Gangesa Nirvikalpaka-Vada

1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception 1.2 Viśis..ta jñāna is produced from Viśes.an.a jñāna 1.
3 Refutation of the objection that Viśes.an.a jñāna is not the cause

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada
2020-11-23
Medi Chaitanya
University of Hyderabad
06th November, 2020
Medi Chaitanya
06th November, 2020
Medi Chaitanya University of Hyderabad

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada 1 / 21
1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception 1.2 Viśis..ta jñāna is produced from Viśes.an.a jñāna 1.3 Refutation of the objection that Viśes.an.a jñāna is not the cause
2020-11-23
Medi Chaitanya
Definition
06th November, 2020
1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception

Definition
Explanation of individual terms
Contrast with conceptual perception
Pūrvapaks.in
1.2 Viśis..ta jñāna is produced from Viśes.an.a jñāna

Nyaya’s main claim
pūrvapaks.in’s objection
1.3 Refutation of the objection that Viśes.an.a jñāna is not the cause
Objection that Inference is Untenable
the problem with the anology
non-immedicacy is not an undercutter
Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada Tatva-Cintamani Definition
2020-11-23
Definition Definition I tac ca pratyaks.am
iti .
. dvi-vidham nirvikalpakam
I tatra nāma-jātyādi-yojanā-rahitam
. savikalpakam
. vaisis..tyân-avagāhi
. ca
Tatva-Cintamani Definition nis.prakārakam

. nirvikalpakam ..
Tatva-Cintamani Definition
I tac ca pratyaks.am . dvi-vidham nirvikalpakam . savikalpakam

. ca
iti .
I tatra nāma-jātyādi-yojanā-rahitam
. vaisis..tyân-avagāhi
nis.prakārakam
. nirvikalpakam ..

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada V.P.Bhatta Translation
2020-11-23
I That such a perceptual knowledge or perception is two fold as
Definition Definition indeterminate and determinate.

I Between them, the perceptual knowledge, which is devoid of
association of name, generic property and others, and which
V.P.Bhatta Translation does not involve any qualification and is without a qualifier, is
indeterminate knowledge.
V.P.Bhatta Translation
non-conceptual perception is supposed to fill a necessary causal and
epistemic role, particularly with respect to a fundamental Navya
I That such a perceptual knowledge or perception is two fold as Nyāya belief about descriptive object-identification,
indeterminate and determinate. namely that “I cannot identify an object unless I already
I Between them, the perceptual knowledge, which is devoid of possess some information about it” (Matilal 1986: 350).
association of name, generic property and others, and which
does not involve any qualification and is without a qualifier, is
indeterminate knowledge.

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada Ramanuja and Phillips Translation
2020-11-23
I And Perception is of two sorts, indeterminate and
Definition Definition determinate.

I Of the two, the indeterminate does not have (as object) the
tie to name, universal, and so on (having which a perception
Ramanuja and Phillips Translation is determinate); it does not grasp a qualificative relationality;
and it is without predication content.
Ramanuja and Phillips Translation

In Nyāya tradition, the basic form of a qualificative cognition
(viśis.t.ajñāna) is structured into three parts: a qualificand
I And Perception is of two sorts, indeterminate and (viśes.ya), qualifier (prakāra), and the relation between qualifier
and qualificand (sam . sarga)
determinate.
I Of the two, the indeterminate does not have (as object) the
tie to name, universal, and so on (having which a perception
is determinate); it does not grasp a qualificative relationality;
and it is without predication content.

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada nāma-jātyādi-yojanā-rahitam
. - deviod of attribution of
2020-11-23
1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception name and other properties
Explanation of individual terms Explanation of individual terms I the perception of a particular object does not involve any
attribution of names or properties to it.
(nāma-jātyādi-yojanā-rahitam.)
nāma-jātyādi-yojanā-rahitam
. - deviod of
I We can minimally say that at this stage, we are only aware of
”something” or ”some being”
nāma-jātyādi-yojanā-rahitam
. - deviod of attribution of attribution of name and other properties
name and other properties

1. Similar to that of Dignāga’s notion of perception as being
essentially devoid of conceptualization (kalpanāpod.ha), which is just
to say that the perception of a particular object does not involve
any attribution of names or properties to it (nāma-jātyādi-yojanā)
I the perception of a particular object does not involve any (PS 1.3, 2.7-9)
attribution of names or properties to it.
(nāma-jātyādi-yojanā-rahitam.)
I We can minimally say that at this stage, we are only aware of
”something” or ”some being”

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada vaisis..tyân-avagāhi- Lack of qualificative relationality
2020-11-23
1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception I In Gaṅgeśa’s view, non-conceptual perception directly
acquaints us with an object and its identifying attributes, but
Explanation of individual terms Explanation of individual terms it doesn’t present the object and its attributes as being related
(vaisis.t.yân).
I For instance, the non-conceptual awareness of a tree would
vaisis..tyân-avagāhi- Lack of qualificative present the tree and its property of treehood, but it would not
yet present the treehood as being related or belonging to the
tree.
vaisis..tyân-avagāhi- Lack of qualificative relationality relationality
The objects of a nirvikalpaka perception are ontologically the same

as a savikalpaka perception—both are caused by real universals,
I In Gaṅgeśa’s view, non-conceptual perception directly
tropes, etc.
acquaints us with an object and its identifying attributes, but
it doesn’t present the object and its attributes as being related Yet, a nirvikalpaka perception presents the qualifying attribute
on its own, rather than in a qualificative relation with its
(vaisis.t.yân).
bearer.
I For instance, the non-conceptual awareness of a tree would
present the tree and its property of treehood, but it would not
yet present the treehood as being related or belonging to the
tree.

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada nis.prakārakam
. - no predicative content
2020-11-23
1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception I Accordingly, Gaṅgeśa’s also characterizes non-conceptual
Explanation of individual terms Explanation of individual terms perception as being devoid of predicative content
(nis.prakārakam. );
I a non-conceptual awareness does not present any properties as
being predicated of the object that actually possesses them.
nis.prakārakam
. - no predicative content I It doesn’t present the property of treehood as being
predicated upon the tree.
nis.prakārakam
. - no predicative content
Even though they are metaphysically related, both a property and
property- possessor are represented in a nirvikalpaka perception
I Accordingly, Gaṅgeśa’s also characterizes non-conceptual merely by themselves, and not as being a property and a
perception as being devoid of predicative content property-possessor respective to each other.
(nis.prakārakam. ); nirvikalpaka perceptions are distinct from savikalpaka perceptions
I a non-conceptual awareness does not present any properties as because they present their objects in a pre-predicative,
being predicated of the object that actually possesses them. non-propositional manner
I It doesn’t present the property of treehood as being
predicated upon the tree.

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada Comparision or contrast with that of conceptual perception
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1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception I Matilal has rightly pointed out that savikalpaka perceptions
are instances of “seeing-as”:
Contrast with conceptual perception Contrast with conceptual perception I In seeing something as a tree, a concept-laden perception
presents the property of treehood as being a predicate
(prakāra) of the tree;
Comparision or contrast with that of conceptual I the tree as being what is predicated/qualified (viśes.ya) by
treehood;
I and the metaphysical relation of inherence as being what
connects or relates (sam. sarga) the treehood to the tree.
Comparision or contrast with that of conceptual perception perception
While the same object and its properties may be presented in a

I Matilal has rightly pointed out that savikalpaka perceptions nirvikalpaka perception, a savikalpaka perception takes the extra
are instances of “seeing-as”: step of seeing the object, its properties, and the relation which
I In seeing something as a tree, a concept-laden perception binds them together as having distinct roles within a
structured predicative complex.
presents the property of treehood as being a predicate
(prakāra) of the tree; A nirvikalpaka cognition appears differently than a savikalpaka
cognition because it does not involve the verbal identification of its
I the tree as being what is predicated/qualified (viśes.ya) by
content
treehood;
I and the metaphysical relation of inherence as being what
connects or relates (sam. sarga) the treehood to the tree.

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada Is Gaṅgeśa proposing a content non-conceptualism here?
2020-11-23
1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception I He kind of explained the distinction between non-conceptual
and conceptual perceptions in terms of how their respective
representational contents are differently structured.
Contrast with conceptual perception Contrast with conceptual perception 1. State non-conceptualism- the representational content of a
given mental act or state is non-conceptual if and only if the
subject of that act or state does not possess concepts for the
specification of that act or state
Is Gaṅgeśa proposing a content 2. Content non-conceptualism- the content of a given mental

act or state is non-conceptual if and only if the content of that
act or state is of a different kind from the conceptual content
Is Gaṅgeśa proposing a content non-conceptualism here?

of any mental act or state.
non-conceptualism here?
State Non-Conceptualism is based on theories of conceptual

I He kind of explained the distinction between non-conceptual possession conditions.
and conceptual perceptions in terms of how their respective
representational contents are differently structured. Content Non-Conceptualism is based on theories of the
1. State non-conceptualism- the representational content of a composition, compositional stuff, or formal constitution of
given mental act or state is non-conceptual if and only if the mental content, since these seem to be the three basic ways in
subject of that act or state does not possess concepts for the which contents could differ in kind.
specification of that act or state
2. Content non-conceptualism- the content of a given mental
act or state is non-conceptual if and only if the content of that
act or state is of a different kind from the conceptual content
of any mental act or state.

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada Pūrvapaks.in
2020-11-23
1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception I nanu jñānatvam savikalpaka-bhinna-vr.tti ity atra kim
. mānam
Pūrvapaks.in Pūrvapaks.in I na pratyaksam̄, asiddheh., atīndriyatvâbhyupagamāc ca

I na ca vyavahārah., tasya savikalpaka-sādhyatvāt
I na api na vivecitam . pūrvam adhunā vivecayāmi
Pūrvapaks.in ity-anubhava-pramān.akāv ālocana-vikalpau,

bahu-viśes.an.a-jñānā-jǹānābhyām
. tad-upapatteh.
Pūrvapaks.in
I nanu jñānatvam savikalpaka-bhinna-vr.tti ity atra kim

. mānam
I na pratyaksam̄, asiddheh., atīndriyatvâbhyupagamāc ca
I na ca vyavahārah., tasya savikalpaka-sādhyatvāt
I na api na vivecitam . pūrvam adhunā vivecayāmi
ity-anubhava-pramān.akāv ālocana-vikalpau,
bahu-viśes.an.a-jñānā-jǹānābhyām
. tad-upapatteh.

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada Bhatta-Translation
2020-11-23
1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception I What is the proof that the knowledgeness exists even in what
is other than detenninate, i.e. indeterminate knowledge?
I And the perception cannot be the proof; for, it involves non-
establishment and also the state of being beyond the
Pūrvapaks.in Pūrvapaks.in congnizance of is admitted in the indeterminate knowledge.

I Also the usage or communication cannot be the proof; for, the
same is to be accomplished from the determinate knowledge.
Bhatta-Translation I Also the qualificative knowledge and perceptual knowledge,

validated by the experience that ’This was not distinguished
before and now I shall distinguish’, cannot be the proofs; for,
Bhatta-Translation
the same (qualificative knowledge and perceptual knowledge)
can be tenable only from the knowledge of many qualifiers
and the non-knowledge respectively.
I What is the proof that the knowledgeness exists even in what

is other than detenninate, i.e. indeterminate knowledge?
I And the perception cannot be the proof; for, it involves non-
establishment and also the state of being beyond the
congnizance of is admitted in the indeterminate knowledge.
I Also the usage or communication cannot be the proof; for, the
same is to be accomplished from the determinate knowledge.
I Also the qualificative knowledge and perceptual knowledge,
validated by the experience that ’This was not distinguished
before and now I shall distinguish’, cannot be the proofs; for,
the same (qualificative knowledge and perceptual knowledge)
can be tenable only from the knowledge of many qualifiers
and the non-knowledge respectively.
Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada Phillips Translation
2020-11-23
1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception I What is the evidence that a cognition can be anything other
than determinate?
I It is not perception, for it is not established that perception
can do that and your own position is that indeterminate
Pūrvapaks.in Pūrvapaks.in perception is beyond the range of the senses.

I Moreover, it is not the way we talk (that establishes
indeterminate perception), since that (verbalisation) is
Phillips Translation accomplished through determinate awareness (alone)

I Also, the (common introspective) experience, ”I now discern
distinctly this (qualifier) not previously discerned (by me just
previously),” which shows two cognitions (in succession), is no
Phillips Translation evidence that there is a bare looking at (ālocana) and then a
determinate perception. For that (introspective datum) can
be expalined by cognition or non-cognition.
I What is the evidence that a cognition can be anything other

than determinate?
perception is beyond the range of the senses.
accomplished through determinate awareness (alone)
evidence that there is a bare looking at (ālocana) and then a
Medi Chaitanya
be expalined by cognition or non-cognition. University of Hyderabad
Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada Phillips Translation
2020-11-23
1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception I What is the evidence that a cognition can be anything other
than determinate?
Nyaya’s main claim Pūrvapaks.in perception is beyond the range of the senses.
Phillips Translation accomplished through determinate awareness (alone)

evidence that there is a bare looking at (ālocana) and then a
be expalined by cognition or non-cognition.

Definition
Explanation of individual terms
Contrast with conceptual perception
Pūrvapaks.in
1.2 Viśis..ta jñāna is produced from Viśes.an.a jñāna

Nyaya’s main claim
pūrvapaks.in’s objection
1.3 Refutation of the objection that Viśes.an.a jñāna is not the cause
Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada Qualificative knowledge is preceded by the knowledge of
2020-11-23
1.2 Viśis..ta jñāna is produced from Viśes.an.a jñāna the qualifier
Nyaya’s main claim Nyaya’s main claim I It can be inferred now that ”The qualificative perception
such as ’This (cow) is a cow’ is produced from the
knowledge of the qualifier;
I for, it constitutes the qualificative knowledge like the
Qualificative knowledge is preceded by the inference.” (And the same knowledge of the qualifier is the
determinate knowledge)
Qualificative knowledge is preceded by the knowledge of knowledge of the qualifier
the qualifier
The perceptual cognition, ”A cow,” is generated by an
(indeterminate) cognition of the qualifier, since it is a
cognition of an entity as qualified, like an inferential
I It can be inferred now that ”The qualificative perception awareness.
such as ’This (cow) is a cow’ is produced from the And the same knowledge of the qualifier is the determinate
knowledge of the qualifier; knowledge.
I for, it constitutes the qualificative knowledge like the
inference.” (And the same knowledge of the qualifier is the
determinate knowledge)

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada Qualificative knowledge is the result of the totality of the
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1.2 Viśis..ta jñāna is produced from Viśes.an.a jñāna causes
I a single qualificative knowledge is produced from the totality
of causes conducive to the knowledges of the qualifier and the
pūrvapaks.in’s objection pūrvapaks.in’s objection qualificand.

I For instance, the previously unknown qualifier appears in the
perception due to the comprehensional relation of the
Qualificative knowledge is the result of the competent organ.

I in the same way, the qualifier, appears in the inference etc.
due to being the property of the subject of inference etc.
Qualificative knowledge is the result of the totality of the

I Thus, the knowledge of the qualifier is not the cause of the
totality of the causes qualificative knowledge anywhere.
causes
1. Cognition of an entity as qualified- which comes about as the result
I a single qualificative knowledge is produced from the totality of the totality of causes of cognition of the qualifier and what it
of causes conducive to the knowledges of the qualifier and the qualifies- is single and unified
qualificand. 2. and has an object both (the qualifier and what it qualifies) in a
I For instance, the previously unknown qualifier appears in the relation of mutual expectation (each requiring the other)
perception due to the comprehensional relation of the 3. no other type of veridical cognition has indeterminate
competent organ. cogniton has a cause.
I in the same way, the qualifier, appears in the inference etc.
due to being the property of the subject of inference etc.
I Thus, the knowledge of the qualifier is not the cause of the
qualificative knowledge anywhere.

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada Reason for positing indeterminate perception
2020-11-23
1.2 Viśis..ta jñāna is produced from Viśes.an.a jñāna I There seems to be two reasons.
1. All cognition of an entity as qualified by a qualifier is
pūrvapaks.in’s objection pūrvapaks.in’s objection generated, in part, by a cognition of the qualifier. To prove
this point, Gaṅgeśa gave the examples inferential cognitions,
recognitions, knowledge based upon the trustoworthy persons
and analogical comprehensions.
Reason for positing indeterminate perception 2. Much perception is informed by memory but not all. An
experience of something a as an F for the very first time
requires indeterminate perception of the qualifier F.
Reason for positing indeterminate perception

1. In each case, a prior cognition of the qualifier appearing as
I There seems to be two reasons. predication content is required and thus is identified as a
causal factor
generated, in part, by a cognition of the qualifier. To prove 2. a condition that though insufficient in itself to bring about a later
this point, Gaṅgeśa gave the examples inferential cognitions, determinate cognition with F as predication content is needed for
recognitions, knowledge based upon the trustoworthy persons the determinate cognition to occur.
and analogical comprehensions. 3. A second step is required to justify a posit of indeterminate
2. Much perception is informed by memory but not all. An perception, namely, that a first-time perceptual determinate
experience of something a as an F for the very first time cognition of an entity as singly qualified, e.g., ”A cow”, has am
requires indeterminate perception of the qualifier F. indeterminate cognition of a qualifier as a cause.

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada Reason for positing indeterminate perception
2020-11-23
1.2 Viśis..ta jñāna is produced from Viśes.an.a jñāna I There seems to be two reasons.
pūrvapaks.in’s objection generated, in part, by a cognition of the qualifier. To prove

this point, Gaṅgeśa gave the examples inferential cognitions,
recognitions, knowledge based upon the trustoworthy persons
and analogical comprehensions.
Reason for positing indeterminate perception 2. Much perception is informed by memory but not all. An
experience of something a as an F for the very first time
requires indeterminate perception of the qualifier F.

Definition 1. In each case, a prior cognition of the qualifier appearing as
Explanation of individual terms predication content is required and thus is identified as a
Contrast with conceptual perception causal factor
Pūrvapaks.in 2. a condition that though insufficient in itself to bring about a later
determinate cognition with F as predication content is needed for
1.2 Viśis..ta jñāna is produced from Viśes.an.a jñāna the determinate cognition to occur.
Nyaya’s main claim 3. A second step is required to justify a posit of indeterminate
pūrvapaks.in’s objection perception, namely, that a first-time perceptual determinate
cognition of an entity as singly qualified, e.g., ”A cow”, has am
1.3 Refutation of the objection that Viśes.an.a jñāna is not the cause indeterminate cognition of a qualifier as a cause.
Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada Is cognition of the qualifier a causal factor for determinate
2020-11-23
1.3 Refutation of the objection that Viśes.an.a jñāna knowledge in all the cases?
I Gaṅgeśa claims that in an inferntial awareness like ”the
mountain is fire-possessing” requires a prior cognition of fire.
is not the cause I objection- in the above example, the mountain is the
qualificandum and fire its qualifier as the object of the
cognition.
Is cognition of the qualifier a causal factor for I but what if the fire that is actually on the mountain,
qualifying it, can be cognized merely as a substance?
I in that case, ’cognition of the qualifier’ would not stand
Is cognition of the qualifier a causal factor for determinate determinate knowledge in all the cases? as a causal factor in the generation of the above
inferential awareness.
knowledge in all the cases?

1. How precisely one should formulate this requirement of prior
I Gaṅgeśa claims that in an inferntial awareness like ”the cogniton of the qualifier in the first place?
mountain is fire-possessing” requires a prior cognition of fire. 2. According to pūrvapaks.in, this requirement shouldn’t be formulated
I objection- in the above example, the mountain is the as loosely as Gaṅgeśa.
qualificandum and fire its qualifier as the object of the
cognition.
I but what if the fire that is actually on the mountain,
qualifying it, can be cognized merely as a substance?
I in that case, ’cognition of the qualifier’ would not stand
as a causal factor in the generation of the above
inferential awareness.

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada The characterising principle should specify what is the
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1.3 Refutation of the objection that Viśes.an.a jñāna qualifier in the first place
I so the pūrvapaks.in proposes that the principle be formulated
so that cognition of fire as fire gets targeted.
is not the cause I we says that the causal factor at issue is the cognition whose
predication content specifies what the qualifier is in the
resultant inferential awareness.
The characterising principle should specify what I This is the cognition required for the inferential awareness to
arise.
I Thus a cognition of the qualifier tout simplement does not
The characterising principle should specify what is the is the qualifier in the first place play a causal role, and Gaṅgeśa’s inference for indeterminate
cognition is not based on proper analogues.
qualifier in the first place

1. New Principle- every qualificative awareness is produced in part
I so the pūrvapaks.in proposes that the principle be formulated by a prior awareness of that qualifier which is predicated to an
so that cognition of fire as fire gets targeted. object in the subsequent qualificative awareness.
I we says that the causal factor at issue is the cognition whose 2. The new rule relates back to the Nyāya understanding of
predication content specifies what the qualifier is in the qualificative awareness- states as identifying objects through
descriptions or information about them—identifying information
resultant inferential awareness.
must be known beforehand in order for it to be used for picking out
I This is the cognition required for the inferential awareness to some particular entity.
arise.
I Thus a cognition of the qualifier tout simplement does not
play a causal role, and Gaṅgeśa’s inference for indeterminate
cognition is not based on proper analogues.

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada the charge of being overpervassive and redundant
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1.3 Refutation of the objection that Viśes.an.a jñāna I Gaṅgeśa cannot reply that all this is true but a cognition of
is not the cause the qualifier can also be a cause.

I For, that would overextend to cognitions of fire as a
substance, for example (overpervassive)
I and also cognition of the qualifier, being-a-substance, is
the charge of being overpervassive and redundant causally irrelevant to the arising of an inferential cognition of
a mountain as fire-possessing (redundant cause)
the charge of being overpervassive and redundant

1. With the causes of inferential awareness understood differently, the
force of Gaṅgeśa’s prover, ”since it is a cognition of an entity as
I Gaṅgeśa cannot reply that all this is true but a cognition of qualified,”, does not get support from, as claimed, ”inferential
the qualifier can also be a cause. awareness and the others.”
I For, that would overextend to cognitions of fire as a
substance, for example (overpervassive)
I and also cognition of the qualifier, being-a-substance, is
causally irrelevant to the arising of an inferential cognition of
a mountain as fire-possessing (redundant cause)

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada There exists a causal relation between the prior cognition
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1.3 Refutation of the objection that Viśes.an.a jñāna of a qualifier and the cognition of an entity as qualified.
I At this point, they both accept that a cognition of an entity
as qualified by a qualified qualifier, has a cause, a cognition
Objection that Inference is Untenable is not the cause whose predication content specifies what the qualifier is.
I But, then in general a cognition of an entity as qualified has a
cognition of the qualifier as a cause.
Objection that Inference is Untenable I What holds as a relation of effect and cause between two
particulars also holds in general- given no
counterconsiderations- because of the regularity of
effect-cause relationships.
There exists a causal relation between the prior cognition There exists a causal relation between the prior I Otherwise,Gaṅgeśa claims, there would be a rupture in the
general (train of) effects.
cognition of a qualifier and the cognition of an

of a qualifier and the cognition of an entity as qualified. entity as qualified.
1. This view does not have too wide an application.
I At this point, they both accept that a cognition of an entity
as qualified by a qualified qualifier, has a cause, a cognition 2. since this or that particularly characterised effect does not
arise in the absence of its particularly characterised collections
whose predication content specifies what the qualifier is.
of causes.
I But, then in general a cognition of an entity as qualified has a
cognition of the qualifier as a cause.
I What holds as a relation of effect and cause between two
particulars also holds in general- given no
counterconsiderations- because of the regularity of
effect-cause relationships.
I Otherwise,Gaṅgeśa claims, there would be a rupture in the
general (train of) effects.
Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada Perception is immediate, but all the other awareness are
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1.3 Refutation of the objection that Viśes.an.a jñāna mediate
I Gaṅgeśa cites inferential awareness as a supporting example
the problem with the anology is not the cause for his claim of causal regularity.
I but inferential awareness differs from perceptual awareness in
not being immediate.
the problem with the anology I indeed, all of the analogues-testimonial awareness, etc.-seem
to contrast with perception in just this way, being
non-immediate, such that non-immedicacy appears to
undercut the inference
Perception is immediate, but all the other awareness are Perception is immediate, but all the other
awareness are mediate
mediate
1. it pervades the probandum ”has a cognition of the qualifier as a
cause” and fails to pervade in the prover in the instance of the
I Gaṅgeśa cites inferential awareness as a supporting example inferential subject itself, which is a perceptual cognition
for his claim of causal regularity.
I but inferential awareness differs from perceptual awareness in
not being immediate.
I indeed, all of the analogues-testimonial awareness, etc.-seem
to contrast with perception in just this way, being
non-immediate, such that non-immedicacy appears to
undercut the inference

Gaṅgeśa Nirvikalpaka-vada recognition is immediate and it has indeterminate
2020-11-23
1.3 Refutation of the objection that Viśes.an.a jñāna perception as a causal link
I Gaṅgeśa responds that non-immedicacy is not an undercutter.
non-immedicacy is not an undercutter is not the cause I since a recognition, which is an immediate cognition (This is
that Devadatta), also has a cognition of the qualifier
(namely, of the ”that”) as a cause.
non-immedicacy is not an undercutter I Thus everything that has a cognition of the qualifier as a
cause is not non-immediate
I that is to say, the proposed undercutter fails to pervade the
recognition is immediate and it has indeterminate recognition is immediate and it has probandum.
indeterminate perception as a causal link

perception as a causal link
1. the qualificative perception of form etc. produced immediately, the
remembarance of the qualifier (samskara), is absent;
I Gaṅgeśa responds that non-immedicacy is not an undercutter.
2. and therefore, the indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka) becomes
I since a recognition, which is an immediate cognition (This is established in such a case on the strength of being the property of
that Devadatta), also has a cognition of the qualifier the subject of inference.
(namely, of the ”that”) as a cause. 3. thus, the indeterminate knowledge can be established in other cases
I Thus everything that has a cognition of the qualifier as a as well; i.e. the remembarence of the qualifier cannot be the cause.
cause is not non-immediate
I that is to say, the proposed undercutter fails to pervade the
probandum.


Gangesa Nirvikalpaka-Vada

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1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception 1.2 Viśis..ta jñāna is produced from Viśes.an.a jñāna 1.

3 Refutation of the objection that Viśes.an.a jñāna is not the cause

06th November, 2020

06th November, 2020

Medi Chaitanya University of Hyderabad

06th November, 2020

1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception

1.2 Viśis..ta jñāna is produced from Viśes.an.a jñāna

Tatva-Cintamani Definition nis.prakārakam

I tac ca pratyaks.am . dvi-vidham nirvikalpakam . savikalpakam

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Definition Definition indeterminate and determinate.

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Definition Definition determinate.

Ramanuja and Phillips Translation

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name and other properties

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vaisis..tyân-avagāhi- Lack of qualificative relationality relationality

 The objects of a nirvikalpaka perception are ontologically the same

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Comparision or contrast with that of conceptual perception perception

 While the same object and its properties may be presented in a

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Is Gaṅgeśa proposing a content 2. Content non-conceptualism- the content of a given mental

Is Gaṅgeśa proposing a content non-conceptualism here?

 State Non-Conceptualism is based on theories of conceptual

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Pūrvapaks.in Pūrvapaks.in I na pratyaksam̄, asiddheh., atīndriyatvâbhyupagamāc ca

Pūrvapaks.in ity-anubhava-pramān.akāv ālocana-vikalpau,

I nanu jñānatvam savikalpaka-bhinna-vr.tti ity atra kim

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Pūrvapaks.in Pūrvapaks.in congnizance of is admitted in the indeterminate knowledge.

Bhatta-Translation I Also the qualificative knowledge and perceptual knowledge,

I What is the proof that the knowledgeness exists even in what

Pūrvapaks.in Pūrvapaks.in perception is beyond the range of the senses.

Phillips Translation accomplished through determinate awareness (alone)

I What is the evidence that a cognition can be anything other

Phillips Translation accomplished through determinate awareness (alone)

1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception

1.2 Viśis..ta jñāna is produced from Viśes.an.a jñāna

Qualificative knowledge is preceded by the knowledge of knowledge of the qualifier

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pūrvapaks.in’s objection pūrvapaks.in’s objection qualificand.

Qualificative knowledge is the result of the competent organ.

Qualificative knowledge is the result of the totality of the

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Reason for positing indeterminate perception

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pūrvapaks.in’s objection generated, in part, by a cognition of the qualifier. To prove

1.1 Discourse On Indeterminate Perception

knowledge in all the cases?

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qualifier in the first place

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is not the cause the qualifier can also be a cause.

the charge of being overpervassive and redundant

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cognition of a qualifier and the cognition of an

I Gaṅgeśa cites inferential awareness as a supporting example

Medi Chaitanya University of Hyderabad

The objects of a nirvikalpaka perception are ontologically the same

While the same object and its properties may be presented in a

State Non-Conceptualism is based on theories of conceptual