–0.18 m
fires are not static because of the turbulence of the air-fuel

mixture. Therefore, the flames are in fluctuating move-
Detail of experiment
ment from the top, and often, small fireballs are formed by
the consequent oscillation and distortion in the shape and
size (Planas-Cuchi and Casal 1998). Pritchard and Binding
(1992) also gave the expression for the flame height of pool
fires considering the wind effects.
Surface radiation intensity or emissive power depends
To study the characteristics of
on the type of fuel and fire, which can be expressed as a

pool fire by experimental and
function of heat combustion and the fraction of surface

Objectives of the study
radiated. In pool fire, soot is generally produced, which

Table 7 (continued)
reduces thermal radiation. However, only in a few studies,

CFD simulation
actual surface emission including the soot formation in

pool fire was calculated (Thomas 1963). Pritchard and
Binding (1992) gave the expression for surface radiation
intensity without considering the soot formation.

Authenticated
Table 8: Comparison of parameters reported for LPG/LNG pool fire.
Type of fuels Pool fire L/d ratio Liquid Radiation References

dimensions regression
Fraction (%) Emissive power
(m) × 10–4 (m/s)
(kW/m2)
Butane, LNG 0.07–2.4 3–7 – 9.51–40.1 – Burgess and Zabetakis 1962

LNG 13 – 2.2 16–12 – May and McQueen 1973
LNG 1.8–6.1 1.5–3.0 1.5–2.2 20 100 AGA 1974
LNG 6.1 – – 25 143–178 Raj and Atallah 1974
Butane 0.3–0.76 – – 19.9–26.9 – Burgess and Hertzierg 1974
LNG 2 × 2 – – 13 58 JGA 1976
LNG 10–15 – 4–10 12–32 185–224 Raj et al. 1979
LNG, LPG 20 – 2.4 7–36 150–220, 48 Minzer and Lyre 1982
LNG 6.9–15.4 – 2.2 – – Moorhouse 1982
LNG 1.8–35 – 3.3 – 257–273 Nedelka et al. 1989
LPG or propane 10–20 0.375 – – 250 Rew et al. 1997
Methanol 1–10 1.59–0.79 – – 19–34 Van den Bosch and Weterings 2005
L/d is the ratio of the mean flame length and diameter of pool fire for the correlation for a circular fire of turbulent diffusion flames in the
presence of wind, which is predicted by the various authors such as Mudan (Thomas 1963) in the literature.
Thomas (1963) gave the thermal radiation intensity chemical reaction and generation of combustion products
correlation that can be estimated by considering para- such as soot growth or particle and the effects of thermal
meters such as view factor, atmospheric transmissivity, radiation. However, combustion simulation takes large
and surface emission. Shebeko et al. (1995) gave other computational time in arriving at the results.
correlations for thermal radiation by considering such Table 11 shows the general information on the CFD
parameters as the Stefan-Boltzmann constant, flame studies of pool fire as reported in the literature. The CFD
temperature, atmospheric absorption coefficient, angle modeling of pool fires has been attempted in a number of
coefficient, and the absorption capacity of the flame. The studies (Sinai and Owens 1995, Mell et al. 1996, Wang and
range of absorption capacity of the flame from pool fire Joulain 1997, McGrattan et al. 1998). These investigations
of 1 m is 0.9–1.0. The shape of pool fire is considered as a demonstrate encouraging predictions for both confined
vertical or an inclined cylinder. and unconfined pool fires. Schalike et al. (2011) studied
LNG pool fire using FLUENT 12.0, which demonstrated the
combustion properties of large LNG pool fire. Sun et al.
4.1.3 CFD approach in pool fire (2015) and Sun and Guo (2013) validated the CFD model
using the LNG fire series test. Jujuly et al. (2015) studied
In recent years, the CFD codes are widely used to study the the domino effects of pool fire in complex geometrical set-
feasibility of modeling and simulating the characteristics tings of the process industries.
of combustion and large-scale fire dynamics (Hostikka CFD application in predicting the fire dynamics and
et al. 2003, Smith et al. 2003, Malalasekara et al. 2006). thermal radiation from a realistic, large pool fire are still in
Fire dynamics simulator (FDS) uses Lagrangian particles the infancy. The accuracy of prediction is still unrealistic
to represent burning gases and hot smoke to describe for use of this tool in hazard assessment or for regulations
the flowing behavior (Shen et al. 2008, Chi 2013). ANSYS to specify their use for the design of facilities storing liq-
FLUENT, another commercial CFD code, is being increas- uefied gases such as LNG and LPG. Semiempirical models
ingly used to simulate practical fire by the coupling tur- based on field test data with realistic physics of fires may
bulence model, combustion model, and radiation model. have to be evolved in the foreseeable future for fire hazard
It is applied on the close domain scenario for handling and risk assessment efforts.
the smoke generation system with wide applications for
residential, storehouse, and industrial fire (Mell et al.
1996, Yang et al. 2011). These codes use the turbulence 4.2 Jet fire
models such as Navier-Stokes to study the influences of
the mixing of fuel-air and the products of combustion. The Jet fire is a turbulent diffusion flame resulting from
code is capable of simulating the combined effects of the the combustion of a fuel continuously released with

Authenticated
Table 9: Comparative analysis of various models used for calculating thermal radiation and SEP for pool fire.
Mass burning Flame height, H (m) Surface radiation Thermal radiation Atmospheric Reference
rate, ṁ (kg/m2 s) intensity, E (W/m2) intensity, l (W/m2) transmissivity, τa
1
4Q (a) Without wind Fr × ×m
∆Hc EτaFv exp[– 7 × 10−4 Thomas 1963,
1 + 4H
πy 0.61 (r – 0.5d)] Mudan 1984
 m 
42 × D ×  
 a gD 
ρ
(b) With wind effect

0.67
 m 
55 × D ×   × ( u∗ )0.21
 ρa gD 
( m × 1000) – ṁ × ΔHR – – van Aerde

V et al. 1988
–  m
0.305
1 EτaFv
 Fr × ∆Hc
×m – Pritchard and
10.615 × D ×   1 + 4H
 ρa gD  Binding 1992
×( u*) −0.03
0.61
–  m  – ε(1 − τ )σ 0Tf4 ϕ – Babrauskas
42 × D ×  
 ρa gD  1986,
Shebeko et al.
1995
0.61
Q  m  – – – Bubbico and
2 42 × D ×  
πy  ρa gD  Marchini 2008
D is the diameter of pool fire (m), E is the surface radiation intensity (kW/m2), Fr is the fraction of heat radiated (dimensionless), Fv is the
view factor (dimensionless), g is the acceleration due to gravity (9.814 m/s2), H is the height of pool fire (m), ΔHc is the heat of combustion
(kJ/kg), ΔHR is the heat release rate (kJ/kg), k is the absorption extinction coefficient of the flame (1/m), ṁ is the mass burning rate of fuel
(kg/m2 s), ṁ is the mass of liquid spill (kg), Tf is the adiabatic flame temperature (K), u* is the dimensionless wind velocity, V is the volume
of the fuel (m3), ρa is the density of air (kg/m3), ẏ is the burning rate of a finite diameter of pool (m/s), β is the mean-beam-length corrector
(dimensionless), σ0 is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant (5.67 × 10−8 W/m2 K), ε is the absorption capability of the flame (dimensionless), ϕ is
the angle coefficient of pool fire, and τa is the atmospheric transmissivity (dimensionless).
momentum in a particular direction (Cowley and Johnson is not so severe as pool fire or flash fire (Mares et al. 2008);
1992). It occurs in industrial installations, process plants, however, the radiant heat from jet fire is often greater than
and offshore platforms, where the fuel is released from a that from pool fire of similar size (Cormier 2008).
crack or from a puncture on a storage tank or transporta-
tion pipeline due to corrosion or other causes. Jet fires are
common in hydrocarbon industries that deal with highly 4.2.1 Experimental studies on jet fire
flammable substances such as LPG (propane and butane
liquefied gases) and NG, which are either transported Only a small number of studies on jet flames have been
through pipelines and cylindrical vessels under pressur- reported in the last four decades. Diverse experimental
ized conditions or stored in large bullets. The instantane- studies on jet fires have been carried out in recent years;
ous release of flammable substance that may get ignited most of these studies are either sonic or subsonic jet fires
culminates into jet fires. Jet fire is characterized by very of fuels such as methane or propane. Table 12 shows the
high heat flux. Therefore, when it impinges on storage comparative analysis of these experimental and modeling
tanks or pipelines, it induces catastrophic failure with a studies (Sonju and Hustad 1984, McCaffrey and Evans
domino effect (Pula et al. 2006, Mares et al. 2008). Jet fire 1986, Chen et al. 1996, Kiran and Mishra 2007, Palacios

Authenticated
Table 10: Comparative analysis of various thermal radiation models of pool fire.
Parameter Models

Point source Shokri and Beyler Mudan
Mass burning rate (ṁ) m∞′ (1 − e − k βD

) m∞′ (1 − e − k βD
) c1 ∆Hc
∆Hv + Cp (Tb − Ta )
∆Hc
m∞′ = 1.27 × 10−6
∆Hv
0.61
Flame height (H) 0.235q0.4 – 1.02D 0.235q0.4 – 1.02D  m 
12D  0.5 
 ρ0 ( gD ) 
Heat release rate (E) (0.21 – 0.0034D)Q 58 × 100.00823D 0.25πD2 ηm

∆Hc
0.25πD2 + πDH
πD2 ∆Hc ηm

Q=
4
View factor (F12) L = R 2 + ( Hf /2 − Ht )2 F122 H + F122 V F122 H + F122 V
2
H 
R =  f  + L2
 2
Thermal radiation (q) E cos θ L EF12τa EF12τa

; cos θ =
4 πL2 R
Cp is the specific heat capacity of the fuel (J/kg K), D is the diameter of pool fire (m), E is the heat release rate (kW/m2), Fr is the fraction of
heat radiated (dimensionless), F12 is the view factor (dimensionless), F12H is the horizontal view factor (dimensionless), F12V is the vertical view
factor (dimensionless), H is the flame length of pool fire (m), ΔHc is the heat of combustion (kJ/kg), ΔHv is the heat of vaporization (kJ/kg),
k is the absorption extinction coefficient of the flame (1/m), L is the length of pool fire (m), ṁ is the mass flow rate of fuel (kg/s), m∞′ is the
equivalent burning rate of an infinite diameter of pool (kg/m2 s), q is the incident radiation received by target (kW/m2), Q is the heat release
rate (W), R is the radius of pool fire (m), Tb and Ta are the temperature of boiling and ambient temperature of the fuel (K), τa is the atmos-
pheric transmissivity (dimensionless), β is the mean-beam-length corrector (dimensionless), and η is the viscosity of air (μPa s).
et al. 2009, 2012, Mares et al. 2009, 2010, Palacios and Casal of temperature along the jet fire centerline showed that
2011, Lowesmith and Hankinson 2012, Zhang et al. 2015, the temperature increased from the bottom of the flame,
Gopalaswami et al. 2016, Laboureur et al. 2016). Sonju and reached a maximum value at some point along the flame,
Hustad (Attar et al. 2013) reported on experimental meas- and then decreased again at the top zone. Palacios and
urements of turbulent jet fires of propane and methane Casal (2011) conducted experiments of propane jet flame
originating from storage vessels and orifice diameters (d) in still air. They determined the flame length up to 10 m
up to 2–80 mm. Mogi and Horiguchi (2009) studied LPG using exit nozzles of different diameters in the range of
jet fires from 2.2-mm-diameter orifice and release pres- 10–43.1 mm. They measured the visible flame height and
sures up to 400 bar. Jet fires due to LPG mixture (97% lift-off distance through a thermographic camera.
propane, 1.5% butane, and 1.5% other gases; i.e. hydro- Table 13 shows the important parameters of large-
gen, methane, and nitrogen) released from storage vessel scale LPG/LNG jet fire observed from the experimental
of 4 m3 and orifice diameter in the range of 10–43.1 mm results. The main aim of the experiments was to study the
have also been studied (Moorhouse 1982). Jet height was shape or geometrical feature of jet fire. Several shapes of
predicted as a function of mass flow rate, exit diameter, jet fires were proposed based on the experiments and the-
Froude number (Fr), and Reynolds number. The results oretical methods defining the flame surface of laminar or
showed that the flame height increased with an increase turbulent flames (Burke and Schumann 1928, Palacios and
in the orifice diameter and the fuel mass flow rate. Mares Casal 2011). The geometrical features of jet fire or flame (of
et al. (2010) performed experiments to study an axial tem- different fuels) depend on diverse variables such as orifice
perature distribution in the vertical jet fire of propane. exit diameter, jet exit velocity, mass flow rate, and release
The temperature along the jet fire centerline was meas- pressure. Several expressions for estimating the length,
ured using a set of thermocouples and the flame contours trajectory, and vertical and horizontal displacement of a
were determined from infrared (IR) images. The results flame were suggested for horizontal jet flames (Becker and

Authenticated
Qtop Ttop the flame geometry as suggested in the literature (Palacios

and Casal 2011). Clay et al. (1988) proposed an expression
Soot parcels
for flame length by considering the heat of combustion
80% N2 and mass flow rate of fuel. The correlation of flame length,
(Tsp) depending on various parameters such as Mach number,
flame temperature, hole diameter, jet fluid temperature,
Hot spots Hp
molecular weight of air, and the concentration of the fuel-
air mixture, is reported in CCPS (1999). Lowesmith et al.
(2007) gave a simple correlation for calculating the flame
SEP SEP
length with the help of the diameter of the hole and abso-
H lute pressure. TNO (Jo and Crowl 2008) reported the corre-
Ths lation for the width of jet flame from both ends. Figure 5A
shows the jet flame surface of turbulent and vertical non-
Qt U
premixed flame with the shape of vertical ellipse, which
Air entrainment Hpul
was proposed based on a theoretical study (Baron 1954).
Expansion of
combustion products Air entrainment Another shape of jet fire is the inverted circular cone,
Uf
with the apex located approximately at the exit of the
Ignitable volume
orifice (Figure 5B). Kalghati (1983), Chamberlain (1987),
Fuel parcels and Johnson et al. (1994) proposed the geometry of flame
Pyrolysis Hcl surface of jet fire, which looks like a frustum of a cone
Air entrainment gas being influenced by the wind (Figure 5C). Geometries as
suggested by authors can be divided into two categories:
Fuel Fuel vapour
Pool fire
point source model such as conical (Clay et al. 1988) and
ellipse (CCPS 1999) and solid flame model such as frustum
Figure 4: Schematic diagram of pool fire. cone (Jo and Crowl 2008) and tilted cylindrical shape
Ths, temperature hot surface; Tsp, temperature soot particles; Ttop,
(Carter 1991, Lees 1996) for the shape of jet fire. The API
total temperature release in atmosphere; Qtop, total thermal radia-
tion release in atmosphere; Hpul, pulsation in lower zone; Hp, pulsa-
model predicts the jet flame as a single point source. Dif-
tion in upper zone; Hd, combustion zone; Hcl, combustion zone; Qt, ferent computer codes such as WHAZAN, FLARESIM, and
thermal radiation; Uf, ignition volume. THORIN model a jet flame as a multiple of point sources
using the semiempirical approach. The codes such as
FLARE, TORCH, and MAJESTIC SHELF2, and PIPEFIRE
Liang 1981, Gore and Jian 1991, Johnson et al. 1994) and jet MAJ3D model the jet flame as a conical frustum using a
fires in the presence of crosswinds (Gollahalli et al. 1975, semiempirical approach. Bagster and Schubach (Hostikka
Marshall and Burgoyne 1977, Kalghati 1983, Cook et al. et al. 2003) developed a program (JET2) in which the jet
1990, Lowesmith et al. 2007). Various authors studied the flame dimensions (such as flame length and width) in the
correlation of flame length with the Froude number in the buoyancy-dominated regime were estimated through the
buoyancy dominated by the jet regime (Sonju and Hustad assumption of a cylindrical shape. Some computational
1984, McCaffrey 1989, Turns and Myhr 1991, Bagster and models have been developed by various authors to predict
Schubach 1996, Santos and Costa 2005, Kiran and Mishra the structure of jet fires such as the shape of the flame,
2007, Mares et al. 2009, 2010, Palacios et al. 2009). When length, and width (Witlox and Adeyemi 2009). Cham-
the flame length is divided by the diameter of nozzle or berlain (1987) was probably the first who gave the math-
release point, then it becomes dimensionless. ematical expression for jet fire and its shape. Jet fire was
correlated as a flare stack to predict the flame shape and
radiation field. Further, this model was validated with the
4.2.2 M
odeling of jet fire field tests and tunnel experiments for both onshore and
offshore fires.
The modeling of jet fires is carried out based on flame Table 14 shows a brief summary of the models used
geometry that is an important parameter to predict the for jet fire in the literature (Chamberlain 1987, Carter 1991).
effects of fires. Several authors performed experiments The jet fire model is either a point source model or a solid
and theoretical studies to estimate the thermal intensity, flame model. Clay et al. (1988) used the point source model
flame speed, lift-off, and shape of jet fires. Figure 5 shows for the LPG release culminating into a flame in jet fire. The

Authenticated
Table 11: Comparative analysis of CFD studies on LNG/LPG spillage with consequence of pool fire.
Objectives of study Domain size Model used Fuel used Parameter studied Remarks Reference
To investigate the role of pool Pool size: square 90 × 60 × 80 m Turbulence: standard k-ε Kerosene Flame temperature: The predicted flame shape compares Sinai and
shape, bund, and turbulence and circular 20 m; flow domain: model; combustion: eddy square pool 300–1585 K well to the experiment when the Owens
parameters are capable of square 29 × 19 × 31 m and break-up (EBU) model and circular pool modeled pool shape was similar to 1995
affecting the plume shape circular 100 × 60 × 80 m 300–500 K that of the experiment
To compare the experimental Pool size: 10–20 cm; grid size: Turbulence: standard k-ε Methanol Flame temperature: The assumption of axial symmetry Mell et al.
data of methanol pool fire with 192 × 640 model; combustion model 1800 K; axial velocity broke down causing prediction 1996
numerical results of gaseous: 1.1 cm/s; errors in a volume surrounding the
simulation time: 60 h centerline (r/D < 0.2); it is clear that
obtaining the full plume structure for
(z/D > 1), so it requires a 3D analysis
To investigate the two different Pool size: 30 cm; flow domain: Large eddy simulation Methanol Flame temperature: In reaction zone, the flame Wen et al.
combustion models for rectangular 1.6 × 1.6 × 3.2 m; (LES); SGS turbulence 1473 K; simulation time: temperature peak is 1273 K occurs 2007
temperature and axial velocity grid size: coarse 64 × 64 × 96, modeling; SGS 20 s at Z′ = 0.06 and the intermittent
distribution using the FDS medium 108 × 108 × 128, fine combustion modeling; region frequency of crossing 773 and
128 × 128 × 144 laminar flamelet 1023 K occurs within the intermittent
region (0.08 < Z′ < 0.2), whereas the

peak frequency for crossing 250°C
occurs in the fully developed plume
region (Z′ > 0.2)
To study the mass burning rate of Pool size: 1 m; height: 0.025 m; Turbulence: standard TBPB and Flame temperature: Chemical reaction model gives the Mishra
an accidental release of flammable thickness of wall: 0.02 m; flow k-ε model and scale TBPEH 1400 K better results using flamelet and LES et al. 2009
liquid fuel by CFD domain; diameter: 3.4 m; height: adaptive simulation
7.65 m (SAS); combustion:
eddy dissipation model:
discrete transfer radiation
model; Magnussen soot
model
CFD codes are used to study Pool size: 88 × 44 × 8.7 m; flow Turbulence: standard k-ε LNG Spill flow rate: Source-level turbulence for a spill Gavelli
the fate of LNG spills into domain: 500 × 500 × 50 m model; Reynolds stress 28.7 m3/min; spill volume: onto solid ground is expected to et al. 2008
impoundments, such as the model (RSM); turbulent 66.4 m3; vaporization rate: be smaller than for a spill onto
mixing between air and the kinetic energy 0.029–0.195 kg/m2 s; water; a significant reduction in
evaporated gas; it is used to wind velocity: 1.7 m/s; vapor dispersion distance would
predict the flammable vapor cloud simulation time: 700 s be achieved in the event of a spill
distance that is validated through onto solid ground compared to
experimental results the observations an impoundment
surrounding a spill on water

Authenticated
Table 11 (continued)
The present model are validated Pool size: 0.3 × 0.3 m; grid Turbulence –LES model; Methane Flame temperature: Predicted time-averaged velocity Cheung
and compared against the size: coarse-96 × 96 × 96; fine combustion – SGS model; 1200 K; simulation time: and temperature profiles are in good and Yeoh
experimental data and predictions 116 × 116 × 116 soot and radiation model 400 h agreement with the experimental 2009
from another LES field model with data
the numerical simulation in FDS
To study the flame height along Pool size: 5 cm diameter Turbulence: standard k-ε Methanol Curving height: 1–3.5 cm Flame height prediction compares Chuah
the axial on the momentum model favorably to results from the scaling et al. 2009
controlled circulation and the analysis and experiment
effects of buoyancy
To study LNG vapor dispersion Pool size: 4.6 m; flow domain: Turbulence models: k-ε LNG ½ LFL at 0.3 m elevation: Best possible prediction results out Qi et al.
using the ANSYS CFX code and 6.71 × 6.71 × 2.44 m model, k-ω model, and 0–9.8 m; ½ LFL at 1.22 m of CFX with available computing 2010
also discuss the important shear stress transport elevation: 4.1–13.4 m; resources; more experimental works
parameters such as evaporation (SST) model residual: 10−4 are needed to study the parameters
rate, pool area, turbulence that are essential to the physical
in the source term, effects of process of LNG vapor dispersion
obstacles, roughness height, and
atmospheric conditions
To study the flame temperature Pool size: 1–30 m Laminar flamelet; Moos- LNG Flame temperature: Mass burning rate of hydrocarbon Schalike
and SEP of LNG by CFD simulation Brookes soot model; 1298–1320 K; SEP: pool fires is higher, caused et al. 2011
and compare to experimental radiation-discrete 55–230 kW/m2 by the temperature difference
results ordinates model between boiling point and ambient
temperature
To study LNG pool fire radiation Pool size: 35 m; flow domain: Turbulence: standard k-ε LNG Flame length: Relative error is < 10% and results Sun et al.
in 3D CFD model; hazard analysis 500 × 500 × 250 m LES model; nonpremixed 75.1 ± 7.1 m; mean SEP are in good agreement with the test 2014
for an LNG plant is conducted to combustion model; (MSEP): 260.5 ± 6.4 kW/ data; CFD model performs better
study spacing distances between radiation model; m2; flame surface than the commonly used engineering
facilities and ignition source to probability of density temperature: 1100 K; model as solid flame model
avoid radiation damage function (PDF) model inner flame temperature:
600 K; simulation time:
8 h
To study the understanding of Pool size: 15 m; flow domain: Turbulence: Reynolds- LNG Burning rate: 0.177 kg/m2 Relative error of thermal radiation Jujuly et al.
the domino effects of pool fire in 100 × 100 × 70 m averaged Navier- s; flame length: 42 ± 6.4 m; is 2.56% from the experimental to 2015
complex geometrical settings of Stokes (RANS) model; thermal radiation: simulation results; ratio of flame
process industries combustion-nonpremixed 185 ± 6 kW/m2; simulation: length to diameter (L/D) is 0.71%
model; radiation: Monte 27 min only relative error
Carlo model; soot;
Magnussen soot model

Authenticated
flame geometry was used for determining the separation

Reference
Sun et al.
distance of the storage vessels or the structures from the
2015
effect of thermal radiation. The jet flame surface is either
diffusion or turbulent as proposed by many authors. TNO
MSEP: 62.8 kW/m2; flame 15 m, then this potential risk could (Jo and Crowl 2008) used the solid flame model for the
agreement with phenomenological

be averted; CFD model is in a good
Simulation results show that if the
spacing distance was increased to
analysis of jet fire by experiments. It proposed the flame

geometry of jet fire to be of frustum cone shape and pro-
model by comparing fire vided correlations for the width of flame jet with the eleva-
tion angle between the hole and the flame axis. The solid
flame model has been commonly used by a number of
characteristics
authors and in a number of software as well.

Remarks
4.2.3 CFD approach in jet fire

flame tilted angle: 47;
Flame length: 60.1 m;
Several software packages are being used currently for

temperature: 1500 K;
simulation time: 48 h
Fuel used Parameter studied
predicting the fire hazards based on fluid flow and turbu-

lent combustion. CFD uses detailed models of combustion
chemistry, turbulent flow, and radiative heat transfer. The
validation of the CFD turbulent combustion model can be
made with smaller laboratory or medium-scale experi-
ments and then confidently extended to a larger scale
or to more complicated release geometries (Barker et al.
Turbulence: RANS model; LNG
1995, Hernandez et al. 1995, Zhou et al. 1999, Chen et al.

2000). In addition, CFD calculations provide insight for
model; radiation- radiative
combustion-nonpremixed
the development of new robust, simple-to-use, predictive

transfer equation (RTE)
tools. This reduces the expensive large-scale experiments

on jet fire hazards.
Table 15 shows the details of the CFD simulation of
Model used
small/large jet fire of LPG/LNG studies carried out during

the time period of 1990–2015. Hernandez et al. (1995)
studied the accidental release of flammable gases (such
as NG) using CFD and predicted the flame characteristics
(such as flame length and temperature). The CFD model
can be used to study the effect of the presence of obsta-
Case study of LNG hazard analysis Pool size:; flow domain:
cles. Flame lift-off due to the buoyancy of the gas as tem-

500 × 500 × 250 m
perature rises can also be estimated using the CFD model

(Chakrabarty and Aloqaily 2011).
Domain size
4.3 BLEVE
is done based on CFD simulation
BLEVE is an explosion caused by the rupture of a vessel

containing a pressurized liquid above its boiling point. If
the pressurized vessel containing liquid at high tempera-
Objectives of study
ture (which may be room temperature, depending on the

substance) ruptures, the pressure that prevents the liquid
from boiling is lost. If the rupture is catastrophic, where
the vessel is immediately incapable of holding any pres-
sure at all, then suddenly there exists a large mass of

Authenticated
Table 12: Comparison of experimental studies on LPG/LNG jet fire.
Objectives of study Detail of experiment Fuel used Parameter studied Remarks Reference
To study the turbulent jet Circular orifice: 2–80 mm; Mach number: Propane Heat release rate: 7.5 MW; flame length: Nondimensional heights and Sonju and
diffusion flame into a quiescent 0.03 and 8 m; Froude number: 80–6 × 105; flame diameter for propane flame Hustad 1984
air at atmospheric pressure and methane temperature: propane 1070–1470 K and were found to be larger than
temperature methane 1270–1420 K methane flame by ~ 30%–60%
To study the lift-off height and Circular orifice: 38–45 mm; Mach number: Methane Flame temperature: heat release Stability of large flames has McCaffrey and
flame height with the heat 2.9 rate: 500 MW; stagnation pressure: been for methane and confirms Evans 1986
release rate of methane jet 3400–12,000 kPa; velocity of gas: the approach of Kalghatgi and
diffusion 500–600 m/s Annushkin and Sverdlov to
prediction.
Premixed stoichiometric turbulent Nozzle size: 12 mm; velocity: 30–65 m/s; Methane Flame height: 25–45 cm; lift-off: 2.83– Turbulent transport is reduced Chen et al.
methane flames are investigated two-point laser Doppler anemometer (LDA); 5 cm; flame temperature: 500–1500 K due to the presence of low- 1996
on a piloted Bunsen burner 2D Rayleigh thermometry; Raman/Rayleigh density gas in the shear layer
laser induced (Lambda Physik model EMG of the flame front, which leads
150 MSC); 384 × 576 pixels; spectral range: to a longer potential core in the
150 μm flames than cold jet region
To study the flame stability and Nozzle diameter: 2.2 mm; charged-coupled LPG – Error in lift-off height and flame Kiran and
emission characteristics such device (CCD) camera; chemiluminescence length is estimated to be in the Mishra 2007
as lift-off height, flame length, gas analyzer range of 3–7%
and blow-off velocity for LPG jet
diffusion flame
To study the assessment of large Six circular orifice outlet diameters are Propane Mass flow rate: 0.006–0.54 kg/s; lift-off Flame length increases with the Palacios et al.
vertical jet fire into a quiescent used; nozzle diameter: 10–43.1 mm; (LPG) height: 12.75–30 mm; Reynolds number: orifice diameter and the mass 2009
air at atmospheric pressure and electronic pressure transmitter (EPT); K-type 7 × 104–4 × 106 flow rate in jet fires
temperature thermocouple; thermographic camera: view
of 24° horizontal and 18° vertical; spectral
range 7.5–13 μm
To study the axial temperature Five circular orifice outlet diameters are Propane Mass flow rate: 0.06–0.43 kg/s; flame Jet outlet diameter had no Mares et al.
distribution in vertical jet fires used; nozzle diameter: 12.75–30 mm; focal length: 8 m; heat release rate: 19.7 influence on the temperature 2009
and expression for predicting the plane array (FPA) detector: 320 × 240 pixels; MW; lift-off height: 0.65–1 m; flame behavior
fire temperature is formulated two types of thermocouple used: B (Pt 30% temperature: 2470 K
RH/Pt 6% RH) and S (Pt 13% RH/Pt)
To study the sonic propane jet Six orifice diameters were used: 10, 12.75, Propane Mass flow rate: 0.06–0.43 kg/s; lift-off Radiation intensity increases Mares et al.
fire in the absence of wind, with 15, 20, 25.5, and 30 mm; FPA detector: height: 2.2–8.1 m; relative humidity: 45– with the flame size, fuel mass 2010
visible flame length ranging 320 × 240 pixels; spectral range is 7.5–13 53%; heat release rate: 20 MW; flame flow rate, and net heat released
between 2.2 and 8.1 m μm; field of vision is 24° × 18° length: 3–8 m; SEP: 50–100 kW/m2 from the flame

Authenticated
To study the geometrical features Nozzle diameter: 10–43.1 mm; IR, Propane Flame temperature: 800 K; flame length: Ratio of flame length and orifice Palacios and
(flame shape, length, and width) thermographic camera (Flir Systems, AGEMA 10 m diameter is dependent on the Casal 2011
of a large vertical jet fire 570); field of vision of the IR camera was fuel mass flow rate
24° × 18° and spectral range was 7.5–13 μm
To study the geometric and Nozzle diameter: 10–43.1 mm; three Propane Flame temperature: 800 K; flame length: Thermal radiation intensity Palacios et al.
thermal radiation data from Schmidt-Boelter heat flow sensors; IR and 10.3 m and width: 1.5 m; mass flow decreases quickly with distance 2012
a series of large jet fire by video cameras rate: 0.02–0.5 kg/s; flame emissivity: from flames; at short distances,
experiments 0.3–0.4; surface emissivity power: it can be very high, and an
57.8–69.5 kW/m2 accurate prediction is required
in this area for the purposes of
risk analysis
To study the flame length and Nozzle size: 20–50 mm; static pressure: NG and Mass flow rate: 3–20 kg/s; flame length: There was no significant Lowesmith
the incident radiation produced Druck OPTX1400 transmitter; differential hydrogen/ 19–49 m; lift-off: 6–8 m; fraction of difference in the incident and Hankinson
around the fire pressure: DruckSTX2100 transmitter; NG mixture heat radiated: 0.137–0.188; heat flux: thermal radiation around the 2012
thermocouple: BS EN ISO 5167-1(1997); 50–350 kW/m2 fires from the two different fuels
Medtherm radiometers: 12–150°; spectral and the calculated fraction of

range was 0.3–11.5 μm heat radiated for the two fuels
is the same for comparable
release exit diameters
To study thermal radiation Vertical nozzle diameter: 2.54 cm; Propane Flame length: 1–13.2 m; mass flow Lift-off increases with flow rate Zhang et al.
generated by the propane jet fire horizontal nozzle diameter: 1.91 cm; rate: 0.04 kg/s; flame temperature: and maintained an increasingly 2015
in both horizontal and vertical horizontal nozzle angle: 10° (x-y axis); 700–1300 K; fraction of heat radiation: high rate throughout the range;
ways radiometers (Schmidt-Boelter and Gardon 0.054–0.238 SEP was used to developed
gauge) type; IR camera (FLIR SC660) correlations with flow rate,
flame length, and area
To study the flame geometry of Nozzle diameter: 19.05 mm; height of Liquefied Flame length: 2.08–4.41 m; lift-off Vertical extent of jet fires is Gopalaswami
jet fires by varying the mass flow nozzle from ground: 1.25 m; radiometers propane length: 0.37–1.81 m; mass flow rate: reduced with the wind effects in et al. 2016
rate through horizontal way (Schmidt-Boelter 30 kW/m2 and Gardon gas (LPG) 0.015–0.110 kg/s; exit velocity: the crosswind direction
gauge 120–300 kW/m2) type; IR camera 27.5–205.8 m/s
(FLIR SC660)
To study the geometrical features Horizontal pipe of diameter: 1.9 cm; LPG Flame length: 1–10 m, lift-off length: Flame is titled with a higher Laboureur
of horizontal jet fires in the pressure transducers: PX5100-150GI (500 0–2.5 m; mass flow rate: 0–0.12 kg/s; angle than the flow rate et al. 2016
presence of air psi); thermocouple: DBK90; low flow rate: flame temperature: 600–700 K decreases and horizontal flame
FMA1827 (10 lb/h); turbine flow meters: shape gives better presented
FTB932 (9–60 lb/h) and FTB937 (72–1205 than other shape like rectangle
lb/h); IR camera (FLIR SC660) or kite

Authenticated
Mares et al. 2009, Mares et al. 2010

W
2
Wind
Bagster and Schubach 1996
L
McCaffrey and Evans 1986
Peters and Williams 1983
Palacios and Casal 2011
L
R
Sonju and Hustad 1984
b
L
Santos and Costa 2005
Kiran and Mishra 2007
– Hawthorne et al. 1949
Turns and Myhr 1991

Lb
– Schuller et al. 1983 α
McCaffrey 1989
W
S 1 β
– Baron 1954
Froude number Reference
Hydrocarbon pipeline d
A B C
Figure 5: Flame geometry of jet fire from a leak in the pipe.
–
80–6 × 105
–
3 × 104
1930–1.6 × 106,
4000–2 × 105
9568–44,811
4.5 × 104
2.4 × 105
–
218–7.2 × 105
(A) ellipse, (B) inverted circular cone, and (C) a frustum cone with
the effect of wind, where α is the angle between the axis of the hole
and flame (°), L is the flame length of jet fire (m), Lb is the length of
the flame (m), S is the lift-off distance (m), d is the hole diameter
in the pipeline (m), RL is the length of the frustum (m), W1 is the
frustum width of base of the flame (m), and W2 is the frustum width
Reynolds number
–
–
–
–
–
–
3 × 104–5 × 105
3.13 × 103–3.54 × 104,
–
1496–7867
–
8 × 105–3 × 106
–
4.86 × 103–8.85 × 104
of tip of the flame (m).
liquid that is at very high temperature and very low pres-

sure. This causes the entire volume of liquid to instan-
taneously boil, which in turn causes an extremely rapid

3–8 Turbulent small scale

10–16 Turbulent non premixed

Turbulent premixed flow

Sonic and supercritical

Turbulent nonpremixed

Sonic and subsonic flow
expansion. Depending on temperatures, pressures, and

10–80 Turbulent subsonic
Turbulent subsonic
the substance involved, the expansion may be so rapid

that it can be classified as an explosion fully capable of
Sonic gas flow
Turbulent flow
inflicting severe damage on its surroundings (Pinhasi et al.

L/D Orientation Orifice type Nozzle size Flame type
Sonic flow
Turbulent
Laminar
2007). Walls (1978, 1979) reported that when the flamma-

ble substance inside a container becomes superheated,
explosion occurs, which was termed as “BLEVE”. In the
4–12
2–80
38–45
29–59
2.18–6.17
20–1000
5–8
2.2
12.75–30
10–43.1
(mm)
1980s, different definitions were reported to emphasize

the aspect of the BLEVE phenomenon. Reid (1979) defined
BLEVE as the sudden loss of containment of liquid due

to the superheated temperature that generates a strong

Circular and
rectangular
Cylindrical
blast wave. Birk and Cunningham (1994) defined BLEVE

Table 13: Comparison of parameters reported for LPG/LNG jet fire.
Circular
Circular
Circular
Circular
as the explosive release of expanding vapor and boiling

liquid when a container holding a pressure liquefied gas
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

fails catastrophically. Furthermore, CCPS (1999) defined

5.3 Vertical
8.3 Vertical
6.3 Vertical
Vertical
Vertical
Vertical
Vertical
Vertical
10.8–15.0 Vertical
8.5 Vertical
2.2–8.1 Vertical
5.7–8.8 Vertical
BLEVE as the “sudden release of a large mass of pressur-

ized superheated liquid to the atmosphere”. Generally,
– –
the failure of highly pressurized vessel due to an increase

95
6.75–8.4
2.5–5
2.2–6.3
5.9–6.75
in the temperature of inside liquid above its boiling point

at normal atmospheric pressure causes explosion with
the scattering of the fragments of the vessel. When an LPG

Propane mixture of CO2 and H2

container comes in contact with a flame, it will generally

form BLEVE within 8–30 min (Zhang et al. 2015).
Methane, propane mix of
Methane and propane
The probability of a BLEVE in transportable tanks

is less than 2.15 × 10−6 per year (Chakrabarti and Parikh
Propane methane
2011). Many BLEVE accidents reported in the literature

(Feizen 1966, Mexico 1984, and Alma Ata 1989) caused
Fuel type
Methane
Methane
Methane
Methane
Propane
Propane
Propane
City gas
serious loss to industrial assets and led to human fatali-

CO2-H2
LPG
ties. Table 16 shows the reported occurrences of BLEVE

Authenticated
Table 14: Comparative analysis of various models used for calculating thermal radiation and geometrical character of the flame models of jet fire.
Thermal radiation Flame shape Geometrical character of flame length and width (m) Atmospheric transmisivity, τa Heat-radiated Reference
intensity, I (kW/m2) fraction, Fr
Point source model

τa Fr ∆Hcm Conical shape )0.444
( ∆Hc m 1–0.0565 ln(x) – Clay et al. 1988
2
L=
4 πx 161.66
FrQr cos β Conical shape L − a 5.3 Tf  Ma  – 0.33 for propane Crocker and Napier
= C − (1 − CT ) 
4 πx 2 dj CT αTTj  T Mj  1988
uj PM
j j
a=
2ul tan α ZpRTj ρa

Fr ( −∆Hc )m Tilted cylindrical – 1–0.0565 ln(x) 0.2 for methane Chamberlain 1987,
4 πx 2 Carter 1991

τa Fr ∆Hcm Ellipse of single 2.02(PwXs)−0.69 whereas 0.2 for methane CCPS 1999
L 5.3 Tf /Tj  Ma 
2 = C + (1 − CT ) 
4 πx point source dj CT αT  T Mj   5328
Pw = 1013.25( RH ) × exp  14.4114 −
 Ta 

τa Fr ∆Hcm – L = 0.933d0.746P0.373 0.8 EAf Lowesmith et al.
2 , 0.13 for NG
4 πx 1000Q 2007
Solid flame model

( −0.0032uj )
EτaFv Frustum cone L = ( L2b − b2 × sin( α ) − b × cos( α ) 1 – aw – ac; 2.02(PwXs)−0.69 for 0.21 × e + 0.11 Van den Bosch and
104 < PwXs < 105 Weterings 2005
  1 ρa  −70Ri ( Ds )Cuw 
−6uw
W1 = Ds × (13.5 × e + 1.5) ×  1 − 1 − × ×e 
  15 ρj  

−1.5uw − ( −25uw )
W2 = Lb × (0.18 × e + 0.31) × (1 − 0.47 × e )
Af is the area of flame (m2), b is the frustum lift-off height (m), CT is the fuel mole fraction concentration in a stoichiometric fuel-air mixture, d is the diameter of hole in the pipeline (m), dj is the
physical diameter of the nozzle (m), Ds is the effective hole diameter (m), Fr is the fraction of heat radiated (dimensionless), E is the SEP (kW/m2), Fv is the view factor (dimensionless), ΔHc is the
heat of combustion (kJ/kg), l is the incident radiation received by target (kW/m2), L is the flame length of jet fire (m), Lb is the flame length, tip to center of exit plane (m), ṁ is the mass flow rate
of fuel (kg/s), Ma is the molecular weight of air (kg/kmol), Mj is the molecular weight of the fuel (kg/kmol), P is the absolute pressure (MPa), Pw is the water partial pressure (Pa), Pj is the pres-
sure at jet (Pa), Qr is the heat release rate (W), RH is the relative humidity (%), temperature (K), Ta is the air temperature (K), Tf is the adiabatic flame, Tj is the jet fluid temperature (K), uj is the
jet velocity (m/s), uw is the ratio of wind speed to the jet speed, ul is the velocity of fluid from jet (m/s), W1 is the frustum width of base of the flame (m), W2 is the frustum width of the tip of the
flame (m), x is the distance of fireball center from the target or receptor (m), Xs is the distance from the surface of the flame to the target (m), Zp is the compressibility factor (dimensionless), α is

Authenticated
the angle between the axis of the hole and flame (°), αT is the mole of reactant per mole of product for a stoichiometric fuel-air mixture, ρa is the density of air (kg/m3), ρj is the density of gas in
the jet (kg/m3), and τa is the atmospheric transmissivity (dimensionless).
Table 15: Comparative analysis of CFD studies on LNG/LPG jet fire.
To study the design Nozzle size: 5 mm; flow Turbulence: (k-ε) model; NG Flame temperature: 600 K; Stoichiometric flame length as a Hernandez
and operation of flare domain: 60 × 28 × 74; laminar flamelet model; PDF Froude number: 3240– function of Froude number and et al. 1995
in oil installation with fuel velocity: model 14,009; stoichiometric and the wind to jet velocity ratio, that
the prediction of the 12.6–26.2 m/s; wind visible flame length: 0.569 needs validation
consequence of accidental velocity: 0.82–
release of flammable gases 1.64 m/s
To study the turbulent jet flow Nozzle size: 7.74 mm; Turbulence: (k-ε) model; EBU Methane Flame temperature: 1914 K EDC model lacks in popularity in Zhou et al.
and combustion the results flow domain: model; eddy dissipation the partial premixed jet flame 1999
are compared to experimental 3.2 × 0.96 m concept (EDC); PDF model;
and theoretical results combustion model
To study the flamelet model Nozzle diameter: Turbulence: (k-ε) model; Methane Lift-off height: 8.5 mm; Stabilization points are found to Chen et al.
for partially premixed and 8 mm; fuel velocity: flamelet model; PDF model mixture fraction: 0.05; flame be located on the lean side and, in 2000
nonpremixed turbulent 40 m/s; flow domain: shape: laminar diffusion the case of low fuel exit velocities,
combustion in jet fire 1000 × 400 × 191 mm flamelet near the stoichiometric mixture
To study jet fires from high- Flow domain: Turbulence (k-ε) model; NG Mach number: 0.6; flame Flame lift-off can be predicted Cleaver et al.
pressure release of NG 112 × 88 × 48 probability density function temperature: 1900 K; using either an empirical approach 2003
(PDF) model; radiation thermal radiation: 47 based on a turbulence time scale
model MW–3.6 GW
To study the LES of a Nozzle diameter: Navier-Stokes, energy Methane Simulation time: 110 h Present work has capability of Sheikhi
turbulent nonpremixed 7.2 mm; fuel velocity: (enthalpy); subgrid scale LES/FDF for accurate prediction of et al. 2005
piloted methane jet flame 49.6 m/s; flow domain: and LES model; PDF model; complex flames, its further use for
91 × 101 × 101 mm filtered density function modeling of even more complex
(FDF) turbulent reacting flows
To study the flame length Nozzle diameter: Turbulence: (k-ε) model; Propane Flow behavior: laminar Weakness of the flame length Cumber and
and structure of jet fire using 4.57 mm combustion model; PDF counter-flow nonpremixed; methodology is radiation Spearpoint
the CFD model Reynolds number: 17,200– emissions in the visible spectral 2006
58,300; lift-off height: window are assumed to be due to
6.1 mm; flame temperature: soot formation
800–1800 K
To study the consequence Nozzle diameter: k-ε standard; k-ε Methane Flame length: 1.17–5.64 m No turbulence model gives Novembre
analysis of NG release from 2.7 mm; flow domain: renormalization group (RNG) satisfactory results over the entire et al. 2006
high-pressure pipeline 300 × 100 mm; and k-ω SST model domain
through a CFD velocity: 400 m/s
To study the thermal Nozzle size: 20.6 mm; Navier-Stokes equations Hydrogen/ Radiant fraction: 0.082– Ground surface reflectance only Wang et al.
radiation characteristics of velocity: 2061 m/s; in the LES model; EDC methane 0.168; SEP: 0.168–0.176; has minor effect on the SEP of jet 2014
hydrogen and hydrogen/ flow domain: 25 × 10 m combustion model; radiation flame length: 7.58–18.6 m fire

Authenticated
methane jet fires through a model
FireFoam CFD code

Table 16: Formation of BLEVE in different scenarios (Tauseef et al.
Zarate et al.
2010).
Reference
2014
Occurrence Percentage Percentage
of incidents of incidents
(1975–2005) (1995–2010)
Maximum values were obtained

position from the jet axis increases Train derailment 33 –

jet, decreasing its value as the
around the central axis of the
External fire 17 36

Mechanical damage – 22
Loading/unloading terminals 16 –
Road tanker accident 14 –
Overfilling 4 20
Runaway reaction 4 12
Remarks
Others 12 10

in the hydrocarbon industry and their probable causes

1600–1700 K; mass flow
(Tauseef et al. 2010).

Figure 6 shows the schematic formation of BLEVE and
rate: 0.05–0.4 kg/s
Flame temperature:
Parameter studied
its secondary scenario fireball (Marshall 1987). When the

liquefied gas container gets thermally exposed/heated
with external fire and gets engulfed in fire that increases
the temperature of the liquid gas above its normal
boiling temperature, with a subsequent increase of pres-
sure inside the vessel, then the strength of the tank wall

Fuel used
weakens and the container may structurally fail. There is

Propane
a rapid depressurization that produces a rarefaction wave

propagating into the liquid gas, and this rarefaction wave
is followed by boiling of the liquid gas. The process of

the destruction of the vessel may occur as an explosion

model; combustion model
model; energy transport
producing a shock wave, a fireball (Shebeko and Shebeko

RANS; turbulence: (k-ε)
model; mass transport
2015).
Many mathematical models of BLEVE have been
proposed based on heating of the vessel walls, fire
Model used
Flow domain: velocity:

Fireball
Domain size
Wall temperature
Flame upto 600°C
50 m/s
Vapors R
ea
ct
ive
Fracture fo

rce
hydrocarbon jet fire through
After sometime ( ≤ 1 h)
To study the analysis of
Objectives of study
Leakage
and fire Fire weakened
the support leg Final
Initial
Figure 6: Schematic diagram of the formation of BLEVE and the

secondary scenario of fireball with the ignition of the liquid or vapor
CFD
ejection due to the fracture.

Authenticated
engulfment, or thermal exposure. Many investigators Figure 7 shows the schematic diagram of the fire-
studied the phenomenon of BLEVE and gave mathemati- ball. Various models reported in the literature for the
cal correlations for the calculation of its impacts (Baker fireball are compiled in Table 17. The effects of thermal
et al. 1983, Marshall 1987, Moodie et al. 1988, Aouizer- radiation and fragments ejected from BLEVE have been
ate et al. 1990, Shebeko et al. 1993). Moodie et al. (1988) widely studied by different authors (Holden and Reeves
studied the behavior of a vessel containing a liquid or a 1985, Baum 1988, Satyanarayana et al. 1991, Birk 1995).
liquid gas when engulfed by fire. Few authors reported However, overpressure generated by the explosion has
that the occurrence of BLEVE is due to the thermal energy been analyzed only by few authors (Planas-Cuchi et al.
absorbed by the liquid (McDevitt et al. 1988, 1990). 2004). Gonzalez-Ferradas et al. (2006) proposed a new
Both experimental and theoretical studies have been method for calculating the relationship between over-
conducted on BLEVE. Many investigators studied the pressure, impulse, and distance of the vessel from the
mechanism and occurrence of BLEVE through experimen- burst, which are obtained from the characteristic curves
tal and case studies of accidents and proposed various using Baker’s method.
theoretical models (Birk 1995, Reid 1976, Casal et al. 2001, Only a few experimental studies on LPG/LNG fireballs
Park et al. 2006, Bubbico and Marchini 2008). A method- have been reported (Table 18; Balke et al. 1999, Gong et al.
ology based on the liquid superheating energy for the cal- 2004, Birk and Vanderstee 2006, Birk et al. 2007, Chen
culation of the quick approximation of the overpressure et al. 2008, Zhang and Liang 2013, Mishra et al. 2015). The
has been reported (Casal and Salla 2006). However, the consequences of BLEVE along with fireball scenarios are
physical processes in liquids at the initiation of a BLEVE generated using overpressure/shock waves, large amount
have not been studied; therefore, no reliable criteria for a of thermal radiation due to combustion of the released
BLEVE occurrence are available. LPG, and the scattering of the fragments of vessel-like mis-
siles with high velocity. The effects of BLEVE are usually
evaluated as the thermal intensity of the fireball and the
4.4 Fireball overpressure effects (Abbasi and Abbasi 2007, Pintaric
2007).
If a flammable substance is subject to a BLEVE, it may also
be subject to intense heating, either from an external source
of heat that may have caused the vessel to rupture in the 4.5 VCE
first place or from an internal source of localized heating
such as skin friction. This heating can cause a flammable In the past decade, VCE has become a serious hazard in
substance to ignite, adding a secondary explosion caused the industries (e.g. petroleum refining and petrochemi-
by the primary BLEVE. Whereas the blast effects of any cals) dealing with the handling, storage, and transporting
BLEVE can be devastating, a flammable substance such as flammable liquids or gases. VCE has a severe effect on the
propane can add significantly to the danger. loss of life and property (Strehlow 1973, Wiekema 1980).
A BLEVE need not be a chemical explosion nor does
there need to be a fire. BLEVE can occur with any liquid,
even water. The only difference is that with nonflammable
liquids there is no fireball.
BLEVE occurs when the highly pressurized vessel
containing flammable liquids or liquid-gases gets heated
externally or gets engulfed by fire (Marshall 1982, Baker Ra
diu
et al. 1983). The failure of highly pressurized storage tanks
s
depends on the properties of the stored materials. LPG

Height of fireball
Dis
(mixture of propane and butane), LNG (methane), and tan
ce
of
ce
chlorine are the major materials responsible for causing nte
Lift-off distance
r fr
om
BLEVE in the hydrocarbon industry. The release during fire
ba
ll t
or
sudden release causes rapid changes in the physical state ec
ep
tor
from liquid to vapor, thus changing their properties. Any

ignition then causes fire, which then propagates like
Distance of fireball from surrounding
a fireball with the generation of shock wave in its wake Figure 7: Schematic diagram of fireball during explosion (shaped
(Klets 1977). like a mushroom).

Authenticated
Table 17: Comparative analysis of various models used for calculating thermal radiation and SEP during a fireball.
Thermal radiation intensity, SEP, E (W/m2) Atmospheric transitivity, τa Heat-radiated Diameter of Time duration, t (s) Reference
l (kW/m2) fraction, Fr fireball, D (m)
Qr Fr M∆Hc
, – 1 0.27PV0.32 5.80M0.333 – Lees 1996
4 πx 2 tB
2.2τa Fr Hc M0.67 Hc MFr

2
2 2.02(PwXs)-0.69 0.27PV0.32 4.35M0.333 0.45M0.333 for (M < 3 × 104); Roberts 1982,
4 πx πDmax tB
whereas For Pv < 6MPa; 2.6M0.167 for (M > 3 × 104) CCPS 2010
 5328 0.48PV0.32
Pw = 1013.25( RH ) × exp  14.4114 −
 Ta  For Pv > 6 MPa
2.2τa Fr Hc M0.67
– log(14.1( RH )−0.108 X S−0.13 ) RH ≥ 20% 0.3 for bursting 5.80M0.333 0.45M0.333 for (M < 3 × 104); CCPS 2010
4 πL2
below relief valve; 2.6M0.167 for (M > 3 × 104)
whereas
0.4 for bursting
L = X 2 + H2 above relief valve
Hc MFr
EτaFv 2
, whereas 1 – aw – ac; 2.02(PwXs)−0.69 for 0.00325PV0.32 6.48M0.325 0.852M0.260 Berg Mercx and
t
πDmax
104 < PwXs < 105 van den 1997,
ΔH = ΔHc – ΔHV – Cp × ΔT Van den Bosch
and Weterings
2005
EτaFv E = 2.35 × 105.PV0.39 ; for log(14.1( RH )−0.108 X S−0.13 ) RH ≥ 20% – 5.80M0.333 0.45M0.333 for (M < 3 × 104); CCPS 2010
PV ≤ 2MPa; E ≈ 3.5 × 105, 2.6M0.167 for (M > 3 × 104)
for M ≥ 1000 Kg exp −7 × 10−4 × ( rb2 + Hb2 − Ds /2)
– 5.33M0.327 0.923M0.303 Birk et al. 1990
EtaFv 235P0.39, where P is 1 – 0.0565 ln(x) – 5.8M0.333 4.5M0.333 for (M < 37000 kg); Clay et al. 1988
the bursting pressure 8.2M0.167 for (M > 37000 kg)
1.45 MPa for propane
and 0.52 for butane
10exp CA .(log(Tfb )/log10) + CB 
– – – 2 × CR × (M)0.333 Ct × (M)0.3333 van Aerde et al.
1988
– – – – 6.48(m)0.325 0.85(m)0.26 Pietersen 1988
Hc MFr
EτaFv 2
– 0.35 αMβ γMδ Bubbico and
πD tmax B Marchini 2008
CA and CB are the coefficients of damage in fireball (dimensionless), CR or α is the coefficient for fireball, and Ct or γ is the coefficient for fireball duration (s), E is the SEP (kW/m2), Dmax or Ds is
the maximum diameter of fireball (m), Fv is the view factor (dimensionless), Fr is the fraction of heat radiated (dimensionless), H or Hb is the height of the fireball (m), ΔH is the total available
heat (kJ/kg), ΔHc or Hc is the heat of combustion (kJ/kg), l is the incident radiation received by target (kW/m2), L or x is the distance of fireball center from the target or receptor (m), M or m is the
mass of flammable fuel (kg), Pv is the vapor pressure at the moment of burst (MPa), Pw is the water partial pressure (Pa), Qr is the heat release rate (kW), RH is the relative humidity (%), rb is the

Authenticated
radius of fireball (m), tb or Tfb is the fireball duration (s), X is the distance of point on ground directly below the fireball center from the target (m), Xs is the distance from the surface of the flame
to the target (m), Ta is the atmospheric temperature (K), αc is the absorption coefficient for carbon dioxide, αw is the absorption factor for water vapor, and τa is the atmospheric transmissivity
(dimensionless).
Table 18: Comparison of experimental studies on LPG/LNG fireball.
To study the tank ruptures Mass of container: 403 liters; fill degree: Propane Superheat limit temperature: 53°C; BLEVE is a quick tank failure Birk and
that can lead to a BLEVE 80%; liquid temperature: 20°C wall thickness: 3–6.4 mm; maximum process that is < 10 min to Cunningham
rather than a more jet-type temperature: 600–800°C; pressure: complete the process. 1994
release 1725–2150 kPa
To study the failure of a rail Mass of container: 45.36 m3; fill degree: Propane Failure of liquid temperature: 69°C; Damage caused by Balke et al.
tank car 22%; liquid temperature: 15°C pressure: 25 bar; liquid isentropic overpressure from a BLEVE is 1999
expansion energy: 262 MJ; vapor small compared to the fireballs
isentropic expansion energy: 314 MJ and missile projectiles
To study the effect of Mass of container: 60 liters; fill degree: 50– Pressure Heat flux of 3 kW: pressure reach Thermal stratification plays an Gong et al.
stratification of on the liquid 80%; thermocouple: type K; data acquisition liquefied gas 2.1 MPa in 31 min; heat flux of 5 kW: important role as it decreases 2004
energy system: FLUKE 2620T (PLG) pressure reach 2.1 MPa in 20 min; the severity of the hazard if
temperature of liquid: > 30 K BLEVE occurred
To study the importance of Mass of container: 1.8 m3; PRV: 1.9 MPa; Propane Fill degree: 10–20%; failure time: Failure of vessel depends on Birk and
the pressure relief valve (PRV) thermocouple: type K 13.5 min for 5% blow down; velocity the design of the tank, pressure Vanderstee
behavior on tank survivability of initial fragment: 200 m/s relief system, and exposed fire 2006
to fire impingement
To study the behavior of blast Mass of container: 0.4–2 m3; fill degree: 65% Propane Fireball diameter: 45 m; vapor Expansion of the flashing liquid Birk et al.
overpressure involving BLEVE cloud diameter: 15 m; overpressure contributes to other hazards 2007
at 10 m: 15 kPa; liquid isentropic such as projectiles and close in
expansion energy: 4.4 MJ; vapor dynamic pressure effects
isentropic expansion energy: 38 MJ
To study the possible process Dimension of container: 160 × 160 × 880 mm; LPG Pressure in top: 4.35 bar; movement Thickness of the two-phase Chen et al.
than can direct to a BLEVE fill degree: 60%; heater: 5 kW; thermocouple: of two phase: 250 m/s2; bottom layer increases and its lower 2008
K-type; camera: 1024 × 1024 pixel image of vessel: 100 ms; size of bubble: boundary expanded downward
(Ultima FastCam APX); highest data 104–108 cm3; tank rupture pressure: rapidly
acquisition: 500 kHz/s 20 bar
To study the influence of the Mass of LNG: 9500–19,000 kg LNG Fireball diameter: 127.16–159.28 m; Effects of thermal radiation Zhang and
release of LNG on BLEVE and duration: 8.93–10.69 s; height have been evaluated in terms of Liang 2013
its consequence analysis of fireball: 91.85–115.69 m; SEP: safety distances
237–252 kW/m2
To study the characteristics Mass of container: 900 liters; self- Peroxy-fuel Average diameter: 28 m; height: Peroxy-fuel emitted higher Mishra et al.
of fireball accelerating decomposition temperature: (70% tert-butyl 35 m; thermal radiation of 4 kW/m2: thermal radiation due to fast 2015
80°C; heating rate: 0.8 K/min hydroperoxide, 100 m; thermal radiation of 0.8 kW/ burning in fireball
di-tert-butyl m2: 225 m; overpressure: 2.56 bar;
peroxide, and flame temperature: 390–400 K
water)

Authenticated
A large number of VCE accidents can be found in the lit- VCE occurs only in the presence of confinement or con-
erature such as the Flixborough 1974, Beck 1975, and Italy gestion or in some cases due to the turbulence of the
1985 explosion accidents (Contini and Francocci 1993, open air. Gas or vapor clouds ignited under certain condi-
Lees 1996). VCE can cause severe fatalities, destroy instal- tions produce VCE. VCE is affected by numerous factors
lations and their surroundings, and affect a large area up and meteorological conditions such as wind speed, wind
to several kilometers from the source (Windergen et al. direction, discharge rate, vapor density, and mixing at the
1995). source.
VCE can be classified based on the degree of con-
fined or congested area and propagation mechanism by
which the explosion occurs. Three types of VCE based on 4.5.1 Mathematical modeling of VCE
the degree of confined or congested area are reported:
confined gas explosions within vessels (such as pipes, Most VCE studies deal with semiempirical models. Various
tunnels, or channels), partly confined gas explosion (such mathematical modeling studies and the methodologies for
as compartments, buildings, or surrounding), and uncon- VCE prediction have been reported in the last decade. From
fined gas explosion (such as process plants; Gexcon 1975, very simple empirical models to more sophisticated and
Alghamdi 2011). VCE can also be classified into two types complex models are in use. These models can be classified
according to propagation mechanisms such as detonation such as empirical, phenomenological, and CFD models.
(supersonic, shock reaction) and deflagration (subsonic, Empirical models are correlations developed from experi-
turbulent flame). mental data and results. These models are quite simple
For VCE to occur, an accidental release of sufficient and their applicability is limited to the conditions they
amount of flammable material (liquid or gas) within a con- were tested. Some examples of empirical models are the
fined or congested area must be preceded at first. Second, TNO multienergy model (Berg 1985), congestion assess-
there must be delayed ignition, as it allows the formation ment method (CAM; Puttock 1995, 1999), Baker-Strehlow
of the vapor cloud within the flammability limit. Lastly, model (Baker et al. 1998), and trinitrotoluene (TNT) model
there must be an ignition source with a sufficient amount (Lees 2005). For solving not too complex situations, phe-
of energy to ignite the flammable air mixture. In the pres- nomenological modeling is preferred, which can be
ence of an ignition source, the cloud catches fire creating solved by software packages and self-developed codes.
a flame front that propagates through the cloud having These models are based on algebraic and differential
explosive vapor concentration in air. Depending on the equations that take care of the physical processes involved
velocity of the flame front, a blast wave can be generated during VCE. Some examples of phenomenological models
and this phenomenon is known as VCE (Gugan 1978). are Confined Linked Chamber Explosion (CLICHE; Catlin
When the flame propagates through the unburned flam- 1990) and Shell Code for Overpressure Prediction in Gas
mable mixture at a burning velocity that is less than the Explosion (SCOPE; Puttock et al. 2000). The modeling
speed of the sound, then it is known as the deflagration studies reported in the literature on VCE consequences are
of the vapor cloud. It mainly depends on the composition based on the area of confinement and congestion in the
of flammable air. When the combustion wave propagates surrounding as shown in Table 19 (Robinson 1944, Jarrett
at supersonic velocity through the unburned flammable 1968, van den Berg and Lannoy 1993, Baker et al. 1994,
mixture, then it is known as detonation of vapor cloud. Mercx et al. 2000, Puttock et al. 2000, Baker and Tang
Table 19: Various approaches for VCE consequence modeling.
Models Confinement Reference
Empirical
TNT equivalency method 3D gas expansion Robinson 1944, Jarrett 1968
TNO multienergy method 2D and 3D gas expansion van den Berg and Lannoy 1993, Mercx et al. 2000
Baker-Strehlow Tang method 1D, 2D, and 3D gas expansion Baker et al. 1994, Baker and Tang 2004
CAM2 2D and 3D gas expansion Puttock et al. 2000
Numerical (phenomenological)
CLICHÉ, SCOPE 2D gas expansion Catlin 1990, Puttock et al. 2000
CFD
AutoReaGas, FLACS, CFX 2D and 3D gas expansion Baker et al. 1994, Baker and Tang 2004

Authenticated
2004). VCE modeling is also done based on the deflagra- solve the problem. The simplest programs are having
tion using flame velocity. Flame velocity is determined by limited utility to the modeling of one or a few scenarios
the turbulence of flame front due to various factors such (e.g. fire in small areas and the releasing of heavy gases).
as obstacles (confinement or congestion in surrounding), Table 21 shows the list of programs or software codes that
turbulence, and ignition sources (Shebeko et al. 1995). At are available in the market and are used for source mod-
present, no accepted reliable theoretical model is avail- eling and modeling of dispersion, fire, and explosion for
able for the calculation of all the parameters of VCE such various accident scenarios (Khan and Abassi 1999, PHAST
as maximum pressure rise in the atmosphere and the 2006, Shell 2006, Chempute 2010, ALOHA 2011). The com-
impulse of the positive phase of the shock wave. mercial software use empirical, semiempirical, and phe-
nomenological models for risk analysis and analyze the
characteristics of accidents (CCPS 2000, 2010, Gowid et al.
4.5.2 C
FD approach in VCE 2015). Some of the CFD codes used in LPG/LNG leakages/
fires/explosions are listed in Table 22.
Various CFD codes are currently in use for simulation of
VCE. These codes work based on congested environments
that are affected by the different combustion and turbu-
lence closure models. However, there are only a few mod- 6 S
ummary and future research
eling constants for the computation of turbulence and
the complex interaction between the flame front and the
perspectives
turbulent flow field (Popat et al. 1996, Tufano et al. 1998).
The safety of LPG installations, storage, or transportation
Table 20 provides the comparative analysis of the CFD
is essential. Some of the LPG plants are now surrounded
studies for the simulation of gas explosion. The CFD code
and/or located in the areas of intense human activities.
such as AutoReaGas, developed by TNO and the Century
Although LPG installations are equipped with safety
Dynamics Ltd. (United Kingdom), can be used in case of
valves and alarms and have well-designed multilayer pro-
more rigorous analysis.
tection systems in place, constant vigil, strict adherence to
Some of these codes are used for the simulation and
housekeeping, and maintenance schedules must be prac-
validation of the experimental as well as the case study
ticed and mock safety drills must be resorted to minimize
results. Maremonti et al. (1999) simulated and validated
the probability of an incident and reduce the level of risk
the VCE scenario, which occurred on December 21, 1985
in these installations. The present paper aimed at provid-
in a fuel storage area in Naples (Italy) using AutoReaGas
ing a rigorous review of some of the key aspects of safety
codes. The maximum amount of overpressure inside the
studies and engineering methods for LPG, NG, and LNG
vapor cloud predicted by simulation was found to be
installations and their transportation and storage.
85 kPa. The computational explosions and blast analy-
Various models are reported in the literature for
sis model (CEBAM) developed by Clutter and Luckritz
assessing the frequency of accidents during transporta-
(1999) is also used to simulate the blast and fire engineer-
tion of hazardous materials. However, only a few research
ing for topside structures (BFETS) test. The focus of this
papers show the percentage of accidents involving LPG
effort was to demonstrate the applicability of CEBAM for
during transportation and handling. Similarly, a com-
a variety of offshore module configurations (Clutter and
prehensive study on the frequency of accidents involving
Mathis 2002).
LPG/LNG and the consequences thereof is lacking. The
information with respect to developing countries such
as India, China, and Brazil is also scattered and scanty.
5 Software packages Also, no specialized accident databases are also available
for developing countries (Oggero et al. 2006, Yang et al.
Various computer programs or software codes that are 2012).
available for modeling of accidents-fire and explosion During LPG and NG/LNG transportation, small fail-
involving hazardous materials such as NG, LNG, LPG, ures or events can lead to a series of serious and cata-
ammonia, and chlorine make use of a number of assump- strophic failures. The number of parameters and factors
tions and cover different levels of complexity to include the that need to be studied for the prevention and control of
range of various accident scenarios that can be modeled. LPG/NG/LNG release and the spread of these flammable
These programs require different types of input data to materials are not comprehensively available.

Authenticated
Table 20: Comparative analysis of CFD studies on LNG/LPG VCE.
Domain size Model used Software used Fuel used Parameter studied Remarks Reference
Domain: 86 × 71 × 11; turbulence Turbulence: (k-ε) AutoReaGas Butane Mass of vapor: 1100–2150 kg; peak To develop adequate criteria Tufano et al.
constant: 60–120; fraction of model; turbulent overpressure: 14–21.8 kPa; time duration: for adjustable parameters as 1998
energy loss: 0.3–1 burning velocity 1.7–2.2 s; due to obstacle on peak a function of basic properties
model overpressure: 2.8–12.1 kPa and time duration: such as mixture reactivity and
2.2–4.9 s; fuel concentration: 2.2–6% geometrical factors
Domain: 115 × 63 × 11; pool Turbulence: (k-ε) AutoReaGas Propane Maximum overpressure: 82 kPa; explosion More investigation is required Maremonti
length: 60 m; spill flow rate: model; turbulent strength: 6–7 bar; explosion duration: 3–4 s; on the development of the et al. 1999
75 m3/h; relative humidity: 70%; burning velocity ignition source: 0.1 s flame front propagation in
wind velocity: 2 m/s; stability model nonhomogeneous fuel air mixture
class: D; ground temperature:
283 K; surface roughness: 1 m
Domain: 75 × 75 × 75; volume Turbulence: AutoReaGas Methane Overpressure: 0.5–1.5 bar; reflected Determination of flame path Mercx et al.
of blockage ratio: 0.08–0.14; (k-ε) model; overpressure: 0.02–0.24 bar; side length and average obstacle 2000
average obstacle diameter: combustion overpressure: 0.01–0.12 bar; explosion diameter requires specific further
1.04 m; laminar burning model duration: 0.91 s; charge size: 1.03–5 research
velocity: 0.45 m/s
Size of cloud: 80 × 50 × 20 ft – CEBAM Methane Simulated graphs are shown Propagation of blast highly Clutter and
depends on the layout of the Whitney
facility and directly affects the 2001
damage created during a VCE
incident
Domain: 40 × 25 × 14 m; mass – FLACS Methane and Maximum overpressure: 0.09–1 bar; Leak rate, gas density, and Qiao and
flow rate of fuel: 1–10 kg/s; ethane simulation time step: 10 ms; cumulative wind speed/ventilation are Zhang 2010
filling degree: 50–80%; mass frequency in storage area: 1 × 10−4 per year key parameters that determine
flow rate of air: 1.7 kg/s overpressure of 0.12 bar the filling degree of flammable
material after accidental release
Domain: 400 × 300 × 100 m; Turbulence: (k-ε) FLUENT 6.3 LPG Overpressure: 1.074–7.602 kPa; flame speed: It was possible to capture the Tauseef
wind velocity: 0.5–2.73 m/s model; eddy and PHAST 17.53–161.10 m/s; time: 309–1139 ms phenomena of flame acceleration et al. 2010
dissipation associated with combustion in
model the presence of obstacles
Domain: 80 × 80 × 80 m; volume – GAME Methane and Simulation time: 1–3 h; laminar flame speed: Confinement-specific correlation Li et al.
blockage ratio: 0.04–0.103 propane 0.4–0.46 m/s; gas density: 0.65–1.8 kg/m3 gives the satisfactory results with 2014
different explosion blast sources

Authenticated
Table 21: Comparative analysis of various software packages used for dispersion, fire and explosion modeling.
Name of software Models and consequence analysis Purpose Developed by Reference
ALOHA Atmospheric dispersion Hazard analysis U.S. Environment Protection Agency ALOHA 2011
FRED Fire, release, explosion, dispersion Hazard analysis and QRA Shell Global Solution Shell 2006
PHAST Risk/ Discharge, toxic, dispersion, Consequences analysis Det Norske Veritas Ltd. (DNV) PHAST 2006
SAFETI flammable effects and QRA
MAXCRED III Accident simulation and damage Consequences analysis Centre for Pollution Control and Khan and
potential estimation Energy Technology, India Abassi 1999
BREEZE Accidental and flammable release Risk and consequence Chempute Software Chempute
modeling analysis 2010
SLAB View Dispersion model Hazard zone and accident Dr. Donald Lermak (Lawrence –
release Liverpool National Laboratory)
FIREX – Consequence analysis SINTEF –
Some studies reported about the actual accidents of engineering assets, and habitations and human activ-
LPG tankers and the consequence analysis (such as fire- ity areas in case of BLEVE in LPG/NG/LNG tanks/
ball, jet fire, and pool fire) providing information about treatment areas when the tanks/vessels get engulfed
thermal radiation and fatality with respect to distance in fire or flame impinges on the vessels.
from the event sites. However, the experimental works –– Loading and unloading of LPG/LNG/NG plants and
in these areas are scarce. The study of Birk and Cunning- installations are vulnerable areas that need to be
ham (1994) is, however, worth mentioning. The lack of focused on in the future research.
the experimental studies has rendered most simulation –– Experimental work on the collection of relevant data
studies unverified and nonvalidated. during failure of LPG tanker and the NG/LPG pipe-
Many authors have carried out a QRA of LPG/LNG lines during transportation is lacking. Well-planned
accidents involving BLEVE during storage/installation. experiments are needed in these areas. Theoreti-
However, only two experimental studies on LPG storage cal models and formulations need rigorous testing
are available, which deal with BLEVE (Birk and Cunning- against the experimental and real incidents, and case
ham 1994, Mishra and Wehrstedt 2015, Mishra et al. 2015). studies need to be carried out carefully to validate the
The leakage of LPG/LNG from a container/storage models.
vessel is a primary trigger in most accidents. On igni- –– Large variations are found in the input parameters
tion, the leaking gas catches fire leading to explosion related to release size, weather data, and ignition con-
and causes loss of life in terms of injuries and fatalities ditions. Therefore, modeling needs to be fixed around
and property because of thermal radiation and overpres- input parameter determination with increased confi-
sure. An idea about the shape or geometry of fire flames dence level.
helps in estimating the SEP, total radiant heat, and radia- –– Experimental setup for gas ignition, fire, and explo-
tive fraction incident on the target (Ferrero et al. 2007, sion is capital intensive. However, there is no sub-
Knag et al. 2015). A lot of research is, however, needed on stitute for carefully planned experiments and their
the development of simple models for the flame, flame analysis using theoretical models. Similar-interest
dimensions, and emissive characteristics and the disper- companies need to pool together their resources to
sion of soot/combustion products. Although CFD studies have a modern well-instrumented experimental facil-
on the flame structure are increasing, CFD results lack a ity for the purpose. This facility should be used for
rigorous validation of the predictions with experimental data gathering and the data should be tested by mod-
data or real incident data. CFD studies on jet fire of LPG els that have already been developed.
and NG are still exploratory in nature and need more –– The lack of experimental data on large-scale LPG
robust and planned research. Future studies need to be and NG fires and the lack of validation of the math-
focused and cover the following areas to fill the knowl- ematical models on the amount released, gas cloud
edge gaps. formation, its spread, transport, dispersion, time of
–– Identification and determination of the safe operating ignition, and fire spread in the unconfined and con-
distance between plant equipment/storage vessels, fined atmosphere are the serious limitations.

Authenticated
Nomenclature
Century Dynamics Ltd. and TNO

Christian Michelsen Research
European Union in Ispra, Italy

Telernark Technological R&D
Pritchard et al. 1996, AEA Technology Engineering
conjunction with Advantica

Symbol Description Units
Centre (Tel-Tek), Norway
First- or second-order Wilkening and Huld Joint Research Centre of

Mantis Numerics Ltd. in
Af area of flame spread m2
Software at Harwell
Institute in Norway
b frustum lift-off height of jet fire m
Technologies Ltd.
CA, CB coefficient of damage in fireball
Model proposed by Developed by
Cp specific heat capacity at constant pressure kJ/kg K

Cr coefficient for fireball radius
Ct coefficient of fireball time duration
CT fuel mole fraction concentration in a stoichiometric fuel-
air mixture
D diameter of pool fire m
Magnassen and
SoftScout 2010
Hjertager 1976
Spalding 1981
Godunov 1959 Dmax maximum diameter of fireball m

Ds effective hole diameter of jet fire m
E surface emissive power kW/m2
temporal and spatial 1999

Fr fraction of heat radiated
Fv view factor
g acceleration due to gravity (9.814) m/s2

EBU and thin flame
H lift-off height of fireball m

Empirical model
Empirical model
Reaction model
ΔHc heat of combustion kJ/kg

ΔHr heat released rate in pool fire kJ/kg
correlations
Empirical
ΔHv heat of vaporization of the flammable gas kJ/kg

I thermal radiation received from the target W/m2
EBU
Lb flame length of jet fire from flame tip to center of exit

planem

Gas explosion analysis
Gas explosion analysis
m mass of flammable gas kg

treatment of subgrid-scale objects dispersion analysis
Fire and explosion,
Dispersion and fire
ṁ mass flow rate of burning fuel kg/s

and consequence
and consequence
M a molecular weight of air kg/kmol

and explosion
Table 22: Comparative analysis of various CFD models used for simulating leakage, fire and explosion.
Mf molecular weight of flammable gas kg/kmol

Fluid flow
Purposes
P absolute pressure Pa
Pj pressure at jet Pa
Pv vapor pressure at the time of burst Pa
Unstructured, Cartesian cylindrical
Pw partial water pressure Pa

treatment of subgrid-scale objects
polar or hexahedral, adaptive PDR
Pw0 saturated vapor pressure of water in air Pa

Function type Governing equations Geometry/grid representation
Unresolved, structured mesh
Euler (Navier-Stokes) Unresolved, structured mesh
Qr net heat release rate from the fire W

Euler (Navier-Stokes) Structured Cartesian, PDR
Ri Richardson number
Reynolds averaged Unstructured, adaptive
Structured, body-fitted
R gas constant (8.314) J/mol K

Rl length of the frustum in jet fire m
RH relative humidity %
t duration of time of explosion in fireball&# s
Ta air temperature K
Tf adiabatic flame temperature K
Tj jet flame temperature of jet fire K
Tfb temperature of fireball K
ul velocity of fluid from jet m/s
uw ratio of wind speed to jet speed
finite volume (Navier-Stokes)
Navier-Stokes
Navier-Stokes
Navier-Stokes
uj jet velocity in jet fire m/s

V volume of the vessel m3
W1, W2 width of frustum base and tip of jet fire m
X distance of fireball from the center of the flame to the
target m
Xs distance from the surface of the flame to the target m
finite volume
finite volume
2D and 3D
2D and 3D
2D and 3D
ẏ burning rate of a finite diameter of pool m/s

3D finite
3D finite
AutoReaGas 3D finite
volume
volume
volume
Zp compressibility factor (dimensionless)
Greek letters
REACFLOW
software
Name of
COBRA
EXSIM
FLACS
absorption factor for carbon dioxide

CFX-4
α
αw absorption factor for water vapor

Authenticated
α angle between the hole and the flame axis ° Baker QA, Doolittle CM, Fitzgerald GA, Tang MJ. Recent
αT moles of reactant per mole of product for a stoichiometric developments in the Baker-Strehlow VCE analysis
fuel-air mixture methodology. Process Saf Prog 1998; 17: 297–301.
β angle between normal and line joining point source and Balke C, Heller W, Konersmann R, Ludwig J. Study of the failure
target ° limits of a tank car filled with liquefied petroleum gas subjected
ρj density of gas in jet fire kg/m3 to an open pool fire test. In: BAM Project 3215, Federal Institute
ρ a density of air kg/m3 for Materials Research and Testing (BAM), 1999.
ϕ angle coefficient of pool fire Balyan AK. Gas technology. In: Conference Proceeding of LNG
σ0 Stefan-Boltzmann constant (5.67 × 10−8)W/m2 K 2014. Available at: http://www.gastechnology.org/Training/
ε absorption capability of the flame Documents/LNG17-proceedings/6-4-A_K_Balyan.pdf. Accessed
τ0 atmospheric transmisivity 4 July 2015.
Bariha N, Mishra IM, Srivastava VC. Analysis of fire and explosion
hazards during surface transport of liquefied petroleum gas:
a case study. In: Institution of Chemical Engineers Symposium
Subscripts Series 159, Proceedings of ‘Hazards 24’, Edinburgh, United
a air Kingdom, May 7–9, 2014.
f flame and flammable Bariha N, Mishra IM, Srivastava VC. Hazard analysis associated
fb fireball with failure of natural gas and petroleum gas pipelines. J Loss
j jet fire Prevent Proc 2016a; 40: 217–226.
r radius and release Bariha N, Mishra IM, Srivastava VC. Fire and explosion hazard
s surface analysis during surface transport of liquefied petroleum gas
t time (LPG): a case study of LPG truck tanker accident in Kannur,
v view and vapor Kerala, India. J Loss Prevent Proc 2016b; 40: 449–460.
w water vapor and wind Barker PWH, Johnson AD, Goto N. CFD calculation of the combustion
and radiation properties of large-scale natural gas jet flames.
In: Major Hazards Onshore and Offshore II, IChemE Symposium
Series No. 139, 1995; 195–211.
References Baron T. Reactions in turbulent free jets – the turbulent diffusion
flame. Chem Eng Prog 1954; 50: 73–76.
Abbasi T, Abbasi SA. The boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion Baum MR. Disruptive failure of pressure vessels: preliminary design
(BLEVE): mechanism, consequence assessment, management. guidelines for fragment velocity and the extent of the hazard
J Hazard Mater 2007; 141: 489–519. zone. J Press Vess-T 1988; 110: 168–176.
AGA (American Gas Association). LNG Safety Research Program. Beale JP. The facts about LNG. CH-IV International Document:
Report IS 3 1, 1974. RPT-06903-01, 2006. Available at: http://www.ch-iv.com/
Alghamdi SSS. Development of a vapor cloud explosion risk analysis assets/documents/riley_debunk.pdf. Accessed 9 August 2016.
tool using exceedance methodology. Doctoral dissertation, Becker HA, Liang D. Effect of burner orientation and ambient airflow
Texas A&M University, 2011. on geometry of turbulent free diffusion flames. Proc Combust
ALOHA version 5.4, Technical User Guide, 2011. Inst 1981; 18: 1061–1070.
Ames S, Crowhurst D. Domestic explosion hazards from small LPG Berg AC. The multi-energy method – a framework for vapor cloud
containers. J Hazard Mater 1988; 19: 183–194. explosion blast prediction. J Hazard Mater 1985; 12: 1–10.
Aouizerate S, Chaillan N, Chevalier JL, Bescond M, Vuillemin P. Berg Mercx WPM, van den ACCJ. Methods for the calculation of
Modélisation simplifiée du phénomène de BLEVE. RGS 1990; physical effects (The Yellow Book). The Netherlands: TNO, 1997.
90: 51–57. Bernatik A, Senovsky P, Pitt M. LNG as a potential alternative fuel –
API RP 1102. Steel pipelines crossing railroads and highways. safety and security of storage facilities. J Loss Prevent Proc
Washington, DC: American Petroleum Institute, 2008. 2011; 24: 19–24.
Attar AA, Pourmahdian M, Anvaripour B. Experimental study Birk AM. Scale effects with fire exposure of pressure-liquefied gas
and CFD simulation of pool fires. Int J Comput Appl 2013; 70: tanks. J Loss Prevent Proc 1995; 8: 275–290.
1–15. Birk AM, Cunningham M. The boiling liquid expanding vapour
Babrauskas V. Free burning fires. Fire Safety J 1986; 11: 33–51. explosion. J Loss Prevent Proc 1994; 7: 474–480.
Bagster DF, Schubach SA. The prediction of jet dimensions. J Loss Birk AM, Vanderstee JDJ. On the transition from non-BLEVE to BLEVE
Prevent Proc 1996; 9: 241–245. failure for a 1.8 m3 propane tank. J Press Vess-T ASME 2006;
Baker QA, Tang MJ. Effects of vessel temperature on blast loads. 128: 648–655.
In: ASME/LSME, Pressure Vessel and Piping Conference, July Birk AM, Anderson RJ, Coppens AJ. A computer simulation of a
2004. derailment accident. Part I – model basis. J Hazard Mater 1990;
Baker WE, Cox PA, Westine PS, Kulesz JJ, Strehlow RA. Explosion 25: 121–147.
Hazards and Evaluation. Amsterdam/Oxford/New York: Elsevier Birk AM, Davison C, Cunningham M. Blast overpressure from
Scientific Publishing Company, 1983. medium scale BLEVE tests. J Loss Prevent Proc 2007; 20:
Baker QA, Tang MJ, Scheier E, Silva GJ. Vapor cloud explosion 194–206.
analysis. In: American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 28th Bubbico R, Marchini M. Assessment of an explosive LPG release
Annual Loss Prevention Symposium, 1994. accident: a case study. J Hazard Mater 2008; 55: 558–565.

Authenticated
Bubbico R, Ferrari C, Barbara M. Risk analysis of LPG transport by Cheng L, Li S, Ma L, Li M, Ma X. Fire spread simulation using GIS:
road and rail. J Loss Prevent Proc 2000; 13: 27–31. aiming at urban natural gas pipeline. Safety Sci 2015; 75:
Burgess D, Hertzierg M. Radiation from pool flames. In: Heat 23–35.
Transfer in Flames. Chap. 27. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Cheung SCP, Yeoh G. A fully-coupled simulation of vertical structures
1974: 413. in a large-scale buoyant pool fire. Int J Therm Sci 2009; 48:
Burgess D, Zabetakis MG. Fire and explosion hazards associated 2187–2202.
with liquefied natural gas. RI 6099, U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1962. Chi H. Reconstruction of an inn fire scene using the fire dynamics
Burgess DS, Strasser A, Grumer L. Diffusive burning of liquid fuels in simulator (FDS) program. J Forensic Sci 2013; 58: S227–S234.
open trays. Fire Res Abst Rev 1961; 3: 177–184. Chuah KH, Kuwana K, Saito K. Modeling a fire whirl generated over
Burke SP, Schumann TEW. Diffusion flames. Ind Eng Chem Res 1928; a 5-cm-diameter methanol pool fire. Combust Flame 2009; 156:
20: 998–1004. 1828–1833.
Carter DA. Aspects of risk assessment for hazardous pipelines Clay GA, Fitzpatrick RD, Hurst NW, Carter DA, Crossthwaite PJ. Risk
containing flammable substances. J Loss Prevent Proc 1991; 4: assessment for installations where liquefied petroleum gas
68–72. (LPG) is stored in bulk vessels above ground. J Hazard Mater
Casal J, Salla JM. Using liquid superheating energy for a quick 1988; 20: 357–374.
estimation of overpressure in BLEVEs and similar explosions. J Cleaver RP, Halford AR. A model for the initial stages following the
Hazard Mater 2006; 137: 1321–1327. rupture of a natural gas transmission pipeline. Process Saf
Casal J, Arnaldos H, Planas-Cuchi E, Montiel H, Vílchez JA. Modelling Environ 2015; 95: 202–214.
and understanding BLEVEs. In: Fingas M, editor. Handbook of Cleaver RP, Cumber PS, Fairweather M. Predictions of free jet fires
Hazardous Spills. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. from high pressure, sonic releases. Combust Flame 2003; 132:
Catlin CA. CLICHE – a generally applicable and practicable offshore 463–474.
explosion model. IChemE Symposium Series No. 68(B) 1990; Clutter JK, Luckritz RT. Comparison of blast curve and a reduced
245–253. explosion model to experimental results. J Hazard Mater 1999;
CCPS (Centre for Chemical Process Safety). Guidelines for 79: 41–46.
Consequences Analysis of Chemical Releases. New York: AIChE, Clutter JK, Mathis J. Computational modeling of vapor cloud
1999. explosions in off-shore rigs using a flame speed based
CCPS (Centre for Chemical Process Safety). Guidelines for Chemical combustion model. J Loss Prevent Proc 2002; 15: 391–401.
Process Quantitative Risk Analysis. New York: American Clutter JK, Whitney MG. Use of computational modeling to identify
Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2000. the cause of vapor cloud explosion incidents. J Loss Prevent
CCPS (Centre for Chemical Process Safety). Guidelines for Evaluating Proc 2001; 14: 337–347.
the Characteristics of Vapor Cloud Explosions, Flash Fires and Contini S, Francocci GF. Rassegna di modelli per la valutazione degli
BLEVEs. New York: AIChE, 2010. effetti delle esplosioni negli impianti industriali. Ispra, Italia:
Chakrabarti UK, Parikh JK. Route risk evaluation on class-2 hazmat Centro Comune di Ricerca. ISEI/IE 2397/93, 1993.
transportation. Process Saf Environ 2011; 89: 248–260. Cook J, Bahrami Z, Whitehouse RJ. A comprehensive program for
Chakrabarty A, Aloqaily A. Using CFD to assist facilities comply calculation of flame radiation levels. J Loss Prevent Proc 1990;
with thermal hazard regulations such as new API RP-752 3: 150–155.
recommendations. In: Hazards XXII, IChemE, Symposium Series Cormier BR. Computational fluid dynamics for LNG vapor dispersion
No. 156, 2011. modeling: A key parameters study. Ph.D. thesis, B.S., Virginia
Chamberlain GA. Developments in design methods for predicting Tech; M.S., Texas A&M University, 2008: 27–176.
thermal radiation from flares. Chem Eng Res Des 1987; 65: Cowley LT, Johnson AD. Oil and Gas Characteristics and Impact.
299–309. Silwood Park, Ascot, Berkshire, UK: Shell Research Limited,
Chatris JM, Quintela J, Folch J, Planas E, Arnaldos J, Casal J. Steel Construction Institute, 1992: 24–34.
Experimental study of burning rate in hydrocarbon pool fires. Crocker WP, Napier DH. Assessment of mathematical models for fire
Combust Flame 2001; 126: 1373–1383. and explosion hazards of liquefied petroleum gas. J Hazard
Chempute software. Software solutions for the engineering Mater 1988; 20: 109–135.
industry. BREEZE. Available at: http://www.chempute.com/ Cumber PS, Spearpoint M. A computational flame length
Software.aspx?id=HAZ1. Accessed 27 April 2010. methodology for propane jet fires. Fire Safety J 2006; 41:
Chen YC, Peters N, Schneemann G, Wruck N, Renz U, Mansour MS. 215–228.
The detailed flame structure of highly stretched turbulent Demichela M, Piccinini N, Poggio A. Analysis of an LPG accidental
premixed methane-air flames. Combust Flame 1996; 107: release. Process Saf Environ 2004; 82: 128–131.
223–244. El-Harbawi M, Saari M, Choong SY, Chuah TG, Rashid MSA. Hazards
Chen M, Herrmann M, Peters N. Flamelet modeling of lifted turbulent analysis of LPG storage installation in Universiti Putra Malaysia:
methane/air and propane/air jet diffusion flames. Proc a preliminary study. J Inst Eng Malaysia 2004; 65: 43–49.
Combust Inst 2000; 28: 167–174. EPA (Environmental Protection Authority). Available at: http://www.
Chen QS, Wegrzyn J, Prasad V. Analysis of temperature and pressure epa.govt.nz/searchdatabases/HSNO%20Application%20
changes in liquefied natural gas (LNG) cryogenic tanks. Register%20Documents/HRE09001%20Application%20-%20
Cryogenics 2004; 44: 701–709. Appendix%202%20-%20Tank%20Wagon%20Parking.pdf.
Chen S, Sun J, Wan W. Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion: Accessed 12 February 2013.
Experimental research in the evolution of the two-phase flow Fay JA. Model of spills and fire from LNG and oil tankers. J Hazard
and over-pressure. J Hazard Mater 2008; 156: 530–537. Mater 2003; B96: 171–188.

Authenticated
Ferrero F, Munoz M, Arnaldos J. Effects of thin layer boil over on Hostikka S, McGrattan KB, Hamins A. Numerical modeling of pool
flame geometry and dynamics in large hydrocarbon pool fire. fires using LES and finite volume method for radiation. In:
Fuel Process Technol 2007; 88: 227–235. Evans DD, editor. Proc Fire Safety Science, 7th Int Symp,
Gavelli F, Bullister E, Kytomaa H. Application of CFD (Fluent) to LNG International Association for Fire Safety Science (IAFSS), June
spills into geometrically complex environments. J Hazard Mater 16–21, 2003, Worcester, MA, Int Assoc for Fire Safety Science,
2008; 159: 158–168. Boston, MA, 2003: 383–394.
GexCon. Gas Explosion Handbook. Report on the explosion at DSM HSE (Health and Safety Executive). Second Report. Advisory
in Beck. 7 November 1975. Vapour cloud explosion in naphtha Committee Major Hazards. U.K. Health and Safety Commission,
cracker II, Ministry of Social Affairs, The Netherlands. Available 1991.
at: http://www.gexcon.com. Interim. Report Implementation of Advanced LCNG Fueling
Godunov SK. A finite difference method for the computation of Infrastructure in Texas along the I-35/NAFTA Clean Corridor
discontinuous solutions of the equations of fluid dynamics. Project, submitted to Department of Energy, Chicago
Mat Sb 1959; 47: 271–290. Operation, by Blue Fuels Group L.P. formerly Lone Star Energy
Goh CB, Ching CB, Tan R. Risk analysis for the road transportation Company, Contract #9889, February 2001.
of hazardous chemicals in Singapore – a methodology. J Loss Jaffee A, Suardina A, McPhate Jr J. Fire and explosion assessment on
Prevent Proc 1995; 8: 35–39. oil and gas floating production storage offloading (FPSO): an
Gollahalli SR, Brzustowski TA, Sullivan HF. Characteristics of a effective screening and comparison tool. Process Saf Environ
turbulent propane diffusion flame in a cross-wind. Trans CSME 2009; 87: 147–160.
1975; 3: 205–214. Jarrett DE. Derivation of the British explosives safety distances. Ann
Gong YW, Lin WS, Gu AZ, Lu XS. A simplified model to predict the N Y Acad Sci 1968; 152: 18–35.
thermal response of PLG and its influence on BLEVE. J Hazard JGA (Japan Gas Association). A Study of Dispersion of Evaporated
Mater 2004; A108: 21–26. Gas and Ignition of LNG Pool Resulting from Continuous
Gonzalez-Ferradas E, Diaz Alonso F, Sanchez Perez JF, Minana Aznar Spillage of LNG. J Japan Gas Assoc, 1976.
A, Gimeno RJ, Martinez Alonso J. Characteristic overpressure- Jo YD, Ahn BJ. A simple model for the release rate of hazardous gas
impulse-distance curves for vessel burst. Process Saf Prog from a hole on high pressure pipelines. J Hazard Mater 2003;
2006; 25: 250–254. 97: 31–46.
Gopalaswami N, Liu Y, Laboureur DM, Zhang B, Mannan MS. Jo YD, Ahn BJ. A method of quantitative risk assessment for
Experimental study on propane jet fire hazards: comparison transmission pipeline carrying natural gas. J Hazard Mater
of main geometrical features with empirical models. J Loss 2005; 123: 1–12.
Prevent Proc 2016: 41: 365–375. Jo YD, Crowl DA. Individual risk analysis of high-pressure natural gas
Gore JP, Jian CQ. Trajectories of horizontal buoyant free-jet flames. pipelines. J Loss Prevent Proc 2008; 21: 589–595.
ASME/JSME Therm Eng Proc 1991; 5: 127–138. Joel K, Duncan S. A practical approach to fire hazard analysis for
Gowid S, Dixon R, Ghani S. Profitability, reliability and condition offshore structures. J Hazard Mater 2003; 104: 107–122.
based monitoring of LNG floating platforms: a review. Fuel Johnson AD, Brightwell HM, Carsley AJ. A model for predicting
Process Technol 2015; 27: 1495–1511. the thermal radiation hazards from large-scale horizontally
Gregory J, Keltner N, Mata Jr R. Thermal measurements in large pool released natural gas jet fires. Transition IChemE 1994; 72:
fires. J Heat Transfer (US) 1989; 111. 157–166.
Gugan K. Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosions. Institution of Jones JC. The explosion phenomenology of liquefied natural gas.
Chemical Engineers in association with George Godwin Ltd., J Loss Prevent Proc 2015; 38: 233.
Reading (UK), Houston, TX: Gulf Publishing, 1978. Jujuly MM, Rahman A, Ahmed S, Khan F. LNG pool fire simulation
Haastrup P, Brockhoff L. Severity of accidents with hazardous for domino effect analysis. Reliab Eng Syst Safe 2015; 143:
materials – a comparison between transportation and fixed 19–29.
installation. J Loss Prevent Proc 1990; 3: 395–405. Kalghati GT. The visible shape and size of a turbulent hydrocarbon
Han ZY, Weng WG. An integrated quantitative risk analysis method jet diffusion flame in a cross-wind. Combust Flame 1983; 52:
for natural gas pipeline network. J Loss Prevent Proc 2010; 23: 91–106.
428–436. Khan FI, Abassi SA. Assessment of risks posed by chemical
Hawthorne WR, Weddell DS, Hottel HC. Mixing and combustion industries – application of a new computer automated tool
in turbulent gas jets. Combust Flame Explo Phenom 1949; 3: MAXCRED-III. J Loss Prevent Proc 1999; 12: 455–469.
266–288. Kiran DY, Mishra DP. Experimental studies of flame stability and
Hayes J. Lessons for effective integrity management from the San emission characteristics of simple LPG jet diffusion flame.
Bruno pipeline rupture. Process Saf Prog 2015; 34: 202–206. Fuels 2007; 86: 1545–1551.
Hernandez J, Crespo A, Duijm NJ. Numerical modeling of turbulent Klets TA. Protect pressure vessels from fire. Hydrocarb Process 1977;
jet diffusion flames in the atmospheric surface layer. Combust 56: 98.
Flame 1995; 101: 113–131. Knag YH, Wang QH, Lu XF, Ji XY, Miao SS, Wang H, Guo Q, He HH,
Holden PL, Reeves AB. Fragment hazards from failures of Xu J. Experimental and theoretical study on the flow, mixing,
pressurized liquefied gas vessels. Chem Eng Prog Symp Ser and combustion characteristics of dimethyl ether, methane,
Abstr 1985; 31: 205. and LPG jet diffusion flames. Fuel Process Technol 2015; 129:
Holmstrom D, Lay J, Banks J, Kaszniak M, MacKenzie C, Parasram V. 98–112.
Valero-Mckee refinery propane release and fire. Process Saf Koseki H, Mulholland GW. The effect of diameter on the burning of
Prog 2010; 29: 322–331. crude oil pool fires. Fire Technol 1991; 27: 54–65.

Authenticated
Laboureur DM, Gopalaswami N, Zhang B, Liu Y, Mannan MS. Mares MG, Munoz M, Casal J. Radiant heat from propane jet fires.
Experimental study on propane jet fire hazards: assessment of Exp Therm Fluid Sci 2010; 34: 323–329.
the main geometrical features of horizontal jet flames. J Loss Mares MG, Zarate L, Casal J. Jet fires and the domino effect. Fire
Prevent Proc 2016; 41: 355–364. Safety J 2008; 43: 583–588.
Landucci G, Tugnoli A, Busini V, Derudi M, Rota R, Cozzani V. The Marshall VC. Assessment of hazard and risk. In: Hazardous
Viareggio LPG accident: lessons learnt. J Loss Prevent Proc Materials Spills Handbook. 1st ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book
2011; 24: 466–476. Company, 1982: 5–23.
Lautkaski R. Evaluation of BLEVE risks of wagons carrying flammable Marshall V. Major chemical hazards. Chichester: Ellis Harwood Ltd.,
liquids. J Loss Prevent Proc 2009; 22: 117–123. 1987: 69–75.
Leal CA, Santiago GF. Do tree belts increase risk of explosion LPG Marshall JG, Burgoyne JH. The size of flammable clouds arising from
sphere? J Loss Prevent Proc 2004; 17: 217–224. continuous releases into the atmosphere. IChemE Symp Ser
Lees FP. Loss prevention in the process industries – hazard 1977; 49: 99–109.
identification, assessment, and control. Vol. 2, 2nd ed. Oxford: May WG, McQueen W. Radiation from large liquefied natural gas
Butterworth-Heinemann, 1996. fires. Combust Sci Technol 1973; 7: 51–56.
Lees FP. Loss Prevention in the process industries. 3rd ed. McCaffrey BJ. Momentum diffusion flame characteristics and the
Burlington, MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2005. effects of water spray. Combust Sci Technol 1989; 63: 315–335.
Leslie IRM, Birk AM. State of the art review of pressure liquefied gas McCaffrey BJ, Evans DD. Very large methane jet diffusion flames.
container failure modes and associated projectile hazards. J Proc Combust Inst 1986; 21: 25–31.
Hazard Mater 1991; 28: 329–365. McDevitt CA, Steward FR, Venart JES. Research of boiling liquid
Li Q, Song W, Zhang M, Lei Y. Numerical simulation of liquefied expanding vapour explosions. Spill Technol Newsl 1988; 13:
propane gas storage tank’s full size pool fire based on FDS. 17–26.
Appl Mech Mater 2013; 353: 2419–2423. McDevitt CA, Chan CK, Steward FR, Tennankore KN. Initiation step
Li J, Abdel-Jawad M, Ma G. New correlation for vapor cloud explosion of boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions. J Hazard Mater
overpressure calculation at congested configurations. J Loss 1990; 25: 169–180.
Prevent Proc 2014; 31: 16–25. McGrattan KB, Baum HR, Rehm RG. Large eddy simulation of smoke
Liu M, Liu F. Risk assessment of urban gas pipeline. J Nat Disasters movement. Fire Safety J 1998; 30: 161–178.
2009; 18: 84–86. Mell WE, McGrattan KB, Baum HR. Numerical simulation of
Lowesmith BJ, Hankinsion G, Acton MR, Chamberlain G. An overview combustion in fire plumes. In: Symp Int Combust 1996; 26:
of the nature of hydrocarbon jet fire hazards in the oil and gas 1523–1530.
industry and a simplified approach to assessing the hazards. Mercx WPM, Berg AC, Hayhurst CJ, Robertson NJ, Moran KC.
Process Saf Environ 2007; 5: 207–220. Developments in vapour cloud explosion blast modeling. J
Lowesmith BJ, Hankinson G. Large scale high pressure jet fires Hazard Mater 2000; 71: 301–319.
involving natural gas and natural gas/hydrogen mixtures. Metropolo PL, Brown AEP. Natural gas pipeline accident
Process Saf Environ 2012; 90: 108–120. consequence analysis. Process Saf Prog 2004; 23: 307–310.
Luketa-Hanlin A. A review of large-scale LNG spills: experiments and Minzer GA, Lyre JA. Large scale LNG and LPG pool fires. IChemE
modeling. J Hazard Mater 2006; 132: 119–140. Symp Ser 1982; 71: 147–163.
Luketa-Hanlin A, Koopman RP, Ermak DL. On the application of Mishra KB, Wehrstedt KD. Diffusive burning of blended peroxy-fuels:
computational fluid dynamics codes for liquefied natural gas some experimental results. Fuel Process Technol 2015; 140:
dispersion. J Hazard Mater 2007; 140: 504–517. 324–330.
Ma L, Li Y, Liang L, Li M, Cheng L. A novel method of quantitative Mishra KB, Wehrstedt KD, Schoenbucher A. Prediction of burning
risk assessment based on grid difference of pipelines sections. rate of an accidentally released flammable fuel by means of
Safety Sci 2013; 59: 219–226. CFD simulation. In: Proceedings of 7th International Conference
Magnassen BF, Hjertager BH. On mathematical modeling of turbulent on CFD in the Minerals and Process Industries, CSIRO,
combustion with special emphasis on soot formation and Melbourne, December 9–11, 2009.
combustion. In: 16th Symposium (International) on Combustion. Mishra KB, Wehrstedt KD, Krebs H. Lessons learned from recent fuel
Pittsburgh, PA: The Combustion Institute, 1976: 719–729. storage fires. Fuel Process Technol 2013; 107: 166–172.
Malalasekara WMG, Versteeg HK, Gilchrist K. A review of research Mishra KB, Wehrstedt KD, Krebs H. Amuay refinery disaster: the
and an experimental study of the pulsation of buoyant aftermaths and challenges ahead. Fuel Process Technol 2014;
diffusion flames and pool fire. Fire Mater 2006; 20: 261–271. 119: 198–203.
Malvos H, Raj PK. Details of 35 m diameter LNG tests conducted in Mishra KB, Wehrstedt KD, Krebs H. Boiling liquid expanding
monitor, France in and analysis of fire spectral and other data. vapour explosion (BLEVE) of peroxy-fuels: Experiments and
In: AIChE 2006, Spring National Meeting, Orlando, FL, April computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulation. Energy
23–27, 2006. Procedia 2015; 66: 149–152.
Manca D, Brambilla S. Complexity and uncertainty in the Mogi T, Horiguchi S. Experimental study on the hazards of
assessment of the Viareggio LPG railway accident. J Loss high-pressure hydrogen jet diffusion flames. J Loss Prevent
Prevent Proc 2010; 23: 668–679. Proc 2009; 22: 45–51.
Maremonti M, Russo G, Salzano E, Tufano V. Post-accident analysis Montiel H, Vílchez JA, Arnaldos J, Casal J. Historical analysis of
of vapor cloud explosions in fuel storage areas. Trans IChemE accidents in the transportation of natural gas. J Hazard Mater
1999; 77: 360–365. 1996; 51: 77–92.
Mares MG, Munoz M, Casal J. Axial temperature distribution in Montiel H, Vílchez JA, Casal J, Arnaldos J. Mathematical modeling of
vertical fires. J Hazard Mater 2009; 172: 54–60. accidental gas releases. J Hazard Mater 1998; 59: 211–233.

Authenticated
Moodie K, Cowley LT, Denny RB, Small LM, Williams E. Fire Pritchard DK, Freeman DJ, Guilbert PW. Prediction of explosion
engulfment tests on a 5 tonne LPG tank. J Hazard Mater 1988; pressures in confined spaces. J Loss Prevent Proc 1996; 9:
20: 55–71. 205–215.
Moorhouse J. Scaling criteria for pool fires derived from large scale Pula R, Khan FI, Veitch B, Amyotte PR. A grid based approach for
experiments. Inst Chem Eng Symp 1982; 71: 165–179. fire and explosion consequence analysis. Process Saf Environ
Mudan KS. Thermal radiation hazards from hydrocarbon pool fires. 2006; 84: 79–91.
Prog Energ Combust Sci 1984; 10: 59–80. Purdy G. Risk analysis of the transportation of dangerous goods by
Muhlbauer WK. Pipeline risk management manual. 3rd ed. road and rail. J Hazard Mater 1993; 33: 229–259.
Burlington: Gulf Publishing Company, 2004. ISBN 0-7506- Purdy G, Campbell HS, Grint GC, Smith LM. An analysis of the risks
7579-9. arising from the transport of liquefied gases in Great Britain. J
Nedelka D, Moorhouse J, Tucker RF. The Montoir 35 m diameter LNG Hazard Mater 1988; 20: 335–355.
pool fire experiments. In: TRCP.3148R, 9th Intl. Conf. & Expo on Puttock JS. Fuel gas explosion guidelines – the congestion
LNG, LNG IX, Nice, France, 1989. assessment method. In: 2nd European Conference on Major
Novembre N, Podenzani F, Colombo E. Numerical study for Hazard’s On- and Off-shore. Manchester (UK), 1995: 24–26.
accidental gas releases from high pressure pipelines. In: Puttock JS. Improvements in guidelines for prediction of vapour-cloud
European Conference on Computational Fluid Dynamics explosions. In: International Conference and Workshop
(ECCOMAS CFD-2006), The Netherlands, 2006. on Modeling the Consequences of Accidental Releases of
Oggero A, Darbra RM, Munoz M, Planas-Cuchi E, Casal J. A survey Hazardous Materials, San Francisco (CA), 1999: 7–19.
of accidents occurring during the transport of hazardous Puttock JS, Yardley MR, Cresswell TM. Prediction of vapor cloud
substances by road and rail. J Hazard Mater 2006; 133: 1–7. explosions using the SCOPE model. J Loss Prevent Proc 2000;
Palacios A, Casal J. Assessment of the shape of vertical jet fires. 13: 419–430.
Fuels 2011; 90: 824–833. Qi R, Ng D, Cormier BR, Mannan MS. Numerical simulations of LNG
Palacios A, Muñoz M, Casal J. Jet fires: an experimental study of the vapor dispersion in Brayton Fire Training Field tests with ANSYS
main geometrical features of the flame in subsonic and sonic CFX. J Hazard Mater 2010; 183: 51–61.
regimes. AIChE J 2009; 55: 256–263. Qiao A, Zhang S. Advanced CFD modeling on vapor dispersion and
Palacios A, Muñoz M, Darbra RM, Casal J. Thermal radiation from vapor cloud explosion. J Loss Prevent Proc 2010; 23: 843–848.
vertical jet fires. Fire Safety J 2012; 51: 93–101. Raj PK. A criterion for classifying accidental liquid spills into
Pandya N, Gabas N, Marsden E. Sensitivity analysis of Phast’s instantaneous and continuous types. Combust Sci Technol
atmospheric dispersion model for three toxic materials (nitric 1979; 19: 251–254.
oxide, ammonia, chlorine). J Loss Prevent Proc 2012; 25: 20–32. Raj PK, Atallah S. Thermal radiation from LNG spill fires. Adv Cryog
Park K, Mannan MS, Young DJ, Kim JY, Keren N, Wang Y. Incident Eng 1974; 20: 143–149.
analysis of Bucheon LPG filling station pool fire and BLEVE. J Raj PK, Kalelkar AS. Assessment Models in Support of the Hazard
Hazard Mater 2006; 137: 62–67. Assessment Book (CG-446-3). Washington, DC: U.S. Coast
Peters N, Williams FA. Liftoff characteristics of turbulent jet diffusion Guard, 1974.
flames. AIAA J 1983; 21: 423–429. Raj PK, Aravamudan KS, Moussa AN. Experiments Involving Pool and
PHAST version 4.1, Technical User Guide, Det Norske Veritas Ltd. Vapour Fires from Spills of LNG on Water. Report #CG-D-55-79,
(DNV), 2006. NTIS AD77073, U.S. Coast Guard, 1979.
PHMSA (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration), Rashid ZA, El-Harbawi M, Shariff AR. Assessment on the
2015. consequences of liquefied petroleum gas release accident in
Pietersen CM. Analysis of the LPG disaster in Mexico City. J Hazard the road transportation via GIS approaches. J Appl Sci 2010; 10:
Mater 1988; 20: 85–107. 1157–1165.
Pinhasi GA, Dayan A, Ullmann A. Modeling of flashing two-phase Reid RC. Superheated liquids. Am Sci 1976; 64: 146–156.
flow. Rev Chem Eng 2005; 21: 133–264. Reid RC. Possible mechanism for pressurized-liquid tank explosions
Pinhasi GA, Dayan A, Ullmann A. 1D plane numerical model for or BLEVEs. Science 1979; 203: 1263–1265.
boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE). Int J Heat Rew PJ, Spencer HS, Franks AP. A Framework for the Ignition
Mass Transfer 2007; 50: 4780–4795. Probability of Flammable Gas Clouds. HAZARDS 13.
Pintaric ZN. Assessment of the consequences of accident scenarios Manchester, UK: IChemE North Western Branch, 1997.
involving dangerous substances. Process Saf Environ 2007; 85: Roberts AF. The effect of conditions prior to loss of containment on
23–38. fireball behaviour – the assessment of major hazards. Rugby
Planas-Cuchi E, Casal J. Flame temperature distribution in a pool Istn Chem Engr 1982.
fire. J Hazard Mater 1998; 26: 213–241. Roberts T, Gosse A, Hawksworth S. Thermal radiation from fireballs
Planas-Cuchi E, Gasulla N, Ventosa A, Casal J. Explosion of a road on failure of liquefied petroleum gas storage vessels. Process
tanker containing liquefied natural gas. J Loss Prevent Proc Saf Environ 2000; 78: 184–192.
2004; 17: 315–321. Robinson CS. Explosions: their anatomy and destructiveness. New
Popat NR, Catlin CA, Arntzen BJ, Lindstedt RP, Hjertager BH, Solberg York: McGraw Hill, 1944.
T, Saeter O, Berg AC Van den. Investigations to improve and Rose K. Risk to facilities located adjacent to railroads. Volumes 1 and
assess the accuracy of computational fluid dynamic based 2. Kingston, Canada: Department of Civil Engineering, Queen’s
explosion models. J Hazard Mater 1996; 45: 1–25. University, 1984.
Pritchard MJ, Binding TM. FIRE2: a new approach for predicting Saeid M, Speight JG, Poe WA. Handbook of Natural Gas Transmission
thermal radiation levels from hydrocarbon pool fires. IChemE and Processing. 2nd ed. Gulf Professional Publication, 2006.
Symp 1992; 130: 491–505. ISBN: 978-0-7506-7776-9.

Authenticated
Salla JM, Demichela M, Casal J. BLEVE: a new approach to the Computational-Fluid-Dynamics-CFD/CFX-4.html. Accessed 27
superheat limit temperature. J Loss Prevent Proc 2006; 19: April 2010.
690–700. Sonju OK, Hustad J. An experimental study of turbulent jet diffusion
Santos A, Costa M. Reexamination of the scaling laws for NOx flames. Norw Maritime Res 1984; 4: 2–11.
emissions from hydrocarbon turbulent jet diffusion flames. Spalding DB. A general purpose computer program for
Combust Flame 2005; 142: 160–169. multi-dimensional one and two-phase flow. In: Mathematics
Satyanarayana K, Borah M, Rao PG. Prediction of thermal hazards and Computers in Simulation IMACS, XXII, 1981: 267–276.
from fireballs. J Loss Prevent Proc 1991; 4: 344–347. Stawczyk J. Experimental evaluation of LPG tank explosion hazards.
Schalike S, Wehrstedt K, Schönbucher A. CFD simulation to predict J Hazard Mater 2003; B96: 189–200.
the thermal radiation of large LNG pool fires. In: Proceedings of Steckler KD, Quintiere JG, Rinkinen WJ. Flow induced by fire in a
the European Combustion Meeting, 2011. compartment. Symp Int Combust 1982; 19: 913–920.
Schonbucher A, Mishra KB, Wehrstedt KD. Radiative characteristics Stewart AM, Van Aerde M. An empirical analysis of Canadian gasoline
of large pool fires organic peroxides characteristics. In: and LPG truck releases. J Hazard Mater 1990; 25: 205–217.
Proceedings of 4th European Combustion, Meeting, Technical Strehlow RA. Unconfined vapor cloud explosions – an overview. In:
University, Vienna, Austria, 810353, 2009: 1–6. ISBN 14th International Symposium on Combustion, University Park,
978-3-902655-06-6. Pennsylvania, USA. Pittsburgh: The Combustion Institute, 1973.
Schuller RB, Nylund J, Sonju OK, Hustad J. Effect of nozzle geometry Sun B, Guo K. LNG accident dynamic simulation: application for
on burning subsonic hydrocarbon jets. ASME/AIChE Natl Heat hazardous consequence reduction. J Loss Prevent Proc 2013;
Transfer Conf 1983; 25: 33–36. 26: 1246–1256.
Seeto BCM, Bowen AJ. A review of the dispersion of liquefied Sun B, Utikar RP, Pareek VK. Computational fluid dynamics
petroleum gas in the atmosphere. J Wind Eng Ind Aerodyn simulation of LNG pool fire radiation for hazard analysis. J Loss
1983; 15: 91–102. Prevent Proc 2014; 29: 92–102.
Sharma RK, Gurjar BR, Wate SR, Ghuge SP, Agrawal R. Assessment of Sun B, Guo K, Pareek VK. Dynamic simulation of hazard analysis
an accidental vapour cloud explosion: lessons from the Indian of radiations from LNG pool fire. J Loss Prevent Proc 2015; 35:
Oil Corporation Ltd. accident at Jaipur, India. J Loss Prevent 200–210.
Proc 2013; 26: 82–90. Tauseef SM, Abbasi T, Abbasi SA. Risks of fire and explosion
Shebeko YN, Shevchuk AP, Simonov OA. A hazard assessment of associated with the increasing use of liquefied petroleum gas. J
a thermal action of an external fire on a LPG tank. Chem Ind Fail Anal Prevent 2010; 10: 322–333.
1993; 1–2: 9–12. Tauseef SM, Rashtchian D, Abassi T. A method for simulation of
Shebeko YN, Smolin IM, Korolchenko AYa, Shevchuk AP, Borodkin vapor cloud explosions based on computational fluid dynamic
AN, Malkin VL, Simonov OA, Gurinovich LV, Popov SA, Kolosov (CFD). J Loss Prevent Proc 2011; 24: 638–647.
VA, Smirnov EV. Some aspects of fire and explosion hazards The Times of India. Nagaram blast: probe nails GAIL, says it ignored
of large LPG storage vessels. J Loss Prevent Proc 1995; 8: disaster warnings. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.
163–168. com/india/Nagaram-blast-Probe-nails-GAIL-says-it-ignored-
Shebeko YN, Bolodian IA, Filippov VN, Navzenya VY, Kostyuhin disaster-warnings/articleshow/39775714.cms. Accessed 7
AK, Tokarev PM, Zamishevski ED. A study of the behavior of a August 2014.
protected vessel containing LPG during pool fire engulfment. J Thomas PH. The size of flames from natural fires. In: 9th Int Combust
Hazard Mater 2000; 77: 43–56. Symp 1963: 844–859.
Shebeko YN, Shebeko AY. On the mechanism of a BLEVE occurrence Tieszen S, O’Hern T, Weckman E, Schefer R. Experimental study of
due to fire engulfment of tanks with overheated liquids. J Loss the effect of fuel mass flux on a 1m diameter methane fire and
Prevent Proc 2015; 36: 167–170. comparison with a hydrogen fire. Combust Flame 2004; 139:
Sheikhi MRH, Drozda TG, Givi P, Jaberi FA, Pope SB. Large eddy 126–141.
simulation of a turbulent nonpremixed piloted methane Tufano V, Maremonti M, Salzano E, Russo G. Simulation of VCEs by
jet flame (Sandia Flame D). Proc Combust Inst 2005; 30: CFD modelling: an analysis of sensitivity. J Loss Prevent Proc
549–556. 1998; 11: 169–175.
Shell FRED version 5.1, Technical User Guide, 2006. Turns SR, Myhr FH. Oxides of nitrogen emissions from turbulent jet
Shen TS, Huang YH, Chien SW. Using fire dynamic simulation (FDS) flames: part I – fuel effects and flame radiation. Combust Flame
to reconstruct an arson fire scene. Build Environ 2008; 43: 1991; 87: 319–335.
1036–1045. Van Aerde M, Stewart A, Saccomanno F. Estimating the impacts
Sinai Y, Owens M. Validation of CFD modelling of unconfined pool of LPG spills during transportation accidents. J Hazard Mater
fires with cross-wind: flame geometry. Fire Safety J 1995; 24: 1988; 20: 375–392.
1–34. van den Berg AC, Lannoy A. Methods for vapor cloud explosion blast
Sklavounous S, Rigas F. Estimation of safety distances in the vicinity modeling. J Hazard Mater 1993; 34: 151–171.
of fuel gas pipelines. J Loss Prevent Proc 2006; 19: 24–31. Van den Bosch CJH, Weterings RAPM. Methods for the Calculation
Smith P, Rawat R, Spinti J, Kumar S, Borodai S, Violi A. Large of Physical Effects (TNO Purple Book). 2nd ed. The Hague, The
eddy simulations of accidental fires using massively parallel Netherlands: TNO, 2005.
computers. AIAA-2003-3697, Proc 16th AIAA Computational van der Voort MM, Klein AJJ, de Maaijer M, van den Berg AC, van
Fluid Dynamics Conf, Orlando, FL, June 23–26, 2003. Deursen JR, Versloot NHA. A quantitative risk assessment tool
SoftScout. The business software encyclopedia. Available for the external safety of industrial plants with a dust explosion
at: http://www.softscout.com/software/Engineering/ hazard. J Loss Prevent Proc 2007; 20: 375–386.

Authenticated
Vianello C, Maschio G. Risk analysis of natural gas pipeline: Zhang M, Song W, Qinggong L, Chen Z. FDS simulation and
case study of a generic pipeline. Chem Eng Trans 2011; 24: consequences forecasting of LPG storage tank pool fire and
1309–1314. explosion. Appl Mech Mater 2013; 353: 2412–2418.
Walls WL. Just what is a BLEVE? Fire J 1978: 46–47. Zhang B, Liu Y, Laboureur D, Mannan MS. Experimental study on
Walls WL. The BLEVE – part 1. Fire Command 1979; 17: 35–37. propane jet fire hazards: thermal radiation. Ind Eng Chem Res
Wang HY, Joulain P. Modeling on the interaction of the turbulent 2015; 54: 9251–9256.
diffusion flames between a vertical burning wall and a pool fire. Zhou X, Sun Z, Durst F, Brenner G. Numerical simulation of
Fire Safety Sci 1997; 5: 475–486. turbulent jet flow and combustion. Comput Math Appl 1999;
Wang CJ, Wen JX, Chen ZB, Dembele S. Predicting radiative 38: 179–191.
characteristics of hydrogen and hydrogen/methane jet fires
using FireFoam. Int J Hydrogen Energ 2014; 39: 20560–20569.
Weckman E, Strong A. Experimental investigation of the turbulence
structure of medium-scale methanol pool fires. Combust Flame Bionotes
1996; 105: 245–266.
Wen JX, Kang K, Donchev T, Karwatzki JM. Validation of FDS for the Nilambar Bariha
prediction of medium-scale pool fires. Fire Safety J 2007; 42: Department of Chemical Engineering,
127–138. Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee,
Wiekema BJ. Vapour cloud explosion model. J Hazard Mater 1980; 3: Roorkee-247667, Uttarakhand, India
221–232.
Wilkening H, Huld T. An adaptive 3-D CFD solver for explosion
modeling on large scales. In: 17th International Colloquium on
the Dynamics of Explosions and Reactive Systems, Heidelberg,
Germany, July 25–30, 1999.
Nilambar Bariha obtained his BTech in chemical engineering from
Windergen K, Salvesen HC, Perbal R. Simulation of an accidental
the National Institute of Technology (NIT), Raipur, in 2008 and
vapour cloud explosion. Process Saf Prog 1995; 14: 173–181.
MTech in chemical engineering from the Indian Institute of Techno
Witlox WMH, Adeyemi O. Verification and Validation of Consequence
logy (IIT), Roorkee, in 2010. He has submitted his PhD thesis at
and Risk Models for Accidental Releases of Hazards Chemicals
the IIT Roorkee in 2016. Currently, he is working as an assistant
to the Atmosphere. London, UK: DNV Software, 2009.
professor in the Department of Chemical Engineering, Maulana Azad
Woods JAR, Fleck BA, Kostiuk LW. Effects of transverse air flow on
National Institute of Technology, Bhopal, India. He has three papers
burning rates of rectangular methanol pool fires. Combust
in peer-reviewed journals. His research interests include industrial
Flame 2006; 46: 379–390.
safety and hazards management, fire and explosion analysis, and
World Bank. Manual of Industrial Hazard Assessment Techniques.
risk assessment.
Office of Environmental and Scientific Affairs, The World Bank,
1985.
Xu YB, Qian XM, Liu ZY. Quantitative risk analysis on the leakage Vimal Chandra Srivastava
of compressed natural gas pipeline. China Saf Sci J 2008; 18: Department of Chemical Engineering,
146–148. Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee,
Yang P, Tan X, Xin W. Experimental study and numerical simulation for Roorkee-247667, Uttarakhand, India,
a storehouse fire accident. Build Environ 2011; 46: 1445–1459. vimalcsr@yahoo.co.in; vimalfch@iitr.ac.in
Yang S, Zhang Y, Wu H. Comparison and validation of thermal
radiation models for hydrocarbon jet fire and fireball. Appl
Mech Mater 2012; 204: 3503–3512. Vimal Chandra Srivastava is an associate professor in the Depart-
Zabetakis MG, Burgess DS. Research on hazards associated with ment of Chemical Engineering, IIT Roorkee, India. His major research
production and handling of liquid hydrogen. Technical report: interests are industrial pollution abatement, desulfurization,
BM-RI-5707. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1961. catalysis, carbon dioxide utilization, alternative fuels, adsorption,
Zarate LG, Lara HE, Cordero ME, Kozanoglu B. Infrared thermography electrochemical methods, nanoparticle synthesis, and safety and
and CFD analysis of hydrocarbon jet fires. Chem Eng Trans hazards management. He has authored more than 135 papers and 5
2014; 39. book chapters and has received 5000 citations of his papers (as per
Zhang QX, Liang D. Thermal radiation and impact assessment of the Scopus); his h-index is 33. He has guided 8 PhD and 40 M.Tech. stu-
LNG BLEVE fireball. Procedia Eng 2013; 52: 602–606. dents. He was awarded the Prosper.Net-SCOPUS Young Researcher
Zhang Y, He C, Fang Y, Sun X. Study on quantitative risk assessment Award 2010-First Runner-Up, INAE Young Engineer Award 2012, INSA
of LPG transportation in road tunnel. Adv Mater Res 2011; Young Scientist Medal 2012, IE Young Engineer Award 2013, and
255–260: 4105–4109. IIChE-Amar Dye-Chem Award 2013.

Authenticated
Indra Mani Mishra

Department of Chemical Engineering, Indian
Institute of Technology (Indian School of
Mines), Dhanbad-826004, Jharkhand, India
Indra Mani Mishra is a professor and currently the head of the

Department of Chemical Engineering, IIT (Indian School of Mines),
Dhanbad, India. He obtained his Bachelor’s, Master’s, and PhD
in chemical engineering from the Institute of Technology, now
IIT Banaras Hindu University (BHU), Varanasi, India, and carried
out postdoctoral research at the Leibniz University of Hanover,
Germany, from 1980 to 1982. Prof. Mishra served at the IIT Roorkee
for about 40 years (1975–2015) in various capacities and was the
Head of the Department of Chemical Engineering for 6 years and
a Dean for more than 8 years. He has guided 20 PhD students and
more than 65 Master’s dissertations and has authored more than
175 journal research papers and about 170 papers in conferences/
seminars. His research interests include industrial safety, transport
phenomena, biochemical engineering, environmental engineering,
and energy engineering. He has received a number of awards and
more than 5000 citations to his research papers.

Authenticated

Models and Experiments

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Models and Experiments

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rev Chem Eng 2016; aop

Nilambar Bariha, Vimal Chandra Srivastava* and Indra Mani Mishra

Theoretical and experimental studies on hazard

Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services

tankers (RT)] because of which corrosion, fatigue, or creep

develops in the vessels. The derailment or overturn of RT

passing over the curved track at a speed higher than its

critical value. During derailments or overturns, the LPG/

faults are most commonly encountered. Released LPG/

LNG forms vapor cloud or pool fire or fireball depending

e r a 1983, Bariha et al. 2014, 2016a). Although the analysis

Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services

Figure 2: Contribution to the NG sector by private and government agencies in India.

and property are challenging objectives for emergency 2 C

Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services

Physical properties LPG Methane (NG)

Chemical formula C3H6/C3H6-C4H10 CH4

Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services

Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services

Table 2: Comparative analysis of various conditions during different types of accidents.

Scenario Discharge rate State of material Dispersion Duration Causes

Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services

handling of LPG/NG population density and other engineering or commercial

LPG transfer through pipelines

LPG storage LPG storage

Figure 3: Chain diagram of LPG production to distribution.

Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services

Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services

(a) Actual accidents

(b) Theoretical analysis

Download Date | 12/8/16 9:17 AM

storage vessel, thereby raising the pressure inside the LPG

Simulated the behavior of tank wagon loaded

approximately for 77 s after the derailment,

where explosions occurred. No time for any

emergency response plan or action to take

Accident analyzed and recommendations

due to release from a tanker and used the TNO multienergy

the LPG rail wagon

The NG pipeline network for transport and distribution

FLUENT 6.3 and

are transported through pipelines from LNG terminals

(after heating, evaporation, and compression) or liquefac-

tion plants and gas fields after pretreatment, with booster

compressors at intervening distances along the pipelines

to consumers while in liquid phase by filling LNG tankers.

Flash fire, VCE, torch

Release phase, two-

Dispersion and k-ε

The network of NG pipelines are considered to be critical

fire and BLEVE

infrastructure and their failure can cause loss to engineer-

are generally laid underground, buried at a depth from the

30 accidents recorded in the

In Viareggio, Italy, on June 29,

the wide area. The American Petroleum Institute (API)

LPG wagon derailed while it

1102 provides the procedure for the calculation of the safe

depth of ground cover for uncased pipelines for crossing

(API 2008). A depth of 1–2.5 m underground for the NG

The installation, operation, and maintenance of the

tion and distribution of gas in the localities in the highly

Risk arising during rail transport of LPG

4 LPG/LNG experimental studies 4.1.1 Experimental studies on pool fire

4.2.3 CFD approach in jet fire