Evaluation of Service Failure of Three Phase Induction Motor Using Failure Mode and

Effects Analysis

Chiejine, Chinedu Michael

Department of Electrical/Electronic Engineering Technology, Delta State Polytechnic Ogwashi-uku,

Delta State, Nigeria

E-mail: pstchiejine@yahoo.com Tel: +23408067349981

Abstract

The need to remain competitive in a highly competitive market has necessitated the quest by
manufacturer to strive for customer satisfaction. To facilitate their pursuit of these expected
standard objectives, manufacturers adopt up-to-date techniques. One among many of such
cutting edge techniques is Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA. Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) is a systematized quality determinative technique used for reliability
evaluation. It seeks to ascertain likely failures and their consequences; and is effective in
enhancing reliability of a system or product. This study engaged the procedure for performing
the FMEA as outlined in MIL-STD 1629 to analyze the failure modes of three phase Induction
motor. The result showed that the three phase induction motor is rugged and reliable and
majorly affected by externalities like improper installation, lack of proper maintenance and
mismatched spare parts. Therefore if these areas of concern are given the right attention, major
failure modes of induction motors will be forestalled.
Key Words: Risk Priority number, Three phase Induction motor, Severity, Failure mode,
Detection

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Introduction

To maintain competiveness in the market, manufactures are saddled with the task of satisfying

their customers’ expectations of cost effective, reliable and high quality products. To facilitate

their pursuit of these expected standard objectives, manufacturers adopt up-to-date techniques.

One among many of such cutting edge techniques is Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA).

This FMEA technique is employed to ascertain probable failure modes, identify their effects on

both the product and the personnel using them, as well as determine mitigating procedures

(Janarthanan and Kumar, 2013). This study seeks to evaluate the reliability of three phase

induction motor by using the technique of FMEA to ascertain its failure potential and identify

what to do forestall or lower the threat of failure.

Three phase induction motor is one of the most broadly accepted and extensively used electric

motors. This stems from their ruggedness and virtually maintenance-free operation. It is an

asynchronous machine which operates on the principle of induction. Nevertheless, like other

machines, the three phase induction motors are susceptible to defects as well which could

possibly result in downright damage to the motor. To ensure optimum performance, a system,

subsystem, component of equipment, the component itself, or even a certain process its failure

mode is often determined. Failure mode describes the manner in which failures presents itself.

This is important when attempting to avoid, prevent, understand or resolve a failure (Chiejine,

2021). A series of failure modes could reveal greatly, about the practical effects of failure

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematized quality determinative technique

used for reliability evaluation. It seeks to ascertain likely failures and their consequences; and is

effective in enhancing reliability of a system or product (Chen et al, 2012). Furthermore, it is

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also appropriate in expressing quality review points, operational limitations and requisite means

of failure risk reduction (MIL-STD 1627, 1980).

FMEAs are extensively used engineering analysis tool used during design stage. However, the

failure of existing equipment already in service are also analyzed with FMEAs; in which case it

is handy in evaluating and enhancing the preventive maintenance agenda. As note by Road to

Reliability (2021) and Arun et al, (2013) FMEA analyses the following:

i. The possible failure modes of product or machine that explains how it fails to carry out

its intended function;

ii. The cause(s) of possible failure (e.g. material defect, Design deficiencies, processing and

manufacturing deficiencies, and service conditions etc.);

iii. What effect the failure has on either the equipment the item is part of or the person using

it;

iv. Determination of a risk priority factor; and

v. Assessing current process controls.

The Origin of FMEA

In the late 1940s, a need arose in the American military to investigate problems with the failure

of armaments. This probe necessitated the development of a structural procedure in order to

eliminate all likely causation. This structural procedure is FMEA (Datalyzer, 2015). Arising

from the effectiveness of this technique, the nuclear and aerospace industry adopted it. Similarly,

NASA implemented it and believed the success of the moon landing was by its use. Furthermore,

when food contamination on space mission became a concern to NASA, they developed an

identical methodical tool termed Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) which

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was exclusively for the food industry. Again in the 1970s, there were reoccurrences of fatal fires

in Ford Pinto occasioned by slow speed shunt each time the petrol tank split. To put an end to

this, Ford Motor Company employed FMEA in the course of their design (McDermott et al,

2019). As time went by, other industries with quest for topmost degree of reliability, for instance,

oil and gas and semiconductor adopted and employed FMEA. Hence, this technique is today

being widely used reliability and quality assurance analysis for diverse products including white

goods and common electronic products as well as industrial electrical contrivances like the three

phase induction motor which is the object of the present study. Practically, the FMEA is a risk

analysis and defect decreasing tool which focuses on three vital elements namely Severity (S) of

the defect for both equipment and the users, the Occurrence (O) of the possible causation and

the effectual Detection (D) and eventual eradication of the cause(s).

Three phase Induction Motor

The three phase induction motor (also referred to as asynchronous motor) converts electrical

energy into mechanical energy and are the most prevalently used motors particularly in

industrial, commercial and domestic spheres on account of their ruggedness simplicity, low cost

and high performance (Wan and Hong, 2001). Furthermore, it needs no additional starting motor

and necessity not to be synchronized. They are termed asynchronous motors because they run at

a speed lower than their synchronous speed.

Structural Components of Induction Motor

Basically, the induction motors principally comprise two parts which are Stator and Rotor.

Stator

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As the name implies, this is the stationary part of the motor, and produces a rotating magnetic

field to interact with the rotor. It consists of a number of stampings with slots meant to bear the

three-phase windings. The coils of insulated wires are implanted into the provided slots. Each set

of coils, as well as the core surroundings form an electromagnet (a pair of poles) when an AC

supply is applied. The inner connection of the stator windings determines the number of poles an

AC induction motor possesses. When an AC supply is applied, a rotating magnetic field is

created. The speed requirement is what determines the number of poles. Thus, the more the

number of poles, the lower the speed. This is governed by the relation

1
Ns ∝ (1)
P

120 f
Ns= (2)
P

Where N s is the speed; P is the number of poles and f is the frequency of supply voltage

Rotor

This is the rotating part of the motor. Generally, there are two types of rotors in three phase
induction motor. They are:

i. Squirrel Cage Rotor

ii. Phase Wound rotor or Slip ring rotor

Squirrel Cage Rotor

A squirrel cage rotor consists of a laminated cylindrical core. The circular slots at the outer

periphery are semi-closed. The slots are not made parallel to each other but are bit skewed, as the

skewing prevents magnetic locking of stator and rotor teeth and makes the working of the motor

more smooth and quieter. The squirrel cage rotor consists of aluminum, brass or copper bars as

shown in Fig.1 (a) and Fig.1 (b). This aluminum, brass or copper bars are called rotor
5
conductors, and are placed in the slots on the periphery of the rotor. The rotor conductors are

permanently shorted by the copper, or aluminum rings called the end rings. To provide

mechanical strength, these rotor conductors are braced to the end ring and hence form a complete

closed circuit resembling a cage, and hence got its name as a squirrel cage induction motor. The

squirrel cage rotor winding is made symmetrical. As end rings permanently short the bars, the

rotor resistance is quite small, and it is not possible to add external resistance as the bars get

permanently shorted. The absence of slip ring and brushes make the construction of squirrel

cage. Three phase induction motor very simple and robust and hence widely used. These motors

have the advantage of adopting any number of pole pairs.

Fig. 1 (a): Schematic diagram of the

Fig. 1 (b): Pictorial view of the squirrel
squirrel cage induction rotor
cage induction rotor showing
showing the skewed bars
the skewed aluminum bars
shorted with end rings
shorted by aluminum end rings

Phase Wound Rotor

The phase wound rotor is also known as slip ring rotor (or simply, wound rotor). It consists of a

cylindrical core which is laminated the outer periphery of the rotor has a semi-closed slot which

carries a 3 phase insulated windings. The rotor winding are connected in star. As its name

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indicates, the slip rings are mounted on the shaft with brushes resting on them. The brushes are

connected to the variable resistor. Fig. 2 illustrates the electrical diagram of slip ring three phase

induction motor. The function of the slip rings and the brushes is to provide a means of

connecting external resistors in the rotor circuit. The resistor enables the variation of each rotor

phase resistance to serve the following purpose:

(i) Increase the starting torque and decrease the starting current

(ii) Used to control the speed of the motor.

The rotor of this type is also skewed. A mild steel shaft is passed through the center of the rotor

and is fixed to it. The purpose of the shaft is to transfer mechanical power.

Fig. 2 shows a typical electrical diagram of a slip ring three phase induction motor while Fig. 3

shows a phase wound (slip ring) rotor.

Fig. 2: An electrical diagram of a slip ring three phase induction

motor

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 Fig. 3: Phase wound (Slip ring) Rotor

Applications of Three Phase Induction Motors

The three phase induction motors have diverse use in domestic, commercial and industrial
applications. These include in lifts, cranes, hoists, large capacity exhaust fans, Driving lathe
machines, crushers, oil extraction mills, textiles etc. (Princy, 2020)

Methodology

The procedure followed while performing the FMEA in this study is as outlined in MIL-STD
1629 9 (1980). These steps are outline below and further illustrated in the flow chart of Fig. 4 as
presented by Sheng-Hsien and Shin-Yann (1995).

o Component selection/ definition of the system

o Carrying out a breakdown of the system into subsystems with emphases on the functional
relationship
o Identification of all potential failure modes and their effects on system operation,
functionality as well as on persons using them
o Grading of each failure effects in terms of the severity of its consequence
o Computation of risk priority number
o Obtainment of methods for failure identification as well as remediation for each failure
mode
o Ascertaining the required measure(s) to avert the failure or identify rectitude in design in
order to manage the risk
o Once corrective actions are taken, modifications are effected to curb the effect of each
failure
o Afterwards, FMEA report is prepared with some attention given to problems that were
not able to be corrected. For such problems it is ascertained that there is a means of
assuagement of the risk of failure.

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Fig. 4 :The Flow Chart for FMEA steps (Sheng-Hsien and Shin- Yann, 1995)

Severity (S) Ratings

The severity rating of the failure mode is graded on a scale from 1 to 10. It is an estimation of

how severe or otherwise, the effects would be if a given failure takes place. Sometimes, as a

result of antecedent experience, the severity is well defined. There are however, diverse

contributory factors towards the overall severity of the situation being analyzed (Robin et al

1996). A serious effect marks a high severity grading and ensuing critical risk (Arun et al, 2013).

For instance, a failure mode that wields a severity number of 10 connotes a serious

discontentment and perhaps annoyance of the customer which could result to bodily injury as a
9
result of failure. On the other hand, severity ratings in the range of 4-6 brings about slight

dissatisfaction of customers while the failure mode within the range of 1-3 are interpreted as not

so severe, and may well not be detected (Robin et al, 1996). Table 1 provides the severity rating

and risk factor evaluations.

Table 1: Severity Ratings (Tai-wu et al, 2019); (Arun et al, 2013)

Rating Severity (S) Description

1 No
2 Very slight
3 Slight
4 Minor
5 Moderate
6 Significant
7 Major
8 Extreme
9 Serious
10 Hazardous
Failure in this range such minor class that it is improbable for
customers to detect the failure
The failures in this category result in slight customer
dissatisfaction and/or insignificant decline in part or system
performance
Failures in this category give rise to customer dissatisfaction
and/or decline of part or system performance
In this category, the failures bring about high degree of
customer dissatisfaction and results in unworkability of the
system
In this category, highest customer dissatisfaction ensues, and
system unserviceableness or non compliance with standards and
regulations

Occurrence (O) Ratings

A high occurrence rating shows great failure occurrence potential. Under this phase, the

frequency of failure is observed. This could be achieved by investigating similar products or

processes and the documented failure mode (Robin et al, 1996). The possibility of failure

occurrence is ranked on a scale from 1-10. An inexorable failure, which occurs often is rated

between 8-10. The failures with mild occurrences are ranked from 4-6, while those with low or

eliminated failures have 1-3 occurrence rankings. Table 2 shows the occurrence ratings and risk

factor evaluations.

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Table 2: Occurrence (O) Ratings (Tai-wu et al, 2019); (Arun et al, 2013)

Ratings Occurrence (O) Meaning

1 Almost never Failure eliminated or no occurrence
2 Remote Low or very few
3 Very slight
4 Slight Moderate or few occurrence
5 Low
6 Medium
7 Moderately high High or repeated failure occurrence
8 High
9 Very high Very high rate of failure or inexorable failures
10 Almost certain

Detection (D) Ratings

This provides a ranking which is based on an evaluation of the probability that the failure mode

will be detected under predetermined regulations. Appropriate monitoring techniques must be

selected. The capability of failure detection is graded on a scale from 1-10. This grading is

however in the converse direction. In other words, a high detection rating shows low detection

capability. For instance, a rating “1” denotes a very high probability that a failure would be

detected before getting to the customer, and a rating of “10” indicates a low to zero probability

that the failure will not be detected. Table 3 shows the detection ratings and risk factor

evaluations.

Table 3: Detection (D) Ratings (Tai-wu et al, 2019); (Arun et al, 2013)

Ratings Detection (D) Description

1 Almost certain Very certain that failure will be detected

2 Very high
3 High
4 Moderately high
5 Medium
High probability that the defect will be detected
Moderate probability that the defect will be detected
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 6 Low
7 Slight
8 Very slight
9 Remote
10 Almost impossible
Low probability that the failure will be detected
Low probability that the failure will be detected
Very low probability that the defect will be detected
Faults will be passed to customer undetected.

Computation of Risk Priority Number (RPN)

In any FMEA procedure, one key element is the Risk Priority Number (RPN). This establishes

where efforts need to be focused as well as the failure modes that will be given primacy of

mollification. RPN is calculated by multiplying the three variables namely: Severity (S),

Occurrence (O) and Detection (D) as follows:

R isk Priority Number=Severity ( S ) ×Occurence (O ) × Detection( D)

The RPN values range from 0-1000 which provides a measurable means of weighing up the risks

in the FMEA analysis. This, however does not by any means have RPN as an unbroken linear

scale from 0-1000 rather, there are only 120 probable outcomes that range from 0-1000. These

outcomes have been generally found to be vulnerable to little changes. Furthermore, smaller

value of RPN is better than its higher value (Rakesh et al, 2013). Correct calculation of RPN

makes it easy to ascertain areas of critical concern. Some failures might be less severe, but

happen more frequently and less detectable.

Table 4: FMEA Table for Three Phase Induction Motor

S/ Problem Effort(s) (S) (O) (D) Causes Solution RPN
N
1. Short- 8 4 1 High voltage spike, Rewinding or replacement 32
turns(winding Overheated winding, aged of motor
breakdown) insulation, loose, vibrating
coil wire, conductive

12
 contaminants
2. Ground Winding 6 3 2 Overheating ;lightening Rewinding or replacement 36
winding shorted either ;pressure of a tight coil fit, hot of motor
shorted to to the spots caused by lamination
frame laminated core damage,
or to the motor
frame; slot
insulation
breakdown
3. Phase-to-phase Voltage 6 4 2 Insulation breakdown at the Rewinding or replacement 48
short between phases coil ends or the slots of motor
can be very
high
4. Open winding Charred 6 3 2 Undersized lead lugs, faulty Rewinding or replacement 36
connections in internal coil-to-coil of motor
the motor connections, severe
connection overloads, and physically
terminal box; damaged coils, phase-to
motor runs phase shorts, ground-to-
more slowly frame-shorts
and overheated
5. Burned Power output is 7 4 1 Operating on single phase Rewinding or replacement 28
windings from cut of motor
operating on approximately
single phase in half if it
happens while
the motor is
running; it will
continue to run
but it can no
longer start by
itself (it has no
rotating
magnetic field
to get it
started)
6. Open rotor bars Loss of power; 6 4 3 Overload burn out, arcing in 1.They can be repaired, 72
or end rings slow starting the slot from a short recast, or rebarred (if it is
and lower than winding, loose bar vibration, economical)
rated RPN; thermal growth stress (from 2. otherwise the motor can
very low starting), Flaws in bar be replaced
ampere with no materials (casting flaws) and
load. poor connection with end
rings
7. Open end rings Muse uneven 5 5 4 Flawed casting, motor burn 100
torque and out from overload,
some power mechanical damage, thermal
loss; electrical growth stress.
vibration
8. Misaligned Draws high 6 5 3 Wrong bearing shim Correcting the 90
rotor/stator ampere and placement, wrong bearing misalignment using
iron will lose width, incorrect installation vibration tester or analyzer
power; charred of bearing on the shaft, stator to determine the right
stator winding core shifted on its shell, rotor balance.
shifted on its shaft.
9 Rotor dragging Motor runs 6 4 2 Wrong bearing shim Replace motor 48
on the stator hotter than placement, wrong bearing
normal; low width, incorrect installation
voltage; power of bearing on the shaft, stator
and efficiency core shifted on its shell, rotor
loss; degraded shifted on its shaft.
magnetic
circuit.
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 1 Rotor loose on Rumbling or 7 4 2 Excessive clearance between Repair could be effected 56
0. shaft vibrating rotating and stationary depending on the price of
sound; a red elements of the machine replacement motor and the
dust forms such as bearing importance of the motor in
between the the plant operation.
shaft and rotor Otherwise, rotor (and
iron (this is shaft) can be replaced; the
oxidized iron) rotor can be bored out and
caused by the a new one shaft fitted to it
rubbing action or; a thin metal wedge can
between the be driven between the shaft
shaft and the and rotor to secure it.
rotor iron.

Results and Discussion

Arising from Table 4, the FMEA table for three phase induction motor, it is made known that

induction motor faults may be classified into fault on stator and rotor. However, it is obvious that

the induction motor is on the average, reliable seeing that most of the RPN values are low. On

the other hand, the high value wielded by open end rings, misaligned rotor/stator iron and open

rotor bars or end rings bring to light that such malfunctioning are due to wrong or incorrect

installation, mismatched spare parts, wrong/poor operation procedures etc. All these are external

factors. Attention needs to be directed to attending to the above concerns with additional

attention given to appropriate and quality power supply to the motor to forestall adverse effect on

the smooth operation of the motor.

Conclusion

The study dealt with FMEA procedure of three phase induction motor. Thus, the three phase

induction motor used for industrial, commercial and domestic application has been analyzed with

the expected failure mode observed and recorded. The probable cause and effects of failure

modes were evaluated with their severity values. The risk priority number was calculated by

assigning the detection rating to the failure mode.

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By this study, a well documented method for operating three phase induction motor to ensure

high probability of successful operation and reliability.

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