Sher Shah V State of Harayana On Behalf of Respondent

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Sher shah v State of harayana on behalf of respondent
International Law (University of Jammu)
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IN THE HON’BLE
HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF
1. SHER SHAH
2. GAJENDRA SHAH
3. SURI SHAH
….APPELLANTS
VERSUS
KARIM …
RESPONDENT
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………….……………...…..……………………..
….3
INDEX OF
AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………………..........4
TABLE OF CASES
BOOKS REFERRED
STATUTES REFERRED
DIGESTS REFERRED
WEBSITES REFERRED
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION……….…………………………...….
…………….......6
STATEMENT OF FACTS……………………………………………..….
……………….....7
STATEMENT OF ISSUES…….……………………………………..
…………………….....9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS………………………..….…………………………..
…....10
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED………………………………..…….………………….………
12
PRAYER……………………………………………………………………………………….
20

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
S. No. Abbreviation Full Form

1. ¶ Paragraph
2. & And
3. ACR Allahabad Criminal Rulings
4. Add. Additional
5. AIR All India Reporter
6. All. Allahabad
7. Cr.P.C. Code of Criminal Procedure
8. CriLJ Criminal Law Journal
10. edn. Edition
11. Exh. Exhibit
12. Hon’ble Honourable
13. i.e. That is
14. IPC Indian Penal Code
15. NOC Notes on Cases
16. Ors. Others
18. SC Supreme Court
19. SCC Supreme Court Cases
20. SCR Supreme Court Reporter
21. Sec. Section
22. Sr. Senior
23. U.P. Uttar Pradesh
24. u/s Under Section
25. v. Versus
26. Vol. Volume
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
TABLE OF CASES
1. A.P. Kuttan Panicker and Ors. v. State of Kerala, (1963) CriLJ669.

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2. Aijaz Ahmad v. State of U.P., ¶ 10, 2004(2) ACR1596.
3. Bai Radha v. The State of Gujarat, AIR1970SC1396.
4. Chinnapattu Nagan v. State of A.P, 1999(2) ALT(CrI.)460(AP),
5. Emperor v. Mt. Dhirajia, AIR1940All486.
6. Gopal Anjayya Falmari and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra,

(1995)1BomCR116.
7. Hari Chunnilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977MPLJ321.
8. Kumbhar Narsi Bechar v. The State, AIR1962Guj77.
9. Mukanda and Ors. v. State, 1957CriLJ1187.
10. Nemichand Jain v. Supt. of Central Excise and Customs, (1963) 2 CriLJ
11. Ram Lal v. State of H.P., 2005(3) ShimLC67.
12. Ravindra Pyarelal Bidlan and other v. State of Maharashtra, 1993 CriLJ3019
(Bom).
13. State of Assam v. Mafizuddin Ahmed, AIR 1983 SC 274.
14. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Prasad, AIR1968SC881.
15. State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh, AIR2004SC1264.
16. State v. Madhusudan Rao M (2008) 15 SCC 604.
BOOKS REFERRED
 Batuk Lal, “Commentary on the Indian Penal Code, 1860”, Ed. R. P. Kataria and S.
K. A. Naqvi, Vol-I, (Section 1 to 300), (Orient Publishing Company, 1st Edn. New
Delhi) (2006-07).
 Dr. Hari Singh Gour, “The Penal Law of India”, Vol-I, (Section 1 to 120), (Law
Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd., 11th Edn.) (2006).
 Halsbury’s Laws of India, Vol-32, “Criminal Procedure – I & II”, (Lexis Nexis
Butterworths, New Delhi) (2007).

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 K. D. Gaur, “Commentary on Indian Penal Code”, (Universal Law Publishing Co.

Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi) (2006).
 Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, “Law of Crimes”, Vol-I & II, Ed. Justice C. K. Thakkar,
(Bharat Law House, 25th Edn., New Delhi) (Reprint 2006).
STATUTES REFERRED
1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1973)
2. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act 18 of 1872)
3. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860)
DIGESTS REFERRED
1. C.D. FIELD, COMMENTARY ON LAW OF EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, DELHI
LAW HOUSE, VOL. 1 (13th ed. 2013).
2. HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND, CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE AND
PROCEDURE, LEXIS NEXIS BUTTERWORTHS, VOL. 11(4) (4th ed. 2006).
WEBSITES REFERRED
 http://www.supremecourtcaselaw.com
 http://www.judis.nic.in
 http://www.heinonline.com
 http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/myncbi/
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Counsels, appearing on behalf of the Respondent, humbly submit this memorandum
under Sec. 314 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The memorandum sets forth the
facts, contentions and arguments in the present case.
The counsel humbly submits that this Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction to try the instant matter
under Sec. 374 (2)1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
1 Section 374(2) – Appeal from convictions:

Any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or on a trial held by
any other Court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more than seven years [has been passed against him or

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STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the sake of brevity and convenience of the Hon’ble Court the facts of the present case are
summarized as follows:
1. Karim worked as a system operator at a computer Centre in Jajhhar District, Haryana
and
lived in the town. His village was at a distance of 12 kilometres from his workplace
which he ordinarily visited on Saturdays and Sundays.
2. Sher Shah was a farmer who lived with his family consisting of his wife, Sobti, son
Gajendar Shah and a daughter Naina. Sher Shah’s brother, Suri Shah, also lived in the
same household. He was used to drinking and gambling and owed a debt of Rs.
20,000 to Karim.
against any other person convicted at the same trial] may appeal to the High Court.

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3. Whenever Karim demanded his money, Suri Shah showed his helplessness but never
denied to pay off his debt.
4. Karim was in love with Naina and used to meet Naina on the weekends when her
father was not at home on the pretext that he had come to collect the money. Sher
Shah did not like it and told Karim many a times not to visit his home in his absence.
He also scolded his daughter for meeting Karim but Karim did not stop visiting
Naina.
5. During the day on Monday, 8th August 2010, Karim received a phone call from Suri
Shah inviting him to come that evening to collect his debt.
6. Karim went to their house around 8.30 P.M. The members of Naina’s family had
finished their dinner and were preparing to go to sleep. On hearing some whispering
voices coming from the backyard of their house, Sher Shah with his brother Suri Shah
and son Gajendar Shah went there to investigate.
7. They saw Karim talking with Naina. Sher Shah lost his temper and started abusing
Karim. Gajendar Shah brought a lathi from inside and gave a blow to Karim on the
leg. Then Suri Shah grabbed the lathi from Gajendar Shah and started beating Karim
mercilessly giving blows on his head and chest.
8. On hearing the hue and cry, other villagers came to the scene. They found Suri Shah
giving blows to Karim while the other two were shouting abuses on Karim. Karim
was bleeding from the head and became unconscious. He was taken to the hospital by
the villagers where he died three days later without regaining consciousness.
9. The post-mortem report confirmed that Karim suffered injuries on the head and
fractures of three ribs. There were many concussions on different parts of his body.
There was much loss of blood. While none of the injuries independently was
sufficient to cause death, the cumulative result was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death.

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10. FIR was registered against Suri Shah, Gajendar Shah and Sher Shah under Section
3072 read with S. 343 of the Indian Penal Code. Three days later when Karim died, it
was changed to Section 3024 r/w 34 IPC.
11. The session court charged and convicted all the three accused persons under Section
302 r/w 34 of the IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment for the murder of
Karim.
12. The accused persons pleaded grave and sudden provocation in their defence. They
also pleaded that the prosecution had failed to prove existence of common intention of
all the three accused to kill Karim. In the absence of proof of common intention, they
cannot be convicted under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC.
13. The three accused have filed separate appeals to the High Court against the order of
conviction and sentence and henceforth, the matter is listed before this Hon’ble Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues have arisen for determination before the Hon’ble Court in
the instant matter:
2 Section 307-Attempt to murder:

Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act
caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act,
the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
3 Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention:
When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such
persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
4 Section 302. Punishment for murder:
Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or 1[imprisonment for life], and shall also be liable to
fine.

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1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS WERE RIGHTLY CONVICTED FOR THE
OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 302 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE?
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE PUNISHED UNDER
SECTION 34 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. THE ACCUSED PERSONS WERE RIGHTLY CONVICTED FOR THE

OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 302 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE.
The counsels on behalf of the respondents humbly submit that the judgment passed by
the Sessions Court is appropriate and the conviction of the accused under section 302 5
of IPC is correct and as per the demands of justice.
5 Section 302. Punishment for murder:

Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or 1[imprisonment for life], and shall also be liable to
fine.

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To convict any accused under the aforementioned section, the requirements of section
3006 of IPC needs to be fulfilled. The instant case comes under the purview of clause
4th of this section since the accused has committed the act which he knew to be
imminently dangerous that it would, in all probability, cause death or such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death and committed it without any excuse for incurring
the risk of causing such death or injury as aforesaid. The accused Gajendra Shah
committed the murder of Karim by bringing a lathi from inside and beating Karim on
the leg. Suri Shah then grabbed it and started beating Karim mercilessly, giving blows
on his head and chest.7 He had the knowledge that this act is imminently dangerous to
the extent that in all human probabilities it would lead to his death or at least cause
him such bodily injuries which might lead to death. Moreover, he did not have any
excuse for undertaking such a risk in the sense that it was necessary for him to do
such an act at that very particular moment. This is an undisputed fact that the post-
mortem report confirmed that Karim suffered injuries on the head and fractures of
three ribs. While none of the injuries independently was sufficient to cause death, the
cumulative result was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 8
Therefore, the act committed by the accused was so grave and heinous in nature that
his conviction under section 302 for the sentence of life imprisonment is appropriate
and required in order to deliver justice to the deceased.
2. THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE PUNISHED UNDER

SECTION 34 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE.
If the criminal act is done in furtherance of common intention, each person is liable
for the result of such act. Once it is prove that the criminal act was done in furtherance
6Section 300 of IPC-Murder:

Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is
done with the intention of causing death, or--
Secondly.--If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to
cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or--
Thirdly.--If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to
be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or—
Fourthly.--If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any
excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
7 Factsheet ¶ 7.
8 Factsheet ¶ 9.

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of common intention of all, each person is liable for the criminal act as if it were done
by him alone9. Essential ingredient of S.34:
i) There must be a criminal act.
ii) The criminal act done by several person
iii) The act is done in furtherance of common intention of all.
Participation, in the commission of the offence, in furtherance of common intention
invites its application.10 Accused along with the principal offender intended to do the
offence prior to the commission of the offence. They have got inspired and incited by
each other’s presence. The case in which the ingredients are satisfied or established all
accused will be liable for the said offence. 11 Under the provision of S.34 the essence
of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating from
the accused leading to the commission of a criminal act in furtherance of such
intention.12 Thus it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that from all the
facts presented, the respondent has proved the common intention from the part of all
the three accused to do the alleged crime.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
[I] THE ACCUSED WAS RIGHTLY CONVICTED FOR THE OFFENCE

PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 302 OF IPC.
1. The counsels on behalf of the respondents humbly submits that the order passed by the
Sessions Court of sentencing the accused for imprisonment for life for his offence committed
under section 300 and punishable under section 302 of IPC is appropriate.
The conditions of section 300 of IPC have been satisfied.
2. The accused has committed the offence of murder because act done by him falls under the
definition of Murder as defined in Section 30013 of IPC. The present case comes under the 4th
clause of the said section. Clause 4 of the Section talks about a person committing any act
9 Shyamal Ghosh v State of West Bengal 2012 (6) SCALE 381
10 Momin v State of Maharashtra,1971 SC 885
11 Gurdatta Mal v State of UP,1965 SC 257
12 Chinta Pulla Reddy v State OF Andhra Pradesh AIR 1993 SC 1899
13 Supra Note 6

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and knowing that the act thus committed is so imminently dangerous that it will in all
probability cause death or bodily injury as is likely to cause death and that person commits
the act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury aforesaid.14
3. The essential ingredients of this clause are15 –

(a) The act must be imminently dangerous,
(b) The person committing the act must have knowledge that it is so imminently
dangerous, As per the Oxford Dictionary, the word knowledge means: ‘Acquaintance with
a fact, perception, or certain information of a fact matter; state of being award or informed;
consciousness (of anything).’16
For practical and legal purposes, ‘knowledge’ means the state of mind entertained by a
person with regard to existing facts which he has himself observed, or the existence of
which has been communicated to him by persons whose veracity he has no reason to
doubt.17
(c) That in all probability it will cause– either Death or Bodily injury as is likely to cause
death and;
(d) Such imminently dangerous act should be done without any reason or justification
for running the risk of causing death or such injury.
4. This present act of the accused persons of bringing the lathi from inside and giving blows
over his body mercilessly shows that the person had the knowledge that the act is so
imminently dangerous that in all probability it will cause death. 18 Suri Shah gave blows on
head and chest of Karim and was also aware of the same and had the knowledge about the
act of giving blows that in all probability would cause the death of the respondent and still
doing the act fulfills the condition of the Clause 4 of Section 300 of IPC and brings the act
of the accused persons under the definition of Murder.
14 Ibid, clause 4.
15 K I VIBHUTE, PSA PILLAI’S CRIMINAL LAW, LEXIS NEXIS PUBLICATION, P-582
16 Justice C.K.Thakker, ‘Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon’, Volume II, Edn.2010, ASHOKA LAW HOUSE, p-2568
17 Ibid
18 Supra Note 5

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5. Held since no special knowledge is needed to know that one may cause death by beating if
one give blows on chest and head it is obvious that the accused must have known that he
was running the risk of causing the death of the victim or such bodily injury as was likely
to cause his death. As he had no excuse for incurring that risk, the offence must be taken to
fall within 4th clause of section 300, Penal Code. In other words, his offence was culpable
homicide amounting to murder even if he did not intend causing the death. He committed
an act so imminently dangerous that it was in all probability likely to cause death or to
result in an injury that was likely to cause death.19
6. In the case of State of M.P. v. Ram Prasad, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that this was
the case where it was difficult to find the intention of the accused. But then the Supreme
Court observed that in respect of the clause 1-3 of Section 300 of IPC, the question would
rise as what was the intention of the accused, the nature of injuries he intended to cause
etc. Then the Supreme Court opined that it would be simpler to place reliance on Clause 4
because it contemplates only ‘knowledge’ and no intention. In this case, when the accused
gave blows, he must have known that the act would result in his death. 20 This knowledge is
sufficient to bring the act of the accused under the Clause 4, Section 300.
7. The numbers of injuries only doesn’t matter; it is also the nature of the injuries and part of
body where it is caused.21 If the injuries are sufficient enough to cause death then they
could be anything irrespective of the number of injuries. In the present case the deceased
had sustained injuries on the head and fractures of three ribs. There were many
concussions on different parts of his body. There was much loss of blood and they were
sufficient to cause the death. In one of the case Court held that having the knowledge of
the act wouldn’t prima facie make it murder but another essential ingredient for an act to
be murder is that there shouldn’t be any excuse and it is to be wholly inexcusable when
even a risk of gravest possibly character, which must normally result in death, is
incurred.22
19 State of M.P. v. Ram Prasad AIR 1968 SC 881

20 AIR 1968 SC 881
21State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh, AIR2004SC1264.
22 Emperor v. Mt. Dhirajia, AIR1940All486.

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8. If there was no intention to kill, then it can be murder only if –

a) The accused knew that the injury inflicted would be likely to cause death or
b) That it would be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or
c ) That the accused knew that the act must in all probability cause death.23
9. In this case the accused had intention to kill as well as accused knew that the act must in all
probability cause death, so he doesn’t have any chance to run from his liability. Both
knowledge and intention can be seen here in the mind of accused by the act he has done.
10. In order to hold a person responsible for having caused the death, it is not necessary that
his act should be the immediate cause of death, in the medical sense. If accused has caused
injuries then he is liable for murder.24 And in the present case the accused had caused
sufficient injuries to hold him responsible for the act.
Intention of Accused
11. “In the present analysis of the mental element in crime, the word ‘intention’ is used to
denote the mental attitude of a man who has resolved to bring about certain result if he can
possibly do so. He shapes his line of conduct so as to achieve a particular end at which he
aims.” 25
12. During the day on Monday, 8th August 2010, Karim received a phone call from Suri Shah
inviting him to come that evening to collect his debt. Though Karim ordinarily used to meet
Naina on the weekends when her father was not at home but that day, it was Suri Shah who
invited Karim himself. So Karim had a valid reason to be at Sher Shah’s house and was at no
fault. Suri Shah owed a debt of 20,000 rupees and Sher Shah had told Karim not to visit his
home when he was absent. The admitted facts here are that the appellant and the deceased
were not having good relations and Suri Shah had no means to repay his debt off so can do
anything in that order.
23Willie (William) Slaney v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR1956SC116.

24 Kumbhar Narsi Bechar v. The State, AIR1962Guj77.
25 Russell on Crime (12th Edition at page 41) mentioned in Justice C.K.Thakker’s, Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon,
Volume II, Edn.2010, p-2381

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13. The deceased was mercilessly given blows on his head and chest and on hearing the hue
and cry, villagers came to the scene who were the witnesses and found Suri Shah giving
blows to Karim while the other two were shouting abuses on Karim. Karim was bleeding
from the head and became unconscious.
Actus Reus of Accused –

14. Actus Reus means a ‘wrongful act’ and is a legal maxim.26
The term may be so defined as to include accts of omission as well as acts of commission,
and a person may incur criminal liability for failing to do that which the law enjoins as much
as by doing that which the law proscribes.27
The admitted facts here are that the appellant and the deceased were not having good
relations and Suri Shah had no means to repay his debt for which he always showed
helplessness. On the other hand, Karim was in love with Naina and used to meet
Naina on the weekends when her father was not at home on the pretext that he had
come to collect the money. Sher Shah did not like it and told Karim many a times not
to visit his home in his absence. He also scolded his daughter for meeting Karim but
Karim did not stop visiting Naina. The accused were already fed up with the regular
tense atmosphere and more annoyed by seeing Karim talking to Naina in the backyard
of their house. Sher Shah lost his temper and started abusing Karim. Gajendar Shah
brought a lathi from inside and gave a blow to Karim on the leg. Then Suri Shah
grabbed the lathi from Gajendar Shah and started beating Karim mercilessly giving
blows on his head and chest. On hearing the hue and cry, other villagers came to the
scene. They found Suri Shah giving blows to Karim while the other two were
shouting abuses on Karim. Karim was bleeding from the head and became
unconscious. He was taken to the hospital by the villagers where he died three days
later without regaining consciousness.
26 Justice C.K.Thakker’s, Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon, Volume II, Edn.2010, p-141

27 Justice C.K.Thakker’s, Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon, Volume II, Edn.2010, p-141. See Halsbury’s Laws of
England, 4th Ed., Vol.11, p-13.

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15. In the instant case, the accused persons had the knowledge that fiving blows on head and
chest would lead to Karim’s death as a consequence of his imminently dangerous act and he
still committed the act.
16. The accused would be liable for the offence of murder though there was not pre-
meditation of the act. So the act of murder would be punishable under the section of 302 28of
IPC.
17. The post-mortem report confirmed that Karim suffered injuries on the head and fractures
of three ribs. There were many concussions on different parts of his body. There was much
loss of blood. While none of the injuries independently was sufficient to cause death, the
cumulative result was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This proves
that accused persons have committed the offence of the Murder.
18. For the act done by the accused he must be punished. The act committed by the accused
persons comes under the Section 30229 of Indian Penal Code. The said section prescribes the
punishment for murder. In the present case, accused has committed the murder of Karim (as
proved above) and for this they are liable under Section 302. In the Section 302 the
punishment prescribed is either death sentence or life imprisonment. Here, as the case doesn’t
fall under the purview of rarest of the rare case, so death penalty cannot be imposed, hence
the option left is life imprisonment.30 Life imprisonment to the accused is completely justified
if we go as per the grounds mentioned above.
[II] THE ACCUSED WAS RIGHTLY CONVICTED FOR THE OFFENCE

PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 302 OF IPC.
19. It is most humbly submitted that Co-Accused shared a common intention to

murder Karim. It was Sher Shah lost his temper and started abusing Karim. Gajendar
Shah brought a lathi from inside and gave a blow to Karim on the leg. Also, Suri Shah
grabbed the lathi from Gajendar Shah and started beating Karim mercilessly giving
blows on his head and chest. On hearing the hue and cry, other villagers came to the
28Supra note 13.

29 Supra Note 5
30 Supra Note 8, p-84

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scene. They found Suri Shah giving blows to Karim while the other two were
shouting abuses on Karim.31
20. The Supreme Court while dealing with the question of conviction under Section
307 alongwith Section 34 in the matter of Girija Shankar v. State of U.P.32 held that:
“Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the doing of a
criminal act. The Section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive
offence. The distinctive feature of the Section is the element of participation in action.
The liability of one person for an offence committed by another in the course of
criminal act perpetrated by several persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal
act is done in furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in
committing the crime. Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and,
therefore such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from
the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the
charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether
direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the accused
persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34,
be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must necessarily be before the
commission of the crime. The true concept of Section is that if two or more persons
intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them
has done it individually by himself.”
21. Further in the matter of Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab,33 it was observed that
“the existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the
essential element for application of this Section. It is not necessary that the acts of the
several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or
identically similar. The acts may be different in character, but must have been
actuated by one and the same common intention in order to attract the provision.”
31 Factsheet ¶ 7& 8.
32 Girija Shankar v. State of U.P. (2004)3SCC793.
33 Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab 1977 CriLJ 164.

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22. It was further observed by the Court in the matter of Girija Shankar34: “The
Section does not say "the common intention of all", nor does it say "and intention
common to all". Under the provisions of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to be
found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the
doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. As a result of the application
of principles enunciated in Section 34, when an accused is convicted under Section
302 read with Section 34, in law it means that the accused is liable for the act which
caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. The
provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between
acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention
of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them.”
23. In the matter of Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh 35, it was
held that: “Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the
particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 it is not necessary to show some
overt act on the part of the accused.”
24. It is submitted that the common intention or plan may be proved either from
conduct, circumstances or from incriminating facts.36
25. It is submitted it can be inferred from the instant facts that the co-accused had the
common intention as Karim was invited by Suri Shah to their house and in the
presence of Sher Shah, on a weekday. Moreover, the factsheet provides that they saw
Karim talking with Naina. Sher Shah lost his temper and started abusing Karim.
Gajendar Shah brought a lathi from inside and gave a blow to Karim on the leg. Then
Suri Shah grabbed the lathi from Gajendar Shah and started beating Karim
mercilessly giving blows on his head and chest.37
34 Girija Shankar v. State of U.P. (2004) 3 SCC 793 .

35 Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1993 CriLJ 2246.
36 Krishnan v. State AIR 2003 SC 2978: (2003) 7 SCC 56; Gopi Nath v. State of U.P. AIR 2001 SC 2493:
(2001) 6 SCC 620.
37 Factsheet ¶ 7.

18

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26. In light of the above, it can be rightly construed that Co-accused had the common
intention to kill and cause grievous hurt to Karim as all the ingredients required under
Section 34 are satisfied. It is humbly submitted that Accused persons are liable to be
convicted under Section 34 read along with Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
PRAYER
In light of the facts presented, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited the
Counsel for the Appellants humbly pray before this Hon’ble Court that it may be pleased:
1. To declare that the Judgment given by the Sessions Court is appropriate;
2. To declare that the Appellants have been rightly convicted for the offence punishable
under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code;
3. To convict the accused for the offence punishable under Section 34 of Indian Penal
Code along with Section 302 of Indian Penal Code;
Or pass any other order or make directions as the Hon’ble Court may deem fit to meet the
interest of justice, equity and good conscience in the instant case.
And for this act of kindness, the Respondent shall duty bound forever pray.
Respectfully Submitted on Behalf of the Respondent.
COUNSELS FOR
RESPONDENT

19

lOMoARcPSD|10036670

20

Sher Shah V State of Harayana On Behalf of Respondent

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Sher shah v State of harayana on behalf of respondent

International Law (University of Jammu)

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HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

Under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

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S. No. Abbreviation Full Form

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2. Aijaz Ahmad v. State of U.P., ¶ 10, 2004(2) ACR1596.

3. Bai Radha v. The State of Gujarat, AIR1970SC1396.

4. Chinnapattu Nagan v. State of A.P, 1999(2) ALT(CrI.)460(AP),

5. Emperor v. Mt. Dhirajia, AIR1940All486.

6. Gopal Anjayya Falmari and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra,

8. Kumbhar Narsi Bechar v. The State, AIR1962Guj77.

9. Mukanda and Ors. v. State, 1957CriLJ1187.

11. Ram Lal v. State of H.P., 2005(3) ShimLC67.

14. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Prasad, AIR1968SC881.

15. State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh, AIR2004SC1264.

16. State v. Madhusudan Rao M (2008) 15 SCC 604.

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 K. D. Gaur, “Commentary on Indian Penal Code”, (Universal Law Publishing Co.

1 Section 374(2) – Appeal from convictions:

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the instant matter:

2 Section 307-Attempt to murder:

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1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS WERE RIGHTLY CONVICTED FOR THE

OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 302 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE?

2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE PUNISHED UNDER

SECTION 34 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE?

1. THE ACCUSED PERSONS WERE RIGHTLY CONVICTED FOR THE

5 Section 302. Punishment for murder:

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2. THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE LIABLE TO BE PUNISHED UNDER

6Section 300 of IPC-Murder:

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[I] THE ACCUSED WAS RIGHTLY CONVICTED FOR THE OFFENCE

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3. The essential ingredients of this clause are15 –

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19 State of M.P. v. Ram Prasad AIR 1968 SC 881

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8. If there was no intention to kill, then it can be murder only if –

23Willie (William) Slaney v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR1956SC116.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT