Troubleshooting Course Rev 0

Lufthansa LAN Technical Training
A320 TROUBLESHOOTING COURSE

TROUBLESHOOTING FUNDAMENTALS
TROUBLESHOOTING FUNDAMENTALS INTRODUCTION

For Training Purposes Only
Scl rbg Sep 2006 Page: 1

TROUBLESHOOTING TRAINING BENEFITS

Individuals who receive troubleshooting training and an opportunity to practice are better prepared to deal with
the complexities associated with the maintenance of modern aircraft. They enjoy the satisfaction that come from
solving difficult problems routinely and efficiently.
Troubleshooting training also benefits the organizations to which the well--trained technician belong. Organiza-
tions enjoy Iess aircraft downtime, decreased maintenance and inventory expenses and better customer rela-
tion.
Customer are less likely to absorb the expense of misdiagnosed problems and unnecessary parts replacernent.
They may also develop a respect for and trust in the capabilities of the technicians employed by the company
that services their aircraft.
Figure 1 Troubleshooting Training Benefits

WHAT IS TROUBLESHOOTING?
One author defines troubleshooting as “a sequence of fault diagnosis in which the troubleshooter analyzes the
apparent malfunction and applies appropriate tests to identify the cause”
More simply troubleshooting is a methodical approach used to determine the cause of a problem.
Troubleshooting Goal
In general, the goal of troubleshooting is to identify the source of a problem-- the malfunctioning part of a system
that is causing an observed fault or deviation from normal performance. This troubleshooting goal applies equal-
ly well to almost any profession. A management consultant searches for the cause of a corporation’s poor per-
formance. An aviation maintenance technician searches for the reason that an aircraft engine will not start.
Efficiency
Always the objective of the troubleshooter is the same--to identify the cause of the malfunction as efficiently as
possible under the existing conditions. in most situations, the measure of efficiency is generally in terms of time
and money. This is because ”good” solutions tend to be those which can be accomplished quickly and inexpen-
sively.
As say above, “under the existing conditions” because that condition can change. Sometimes the troubleshoot-
ing “customer” has plenty of time to spare and expects us to complete the troubleshooting process as economi-
cally as possible. In other cases, time may be more important to the customer than cost.
Results
The troubleshooting is one crucial step toward meeting a higher objective of returning the system to normal
operation.
The maintenance technician may decide that that unit is faulty en the system.
But the troubleshooting process yields no results until the corrective action is taken.
The corrective action, then, becomes both the ultimate goal and the final test of the troubleshooting process. If
the system functions properly after taking the corrective action, then the troubleshooting process is obviously
successful.
Figure 2 Identify the source of the Problem

HOW CAN I BE A TRUBLESHOOTER?

Some people clearly are better troubleshooters than others. Why? How do they do it? How can we learn to be
like them?.
The Art of Troubleshooting
There is an art associated with troubleshooting and that one person may be more talented in this art than anoth-
er person. On the other hand, we also find that there are strategies, rules, and techniques which can be used to
organize one’s efforts and improve effectiveness as a troubleshooter. Such guidelines can even improve the ef-
fectiveness of an expert.
Troubleshooting Restraints
An expert troubleshooter must be concerned not only with simply identifying faulty components, but also must
be able to recognize the restraints to a successful troubleshooting. These restraints generally center around
time and money. We need know the priority this restraints is each case.
Common Sense
The most frequent explanation by an good troubleshooter is “Well, you just make observations and use common
sense” But how do we gain this “common sense” and, once gained, how can we transfer this knowledge to
someone else?
Figure 3 Troubleshooting is NOT Magic

SYSTEM--COMPONENTS INFLUENCE
Is fundamental to the art of troubleshooting to know the relation and conexion between system--components.
DEFINITION
The paths of influence concept is a way of thinking about aircraft systems. Instead of viewing each system as a
collection of components, we must think of systems in terms of the functions that each system and each ele-
ment of that system performs. With this in mind, troubleshooting becomes a matter of determining which func-
tions could have an influence on the undesirable behavior we are observing in the aircraft. Thus, a path of influ-
ence is a path that leads from the observed indication through all connected functions that could fail, and cause
that indication.
CRITICAL PATH
While troubleshooting, we identify the critical path as that path which contains not only the indication, but also
the malfunctioning component.
In aviation troubleshooting, the required funtional level is usually reached when an interruption to a path of influ-
ence is indicated within a specific aircraft component, thus allowing the component to be repaired or replaced.
Figure 4 System-- Components Influence

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TROUBLESHOOTING FUDAMENTALS
LOGICAL THINKER

INTRODUCTION
The dictionary defines logic as the science of the formal principles of reasoning. Reason, in turn, is defined as
the power of comprehending, inferring, or thinking in orderly, rational ways. But what is this “power” exercised by
the ancient philosophers and discussed in such great detail in so many books on the library shelves? What can
the study of logic possibly have to do with repairing broken aircraft? What does the use of logic have to do with
troubleshooting?
Figure 5 Old Logic Thinker

FUNCTION OF LOGIC
A good troubleshooter must be a “logical thinker”. Simply knowing the principles of troubleshooting is not
enough since. without logical thought, it would be impossible to understand and apply these principles. Basic
logic, as used in the troubleshooting process. can be considered an exercise in functional logic.
Every troubleshooter must be capable of reasoning or of using logical reason in an orderly mode.
Figure 6 Actual Logic Thinker

CLASSICAL LOGIC VS EVERYDAY LOGIC

CLASSICAL LOGIC
Classical or traditional logic is primarily concerned with the kinds of reasoning used in mathematics and the spe-
cial sciences. This form of logic involves the study and use of extremely precise and sometimes complex rules in
order to determine “truth.”
Classical logic generally uses deduction or deductive reasoning.
Deductive reasoning leads to a conclusion which follows necessariIy from a general or universal premise. A de-
ductive scheme of formal logic Consists of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. This scheme or
“symbologism” might be constructed as follows:
S Major Premise--All aircraft require fuel to fly.
S Minor Premise--This aircraft has no fuel.
S Conclusion--Therefore, this aircraft will not fly.
EVERYDAY LOGIC
For most of us, the deductive scheme of formal logic described may be interesting but not especially useful in
every day life. To most of us, logical thinking means the kind of reasoning necessary for making our way in the
everyday world. We normally do not have the time to develop a series of symbologisms to determite the “truth”
about every maintenance problem we encounter on the flight line.
As maintenance technicians, we must decide based on the evidence presently available. We are expected to
identify and repair aircraft malfunctions and to complete the job quickly and efficiently. If we are unable to do so,
we cannot retire to our laboratory to perform additional research. Our bosses, our customers, and our fellow
maintenance technicians demand more timely answers. Unlike classical, deductive reasoning, everyday logic or
reasoning, by necessity, must operate under quite different conditions.
We must not conclude, however, that everyday reasoning is something we just muddle through. There are basic
guidelines and principles for logical thinking. We can and must apply these principles of reasoning to everyday
problems, but we cannot do so mechanically.
Figure 7 Decide based on the evidence

Inductive Reasoning
Everyday reasoning is most often inductive. Inductive reasoning generally involves making a number of observa-
tions and drawing a conclusion based upon those observations. A person traveling in a foreign country, for
example, notices a sign with a distinctive shape at certain road intersections. The traveler also observes that
automobile drivers habitually stop at road intersections equipped with the sign. The traveler concludes that the
distinctively shaped sign is a stop sign.
Is our traveler correct? We cannot be absolutely certain. This is because, unlike conclusions based on deductive
reasoning, conclusions based on inductive reasoning are more generalized in nature and are drawn from a par-
ticular set of instances. In addition, conclusions based on inductive reasoning do not necessarily follow from a
general or universal premise. As a result, the conclusions of inductive reasoning make claims that go beyond the
evidence provided. These claims do not automatically become “truth,” but must be confirmed or falsified by fur-
ther observations or testing.
Probability
Since the conclusions or claims of inductive reasoning go beyond the evidence provided, “truth” is not guaran-
teed as in a properly developed deductive argument. The inductive reasoning process is not foolproof; it
only make conclusion probable.
The degree of probability of a given conclusion is always relative to both the quantity and quality of the
evidence presented or observations made. In addition, conclusions may well change as new information is
added.
Finally, the degree of probability assigned to a given conclusion is often heavily influenced by the judgment, per-
sonality, and expertise of the person drawing the conclusion. Different reasoners may draw completely different
conclusions after examining the same evidence, A jury, for example, is often sharply divided after hearing exact-
ly the same evidence.
Figure 8 Different Reasoners Draw Different Conclusion

Pitfalls of lnductive Reasoning

Since inductive reasoning is not foolpfoor, we must examine some of the major pitfalls associated with this meth-
od of thinking.
Hasty Induction
Hasty induction is simply jumping to a conclusion based on insufficient evidence. Hasty induction may occur in
several ways.
Too Few Observed Instane

This is probably the most common reason that we jump to conclusions. We often simply have not made
enough observations to draw a valid conclusion.
We may, for example, observe that three aircraft of the same model are equipped with a certain brand of hy-
draulic pump. From this we conclude that all aircraft of the same model are equipped with that brand of
pump. Are we correct? Perhaps. We may, on the other hand, discover that the fourth aircraft we observe is
equipped with a different type of hydraulic pump.
Sample Too Much Alike
We often jump to conclusions based on observations which are not representative of the entire picture. We
may, for example, draw conclusions about aircraft in general based on observations of a representative sam-
ple of all the world’s aircraft. Our conclusions are suspect, however, if we only observe aircraft designed by a
single individual or manufactured by a single company.
Conclusion Too Sweeping
A conclusion is too sweeping when, although based on a sufficient number of representative observations, it
goes beyond that which can be supported by those observations. We may, for exampIe, observe dozens of
aircraft, all of which are painted purple. We may not correctly conclude, however, that all aircraft always will
be painted purple. In fact, there is no absolute assurance that the next aircraft observed will be painted pur-
ple.
Figure 9 Hasty Induction (Jumping to a Conclusion)

Forgetful Induction
Forgetful induction is overlooking some obvious or well--known facts that cast doubt on the reasoning.
An example of forgetful induction is the case of the mechanic who spent an hour testing engine instrument sys-
tems because of an abnormal indication. During one of his trips to his toolbox, he passed in front of the aircraft.
When he glanced up into the engine inlet, he discovered that the engine had a foreign object lodged in the in-
take. This should have been obvious to the mechanic. Unfortunately, he forgot to look for the obvious.
Aplication of Inductive Reasoning

What, then, is the function of inductive reasoning in the troubleshooting process! A good troubleshooter must be
at good problem solver.
A good problem solver, in turn, must be able to use inductive reasoning in forming a hypothesis or theory as to
the source of the problem. It is not enough to simply develop any theory. We must be able to use inductive rea-
soning in seeking the most probable theory.
Figure 10 Forgetful Indication (Overlooking the Obvious)

LOGIC SYMBOLOGY
Logic symbology is a shorthand method of depicting sometimes rather complex functions.
Logic symbology allows the technician to visualize these functions in situations where written descriptions are
both inadequate and impractical.
Logic symbology, in a sense, becomes the language of the troubleshooter. Once learned, this language has
broad application--even beyond its obvious usefulness in maintenance. We will begin with a brief discussion of
the most commonly used logic symbols.
Figure 11 Logic Symbology

YES SYMBOL
The YES symbol is used to indicate that only a single true input is required for a true output. The truth table for a
YES symbol is shown. This rather simple logic symbol provides a 1 output only with a 1 input and a 0 output with
a 0 input.
A truth table is a means of graphically depicting all possible combinations of inputs and outputs. Inputs and out-
puts can only be in either one state or the other. They may be on or off, true or false, yes or no, voltage or no
voltage, pressure or no pressure, etc.
For simplicity, inputs and outputs will be depicted as 1s and 0s in the following discussions of other types of logic
symbols.
Figure 12 YES Symbol Truth Table

AND SYMBOL
The AND symbol is used to indicate that all inputs must be true in order for the output to be true. This idea may
also be represented by a series of two switches. Note that both switches must he closed in order to achieve out-
put through the switches. All possible inputs and outputs for an AND symbol may be depicted by a truth table as
shown.
If both inputs A and B are false, the output of an AND symbol will always be false. Likewise, if either input A or B
is false. the output will be false. Only when both inputs A and B are true is a true output obtained.
Figure 13 AND Symbol Truth Table

OR SYMBOL
The OR symbol is used to indicate that at least one of two or more conditions must be true in order for the out-
put to be true. This idea may be represented by electrical switches, as shown in Figure. Note that either switch
may be closed in order to achieve output.
All possible inputs and outputs symbol may be depicted on a truth table.
Figure 14 OR Symbol Truth Table

EXCLUSIVE OR SYMBOL
An EXCLUSIVE OR symbol produces a logic 1 output only when one (but not both) of the inputs is a logic 1 in-
put. EXCLUSIVE OR symbol logic is indicated by the truth table.
EXCLUSIVE OR symbol logic may be represented with a shuttle valve illustration.
Figure 15 XOR Symbol Truth table

INVERTED LOGIC SYMBOLS

Each of the four symbols can be inverted with the addition of a small circle to their logic symbols. This produces
NOT, NAND, NOR, and EXCLUSIVE NOR symbols.
NOT Symbol (Inverted YES Symbol)
A NOT symbol is an inverted YES symbol. As with the other inverted symbols, a NOT symbol produces an out-
put which is opposite the output of its counterpart. The truth table for a NOT symbol is shown in Figure.
Figure 16 NOT Symbol Truth Table

NAND Symbol (Inverted AND Symbol)

A NAND symbol is simply an inverted AND symbol. As you might expect, the output is always the opposite of
the output of an AND symbol. The Figure illustrates all possible inputs and outputs associated with a two--input
NAND symbol. Note that the NAND symbol produces a logic 1 output in all cases except when all inputs are
logic 1.
Figure 17 NAND Symbol Truth Table

NOR Symbol (Inverted OR Symbol)

A NOR symbol is an inverted OR symbol. As such, a NOR symbol produces an output opposite to that of an OR
symbol. Figure illustrates all possible inputs and outputs associated with a two--input NOR symbol. The NOR
symbol produces a logic 1 output only when all inputs are logic 0.
Figure 18 NOR Symbol Truth Table

EXCLUSIVE NOR Symbol (Inverted EXCLUSIVE OR Symbol)

An EXCLUSIVE NOR symbol is an inverted EXCLUSIVE OR symbol. It will produce output exactly opposite of
that produced by an EXCLUSIVE OR symbol. Figure illustrates all possible input/output combinations for this
symbol. An EXCLUSIVE NOR symbol will produce a true output when either all inputs are true or all inputs are
false.
Figure 19
Computer Chip Representation

Logic symbols are used in solid--state technology to describe the internal workings of devices such as computer
chips. Computer chips, or integrated circuits, employ devices called gates. Gates perform switching functions
with no moving parts. They are described with logic symbols and may be referred to as “logic gates.”
AND gates in a computer chip may be represented as shown by the diagram in the figure. Note that this com-
puter chip contains four AND gates. It is understood that each of the gates are supplied operating voltage from
pin 12 and a ground from pin 7.
The exploded view of gate No. 1 depicts the operating power and ground paths. Inputs are supplied through pins
1 and 2. Output is supplied through pin 3. Note that since we are dealing with an AND gate, a output is only
achieved when both A and B inputs are true.
To simplify matters, these inputs and Outputs can be depicted by 1s and 0s rather than by specific voltages.
Five volts may be indicated by a 1, while zero volts may be indicated by a 0.
Integrated circuits, like the computer chip discussed here, may contain other logical elements. The logic symbols
described in this text will appear in diagrams that you are likely to encounter in your work as a technician.
Keep this in mind as you learn more about this language of logic.
Figure 20 Typical Computer Chip

Logic Symbols Practical Application

Logic symbols logic can be applied throughout the entire spectrum of aircraft maintenance.
A example of logic symbols are shown in Figure.
In this example we can observe AND, OR, XOR and NOT gates used in a Pack Flow Control Card.
We can find diferent types of gates in the aircraft systems, usually the gates are used to simplified the aircraft
system comprension.
Figure 21 Logic Symbols Practical Aplications

SUMMARY
Logic symbols are used to express sometimes complex logical relationships in a simple fashion. As aircraft com-
plexity increases, they will be found in more and more technical references. Become comfortable with them.
Also, learn to think and communicate logicaily so that you will be better equipped to face the challenges of main-
taining complicated aircraft systems.
A summary of the logic symbols discussed in this text can be found in the following Figures. Take a few minutes
to review these symbols.
Figure 22 Single Input Summary

Figure 23 Multiple Inputs Symbol Summary

LOGIC SYMBOL NETWORK EXERCISES

Objective
At the cornptetation of this exercises you will be able to accurately determine the output of a logic symboI net-
work.
Instructions
Accurately determine the final output value of symbol networks. Start at the right side of the screen and work
only as far into the system as necessary.
Figure 24 Logic Symbol Network Exercises



SYSTEM--COMPONENTS INFLUENCE

INTRODUCTION
As mentioned previously, the paths of influence concept is the basis for the troubleshooting process. It guides us
through the process of locating the cause of a malfunction. By identifying, following, and eliminating paths of in-
fluence, we are led directly to the source of a problem. During this entire process, we minimize time and effort
lost on unrelated areas.
DEFINITIONS
A path of influence is a functional path between an indication and one of the potential causes of that indication.
Each path of influence begins at the indication of a malfunction and extends through all connected functions
which could fail, and cause the observed indication.
During the investigation of a problem, we limit the scope of our analysis to the immediate contributing functions.
When we have identified which of these functions is producing a bad influence (improper output), we continue
the investigation by analyzing which functions contribute to its operation (influence it).
We use paths of influence to mentally identify the possible causes (direct influences) of an observed malfunc-
tion. In this way, we force ourselves to identify all of the possible causes prior to beginning any effort to identify
which possibility is in fact the cause. If we do not follow this course of action, we run the risk of overlooking a
possibility and perhaps making more work for ourselves.
For example, imagine a landing gear retraction problem. Investigation of the system reveals that no hydraulic
power is available. That explains why the landing gear will not retract. But is the information gathered up to this
point sufficient to identify the cause? Should we replace the hydraulic pump? Does the lack of hydraulic pres-
sure prove we have a bad pump or merely indicate that some problem exists in the system?
Figure 25 Landing Gear Retraction System Failure

FUNCTIONS V/S COMPONENTS

In order to examine any malfunction, we should first step back and look at the overall picture.
There is a tendency when troubleshooting to go immediately to familiar areas and begin testing for further indi-
cation of where the problem might be originating. But we must resist this temptation in order to avoid getting
bogged down in unnecessary detail (pieces and parts). Failure to look at the over all picture could prematurely
divert our attention from analysis to action.
The best approach is first to think of the system in terms of its primary functions. We must also ask, in general
terms, what is the system designed to do? When that question is answered, we can consider in what way the
system is not performing properly.
Figure 26 Funtional Analysis of Landing Gear System

SYSTEMS KNOWLEDGE
In the landing gear retraction example, the troubleshooter must have some knowledge of how the system oper-
ates.
It is nearly impossible to determine in what way the system is performing abnormally if we do not know
how the system should perform normally. This is the reason there will always he a need for traditional air-
craft systems training.
ABNORMAL SITUATIONS
Before continuing, we should note that we occasionally encounter abnormal situations during the troubleshooting
process. We will briefly discuss two such abnormal situation as a multiple malfunctions.
Multiple Malfunctions
It is possible that two or more unrelated functions could fail simultaneously. It is at this point that we must again
consider probability, as we did when we discussed abnormal paths of influence.
Multiple failures are much less likely than single failures. Accordingly, we should first assume that only one func-
tion has failed. We should consider the possibility of multiple malfunctions only after exhausting all single--failure
possibilities.
During this course, we will consider only single failures in our discussions and exercises.
Figure 27 Abnormal Situation

TROUBLESHOOTING LEVELS
While performing aircraft troubleshooting. we move progressively along the critical path toward our objective--
usually a malfunctioning component. This path takes us through many levels of aircraft complexity, from a gen-
eral level to a more detailed level.
At the most general level, we have the entire aircraft, At a more detailed level, we have the major systems that
make up the aircraft. These major systems, in turn, are made up of sub systems. And so it goes until we reach
the required level of detail (where we are able and authorized to make a repair or replacement). In this manner,
we are able to reduce and simplify any problem until, ultimately, it is solved.
AIRCRAFT AND SYSTEMS LEVELS

The most general levels of the electrical path shown in Figure are the aircraft and systems levels. For the air-
craft passenger, these levels may represent the required level of detail.
For the aircraft troubleshooter, however, this is only the beginning point on the path. To determine the cause of
the malfunction, repair the aircraft, and return it to service, additional levels of detail must be explored.
SUBSYSTEM AND ASSEMBLY LEVELS

The next two more detailed levels depicted in Figure are the subsystem and assembly levels.
For the aircraft troubleshooter, however is only a midpoint on the critical path leading to the malfunctioning com-
ponent. The problem must be explored or one or more additional levels of detail.
SUBASSEMBLY AND COMPONENT LEVELS
For most maintenance technicians, the required level of detail is usually reached at the subassembly or compo-
nent level. At this level, the troubleshooter identifies the malfunctioning subassembly or component and replaces
or repairs it.
Figure 28 Troubleshooting Levels

ALWAYS BEGIN AT A GENERAL LEVEL

As with any problem, the best place to start troubleshooting is usually at the beginning.
A good aviation troubleshooter always begins at a general level where an accurate assessment can be made.
After examining the big picture, the efficient troubleshooter will pursue additional levels of detail.
Obviously, an experienced troubleshooter may remain at a general level for only ashort time. He nevertheless
begins at this level to ensure that nothing is missed and that the correct path of influense have been
identified.
Figure 29 Begin at a General Level

EXAMINE FUNCTIONS WITHING PATHS

While examining functions within paths of influence, we must determine through testing whether each function is
defective in such a way as to cause the indications that we have observed. In the process, we will eliminate
some functions which prove satisfactory and begin to narrow the scope of our investigation.
Figure 30 Examine Function Within Path

TRACE THE CRITICAL PATH THROUGH EACH LEVEL

The key to success is to trace the critical path systematically through each level of detail. As discussed pre-
viously, the critical path is the one path of influence which contains both the observed indications and the mal-
functioning component or subassembly. To find and follow the critical path, we must examine path of influence
(leading to a possible cause) to determine which path is not providing the normal satisfactory influense required
(the path containing the actual cause)
Figure 31 Trace the Critical Path

TROUBLESHOOTING IS A PROCESS
Troubleshooting, then, becomes a layered process as we work our way through each level of detail.
First examining the big picture and thinking in terms of functions rather than components, we avoid getting
hogged down in the myriad of individual parts--relays, valves, actuators, transistors, etc.
By associating components according to the function they provide in the system, we are able to deal with large
numbers of possibilities effectively. The paths of influence concept allows us to eliminate entire groups of com-
ponents with the administration of a single, carefully considered test.
In the Figure, the simple landing gear retraction problem was analyzed through various layers of detail (functions
and supporting functions) until the problem was isolated to a single hydraulic control valve, However, the trouble-
shooter still has to perform some test to determine whether the valve problem is electrical or mechanical in na-
ture before the appropriate corrective action can be taken. This is due to the fact that on this aircraft solenoids
are line--replaceable units.
Figure 32 Troubleshooting Is a Layered Process

SYSTEM-- COMPONENTS INFLUENCE EXERCISES (POSIBLE CAUSES)

COMPUTER DISPLAYS CRITICAL PATH
Objectives
At the completion of this exercise, you will be able to:
1. Idetify possible causes.
2. Avoid making two common errors:
A. Analyzing areas which do not require analysis.
B. Overlooking a possibie cause.
Figure 33 System-- Components Influence Exercises

INSTRUCTIONS
On your display, you will see an arrangement of boxes connected by arrows. This is an imaginary system. In this
system, each box represents a function. A function is provided by a componentor a group of components. The
arrows in the system define the relationships between functions. Some functions are dependent on other func-
tions for required inputs Without these inputs, they will not provide their function to te system.
Choose a function to fail, and write its number in the left margin of your book.
To the right of the margin, record all of the functions which you feel could cause identical indicatíons (symptoms
and lack of symptoms.) if they fail. See the example below.
When your list is complete click the left monse button and compare your list with the indication show in the
screen. If your list includes numbers that are not in the display, mark an “X” through each of them. if your list
(does not include all of the numbers on the display add the missing numbers and circle them).
A number with an “X” trough it indicates that you have included a function that, if failed, could not cause identical
indications. Analysis of this function is unnecessary and potentially confusing.
Circled numbers indicate that you have not included all of the possible causes of the observed indications. If we
overlook a possible cause when troubleshooting, we may not investigate the area where the problem’s cause
may actually be found.

Function Chosen to List of other function affected by the failure

Fail

TROUBLESHOOTING PROCESS

OVERVIEW
Regardless of the restraints and pressures associated with the specific troubleshooting project, the process can
be more productive if the troubleshooter has a plan of attack, which allows a troubleshooting problem to be at-
tacked in a logical manner.
Figure 34 Troubleshooting Process

DEFINE THE PROBLEM

It is absolutely essential to accurately and completely define the problem.
Very often, this step is partially performed by the pilot when a writeup is entered in the aircraft log--book. Howev-
er, the troubleshooter must confirm what has been reported and gather additional information by asking ques-
tions and making observations.
In the process of defining the problem, a clear picture emerges as to what function of aircraft operation is in-
volved and at what level of detail we can begin the analysis. When we think of the situation in terms of functions,
we realize that the problem is one of an unsatisfactory output and that the observed indications serve to point to
the function that is unsatisfactory.
Figure 35 Define the Problem

FIND POSIBLE CAUSES

To determine posible causes, we find all functions whose output, if malfunctioning, can cause the observed un-
satisfactory function and associated indication(s). These functions, either individually or in groups, lie on paths
that connect with the unsatisfactory functions(s) and indication(s).
Figure 36 Find Posible Causes

TEST
Testing is used to determine which of the paths of influence is the critical path. The critical path is that path that
contains the source of the malfunction. The critical path is identified when we determine that one of the paths of
influence is not contributing a necessary input for a function downstream. This is accomplished through various
means of testing.
Figure 37 Test
TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION

When possible, a repair or replacement is performed and further testing is used to verify that the problem is re-
solved. However, we may not have identified the problem in sufficient detail yet. It may be necessary to continue
the process by redefining the situation at the next level of detail (start again at step one). In general, the process
is repeated until the malfunction is isolated to a particular component or item that can be repaired or replaced
Figure 38 Take Corrective Action

DISCUSSION
This Troubleshooting process works to lead us toward the cause of a malfunction at any level of detail. The
well--trained troubleshooter implements the process at a general level of detail. Then he systematically follows
the steps as they lead through as many levels of detail as necessary until, ultimately, the cause of the malfunc-
tion is located. Once the cause of the problem has been identified, the technician must then choose a corrective
action, implement it, and test to be certain the problem is resolved.
There are many techniques and strategies that you will find useful throughout the troubleshooting process. Al-
though elements of these techniques and strategies find application throughout the troubleshooting process, we
will relate them to the steps where they are most useful.
DEFINING PROBLEM
Many troubleshooters, even experts, sometimes fail to troubleshoot efficiently because the malfunction has been
incorrectly defined. An incorrectly defined malfunction often results in the unnecessary expenditure of large
amounts of resources.
The most precious of these wasted resources is probably time. But test equipment, ramp and hanger space,
materials, and parts represent resources which also are wasted frequently on improperly identified problems.
Another consideration is stress. Failure to properly define the problem results in unnecessary work. This unnec-
essary work adds stress to a job. This stress affects us negatively in a number of ways. Excessive stress re-
duces our ability to think clearly and logically, produces unnecessary fatigue, and often results in poor attitudes,
displays of anger, and associated interpersonal difficulties. When defining a problem, observing the following
guidelines may help you to avoid some of these negative aspects.
ENSURING THAT A PROBLEM EXISTS

Resources are often expended on what we later discover was not a problem at all. Sometimes, normal condi-
tions are perceived to be malfunctions.
A pilot, for example, may report a “problem” with a system on the aircraft. A maintenance technician performs a
functional check of the system and confirms that the reported “problem” in fact exists, but cannot determine its
cause. Only after expending a great deal of time and effort is it discovered that the indication reported by the
pilot and verified by the maintenance technician either falls within the normal operating range for the system or is
an inherent part of the design.
Figure 39 Ensure That a Problem Exists

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN MALFUNCTIONS AND INDICATIONS

A major factor in the misidentification of a problem is confusing the indications with the real, underlying malfunc-
tion.
The indications are usually highly visible and easy to describe, Often a “solution that makes the indication go
away may be quite simple. The simple solution, however, may not make the actual malfunction go away.
We must always remember that determining the underlying malfunction is the ultimate goal of the troubleshoot-
ing process. To use a medical example, the underlying malfunction that causes a patient to complain of leg pain
might be a broken bone. Prescribing a painkiller will not fix the leg.
Indications
The indications of a problem can be compared to the symptoms of a disease. The symptoms can both help us
and hinder us as we attempt a diagnosis.
The symptoms help us by serving as clues to the nature of the illness. The symptoms may also hinder us in that
they may hide the real problem or other important clues.
A flightcrew, for example, might report that an electrically powered aircraft system is inoperative. The trouble-
shooter may discover a tripped circuit breaker for a major component of that system. If the breaker is reset and
the aircrew writeup is cleared without attempting to determine what caused the breaker to trip, the breaker may
trip again on the next flight.
The troubleshooter treated the indication instead of the malfunction.
However, if we regard indications as clues to unsatisfiactory functions and as a starting point for determining
paths of influence, then a careful analysis of the observed indications is very beneficial, This analysis leads us to
the unsatisfactory function.

Figure 40 Don’t Treat the Symptom-- Find the Cause

IDENTIFYING THE CORRECT OR MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM

We often spend an excessive amount of time dealing with minor problems. When faced with multiple problems,
we often tend to focus on one of the more minor problems.
This can happen in a couple of ways. We can spend too much time working on the least serious problem of a
series of related problems. Or, we might be sidetracked by a totally unrelated problem. This is often due to hu-
man nature. We tend to attack the simple first. In either case, we may spend an excessiveamount of time on the
simple problems and fail to deal effectively with the more complex problem.
Figure 41 Identify the Most Serious Problem

RECOGNIZING RESTRAINTS
it is important to know what restraints are involved in a particular troubleshooting assignment before you begin
the process.
If you know, for example, that time has the highest priority, you may choose an approach to the problem that
may be a little more expensive but that will assure that the aircraft be returned to service promptly. If, on the oth-
er hand, the customer has more time money, you may work a little longer to avoid an expensive test procedure.
Sometimes, the availability of certain materials and equipment will determine how you proceed. Do not make
any assumptions about the availability of resources that may be needed. Find out what the restraints are before
you get too involved.
Figure 42 Recognizing Restraints

FINDING POSIBLE CAUSES

After the problem has been accurately defined, we then think of the problem in terms of functions. We must ask
what function is not being realized.
If the landing gear does not retract, for example, the landing gear retraction function is not being realized. There
is nothing complex here. We are just taking a slightlydifferent view of the problem. We translate the malfunction
description into a description of the missing or unsatisfactory function. Indications in this case are, therefore, a
manifestation of the unsatisfactory function.
Our reason for restating the problem is so that we may think of the problem as one of a missing or unsatisfacto-
ry output. Upon examining the problem further, it becomes apparent that the appropriate output (normal func-
tion) will be received only when certain conditions have been met (when normal inputs have been supplied).
In this phase of the troubleshooting process, we identify every function that directly contributes to the normal
operation of the function currently being investigated.
You may find information in the maintenance manuals and schematics. It may even be helpful to draw a sketch
of the functions and relationships involved. Or, you may find a suitable diagram in one of the available refer-
ences. Use your sketch or diagram to help you trace the flow of the functions involved.
However it is acquired, you must have a complete understanding of the relationships between the various func-
tions so that you can sort out the paths that are involved. What you do not already know from experience and
study,you must find through data collection and testing.
Figure 43 Finding Posible Causes

TESTING
We have defined the problem and identified the possible Causes. Now we must examine the paths of influence
to determine which path is the critical path (the path containing the cause of the problem).
This step in the process involves eliminating those paths which contain functions that are contributing satisfacto-
ry inputs. This is usually accomplished by means of inspection or testing. Each of the functions identified in the
previous step of the process is checked to verify that it is producing the proper output. Remember, the output of
these functions becomes the input for the function at the more general level of detail. We are, in effect, looking
back upstream from the evidence of the malfunction toward the cause. Each time we find a bad input, we rees-
tablish the critical path on that level of detail.
IF THE OUTPUT IS SATISFACTORY
If a function is producing the proper output, you must determine whether there are any more functions (paths of
influence) to check at this level of detail. If there are, check them until you have found the one that is not pro-
ducing the proper output. If all functions at this level produce the proper output, then, either there is an additional
path of influence or the component/assembly that uses the just--tested functions as an input is malfunctioning
(the problem is internal).
IF THE OUTPUT IS UNSATISFACTORY
If a supporting function is not contributing the satisfactory input for the more general level, you have confirmed
that the critical path extends to the next level of detail. Now you need to determine if you have the capability of
going to that more detailed level. If you can go, the entire process is repeated at the next level, If you cannot go
to the more detailed level you must take corrective action at this level
Figure 44 Testing
TAKING CORRECTIVE ACTION

Corrective action may take many forms. If you have identified the cause of a problem that is within your mainte-
nance responsibility and capability, you may simply remove and replace a component or effect a repair. If, how-
ever, the cause of the problem lies outside of your maintenance capability, you may report your findings to the
appropriate personnel. You might call in the sheet metal or engine specialists, for example. In either case, you
have successfully performed the troubleshooting process to the point where the corrective action taken will be
the right action. Wasted time and effort have been avoided.
Remember that troubleshooting is not complete until the malfunctioning component has been replaced
and the system tested for proper operation.
The process described in this chapter will be used during troubleshooting exercises you will perform in this
course. Begin working slowly and carefully. Concentrate on technique rather than speed. Speed will be a natural
byproduct of more efficient work habits.
Figure 45 Finding the critical Paths

SYSTEM EXERCISES

SYSTEM EXERCISES
Instruction
This exercices allow you practice troubleshooting in differents system with which you have not experience, the
problems are designed to make it easy for you to think in terms of function and relationships
Objective
At he completion of this leason you will be able to apply the four--step process to problems in differents systems
you will also be able to use a schematic diagram.
Instructions
Using your knowledge acquired in this course select and perform the appropiate electrical test, then make your
conclusion and finally make a corrective action to solve the failure.
IS VERY IMPORTAT PLAN YOUR WORK, THEN WORK YOUR PLAN

Figure 46 Exercises
LAVATORY AND GALLEY EXTRACTION FAN SYSTEM

System description
The lavatory and galley extraction fan 1hu operates continously. 28v dc from normal busbar 101PP trough cir-
cuit breaker 5HU energizes the power relay 2HU.
The power relay energizes the extraction fan with 115v ac from normal busbar 101XP thruogh circuit breaker
6HU. If an overheat of the lavatory and galley extraction fan 1HU occurs, the thermo switches of the fan stop
the electrical power supply through the power relay 2HU. The fan stops and the indicating relay 4HU opens.
Instructions
Using your knowledge acquired in this course select and perform the appropiate electrical test for each failure,
then make your conclusion and finally make a corrective action to solve the failure.
Figure 47 Lavatory and galley Extraction Fan

VENTILATION BULK CARGO FAN

System Description
The bulk cargo ventilation fan will start when the BULK CARGO HEAT selector is moved to VENT and the
BULK CARGO HEAT switchlight (on the P5 panel) is pushed to on. The fan makes air from the passenger
compartment flow through a diffuser and into the bulk cargo compartment. The air pressurizes the compartment.
The bulk cargo ventilation fan will stop when the BULK CARGO HEAT is moved to NORM or the BULK CARGO
HEAT switchlight is pushed to off.
With the BULK CARGO HEAT switchlight in the ON position, the aft/bulk cargo fire override relay de--energized,
and the BULK CARGO HEAT selector in the VENT position, 28v dc power energizes the bulk cargo vent fan
control relay if the bulk cargo vent fan overheat switch has not tripped. 115v ac power then passes through the
energized bulk cargo vent fan control relay and starts the fan. The bulk cargo vent fan current sensor senses
115v ac power to one coil of the fan. If no current exists, EICAS displays a BULK CARGO FAN status message.
The same EICAS message displays when the fan overheats. Arming of the AFT CARGO FIRE switch/light, on
the aft pilots’ control stand, shuts down the fan.
Instructions
Using your knowledge acquired in this course select and perform the appropiate electrical test for each failure,
then make your conclusion and finally make a corrective action to solve the failure.
Figure 48 Ventilation Bulk Cargo Fan

CFDS
31--30 CENTRALIZED FAULT DISPLAY SYSTEM (CFDS)


CFDS
CFDS PRESENTATION
CFDIU
The Centralized Fault Display Interface Unit (CFDIU) receives failure messages from the aircraft systems.
It memorizes and manages them. Information is available in various reports.
The CFDIU consists of two distinct channels:
S a NORMAL CHANNEL which ensures all the functions.
S a STANDBY CHANNEL (or BACKUP CHANNEL) which permits restricted operation when the normal chan-
nel is faulty.
BITE
The BITE is a function incorporated in the computers which detects, localizes and memorizes failures.
All systems including a Built in Test Equipment (BITE) are connected to the CFDIU.
ECAM
The ECAM monitors the aircraft systems. The warning information is delivered to the Centralized Fault Display
System.
FWC: Flight Warning Computer
Only the primary and the independent failure information is sent to the CFDS.
MCDU
The Multipurpose Control and Display Unit (MCDU) is a display unit and a keyboard used by the CFDS to dis-
play and interrogate BITE‘s and to initiate system tests.
The 2nd MCDU is also connected to the CFDS.
You can only use the CFDS on one MCDU at a time.
PRINTER
The PRINTER is used for printing information automatically or on request.
ACARS
The ACARS (Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System) is used to exchange data between the
aircraft and a ground station via a radio VHF link.

CFDS
Figure 49 CFDS Presentation

CFDS
SYSTEM BITE PHILOSOPHY

BITE
Most aircraft systems are equipped with a Built--In Test Equipment (BITE).
The BITE monitors permanently the system operation. It can also store and transmit the detected failure.
Each system computer includes a BITE circuit which detects failures.
When a failure is detected, it is stored in the BITE memory and is transmitted to the centralized fault display sys-
tem.
Memorization of the 64 previous legs report is done by most of the BITEs.
CFDS
The Centralized Fault Display System centralizes all information concerning aircraft system failures.
Reading or printing of all the failure information is done in the cockpit.
The CFDS functions are accessed through the MCDU.
Figure 50 System BITE Philosophy

TROUBLESHOOTING COURSE
HOW TO USE THE CFDS
HOW TO USE THE CFDS


HOW TO USE THE CFDS
HOW TO USE THE CFDS
TYPES OF SYSTEMS
Systems have been divided into three categories in order to limit the complexity:
-- type 1
-- type 2
-- type 3
depending on the type of interface that they may have with the CFDIU.
This system organization in three types essentially remains transparent for the operator as the CFDIU manages
any differences. Nonetheless, their definitions make it possible to understand why certain menus are simplified.
(1) Type 1 systems
These systems are characterized by an input/output interface with the CFDIU of the ARINC 429 bus/ARINC 429
bus type. Most systems are provided with this type of interface.
This type of system enables:
-- output: permanent transmission to the CFDIU of maintenance messages generated during the current flight
or during the last flight
-- input: an operator to dialog on the ground with the BITEs and therefore have access to complementary infor-
mation (test, ground report, etc.).

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
(2) Type 2 systems

These systems are characterized by an input/output interface with the CFDIU of the discrete/ARINC 429 bus
type.
-- output: permanent transmission to the CFDIU of maintenance messages generated during the current flight
or during the last flight, as well as permanent transmission while on the ground of maintenance messages gen-
erated on the ground
-- input: an operator to launch on the ground the system test and to obtain the results via the output bus.
(3) Type 3 systems

These systems are characterized by an input/output interface with the CFDIU of the discrete/discrete type.
-- output: permanent transmission of the operating status (OK, not OK)
-- input: an operator to launch on the ground the system test and to obtain the result (OK, or not OK) via the
discrete output.
The CFDIU decodes the corresponding maintenance message into plain language.

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
SYSTEM BITE
When a system includes several computers, one of the computers collects the maintenance information and
provides the link between the system and the CFDIU. It then performs the BITE function and therefore reports
on behalf of all system computers.
This architecture provides a better targeted diagnosis by correlating data between system computers as well as
reducing bus links with the CFDIU.
For the operator, the resulting consequences are minor:
-- it is the maintenance message itself which identifies, where necessary, the message source in the system.
Example: source = ECAM1; message = SDAC1 : NO DATA FROM BMC1.
The SDAC which is part of the Flight Warning System has generated the message.
Figure 51 System BITE

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
FLIGHT/GROUND CONDITIONS
Transition to flight (Event “1”) is defined “at the soonest” or “at the latest” depending on whether the flight num-
ber has been entered by the crew before take--off or not.
Event “1”:
-- “At the soonest”: First engine start + 3 minutes if flight number entered prior to first engine start.
-- “At the latest”: Aircraft speed > 80 knots if flight number not entered prior to first engine start.
At event “1”, the leg number is incremented.
“IN FLIGHT” PHASE
From event “1” until aircraft speed has been below 80 knots for 30 seconds, type 1 and 3 systems are consid-
ered in flight.
NOTE: TYPE 2 SYSTEMS ARE ONLY CONSIDERED IN FLIGHT FROM 30 SECONDS AFTER LIFT OFF
UP TO TOUCH DOWN.
In flight, the system Built--In Test Equipment (BITEs) ensures:
-- detection (Type 1/2/3 systems) and memorization in their flight memory (Type 1/2 systems only as type 3 sys-
tem BITEs do not have any memory) of internal and external faults,
-- transmission to the Centralized Fault Display Interface Unit (CFDIU) of internal and external faults for memori-
zation and establishment of the CURRENT LEG REPORT.
This “in flight” phase corresponds to the Post Flight Report (PFR) recording time (Beginning and end of fault and
ECAM warning message memorization in the CFDIU).
FLIGHT/GROUND TRANSITION
Transition to ground occurs when, after touch down, the aircraft speed has been below 80 knots for 30 seconds.
At this time, the CURRENT LEG REPORT is renamed under the title LAST LEG REPORT and is stored in the
PREVIOUS LEGS REPORT.
NOTE: AS THE LEG HAS NOT CHANGED, THE CONTENT OF THE LAST LEG REPORT IS IDENTIFIED
IN THE PREVIOUS LEGS REPORT UNDER THE LEG --00.
“ON GROUND” PHASE

On ground, the system BITEs ensure:
-- detection (Type 1/2/3 systems) and memorization in their ground memory (Type 1/2 systems) of internal faults
only,
-- transmission to the CFDIU of internal faults for monitoring and establishment of the AVIONICS STATUS.
All CFDS functions (e.g. PFR printing) are available on request through the Multipurpose Control and Display
Units (MCDUs).

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
Figure 52 Flight/Ground Conditions

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
MAINTENANCE MESSAGE CLASSIFICATION

General
Maintenance message classification is based on fault consequence.
All faults can be divided into three groups:
-- the faults leading to an operational event in the cockpit (Class 1)
-- the faults leading to an ECAM MAINTENANCE STATUS (Class 2)
-- the faults without cockpit events (Class 3)
NOTE: The list of fault symptoms provides :
-- all the possible theorical cases.
In order to limit the number of cockpit events displayed to the pilots after a single fault, some systems do not
generate a cockpit event while they send a class 1 or class 2 fault message because it is already done by anoth-
er system.
This means that in most of the cases, the fault message is associated with a cockpit event (ECAM warning, lo-
cal warning, maintenance status...).
But in specific cases of fault e.g. only a small part of wiring is faulty and only one of the receivers detects the
fault, it is possible to find in the PFR only the fault message.
-- fault messages which are only displayed in a test result page.
Some faults can be detected only during a specific test.
The associated fault message is therefore only displayed on the MCDU as a test result and will never appear on
a PFR.
-- fault messages which need a manual switching in order to generate a cockpit event.
For systems which are in standby and which fail, the fault message is immediately available in the PFR but the
associated cockpit event is shown in the cockpit only when a manual switching activates this system (example
ADIRU3).
CLASS 1
CLASS 2
OPERATIONAL
CONSEQUENCE
CLASS 3
NO IMMEDIATE
OPERATIONAL
CONSEQUENCE
NO CONSEQUENCE
ON AIRCRAFT SAFETY
Figure 53 Maintenance Message Clasification

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
FAULTS WITH OPERATIONAL COCKPIT EVENT (CLASS 1)

This event is also called a cockpit effect. Examples of cockpit effects are: an ECAM warning, a local warning, a
flag, or any invalid function such as a missing audio signal, amber crosses on a system page, etc.
Some of these faults have consequences on the system safety objective and are NO GO items (i.e.: the failure
must be fixed before the next departure) or GO IF items (GO if the conditions given in the MEL are fulfilled). The
others are GO without conditions.
For some of these faults the cockpit effect does not automatically appear to the crew when it is activated (e.g.:
amber crosses on a system page).
The status regarding all these faults is given by the MEL.
When the crew take notice of a fault through the cockpit effect they must report it in the aircraft LOG BOOK.
In order to be able to launch the proper maintenance actions, all faults:
-- having a cockpit effect and
-- detected by the systems are covered by a CLASS 1 maintenance message transmitted to the CFDIU.
Class 1 maintenance messages are presented in the Post Flight Report at the end of the flight.
NOTE: Some of the system faults having an effect in the cabin are also covered by a CLASS 1 maintenance
message transmitted to the CFDIU.
ELEC PUMP
MASTER FAULT A
U
CAUT T
OFF O
HYDB RSVR OVHT

--BLUE ELEC PUMP..OFF CURRENT LEG REPORT
date:feb 23
STS
GMT:1125 ATA:31--55--00
HYD BLUE TEMP SENSOR
3000PSI 3000 PSI 3000
< RETURN PRINT *

OVHT
Figure 54 Failure Class 1

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
FAULTS TRIGGERING AN ECAM MAINTENANCE STATUS (CLASS 2)

These faults have no consequence on the system operating conditions. They are always GO without any restric-
tion. These faults must be fixed at the first opportunity and not later than the ”rectification interval” required as
per MMEL section 01.00.
The crew must make an entry into the LOG BOOK (Pilot report) because this information is provided by the
FWS at the end of the flight, after engines shutdown, through the ECAM MAINTENANCE STATUS.
In order to launch at the first opportunity the proper maintenance action it is necessary to provide the information
to the maintenance teams. Consequently, these faults are covered by a CLASS 2 maintenance message trans-
mitted to the CFDIU.
Class 2 maintenance messages are presented in the Post Flight Report at the end of the flight.
CURRENT LEG REPORT

date:feb 23
GMT:1105 ATA:26--17--00
STATUS SDCU CHANNEL 1(10WQ)
MAINTENANCE
< RETURN PRINT *
SDCU

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
FAULTS WITHOUT COCKPIT EVENT (CLASS 3)

These faults have no consequence on the system operating conditions and the crew is not aware of them.
All faults detected by the systems without cockpit event are covered by a CLASS 3 fault maintenance message.
These messages are recorded in each system BITE (class 3 report).
NOTE: For engine system this definition must be completed with the following information.
(b) Engine system
The class 3 faults (without cockpit event) have been classified in the two following categories:
-- the TIME LIMITED dispatch faults: which means that the fault may remain uncorrected within a maximum
time frame specified by the Maintenance Planning Document.
-- the UNLIMITED TIME dispatch faults: which means that the fault may remain uncorrected within an unlimit-
ed time frame.
All these faults are presented by the FADEC BITE in the ’Scheduled Maintenance Report’ at the aircraft level
and classified ”S” in the Trouble Shooting Manual.
Within class ”S” faults, an (*) at the end of the maintenance message will highlight UNLIMITED TIME dispatch
faults.
Faults without the (*) correspond to TIME LIMITED dispatch faults.
Example:
“CFDIU,EIU (FLGT), J3*” is an UNLIMITED TIME dispatch fault and should be treated like any other aircraft
system CLASS 3 fault.
“T495L harn (En--4028 KS2)J9/ECU(En--4000Ks)” is a TIME LIMITED dispatch fault and must be corrected in
accordance with the Maintenance Planning Document.
AVIONICS STATUS
DMC 3 (CLASS 3)
STATUS
NORMAL
< RETURN PRINT *

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
INTERNAL FAULT/EXTERNAL FAULT

A unique fault may disturb several systems. In this case, it will lead to the generation of several maintenance
messages (one per system). One of these messages may be more accurate than the others. Depending on the
fault and its effect, it will be the one generated either by a computer which detects itself faulty (self monitoring)
or by the computer in charge of the BITE of the system.
Under these conditions this message is qualified by the unit generating it as having priority over all messages
transmitted by the other systems for the same fault. It will be the one retained by the CFDIU (refer to the PFR).
This message is called internal.
The other maintenance messages related to the same fault are called external by the other systems. They have
less accuracy, have not priority and are not recorded in this case by the CFDIU. Only their origins are memo-
rized by the CFDIU as identifiers (refer to the PFR).
Therefore, each system has in memory an information linked to every message transmitted to the CFDIU which
defines its internal or external attribute so that the CFDIU can give priority to the most accurate one.
When no priority messages are received by the CFDIU for the same event it is considered that the accuracy is
the same for all messages received. In this case the CFDIU retains the first one received.
Remark: as a general rule, the LRUs incriminated by the maintenance messages shown in the PFR are part of
the systems which generated the internal messages.
Example:
A fault of the ADM sensor is detected by the ADIRU.
The ADIRU sends a fault message (e.g. ADIRU1: NO ADM 19FP1 DATA) to the CFDIU and invalidates some
parameters on its output buses (e.g. Airspeed). This fault message is coded as internal by the ADIRU.
The users of the ADIRU data (EIS, AFS, ECAM, FADEC, ...) detect the loss of the airspeed parameter. They
send fault messages to the CFDIU, coded as external (e.g. EIS1: NO ADIRU1 DATA).
The CFDIU stores the fault message from the ADIRU and the name of the systems which have detected the
fault.
The PFR is:
SOURCE IDENTIFIERS
ADIRU 1: NO ADM19 FP1 DATA ADIRU 1 EIS, AFS, ECAM, FADEC

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
AIR DATA SYSTEM
C
ANGLE OF ATTACK
SENSOR
B
AIR DATA
COMPUTER
A
INTERNAL
EXTERNAL FAILURE
FAILURE
CFDIU
Figure 57 Internal/External Failures

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS
The PFR
Description of the PFR
A maintenance report on the last fligt is automatically printed eighty knots plus thirty seconds after touch down.
This document is the Post Flight Report (PFR). The PFR is a result of the CFDS automatic operating mode.
This report is the main source of information used to initiate trouble shooting and to decide on the required main-
tenance actions.
A backup of the printed PFR is available on the MCDU. It should only be used if the printed PFR is not available
as the information is less complete and the presentation is not so friendly.
Conditional maintenance operations are carried out in response to the observations made by the flight crew in
the LOG BOOK.
This information represents a cockpit effect as previously defined.
The following data are recorded in the PFR:
-- ECAM WARNING MESSAGES
The ECAM WARNING MESSAGES contains:
. the warning message available on the upper ECAM display unit
. the maintenance status
These warning messages are associated with their ATA reference (aid for cross referencing with the mainte-
nance message).
-- FAULTS:
Maintenance messages are listed in the PFR in the FAILURE MESSAGES part.
Additional information is associated with each message.
-- FLIGHT PHASE -- GMT
Flight operational phases (CLIMB, CRUISE, etc.) are indicated in coded form in the PFR in front of the warning
message. The time (GMT) is also given in front of the warning message and the maintenance message.
. FLIGHT PHASE decoding:
02 : Engine start + 3 mn up to TO Power
03 : TO Power up to 80 kts
04 : 80 kts up to lift off
05 : Climb
06 : Cruise
07 : Descent
08 : Touch down up to 80 kts
09 : 80 kts up to last engine shut down.
-- ATA:
This is the ATA chapter of the first suspected component.
It is the entry point to the technical documentation. It may also be an aid in relation to the corresponding warning
message and with the GMT.
-- SOURCE:
The source is the system (for system BITE) or the computer which generated the maintenance message re-
tained by the CFDIU for this event and recorded in the PFR.
-- IDENTIFIER(S):
The identifier(s) are the computers which have also reacted in relation to the fault by generating:
. external maintenance messages not retained by the CFDIU
. cockpit effects.

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
Correlation principle
S Correlation between fault messages:
In order to limit the number of fault messages printed on the PFR and to give the line mechanic only the root
cause of a fault, the CFDIU correlates the fault messages.
This correlation is based on the GMT and the ATA chapter of the received fault messages.
S Correlation between fault message and ECAM warning or Maintenance Status:
This correlation has to be performed by the line mechanic.
The ATA Chapter and the GMT have to be used (general case).
If a fault appears and disappears several times during the same flight leg, the corresponding fault message is
transmitted only at the first detection, but the ECAM warning (for a Class 1 fault) or the Maintenance Status (for
a Class 2 fault) is displayed every time in the cockpit and transmitted every time to the CFDIU.
Therefore, it is possible to find in the PFR several times the same ECAM warning or Maintenance Status but
only one fault message.
Figure 58 Post Flight Report

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
REPORTS AVAILABLE VIA THE SYSTEM REPORT/TEST

The manual test function is the main function of the CFDS manual operating mode.
The purpose is to be able to test on the ground, the maximum number of components, i.e. the integrity of the
computer managing the test, the system LRUs and the validity of the external signals used by the system with a
single test.
Various types of tests
Nonetheless, in order to optimize the test function and better satisfy operator requirements, certain adaptations
have been introduced:
-- To limit system complexity and their BITE, the test function does not always fully cover complete system in-
tegrity.
In the TSM with each maintenance message, the test or the procedure will be indicated making it possible to
recheck the component on the ground
-- To better manage the effect of the test on the system and its ground handling the test function may be divid-
ed into two groups:
S BASIC TEST (OR SYSTEM TEST)
S COMPLEMENTARY TESTS.
This makes it possible to have at least one test available at the terminal gate (the basic test) which is quickly to
start--up by a single technician, the other tests making it possible to increase the global coverage level of the
tests where useful and possible.
All these tests are run on the ground from the MCDU using, first of all, the CFDIU menu (SYSTEM REPORT/
TEST) then the system MENU.
* Basic test or system test
This test has no effect on the aircraft and does not require that any long or complex actions be performed by the
operator.
Consequently, this test may be initiated from the cockpit by a single operator whenever required during stop-
overs.
All faults present on ground and actually detected by the system will be analyzed and reported by this test. Fur-
thermore, it must be run before any other test to check the integrity of the computer housing the BITE.
* Complementary tests
These tests may affect the aircraft (and may require actions by the operator). In fact these tests send stimuli to
various components such as actuators, valves, etc.
For this reason, CAUTIONS may be displayed on the MCDU before activation of test.
The wording of the cautions is in fact simply a reminder of the consequences on the aircraft following test activa-
tion. In fact, the safety procedures associated with these tests are in the AMM.
Consequently, normally these tests are not performed during a short stopover. Test names are related to the
tested parts.
These tests can also be menu--guided tests. The actions to be taken are displayed in plain language on the
MCDU. (Description of the initial configuration, description of the actions, wording of the questions to which the
operator must respond). Test names are related to the tested parts.
Presentation of the test pages
-- Certain information may require several pages. Each page is then numbered and the MCDU NEXT PAGE
function key is used to run through the test
-- In certain cases, the system waits until the operator has performed an action to continue the test. Then there
is a limited time out so as not to stop in this configuration when the monitored signals are blocked. This implies
that the operator action must be performed before this time out.
-- A dash may be shown when data is not available. This does not necessarily mean that an effective failure is
present. Only maintenance messages indicate possible failures.

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
Initial aircraft configuration for test activation

The general configuration of the aircraft for test activation is basically as follows:
-- aircraft on ground
-- engines stopped
-- all systems power supplied (ADIRS, FADEC may be off)
-- pushbutton switches and switches in normal configuration.
If a test calls for a different configuration, this configuration will be described in the AMM.
To limit BITE complexity all these conditions are assumed to be correctly applied by the operator. Consequently,
if a difference is detected by a system it is considered as a fault and therefore generates a maintenance mes-
sage in the test results.
In all cases, it is recommended to restart the tests indicating faults in the results to eliminate any possible distur-
bances or wrong initial conditions.
TEST IN PROGRESS
When a test is run without any operator action being requested the TEST IN PROGRESS can be displayed on
the MCDU.
Test results
The result of a test is one of the following:
-- The mention TEST OK, PASS, NO FAULT, ...:
The test has not detected any faults
-- The display of maintenance messages on the MCDU:
The test has detected at least one fault.
In certain multiple fault cases, the test may only indicate the first fault encountered. In fact, certain faults prevent
to run the test more extensively.
Test re--running after repair of the fault is therefore always necessary to check whether there is another fault or
not. Only the mention TEST OK, PASS, NO FAULT ... is proof that the test has not detected any other faults.
-- No response from the system to the test request or no results displayed:
In this case, the test has not been completed.
Return to initial condition is obtained by pressing the MCDU MENU key then CFDS key and selecting the sys-
tem again.
If the same sequence reoccurs then the computer managing the BITE of the system or the wiring from the
CFDIU must be the cause.
Test stop
In some cases, a key is allocated to stop a test in progress.
Configuration resetting after a test
The operator may be requested to reconfigure after a test if the initial conditions required by the test have had a
significant effect on the aircraft (instructions are in the AMM). If the operator wants to repeat the test he is not
obliged to apply these instructions on configuration resetting.
Ground handling of the tests

As maintenance messages are stored in the PFR or the GROUND REPORT they will not be erased until the
next beginning of flight. Therefore, a test is a means of checking whether a fault is still present and a means of
isolating a failed LRU.
Activation of a test will be requested in the TSM by the fault isolation procedure related to a maintenance mes-
sage. It will be used to confirm the presence of a fault or to eliminate any ambiguity. As a general rule, the test of
the system including the LRU incriminated by the maintenance message (message ATA) will be activated. By
default, the test of the system which generated the message (SOURCE) may be activated.
The activation of a test may also be part of the removal/installation procedure of an LRU given in the AMM.

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
Figure 59 System Report Test

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
AVIONICS STATUS
This function displays the identity of the systems detecting a class 1, 2 or 3 internal or external fault when the
function is called.
The AVIONICS STATUS thus rapidly provides a global overview of the status of all systems. It is a user--friendly
monitoring device providing direct access to system menus which detect a fault (for example, flag displayed on
the PFD).
Furthermore, after aircraft power up, it enables to check that all computers have correctly satisfied the related
power up tests.
In order to know the reason for which a system is displayed in the AVIONICS STATUS it is recommended to get
access to the system menu and to activate the system test (or test).
NOTE: Certain systems are listed in the AVIONICS STATUS due to normal absence of a ground power supply.
Therefore, it is recommended to supply all systems prior to gaining access to the AVIONICS STATUS. It shall be
noted that when a computer is not supplied it is not directly displayed in the AVIONICS STATUS as it no longer
detects, itself, this fault. However, the systems using the signals from this computer appear in the AVIONICS
STATUS.
Figure 60 Avionic Status

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
GROUND SCANNING
The GROUND SCANNING enables fault trouble shooting based on ground activation by the operator himself of
functions normally performed during a flight.
The advantage of this is that it is not restrictive as far as actions are concerned. In fact, the operator decides
what type of actions to be performed on the system, which is in GROUND SCANNING, as a function of the
problems to be processed.
This action may include dynamic phases (for example: engine startup, flight control surface movement, etc.).
This is also an aid in trouble shooting faults difficult to resolve.
All maintenance messages (class 1, 2 and 3, internal and external) related to all faults detected in real time by
the system will be displayed during the GROUND SCANNING.
In order to indicate a transient fault source to the operator, the maintenance messages, automatically displayed
in GROUND SCANNING, are only erased when exiting from the function.
Furthermore, GROUND SCANNING must always be preceded by a system test in order to identify the possible
static faults.
The use of this function may also be requested by the TSM procedures.
Figure 61 Ground Scanning

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
LAST LEG REPORT

This section presents a portion of the information given in the PFR.
It contains the class 1 and 2 fault messages transmitted to the CFDIU during the previous flight.
NOTE: For information purposes, the messages generated by the identifiers are accessible in the last leg report
of these identifiers. The user who wants to use these messages must do so carefully as the information involved
is non--correlated and non--priority information.
Figure 62 Last Leg Report

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
PREVIOUS LEGS REPORT

The PREVIOUS LEGS REPORT function is the history of the LAST LEG REPORT limited to 64 flights. There-
fore, it is displayed with the same restrictions.
Figure 63 Previous Leg Report

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
TROUBLE SHOOTING DATA

In most cases, this concerns primary and coded data.
The purpose is to supply additional information on conditions prevailing when the maintenance message was
generated.
In general, these data are read in the case of events which do not result from effective part failure, already cov-
ered by the replacement of the failed part.
Analysis of this data will be effectively useful in the study which may enable the identification of the cause of an
event.
If certain trouble shooting data are required for fault trouble shooting, data readout will be requested by a TSM
procedure. Wherever possible, these data will be displayed decoded on the MCDU.
Figure 64 Trubleshooting Data

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
LRU IDENTIFICATION
The purpose of this section is to display on ground the part numbers of computers of the selected system and
possibly their serial numbers. This section may be consulted to check the interrogated computer standard.
This is a configuration management aid.
Figure 65 LRU Identification

HOW TO USE THE CFDS
CLASS 3 REPORT
All class 3 (internal and external) maintenance messages corresponding to the selected system are grouped
under this report. This function enables a quick access to the class 3 messages of a given system.
NOTE: Some systems do not have class 3 reports.
Figure 66 Class 3 Report

TROUBLESHOOTING MANUAL
TROUBLESHOOTING MANUAL INTRODUCTION


GENERAL
Trouble Shooting Manual (TSM) Objective
The TSM is provided by AIRBUS to enable the systematic identification, isolation and correction of aircraft warn-
ings and malfunctions reported in flight and on the ground.
Figure 67 TSM Introduction

TSM ORGANIZATION AND CONTENT

General
The TSM contains the following main parts:
-- Table of Contents (provided in electronic format)
-- Front matter
-- Introduction
-- Standard chapters.
The organization and content of these is as follows:
Front Matter
The front matter contains information on the revision status, management of pages and updating records for the
TSM. The layout is as follows:
-- Title Page
-- List of Temporary Revisions
-- Record of SBs (Service Bulletins)
-- List of COCs (Customer Originated Changes)
Introduction
The introduction provides the following information:
-- Organization and Content
-- Philosophy and Use
-- How to use the Centralalized Fault Display System (CFDS)
-- List of Abbreviations.
Standard Chapters
(1) General
Each of the standard chapters contains the following information:
-- Fault Symptoms (corresponding to each Fault Isolation Procedure)
-- Fault Isolation Procedures (with links to Highlights and Fault Symptoms)
-- Task Supporting Data
The contents of these is as follows:
(2) Fault Symptoms
The fault symptoms corresponding to the Fault Isolation procedure is provided under electronic link.
A Fault Symptom is the association of a Warning/Malfunction and/or CFDS fault message.
The Fault Symptoms pages are divided into the following five separate sections:
-- ECAM,
-- EFIS,
-- LOCAL,
-- OBSV (observations),
-- CFDS.
The division of the sections is identical to that of the Index of Warnings/ Malfunctions and the Index of CFDS
Fault Messages.
The Fault Symptom pages in each section are divided into the following three main columns:
-- WARNINGS/MALFUNCTIONS,
-- CFDS FAULT MESSAGES,
-- FAULT ISOLATION PROCEDURE.


The WARNING/MALFUNCTION column is divided into blocks in most sections in accordance with the priority
classification of warnings and malfunctions as follows:
ECAM Section
-- ECAM warnings
-- Inoperative Systems
-- Maintenance Status
-- System display
EFIS Section
-- PFD (Primary Flight Display)
-- ND (Navigation Display)
LOCAL Section
These are sub--divided into the various panels on which they are located.
Crew and Maintenance Observation
This covers crew and/or maintenance observations (malfunctions) which are generally not monitored by the air-
craft systems and is not divided into blocks.
CFDS Section
The CFDS FAULT MESSAGE lists the complete message (source, text, ATA reference, class and system identi-
fiers) which is associated (if applicable) with a warning or malfunction.
(3) Fault Isolation Procedures
The Fault Isolation Procedures contain the information required to isolate and correct each fault symptom.
They are similar in structure to the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) maintenance procedures and are con-
sidered as maintenance tasks.
The breakdown of each procedure is as follows:
-- Fault identification (procedure title)
-- 1. Possible Causes
-- 2. Job Set--up Information
-- 3. Fault Confirmation
-- 4. Fault Isolation
-- 5. Close--up.
(a) Possible Causes
This lists all the suspect items which are replaced or checked during the procedure.
The list is given to enable the collection of all items required to correct the fault and not for “shot--gun” trouble
shooting. This form of trouble shooting is not recommended.
The list does not give details of wiring to be checked. This is detailed in the procedure and only mentioned in the
list (eg: aircraft wiring).
(b) Job Set--up Information
This lists any tools, equipment and procedures required to be carried out before commencing the fault isolation
and is the same as the AMM job set--up.
(c) Fault Confirmation

Any test procedure needed to confirm that the fault is genuine is given here. This is to avoid unjustified LRU re-
movals. Confirmation tests of spurious warnings will also be covered, if applicable.
(d) Fault Isolation Procedure
The procedure gives the appropriate actions to isolate and correct the related fault symptom.

Wiring checks are given where necessary. These give values (eg. resistance), connector and pin numbers
where appropriate.
When not specified, a wiring check must include continuity and insulation test.
(e) Close--up
If it is necessary after fault confirmation or fault isolation to return the A/C to its initial configuration, a procedure
is given.
(4) Task Supporting data
Task Supporting data are given to show the system layout and interconnections with other systems.
Breakdown and Page Numbering
(1) Breakdown
The TSM is divided into chapters to provide a functional breakdown of systems in accordance with the Air
Transport Association (ATA) Specification 100.
Each chapter is sub--divided into sections which are identified by a six digit number made up of three elements:
Each standard chapter takes its 1st element number from these ATA groups:
AIRFRAME SYSTEMS (21 -- 38, 45, 49, 52)
POWER PLANT (70 -- 80)
The chapters are separated by tab dividers to ease location of information.
Effectivity Statements
(1) Effectivity in text
In the case of effectivity differences within the text, a statement of effectivity indicates the effectivity of the fol-
lowing text.
Example : ** ON A/C 001--003
(2) Effectivities of Service Bulletins
Service Bulletins are incorporated automatically in the TSM if at least one aircraft is potentially applicable and
quoted in the Service Bulletin.
Example : ** ON A/C ALL

Post SB 29--1XXX For A/C 001--005
The above statement indicates that the information is potentially valid for ALL A/C. For A/C 001--005 the infor-
mation is only valid after accomplishment of the SB. For A/C 006 and up the information is valid as the modifica-
tion/SB was embodied before delivery.

Figure 68 TSM Organization and Content Paper/PDF Layout

Revision Service
The TSM is customized and subject to:
-- Normal revisions
-- Temporary Revisions (TR)
-- Customer Originated Changes (COC).
These are managed as follows:
(1) Normal revisions
Normal revisions consist of an issue of differential data at the specified revision date. Highlights are provided by
electronic link.
The Highlights provide the reasons for the revision in each chapter (modification/SB incorporation etc.).
(2) Temporary revisions
Temporary revisions are issued to introduce information which cannot wait until the next normal revision. They
must be incorporated as stated on the TR transmittal sheet. However only the temporary revisions deleted by
the highlights of a normal revision must be removed.
IMPORTANT:
-- Do not remove a temporary revision unless instructed to do so by:
(1) the highlights of a normal revision or
(2) a new temporary revision superseding the previous one.
-- Update the Record of the TRs page accordingly.
-- The normal revisions are accompanied by a list giving the temporary revisions which have been incorporated
and the temporary revisions which still remain effective.
(3) Revision symbols
The revised text is highlighted in Yellow.
(4) Customer Originated Changes (COCs)
(a) COC Identification
COCs incorporated into the TSM at Customer request to reflect data or procedures originated by and peculiar to
that specific customer, will be permanently identified by the COC reference number.
(b) Responsibility
Where the Customer requests Airbus to incorporate the Customer’s originated data or that of any other party
into the technical data issued by Airbus (”Technical Data”) relating to the operation, maintenance, overhaul, re-
pair or modification of the aircraft, Airbus shall do so on the condition that the use of the COC data shall be en-
tirely at the Customer’s risk, Airbus being under no liability whatsoever in respect of either the contents of any
COC data, or the effect which the incorporation of such COC data may have on the Technical Data issued by
Airbus.
Requests for TSM Revision and Correspondence
(1) An RFI/RFR (Request For Information/Request For Revision) form is provided for communication between
Customers/Operators and AIRBUS. It is requested that this form be used for any questions concerning the
TSM.
(2) All communications concerning the TSM should be sent to:
AIRBUS S.A.S.
Technical Data Support and Services
1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte

31707 Blagnac Cedex
France

Text Breakdown (AMTOSS) and Configurations

The fault isolation procedures can generally be considered as corrective maintenance tasks. Therefore, AM-
TOSS (Aircraft Maintenance Task Oriented Support System) has been applied to the TSM for the functional ar-
rangement of the data. This also has the advantage of consistency with the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manu-
al). Consequently, the fault isolation procedures are broken down into AMTOSS tasks and subtasks. However,
only the Task numbers are printed in the TSM and the subtask numbers are omitted. A brief description of the
structure of Task numbers follows, for further information please refer to the AMM introduction.
Task Elements/ TASK XX--XX--XX--XXX--XXX--XXX--XXX

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(1 to 3) ATA six digit number

(4) This three digit numeric function code is used to indicate the
particular function involved. For the TSM this is always 810.
(5) This three digit numeral enables a unique identification task
number to be allocated for all Tasks which are identically
numbered throughout the preceding elements.
S Task idents begin at 801 and raise, in sequence, to 999 (maximum) within the P. Block.
S llustrations and tables are considered as tasks.
(6) This three digit alphanumeric indicator consists of:
S First digit alpha to indicate a different configuration (modification, service bulletin(s), etc.).
S Second and third digit numerals to indicate alternative methods/techniques of trouble shooting
S Configurations due to different modification standard, Service Bulletin (SB) incorporation, etc.:
S Configurations due to different methods/techniques for trouble shooting
(7) A three digit alphanumeric indicator can be assigned by the airline to highlight unique airline
data.
Warnings, Cautions and Notes
WARNING : CALLS ATTENTION TO USE OF MATERIAL, PROCESSES, METHODS, PROCEDURES OR
LIMITS WHICH MUST BE FOLLOWED PRECISELY TO AVOID INJURY OR DEATH TO PERSONS.
CAUTION: CALLS ATTENTION TO METHODS AND PROCEDURES WHICH MUST BE FOLLOWED TO
AVOID DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT.
NOTE: CALLS ATTENTION TO METHODS WHICH MAKE THE JOB EASIER OR PROVIDE SUPPLE-
MENTARY OR EXPLANATORY INFORMATION.
Functional Item Numbers (FIN)
The equipment on the A/C is identified by a unique identifier called a Functional Item Number (FIN). The basic
element of the FIN is a two letter code indicating to which system/circuit the equipment belongs. To this code are
added prefixes and/or suffixes which provide the unique identification for individual items of equipment.
For electrical equipment (any component with an electrical connection) the FIN is of the form 2CA1 where:
-- 2 = Second component in circuit CA
-- CA = Circuit two letter code

-- 1 = Suffix -- First of several similar systems (System 1)
NOTE: SEVERAL IDENTICAL COMPONENTS WHICH PERFORM THE SAME FUNCTION IN THE SAME
CIRCUIT CAN BE DIFFERENTIATED BY THE SUFFIX NUMBER. THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT
AN EVEN SUFFIX IDENTIFIES A COMPONENT ON THE RIGHT HAND SIDE AND AN ODD SUF-
FIX IDENTIFIES A COMPONENT ON THE LEFT HAND SIDE.
For mechanical equipment the FIN is similar to the electrical FIN.

The FIN sequence number serves to differentiate between mechanical and electrical equipment. Sequence
numbers below 5000 are reserved for electrical FINs and 5000 and above are reserved for mechanical FINs.
Figure 69 TSM Organization and Content Electronis Layout



TSM PHILOSOPHY AND USE
TROUBLESHOOTING MANUAL PHILOSOPHY AND USE


PHILOSOPHY AND USE

The Maintenance concept is based on the use of CFDS and TSM.
NOTE: THE AIRCRAFT IS EQUIPPED WITH A HIGH NUMBER OF DIGITAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT. IN
MOST OF THE CASES, COMPUTERS MAY BE RECOVERED AFTER AN ABNORMAL BEHA-
VIOUR OR A DETECTED FAULT, EITHER BY A SOFTWARE RESET (RESET OF MICROPROCES-
SOR) OR BY INTERRUPTING THE POWER SUPPLY OF ITS PROCESSING PARTS FOR A
SHORT TIME. THIS IS ACHIEVED WITH THE NORMAL COCKPIT CONTROLS (ENGAGEMENT
LEVERS, PUSHBUTTON SWITCHES) BY SELECTING THE RELATED CONTROL OFF THEN ON
OR BY ACTION ON THE CORRESPONDING CIRCUIT BREAKER.
A. Philosophy
(1) TSM
The TSM provides coverage of all probable aircraft faults. This includes being a trouble shooting guide to faults
monitored and displayed by the aircraft systems. Faults not monitored by the aircraft systems are also covered.
(2) CFDS
The objective of the CFDS is to provide an economic, efficient and easy--to--use means of maintaining the air-
craft systems. To do this the CFDS directly monitors and identifies faulty Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) in the
aircraft systems and displays items identified as faulty to the maintenance crew. This is essentially achieved by
analysis of all cockpit events which are triggered by the monitoring of the aircraft systems.
The CFDS also takes into account a major objective of the line maintenance which is to avoid unjustified remov-
als of equipment. For these reasons the CFDS makes a detailed analysis to identify the responsible LRUs; this
is also to confirm that the event was actually due to a hardware failure and not an intermittent fault.
To achieve its purpose, the CFDS has several major functions which supply:
-- A maintenance Post Flight Report (PFR) which is printed at the end of each flight. The PFR allows associa-
tion of ECAM warnings and CFDS maintenance messages.
-- Directly usable maintenance messages which identify faulty LRUs.
-- User--friendly access to tests of the aircraft systems.
B. How to Use the TSM
(1) Types of faults
In the TSM, there are two basic types of faults : monitored faults and non--monitored faults.
Monitored faults are those which are monitored and displayed by the aircraft systems (mainly ECAM and
CFDS).
Non--monitored faults are generally not displayed by the aircraft systems and can be of a general nature, such
as: “Nose landing gear doors slow to move”.
Within each of these general divisions faults are divided according to the type of system and display:
(a) Monitored faults:
-- ECAM
-- EFIS
-- local
-- CFDS
(b) Non--monitored faults
-- Crew and/or maintenance observations.

NOTE: All these types of fault are used as entry points into the TSM under the titles given above.
(2) Trouble Shooting Function
Trouble shooting function is initiated by a flight crew or maintenance crew report of a fault. The fault can then be
used as an entry point into the TSM; Fault Symptoms, Warnings/Malfunctions, or CFDS Fault Message, de-
pending on the type of fault. The troubleshooter is directed to the procedure to isolate the fault.

Three types of monitored faults (ECAM, EFIS and local) reported by the flight crew are usually associated with
CFDS fault messages. For these the first two digits of the ATA reference given on the PFR are used to enter
directly into the appropriate fault symptoms .
CFDS fault messages are not normally reported by the flight crew and are used by maintenance crews. They
can be displayed alone without an associated warning or malfunction, in which case they may be the entry point
for maintenance-- related trouble shooting. TSM entry is via the appropriate TSM fault symptoms using the ATA
reference, or the CFDS Fault Messages using the message text.
Crew or maintenance observations are usually a single fault without an associated CFDS fault message. TSM
entry is via the appropriate TSM chapter fault symptoms if the system (ATA reference) is known, or the Warn-
ings/Malfunctions using the fault text.
Examples of trouble shooting for these faults are given in the following trouble shooting examples.
C. Trouble Shooting of Faults Reported on the PFR
The following general procedure describes trouble shooting of Upper ECAM DU warnings, ECAM STS (Status)
Maintenance messages or CFDS fault messages given on the PFR.
(1) Compare the ECAM warning or ECAM STS message with the CFDS fault message (if applicable) on the
PFR to obtain the fault symptom and the ATA chapter reference.
NOTE: A time difference of 1--3 minutes between the fault message and the warning message may occur due to
CFDIU internal behaviour.
(2) Use the Trouble Shooting function to retrieve the fault symptom, correlate the CFDS message and retrieve
the associated fault isolation procedure.
NOTE: For further fault isolation use the source (SOURCE column) and/or CFDS fault message identifiers (ID-
ENT block). Due to the number of possible identifier, the fault message identifier in the TSM must be the same
as on the PFR.
D. Trouble Shooting of Faults not Reported on the PFR
The following general procedure describes trouble shooting of Inop System messages, Lower ECAM DU flags/
advisories, local warnings and crew or maintenance observations.
(1) Use the Trouble Shooting function to retrieve the fault symptom and correlate the CFDS message.
NOTE: For further fault isolation use the source (SOURCE column) and/or CFDS fault message identifiers (ID-
ENT block).
(2) The fault isolation procedure is displayed after identification of the relevant fault symptom.
E. Trouble Shooting of CFDS Fault Messages

The following general procedure describes trouble shooting of CFDS Fault Messages including class 3 mes-
sages. Class 3 Fault Messages are shown on the SYSTEM/REPORT TEST CLASS 3 FAULT pages.
(1) Note the CFDS fault message ATA chapter reference.
Use the trouble shooting function to retrieve the CFDS message. The fault isolation procedure is displayed when
the CFDS message is identified.
F. Trouble Shooting Tips
(1) Fault symptoms
For clarity, only the primary fault is given in the TSM to avoid confusion with the associated faults.
The list of faults in the Fault Symptoms is customized by airline. This means that one fault symptom is effective
for at least one aircraft in the fleet.
(a) APU Fault Symptom Peculiarities

Whenever the operation of the APU may result in damage to the aircraft, or to the APU or the Electronic Control
Box (ECB) of the APU, the ECB shuts down the APU automatically. The cause of the shutdown and the associ-
ated LRUs are stored in the ECB memory. This information is available on the APU SHUTDOWNS menu page
of the CFDS.
i.e. NO FLAME (shutdown cause)

IGNITION EXCITER P12 (faulty LRU)

In parallel, the ECB generates a maintenance message with associated ATAChapter and related Fault Class of
the faulty LRU. This maintenance message isavailable on the Post Flight Report (PFR), which is, in the AIRBUS
TSMphilosophy, the entry point to the TSM.
i.e. ATA 494138
CLASS: 1
IGNITION EXCITER P12
However, during several operator conferences concerning the APU, it has beenshown that most operators pre-
fer to enter the TSM via the information of theAPU SHUTDOWNS menu, which shows the same faulty LRU as
the PFR but additionallythe shutdown reason.
It has been decided to follow the operators preference and to combine the PFR maintenance message with the
Shutdown cause in one Fault Symptom.
i.e. Source Message ATA Class
ECB NO FLAME ASD *
associated with
ECB IGNITION EXCITER P12 494138 1
(2) Fault isolation procedures
(a) Possible Causes
This lists all the suspect items in the fault isolation procedure to allow assembly of all items required to fix the
fault. It is not provided for “shotgun” trouble shooting.
(b) Fault confirmation
1 Permanent fault
The fault is confirmed on the ground by performing the test given in the fault confirmation paragraph. Conse-
quently, the procedure must be applied to troubleshoot the A/C.
2 Intermittent fault
(INTM) is added to the message when an intermittent operation of the system is detected.
Example of message :
NO BSCU DATA (INTM)
The fault is not confirmed on the ground by performing the test given in the fault confirmation paragraph. Faults
are sometimes generated by electrical transients or similar events without the aircraft system being faulty. If the
confirmation test result is ”TEST OK” or equivalent, no further action is required (unless specified in the fault
isolation procedure), and the aircraft may be dispatched.
It is recalled that the TSM has been designed to isolate/troubleshoot hard faults. However depending on the air-
lines organization, the following can be applied ”to trap” intermittent faults:
-- if the test result is ”TEST OK” (fault not confirmed), dispatch the aircraft, then monitor the reported symptom
on the following flights by checking:
* the previous leg reports
* the PFR/Previous PFRs (if available)
* the log book of the previous flights.
After three occurrences of the same phenomenon (even though the test is still OK), the other steps of the TSM
procedure must be followed and the LRU involved must be removed.
In this case, as for all LRUs removed from the aircraft, AIRBUS recommend providing shop people or suppliers
with data related to the removal: PFR, test result, trouble shooting data (if available).
-- if test NOT OK (fault confirmed), apply the trouble shooting procedure.
(c) Fault isolation procedure
1 Do not replace (swap) LRUs as a trouble shooting step unless the TSM tells you to do so.
After carrying out the fault isolation in accordance with the TSM, to prevent a NO GO situation in the dispatch of
the aircraft when no spare is available, swapping of LRUs is permissible in accordance with operator policy.

CAUTION : IF YOU SWAP LRUs :

-- MAKE ONE SWAP AT A TIME
-- DO NOT SUPPLY THE SUSPECT LRU WITH ELECTRICAL POWER WHEN INSTALLED IN
ITS NEW POSITION
-- FREQUENT DISCONNECTIONS AND CONNECTIONS CAN INCREASE THE RISK OF DAM-
AGE TO PLUGS AND RECEPTACLES.
CAUTION : WHEN DOING FAULT ISOLATION ON ETOPS IMPORTANT SYSTEMS, IN AC-
CORDANCE WITH THE TSM, IT MAY REQUIRE THE SWAPPING OF LRUs. THE OPERATOR’S APPROVED
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES MUST BE FOLLOWED TO KEEP THE ETOPS STATUS OF THE AIRCRAFT.
2 The TSM does not give the action to be taken if a suspect unit removed from the aircraft during trouble shoot-
ing is found to be serviceable rather than failed. This is due to differing replacement policies of airlines on such
units (re--install, or send to the workshop). If such a situation occurs, airline internal replacement policy shall be
applied.
3 Continuity and isolation checks of LRUs and wiring performed on the equipment rack ARINC 600 connectors,
should only be done with the use of a breakout box and test cables or equivalent.
4 After a fault isolation procedure action has been completed, a check must be done to make sure that the re-
ported fault has been corrected.
5 When an AMM LRU replacement procedure is referenced in the TSM, the AMM procedure usually specifies a
test. This AMM test is to make sure that the replacement unit is installed correctly. It does not always confirm
the correction of the fault symptom. In such a case the TSM refers to the appropriate operational or system test
procedure.
6 Warnings about static sensitive devices may have to be used to prevent damage to sensitive devices.
7 On the ground, a tripped circuit breaker must not be engaged without trouble shooting of the associated sys-
tem.

Figure 70 Maintenance Concept Troubleshooting Decision Tree

Trouble Shooting Summary

The various possibilities for using the TSM are summarized in the flow chart in the following figure.
Figure 71 Troubleshooting Flow



MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST
MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST (MEL)


GENERAL
A “R” in the margin indicates a change, addition or deletion in the adjacent text for the current revision of that
page only. The “R” is dropped at the next revision of that page.
Column 1: ITEM
It list the equipment, components, system or functions, for wich dispatch condition apply.
System numbers are based on Air Transport Association (ATA) specification number 100.
NOTE: ONE SINGLE COMPUTER MAY INCLUDE SEVERAL FUNCTIONS. THE CORRESPONDING MEL
ENTRY EITHER THE COMPUTER ITSELFT IF FULLY INOPERATIVE OR EACH FUNCTION SEPA-
RATELY. IF SEVERAL FUNCTIONS ARE INOPERATIVE, REFERENCE MUST BE MADE TO EACH
ONE.
Column 2: “Rectification Interval”
It Indicates, for a given item, the rectification interval category. The category of each item is determined accord-
ing to the requirements specified below:
Category A
No standard interval is specified, however, items in this category shall be rectified in accordance with the condi-
tions stated in the Remarks column (5) of the MEL.
Where a time period is specified it shall start at 00:01 on the calendar day following the day of discovery.
Category B
Items in this category shall be rectified within three (3) consecutive calendar days, excluding the day of discov-
ery.
For example, if it were recorded at 10 am, on January 26th, The three day interval would begin at midnight the
26th and end at midnight the 29th.
Catergory C
Items in this category shall be rectified within ten (10) consecutive calendar days, excluding the day of discov-
ery.
For example, if it were recorded at 10a.m. on January 26th, the 10 day interval would begin at midnight the 26th
and end at midnight February 5th.
Category D
Items in this category shall be rectified within one hundred and twenty (120) consecuilve calendar days, exclud-
ing the day of discovery.
Rectification Interval Extension
S Subject to the approval of the aeronautical authority. The operator may request the extension of the applica-
ble Rectification Intervals B, C, and D, provided:
S A description of specific duties and responsabilities for controlling each extension is established by the opera-
tor and accepted by the aeronautical authority and,
S The operator only grants a one time extension of the applicable Rectification Intorval and,
S Rectification is accomplished at the earliest opportunity.
Column 3: “Number Installed”
It indicates, for a given item, the quantity of equipment, components systems or functions, installed on the air-
plane.
This quantity reflects the airplane type certificated configuration and, therefore required for all flight conditions,
unless otherwise indicated in column 4 in conjunction wfth exceptions or remarks listed in column 5, it neces-
sary.
“Dash” symbol indicates that a variable quantity is installed.
No indication (blank indication) is associated with the wording “as required by regulations” in column 5 (if any).

Column 4: “Number Required For DIspatch”

It indicates, for a given item, the minimum quantity of equipment, components, systems or functions which must
be operative for dispatch, under the conditions listed in column 5 (if any).
“Dash” symbol indicates that a variable quantity is required for dispatch.
Column 5: “Remarks Or Exceptions”
S Asterisk (*) requires inoperative equipment, component, system or function to be placarded in the cockpit to
inform crewmembers of the equipment condition. Unless otherwise specified herein, placard wording and
location will be determined by the operator.
S Double asterisk (**) shows items affected for CAT Il/Ill operations(refer to Appendix Cat Il/Ill at the end of
this Manual or QRH)
(o) Symbol identifies a crew operational procedure. This procedures are defined in APPENDIX A corresponding
to Operational Procedures, (m) Symbol indicates a requirement for a specific maintenance procedure which
must be accomplished when operating with the listed item inoperative. If no periodicity is defined in the Remarks
column of the MEL, maintenance action is a one time action to be accomplished before the first flight under rele-
vant MEL item (e.g, a deactivation procedure). Otherwise, this is a repetitive action. In this case, periodicity of
the maintenance procedure is defined in the Remarks column of the relevant MEL item. The Maintenance Pro-
cedure (m) are defined in APPENDIX B corresponding to Maintenace Procedures.
NOTE: WHEN A PERIODICITY IS DEFINED, MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE MUST BE APPLIED BEFORE
THE FIRST FLIGHT UNDER THE RELEVANT MEL ITEM AND MUST BE REPEATED AT THE DE-
FINED INTERVAL.
Normally these procedures are accomplished by maintenance personnel. Procedures requiring specialized
knowledge or skill, or requiring the use of tools or test equipment should be accomplished by maintenance per-
sonnel.
The satisfactory accomplishment of all maintenance procedures, is the responsibility of the operator.
NOTE: TO PERFORM DEACTIVATION PROCEDURES USE AS A REFERENCE MEL VOLUME 2, CHAP-
TER 03, OR AIRPLANE MAINTENANCE MANUAL AS THE PREFERRED DOCUMENT.
NOTE: BOTH SYMBOLS (O) AND (M) USED SINGULARLY, OR IN COMBINATION, REQUIRE THE AP-
PROPRIATE PROCEDURES TO BE ESTABLISHED, PUBLISHED, AND COMPILED WITH, IF
FLIGHT IS ACCOMPLLSHED WITH ONE ITEM INOPERATIVE.
Different possibilities may be considered for an item. They will be identified by a), b), c)...
Within one possibility, different conditions may be required.
They wilt be identified by 1), 2), 3)...
References given in column 5 can either be provided:
S To indicate that an item of equipment has to be considered inoperative as a result of the failure item listed in
column 1, or
S To indicate that another document has to be consulted (e.g. Refer to FCOM), or
S To indicate that another ATA chapter of the MEL has to be consulted to determine applicable item (e.g. item
22--61--01 refers to 27--23).
These references are intended to assist with compliance, but do not relieve the operator of responsibility for de-
termining such interrelationships, as stated in the preamble.
“Note” in column 5 indicates additional information and references for crewmember or maintenance consider-
ation. Refer to 00--02 p 5.

Definitions
3. “inoperative” means that a listed item of equipment is unserviceable or maffunctioning to the extent that it
does not accomplish its intended purpose, or is not consistently functioning within its designed operating lim-
its or tolerances.
Some systems have been designed to be fault tolerant and are monitored by digital computers which trans-
mit fault messages to the CFDS. The presence of this category of fault messages does not mean that the
system is inoperative.
4. “Considered inoperative” means that the item of equipment listed must be treated as inoperative.
For example, MEL 36--11--05 Bleed Air Precooler indicates that associated bleed air supply system is consid-
ered inoperative and therefore MEL 36--1 1--01 Bleed Air Supply System must be applied.
Therefore, the “considered inoperative” MEL item must also be entered and the associated dispatch condi-
tions must be applied, including the respective (o) and (m) procedures if any.
In all cases the rectification interval of the initial inoperative item must be applied, even if the rectification in-
terval of the “considered inoperative” item is longer.
5. The Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS) indicates the identity of faulty system for maintenance pur-
pose and is not required for dispatch of the aircraft.
6. “VMC” (Visual Meteorological Conditions) -- Under IFR or VFR the crew must maintain Visual Meteorological
conditions,
7. “Icing Conditions” means an atmospheric environment that may cause ice to form on the airplane or power-
plant.
8. “Required cabin attendant seat” means a seat required to be occupied by a cabin attendant during critical
phases of flight. This cabin attendant is required by the regulations to be part of the cabin crew and to be
assigned to a station for the intended flight.
9. “Days” -- Some items have a time interval given in the remarks column of the MEL. Except if otherwise spe-
cified, “days” must be considered as “calendar days” excluding the calendar day the malfunction was re-
corded.
10.“Domestic Flight” -- For purposes of this manual the term “Domestic Flights” is for those flights with origin,
destination and alternate airports inside Chile.
11. An “Extended oveiwater flight” is an overwater flight that containt a point further than 30 minutes or 100 nau-
tical miles from an adequate airport, whichever is less which required life --rafts,
Preamble
Objetives
An airplane is being type certificated with all required equjments in operating conditions. If deviations from this
type certificated configuration and equipment required by the operating rules were not permitted, the aircraft
could not be flown in revenue service unless such equipment was operable.
Experience has proven that the operation of every system or component installed on the aircraft is not neces-
sary, in specific conditions and during limited period, when the remaining instruments and equipment provide an
acceptable level of safety. Therefore, certain conditional deviations trorn the original requirement are authorized
to permit continued or uninterrupted operation of the aircraft in revenue flight : they are published in the MINI-
MUM EQUIPMENT LIST (MEL) related to applicable regulations specific operations or airlines particular defini-
tions.
TO FACILITATE THE PREPARATION OF MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST FOR OPERATIONS THE MANUFAC-
TURER PROPOSES A MASTER MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST (MMEL) ACCEPTED BY JAA.
THIS MEL IS THE REGULAR BASIS ALLOWING OPERATORS TO UTILIZE THE AIRCRAFT WHEN SOME
SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS ARE INOPERATIVE, IN SPECIFIED CONDITIONS AND FOR A LIMITED PE-
RIOD OF TIME, UNDER THE CONDITION THAT AN ACCEPTABLE SAFETY LEVEL BE MAINTAINED BY
APPROPRIATE DESIGN REDUNDANCIES, PROCEDURES AND LIMITATIONS.
THE MMEL CANNOT IN ANY CASE BE USED AS A MEL, DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT RELATED
TO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, SPECIFIC OPERATIONS OR AIRLINES PARTICULAR DEFINI-
TIONS.

Principles
For the sake of brevity, the MEL does not include obviously required items such as wings, control surfaces, en-
gines, landing gear, etc... or items which do not affect the airworthiness of the aircraft such as galley equipment,
entertainment systems, passenger convenience items, etc...
THUS, ALL ITEMS WHICH ARE RELATED TO THE AIRWORTHINESS OF THE AIRCRAFT AND NOT IN-
CLUDED IN THE LIST ARE AUTOMATICALLY REQUIRED TO BE OPERATIVE FOR EACH FLIGHT.
UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED IN THE EXCEPTIONS COLUMN, the MEL does not define “where or
when” an inoperative item is to be repaired or replaced but rather indicates those instruments and items of
equipment that may be inoperative for certain flight conditions, with the intent that no revenue flight can take off
from an airport with inoperative equipment other than that specified.
The failure of instruments or items of equipment in excess of those allowed to be inoperative by the MEL causes
the aircraft to be unairworthy. The MEL makes no distinction between what is required for the flight between ori-
gin and destination (including the intermediate stops) and what is required for a flight beyond the scheduled ar-
rival point.
The MEL is intended to permit operation with inoperative items of equipment for a period of time until rectifica-
tions can be accomplished. It is important that rectification’s be accomplished at the earliest opportunity.
In order to maintain an acceptable level of safety and reliability the MEL establishes limitations on the duration of
and conditions for operation with inoperative equipment. The MEL provides for release of the aircraft for flight
with inoperative equipment.
MEL utilization implies that the aircraft is operated within the framework of a controlled and sound program of
repairs and parts replacement.
LAN AIRLINES S.A. is responsible for exercising the necessary operational control to assure that no aircraft is
dispatched or flown with one or more MEL item inoperative for an indefinite period and without first determining
that any interface or interrelationship between inoperative systems or components will not result in a degradation
in the level of safety and/or an undue increase in crew workload.
The exposure to additional failures during operation with failed inoperative systems or components must also be
considered to determine that an acceptable level of safety is being maintained.
This MEL may not deviate from requirements of the flight manual limitations section, emergency procedures, or
airworthiness directives, unless the flight manual or airworthiness directive provides otherwise.
Handling Of Maintenance Message Displayed On ECAM Status Page
At the head of each ATA chapter of this MEL, the related MAINTENANCE messages which may be displayed on
ECAM STATUS page are listed with the indication of the associated dispatch status.
A MAINTENANCE message Indicates the presence of a categoty of failure which can only be idenifiled by the
interrogation of CFDS.
Operators must implement procedures to manage MAINTENANCE messages and associated CFDS messages,
to handle faults recording and repair within the rectification interval of category C (10 days).
All MAINTENANCE messages have a rectification interval C except the following messages: DAR, DMU and
QAR which have an interval D.
Dispatch with MAINTENANCE message displayed on ECAM STATUS page is allowed without specific condi-
tions except for the following message:
-- AIR BLEED: Refer to MEL 36--00.01
It is left to the operator to define the role devoted to flight crew and/or maintenance personnel in these proce-
dures.
CAT2, CAT3 Single, CAT3 Dual Automatic Approach And Landing
-- Required equipment are listed in Fhght Manual 4.03.00 page 8, and QRH.
-- Equipment to be operative to get CAT2, CAT3 SINGLE, or CAT3 DUAL capability displayed on FMAs are also
listed in QRH.
However items affected to CAT II/III will be highlighted with two asterisks (**) in the remarks column.
Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM)

-- Minimum equipmenUtunctions required to begin RVSM operations are listed in Flight Manual 4.03.00 and
FCOM 2.04.50.
The MEL does not include these requirements, refer to Flight Manual and FCOM.
Required Navigation Performance (RNP)
--Minimum equipmenUtunctions required to begin RNP operations are listed in FM 4.03.00 and FCOM 2.04.51.
Figure 72 MEL Section 01 Example (Sheet 1)

Figure 73 MEL Section 01 Example (Sheet 2)

ECAM WARNING MEL ENTRY

Before entering in the MEL Section 01, troubleshooting actions should have already been conducted in order to
determine and confirm which equipment, component, system or tunction is noperative. The objective of the pres-
ent Section is only to help the airline identily the corresponding MEL ENTRY point when a caution/warning has
been displayed on ECAM EWD. The present Section does not substitute troubleshooting actions.
The following pages give correspondence between ECAM caution/warning messages and MEL item number.
CAUTION
1) This section is, normally, not intended to cover false cautions/warnings.
However, if a caution/warning is determined to be false by troubleshooting, the crew should refer to the con-
cerned caution/warning message item in the associated ATA chapter of section 01.
2) In order to help the crew to determine the MEL ENTRY point corresponding to a caution/warning mes-
sage, the REMARK column contains the text:
a)“Actual warning” or “Actual caution”
The associated MEL item number is the MEL ENTRY point which gives the dispatch conditions corre-
sponding to an actual failure of the syster/component monitored by the caution/warning.
b)“False warning” or “False caution”
The associated MEL item number is the MEL ENTRY point which gives the dispatch conditions corre-
sponding to the failure of the warning, determined by troubleshooting. The system/component monitored
by the caution/waning being still operative.
3)When the REMARK column contains nefther, “Actual caution/warning”, nor “false caution/warning” texts,
the MEL ENTRY point corresponds to an actual warning which indicates an actual failure of the system/com-
ponent monitored by the caution/warning.
4)When either an actual, or a false cautior/waming is acivated, this section gives the MEL ENTRY point to be
considered.
But the crew MUST CHECK THAT THE AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS/COMPONENTS ARE IN A CONDITION
WHICH COMPLIES WITH THE DISPATCH CONDITIONS.
IF NOT. AIRCRAFT DISPATCH IS NOT ALLOWED.
5) When a caution/waming is associated with the wording “Not applicable” in the Remark column, this means
that the MEL is not the appropriate document to be consulted.
When such cautions/warnings have been triggered, application of associated procedure, it any (refer to
FCOM Vol 3 Abnormal/Emergency procedures), and/or accomplishment of maintenance action, if required,
would permit to fix the problem.
Examples
1) It the “BAT FAULT” caution message is displayed on ECAM, the crew must refer to the MEL 24--30--02
(Battety channel).
2) If the “AC BUS 1 FAULT” caution message is displayed on ECAM, A/C dispatch is not allowed.
3) If the “GEN 1 OFF” caution message is displayed on ECAM no MEL entry is required, and the text “Not
applicable” is written in the Remark column.
In this example, the crew must switch on the GEN pb SW.
4) If “PACK 1+2 FAULT” caulion message is displayed the crew must refer to FCOM for “FLIGHT WITHOUT
PRESSURIZATION”.
Note: The ECAM warnings and cautions listed in section 00E in the column “ECAM WARNINGS” are gener-
ic.
*example:
ECAM WARNING DISPATCH CONDITION REMARK

FCU 1(2) (1+2) FAULT Refer to MEL 22--81--01

Wording FCU 1(2) (1+2) FAULT represents the three messages: “FCU 1 FAULT” “FCU 2 FAULT” “FCU 1+2
FAULT”
Figure 74 ECAM Warnings/MEL Entry Examples

Figure 75 ECAM Warnings/MEL Entry Examples

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
(o) Symbol identifies a crew operational procedure. This procedures are defined in APPENDIX A corresponding
to Operational Procedures
Figure 76 Operational Procedures Examples

Figure 77 Operational Procedures Examples

MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
(m) Symbol indicates a requirement for a specific maintenance procedure which must be accomplished when
operating with the listed item inoperative. If no periodicity is defined in the Remarks column of the MEL, mainte-
nance action is a one time action to be accomplished before the first flight under relevant MEL item (e.g, a deac-
tivation procedure). Otherwise, this is a repetitive action. In this case, periodicity of the maintenance procedure
is defined in the Remarks column of the relevant MEL item. The Maintenance Procedure (m) are defined in AP-
PENDIX B corresponding to Maintenace Procedures.
NOTE: WHEN A PERIODICITY IS DEFINED, MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE MUST BE APPLIED BEFORE
THE FIRST FLIGHT UNDER THE RELEVANT MEL ITEM AND MUST BE REPEATED AT THE DE-
FINED INTERVAL.
Normally these procedures are accomplished by maintenance personnel. Procedures requiring specialized
knowledge or skill, or requiring the use of tools or test equipment should be accomplished by maintenance per-
sonnel.
The satisfactory accomplishment of all maintenance procedures, is the responsibility of the operator.
Figure 78 Maintenance Procedure Example 1 (Sheet 1)




CMOS
COCKPIT MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS SIMULATOR (C.M.O.S.)


CMOS
INTRODUCTION
The Airbus A320 MTD or C.M.O.S. (Cockpit Maintenance Operations Simulator) results from the cooperation
between FAROS, AEROSPATIALE (Airbus Division) and AIRBUS INDUSTRIE.
To operate the AIRBUS A320, maintenance staff need a whole knowledge of maintenance operations which
can only be achieved by an intensive and exhaustive training to cope with the variety and complexity of situa-
tions that crew have to face while operating aircraft systems.
The C.M.O.S. consists in a sophisticated procedure simulator. It allows the performance of complex and realistic
maintenance procedures with all the functions offered by the real systems (ElS, CFDS, etc).
Improving the quality of maintenance training while reducing costs are the main purposes of the C.M.O.S..
What is the C.M.O.S. usable for?
A. Practice for NORMAL and ABNORMAL Aircraft system operation:
B. Practice of AMM procedures (optional)
C. Practice of TSM procedures
D. Improve practical skills for this new generation of Aircraft.
E. Improve initial training.
F. Initial and recurrent training at airline training base.
G. Flight phase initialization (frozen position).
H. Insertion of failures at any flight phase.
Figure 82 Cockpit Maintenance Operations Simulator (C.M.O.S.)

CMOS
CHECK LIST
The Following Pages you will find Check Lists required for a safe operation based on the procedures of the
Maintenance Manual.
WARNING: THIS MATERIAL WAS DESIGNED FOR TRAINING PURPOSE ONLY.
Figure 83 Control Safety Check List

CMOS
Figure 84 External Power Check List

CMOS
Figure 85 APU Start on Batteries

CMOS
Figure 86 APU Start with External Power

CMOS
Figure 87 Cockpit Preparation Check List

CMOS
Figure 88 Cockpit Preparation Check List (Continuation)

CMOS
Figure 89 Before Engine Start Check List

CMOS
Figure 90 Engine Automatic Start

CMOS
Figure 91 Engine Manual Start Check List

CMOS
Figure 92 After Engine Start

CMOS
Figure 93 Engine Shutdown Check List

CMOS
Figure 94 Leaving the Aircraft Check List

ELECTRICAL POWER
ATA 24 ELECTRICAL POWER


ELECTRICAL POWER
GENERAL
The electrical power system consists of a three--phase 115/200--volt 400--hertz constant--frequency AC sys-
tem and a 28--volt DC system.
Electrical transients are acceptable for equipment.
Commercial supply has secondary priority.
Normally, the system produces alternating current, some of which it then transforms into direct current for cer-
tain applications.
Each of the aircraft’s three generators can supply the whole network.
If all normal AC generation is lost, an emergency generator can supply AC power.
If all AC generation is lost, the system can transform DC power from the bafteries into AC power.

ELECTRICAL POWER
GENERATION OF ELECTRICAL POWER

AC GENERATORS
MAIN GENERATORS
Two three--phase AC generators (GEN 1, GEN 2), one driven by each main engine through an integrated drive,
supply aircraft electrical power. Each generator can supply up to 90 KVA of power at 115 and 200 volts and 400
hertz.
A third generator (APU GEN), driven directly by the APU and producing the same output as each main engine
generator, can replace either or both main engine generators at any time.
A Generator Control Unit (GCU) controls the output of each generator. The main functions of each GCU are:
-- Control the frequency and voltage of the generator output.
-- Protect the network by controlling the associated Generator Line Contactor (GLC).
EXTERNAL POWER
A ground power connector near the nose wheel allows ground power to be supplied to all bus bars.
A Ground Power Control unit (GPCU) protects the network by controlling the external power contactor.
EMERGENCY GENERATOR
The blue hydraulic circuit drives an emergency generator that automatically supplies emergency AC power to
the aircraft electrical system if all three main generators fail. This generator supplies 5 KVA of three--phase
115/200--volt 400--hertz power.
A Generator Control Unit (GCU)
-- keeps the emergency generator at a constant speed
-- controls the generator’s output voltage
-- protects the network by controlling the emergency generator line contactor
-- controls the emergency generator start--up
STATIC INVERTER
A static inverter transforms DC power from Battery 1 into one KVA of single--phase 115--volt 400--hertz AC pow-
er, which is then supplied to part of the AC essential bus. When the aircraft speed is above 50 knots, the inverter
is automatically activated, if nothing but the batteries are supplying electrical power to the aircraft, regardless of
the BAT 1 and BAT 2 pushbutton positions.
When the aircraft speed is below 50 knots, the inverter is activated, if nothing but the batteries are supplying
electrical power to the aircraft, and the BAT 1 and BAT 2 pushbuttons are both on at auto.
DC GENERATION
TRANSFORMER RECTIFIERS (TRs)
Two main transformer rectifiers, TR 1 and TR 2, supply the aircraft’s electrical system, with up to 200 amperes
of DC current.
A third (identical) transformer rectifier, the ESS TR, can power the essential DC circuit from the emergency gen-
erator, if the engine and APU generators all fail, or if TR 1 or TR 2 fails.
Each TR controls its contactor by internal logic.
BATTERIES
Two main batteries, each with a normal capacity of 23 ampere--hours, are permanently connected to the two hot
buses.
Each battery has an associated Battery Charge Limiter (BCL).
The BCL monitors battery charging and controls its battery contactor.

ELECTRICAL POWER
CIRCUIT BREAKERS (C/Bs)

The aircraft has two types of C/Bs
-- Monitored (green) : When out for more than one minute, the C/B TRIPPED warning is triggered on the ECAM.
-- Non--monitored (black).
The Wing Tip Brakes (WTB) C/Bs have red caps on them to prevent them from being reset.
The C/B TRIPPED warning on the ECAM indicates the location of the affected C/B. The following panels are
monitored : OVHD PNL, L(R) ELEC BAY, REAR PNL J--M or N--R or S--V or W--Z.
NOTE: THE C/B TRIPPED, CAUTION MAY BE CLEARED FROM THE ECAM BY PRESSING THE CLR OR
THE EMER CANCEL PUSHBUTTON. IF THE EMER CANCEL IS USED, AND IF A SECOND C/B IS
TRIPPED ON THE SAME PANEL, THE CORRESPONDING C/B TRIPPED CAUTION WILL NOT BE
TRIGGERED.

ELECTRICAL POWER
OPERATIONS
GENERAL
GEN 1 and 2 when operating have priority over the APU generator and over external power.
External power has priority over the APU generator when the EXT PWR pushbutton switch is ON.
The APU generator or external power can supply the entire network.
One engine generator can supply the entire network.
The generators cannot be connected in parallel.
NORMAL CONFIGURATION
IN FLIGHT
Each engine--driven generator supplies its associated AC BUS (1 and 2) via its generator line contactor (GLC 1
and GLC 2).
AC BUS 1 normally supplies the AC ESS BUS via a contactor.
TR 1 normally supplies DC BUS 1, DC BAT BUS, and DC ESS BUS.
TR 2 normally supplies DC BUS 2.
The two batteries are connected to the DC BAT BUS if they need charging. When they are fully charged the bat-
tery charge limiter disconnects them.

ELECTRICAL POWER
ON GROUND
Either the APU generator or external power may supply the complete system

ELECTRICAL POWER
On ground, when only ground services are required, external power can supply the AC and DC GND/FLT
BUSES directly without supplying the entire aircraft network.
Personnel select this configuration with the MAINT BUS switch in the forward entrance area.

ELECTRICAL POWER
ABNORMAL CONFIGURATIONS
FAILURE OF ONE ENGINE GENERATOR
The system automatically replaces the failed generator with:
-- the APU GEN if available, or
-- the other engine generator (automatically shedding part of the galley load).

ELECTRICAL POWER
FAILURE OF AC BUS 1
-- The AC BUS 2 can supply the AC ESS BUS and the ESS TR can supply the DC ESS BUS, both through the
AC ESS FEED pushbutton switch.
-- The DC BUS 2 supplies the DC BUS 1 and DC BAT BUS automatically after 5 seconds.

ELECTRICAL POWER
FAILURE OF ONE TR
The contactor of each TR opens automatically in case of:
-- overheat
-- minimum current
The other TR automatically replaces the fautly one.
The ESS TR supplies the DC ESS BUS.

ELECTRICAL POWER
FAILURE OF TR 1 AND TR 2
If TR 1 and TR 2 are lost DC BUS 1, DC BUS 2, and DC BAT BUS are lost. The DC ESS BUS is supplied by
the ESS TR.

ELECTRICAL POWER
EMERGENCY GENERATION AFTER LOSS OF ALL MAIN GENERATORS

If both the AC BUS 1 and AC BUS 2 buses are lost and the aircraft speed is above 100 knots, the Ram--Air Tur-
bine (RAT) extends automatically. This powers the blue hydraulic system, which drives the emergency generator
by means of a hydraulic motor. This generator supplies the AC ESS BUS, and the DC ESS BUS via the ESS
TR.
If the RAT stalls or if the aircraft is on the ground with speed below 100 knots, the emergency generator has
nothing to drive it. The emergency generation network transfers automatically to the batteries and static inverter,
and the system automatically sheds the AC SHED ESS and DC SHED ESS buses.
When the aircraft is on the ground
-- Below 100 knots the DC BAT BUS is automatically connected to the batteries.
-- Below 50 knots the AC ESS BUS is automatically shed, leading to the loss of all CRTs.
NOTE: DURING RAT EXTENSION AND EMERGENCY GENERATOR COUPLING (ABOUT S SECONDS),
THE BATTERIES POWER THE EMERGENCY GENERATION NETWORK.
EMER GEN RUNNING

ELECTRICAL POWER

ELECTRICAL POWER

ELECTRICAL POWER

ELECTRICAL POWER
SMOKE CONFIGURATION
In this configuration the main bus bars are shedded. The electrical distribution is the same as it is in the emer-
gency configuration (loss of main generators), except that the fuel pumps are connected upstream of the GEN 1
line connector.
The procedure sheds about 75 % of electrical equipment. All equipment that remains powered is supplied
through C/Bs on the overhead panel (except for that which is supplied by hot buses).

ELECTRICAL POWER

ELECTRICAL POWER

ELECTRICAL POWER
CONTROLS AND INDICATIONS

OVERHEAD PANEL
10 1 2
8 6 7
5 9 4 3
1 BAT 1 (2) ind.

Shows battery voltage in white
2 BAT 1 (2) pb SW
Controls the operation of the corresponding battery charge limiter.
Auto : The battery charge limiter controls automatically the connection and the disconnection of the
corresponding battery to the DC BAT BUS (3 PP) by closing and opening of the battery line contactor.
-- The batteries are connected to the DC BAT BUS in the following cases:
S APU starting (MASTER SW at ON and N < 95%).
NOTE: THE CONNECTION IS LIMITED TO 3 MINUTES WHEN THE EMERGENCY GENERATOR
IS RUNNING.
S Battery voltage below 26.5 V (battery charge). The charging cycle ends when battery charge current
goes below 4 amperes.
-- on ground, immediately
-- in flight, after a time delay of 30 minutes.
--Loss of AC BUS 1 and 2 when below 100 knots (EMER GEN not supplying).
-- If AC BUS 1 and 2 are not energized and emergency generator is not supplying
S battery 1 supplies the AC STAT INV BUS, and, if speed is greater than 50 kt, the AC ESS BUS.
S battery 2 supplies the DC ESS BUS.
NOTE: IN NORMAL CONFIGURATION THE BATTERIES ARE DISCONNECTED MOST OF THE
TIME.

ELECTRICAL POWER
NOTE: A BATTERY AUTOMATIC CUT--OFF LOGIC PREVENTS THE BATTERIES FROM DIS-
CHARGING COMPLETELY WHEN THE AIRCRAFT IS ON THE GROUND (PARKING).
Automatic battery contactors open when
S The aircraft is on the ground.
S The BAT pushbutton switches are at AUTO.
S The main power supply (EXT PWR + GEN) is cut off
S Battery voltage is low.
The flight crew can reset the contactors by switching the BAT pushbutton switch to OFF then to AUTO.
OFF: The battery charge limiter is not operating : the battery line contactor is open.
OFF comes on white if the DC BAT BUS is supplied. Hot buses remain supplied.
FAULT It : Comes on amber, accompanied by an ECAM caution, when the charging current for the correspond--
ing battery is outside limits.
In this case the battery contactor opens.
3 IDG 1 (2) (Integrated Drive Generator) pb SW (guarded)

CAUTION: 1. HOLDING THIS PUSBUTTON SWITCH IN FOR MORE THAN ABOUT 3 SECONDS MAY
DAMAGE THE DISCONNECTION MECHANISM.
2. DO NOT DISCONNECT THE IDG WHEN THE ENGINE IS NOT RUNNING (OR NOT WIND-
MILLING), BECAUSE STARTING THE ENGINE AFTER HAVING DONE SO WILL DAMAGE
THE IDG.
The lDG switches are normally springloaded out.
Pressing this switch disconnects the IDG from its driveshaft : only maintenance personnel can reconnect it.
FAULT It : Lights up amber, and ECAM caution comes on, if
-- IDG oil outlet overheats (above 185 C degrees), or
-- IDG oil pressure is low (inhibited at low engine speed : N2 below 14 %) It extinguishes when the IDG
is disconnected.
4 GEN 1 (2) pb sw
ON: The generator field is energized and the line contactor closes if electrical parameters are normal.
OFF: The generator field is de--energized and the line contactors opens.
The fault circuit is reset.
FAULT It : Lights up amber, and an ECAM caution comes on, if:
-- The associated generator control unit (GGU) trips it.
NOTE: IF A DIFFERENTIAL FAULT TRIPS THE PROTECTION, RESET ACTION HAS NO EFFECT
AFTER TWO ATTEMPTS.
-- Opening of the line contactor (except if the GEN pushbutton switch is selected OFF)
5 APU GEN pb sw
ON : The APU generator field is energized and the line contactor closes if parameters are normal and the
EXT PWR line contactor is open.
The bus tie contactor 1 (2) closes automatically if GEN 1 (2) is not operating.
OFF : The generator field is de--energized and the line contactor opens. The fault circuit is reset.
FAULT It : Same as GEN 1 or 2 FAULT
The APU GEN FAULT light is inhibited when APU speed is too low or if the APU GEN line contactor opens
after EXT PWR or ENG GEN takes over.

ELECTRICAL POWER
6 BUS TIE pb sw
AUTO : The bus tie contators (BTCs) open or close automatically in order to maintain power supply to both AC
BUS 1 and AC BUS 2.
-- One contactor is closed When
* One engine generator supplies the associated AC BUS, and
* The APU generator or external power supplies the other side.
-- Both contactors are closed during single--engine operation, or operation on the APU generator or exter-
nal power supply.
OFF : Both bus tie contactors open.
7 AC ESS FEED pb sw
The AC ESS BUS is normally supplied from AC BUS 1
It may be supplied by AC BUS 2 through the AC ESS FEED pushbutton switch.
NORMAL: The AC ESS BUS is supplied from AC BUS 1.
ALTN: The AC ESS BUS is supplied from AC BUS 2.
FAULT It : Comes on amber, and ECAM caution comes on, When the AC ESS BUS is not electrically supplied.
NOTE: IN CASE OF TOTAL LOSS OF MAIN GENERATORS, THE AC ESS BUS IS AUTOMATICALLY
SUPPLIED BY THE EMERGENCY GENERATOR, OR BY THE STATIC INVERTER IF THE
EMERGENCY GENERATOR IS NOT AVAILABLE.
8 GALY & CAB pb sw

AUTO : Main galley, secondary galley and in--seat power supply 41 are supplied.
The main galley and in--seat power supply 41 are shed automatically when
-- In flight : only one generator is operating.
-- On the ground : only one engine generator is operating. (All galleys are available when the APU
GEN or EXT PWR is supplying power.) The main galley, secondary galley and in--seat power supply
41 are not supplied.
FAULT It : Comes on amber, and ECAM caution comes on, when the load on any generator is more than 100 %
of rated output.
9 EXT PWR pb (momentary action)

AVAIL light comes on green if:
-- external power is plugged in, and
-- external power parameters are normal.
Pressed momentarily:
-- If the AVAIL light was on:
The external power line contactor closes.
The AVAIL light goes off.
The ON light comes on blue.
-- lf the ON light was on:
The external power line contactor opens.

The ON light goes off.
The AVAIL light comes on.
NOTE: 1. EXTERNAL POWER HAS PRIORITY OVER THE APU GENERATOR. THE ENGINE GENERA-
TORS HAVE PRIORITY OVER EXTERNAL POWER.
2. THE ON LIGHT STAYS ON EVEN WHEN THE ENGINE GENERATORS SUPPLY THE AIR-
CRAFT

ELECTRICAL POWER
10 COMMERCIAL pb sw
ON : All aircraft commercial electrical loads are supplied
-- cabin and cargo lights
-- Water and toilet system
-- drain mast ice protection
-- galley
-- passengers’ entertainment
-- semi--automatic cargo loading (if installed)
OFF : Switches off all aircraft commercial electrical loads.

ELECTRICAL POWER
3 4 1
1 MAN ON ph (guarded)
AUTO : When the following conditions are met
* AC BUS 1 is not electrically supplied.
AC BUS 2 is not electrically supplied.
Aircraft speed is greater than 100 knots.
-- The RAT extends.
-- The blue hydraulic system drives the emergency generator.
-- As soon as the emergency generator electrical parameters are within tolerance and the landing gear is
retracted, the emergency generator is connected to the aircraft network.
Pressed : This selects manual RAT extension.
Emergency generator coupling occurs 3 seconds after the RAT supplies the emergency generator.
2 FAULT It
This light comes on red if the emergency generator is not supplying power when
-- AC BUS 1 and AC BUS 2 are not powered and,
-- Nose landing gear is up.
3 EMER GEN TEST pb (guarded)

Pressed and held
If AC NORMAL BUSES are supplied
-- The EMER GEN is driven hydraulically if the blue electric pump is running.
The AC ESS BUS and the DC ESS BUS are connected to the emergency generator.
(The DC ESS SHED and AC ESS SHED buses are not powered.)
-- ECAM displays the ELEC page automatically (only on the ground).
If only the batteries supply the aircraft
-- The static inverter powers the AC ESS BUS.
4 GEN 1 LINE pb sw
GEN 1 line contactor opens.
The AC BUS 1 channel is supplied from GEN 2 through bus tie contactors. This is used for smoked drill.
SMOKE It : (Refer to ATA 26)

ELECTRICAL POWER
EXTERNAL POWER PANEL
1 EXT PWR NOT IN USE

This white light comes on to inform ground personnel that the ground power unit is not supplying the aircraft net-
work and can be removed.
2 EXT PWR AVAIL

This amber light comes on to indicate that external power is available and the voltage is correct.

ELECTRICAL POWER
FORWARD CABIN
MAINT BUS Sw:
This switch allows personnel to energize electrical circuits for ground servicing without energizing the entire air-
craft electrical system.
ON : The switch latches magnetically if external power is connected and normal (AVAIL light on).
The AC and DC GND/FLT buses have power and the following loads can be energized
-- passenger compartment lighting
-- galley lighting
-- entrance area lights
-- lavatory lighting and service
-- vacuum cleaner sockets
-- flight compartment service outlets
-- hydraulic pump (yellow system)
-- flight compartment flood lighting
-- fuel quantity indications
-- refueling
-- cargo hold lighting
-- main and nose landing gear compartment lighting
-- belly fairing panel service outlets
-- ground call
-- equipment compartment lights and service outlets
-- navigation lights.
The switch trips when the external source is removed.
OFF : The AC and DC GND/FLT buses are connected to AC BUS 2 and DC BUS 2.

ELECTRICAL POWER


For Training Purposes Only Lufthansa LAN Technical Training
ATA 26 FIRE PROTECTION
Page: 161
DESCRIPTION
Aircraft Fire Protection Systems are comprised of:
-- Fire and overheat detection and extinguishing systems for the:
* Engines
*APU
-- Smoke detection and extinguishing systems for the:
* Cargo compartments
* Lavatories
-- Smoke detection for the:
* Avionic bay
-- Portable fire extinguishers for the:
* Flight compartment
* Passenger cabin
Page: 162
ENGINE AND APU

DETECTION
The engines and the APU each have a fire and overheat detection system consisting of:
-- Two identical gas detection loops (A and B) mounted in parallel.
-- A Fire Detection Unit (FDU).
The gas detection loops consist of:
-- Three sensing elements for each engine, one in the pylon nacelle, one in the engine core and one in the en-
gine fan section.
-- One sensing element in the APU compartment.
When a sensing element is subjected to heat, it sends a signal to the fire detection unit.
As soon as loops A and B detect temperature at a preset level, they trigger the fire warning system.
A fault in one loop (break or loss of electrical supply) does not affect the warning system.
The unaffected loop still protects the aircraft.
If the system detects an APU fire while the aircraft is on the ground, it shuts down the APU automatically and
discharges extinguishing agent.
FIRE SENSING ELEMENTS
CRC
LOOP A LOOP B
ECAM
FDU
MASTER
WARNING
AND LOGIC WHEN BOTH LOOPS ARE OPERATIVE
OR LOGIC WHEN EITHER LOOP IS INOPERATIVE
Page: 163
EXTINGUISHING
Each engine has two extinguisher bottles equipped with electrically operated squibs to discharge their contents.
Each squib has a dual electric supply. The flight crew controls the discharge from the ENG FIRE panel in the
cockpit.
The APU has one fire extinguisher bottle that has an electrically operated squib to discharge its agent. The flight
crew controls the discharge from the APU FIRE panel in the cockpit. This bottle also discharges automatically if
there is an APU fire when the aircraft is on the ground.
FIRE WARNINGS AND LOOP CAUTIONS
Fire detection units process all the warnings and cautions originating in the sensing elements
-- The fire warning appears in case of
* a fire signal from both loop A and B or,
* a fire signal from one loop when the other is faulty, or
* breaks in both loops occuring within 5 seconds of each other (flame effect), or
* a test performed on the control panel.
-- The loop--fault cautions appear if
one loop is faulty or,
both loops are faulty or1
the fire detection unit fails.
Page: 164
CONTROLS AND INDICATORS

OVERHEAD PANEL
ENG FIRE PANEL
1
3
The aircraft has two identical ENG FIRE panels, which contain the following switches and indicators
1 ENG 1 (2) FIRE Pb

This pushbufton’s normal position is in, and guarded.
The pilot pushes it to release it. It pops out, sending an electrical signal that performs the following for the corre-
sponding engine:
-- Silences the aural fire warning
-- Arms the fire extinguisher squibs
-- Closes the low--pressure fuel valve
-- Closes the hydraulic fire shut off valve
-- Closes the engine bleed valve
-- Closes the pack flow control valve
-- Cuts off the FADEC power supply
-- Deactivates the IDG
ENG 1 (2) FIRE It
This red light comes on, regardless of the pushbutton’s position, whenever the fire warning for the corresponding
engine is activated.
2 AGENT 1 and AGENT 2 pb

Both of these buttons become active when the flight crew pops the ENG FIRE button for their engine.
A brief push on the button discharges the corresponding fire bottle.

-- “SQUIB” lights up white when the flight crew pops the ENG FIRE button for its engine to help the flight crew
identify the AGENT pushbufton to be activated.
-- “DISCH” lights up amber when its fire extinguisher bottle has lost pressure.
3 TEST pb
This button permits the flight crew to test the operation of the fire detection and extinguishing system.
Page: 165
-- When the flight crew presses it

-- A continuous repetitive chime sounds.
-- The MASTER WARN lights flash.
-- ENG FIRE warning appears on ECAM.
On the FIRE panel:
-- The ENG FIRE pushbutton lights up red.
-- The SQIJIB lights come on white if discharge supplies are available.
-- The DISCH lights come on amber.
On the ENG panel (pedestal):
-- The FIRE lights come on red.
Page: 166
APU FIRE PANEL
2 3
1 APU FIRE Pb SW
This switch’s normal position is in and guarded.
The pilot pushes it to release it. It pops out sending an electrical signal that performs the following for the APU:
-- shuts down the APU
-- silences the aural warning
-- arms the squib on the APU fire extinguisher
-- closes the low--pressure fuel valve
-- shuts off the APU fuel pump
-- closes the APU bleed valve and X bleed valve and deactivates the APU generator.
The red APU FIRE light comes when the APU fire warning is activated, regardless of the position of the push-
button.
2 AGENT pb
This button becomes active when the pilot pops the APU FIRE button.
The flight crew presses it briefly to discharge the fire bottle.
-- SQUIB lights up white when the pilot pops the APU FIRE button.
-- DISCH lights up amber on when the fire extinguisher bottle has lost pressure.
NOTE: A RED DISK, WHICH IS OUTSIDE AT THE REAR OF THE FUSELAGE, SIGNALS THAT THE
AGENT IS NOT DISCHARGED OVERBOARD DUE TO BOTTLE OVERPRESSURE.
3 TEST pb
This button permits the flight crew to test the operation of the fire detection and extinguishing system for the
APU.
-- When the flight crew presses it
-- A continuous repetitive chime sounds.
-- The MASTER WARN lights flash.
-- APU FIRE warning appears on ECAM.
On the APU FIRE panel:
Page: 167
-- The APU FIRE pushbutton lights up red.

-- The SQUIB light comes on white.
-- The DISCH light comes on amber.
NOTE: THE AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN OF THE APU ON THE GROUND WILL NOT OCCUR WHILE THE
FLIGHT CREW IS PERFORMING THIS TEST.
PEDESTAL
1 FIRE It
This light identifies the engine to be shutdown because of fire.
Light comes on red when an engine fire warning is triggered.
Page: 168
EXTERNAL POWER PANEL
When the aircraft is on the ground, an APU fire causes an additional external warning.
1 APU FIRE It
The red APU FIRE light comes on and an external warning horn sounds when the system detects an APU fire.
The APU fire extinguisher discharges automatically three seconds after the appearance of the fire warning.
The light goes out when the fire has been extinguished.
2 APU SHUT OFF pb

A flap guards this pushbutton. When there is an APU tire and someone outside the aircraft presses this button, it
confirms that the APU has shut down automatically and silences the external warning horn.
Page: 169
MAINTENANCE PANEL
2
1
1 TEST pushbutton--switch
Tests the following APU circuits : Fire warning, auto extinguishing, and shutdown.
The test sequence lasts for 10 seconds.
During the test sequence, the Aft MASTER switch must be ON.
If all circuits are operating correctly, the OK light comes on.
NOTE: NOTE: IF THE APU WAS RUNNING, IT SHUTS DOWN.
2 RESET pushbutton
Resets, the test circuit.
Page: 170
AVIONICS BAY
One smoke detector in the air extraction duct of the avionics ventilation system detects smoke in the avionics
compartment.
It signals the ECAM to display a warning in the cockpit.
When it detects smoke for more than 5 seconds
-- A single chime sounds.
-- The MASTER CAUTION lights, on the glareshield, light up.
-- The ECAM displays a caution on the E/WD.
-- The SMOKE light on the EMER ELEC PWR panel, lights up.
-- The BLOWER and EXTRACT FAULT, on the VENTILATION panel, light up.
If smoke is detected for more than 5 minutes, the caution can be cleared ; but, it remains latched, and can be
recalled. On the ground, a dual FWC reset will unlatch the caution.
AVIONIC BAY
SKIN EXCH
OUTLET
BYPASS
VALVE SKIN
HEAT
EXCH
AIR COND
FROM COCKPIT SKIN EXCH
ISOL VALVE
COCKPIT PANEL
VENTILATION
SKIN AIR BLOWER
INLET EXTRACT
FAN FAN
VALVE
COOL AVIONIC
EQPT OVBD
UNIT
FILTER SKIN AIR
EXTRACT
AIR COND VALVE
INLET SKIN EXCH
VALVE INLET
BYPASS VALVE
AIR COND CARGO

DUCT UNDERFLOOR
ECAM
Page: 171

OVERHEAD PANEL
1 GEN 1 LINE
SMOKE It : Comes on amber, along with a warning on ECAM, when smoke is detected in the avionics ventila-
tion duct.
2 BLOWER and EXTRACT pb sw

FAULT Its : Both FAULT lights come on amber, along with a warning on ECAM, when smoke is detected in the
avionics ventilation duct.
Lavatory
Page: 172
LAVATORY
SMOKE DETECTION
The lavatory smoke detection system consists of:
-- One smoke detector in each lavatory.
-- A double channel Smoke Detection Control Unit (SDCU).
When a detector finds smoke in a lavatory, it sends a signal to the SDCU. The SDCU transmits it to the flight
warning computer (for warning display in the cockpit) and to the CIDS (for warning in the cabin).
LAVATORY COCKPIT
WARNING
SMOKE SDCU
DETECTOR
CABIN
WARNING
Page: 173
CARGO COMPARTMENT
SMOKE DETECTION
The cargo compartments have a smoke detection system.
-- Cavities in the cargo compartment ceiling panels each hold two smoke detectors. Each detector is linked to
one of the two detection loops (dual loop principle).
-- The forward cargo compartment has one cavity.
-- The aft cargo compartment has two cavities.
-- The Smoke Detection Control Unit (SDCU) receives signals from the detectors and transmits them to the
ECAM, which displays a warning in the cockpit. The SDCU has two identical channels.
Smoke in one cavity activates the cargo smoke warning if
-- Both smoke detectors detect it, or
-- One smoke detector detects it and the other is inoperative.
If cargo ventilation is installed, and the cargo smoke warning is activated in either compartment, the associated
isolation valves automatically close and the extraction fan stops.
ECAM ECAM
CARGO CARGO
VENTILATION VENTILATION
SDCU
SMOKE
DETECTOR
FWD AFT
Page: 174
FIRE EXTINGUISHING
A fire extinguishing system protects the FWD and AFT cargo compartments.
One fire bottle supplies three nozzles (one in FWD compartment and two in AFT compartment). The bottle has
two discharge heads, one for each compartment. When a member of the flight crew presses the DISCH push-
button for either compartment, the action ignites the corresponding squib on the fire bottle, which then dis-
charges extinguishing agent into that compartment.
When the bottle has discharged, the amber DISCH light comes on.
PRESSURE
SWITCH
BOTTLE
DISCHARGE
HEADS
FWD AFT
Page: 175

OVERHEAD PANEL
1 1
2 3 4 3 2
1 SMOKE light
This red light, and the associated ECAM warning, come on when the system detects smoke in the indicated
compartment. This light comes on, if:
-- Both channels detect smoke, or
-- One channel detects smoke and the SDCU finds that the other channel is faulty.
2 DISCH pushbutton
This button ignites the squib to discharge the extinguishing agent in the corresponding compartment (FWD or
AFT).
3 DISCH light
Within 60 seconds after pressing the discharge pushbutton, this amber light comes on, thereby indicating that
the agent bottle has fully discharged.
4 TEST pushbutton
Pressing this button for at least 3 seconds, and until it is released
-- Tests the smoke detectors in sequence,
-- Turns on the red smoke lights twice, and displays the ECAM warning,
-- Closes the ventilation system’s isolation valves.
-- Turns on the amber DISCH lights.
Page: 176
ICE AND RAIN
ATA 30 ICE AND RAIN


ICE AND RAIN
DESCRIPTION
The ice and rain protection system allows unrestricted operation of the aircraft in icing conditions and heavy rain.
ANTI--ICING
Either hot air or electrical heating protects critical areas of the aircraft as follows.
HOT AIR
-- three outboard leading--edge slats of each wing.
-- engine air intakes.
ELECTRICAL HEATING
-- flight compartment windows.
-- sensors pitot probes and static ports.
-- waste--water drain mast.
RAIN REMOVAL
Wipers and when necessary, fluid rain repellent, remove rain from the front windshield panels.
WASTE WATER
DRAIN MAST
WINDOW
HEATING
WING ANTI ICE

ENGINE ANTI ICE
WASTE WATER DRAIN MAST

PROBE HEATING

ICE AND RAIN
WING ANTI ICE

In flight, hot air from the pneumatic system heats the three outboard slats (3--4--5) of each wing.
Air is supplied through one valve in each wing.
The WING pushbutton on the ANTI--ICE panel controls the valves.
When the aircraft is on ground, the flight crew can initiate a 30--second test sequence by turning the system ON.
If the system detects a leak during normal operation, the affected side’s wing anti--ice valve automatically closes.
When wing anti--ice is selected, the EPR limit is automatically reduced, and the idle EPR is automatically in-
creased.
If the electrical power supply fails, the valves close.

ICE AND RAIN

OVERHEAD PANEL
1 WING ANTI ICE pb SW

This switch controls the Wing anti ice system on the left and right sides simultaneously.
ON : It lights up blue.
WING A. ICE appears on the ECAM MEMO page.
Wing anti ice control valves open if a pneumatic supply is available.
On the ground the wing anti--icing control valves open for 30 seconds only (test sequence).
Off : ON light goes off.
Wing anti--icing control valves close.
FAULT : Amber light comes on, and caution appears on ECAM, if
-- the position of the anti--icing control valve is not the required position, or
-- low pressure is detected.
NOTE: THE AMBER FAULT LIGHT COMES ON BRIEFLY AS THE VALVES TRANSIT

ICE AND RAIN
ENGINE ANTI ICE

An independent air bleed from the high pressure compressor protects each engine nacelle from ice. Air is sup-
plied through a two--position (open and closed) valve that the flight crew controls with two pushbuttons, one for
each engine.
The valve automatically closes, if air is unavailable (engine not running).
When an engine anti--ice valve is open, the EPR limit is automatically reduced and, if necessary, the idle EPR is
automatically increased for both engines in order to provide the required pressure.
If electrical power fails, the valves open.
ANTI--ICED
AREA
ENGINE ANTI--ICE
VALVE
FADEC ECAM
OVERHEAD PANEL

ICE AND RAIN

OVERHEAD PANEL
1 ENG 1 (2) ph sw
ON : light comes on blue.
ECAM MEMO displays “ENG A. ICE”.
Engine anti--ice valve opens if bleed air is available from the engine.
Continuous ignition is selected when the valve is opened and the ANTI ICE ENG pushbutton switch is
selected ON. This makes the IGNITION memo appear on the ECAM.
Off : ON light goes out.
Engine anti--ice valve closes.
FAULT : Amber light comes on, and caution message appears on ECAM, if the position of the anti--icing valve
disagrees with the ENG 1 (2) pushbutton selection.
NOTE: THE AMBER FAULT LIGHT COMES ON BRIEFLY AS VALVE TRANSITS.

ICE AND RAIN
WINDOW HEAT
The aircraft uses electrical heating for anti--icing each windshield and demisting the cockpit side windows.
Two independent Window Heat Computers (WHC5), one on each side, automatically regulate the system, pro-
tect it against overheating, and indicate faults.
Window heating comes on:
-- automatically when at least one engine is running, or when the aircraft is in flight.
-- manually, before engine start, when the flight crew switches ON the PROBE/WINDOW HEAT pushbutton
switch.
Windshield heating operates at low power on the ground and at normal power in flight. The changeover is auto-
matic.
Only one heating level exists for the windows.
ECAM ECAM
NORM
NORM
LOW
LOW
GND FLT GND FLT
WHC1 WHC2
ENG 1 OR 2
RUNNING
FLIGHT
EIU RH SIDE
IDENTICAL
AUTO
ON

ICE AND RAIN
PROBES HEAT
Electrical heating protects:
-- pitot heads
-- static ports
-- Angle--Of--Attack probes (AOAs)
-- Total Air Temperature (TAT) probes
Three independent Probe Heat Computers (PHCs) automatically control and monitor:
-- Captain probes
-- F/O probes
-- STBY probes
They protect against overheating and indicate faults.
The probes are heated:
-- automatically when at least one engine is running, or when the aircraft is in flight.
-- manually, when the flight crew switches ON the PROBE/WINDOW HEAT pushbutton switch.
On the ground, the TAT probes are not heated and pitot heating operates at a low level (the changeover to nor-
mal power in flight is automatic).
ONE ENGINE CAPT STBY F/O

RUNNING
STATICS STATICS STATICS
AOA AOA AOA

EIU
FLIGHT GND
LOW
FLT
PITOT PITOT PITOT
NORM
AUTO
ON
TAT TAT
HEATING CURRENT
MONITORING
PHC CAPT
STBY
F/O

ICE AND RAIN

OVERHEAD PANEL
1 PROBE/WINDOW HEAT pb
AUTO : Probes/Windows are heated automatically
-- in flight or
-- on the ground (except TAT probes) provided one engine is running.
ON : Probes and windows are heated permanently. Blue light comes on.

ICE AND RAIN


PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
ATA 36 PNEUMATIC
Page: 187
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
GENERAL DESCRIPTION
General
The pneumatic system supplies high--pressure air for
S air conditioning
S engine starting
S wing anti--icing
S water pressurization
S hydraulic reservoir pressurization
High--pressure air has three sources
S engine bleed systems
S APU load compressor
S HP ground connection
A crossbleed duct interconnects the engine bleed systems and receives air from the APU and ground sources
when appropriate.
A valve mounted on the crossbleed duct allows the left side (engine 1) and right side (engine 2) to he intercon-
nected.
Two Bleed Monitoring Computers (BMC1 and BMC2), the overhead control panel, and the ECAM control and
monitor the operation of the pneumatic system.
A leak detection system detects any overheating in the vicinity of hot air ducts.
Page: 188
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
ENGINE BLEED SYSTEM

General
The aircraft has two similar engine bleed air systems. Each system is designed to:
S select the compressor stage to use as a source of air
S regulate the bleed air temperature
S regulate the bleed air pressure.
A Bleed Monitoring Computer (BMC) controls and monitors each system.
Each BMC receives information about bleed pressure and temperature and valve position.
Each is connected with
S other systems using air or information from the bleed system the other BMC.
S Each supplies indications and warnings to the ECAM and CFDS.
It one BMC fails, the other one takes over most of the monitoring functions.
Each bleed valve is pneumatically operated and controlled electrically by its associated BMC.
Air Bleed Selection

Air is normally bled from the intermediate pressure stage (IP) of engine’s high--pressure (HP) compressor to
minimize fuel penalty.
At low engine speed, when the pressure and temperature of the IP air are too low, the system bleeds air from
the HP stage and maintains it at 36 +/-- 4 psi.
An intermediate pressure check valve downstream ol the IP port closes to prevent air from the HP stage from
being circulated to the IP stage.
The HP valve closes automatically
S pneumatically
-- in case of low upstream pressure
-- in case of excessive upstream pressure
S electrically
-- when the bleed valve is closed electrically
-- in case of overpressure upstream of the HP valve with wing anti--ice off, two packs on and aircraft altitude
above 15000 feet.
Pressure Regulation and Limitation
The bleed valve, which is downstream of the junction of HP and IP ducting, acts as a shut--off and pressure reg-
ulating valve.
It maintains delivery pressure at 45 +/-- 5 psi.
NOTE: BLEED PRESSURE MAY FLUCTUATE BETWEEN 36 AND 56 PSI (WITH A MAXIMUM PEAK TO
PEAK PRESSURE OF 76 PSI) PARTICULARLY AT HIGH ENGINE POWER (TAKEOFF OR CLIMB)
UP TO FL 100.
The bleed valve is fully closed:
S pneumatically
-- if upstream pressure goes below 8 psi
-- if there is return flow

S electrically by means of
-- the BLEED pushbutton switch (switched OFF)
-- the ENG FIRE pushbutton (pushed)
-- the Bleed air Monitoring Computer (BMC) in the following cases
S overtemperature
Page: 189
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
S overpressure
S leak
S open starter valve
S APU bleed being ON.
If pressure regulation fails, the overpressure valve closes when the pressure goes over 85 psi.
Temperature Regulation and Limitation
A precooler downstream of the bleed valve regulates the temperature of the bleed air.
The precooler is an air--to--air heat exchanger that uses cooling air bleed from the engine fan to regulate the
temperature to approximately 200 Celsius degrees.
The fan air valve controls fan air flow.
A spring keeps the fan air valve closed in the absence of pressure.
WING AFT/FWD HYD RESERV WING

PACK 1 PACK 2
ANTI ICE CARGO WATER TANK ANTI ICE
HEATING
X BLEED VALVE ENG 2

BLEED
APU
GROUND BLEED
AIR VALVE
SUPPLY
PRECOOLER APU
OVBR
ENG 1
STARTER
PNEUMATIC CLOSURE CONTROL
O/PRESS
VALVE
REVERSE FLOW
ELECTRICAL CLOSURE CONTROL

ENG 1 STARTER VALVE NOT CLOSED
BLEED
VALVE
APU BLEED VALVE OPENING
IP HP
OVERPRESSURE
OVERHEAT
LEAK DETECTION
BLEED
MANAGEMENT
COMPUTER
ENG 1 BLEED
Page: 190
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
APU BLEED AIR SUPPLY

Air Irom the APIJ load compressor is available on ground and in flight.
The Aft bleed valve operates as a shut--off valve to control Aft bleed air. It is electrically--controlled and oper-
ated by fuel pressure.
The APU BLEED pushbutton, on the AIR COND panel, controls the APU bleed valve.
When the flight crew selects ON with the pushbutton, APU bleed air supplies the pneumatic system, if the APU
speed is above 95 %. This opens the crossbleed valve and closes the engine bleed automatically.
A check valve near the crossbleed duct protects the APU, when bleed air comes from another source.
NO APU LEAK
NO LH WING LEAK
ON
APU BLEED BMC 1
OPENING APU
BLEED
ON VALVE
NO LH WING LEAK
APU
ECB
BMC 2
Note: 1. Leak detection is disregarded during an engine start.

2. APU leak detection is lost, if BMC1 is lost.
Page: 191
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
CROSSBLEED
A crossbleed valve on the crossbleed duct allows the air supply systems of the two engines to be isoleted or
interconnected.
A rotary selector on the AIR COND panel controls the crossbleed valve electrically.
Two electric motors, one for automatic mode and one for manual mode, control the valve.
In automatic mode the crossbleed valve opens when the system is using APIJ bleed air. It closes if the system
detects an air leak (except during engine start).
CLOSE
AUTO
OPEN
CLOSE
MAN
OPEN
WING OR PYLON OR APU

LEAK DETECTED
BMC 2 1
NO ENG START
X BLEED VALVE
APU BLEED VALVE OPEN

Page: 192
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
LEAK DETECTION
Leak detection loops detect any overheating near the hot air ducts in the fuselage, pylons, and wings.
For the pylon and APU, the sensing elements are tied to form a single loop and for the wing a double loop.
When the two wing loops detect a leak, or when one loop detects the leak and the other one is inoperative, they
activate a wing leak signal.
BMC1 and BMC2 each contain identical control logic for the system.
S A wing leak signal causes
-- the bleed valve on the related side to close automatically
-- the associated FAULT light on the AIR COND panel to come on
-- the x--hleed valve to close automatically (except during an engine start)
-- the APU bleed valve to close automatically (if it is open, and if the leak concerns the left wing) (except
during engine start)
S A pylon leak signal causes
-- the bleed valve on the related side to close automatically
-- the FAULT light for the related engine on the AIR COND panel to come on
-- the x--bleed valve to close automatically (except during an engine start).
S An APU leak signal causes
-- the APU bleed valve to close automatically (except during engine start).
-- the FAULT light the APU BLEED pushbutton switch on the AIR CUND panel to come on
-- the x--hleed valve to close automatically (except during an engine start).
BMC 1 BMC 2
LOOP A
LOOP B
LOOP B
LOOP A
APU LOOPS
DETECTION LOOPS
PYLON SINGLE
LH WING
DOUBLE
RH WING
APU SINGLE
Page: 193
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
OPERATION FOLLOWING FAILURES

BMC Failure
If one BMC fails, the adjacent BMC takes over the monitoring of the bleed system to issue the following ECAM
warnings if necessary
S overpressure
S overteniperature
S wing leak.
Nevertheless, the associated FAULT light on the AIR COND panel is lost, and the associated bleed valve does
not close automatically.
ENG BLEED LEAK warning is lost for the associated engine, as is also the APU BLEED LEAK warning if BMC1
has failed.
Page: 194
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
OVERHEAD PANEL
1 2 3
1 ENG 1 and ENG 2 BLEED pb sw

On: Bleed valve opens if
S Upstream pressure is above 8 psi.
S APU BLEED pushbutton switch is off or APU bleed valve is closed.
S There is no onside wing or pylon leak, and no overpressure or overternperature has been detected.
S The ENG FIRE pushbutton has not been popped out.
S The engine start valve is closed.
FAULT It: This amber light comes on, and an ECAM caution appears, if
S There is an overpressure downstream ol the bleed valve.
S There is a bleed air overheat.
S There is a wing or engine leak on the related side.
S The bleed valve is not closed during engine start.
S The bleed valve is not closed with APU bleed ON.
It goes out when the ENG BLEED pushbutton switch is OFF if the fault has disappeared.
OFF: The bleed valve and HP valve close. The white OFF light comes on.
Page: 195
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
2 APU BLEED pb sw
ON: The APU valve opens if N > 95 % and there is no leak in the APU or in the left side bleed. (If there
is a leak on the right side, the x--bleed valve closes.) The blue ON light comes on.
Off: The APU valve closes.
FAULT light: This amber light comes on, and an ECAM caution appears, when the system detects an APU
leak.
3 X--BLEED selector sw
AUTO: The crossbleed valve is open it the APU bleed valve is open.
The crossbleed valve is closed if the APU bleed valve is closed or, in case of a wing, pylon, or APU leak
(except during engine start).
OPEN: The crossbleed valve is open.
CLOSE: The crossbleed valve is closed.
Page: 196
AIR CONDITIONING
ATA 21 AIR CONDITIONING


AIR CONDITIONING
GENERAL
The air conditioning system operation is fully automatic.
It provides a continual renewal of air and maintains a constant selected temperature in the three following zones
COCKPIT, FWD CABIN, AFT CABIN which are independently controlled.
The air is supplied by the pneumatic system, via:
-- two pack flow control valves
-- two packs
-- the mixing unit, which mixes the air coming from the cabin and from the packs.
It is then distributed to the cockpit and the cabin.
The temperature regulation is optimized through the hot air pressure regulating valve and the trim air valves
which add hot air tapped upstream of the packs to the mixing unit air.
In an emergency, a ram air inlet can provide ambient air to the mixing unit.
The temperature regulation is controlled by a zone controller and two pack controllers.
Flight deck and cabin temperature can be selected from the AIR COND panel in the cockpit.
Low pressure air is supplied to the mixing unit by a ground connection.
CPKT FWD AFT
TRIM AIR
VALVES
CABIN MIXER UNIT CABIN

AIR LP GROUND AIR
FILTERS
CONNECTION
PACK 1 PACK PACK PACK 2
CONTROL 1 2 CONTROL
EMER RAM
AIR
PACK FLOW
CONTROL VLV
ZONE
HOT AIR
CONTROL
PRESS REG
VALVE

AIR CONDITIONING
AIR CONDITIONING PACK

The two packs operate automatically end independently of each other. Pack operation is controlled by pack con-
troller signals.
Warm pre--conditioned bleed air enters the cooling path via the pack valve and is ducted to the primary heat ex-
changer.
Then the cooled bleed air enters the compressor section of the air--cycle machine and is compressed to a higher
pressure and temperature.
It is cooled again in the main heat exchanger and enters the turbine section, where it expands and in expanding
generates power to drive the compressor and cooling air tan.
The removal ol energy during this process reduces the temperature ol the air, resulting in very low air tempera-
ture at turbine discharge.
A water separator system dries the air before it enters the turbine section.
AIR BLEED RAM AIR INLET FLAP
PACK FLOW
CONTROL VALVE
MAIN HEAT EXCH.

PRIMARY HEAT EXCH.
PACK FLOW CONTROL VALVE POSITION

PACK OUTLET TEMPERATURE
TURBINE
COOLING FAN
COMPRES.
TURB. BY PASS PACK COMP. OUTLET TEMP
BY PASS VLV POSITION
ANTI ICE VALVE
HOT AIR
PNEUMATIC CTL
PACK FLOW
PRESS REG.
VALVE

AIR CONDITIONING
PACK FLOW CONTROL VALVE

This valve is pneumatically--operated and electrically--controlled. It regulates the air flow in accordance with sig-
nals received from the pack controller.
In the absence of air pressure, a spring keeps the valve closed.
The valve closes automatically in case of pack overheating, engine starting, or operation of the fire or ditching
pushbutton.
The valve is controlled from the AIR COND panel.
RAM AIR
An emergency ram air inlet ventilates the cockpit and cabin to remove smoke, or it both packs fail.
The emergency ram air inlet valve is controlled by the RAM AIR pushbutton on the AIR COND panel.
This pushbutton opens the ram air valve, provided that ditching is not selected.
When the RAM AIR pushbutton is ON : The outflow valve opens about 50%, provided that it is under automatic
control and Diff Press is less than one psi. The outflow valve does not automatically open if it is under manual
control, even if Diff Press is less than one psi. If Diff Press is greater than one psi, the check valve located
downstream the ram air door will not open, even if the ram air door has been selected open. No airflow will then
be supplied.
MIXER UNIT
This unit mixes cold Iresh air from the packs with the cabin air being recirculated through recirculation fans. The
mixer unit is also connected to the emergency ram air inlet and the low pressure ground inlets.
HOT--AIR PRESSURE--REGULATING VALVE
This valve regulates the pressure of hot air, tapped upstream of the packs.
It is pneumatically--operated and electrically--controlled from the HOT AIR pushhufton on the AIR COND panel.
In the absence of air, a spring keeps the valve closed.
The valve closes automatically, if:
S The duct overheats, or
S The cockpit trim air valve fails, or
S Both cabin trim air valves fail.
The hot--air pressure--regulating valve remains operative, even if either the lorward or aft cabin trim air valve
fails.
TRIM AIR VALVES

These valves are electrically--controlled by the zone controller. A trim air valve, associated with each zone, ad-
justs the temperature by adding hot air.
TEMPERATURE AND FLOW REGULATION
Temperature regulation is automatic and controlled by one zone controller and two pack controllers.
PACK CONTROLLER
Each pack controller regulates the temperature of its associated pack, in accordance with a demand signal Irom
the zone controller, by modulating the bypass valve and the ram air inlet flaps.
The ram air inlet flaps close during takeoff and landing to avoid ingestion of foreign matter.
NOTE: DURING TAKEOFF, THE RAM AIR INLET FLAPS CLOSE WHEN TO. POWER IS SET AND THE
MAIN LANDING GEAR STRUTS ARE COMPRESSED. DURING LANDING THEY CLOSE AS SOON
AS THE MAIN LANDING GEAR STRUTS ARE COMPRESSED, AS LONG AS SPEED IS AT OR
ABOVE 70 KNOTS. THEY OPEN 20 SECONDS AFTER THE SPEED DROPS BELOW 70 KNOTS.
The pack controllers also regulate flow by modulating the associated pack flow control valve.

AIR CONDITIONING
ZONE CONTROLLER
PACK FLOW CONTROL
The crew can use the PACK FLOW selector to adjust the pack flow for the number of passengers and breater-
nal conditions.
Whatever thu crew selects, the system delivers high flow for any of the following circumstances:
S in single--pack operation,
S when the APU is supplying bleed air.
The system delivers normal flow if the crew selects LO flow and the temperature demand cannot be satisfied.
Engine pressure demand
When the cooling demand in one zone cannot be satisfied, if the bleed pressure is too low, the zone controller
sends a pressure demand signal to both Engine Interface Units (EIU) to increase the minimum idle and to raise
the bleed pressure.
APU flow demand
When the Aft bleed valve is open, the zone controller signals the APU’s Electronic Control Box (ECB) to in-
crease the APU flow output when any zone temperature demand cannot be satisfied.
TEMPERATURE REGULATION
The zone controller regulates the temperature of the two cabin zones and the cockpit.
BASIC TEMPERATURE REGULATION
The flight crew uses the temperature selectors on the air conditioning panel in the cockpit to select the reference
temperatures. The zone controller computes a temperature demand from the selected temperature and the ac-
tual temperature.
The actual temperature is measured by sensors:
in the cockpit, for the cockpit zone
in the lavatory extraction circuit and galley ventilation system, for the cabin.
A signal corresponding to the lowest demanded zone temperature goes to the pack controller, which then makes
both packs produce the required outlet temperature.
OPTIMIZED TEMPERATURE REGULATION

The zone controller optimizes the temperature by action on the trim air valves. The temperature selection range
is from 18C (64F) to 30C (86F).
SYSTEM OPERATION UNDER FAILURE CONDITION
Each controller consists of a primary channel that is normally in control and a secondary channel that acts as a
backup if the primary channel fails.
ZONE CONTROLLER
PRIMARY CHANNEL FAILURE
The secondary channel operates as backup.
The flow setting function and optimized temperature regulation are not available. HOT AIR and TRIM AIR valves
close.
The zones are controlled to 24C (76F) (backup regulation). Pack 1 controls the cockpit temperature. Pack 2
controls the FWD and AFT cabin temperatures. ALTN MODE appears on the ECAM (Electronic Centralized Air-
craft Monitoring) COND page.
SECONDARY CHANNEL FAILURE
This has no effect on zone temperature regulation.
Backup mode is lost.

AIR CONDITIONING
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CHANNEL FAILURE

Optimized and backup temperature regulation is lost.
The packs deliver a fixed temperature :20C (68F) for pack 1, 10C (50 F) for pack 2. The failure removes all in-
formation from the ECAM COND page, which then displays PACK REG.
PACK CONTROLLERS
PRIMARY CHANNEL FAILURE
The secondary computer operates as a backup.
Regulation is not optimized.
Pack flow is fixed at the previous setting.
SECONDARY CHANNEL FAILURE
This failure has no effect on pack regulation. Backup mode is lost.
ECAM signals related to the corresponding pack are lost.
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CHANNEL FAILURE
As a backup, corresponding pack outlet temperature is controlled by the anti--ice valve and is stabilized to a
temperature between 5C (41F) and 30C (86F) in a maximum of 6 minutes.
ECAM signals, related to the corresponding pack, are lost.
AIR CYCLE MACHINE FAILURE
If the Air Cycle Machine (ACM) fails (compressor/turbine seizure), the affected pack may be operated in heat
exchanger cooling mode.
Warm pre--conditioned bleed air enters the cooling path via the pack valve, and goes to the primary heat ex-
changer. Then, the main part of the cooled air goes directly downstream of the ACM turbine through the bypass
valve, and the rest goes through the failed ACM.
The ACM seizure reduces the pack flow.
As for normal pack operation
S The pack controller regulates temperature, in accordance with zone controller demand, by modulating the
bypass valve and the ram air inlet flap.
S The zone controller regulates the hot air flow through the trim air valves to optimize cockpit/cabin tempera-
ture regulation. Hot air flow is lower than in normal pack operation, because pack flow is reduced.
HOT AIR PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE FAILURE

Failed open: No effect.
Failed closed: Optimized regulation is lost. Trim air valves are driven to the full closed position. Pack 1 controls
the cockpit temperature to the selected value, and pack 2 controls the cabin temperature (FWD and AFT) to the
mean value, of the selected temperatures.
TRIM AIR VALVE FAILURE
Optimized tempereture reguletion of the corresponding zone is lost.

AIR CONDITIONING
AIR COND. PANEL 30VU
1 1 1 2
4
3
3
The panel description is the same for A321 except for the pack flow selector.
1 Zone temperature selector
-- 12 o’clock position : = 24 _C ( 76 _F )
-- COLD position : = 18 _C ( 64 _F )
-- HOT position : = 30 _C ( 86 _F )
2 HOT AIR P / B switch

ON ( P / B switch in ) :
The electro / pneumatic trim air pressure regulating valve regulates hot air pressure to the hot air manifold.
OFF ( P / B switch out ):
” OFF ” light illuminates white.
The trim air pressure regulating valve closes and the 3 trim air valves closes.
The FAULT circuit ( Duct Overheat circuit ) is resetted.
FAULT :
The ” Fault ” light illuminates AMBER, associated with ECAM caution, when duct overheat is detected ( 88 _C
or 80_ C four times during one flight )
The trim air pressure regulating valve and the 3 trim air valves close automatically . The ” FAULT ” light extin-
guishes, when temperature drops below 70 _C and OFF is selected.
3 PACK Override P / B switch

the pack flow control valve is electro / pneumatically automatically controlled.
S lt opens in the following cases :
-- upstream pressure >10 psi.
-- no ACM compressor outlet overheat ( 230 °C )
-- no engine start sequence .

AIR CONDITIONING
Both valves close by an electrical signal when:

S the MODE selector is set to IGN / START when on ground. ( valves reopen if MASTER sw or MAN START
P / B sw are not set to ON within 30 sec )
S the ENG MODE selector is set to IGN / START ( or CRK ) and when
on either engine :
-- the Master switch is set to ON ( or MAN START P / B sw is set to ON )
-- the start valve is open, and N, < 50 %.
On ground, the valves reopening is delayed 30 sec ( after start valve
closure )
to avoid a supplementary pack closure cycle during second engine start.
-- one side engine fire P / B depressed
-- DITCHING selected
OFF ( P / B switch out ) :
OFF light illuminates white and the pack flow control valve gets an electrical signal to move to the close position.
FAULT:
Illuminates AMBER, associated with ECAM caution, when :
-- the pack flow control valve position disagrees with selected position or
-- in case of compressor outlet ( 4 times 230 °C or 260 °C ) or
-- Pack outlet overheat ( 95 °C ) condition
4 PACK FLOW selector

S Permits selection of pack valve flow according to number of passengers and ambient conditions ( smoke
removal, hot or wet conditions ).
-- LO ( 80 % )
-- NORM ( 100 % )
-- HI ( 120 % ).
S The manual selection is irrelevant in single pack operation or with APU bleed supply. In these cases, HI is
automatically selected.
S If LO is selected, the pack flow can be automatically selected up to 100 % when the cooling demand can-
not be satisfied.
5 RAM AIR P / B switch ( guarded )

S the ON light illuminates blue.
Provided the DITCHING P / B sw on the CABIN PRESS panel is in normal
position :
-- The RAM air inlet flap opens operated by an electrical actuator.
-- If Delta P = > 1 psi : the outflow valve control remains normal
-- If Delta P = < 1 psi : the outflow valve opens to 50 %
OFF ( P / B switch out ) :
The RAM air inlet closes.
NOTE: If the Ram Air Inlet is opened on ground, the outflow valve will close to 50 %.

AIR CONDITIONING
PRESSURIZATION GENERAL
The cabin pressurization system has four general functions:
S Ground function: Fully opens the outflow valve on ground.
S Prepressurization: During takeoff, increases cabin pressure to avoid a surge in cabin pressure
during rotation.
S Pressurization in flight: Adjusts cabin altitude, and rate of change to provide passengers with a com-
fortable flight.
S Depressurization: After touchdown, gradually releases residual cabin overpressure before the
ground function fully opens the outflow valve.
The system consists of
-- Two Cabin Pressure Controllers (CPC)
-- One outflow valve, with an actuator that incorporates three motors (two for automatic operation, one for
manual operation)
-- One control panel
-- Two safety valves
Any one of the three independent electric motors may power the outflow valve.
Normally, one of the two cabin pressure controllers operates the outflow valve by means of its associated auto-
matic motor.
In case of ditching, an override switch on the control panel allows the flight crew to close the outflow valve and
all valves below the flotation line.
The flight crew can set the system to operate automatically, semi--automatically, or manually.
In normal operation, cabin pressurization is fully automatic.
AUTOMATIC OPERATION
The flight crew monitors the operation of the system, but does nothing to control it. Air pressure in the cabin fol-
lows external schedules that the system receives as signals from the Flight Management and Guidance System
(FMGS).
When FMGS data is not available for automatic pressurization, the crew only needs to select the landing field
elevation.
The pressurization system then uses the manually--selected landing field elevation for internal schedules.

AIR CONDITIONING
CPC1 CPC2
EMER
RAM AIR
ADIRS STAT. PRESS
1+2+3 BARO CORR
THE SAME AS FOR

CPC1
FIELD LDG ELEV.

FMGC
DEST. QNH
LGCIU
FLT/GRD
1+2
EIU TLA
1+2
ECAM SYS DISP MANUAL NOT
ECAM WARNING BACK UP USED
MOT MAN MOT

1 MOT 2
OUTFLOW
VALVE
SAFETY
VALVES

AIR CONDITIONING
MAIN COMPONENTS
CABIN PRESSURE CONTROLLERS
Two identical, independent, digital controllers automatically control the system, by maintaining the proper cabin
pressure. They receive signals from the Air Data Inertial Reference System (ADIRS), the Flight Management
and Guidance Computer (FMGC), the Engine Interface Unit (EIU), and the Landing Gear Control Interface Unit
(LGCIU).
When the system is in automatic or semi--automatic mode, one controller is active, the other is on standby.
The controllers also generate signals br the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM).
For operation in manual mode, each controller has a backup section, which is powered by an independent pow-
er supply in the controller 1 position. This section also has a pressure sensor that generates the cabin altitude
and pressure signal for the ECAM, when MAN mode is selected.
The controllers communicate with each other via a cross--channel link.
OUTFLOW VALVE
The oufflow valve is on the right--hand side of fuselage, behind the alt cargo compartment and below the flota-
tion line.
The outilow valve assembly consists of a flush, skin--mounted, rectangular frame, carrying inward and outward
opening llaps linked to the actuator. The actuator contains the drives of the two automatic motors and the manu-
al motor. Either of two automatic motors operates the valve in automatic mode, and the manual motor operates
it in manual mode.
In automatic mode, the operating controller signals the position of the valve to the ECAM.
In manual mode, the backup section of the controller 1 signals the position of the valve to the ECAM.
When the RAM AIR pushbutton is ON, and Diff Press is below 1 psi, the system drives the outflow valve about
50 % open if it is under automatic control. If the system is under manual control, the outflow valve does not auto-
matically open, even if Diff Press is below 1 psi.
SAFETY VALVES
Two independent pneumatic safety valves prevent cabin pressure from going too high (8.6 psi above ambient) or
too low (1 psi below ambient).
They are located on the rear pressure bulkhead, above the flotation line.

AIR CONDITIONING
SYSTEM OPERATION
AUTOMATIC PRESSURE CONTROL MODE
Two identical, independent, automatic systems (each consisting of a controller and its associated motors) con-
trol cabin pressure.
Either system controls the single outflow valve.
Only one controller operates at a time.
An automatic transier occurs:
70 seconds after each landing.
If the operating system fails.
The controller automatically controls the cabin pressure. It limits the cabin pressure to 8000 feet maximum and
optimizes it during climb and descent phases.
The controller normally uses the landing elevation and the QNH from the FMGC, and the pressure altitude from
ADIRS.
If FMGC data are not available, the controller uses the captain Baro Reference from the ADIRS and the LDG
ELEV selection.
Pressurization is assumed through the following modes:
Ground (Gl\l)
Before takeoff, and 55 seconds after landing, the outflow valve fully opens to ensure that there is no residual
cabin pressure. At touchdown, any remaining cabin pressure is released at a cabin vertical speed of 500 feet/
minute.
Takeoff (TO)
To avoid a pressure surge at rotation, the controller pre--pressurizes the aircraft at a rate of 400 feet/mInute, until
the Diff Press reaches 0,1 PSI At Iift--off, the controller Initiates the climb phase.
Climb (CL)
During climb, the cabin altitude varies according to a fixed pre--programmed law that takes into account tha air-
craft’s actual rate of climb.
Cruise (CR)
During cruise, the controller maintains cabin altitude at the level--off value, or at the landing field elevation,
whichever is higher.
Descent (DE)
During descent, the controller maintains a cabin rate of descent, such that cabin pressure equals the landing
field pressure, just before landing.
The maximum descent rate is 750 feet/minute.
Abort (AR)
If the aircraft does not climb after takeoff, the abort mode prevents the cabin altitude from climbing.
Cabin pressure is set back to the takeoff altitude + 0.1 PSI.
MANUAL PRESSURE CONTROL MODE
If both automatic systems fail, the flight crew may use the CABIN PRESS control panel to take over manual
control of cabin pressurization.

Press the MODE SEL pushbutton to select MAN, and
Push the MAN V/S CTL switch UP or DN to increase or decrease cabin altitude.
The first of these actions cuts off power to the AUTO motors, and enables the MAN motor to control the outflow
valve.

AIR CONDITIONING
NOTE: 1. DUE TO THE SLOW OPERATION OF THE OUTFLOW VALVES IN MANUAL MODE, AND THE
LIMITED RESOLUTION OF THE OUTFLOW VALVES’ POSITION ON THE ECAM, THE VISUAL
ECAM INDICATION OF A CHANGE IN THE OUTFLOW VALVES’ POSITION CAN TAKE UP TO 5
SECONDS.
2. AS THE PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM IS MANUALLY--CONTROLLED, THE OUTFLOW VALVE
DOES NOT OPEN AUTOMATICALLY AT TOUCHDOWN.
DITCHING
To prepare for ditching, the flight crew must press the DITCHING pushbutton on the CABIN PRESS control pan-
el to close the outflow valve, the emergency ram air inlet, the avionics ventilation inlet and extract valves, and
the pack flow control valves.

AIR CONDITIONING

OVERHEAD PANEL
3 2 1 4
1 LDG ELEV sel

AUTO: The pressurization system uses the FMGS data to construct an optimized pressure schedule.
To exit the AUTO position, pull out and turn the selector.
Other positions:The pressurization schedule does not use the landing elevation from the FMGS, but instead
uses the landing elevation selected with this knob (from -- 2000 to + 14000 feet) as its refer--
ence.
NOTE: THE LDG ELEV SELECTOR SCALE IS ONLY GIVEN AS AN INDICATION; REFER TO THE
ECAM INFORMATION FOR ACCURATE ADJUSTMENT
2 MODE SEL pb
AUTO: Automatic mode is operating. One of the two systems controls the outflow valve.
NOTE: IF THE PILOT SUSPECTS THAT THE OPERATING PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM IS NOT
PERFORMING PROPERLY, HE CAN ATTEMPT TO SELECT THE OTHER SYSTEM BY
SWITCHING THE MODE SEL PUSHBUTTON TO MAN, FOR AT LEAST 10 SECONDS, THEN
RETURNING IT TO AUTO.
MAN: This legend appears in white, and FAULT does not come on. The flight crew then uses the MAN
V/S CTL switch to control the outflow valve.
FAULT It: This legend appears in amber and the ECAM caution light comes on only when both automatic
systems are faulty.
NOTE: THE PILOT MAY NOTICE A VARIATION IN THE CAB ALT INDICATION ON THE ECAM
PRESS PAGE, WHEN THE SYSTEM SWITCHES FROM THE CABIN PRESSURE CONTROL
AUTO MODE TO MAN MODE, DUE TO THE REDUCED RESOLUTION OF THE BACKUP
PRESSURE SENSOR.

AIR CONDITIONING
3 MAN V/S CTL toggle switch

The switch, springloaded to neutral, controls the outflow valve position through operation of the MAN motor,
when the MODE SEL pushbutton is in the MAN position.
UP: The valve moves towards the open position.
DN: The valve moves towards the closed position.
NOTE: THE OUTFLOW VALVE OPERATES SLOWLY, SO THE PILOT MUST HOLD THE TOGGLE
SWITCH IN THE UP OR UN POSITION UNTIL REACHING THE TARGET V/S.
4 DITCHING guarded pushbutton

Normal: The system functions normally.
ON: The operating system sends a “close” signal to the outflow valve, emergency ram air inlet,
avionics ventilation inlet and extract valves, and pack flow control valves.
NOTE: THE OUTFLOW VALVE WILL NOT CLOSE AUTOMATICALLY, IF IT IS UNDER MANUAL
CONTROL

AIR CONDITIONING
AVIONICS VENTILATION
GENERAL
The avionics ventilation system is fully automatic.
It cools the electrical and electronic components in the avionics compartment and on the flight deck, including
the instrument and circuit breaker panels. It uses two electric fans to force the circulation of cooling air.
Whatever the configuration of the avionics ventilation system is, a part of the avionics ventilation air is sucked
from the cockpit through the different cockpit panels.
MAIN COMPONENTS
FANS
Two electric fans operate continuously as long as the aircraft electrical system is supplied.
They make the air circulate around the avionics equipment.
SKIN AIR INLET AND EXTRACT VALVES
These valves admit air from outside the aircraft and evacuate hot air from inside the aircraft.
SKIN EXCHANGE INLET AND OUTLET BYPASS VALVES
These valves permit air to circulate between the avionics bay and the space under the cargo compartment floor.
AIR CONDITIONING INLET VALVE
This valve opens to permit the air conditioning circuit to supply fresh air to the avionics bay.
SKIN EXCHANGE ISOLATION VALVE
This valve connects or isolates the skin heat exchanger.
AVIONICS EQUIPMENT VENTILATION COMPUTER (AEVC)
The AEVC controls the operation of all fans and valves in the avionics ventilation system.

AIR CONDITIONING
AVIONIC BAY
SKIN EXCH
OUTLET
BYPASS
SKIN
VALVE
HEAT
EXCH
AIR COND
FROM COCKPIT SKIN EXCH
ISOL VALVE
COCKPIT PANEL
VENTILATION
SKIN AIR
SKIN AIR
BLOWER EXTRACT EXTRACT
INLET
FAN FAN VALVE
VALVE
AVIONICS OVBD
EQPT
FILTER
SKIN EXCH
AIR COND
INLET
INLET VALVE
BYPASS VALVE
AIR COND
DUCT
CARGO
UNDERFLOOR
NORMAL OPERATION, OPEN--CIRCUIT CONFIGURATION

GROUND OPERATIONS
The open--circuit configuration operates when skin temperature is above the on--ground threshold.
On--ground threshold = + 12C (53F), temperature increasing, or = + 9C (48F), temperature decreasing.

AIR CONDITIONING
NORMAL OPERATION, CLOSE--CIRCUIT CONFIGURATION

Flight operations
The close--circuit configuration operates when skin temperature is beneath the in--flight threshold.
In flight threshold = + 35C (95F), temperature increasing, or = + 32C (90F), temperature decreasing.
Ground operations
The close--circuit configuration operates when skin temperature is beneath the on--ground threshold.
On ground threshold = + 12C (53F), temperature increasing, or = + 9 C (48 F), temperature decreasing.
NORMAL OPERATION, INTERMEDIATE CONFIGURATION

Flight operations
The intermediate configuration operates when skin temperature is above the in--flight threshold.
In flight threshold = + 35C (95F), temperature increasing, or = + 32 C (90 F), temperature decreasing.

AIR CONDITIONING
ABNORMAL OPERATION
BLOWER FAULT or EXTRACT FAULT warning
When the BLOWER or the EXTRACT pushbutton switch is set at the OVRD (override) position, the system is in
closed--circuit configuration and adds air from the air conditioning system to the ventilation air.
When the BLOWER pushbutton switch is set at OVRD, the blower fan is stopped and the extract fan continues
to run.
When the EXTRACT pushbutton switch is set at OVRD, the extract fan is controlled directly from the pushbut-
ton. Both fans continue to run.
Smoke configuration
When the smoke detector detects smoke in the avionics ventilation air the BLOWER and the EXTRACT FAULT
lights come on.
When both the BLOWER and the EXTRACT pushbuttons are set to the OVRD position, the air conditioning sys-
tem supplies cooling air, which is then exhausted overboard. The blower fan stops.
Controller failure
The system goes to the same configuration as above, except that the skin exchange isolation valve stays open.
The inlet valve and the skin exchange inlet bypass valve remain in the position they were in before the failure
occurred.
The extract fan keeps running.

AIR CONDITIONING

OVERHEAD PANEL
1 BLOWER and EXTRACT pb sw

AUTO: When both pushbutton switches are on AUTO
-- On the ground before the application of TO power, the ventilation system is in open circuit configuration
(closed configuration when the skin temperature is below the ground threshold).
-- On the ground after the application of TO power, and in flight, the ventilation system is in closed circuit
configuration.
OVRD: When either pushbutton switch is on OVRD
-- The system goes to closed circuit configuration.
-- Air from the air conditioning system is added to ventilation air. (The blower fan stops if the BLOWER
pushbutton switch is in the OVRD position).
When both pushbutton switches are on OVRD
-- Air flows from the air conditioning system and then overboard.
-- The extract fan continues to run.
FAULT It: Lights up amber (and ECAM activates)
in the blower switch, if :
S blowing pressure is low*
S duct overheats*
S computer power supply fails
S smoke warning is activated
in the extract switch, if :
S extract pressure is low*
S computer power supply fails
S smoke warning is activated.

* If the warning occurs on the ground when the engines are stopped, the external horn sounds.

AIR CONDITIONING
CARGO VENTILATION
GENERAL
An extraction fan draws air from the cargo compartments and exhausts it overboard.
Air from the cabin replaces the exhausted air, thus ventilating the cargo compartments.
OVERBOARD
OUTLET
ISOL. VALVE
CARGO SMOKE DETECTION
EXTRACTION FAN
AFT ISOL. VALVE
AFT
CARGO CARGO
VENTILATION COMPARTMENT
CONTROLLER
INLET
ISOL. VALVE
ECAM
CABIN AMB AIR
SYSTEM OPERATION
AFT CARGO COMPARTMENT VENTILATION
Air from the cabin goes via the inlet isolation valve to the aft cargo compartment, driven by an extraction fan. Air
is controlled by the outlet isolation valve and then goes outboard through the outflow valve.
The cargo ventilation controller controls the operation of the inlet and outlet isolation valves and the extraction
fan.
When the isolation valves are fully open, the extraction fan operates continuously when the aircraft is on the
ground and during flight.
The controller closes the isolation valves and stops the extraction fan when
S the flight crew turns the AFT ISOL VALVE pushbutton switch OFF.
S The aft cargo smoke detection unit detects smoke.

AIR CONDITIONING

OVERHEAD PANEL
AFT ISOL VALVE pb sw

The switch controls the isolation valves and the extraction fan.
Auto: The inlet and outlet isolation valves open. The extraction fan runs if there is no smoke detected
in the AFT CARGO.
OFF: The inlet and outlet isolation valves close, the extraction fan stops.
FAULT It: The light comes on amber associated with ECAM caution when either inlet or outlet valve is not
in the selected position.

FUEL SYSTEM
ATA 28 FUEL SYSTEM


FUEL SYSTEM
DESCRIPTION
Fuel-System:
S keeps the fuel in the main fuel tanks and the center tank, which are open to atmosphere through the vent
surge tanks
S controls and supplies the fuel in the correct quantities to the fuel tanks during refuel operations
S supplies the fuel to the engines
S supplies the fuel to the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
S supplies the fuel to decrease the temperature of the Integrated Drive Generators
S gives indications in the cockpit of the usual system operation
S gives indications in the cockpit of the failures that could cause an unusual condition.
S is controlled by one Fuel Quantity Control Indication Computer ( FQIC ) and two Fuel Level Sensing Control
Units ( FLSCU ).
TANK USABLE CAPACITIES
A 319 / 320 only

SURGE-
TANK
RIB 1 RIB 2
CENTER
LH TANK TANK RH TANK
A 319 Outer Cell Inner Cell Center Tank Total

704 Kg 5531 Kg 6462 Kg 18932 Kg
A 320
1552 Lbs 12193 Lbs 14246 Lbs 41736 Lbs

FUEL SYSTEM
FUEL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

Operating Limitations
The system is designed to operate within:
-- altitude range 0 ft to 39000 ft
-- ambient temperature range of minus 40 deg.C to plus 50 deg.C at zero altitude.
-- and minus 70 deg.C to minus 30 deg.C at 39000ft
-- Fuel temperature range of --54 deg.C to +50 deg.C, the upper temperature limit subject to fall off with increas-
ing altitude to + 40 deg.C at 36000 ft.
FueI Pump System
Each main tank has two centrifugal booster pumps capable of supplying the engines with fuel at the required
pressure and flow rate.
The wing tank pumps are located in a colIector box formed by root Rib 1 and Rib 2. Rib 2 is sealed except for
vent holes at the top and clack valves at the bottom through which fuel gravitates into the enclosure. Two in-
ward--opening hinged panels in Rib 2 provide access into this area. This configuration makes sure that the
pumps are fully in fuel during flight maneuvers.
Each pump has an intake pipe fitted with a straine. A bypass pipe with suction valve enables the engine to get
fuel by suction if the pumps do not work.
NOTE: THE CENTER TANK PUMPS DO NOT HAVE A BYPASS AND FUEL CAN BE OBTAINED FROM
THE CENTER TANK ONLY BY OPERATING THE PUMPS.
Pressure relief sequence valves on the wing tank pumps give precedence to center tank pump delivery.
Scavenge System
The scavenge jet pumps are installed in the wing tank and in the center tank.
The wing tank pumps moves fuel which has entered the wing surge tank back in the outer cell of the wing.
The center tank jet pumps move the fuel to the related center tank main pump inlets.
Crossfeed System
A crossfeed line routed through the fuselage center section provides interconnection of the L and R engine feed
systems.
The fuel crossfeed system consists of the crossfeed valve, which is normally closed, together with its electrical
control circuit and indication. The valve is installed in the engine fuel feed pipeline in the center section connect-
ing the LH and RH engine fuel feed lines. An electrical actuator with twin motors operates the valve. Both motors
are supplied from separate 28V D.C. power sources, one from the Busbar 2 and one from Battery Busbar.
The valve is controlled by the X FEED pushbutton switch on the pilots panel 40VU.
LP ( Low Pressure ) FueI Fire Shut--Off Control.

In case of fire the fuel supply to the engines ( or APU ) is shut off by the LP valves which are electrically actu-
ated by operation of the related ENG FIRE ( or APU FIRE ) push--button. The valves are normally in the open
position.
Auxiliary Power Unit ( APU ) Feed System
The APU takes its fuel from a connection in the main engine feed system which supplies the APU at the re-
quired pressure.
The APU feed line incorporates a supplementary fuel pump powered by the aircraft batteries, and an LP fuel
shut--off valve.
The APU usually takes its supply from the left hand engine feed line.
When the cross feed valve is open, the right--hand engine feed line can also supply the APU fuel supply line.
The operation of the pump is fully automatically. The adjacent pressure switch controls the operation and moni-
tors the pump inlet pressure. When the aircraft is on the ground, the pump can be operated by a pushbutton
switch in the APU compartment to purge the fuel line.

FUEL SYSTEM
Tank Vent System

Each fuel tank vents through vent lines into a vent surge tank, which is located outboard of each wing tank.
The center tank vents into the vent surge tank on the left hand ( LH ) side.
Each vent surge tank vents to atmosphere through a NACA type intake mounted within the tank on an access
panel . installed in the intake is a vent protector ( flame arrestor ) which reduces the risk of a ground fire.
Each wing tank inner cell vents through an open duct at the inboard end and a vent float valve at the outboard
end.
The ducts are large enough to ensure that if the pressure refueling shut--off failed, excess fuel can be dis-
charged overboard through the NACA intake without the tank pressure exceeding design limits.
Vent Float Valves
A vent float valve fitted to the outer side of sealed Rib 15 permits air to be vented from the outer cell to the inner
cell during flght maneuvers.
The center tank vent line is a conventional open line large enough for airflow only. With its open end at the cen-
ter of the tank the line runs through the wing tank to the vent surge tank. If there is a refueling overflow, a pres-
sure relief valve permits fuel to flow into the RH wing tank inner cell.
Fuel Spill
Fuel spilled through the vent pipes into the vent surge tank is induced back into the outer cell by a scavenge jet
pump using motivating force from the wing fuel pumps . The vent surge tank will hold 190 Liters ( 50 U.S. gal. )
before overflowing into the upturned NACA intake duct.
Overpressure Protectors
Overpressure protectors are installed in the system to relieve pressure in the tanks that might occur through
vent blockage or a pressure refueling gallery failure. Overpressure protectors are disposed as follows:
-- Center tank:Mounted in an interconnecting pipe in the LH tank wall,excess pressure in the center tank
relieves into the LH inner cell.
-- Vent tank: mounted on a handhole cover between Ribs 24 and 25 will relieve to permit venting if the vent
protector or NACA intake be comes blocked.
Refuel / Defuel System.
Fuel supplied to the refuel / defuel couplings from a ground fuel supply is distributed in the required quantities to
the aircraft tanks through the refuel valves.
The system can also be used to defuel the aircraft through the same couplings.
FueI Quantity Indicating ( FQI ) System
The system gives:
-- full fuel mass measurement and display.
-- automatic control of refueling to give automatic shut--off at a preselected quantity with correct distribution of
final load.
-- system integrity monitoring using built--in test equipment ( BITE ).
-- Aeronautical Radio Incorporated ARINC 429 digital data outputs which give related FQI information to the
other airborne systems
-- fuel temperature measurement ( and display on ECAM ).
Attitude data ( acceleration ) is received through the ARINC link during flight from the Air Data inertial Reference
System ( ADIRS ) and is used as an alternate source of attitude.
Manual Magnetic Indicator

One MLI is installed in the center tank and five in each wing tank, distributed four in each inner cell and one in
each outer cell.
Prior of using the MLIs for mesurement the fuel quantity a reading is taken from an attitude monitor in the right--
hand ( RH ) fuselage fairing to determine the out of--level attitude of the aircraft in the pitch and roll axis.

FUEL SYSTEM
Intercell Transfer System

When the fuel level in either wing--tank inner--cell drops to the low level sensors,the transfer valves in both the
LH and the RH wing tanks open automatically.
There are two low level sensors in each inner cell. Each sensor will signal two valves to open, one in each wing,
ensuring that transfer is simultaneous in each wing.
A signal from the sensors energizes Channel 1 and Channel 2 relays to open the transfer valves. When opened
they electrically latch in the open position until the system is reset by the next refueling selection.
LEGEND:
FUEL QUANTITY INDICATING PROBE 0 OVERFLOW SENSOR
FUEL QUANTITY INDICATING PROBE U UNDERFULL SENSOR

( WITH TEMPERATURE SENSOR )
F FULL LEVEL SENSOR
FUEL QUANTITY INDICATING PROBE
( WITH COMPENSATOR (CIC) ) T TEMPERATURE SENSOR AIR RELEASE VALVE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CADENSICON
I IDG SHUT - OFF SENSOR
L LOW LEVEL SENSOR
MAGNETIC LEVEL INDICATOR ( MLI )
H HIGH LEVEL SENSOR TO ENGINE 1
IDG RETURN LINE
REFUEL RECEPTACLE
( L/H SIDE OPTIONAL ) H
F
REFUEL VALVE
MM
FLOAT VALVE U
U
WING TK VENT LINE H L
L
L
CTR TK VENT LINE F I L L
OVERWING GRAVITY U
REFUEL PORT
T M MM M S
T
OVERPRESSURE
PROTECTOR
DIFFUSER DEFUEL XFER VALVE

CROSSFEED VALVE
APU PUMP CONTROL PRESS. SW.
INTERCELL TRANSFER VALVE
APU PUMP
NACA INTAKE APU LOW PRESS: VALVE
SCAVENGE JET PUMP
FLAME ARRESTOR
MANIFOLD DRAIN VALVE
AIR INLET VALVE
BOOST PUMP LOW PRESS. SW.
PRESSURE HOLDING VALVE

FUEL SYSTEM
MAIN FUEL PUMP SYSTEM

General Description
When the system is in operation, each main pump supplys fuel to:
– its related engine
– the crossfeed system
– the refuel defuel system ( for pressure defueling / fuel transfer )
If specified failures occur:
– a warning is given on the EWD
– the FUEL page shows on the SD
Engine Supply
The fuel is supplied to the Engines by six Centrifugal Booster Pumps. Two pumps are located in the center tank
and two pumps in left and right wing tank inner cell.
The pumps are controlled by switches on the overhead panel.
The system is designed for minimum pilot work load. During preflight check list, all pump switches, provided fuel
in the tanks, are switched on.
A Mode selector switch provides center tank boost pump control.
The fuel system will now operate without further interference from the Pilots, throughout the flight.
The individual pump is installed in a cannister containing a slide valve, permitting pump replacement without
draining the tank.
Each pump canister has an intake pipe fittet with a strainer.
Pump output pressure is 30 PSI. Sequence valves mounted on the wing tank boost pumps reduces the output
pressure to 25 PSI, thus giving priority to the center tank pumps, whenever they are operating.
A bypass pipe with check valve in each wing tank, enables the engine to obtain fuel by suction if both wing tank
pumps fail.The suction valve is closed by the pump pressure.
Fuel Low Pressure valves in the supply lines will close and isolate the engine or the APU when stopped, or
when the respective FIRE push-- button is activated
Crossfeed System
A Cross--feed valve connects left and right fuel feed system. To provide ” any tank to any engine supply ”.
When closed, the valve divides the main fuel pump system into two parts, one part for each engine.
APU Suply
A dedicated APU fuel pump may automatically supply the APU if the booster pumps are not operating.
The APU boost pump takes fuel from the left side feed line and is operated by AC Bus 1 or by the batteries via
the static inverter.
The APU booster pump will start when the APU master switch is selected to ON and the fuel pressure in the
feed line is below 22 psi.

FUEL SYSTEM
AIR RELEASE VALVE
TO ENGINE 1 SEQUENCE VALVE
LOW PRESSURE VALVE
MM
M MM M S
DEFUEL XFER VALVE

CROSSFEED VALVE
APU PUMP CONTROL PRESS. SW.
APU PUMP
SCAVENGE JET PUMP APU LOW PRESS: VALVE
BYPASS PIPE
BOOST PUMP LOW PRESS. SW.
MAIN PUMP CONTROLS

Wing Tank Pumps
The wing tank pumps of the main fuel pump system are manually controlled.
Normally the two pumps in the wing tank supply an engine. But, one pump can supply the necessary fuel for an
engine.
The L/H - R/H TK PUMPS P/B switches are usally set on together. The main pumps then operate continuously.
If one main pump has a failure ( or is set to OFF ), the other pump will continue to supply fuel to its related en-
gine.
Center Tank Pumps
The center tank pumps have two modes of operation:
– manual
– automatic
In manual mode ( MODE SEL P/B switch released out ), the operation of the pumps is controlled by the CTR
TK PUMPS P/B switches.
In automatic mode ( MODE SEL P/B switch pushed in ) the center tank pumps are controlled by the Fuel Level
Sensing Control Unit depend on, slats position, wing and center tank low level sensors.
If the CTR TK PUMPS P/B switches set to ON:
During engine start, regardless of the slats position, the center tank pumps will operate for two minutes to scav-
enge any water in the tank before take off.
On ground, before take off, when slats are extended, the center tank pumps will stop and the fuel will be sup-
plied by the wing tank pumps.

FUEL SYSTEM
During climb, when slats are retracted below 16˚ the center tank pumps will start and the higher pressure will
give priority to the center tank pumps.
The pumps will now operate untill center tank low level plus five minutes is obtained. Fault inhibit relays do not
let the FAULT annunciators come ON during the five minute periode.
If left or right wing tanks, due to the IDG oil cooling system, reach full level, the center tank pumps will be
stopped untill underfull level in wing tanks are sensed. Underfull level is approximately 500 kg below full level.
Wing Tank Pump Control (Typical)

175˚C
204 XP
115V AC
BUS 2 A
B
FUEL / L WING
C TK / PUMP 2 SPLY
TK PUMP 2 L WING
PUMP CNTOR
L WING TK PUMP
115V
AC
FAULT
OFF
36LP XFMR- SYS 2
OFF
202PP ON
28V DC
BUS 2 FUEL / PUMPS 2
R CTL AND L IND
204PP
28V DC TO SDAC
BUS 2 FUEL / PUMPS 2
L CTL AND R IND P/B SW FUEL
L TK PUMP / 2
FILAMENT TEST
LO
HI
SYS FAULT
P RELAY
TO SDAC
PRESS SW FUEL PUMP BOARD-ANN LT TEST & INTFC


FUEL SYSTEM
2XP
AC BUS 2 PUMP CONTROL 175˚C
A
B
C CTR TK PUMP
MODE SELECTOR
FAULT LIGHT
OFF MAN
AUTO
28V DC STOP
ON AUTO
INNER CELL FULL LVL

SLATS > 16˚
TD
ENG START 2 MIN
LH TK < 5000 kg
CTR TK > 250 kg
N2 IDLE NOT REFUEL
CTR TK > 250 kg
TD
5 MIN L RH TK < 5000 kg
CTR TK LOW LVL A
T
REFUEL PNL DOOR C FQIC
RESET H

FUEL SYSTEM
1 3 2
1 L and R Tank Pump PB Switch ( 4 )

Each PB Switch controls one fuel boost pump in the wing tanks. OFF light ( white ) and FAULT light ( amber )
are integrated in the switch.
OFF – ( PB Switch OUT )
– The pump is switched off. The OFF light is on and the FAULT light is deactivated.
ON – ( PB Switch IN )
– The pump runs, but supplies fuel to the engine only if the outletpressure of the CTR TK Pump drops.
The FAULT light is activated.
– The FAULT light comes on amber, if the pump-outlet-pressure drops. In that case ECAM will be acti-
vated.
2 Mode Selector PB Switch A319 / 320

This PB Switch activates / deactivates the Automatic-Feed-Mode of the center tank boost pumps. In the switch
are FAULT- and MAN light integrated.
AUTO – ( PB Switch IN )
– The CTR TK Pumps are controlled automatically. They run:
S after engine-start for 2 minutes.
S before and after engine-start, if the slats are up.
S until the CTR TK is empty plus 5 minutes.
– The FAULT light comes on, if the CTR TK contains > 250 Kg of fuel and the fuel quantity in one of the
WING TKs drops below < 5000 Kg.In that case ECAM will be activated.
MAN – ( PB Switch OUT )

– The CTR TK Pumps are controlled by their PB Switches manually.

FUEL SYSTEM
3 Center Tank Pump PB Switch ( 2 ) A319 / 320

Each PB Switch controls one fuel boost pump in the center tank. OFF- and FAULT light are integrated in the
switch.
– The pump is switched off. The OFF light is on ( white ) and the FAULT light is deactivated.
– The pump runs, supplies fuel to the engine in MAN MODE. In AUTO MODE the pump is controled auto-
matically.
– The FAULT light comes on amber, if the pump is activated, and the pump outletpressure drops. In that
case ECAM will be activated.
4 X-Feed PB Switch
This PB Switch controls the cross feed valve in the engine feed system. ON light ( white ) and OPEN light (
green ) are integrated in the switch.
– The cross feed valve is closed. No light is on.
– The cross feed valve is open. The ON light is on. The OPEN light comes on when the cross feed valve
reaches full open position.

FUEL SYSTEM
REFUELING CONTROL PANEL
FUEL QTY
KG X 1000
LEFT CTR RIGHT
2.80 2.40 3.00 1
HI. LVL.
LEFT CTR RIGHT 2
REFUEL VALVES
OPEN OPEN OPEN
NORM NORM NORM 3
SHUT SHUT SHUT
TEST 6
MODE SELECT BATT POWER
REFUEL HI LVL ON
4 OFF 12
OPEN LTS
DEFUEL/XFR NORM 5
PRESELECTED REFUEL ACTUAL
KGX1000
7 14.5 8.20 9
DEC INC 11 END
8
CKPT 10
1 FUEL QUANTITY Indicator

Displays the quantity of fuel in each tank.
2 HI LVL Lighs
Illuminate blue when high level is detected.The corresponding refuel valve closes automatically.
3 REFUEL VALVES Select Switch ( guarded in NORM )

NORM:– Refuel valves are controlled by automatic refuelling logic.
OPEN:– Valves open when the MODE SELECT sw is set to REFUEL or DEFUEL position . In REFUEL position
each refuel / defuel valve will close when high level is detected in the associated tank.
SHUT:– Valve close.

FUEL SYSTEM
4 MODE SELECT Switch ( guarded at OFF )

0FF:– Refuel system is deenergized. Refuel valves are closed.
REFUEL:– Refuel valves operate in automatic or in manual mode depending on the position of REFUEL VALVE
switches.
DEFUEL:– Refuel / defuel transfer valve opens. Refuel valve opens provided associated REFUEL VALVE se-
lector is at OPEN position.
5 OPEN XFR Light

Comes on amber when the transfer valve is open.
6 TEST Switch
When pressed to HI.LVL
– the HI LVL lights come on if high level sensors and associated circuits are serviceable
NOTE: If tanks are full ( HI LVL lights on ) when test is performed,the HI LVL lights extingush if high level sen-
sors and associated circuits are serviceable.
When pressed to LTS
– HI.LVL Lights on panel and all 8‘s on FQI and preselector come on.
7 PRESELECTED Display
Displays the preselected total fuel quantity in kg ( lb ) x 1000.
8 Preselector Rocker Switch

Pressing either side of the switch increases or decreases the preselected quantity.
9 ACTUAL Display
Displays the total fuel on board.
10 END Light
GREEN:– Automatic refuelling is completed.
GREEN FLASHING:– Fuelling aborded.
11 CKPT Light
Indicates that cockpit refuel panel has priority.
Illuminates when electrical PWR pb switch on cockpit refuel panel is pressed.
12 BATT. POWER Toggle Switch ( IF INSTALLED! )

ON:– When momentarily selected on and released the FQI is supplied by BAT 1. After completion of FQI
tests ( about 40 sec ),the fuel quantity indications appear and the refuel operation can be selected.
The electrical supply is automatically cut off after 10 min, if no refuel operation is selected or at the
end of refuelling.
NORM:– The FQI is not supplied by BAT.

FUEL SYSTEM


HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
ATA 29 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM


HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
GENERAL
The aircraft has three continuously operating hydraulic systems : blue, green, and yellow. Each system has its
own hydraulic reservoir, Normal system operating pressure is 3000 PSI (2500 PSI when powered by the RAT).
Hydraulic fluid cannot be transferred from one system to another.
GENERATION
Green System Pimp
A pump driven by engine 1 pressurizes the green system.
Blue System Pump
An electric pump pressurizes the blue system. A pump driven by a ram air turbine (RAT) pressurizes this system
in an emergency.
Yellow System Pump
A pump driven by engine 2 pressurizes the yellow system.
An electric pump can also pressurize the yellow system, which allows yellow hydraulics to be used on the
ground when the engines are stopped.
Crew members can also use a hand pump to pressurize the yellow system in order to operate the cargo doors
when no electrical power is available.
Power Transfer Unit (PTU)
A bidirectional power transfer unit enables the yellow system to pressurize the green system and vice versa.
The power transfer unit comes into action automatically when the differential pressure between the green and
the yellow systems is greater than 500 PSI.
The PTU therefore allows the green system to be pressurized on the ground when the engines are stopped.
Ram Air Turbine (RAT)

A drop--out RAT coupled to a hydraulic pump allows the blue system to function if electrical power is lost or both
engines fail. The RAT deploys automatically if AC BUS 1 and AC BUS 2 are both lost. It can be deployed manu-
ally from the overhead panel. It can he stowed only when the aircraft is on the ground.
System accumulators
An accumulator in each system helps to maintain a constant pressure by covering transient demands during
normal operation.
Priority valves
Priority valves cutoff hydraulic power to heavy load users if hydraulic pressure in a system gets low.
Fire shutoff valves
Each of the green and yellow systems has a lire shutoff valve in its line upstream of its engine--driven pump. The
flight crew can close it by pushing the ENG 1(2) FIRE pushbutton.

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
Leak measurement valves

Each system has a leak measurement valve upstream of the primary flight controls.
These valves, which measure the leakage in each circuit, are closed by operation of the LEAK MEASUREMENT
VALVES pushbutton switch on the maintenance panel.
Filters
Filters clean the hydraulic fluid as follows
-- HP filters on each system and on the reservoir filling system and the normal braking system
-- return line filters on each line
-- case drain filters on engine pumps and the blue electric pump (which permit maintenance to monitor engine
wear by inspecting the filters for the presence of metallic particles).
MP MP
ACCUM ACCUMULATOR ACCUMULATOR
CARGO DOOR
ENG 1 ELEC ENG 2 ELEC

PUMP PUMP PUMP PUMP
(78L/MN) RAT
HAND
PUMP
ENG 1 ENG 2
FIRE FIRE
SHUT OFF SHUT OFF
VALVE VALVE
GREEN BLUE YELLOW

RESERVOIR RESERVOIR RESERVOIR

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
LANDING GEAR EMER GEN FLAPS
SLAT & FLAPS SLATS
NWS
PRIORITY PRIORITY PRIORITY

VALVE VALVE VALVE
REV ENG 1
NOR BRAKES
ALT/PARK BRAKE
YAW DAMP 1 REV ENG 2
RUDDER RUDDER YAW DAMP 2
STABILIZER FLAPS L&R WTB RUDDER
L ELEVATOR SLATS L&R WTB STABILIZER
L & R SPLR 1 L & R ELEVATOR R ELEVATOR
R AIL L & R SPOILER 3 L & R SPLR 2
R SPLR 5 L & R AILERON R SPLR 4
R SLAT WTB
R FLAP WTB
S SLAT WTB
L FLAP WTB
L AIL
L SPLR 4
L SPLR 5
GREEN BLUE YELLOW

PRESSURE PRESSURE PRESSURE

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
A/C SYSTEMS
ECAM
LEAK SYS LO PR CAUTION

MEAS.
VALVE
SYS PRESS
P
PTU
ACCUMULATOR
ENG PUMP LO PR
ENG
DRIVEN
PUMP
ENG
FIRE
SHUOFF
VALVE
LO AIR PR
FLUID
QUANTITY
FLUID TEMP OVHT

LO LVL

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
OVERHEAD PANEL
4
1 5 2 1 3
1 ENG 1 (2) PUMP pb

On: The pump pressurizes the system when the engine is running.
OFF: The pump is depressurized. The generation of hydraulic power stops.
FAULT It: This amber light comes on, and the ECAM caution appears, if
S The reservoir level is low
S The reservoir overheats
S The reservoir air pressure is low
S The pump pressure is low (inhibited on the ground, when the engine is stopped).
This light goes out, when the crew selects OFF, except during an overheat.
(The light stays on as long as the overheat lasts).
2 BLUE ELEC PUMP pb

AUTO: If AC power is available, the electric pump operates
S In flight
S On the ground, if one engine is running or if the crew has pressed the BLUE PUMP OVRD pushbutton on the
maintenance panel.
OFF: The pump is de--energized.
FAULT It: This amber light comes on, and a caution appears on the ECAM, if:
S The reservoir level is low
S The reservoir overheats
S The air pressure in the reservoir is low
S The pump is delivering low pressure (inhibited on the ground, when the engines are stopped)
S The pump overheats.
The light goes out, when the crew selects OFF, except during an overheat.
3 YELLOW ELEC PUMP pb sw (springIoaded)

ON: The electric pump is ON. (If the electrical power supply is removed, the pump will remain off when
electrical power is applied again.)
Off: The pump is off.
It comes on automatically when a crewman sets the lever of the cargo door manual selector valve to
OPEN or CLOSE.

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
This inhibits the operation of other yellow system functions (except alternate braking and engine 2
reverse).
4 FAULT It: This amber light, accompanied by an ECAM caution, comes on if:
S the reservoir level is low
S air pressure in the reservoir is low
S the reservoir overheats
S pump pressure is low
S the pump overheats.
The light goes out when the crew selects OFF, except during an overheat.
5 PTU pb sw
AUTO: The bidirectional power transfer unit is armed and both the yellow and the green electrohydraulic
valves are open.
The power transfer unit runs automatically when the differential pressure between the green and yellow
systems is more than 500 PSI.
NOTE: THE PTU IS INHIBITED DURING THE FIRST ENGINE START AND AUTOMATICALLY
TESTED DURING THE SECOND ENGINE START.
OFF: Both the green and the yellow PTU electrohydraulic valves close. Power transfer stops.
FAULT It: This amber light comes on, and a caution appears on the ECAM, if:
S the green or the yellow reservoir overheats
S the green or the yellow reservoir has low air pressure
S the green or the yellow reservoir has a low fluid level.
The light goes out when the crew selects OFF, except during un overheat.
RAT MAN ON pb
The flight crew may extend the RAT at any time by pressing the RAT MAN ON pushbutton.
NOTE: THE RAT EXTENDS AUTOMATICALLY IF AC BUS I AND AC BUS 2 ARE LOST.

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
MAINTENANCE PANEL
1 2 2 2
1 BLUE PUMP OVRD pb sw (springloaded)

ON: The blue electric pump is on if the ELEC PUMP pushbutton switch on the HYD panel is at AUTO.
Off: The blue electric pump is off.
2 LEAK MEASUREMENT VALVES pb sw

OFF: The corresponding electrohydraulic valve closes and shuts off hydraulic supply to the primary Ilight con-
trols.
On: The corresponding electrohydraulic valve opens to go back to normal hydraulic supply.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
ATA 27 FLIGHT CONTROLS


FLIGHT CONTROLS
GENERAL
The fly--by--wire system was designed and certified to render the new generation of aircraft even more safe, cost
effective, and pleasant to fly.
BASIC PRINCIPLE
Flight control surfaces are all:
S Electrically--controlled, and
S Hydraulically--activated.
The stabilizer and rudder can also be mechanically--controlled.
Pilots use sidesticks to fly the aircraft in pitch and roll (and in yaw, indirectly, through turn coordination).
Computers interpret pilot input and move the flight control surfaces, as necessary, to follow their orders.
However, when in normal law, regardless of the pilot’s input, the computers will prevent excessive maneuvers
and exceedance of the safe envelope in pitch and roll axis.
However, as on conventional aircraft, the rudder has no such protection.
A/P
COMPUTER FEEDBACK
COMPUTER
SIDE
ORDER
STICK
F/CTL
COMPUTER
FEEDBACK
PILOT’S COMMAND SURFACE RESPONSE

FLIGHT CONTROLS
CONTROL SURFACES
SLATS
RUDDER
FLAPS
HORIZONTAL
STABILIZER
AILERON SPOILERS ELEVATORS
The flight controls are electrically or mechanically controlled as follows

Pitch axis
Elevator = Electrical
Stabilizer = Electrical for normal or alternate control. Mechanical for manual trim control
Roll axis
Ailerons = Electrical
Spoilers = Electrical
Yaw axis
Rudder = Mechanical, however control for yaw damping, turn coordination and trim is electrical.
Speed brakes
Speed brakes = Electrical
NOTE: ALL SURFACES ARE HYDRAULICALLY ACTUATED.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
COCKPIT CONTROLS
S Each pilot has a sidestick controller with which to exercise manual control of pitch and roll. These are on their
respective lateral consoles.
The two sidestick controllers are not coupled mechanically, and they send separate sets of signals to the
flight control computers.
S Two pairs of pedals, which are rigidly interconnected, give the pilot mechanical control of the rudder.
S The pilots control speed brakes with a lever on the center pedestal.
S The pilots use mechanically interconnected handwheels on each side of the center pedestal to control the
trimmable horizontal stabilizer.
S The pilots use a single switch on the center pedestal to set the rudder trim.
S There is no manual switch for trimming the ailerons.
COMPUTERS
Seven flight control computers process pilot and autopilot inputs according to normal, alternate, or direct flight
control laws.
The computers are
2 ELACs
(Elevator Aileron Computer)
For : Normal elevator and stabilizer control.
Aileron control.
3 SECs
(Spoilers Elevator Computer)
For : Spoilers control.
Standby elevator and stabilizer control.
2 FACs
(Flight Augmentation Computer)
For : Electrical rudder control.
In addition 2 FCDC
Flight Control Data Concentrators (FCDC) acquire data from the ELACs and SECs and send it to the electronic
instrument system (ElS) and the centralized fault display system (CFDS).

FLIGHT CONTROLS
MECH LINK
ADIRU FMGC
RUD TRIM
NOSE NOSE
L R
RUDDER
FAC 2
1
YAW RATE
ORDER
RADIO
ACCELERO ALTI
SIDE FMGC
STICK ADIRU LGCIU
AILERONS
ELAC 2
1
ROLL ORDERS
(A/P OR MANUAL)
PEDALS
ELEVATOR
EIS
SPEED FCDC
BRAKE THS
CONTROL
LEVER ABN
LAW
SIDE
STICK
SPOILERS
3
SEC 2
1
HYDRAULIC
SFCC ACCELERO RADIO JACKS
ALTI
ADIRU LGCIU
TRIM

FLIGHT CONTROLS
SPD--BRK SPD--BRK
GRD--SPLR GRD--SPLR
ROLL ROLL
L. AIL G Y B Y G G Y B Y G R. AIL
B G G B
ELAC 1 2 1 2 ELAC
SEC 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 1 1 2 SEC
B SFCC1 THS HYDRAULIC SFCC2 Y

SLATS MOTORS FLAPS
G SFCC2 SFCC1 G
G Y
MECH
L. ELEV CONT R. ELEV
B G Y B
1 2 3 ELECTRICAL MOTORS
ELAC 1 2 2 1 2 1 ELAC
SEC 1 2 1 2 2 1 SEC
FAC 1 2
1 2 TRV LIM
YAW DAMPER B
ACTUATOR
Y
FAC 1 G
RUDDER
G
FAC 2 Y
1 FAC 1
MECH CONT RUD TRIM
2 FAC 2
Arrow indicate the control reconfiguration priorities

G B Y indicate the hydraulic power source (Green, Blue, or Yellow) for each servo control

FLIGHT CONTROLS
PITCH CONTROL
TRIM
B
L. ELEV
G
MECHANICAL TRIM
TRIM
1 G
AUTO 2 THS
TRIM
3 Y
ELEC MOTORS HYD. MOTORS
Y
AUTOPILOTS R. ELEV
ELAC B
COMMAND (2)
(1)
NORM
ELAC 1+2 FAIL
SEC (2)
SIDESTICK (1)
COMMANDS
Two elevators and the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) control the aircraft in pitch. The maximum elevator
deflection is 30 degrees nose up, and 17 degrees nose down. The maximum THS deflection is 13.5 degrees
nose up, and 4 degrees nose down.
ELECTRICAL CONTROL
S In normal operations, ELAC2 controls the elevators and the horizontal stabilizer, and the green and yellow
hydraulic jacks drive the left and right elevator surfaces respectively.
The THS is driven by N 1 of three electric motors.
S If a failure occurs in ELAC2, or in the associated hydraulic systems, or with the hydraulic jacks, the system
shifts pitch control to ELAC1. ELAC1 then controls the elevators via the blue hydraulic jacks and controls the
THS via the N 2 electric motor.
S If neither ELAC1 nor ELAC2 is available, the system shifts pitch control either to SEC1 or to SEC2, (depend-
ing on the status of the associated circuits), and to THS motor N 2 or N 3.
MECHANICAL CONTROL
Mechanical control of the THS is available from the pitch trim wheel at any time, if either the green or yellow hy-
draulic system is functioning.
Mechanical control from the pitch trim wheel has priority over electrical control.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
ACTUATION
Elevators
-- Two electrically--controlled hydraulic servojacks drive each elevator.
Each servojack has three control modes
Active : The jack position is electrically--controlled.
Damping : The jack follows surlace movement.
Centering : The jack is hydraulically retained in the neutral position.
-- In normal operation
One jack is in active mode.
The other jack is in damping mode.
Some maneuvers cause the second jack to become active.
-- If the active servojack fails, the damped one becomes active, and the failed jack is automatically switched to
the damping mode.
-- If neither jack is being controlled electrically, both are automatically switched to centering mode.
If neither jack is being controlled hydraulically, both are automatically switched to damping mode.
-- If one elevator fails, the deflection of the remaining elevator is limited in order to avoid putting excessive asym-
metric loads on the horizontal tailplane or rear fuselage.
Stabilizer
-- A screwjack, driven by two hydraulic motors, drives the stabilizer.
-- The two hydraulic motors are controlled by One of three electric motors, or The mechanical trim wheel.
Roll Control
One aileron and four spoilers on each wing control the aircraft about the roll axis.
The maximum deflection of the ailerons is 25.
The ailerons extend 5 down when the flaps are extended (aileron droop).
The maximum deflection of the spoilers is 35.

FLIGHT CONTROLS

FLIGHT CONTROLS
ROLL CONTROL
AILERONS HYDRAULIC
JACKS
AUTOPILOT
COMMANDS
ELAC 2
1
SPOILERS 2,3,4&5
3
SIDESTICK SEC 2
1
COMMANDS
One aileron and four spoilers on each wing control the aircraft about the roll axis.
The maximum deflection of the ailerons is 25 degrees.
The ailerons extend 5 degrees down when the flaps are extended (aileron droop).
The maximum deflection of the spoilers is 35 degrees.
ELECTRIC CONTROL
-- The ELAC 1 normally controls the ailerons.
If ELAC1 fails, the system automatically transfers aileron control to ELAC2.
If both ELACs fail, the ailerons revert to the damping mode.
-- SEC3 controls the N 2 spoilers1 SEC1 the N 3 and 4 spoilers, and SEC2 the N 5 spoilers.
If a SEC fails1 the spoilers it controls are automatically retracted.
ACTUATION
Ailerons
Each aileron has two electrically controlled hydraulic servojacks.
One of these servojacks per aileron operates at a time.
Each servojack has two control modes
Active : Jack position is controlled electrically
Damping : Jack follows surlace movement.
The system automatically selects damping mode, if both ELACs fail or in the event of blue and green hydraulic
low pressure.
Spoilers
A servojack positions each spoiler. Each servojack receives hydraulic power from either the green, yellow, or
blue hydraulic system, controlled by the SEC 1, 2 or 3
The system automatically retracts the spoilers to their zero position, if it detects a fault or closes electrical con-
trol.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
If the system loses hydraulic pressure, the spoiler retains the deflection it had at the time of the loss, or a lesser
deflection if aerodynamic forces push it down.
When a spoiler surface on one wing fails, the symmetric one on the other wing is inhibited.
SPEEDBRAKES AND GROUND SPOILERS
SPEEDBRAKE CONTROL
The pilot controls the speedbrakes with the speed brake lever.
The speedbrakes are actually spoilers 2, 3 and 4.
Speedbrake extension is inhibited if
-- SEC1 and SEC3 both have faults.
-- An elevator (L or R) has a fault (in this case only spoilers 3 and 4 are inhibited).
-- Angle--of--attack protection is active.
-- Flaps are in configuration FULL.
-- Thrust levers above MCT position
-- Alpha floor activation
If an inhibition occurs when the speedbrakes are extended, they retract automatically and stay retracted until the
inhibition condition disappears and the pilots reset the lever. (The speedbrakes can be extended again 10 sec-
onds or more after the lever is reset).
When a speedbrake surface on one wing fails, the symmetric one on the other wing is inhibited.
NOTE: 1. FOR MAINTENANCE PURPOSES, THE SPEEDBRAKE LEVER WILL EXTEND THE N 1 SUR-
FACES WHEN THE AIRCRAFT IS STOPPED ON THE GROUND, WHATEVER THE SLAT/FLAP
CONFIGURATION.
NOTE: 2. WHEN THE AIRCRAFT IS FLYING FASTER THAN 315 KNOTS OR MACH 0.75 WITH THE AU-
TOPILOT ENGAGED, THE SPEEDBRAKE RETRACTION RATE IS REDUCED (RETRACTION
FROM FULL TO IN TAKES ABOUT 25 SECONDS).
The maximum speedbrake deflection in manual flight is:
40 degrees for spoilers 3 and 4
20 degrees for spoiler 2.
The maximum speedbrake deflection with the autopilot engaged is:
25 degress for spoilers 3 and 4
12.5 degrees for spoilers 2.
The maximum speedbrake deflection with the autopilot engaged is achieved with half speedbrake lever deflec-
tion.
For these surfaces (which perform both roll and speedbrake functions) the roll function has priority. When the
sum of a roll order and a simultaneous speedbrake order on one surface is greater than the maximum deflection
available in flight, the same surface on the other wing is retracted until the difference between the two surfaces
is equal to the roll order.
GROUND SPOILER CONTROL
Spoilers 1 to 5 act as ground spoilers.
When a ground spoiler surface on one wing fails, the symmetric ground spoiler surface on the other wing is in-
hibited.
Arming
The pilot arms the ground spoilers by pulling the speedbrake control lever up into the armed position.
Full extension -- Rejected takeoff phase
-- If the ground spoilers are armed and the speed exceeds 72 knots, the ground spoilers will automatically ex-
tend as soon as both thrust levers are reset to idle.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
-- If the ground spoilers are not armed and the speed exceeds 72 knots, the ground spoilers will automatically
extend as soon as reverse is selected on one engine (the other thrust lever remains at idle).
Full extension -- Landing phase
-- If the ground spoilers are armed and all thrust levers are at idle, the ground spoilers will automatically extend
as soon as both main landing gears have touched down.
-- If the ground spoilers are not armed and both main landing gears have touched down, the ground spoilers will
automatically extend as soon as reverse is selected on one engine (the other thrust lever remains at idle).
NOTE: IN AUTO/AND, THE GROUND SPOILERS FULLY EXTEND AT HA/F SPEED ONE SECOND AFTER
BOTH MAIN LANDING GEARS TOUCH DOWN.
THE SPOILER ROLL FUNCTION IS INHIBITED WHEN SPOILERS ARE USED FOR THE GROUND
SPOILER FUNCTION.
Partial extension
The ground spoilers partially extend (10 degrees) when reverse is selected on at least one engine (other engine
at idle), and one main landing gear strut is compressed. This partial extension, by decreasing the lift, eases the
compression of the second main landing gear strut, and consequently leads to full ground spoiler extension.
Retraction
The ground spoilers retract:
After landing, or after a rejected takeoff, when the ground spoilers are disarmed.
NOTE: IF GROUND SPOILERS ARE NOT ARMED, THEY EXTEND AT THE REVERSE SELECTION AND
RETRACT WHEN IDLE IS SELECTED.
During a touch and go, when at least one thrust lever is advanced above 20 degrees.
NOTE: AFTER AN AIRCRAFT BOUNCE, THE GROUND SPOILERS REMAIN EXTENDED WITH THE
THRUST LEVERS AT IDLE.
GRD SPOILER
HANDLE ARMED
THRUST LEVERS
AT IDLE
ONE THRUST
LEVER IN REV
SPOILER
OTHER THRUST EXTENSION
LEVER AT IDLE
OR REV
WHEEL SPD>72 KT
(BOTH MLG)
RA<6FT FLT TO
GRD AUTO MAINTAIN
BOTH MLG TRANSITION
COMPRESSED LATCHED 3s
AT LEAST ONE THRUST

LEVER IN REV
OTHER THRUST PARTIAL
LEVER AT IDLE SPOILER
EXTENSION
ONE MLG
COMPRESSED SEC
The landing gear touchdown condition is triggered for both main landing gear, either when their wheel speed is
greater than 72 knots, or when their landing gear struts are, confirmed to be compressed by the radio altitude
(RA<6 feet).
The thrust levers are considered to be at idle when they are :
* Below 4 degrees, when the RA is above 10 feet,
* Below 15 degrees, when the RA is below 10 feet.

FLIGHT CONTROLS

FLIGHT CONTROLS
YAW CONTROL
NWS ORDER
2
1 MOTORS
ELAC RUDDER LIMIT

M1 M2
HYDRAULIC
JACKS
YAW DAMPING
A/P ROLL/YAW COMMAND TURN B
COORDINATION Y Y
YAW ORDER
G G
YAW DAMPER
SERVO ACTUATORS
2
1
FAC RUDDER TRIM RUDDER
M1 M2
ARTIFICIAL
FEEL
RUDDER
PEDALS
One rudder surface controls yaw.

ELECTRICAL RUDDER CONTROL
The yaw damping and turn coordination functions are automatic.
The ELACs compute yaw orders for coordinating turns and damping yaw oscillations, and transmit them to the
FACs.
MECHANICAL RUDDER CONTROL
The pilots can use conventional rudder pedals to control the rudder.
RUDDER ACTUATION
Three independent hydraulic servojacks, operating in parallel, actuate the rudder. In automatic operation (yaw
damping, turn coordination) a green servo actuator drives all three servojacks. A yellow servo actuator remains
synchronized and takes over if there is a failure.
There is no feedback to the rudder pedals from the yaw damping and turn coordination functions.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
RUDDER TRAVEL LIMIT

The deflection of the rudder and the pedals is limited as a function of speed.
Each channel of the limiter is controlled and monitored by its associated FAC. If both FACs fail, maximum
deflection is available when the slats are extended.
RUDDER TRIM
The two electric motors that position the artificial feel unit also trim the rudder. In normal operation, motor N1,
controlled by FAC1, drives the trim, and FAC2 with motor N2 remains synchronized as back--up.
In manual flight, the pilot can apply rudder trim with the rotary RUD TRIM switch on the pedestal.
-- Maximum deflection is +-- 20 degrees.
-- Rudder trim speed is one degree per second.
-- In addition to limitation by TLU, if rudder trim is applied, maximum rudder deflection may be reduced in the
opposite direction.
The pilot can use a button on the RUD TRIM panel to reset the rudder trim to zero.
NOTE: WITH THE AUTOPILOT ENGAGED, THE FMGC COMPUTES THE RUDDER TRIM ORDERS. THE
RUDDER TRIM ROTARY SWITCH AND THE RUDDER TRIM RESET PUSHBUTTON ARE NOT AC-
TIVE.

FLIGHT CONTROLS

FLIGHT CONTROLS
3 1
1 RUD TRIM Rotary Switch

Controls the rudder trim actuator, which moves the neutral point of the artificial feel by the equivalent of one de-
gree of rudder travel per second.
Note: The rudder trim rotary switch has no effect, when the autopilot is engaged.
2 RESET Pushbutton
By pushing the RESET pushbutton, the zero trim position is ordered at 1 .5 degree/second.
Note: The RESET pushbutton is not active, when the autopilot is engaged.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
3 Position Indicator
Displays the rudder trim direction (L or R) and value (0 to 20degrees).
4 SPEEDBRAKE lever
The lever controls
-- The position of the speedbrake surfaces.
To set speedbrake surlaces to a required position, the lever has to be pushed down and set to the required posi-
tion. A “hardpoint” is provided at “1/2” SPEEDBRAKE position.
-- The manual preselection of the ground spoilers.
To arm the ground spoilers, the lever must be pulled up when in the RET position.
When the lever is armed (or reverse thrust is selected), all spoiler’s surfaces will automatically extend at land-
ing, or in case of a rejected takeoff.
5 PITCH TRIM wheel

Both pitch trim wheels provide mechanical control of the THS and have priority over electrical control. A pilot
action on the pitch trim wheel disconnects the autopilot.
Note: Crew action on the pitch trim wheel does not disconnect the ELACs (micro--switches, actuated by the
override mechanism, ensure that the computers remain synchronized with the manually--selected position).
The THS is manually--controlled on ground for the THS setting, before takeoff and in flight, when in direct law.
-- Before takeoff, the pilot sets the THS to the angular value, determined as a function of the aircraft CG, using
the CG scale on the wheel. The relationship between the aircraft CG and the THS setting shown on the trim
wheel is only applicable for takeoff.
The limits of the THS normal setting range for takeoff are indicated by a green band on the pitch trim wheel.
-- In flight, when in direct law, the pilot uses the THS conventionally to fly in trim. In flight, the aircraft pitch trim
setting depends on aircraft CC, weight, altitude and speed. Consequently, the relation between the aircraft CG,
and the THS setting displayed on the pitch trim wheel, does not apply in flight.
Following nosewheel touchdown, as the pitch attitude becomes less than 2.5 degrees for more than 5 seconds,
pitch trim is automatically reset to zero.
Note: This function is inoperative, when the green or yellow hydraulic system is not pressurized.

FLIGHT CONTROLS
OVERHEAD PANEL
1 2 3
2
1 3

FLIGHT CONTROLS
1 ELAC 1(2) pushbutton

Controls the Elevator and Aileron Control (ELAC) Computer 1(2).
ON : ELAC 1(2) performs the following functions
-- Normal pitch and roll
-- Alternate pitch
-- Direct pitch and roll
-- Abnormal attitude
-- Aileron droop
-- Acquisition of autopilot orders.
OFF : The corresponding computer is not active. Switching it OFF, then ON, resets the computer.
FAULT : Comes on amber, along with an ECAM caution
-- When a failure is detected
-- During ELAC power--up test (eight seconds).
Note: The ELAC power--up test occurs when electrical power is turned on, or after the occurrence of an electri-
cal transient lasting longer than 25 milliseconds.
The FAULT light goes off, when the pilot selects OFF, or at the end of the ELAC power--up test, if its results are
satisfactory.
1 SEC 1(2)(3) pushbutton

Controls the spoiler and elevator (SEC) computers 1(2)(3).
ON : SEC 1(2)(3) performs the following functions
-- Normal roll (by controlling the spoilers)
-- Speedbrakes and ground spoilers
-- Alternate pitch (SEC 1 and SEC 2 only)
-- Direct pitch (SEC 1 and SEC 2 only)
-- Direct roll
-- Abnormal attitude.
OFF : The corresponding computer is not active. Switching it OFF, then on, resets the computer.
FAULT : Comes on amber, along with an ECAM caution, when a failure is detected.
The FAULT light goes off, when the pilot selects OFF.
1 FAC 1(2) pb sw
Controls the flight augmentation computer (FAC) 1(2).
ON : Both FAGs perform the following functions
-- Normal roll (coordinating turns and damping dutch roll)
-- Rudder trim
-- Rudder travel limit
-- Alternate yaw
OFF: The corresponding computer is not active. Switching it OFF and then ON resets the computer.
FAULT : Lights up in amber, along with a caution on ECAM, when a failure is detected.
The FAULT light goes out when the pilot selects OFF.

ATA 32 LANDING GEAR
Page: 261
GENERAL
The landing gear consists of:
-- two main gear that retract inboard,
-- a nose gear that retracts forward.
Doors enclose the landing gear bays. Gear and doors are electrically controlled and hydraulically operated.
The doors, which are fitted to the landing gear struts, are operated mechanically by the gear and close at the
end of gear retraction.
All gear doors open while the gear is retracting or extending.
Two Landing Gear Control and Interlace Units (LGCIUs} control the extension and retraction of the gear and the
operation of the doors. They also supply information about the landing gear to ECAM for display, and send sig-
nals indicating whether the aircraft is in flight or on the ground to other aircraft systems.
A hand crank on the center pedestal allows the flight crew to extend the landing gear if the aircraft loses hydrau-
lic systems or electrical power.
MAIN GEAR
Each main gear has twin wheels and an oleopneumatic shock absorber.
Each main wheel has an antiskid brake.
NOSE GEAR
The two--wheeled nose gear has an oleopneumatic shock strut and a nose wheel steering system.
Page: 262
DOWNLOCK RETRACTION ACTUATOR

ACTUATOR
LOCK STAY
SAFETY PIN
DOWNLOCK
SPRINGS
SHOCK ABSORBER
RETRACTION
ACTUATOR
DOWNLOCK
ACTUATOR
SAFETY PIN
DOWNLOCK SPRINGS
FWD
Page: 263
OPERATION OF GEAR AND DOORS

NORMAL OPERATION
The flight crew normally operates the landing gear by means of the lever on the center instrument panel.
The LGCIUs control the sequencing of gear and doors electrically. One LGCIU controls one complete gear
cycle, then switches over automatically to the other LGCIU at the completion of the retraction cycle. It also
switches over in case of failure.
The green hydraulic system actuates all gear and doors. When the aircraft is flying faster than 260 kt, a safety
valve automatically cuts off hydraulic supply to the landing gear system. Below 260 kt, the hydraulic supply re-
mains cut off as long as the landing gear lever is up.
GREEN HYDRAULIC SUPPLY

ADR 1 < 260KT
ADR 3 < 260 KT
MLG ON GRD
OPENING
SAFETY VALVE
SYST 1
L/G LEVER DOWN
SELF MAINTAINED
CLOSURE
GRAVITY EXTENSION
CUT OFF VALVE
PROXIMITY
DETECTORS
LGCIU
LANDING GEAR 2
LEVER 1
DOOR GEAR
SELECTOR SELECTOR
VALVE VALVE
ECAM
LANDING GEAR INDICATION PANEL
(LGCIU 1 ONLY)
DOORS NOSE AND

MAIN GEARS
Page: 264
EMERGENCY EXTENSION
If the normal system fails to extend the gear hydraulically, the flight crew can use a crank to extend it mechani-
cally.
When a crew member turns the crank, it
-- isolates the landing gear hydraulics from the green hydraulic system,
-- unlocks the landing gear doors and the main and nose main gear,
-- allows gravity to drop the gear into the extended position.
Locking springs help the crew to crank the main gear into the locked condition, and aerodynamic forces assist in
the locking of the nose gear.
The gear doors remain open.
The flight crew can reset the emergency extension system in flight after using it for training (if green hydraulic
pressure is available).
Page: 265
LANDING GEAR SYSTEM INTERFACE

LGCIUs
The LGCIUs receive position information from the landing gear, cargo door, and landing flap systems.
LANDING GEAR
The LGCIUs receive the following information about the landing gear from proximity detectors
-- gear locked down or up,
-- shock absorbers compressed or extended,
-- landing gear door open or closed.
Failure of a proximity detector
The LGCIU detects any electrical failure in a proximity detector, and signals the associated output to the flight
position (shock absorber not compressed or landing gear uplocked).
The other LGCIU then automatically takes over control of the landing gear operation.
-- In case of mechanical failure, the LGCIU does not modify the associated output. The effect that such a failure
has on the system depends upon which condition is signalled incorrectly.
Electrical failure of an LGCIU
-- The other (healthy) LGCIU takes control of the landing gear.
-- The system does not force the outputs of the failed LGCIU to the safe (flight) condition.
Some users will see flight condition.
Some users will see ground condition.
CARGO DOORS
Sensors send to the LGCIUs the position of the following components
-- manual selector valves,
-- locking shaft,
-- locking handle,
-- safety shaft,
The LGCIUs detect electrical failures only in certain proximity switches in the cargo door system
-- locking shaft,
-- locking handle,
-- safety shaft.
When an LGCIU makes such a detection, it indicates the NON LOCKED condition for that component.
FLAPS
The LGCIIJs process the signals from four flap disconnect proximity switches, then send them to the Slat/Flap
Control Computers (SFCCs).
The LGCIUs do not monitor failures in the SFCC system.
Page: 266
PROXIMITY DETECTOR OUTPUT SIGNAL
Page: 267
PROXIMITY DETECTOR OUTPUT SIGNAL (CONT’D)
Page: 268
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN LANDING GEAR AND AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

The following tables present the operational effects of the proximity detectors on aircraft systems.
How to read the tables
The above lines mean that the service interphone receives the output 6 from both LGCIUs, while SFCC 1 re-
ceive the output 5 from LGCIU 1 and SFCC 2 the output 5 from LGCIU 2.
The two additional colums give the system functioning when the aircraft is in flight and on the ground.
PROXIMITY DETECTORS ON SHOCK ABSORBER

Page: 269
Page: 270
Page: 271
Page: 272
Page: 273
Page: 274
Page: 275
Page: 276
Page: 277
Page: 278
Page: 279

LANDING GEAR INDICATOR PANEL
This panel is connected to LGCILJ11 which receives signals from proximity detectors.
UNLK: come on red if the gear is not locked in the selected position.
come on green if the gear is locked down.
NOTE: THE LIGHTS ON THE LDG GEAR INDICATOR PANEL COME ON AS LONG AS THE LGCIU1 IS
ELECTRICALLY SUPPLIED.
Page: 280
LANDING GEAR SELECTOR LEVER

A two--position selector lever sends electrical signals to the two LGCIUs. These control the green hydraulic sup-
ply to the landing gear system by means of selector valves.
When the flight crew selects UP or DOWN (and if the airspeed is below 260 knots)
-- All landing gear doors open.
-- Each landing gear moves to the selected position.
-- All landing gear doors close.
1 2
1 L/G LEVER
UP : This position selects landing gear retraction.
While the landing gear doors are opening, the normal brake system brakes the wheels of the main gear
automatically.
DOWN : This position selects landing gear extension.
An interlock mechanism prevents anyone from accidentally retracting the gear while the aircraft is on the
ground. It does so by locking the lever in DOWN position when the shock absorber on either main gear is
compressed (aircraft on ground) or the nose wheel steering is not centered.
The landing gear hydraulic system remains pressurized as long as the landing gear is extended (if green
hydraulic pressure is available).
2 RED ARROW
This red arrow lights up if the landing gear is not locked down when the aircraft is in the landing configuration,
and a red warning appears on ECAM.
Page: 281
EMERGENCY EXTENSION
To put the landing gear down by gravity, the flight crew must pull the gear crank out then turn it clockwise for 3
turns.
When the flight crew operates the crank handle, the cutout valve shuts off hydraulic pressure to the landing gear
system and depressurizes it.
Page: 282
NOSE WHEEL STEERING

DESCRIPTION
A hydraulic actuating cylinder steers the nose wheel. The green hydraulic system supplies pressure to the cylin-
der, and electric signals from the Brake and Steering Control Unit (BSCU) control it.
The BSCU receives orders from:
-- the Captain’s and the First Officer’s steering hand wheels (orders added algebraically),
-- the rudder pedals,
-- the autopilot.
The BSCU transforms these orders into nose wheel steering angle. That angle has the following limits, which
depend on ground speed and the origin of the orders.
The steering system receives actuating hydraulic pressure when

-- the 4/SKID & N/W STRG switch is on and,
-- the towing control lever is in normal position and,
-- at least one engine is running and,
-- the aircraft is on ground.
The nose landing gear doors must be closed in order for the green hydraulic system to apply pressure to the
actuating cylinder.
The handwheel can turn the nose wheel up to 75 in either direction. A lever on the towing electrical box (on
nose landing gear) allows ground crew to deactivate the steering system for towing. This then allows the wheel
to be turned 95 in either direction.
The pilots can use a pushbutton on either steering handwheel to prevent rudder pedal orders or autopilot orders
from going to the BSCU.
An internal cam mechanism returns the nose wheel to the centered position after takeoff.
Page: 283
BSCU
E
L
A ONE ENGINE RUNNING
C TOWING LEVER
AUTO PILOT
NORMAL POSITION
AIRCRAFT ON GROUND
GREEN POWER
FROM NOSE GEAR DOORS STEERING SERVO
CLOSING CIRCUIT (WHEN VALVE
DOORS ARE CLOSED)
NOSE
GEAR
Page: 284

SIDE CONSOLES
1 Steering handwheels
The steering handwheels, which are interconnected, can steer the nose wheel up to 75 degrees in either direc-
tion.
Note: The steering system centers the nose wheel automatically after liftoff
2 Rudder PEDAL DISC pb

Pressing this button on either handwheel removes control of nose wheel steering from the rudder pedals until
the button is released.
CENTER INSTRUMENT PANEL
1
1 A/SKID & N/W STRG SW

This ON/OFF switch activates or deactivates the nose wheel steering and anti--skid.
Page: 285
BRAKES AND ANTI--SKID

DESCRIPTION
The main wheels have multidisc brakes that can be actuated by either of two independent brake systems.
The normal system uses green hydraulic pressure : the alternate system uses the yellow hydraulic system
backed up by a hydraulic accumulator.
An anti--skid system and autobraking work through the brake system.
Braking commands come from either the brake pedals (pilot action) or the autobrake system (deceleration rate
selected by the crew).
Two units on each main gear monitor the temperature of the brakes.
All braking functions (normal and alternate braking control, anti--skid control, autobraking, brake temperature
indication) are controlled by a two--channel Brake and Steering Control Unit (BSCU).
The main wheels have fusible plugs that prevent the tires from bursting if they overheat.
The main wheels may also have brake cooling fans.
ANTI--SKID SYSTEM
The anti--skid system produces maximum braking efficiency by maintaining the wheels just short of an impend-
ing skid.
When a wheel is on the verge of locking, the system sends brake release orders to the normal and alternate ser-
vovalves and to the ECAM, which displays the released brakes.
The anti--skid deactivates when ground speed is less than 20 knots.
An ON/OFF switch turns the anti--skid system and nose wheel steering on and off.
PRINCIPLE
The system compares the speed of each main gear wheel (given by a tachometer) with the speed of the aircraft
(reference speed). When the speed of a wheel drops below 0.87 times the reference speed, the system orders
brake releasing in order to maintain the brake slip at that value (best braking efficiency).
In normal operation, the BSCU determines the reference speed from the horizontal acceleration furnished by
ADIRU1, ADIRU2, or ADIRU3.
If all three ADIRUs fail, reference speed equals the greater of either main landing gear wheel speed. Decelera-
tion is limited to 1 .7 meters/second2 (5.6 feet/second2).
Page: 286
AIRCRAFT
LONGITUDINAL AIRCRAFT SPEED
DECELERATION AT IMPACT
(ADIRU) WHEEL SPEED
GREEN
HYD AUTOMATIC
SELECTOR
YELLOW
ALTERNATE NORMAL
SERVO SERVO
VALVE VALVE
WHEEL SPEED
Page: 287
AUTO BRAKE
The purposes of this system are
-- to reduce the braking distance in case of an aborted takeoff
-- to establish and maintain a selected deceleration rate during landing, thereby improving passenger comfort
and reducing crew workload.
SYSTEM ARMING
The system arms when the crew presses the LO, MED. or MAX pushbutton switch if
-- Green pressure is available.
-- The anti--skid system has electric power.
-- There is no failure in the braking system.
-- At least one ADIRS is functioning.
Note: Auto brake may be armed with the parking brake on.
SYSTEM ACTIVATION
Automatic braking activates when the ground spoilers extend. Therefore, if the aircraft makes an acceleration
stop and begins to decelerate when its speed is under 72 knots, the automatic braking will not activate because
the ground spoilers will not extend.
For autobrake to activate, at least two SEC’s must be operative.
SYSTEM DEACTIVATION
The system deactivates
-- When it is disarmed (see below).
-- When the ground spoilers retract. In this case it remains armed.
SYSTEM DISARMING
The system disarms when
-- Flight crew presses the pushbutton switch or,
-- One or more arming conditions is lost or,
-- Flight crew applies enough deflection to at least one brake pedal when autobrake is active in MAX, MED or LO
mode.
-- After take--off/touch and go.
OPERATION
There are four modes of operation
-- Normal braking,
-- Alternate braking with anti--skid,
-- Alternate braking without anti--skid,
-- Parking brake.
NORMAL BRAKING
Braking is normal when
-- Green hydraulic pressure is available.
-- The A/SKID & N/W STRG switch is ON.

-- The parking brake is not ON.
During normal braking, anti--skid operates and autobrake is available.
Braking is controlled electrically through the BSCU
-- from the pilot’s pedals or,
-- automatically
Page: 288
on the ground by the autobrake system,

in flight when the landing gear lever is up.
The anti--skid system is controlled by the BSCU via the normal servo valves.
There is no indication of brake pressure in the cockpit.
ALTERNATE BRAKING WITH ANTI--SKID
Braking uses this mode when green hydraulic pressure is insufficient and
-- Yellow hydraulic pressure is available.
-- The A/SKID & N/W STRG switch is ON.
-- The parking brake is not ON.
An automatic hydraulic selector changes from the green to the yellow system.
The pedals brake through the auxiliary low--pressure hydraulic distribution line acting on the dual valves. The
BSCU controls the anti--skid system via the alternate servo valves.
A triple indicator on the center instrument panel shows the pressure delivered to the left and right brakes, as well
as the accumulator pressure.
Autobrake is inoperative.
ALTERNATE BRAKING WITHOUT ANTI--SKID
The anti--skid system can be deactivated
-- electrically (A/SKID Er N/W STRG switch OFF, or power failure or BSCU failure),
-- hydraulically (low pressure in both green and yellow systems, brakes being supplied by the brake accumula-
tors only).
The pilot controls the braking with the pedals (acting on the dual valves).
Alternate servo valves are fully open.
The pilot must refer to the triple indicator to limit brake pressure in order to avoid locking a wheel.
The accumulator can supply at least 7 full brake applications.
Autobrake is inoperative.
PARKING BRAKE
Putting on the PARKING BRK deactivates the other braking modes and the anti--skid system.
The yellow hydraulic system or accumulators supply brake pressure via the dual shuttle valves. Alternate servo
valves open to allow the application of full pressure.
Accumulators maintain the parking pressure for at least 12 hours.
Crew members can pressurize the yellow accumulators by pressing the yellow electric pump switch.
The triple indicator shows brake pressure.
Page: 289
AUXILIARY LP DISTRIBUTION LINE

TO OTHER
DUAL VALVE
PEDALS
ACCU
GREEN YELLOW
HP HP
NORMAL SELECTOR
VALVE
CONTROL VALVE
PARKIMG BRAKE
AUTOMATIC
SELECTOR
BSCU TO OTHER GEARS
DUAL
VALVE
TO OTHER DUAL SHUTTLE

VALVE
TO OPPOSITE
WHEEL
NORMAL SERVO
VALVE ALTERNATE ACCU PRESS
SERVO VALVE
TO ECAM
Page: 290

CENTER INSTRUMENT PANEL
1 A/SKID & N/W STRG sw

ON : If green hydraulic pressure is available
-- Anti--skid is available.
-- Nose wheel steering is available.
If green hydraulic pressure is lost
-- Yellow hydraulic pressure takes over automatically to supply the brakes.
-- Anti--skid remains available.
-- Nose wheel steering is lost.
-- The triple indicator shows yellow system brake pressure.
OFF : Yellow hydraulic system supplies pressure to the brakes.
-- Anti--skid is deactivated. The pilot must refer to the triple indicator to limit
brake pressure and avoid locking a wheel.
-- Nose wheel steering is lost.
-- Differential braking remains available through the pedals.
-- The triple indicator displays yellow system brake pressure.
2
2 BRAKES and ACCU PRESS indicator

ACCU PRESS : Indicates the pressure in the yellow brake accumulators.
BRAKES : Indicates the yellow pressure delivered to the left and right brakes, as measured upstream of
the alternate servo valves.
Page: 291
AUTO BRK panel
3 AUTO/BRK panel
The springloaded MAX, MED, and LO pushbutton switches arm the appropriate deceleration rate.
-- MAX mode is normally selected for takeoff.
If the pilot aborts the takeoff, maximum pressure goes to the brakes as soon as the system generates the
ground spoiler deployment order.
-- MED or LO mode is normally selected for landing.
LO mode sends progressive pressure to the brakes 4 seconds after the ground spoilers deploy in order to de-
celerate the aircraft at 1.7 meters/second2 (5.6 feetfsecond2).
MED mode sends progressive pressure to the brakes 2 seconds after the ground spoilers deploy in order to
decelerate the aircraft at 3 meters/second2 (9.8 feet/second2).
-- Lights
The blue ON light comes on to indicate positive arming.
The green DECEL light comes on when the actual deceleration is 80% of the selected rate.
Note: On slip pen,’ runway, the predetermined deceleration may not be reached due to antiskid operation. In
this case DECEL light will not illuminate. This does not mean that autobrake is not working.
Off : The indicated brake mode is not active.
4 BRK FAN pb sw
ON : The brake fans run if the lefthand main landing gear is down and locked.
OFF : The brake fans stop.

HOT It : This amber light comes on when the brakes get too hot. (A caution appears on ECAM, also).
Page: 292
PEDESTAL
1 PARKING BRK handle

Flight crew pulls this handle, then turns it clockwise, to apply the parking brake.
Applying the parking brake deactivates all the other braking modes.
The ECAM memo page displays “PARK BRK”.
CAUTION: IF THE POINTER IS NOT AT ON, THE PARKING BRAKE IS NOT ON.
Page: 293
Page: 294
POWER PLANT
POWER PLANT

POWER PLANT
GENERAL
The V2500--A5 engine is a high bypass ratio turbofan.
Description
Low--pressure (LP) compressor/turbine
The low--speed rotor (Ni) consists of a front fan (single--stage) and a tour--stage LP compressor connected to a
five--stage ft turbine.
High--pressure (HP) compressor/turbine

The high--speed rotor (N2) consists of a ten--stage HP compressor connected to a two--stage HP turbine.
Combustion chamber
The annular combustion chamber is fitted with 20 fuel nozzles and 2 igniters.
Accessory gearbox
The accessory gearbox, located at the bottom of the fan case, receives torque from horizontal HP rotor drive
shaft and drives gearbox mounted accessories.
LP COMPRESSOR
HP TURBINE
COMBUSTION
CHAMBER LP TURBINE
VARIABLE BLEED
VALVE
FAN
VARIABLE STATOR
VANE
N1
N2
HP COMPRESSOR
ACCESSORY
GEARBOX

POWER PLANT
FADEC GENERAL
Each powerplant has a FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) system.
FADECI also called the Electronic Engine Control (EEC), is a digital control system that performs complete en-
gine management.
FADEC has two--channel redundancy, with one channel active and one in standby.
If one channel fails, the other automatically takes control. The system has a magnetic alternator for an internal
power source.
FADEC is mounted on the fan case.
The Engine Interface Unit (EIU) transmits to FADEC the data it uses for engine management.
ADIRS
THRUST LEVER ANGLE

ENGINE
ENG
MAN COOLING
START AND
STABILITY
CONTROL
ENG
SENSORS
IGNITION
FADEC SYSTEM
FUEL RETURN
VALVE
EIU
ZONE CONT
START VALVE
LGCIU THRUST REVER

SYSTEM
E/WD SD
(EEC)
ECAM
FMGS (A/THR)

POWER PLANT
FADEC FUNCTIONS
The FADEC system performs the following functions
Control of gas generator
S control of fuel flow
S acceleration and deceleration schedules
S variable bleed valve and variable stator vane schedules
S control of turbine clearance
S idle setting
Protection against engine exceeding limits
S protection against Ni and N2 overspeed
S monitoring of EGT during engine start
Power management
S automatic control of engine thrust rating
S computation of thrust parameter limits
S manual management of power as a function of thrust lever position
S automatic management of power (NTHR demand).
Automatic engine starting seguence
S control of:
-- the start valve (ON/OFF)
-- the HP fuel valve
-- the fuel flow
-- the ignition (ON/OFF)
S monitoring of Ni, N?, FF and EGT
S initiation of abort and recycle (on the ground only)
Manual engine starting sequence
S passive monitoring of engine
S control of:
-- the start valve
-- the HP fuel valve
-- the ignition
Thrust reverser control
S Actuation of the blocker doors
S Engine setting during reverser operation
Fuel recirculation control

S Recirculation of fuel to the fuel tanks, depending on the engine oil temperature, the fuel system configuration,
and the flight phase.
Transmission of engine parameters and engine monitoring information to cockpit indicators

S Primary engine parameters
S Starting system status
S Thrust reverser system status
S FADEC system status

POWER PLANT
Detection, isolation, and recording of failures

FADEC cooling
Protection against fan flutter
S When on ground at low speed (less than or equal to 0.1 MN), the Electronic Engine Computer (EEC) protects
against fan flufter. In so doing, the EEC prevents the engine from being stabilized between an approximate
range of 60 % to 74 % Ni (depending on the outside air temperature). Therefore, during engine acceleration
on ground, the pilot may notice a non--linear thrust resoonse to thrust lever movement.
POWER SUPPLY
S The FADEC system is sell--powered above 10 % N2.
S In case ol a FADEC self--power loss, the aircraft electrical network automatically supplies the FADEC.
*: If the ENG MODE selector Is set to the Normal position before eigine start, the FADEC supply
is cut off.

POWER PLANT
LGCIU
FLT
GRD
NORM
IGN
CRANK
START
FADEC GND POWER N2 10%

FADEC
GEN
AVAILABLE
CHANNEL
NORM
ON A
PUSHED
A/C POWER UP
OFF
ON
GEN
ON
OFF
N2 > 10 %
ON
FADEC CHANNEL
GEN B
OFF AVAILABLE
SAME LOGIC
AS ABOVE
FADEC
* SUPPLIED FOR 5 MINUTES

POWER PLANT
THRUST CONTROL SYSTEM GENERAL

A FADEC dedicated to each engine controls thrust.
The pilot uses the thrust levers to set the thrust in manuel mode, end the FMGS sets the thrust in automatic
mode.
The FADEC prevents the thrust from exceeding the limit for the thrust lever position in both manual and auto-
matic modes.
The engine thrust setting is made through control of the Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR).
EPR = Low Pressure Turbine exhaust pressure (P5)/Engine inlet pressure (P2)
ENGINE POWER SETTING
The FADEC has two mode of power setting, EPR and N1 modes.
EPR MODE
EPR mode is the normal mode to control the thrust.
The required EPR is set by controlling the fuel flow.
The FADEC computes the command EPR as a function of
S Thrust Lever Angle (TLA)
S Altitude
S Mach number
S Ambient temperature
S Air inlet total temperature (T2)
S Service bleed.
N1 MODES
If no EPR is available (either sensed or computed) the affected FADEC will automatically revert to N1 mode.
At the reversion to N1 mode (rated or unrated) an equivalent thrust to that achieved in EPR mode is provided
until a thrust lever position change.
Autothrust control is lost. Alpha--floor protection is lost.
Depending on the failure case leading to ERR mode loss, the FADEC will revert to either rated or unrated mode.
RATED N1 MODE
An automatic reversion to rated N1 mode occurs in the event of loss of sensed EPR. This occurs when P2 (en-
gine inlet total pressure) and/or P5 (LP turbine exit total pressure) engine parameters are not available.
The FADEC will determine N1 power setting as a function of TLA, altitude and engine inlet total temperature.
The rated N1 mode can also be manually selected through the ENG N1 MODE pushbutton on the overhead
panel.
UNRATED N1 MODE
An automatic reversion to unrated Ni mode occurs in the event of loss of computed EPR due to the loss of T2
(engine inlet total air temperature) or ambient pressure (ambient pressure engine sensor) engine parameters.
The N1 is defined as a function of TLA only and is limited by the FADEC to either the smaller of maximum N1 or
N1 redline (if T2 is available) or N1 redline (if T2 is not available).
The N1 rating limit N1 TLA and maximum N1 indications on ECAM E/WD are lost.
NOTE: AN OVERBOOST CAN OCCUR DURING REVERSION IN THE UNRATED NI MODE, WITH
THRUST LEVER AT FULL FORWARD POSITION.
EPR RECOVERY LOGIC
With the FADEC in either rated or unrated N1 mode, switching OFF the ENG N1 MODE pushbutton on the over-
head panel will permit to return to the ERR mode if the failure has disappeared.

POWER PLANT
THRUST LEVERS
The thrust levers can only be moved manually.
They move over a sector that is divided into four operating segments.
The sector has five positions defined by detents or stops.
Thrust lever position is transmitted to the FADEC, which computes and displays the thrust rating limit and the N1
for that Thrust Lever Angle (TLA).
NOTE: THERE IS NO REVERSE IDLE DETENT WHEN THE PILOT MOVES THE LEVER OUT OF THE
IDLE STOP BY PULLING UP THE REVERSE LEVER ON THE FRONT OF THE THRUST LEVEC
HE SELECTS REVERSE IDLE.

POWER PLANT
THRUST RATING LIMIT

The FADEC computes the thrust rating limit br each thrust lever position, as shown below.
If the thrust lever is set in a detent the FADEC selects the rating limit corresponding to this detent.
It the thrust lever is set between two detents, the FADEC selects the rating limit corresponding to the higher
detent.
THRUST CONTROL
MANUAL MODE
The engines are in the manual mode provided the A/THR function is
S not armed or
S armed and not active (thrust lever not in the A/THR operating range and no alpha floor).
In these conditions, each engine is controlled by the position of its thrust lever.
The pilot controls thrust by moving the thrust lever between IDLE and TOGA positions. Each position of the
thrust lever within these limits corresponds to an EPR.
When the thrust lever is in a detent the corresponding ERR is equal to the ERR rating limit computed by the FA-
DEC for that engine.
When the thrust lever is in the FLX/MCT detent:

--On the ground

The engine runs at the flex takeoff thrust rating if the crew has selected a flex takeoff temperature on the
MCDU that is higher than the current Total Air Temperature (TAT).
Otherwise the engine produces Maximum Continuous Thrust (MCT).
NOTE: A CHANGE IN FLEX TEMP DURING THE TAKEOFF HAS NO EFFECT ON THE THRUST
-- After takeoff

POWER PLANT
The pilot can change from FLX to MCT by moving the thrust lever to TOGA or CL, then back to MCT. After
tha the cannot use the FLX rating.
NOTE: SETTING THE THRUST LEVER OUT OF FLX/MCT DETENT WITHOUT REACHING TOGA OR
CL DETENT HAS NO EFFECT.
The pilot can always get MAX TO thrust by pushing the thrust lever all the way forward.
AUTOMATIC MODE
In the autothrust mode (A/THR function active), the FMGG computes the thrust, which is limited to the value
corresponding to the thrust lever position (unless the alpha--floor mode is activated).
INDICATIONS ON FMA
The FADECs monitor the positions of the thrust levers, and trigger appropriate indications on the FMA.
LVR ASYM : appears in amber (3rd line on the FMA) if, with A/THR active and both engines running, one thrust
lever is set out of the CLB detent.
LVR CLB : flashes white (3rd line on the FMA) if the thrust levers are not in CL position while the aircraft is
above the altitude of thrust reduction with both engines running.
LVR MCT : flashes white (3rd line on the FMA) if the thrust levers are not in MCT position after an engine fail-
ure (with speed above green dot).
EPR TLA
TLA EPR THRUST
LEVER COM-
PUTATION EPR
COMMAND
ON
OFF
EPR LIMIT
EPR LIMIT EPR
ADR COMPUTATION
A/THR
LIMITATION
EPR TARGET
FMGS EIU
FUEL FLOW CONTROL
EPR ACTUAL
FADEC

POWER PLANT
FUEL SYSTEM GENERAL

The fuel system enables the combustion of fuel under appropriate conditions of flow rate and pressure. The FA-
DEC controls the fuel supply via the Fuel Metering Unit (FMU).
High pressure fuel is also used to provide pressure for some actuators.
The major components are:
S High and low pressure fuel pumps (dual unit)
S Fuel/oil heat exchanger
S Low pressure fuel filter
S Fuel Metering Unit (FMU)
S Fuel distribution valve
S 20 fuel injectors
S Diverter and return to tank valve
S IDG fuel/oil heat exchanger.
MASTER 1
ON
FROM FUEL TANK

OVHD PANEL OFF
LP FUEL
SHUT OFF VALVE
LP PUMP
IDG COOLING
OIL IN
OIL OUT
FILTER
HP PUMP
BOOSTER STAGE
BLEED VALVE
VARIABLE
FADEC STATOR VANE FMU
HPT/LPT
ACTIVE CLEARANCE
CONTROL FLOW
METER ECAM
20
FUEL
INJECTORS

POWER PLANT
FUEL PUMP UNIT

Consists of the low and high pressure stages which are driven from a common gearbox output shaft.
S The LP stage increases the pressure to:
-- suppress the cavitation
-- account for the pressure losses of the fuel oil heat exchanger and the low pressure fuel filter
-- provide enough pressure at the inlet of the HP stage
S The HP stage increases the pressure to the appropriate level for optimum fuel flow and atomization at all en-
gine operating conditions.
FUEL FILTER
Cockpit indication is provided by a differential pressure switch.
FUEL OIL HEAT EXCHANGER
Enables fuel to he heated by the oil, to reduce temperature of the oil and prevent fuel icing.
FUEL METERING UNIT
The FADEC controls the Fuel Metering Valve (FMV) which transforms its orders through three torque motors/
servo valves.
The FMV:
S controls the fuel flow
S protects against overspeeding (by reducing down to the minimum fuel flow).
S controls the shut off valve (to start or stop the engine)
S supplies high pressure fuel to the various actuators.
The three FADEC controlled torque motors are used to direct fuel servo pressure to open/close three valves:
S the fuel metering valve meters the fuel supply.
S The overspeed valve reduces the fuel flow in case of a FADEC detected overspeed. This reduction is made
according to a preset value. Once this valve is operated it remains in the minimum fuel flow position until the
engine is shutdown.
S The shut off valve opens/closes to isolate fuel supplies for starting or stopping the engine.
The servo pressure regulator regulates the pressure for FMU internal use.
The FADEC computes the fuel flow that will maintain the target EPR.
As the FADEC maintains this EPR, it allows minimum N2 to vary while remaining between minimum N2 and
maximum N2.
The FADEC also controls the engine parameters to:
S Limit acceleration and deceleration
S Avoid engine stall or flameout
S Limit maximum Ni and N2
S Maintain air bleed pressure requirement.
The FADEC computes an N2 correction according to the bleed configuration.

POWER PLANT
IDLE CONTROL
The FADEC has the following three idle modes
Modulated idle
S Is regulated according to
-- bleed system demand
-- ambient conditions
S Is selected
-- In flight, when the flaps are retracted (FLAPS lever at zero position)
-- On ground, provided reverse is not selected.
Approach idle
S Is regulated according to aircraft altitude, regardless of bleed system demand.
S Is selected in flight when the flaps are extended (FLAPS lever not at zero position)
S Allows the engine to accelerate rapidly from idle to go--around thrust.
Reverse idle
S Is selected on ground, when the thrust lever is in REV IDLE position.
Is slightly higher than forward idle thrust.
MASTER
ON
OFF
EEC
HP HP
MODULATED 2 POSITION 2 POSITION
TORQUE MOTOR TORQUE MOTOR TORQUE MOTOR
SERVO PRESSOR
REGULATOR
TO EXTERNAL
DEVICES
HP
FUEL TO
FLOWMETER
PUMP
FUEL OVER SHUT
METERING SPEED OFF
VALVE VALVE VALVE

POWER PLANT
IDG COOLING FUEL RECIRCULATION SYSTEM

Cooling of IDO oil and engine oil are accomplished respectively by the IDG cooler and by the Fuel/Oil heat ex-
changer.
Fuel, IDG oil and engine oil temperatures are regulated by the EEC commanding the fuel diverter valve and the
return to tank valve in four operation modes.

POWER PLANT
OIL SYSTEM GENERAL

The oil system lubricates the engine components.
It contains:
S the oil tank
S the lube and scavenge pump modules
S the fuel/oil heat and air/oil heat exchangers
S the filters, chip detectors, pressure reliel and bypass valves.
OIL ECAM
PRESS
OIL ECAM
LOW PRESS
FUEL/OIL
HEAT EXCHANGER
FUEL IN FUEL OUT

TO BEARINGS AND GEARBOX
AIR/OIL
HEAT EXCHANGER
OIL FILTER
SCAVENGE OIL SUPPLY

PUMPS PUMP
MAIN SCAVENGE
FILTER
OIL
ECAM
CLOG
BYPASS
ECAM ENG OIL OIL

TEMP QTY ECAM

POWER PLANT
AIR SYSTEM GENERAL

The air bleed system supplies the aircraft with compressed air.
It uses the air for:
S pneumatic system (refer to Ata 36)
S cooling the engine compartment and the turbines
S engine stability.
COOLING
S Active clearance control for the high and low pressure turbines is to optimize the turbine blade tip clearance
by coding the related turbine cases.
This control is made by the FADEC through the FMU as a function of the high pressure rotor speed, and alti-
tude.
In case of failures the system is designed to failsale to the closed position.
Should this happen, fuel consumption would be slightly higher.
S LP/HP turbine cooling air.
Under FADEC control as a function ol N? and altitude, cooling air is taken from the 10th stage of the HPC to
cool the HPT second stage blade. The control valve is either fully open or closed and is normally (failsafe)
open.
ENGINE STABILITY
Two air bleed systems (station 2,5 of the LPC end stages 7th end 10th) provide greater compressor stability in
the different flight phases.
S The LPC 2.5 bleed valve moves under FADEC control as a function of the low rotor speed, altitude and Mach
and is dedicated to improve stall margin during starting, low power or transient operation. The failsale posi-
tion of this valve is open.
S The 7th and 10th stage bleed valves are normally closed for most engine operation but fully open for engine
starting. Their failsabe position is open. Theses valves are controlled by FADEC through FMU.
In the two cases, the air is vented to the fan air stream.
LP/HP TCA OVBD

VALVE
10TH 7TH 7TH NACELLE ANTI--ICE

VALVE
2ND STAGE
BLADE FAN AIR
STREAM
10TH 7TH 2.5
HPT VBV
ACC LPC BV
VBV
LPT
ACC
ENGINE STABILITY
LP/HP TURBINE ACTIVE BLEED PART
CLEARANCE CONTROL PART

POWER PLANT
REVERSER SYSTEM GENERAL

The reverse thrust is obtained by deflecting the fan airstream. This is done when the translating sleeves are fully
deployed rearward, thus enabling the pivoting blocker doors to forward divert the fan flow through the cascades.
TRANSLATING
CASCADE SLEEVE
(See Here Below)
BLOCKER
DOOR
STOWED THRUST REVERSER
CASCADE TRANSLATING
SLEEVE
BLOCKER
DOOR
DEPLOYED THRUST REVERSER
TRANSLATING SLLEVE ACTUATOR
ACTUATOR SHIELD AFT CASCADE

SUPPORT RING
The translating sleeves are hydraulically--actuated (ENG 1: Green System, ENG 2: Yellow System).
The associated FADEC controls the thrust reverser system. Each FADEC channel performs control and moni-
toring functions. The systems br the two engines are independent of each other.
The thrust reverser system on each engine has:
S A Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU), which controls the hydraulic fluid blow to the thrust reverser actuators
S A hydraulic shutoff valve, which allows hydraulic pressure to the HCU.
S Four hydraulic actuators

S One flexible shaft (divided into 3 parts, each of which are connected to the actuators) to synchronize the op-
eration speed of the actuators
S Two linear variable differential transducers, which monitor and transmit the reverser position to the EEC
S Two proximity switches, to monitor whether the sleeves are locked or not.

POWER PLANT
ACTUATION LOGIC
Deployment requires:
S One FADEC channel, operating with its associated throttle reverse signal
S Right and left main gear compressed signals from the corresponding LGCIUs
S A Thrust Lever Angle (TLA) reverse signal from at least one Spoiler Elevator Computer (SEC).
Before deployment is completed, the FADEC sets reverse idle thrust on the engine that is having its thrust re-
versed.
PROTECTION
IDLE PROTECTION
The FADEC will automatically select the thrust to idle:
S In case of inadvertent thrust reverser deployment (while thrust reversers are commanded stowed), as soon
as the thrust reverser feedback position is above 15% deployed (thrust decreasing toward idle, when the de-
tected position is between 10% and 15%).
S In case of inadvertent thrust reverser stowage (while thrust reversers are commanded deployed), as soon as
the thrust reverser feedback position is below 78% deployed (thrust decreasing toward idle between 90% and
18%).
HYDRAULIC POWER:
GREEN (ENG 1)
YELLOW (ENG 2)
SEC 1
SHUT OFF
VALVE
SEC
2 (3)
TLA SIGNAL
TLA SIGNAL
FROM FADEC
TO FADEC CHANNEL B
CHANNEL B
TLA B FADEC 1 HCU

(2) VALVE
TLA A CONTROL PRESSURIZING
SOLENOID
N2 50% VALVE
CHANNEL A
EIU 1 (2)
T/R SYSTEM
PRESSURIZED
LGCIU SIGNAL
INHIB
1 (2) RELAY SW
DIRECTIONAL
SOLENOID
VALVE
DEPLOY TRANSLATING
STOW SLEEVE
ACTUATOR
BLOCKER DOOR

POWER PLANT
IGNITION AND STARTING SYSTEMS

The FADEC controls the ignition and starling system according to
S the position of the engine stert selector
S the position of the ENG MASTER switch
S the position of the ENG MAN START pushbutton switch
S the position of the ENG 1(2) ANTI ICE pushbutton switch
S the aircraft status (flight or ground).
The FADEC receives its inputs from the Engine Interlace Unit (EIU).
ON PEDESTAL
ON OVHD PANEL
ENGINE
INTERFACE
UNIT
EEC START VALVE

START IGNITERS
LOGIC MODULE HP FUEL VALVE
HP FUEL VALVE CLOSURE
IGNITION SYSTEM
The ignition system is used to start the engine on ground, and to restart it in flight. It consists of two identical
independent circuits for each engine, normally controlled by the FADEC channel A, with channel B on standby.
Each FADEC channel can control both igniters.
NOTE: NOTE: SUPPLY FOR IGNITER A SWITCHES TO THE STAT INV BUS BAR, AS SOON AS THE
STATIC INVERTER IS OPERATIVE.

POWER PLANT
lGNITION FOR STARTING

ON THE GROUND
S Automatic start
-- Only one igniter fires.
-- The FADEC automatically alternates the igniters used on successive starts.
-- The ignition comes on automatically after the dry crank sequence, and cuts off automatically when N2
reaches 43 %.
S Manual start
-- Both igniters start firing when the MASTER switch is switched ON.
-- Both stop firing when N2 reaches 43 %.
IN FLIGHT
S Both igniters start tiring when the MASTER switch is switched ON.
CONTINUOUS lGNITION
Continuous ignition may be selected either manually or automatically to maintain engine combustion.
MANUAL SELECTION
In flight, continuous ignition is on when the ENG START selector is on ION/START, if the corresponding engine
is running.
On the ground after the engine is started, because ignition cuts off automatically, the flight crew must switch the
ENG MODE selector to NORM then buck to IGN/START to turn on continuous ignition.
It must be noted that the igniters should he turned off to conserve the life of the ignition system components
whenever ignition is not needed on the ground or in flight (mode selector on NORM position).
AUTOMATIC SELECTION

POWER PLANT
ENGINE STARTING SYSTEM GENERAL

The engine starting system consists of an air turbine starter and a start valve.
The start valve admits air supplied by the pneumatic system to operate the starter.
The FADEC controls the start valve electrically. If electrical control fails when the aircraft is on the ground, a
handle allows the start valve to be operated manually.
AUTOMATIC STARTING
This sequence is under the full authority of the FADEC, which controls:
-- the start valve
-- the igniters
-- the fuel HP valves
The FADEC
-- detects a hot start, a hung start, a stall, or no light up
-- announces FAULT and identifies the fault in an ECAM message
-- runs an abort sequence if a start aborts on the ground when N2 < 50 %
S closes the HP valve
S closes the start valve
S turns off ignition
S cranks the engine after the start abort in order to clear out fuel vapors
-- ensures an automatic dry crank sequence of 30 seconds at maximum motoring speed.
During engine start with residual EGT > 250 C, an auto--crank function motors the engine until EGT decreases
below 250 C.
There is no crew awareness message to indicate the reason for the extended motoring.
This auto--crank function may be activated in very hot condition (typically ISA + 40 C) or short turn--around times
(< 20 minutes).
For an inflight start, the FADEC decides whether the engine is windmilling fast enough or needs assistance from
the starter in view of current engine parameters and flight environment parameters.
Flight crew may interrupt this start sequence by moving the MASTER switch to OFF.

POWER PLANT
MASTER 1
ON
OFF
MASTER 1
ON
OFF
MASTER 1
ON
OFF
MASTER 1
ON
OFF
MASTER 1
ON
OFF

POWER PLANT
MANUAL STARTING
The FADEC has limited authority over manual starts, controlling the:
S Opening of the start valve, when the ENG MODE selector is set to IGN/START and the MAN START push-
button is pressed
S Position of the HP fuel valve and the operation of both igniters, when the master switch is turned ON
S Closing of the start valve at 43 % N2, and, on ground, the cutting off of ignition.
The FADEC makes a passive survey of the engine during the starting sequence (up to 50 % N2) The flight crew
is made aware of an abnormal start by a proper ECAM warning and has to interrupt the start sequence. The FA-
DEC does not have the authority to abort the manual start.
The flight crew may interrupt the sequence
S Before the MASTER switch is set to ON, by switching the MAN START pushbutton switch to OFF.
S After the MASTER switch set to ON, by switching the MAN START pushbutton and the MASTER switch to
OFF (flight crew must perform a dry cranking cycle).
In flight, the FADEC always commands a starter--assisted air start.
ENGINE VENTILATION (dry cranking)
A dry cranking cycle ventilates the engine to remove fuel vapors after an unsuccessful start attempt on the
ground.
The flight crew can manually select cranking, by setting the ENG MODE selector to CRANK and the MAN
START pushbutton to ON (MASTER switch OFF). The flight crew can stop the cranking by setting the MAN
START pushbutton to OFF.

POWER PLANT
MASTER 1
ON
OFF
MASTER 1
ON
OFF
MASTER 1
ON
OFF
MASTER 1
ON
OFF
MASTER 1
ON
OFF
MASTER 1
ON
OFF MASTER 1
ON
OFF

POWER PLANT
1 Thrust levers
The thrust levers can only be moved manually, they move over a sector that is divided into four operating seg-
ments. Thrust lever position is transmitted to the FADEC, which computes and displays the thrust rating limit
and the N1 for that Thrust Lever Angle (TLA).
2 Reverser Iatching levers

These permit the pilot to override the stop at the forward idle position to select reverse thrust.
This stop resets when the pilot moves the lever back into the forward thrust area.
3 Autothrust instinctive disconnect pb

It is used for the pilot to disconnect the autothrust

POWER PLANT
1 ENG MODE selector

CRANK: The start valve opens, it the MAN START pushbutton is ON, and N2 <10 %. Ignition does not
fire.
NORM : This turns on continuous ignition (A and B) when the engine is running and
-- The ENG 1(2) ANTI ICE pushbutton is ON, or
-- The aircraft is in the takeoff phase, or
-- Approach idle is selected, or
-- In flight, an unscheduled sub idle or surge is detected.
IGN START: If the MASTER switch is ON, and N2 »= idle, this position selects continuous ignition (A and B).
-- During an automatic start:
After the dry crank sequence, ignition switches to A or B.
-- During a manual start, ignition (A and B) commences when the MASTER switch is turned ON.
Pack valve closes automatically during the start sequence.
NOTE: ON GROUND, THE IGNITION AUTOMATICALLY CUTS OFF AT THE END OF THE START SE-
QUENCE (N2>43%)
2 ENG MASTER sw 1 (2)

ON: LP fuel valve opens (if the ENG FIRE pushbutton is in).
-- During an automatic start, the HP fuel valve opens if:
S The ENG MODE selector is at IGN/START.
S 10% <= N2 <= 16%
-- During a manual start, the HP FUEL valve opens if:
S The ENG MODE selector is at IGN/START.
S The MAN START pushbufton switch is ON.
OFF: Close signals go directly to the HP luel valve and the LP fuel valve. These signals cause both
channels of the FADEC to be reset.
NOTE: RELEASING THE ENG FIRE PUSHBUTTON ALLOWS FLIGHT CREW TO SHUT DOWN THE EN-
GINE BY CLOSING THE LP FUEL VALVE. THERE IS A TIME DELAY OF ABOUT 60 SECONDS AT
GROUND IDLE AS THE ENGINE BURNS THE FUEL LEFT BETWEEN THE LP VALVE AND THE
NOZZLES.

POWER PLANT
3 FAULT lt 1 (2)
FAULT It: This amber light comes on, and a caution appears on ECAM, if there is:
-- an automatic start abort.
-- a start valve fault.
-- a disagreement between the HP fuel valve position and its commanded position.
1 2
1 MAN START pb sw
ON: The start valve opens if the ENG MODE selector is set to CRANK or IGN/START and N2 <
15%.
Both pack valves close during the start sequence.
The blue ON light comes on.
Off: start valve closed unless a start cycle is in progress.
2 N1 MODE Pb sw
ON: Thrust control reverts from EPR mode to N1 rated mode.
Following an automatic reversion to N1, rated or unrated mode, pressing the pushbutton switch
confirms the mode.
The blue ON light comes on.
Off: If available, EPR mode is selected.
1 FADEG GND PWR pb sw

ON: FADEC has electrical power on the ground if the ENG FIRE pushbutton is not released.

POWER PLANT


POWER PLANT
ECAM
GENERAL
The upper ECAM E/WD permanently displays the engines’ primary parameters. The lower ECAM SD displays
the secondary parameters either when they are selected automatically by the system, or manually by the flight
crew.
PRIMARY PARAMETER
EPR MODE ACTIVE
1 4
7

POWER PLANT
1 Engine Pressure Ratio: EPR
D
C
B
E
A Actual EPR
Actual EPR is green.
B EPR command arc (transient)

From current EPR pointer to EPR command value. This blue arc is only displayed with A/THR engaged.
C EPR TLA
This small white circle shows the EPR corresponding to the thrust lever position.
D EPR max
This amber index shows the EPR the engine would produce with the thrust lever all the way forward.
E REV indication
Appears in amber when a reverser door is unstowed or unlocked.
It changes to green when the doors are fully deployed.
(If a door unlocks in flight the indication first flashes for 9 seconds, then remains steady).
2 Thrust limit mode

The limit mode (TOGA, FLX, MCT, CL, or MREV), selected by the FADEC is displayed in green.
3 EPR rating limit

The EPR rating limit, associated to the thrust limit mode, is displayed in blue.
S In flight (or on ground with engines stopped)
-- The selected mode corresponds to the detent ol the most advanced thrust lever position.
-- The rating limit is computed by the FADEC receiving the highest actual EPR value (except on ground with
engines stopped, where it is computed by the FADEC receiving the most advanced thrust lever position).
NOTE: WHEN A THRUST LEVER IS SET BETWEEN TWO POSITIONS, THE FADEC SELECTS THE RAT-
ING LIMIT CORRESPONDING TO THE HIGHEST MODE. WHEN IDLE IS SELECTED, THE FADEC
SELECTS CL. WHEN MREV IS SELECTED, THE EPR RATING LIMIT VALUE IS REPLACED BY
AMBER CROSSES (MREV MODE IS LIMITED BY N1).
S On ground (with engines running)
-- With engines running, on ground, whatever the lever position, this limit corresponds to the TOGA thrust
limit.

POWER PLANT
-- With engines running, on ground, and if FLEX mode is selected, FLEX EPR is displayed, whatever the
thrust lever position between idle and FLEX/MCT.
4 FLEX Temperature
If FLX mode is selected, the flexible takeoff temperature selected through the MCDUs is displayed in blue.
5 EGT indicator
B
D
A C
A Actual EGT
It is normally green.
It pulses amber, when EGT is above 610 C, except during the start sequence, or for high power operation
(FLEX takeoff or thrust lever above MCT or at maximum REV, or activation of alpha--floor).
It pulses red, when EGT is above 635 C.
B Max EGT
The amber index appears at 610 C. It is not displayed during takeoff.
C Max permissible EGT

EGT redline is at 635 C. A red arc is displayed Irom 635 C to the end of the scale.
D EGT exceedance
If EGT goes over 635 C, a red mark appears at its maximum value. It disappears after a new takeoff, or after
maintenance action through the MCDU.

POWER PLANT
6 LP rotor speed (N1)
A B
A Actual N1
It is normally in green.
It pulses amber, when N1 above N1 rating limit.
It pulses red, when N1 above 100%.
B Max permissible N1
N1 redline is at 100%. A red arc is displayed from 100% to the end of the scale.
C N1 Exceedance
If N1 exceeds 100% during a flight, this red mark appears and remains at the highest N1 attained. It will disap-
pear after a new takeoff, or after maintenance action through the MCDU.
7 HP rotor speed N2
The numbers are normally green. (During start sequence, they are green on a grey background).
When N2 is above 100 %, the indication turns red and a red cross appears next to it.
The red cross will disappear after a new takeoff, or after maintenance action through the MCDU.
8 Fuel flow
It is indicated in green.
At engine shutdown, the FF indication is replaced by amber crosses for about 15 seconds, prior to going to zero.
If case of a discrepancy between the real and displayed EGT, N1, N2, or FF values, an amber CHECK amber
message is displayed near the affected parameter indication.
9 IDLE indication
In flight this legend appears in green when both engines are at idle. It flashes for 10 seconds, then remains
steady.

POWER PLANT
REVERSION TO N1 MODE
If the FADEC is unable to sense or to calculate EPR an automatic reversion to N1 control mode is provided.
The rotor speed reference depends on the thrust lever angle, T2, and altitude.
1 LP rotor speed N1
C
A
D
Actual N1
Actual N1 is normally green.
The index and numeric values pulse red, when N1 > 100%.
N1 TLA
This small white circle shows the N1 corresponding to the thrust lever position. It is not displayed in unrated N1
mode.

POWER PLANT
Max N1
This amber index shows the N1 the engine would produce with the thrust lever all the way forviard. It is not dis-
played in unrated N1 mode.
Max permissible N1
N1 redline is at 100%. A red arc is displayed from 100% to the end of the scale.
N1 Exceedance
If N1 exceeds 100% during a flight, this red mark appears and remains at the highest N1 attained. It disappears
after a new takeoff, or after maintenance action through MCDU.
2 N1 MODE and N1 rating limit

S The N1 MODE indication is displayed in blue.
S The N1 rating limit, corresponding to the thrust lever position, is displayed in blue. It is not displayed in un-
rated Ni mode.
Secondary Parameters
Start Configuration
2 5
3
6
4
7
8
10
After Start Configuration


POWER PLANT
11
1 Fuel used
The green number is the fuel used, as computed by the FADEC.
It resets when the engine starts (MASTER switch ON) on ground.
It is frozen at its last value (until the next engine start), when the engine shuts down. (It is also displayed on the
ECAM CRUISE page).
The last two digits are dashed, ii the fuel--used indication is inaccurate due to the loss of fuel flow data for more
than one minute.
2 Oil quantitv
The needle and the numbers are normally in green.
The indication pulses, when the oil quantity goes below 5 quarts (decreasing), or above 7 quarts (increasing).
3 Oil pressure
The needle and the numbers are normally in green.
The digital indication pulses, if oil the pressure exceeds 390 psi (increasing), or 386 psi (decreasing).
The needle and digital indication become amber if the oil pressure drops below 80 psi, then red if below 60 psi.
4 Oil temperature
These numbers are normally in green.
They pulse above 155 C (increasing), or 150 C (decreasing).
They become amber, and an associated warning appears on the ECAM, if the temperature
Exceeds 165 C
Exceeds 155 C for more than 15 minutes
Is below -- 10 C
5 VIB
It pulses above 5. (These numbers also appear on the ECAM CRUISE page).
6 Oil filter clog

CLOG appears in amber, if there is an excessive pressure loss across the main oil scavenge filter, and oil tem-
perature exceeds 32 C.

POWER PLANT
7 Fuel filter clog

CLOG appears in amber, it there is an excessive pressure loss accross the fuel filter.
8 Ignition
IGN appears in white during the start sequence.
The letters A, B, or AB appear in green when the respective igniters are firing.
9 Start valve position

In line -- Green The valve is fully open.
Crossline-- Green The valve is fully closed.
10 Engine bleed pressure

The green numbers indicate the bleed pressure upstream of the precooler.
They become amber, when the pressure drops below 21 psi with N2>= 10 % with the start valve not closed, or if
there is an overpressure.
11 Nacelle temperature indication

It is displayed, except during the start sequence.
It is normally green.
It pulses above 320 C (increasing), or 300 C (decreasing). The advisory threshold is indicated by a white check
mark.

NOTEBOOK
NOTES

NOTEBOOK

NOTEBOOK

NOTEBOOK


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Lufthansa LAN Technical Training

A320 TROUBLESHOOTING COURSE

TROUBLESHOOTING FUNDAMENTALS INTRODUCTION

Scl rbg Sep 2006 Page: 1

TROUBLESHOOTING TRAINING BENEFITS

Figure 1 Troubleshooting Training Benefits

Figure 2 Identify the source of the Problem

HOW CAN I BE A TRUBLESHOOTER?

Figure 3 Troubleshooting is NOT Magic

Figure 4 System-- Components Influence

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

Scl rbg Sep 2006 Page: 6

Scl rbg Sep 2006 Page: 7

Figure 5 Old Logic Thinker

Figure 6 Actual Logic Thinker

CLASSICAL LOGIC VS EVERYDAY LOGIC

Figure 7 Decide based on the evidence

Figure 8 Different Reasoners Draw Different Conclusion

Pitfalls of lnductive Reasoning

Too Few Observed Instane

Figure 9 Hasty Induction (Jumping to a Conclusion)

Aplication of Inductive Reasoning

Figure 10 Forgetful Indication (Overlooking the Obvious)

Figure 11 Logic Symbology

Figure 12 YES Symbol Truth Table

Figure 13 AND Symbol Truth Table

Figure 14 OR Symbol Truth Table

Figure 15 XOR Symbol Truth table

INVERTED LOGIC SYMBOLS

Figure 16 NOT Symbol Truth Table

NAND Symbol (Inverted AND Symbol)

Figure 17 NAND Symbol Truth Table

NOR Symbol (Inverted OR Symbol)

Figure 18 NOR Symbol Truth Table

EXCLUSIVE NOR Symbol (Inverted EXCLUSIVE OR Symbol)

Computer Chip Representation

Figure 20 Typical Computer Chip

Logic Symbols Practical Application

Figure 21 Logic Symbols Practical Aplications

Figure 22 Single Input Summary

Figure 23 Multiple Inputs Symbol Summary

LOGIC SYMBOL NETWORK EXERCISES

Figure 24 Logic Symbol Network Exercises

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

Scl rbg Sep 2006 Page: 28

Scl rbg Sep 2006 Page: 29

Figure 25 Landing Gear Retraction System Failure

FUNCTIONS V/S COMPONENTS

Figure 26 Funtional Analysis of Landing Gear System

Figure 27 Abnormal Situation

AIRCRAFT AND SYSTEMS LEVELS

SUBSYSTEM AND ASSEMBLY LEVELS

Figure 28 Troubleshooting Levels

ALWAYS BEGIN AT A GENERAL LEVEL

Figure 29 Begin at a General Level

EXAMINE FUNCTIONS WITHING PATHS

Figure 30 Examine Function Within Path

TRACE THE CRITICAL PATH THROUGH EACH LEVEL

Figure 31 Trace the Critical Path

Figure 32 Troubleshooting Is a Layered Process

SYSTEM-- COMPONENTS INFLUENCE EXERCISES (POSIBLE CAUSES)

Figure 33 System-- Components Influence Exercises

Scl rbg Sep 2006 Page: 39