Architectural Theory Review

ISSN: 1326-4826 (Print) 1755-0475 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ratr20

TRANSLATING TRADITION: Technology, Heidegger's

‘Letting-be,’ and Japanese New Wave Architecture

Adrian Snodgrass

To cite this article: Adrian Snodgrass (1997) TRANSLATING TRADITION: Technology,

Heidegger's ‘Letting-be,’ and Japanese New Wave Architecture, Architectural Theory Review,
2:2, 83-104, DOI: 10.1080/13264829709478320

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13264829709478320

Published online: 28 Jul 2009.

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Translating Tradition

TRANSLATING TRADITION: Technology,

Heidegger's 'Letting-be/ and Japanese
New Wave Architecture

ADRIAN SNODGRASS

T/ie Japanese 'New Wave' architects are critical of Western rationality, yet resort
to sophisticated technology. This seemingly paradoxical stance lias correspondences
on the one hand witli some aspects of Heidegger's thinking on technology and with
his notion of 'letting-be' (Gelassenheit), and on the other hand with certain
traditional Buddhist doctrines.

The Modern Movement repudiated the past. It looked to modem technology for
focus and inspiration, and put its trust in a Utopian future determined by tech-
nological progress. The post-Moderns, in reaction, reaffirmed the relevance of the
past, sought to preserve some measure of historical continuity, and tended to be less
credulous concerning the inevitability of technological advance to a perfect world.

For the most part contemporary Japanese architects follow the world-wide post-
Modernist trend in being more conciliatory towards the past and more critical in
their attitude towards notions of technological utopianism. Some of them, however,
give a distinctively Japanese twist to this general tendency. A number of Japanese
architects reject the Modem Movement not because of its particular notions
concerning architecture, but because of its associations with Western forms of
rationality and the technological applications of that rationality. They turn to their
tradition not, as do post-Modem architects elsewhere, to evoke a nostalgic sense of
the familiar, to indulge in irony, or to reinforce a sense of local or national identity,
but as an alternative and counter to modem Western modes of logic.

The architect Kurokawa Kisho argues for this rejection of Western rationality in
favour of traditional ways of thinking.' In his writings he describes the strategies he
employs in his architectural works for expressing such Buddhist notions as Non-
duality (funi), Emptiness (ku.) and ephemerality (mujo). He dissolves boundaries,
merges inside and outside, emphasizes intermediary zones and ambiguous spaces,
fuses public and private areas, and uses other such means to create a sense of the

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Architectural Theory Review Vol. 2, No. 2,1997

ambiguous and the amorphous and to effect what he calls a 'symbiosis,' a non-dual
merging of spaces and times. He regards these strategies not merely as devices for
achieving aesthetic ends, but primarily as a counter to the rigid demarcation of
categories and the either/or dichotomies of Western thinking, which he blames for
the decline of Japanese cities to a state of anti-human chaos, for the present sterility
of architecture, and for the excesses of a consumption-driven and increasingly
rootless society. He totally rejects Utopian notions of technological progress.

Kurokawa is by no means alone in his thinking. The younger generation of Japanese

architects (the 'New Wave') similarly deplore the deterioration of architecture, the
chaos of the urban environment and the waning of Japanese culture. 4 They share
Kurokawa's skepticism towards Western modes of thinking and search for archi-
tectural ways to revive and preserve the Buddhist tradition as an alternative to
Western rationalism.

There is nothing distinctively Japanese in deploring many aspects of modernity, in

noting the consequences of an excessively rigid application of rationality, or in
turning back to the past for a sense of cultural identity. Many postmodernist thinkers
in the West share these tendencies. What differentiates the attitude of the Japanese
from other postmodernist architects is the means they adopt to rehabilitate their
tradition. Whereas, on the one hand, they declare a rejection of Western rationality,
on the other hand they do not abandon technology, but use it in its purest and
undiluted forms.

They make no effort to revive handcraft or the materials and techniques of earlier
times. Quite on the contrary, Kurokawa and the New Wave are masters of the most
sophisticated and advanced technology. Nor do they use technology, as do some
other postmodernist architects, to reproduce the superficial forms of the archi-
tecture of the past. Their aim is not to quote the styles of previous periods. It is not
to reproduce the visible tradition or endorse any sort of stylistic revivalism, but to
preserve the unseen tradition, the spiritual heritage of Japan. 5

Kurokawa and the New Wave aim not to quote the tradition but to translate it into
the language of technology. They use technology to evoke a sense of the passing of
the seasons, the ceaseless flow of all phenomena, the subtle sadness that tinges
beauty, the silence that lies beyond sounds, and in this way emulate the traditional
arts of Japan, which aimed to evoke intimations of the impermanence of all things,
their suchness, their Emptiness, and the non-duality of forms and Emptiness. To
this purpose they use metal and glass surfaces to mirror natural changes in the light,
sky and weather; they design courts to reflect the play of the sun, cloud shadows
and the rain, and thus draw attention to natural processes even in the midst of the
city; 6 they hang metal screens to create an 'anemorphic' architecture, its forms
changing and resonating with the breezes, to evoke a sense of subtle transformation

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Translating Tradition

and immateriality; they use technological means to manipulate planes and spaces
and to dislocate geometries so as to give a sense of implied space, to express
'fluctuations' (yuragi) and to create architectural forms redolent of nature and to
evoke images of a 'primal landscape' deemed to reside in the collective memory of
the Japanese.

In all of this they avoid the use of the materials, techniques or forms of traditional
architecture, but employ hi-tech means which have no connection with those of
earlier times. The architectural forms they produce are not calculated to evoke
memories of past styles. Although their architecture draws upon the vocabulary and
syntax of the traditional arts—the use of understatement and the unspoken, the
evocation of'betweenness' (ma),8 the opening up of empty space, and so on—these
are conveyed by strictly technological means which have nothing in common with
the arts of former days.

There is, obviously, a basic contradiction here. On the one hand the Japanese
architects express an antagonism towards Western rationality and its manifestations
in modern Japanese life, but on the other hand their buildings are state-of-the-art
examples of the use of advanced technology, a technology which has resulted from
and expresses the Western rationality they seek to reject.

Is this acceptance of the uses of technology and the simultaneous rejection of its
rational base a case of having one's cake and eating it? Does it evidence either
hypocrisy or unthinking naivety? Or does it, perhaps, stem from some darker,
xenophobic source? Is it simply a new expression of 'Japanese Spirit, Western
Technology' (wakon yosei), the anti-foreign slogan of those in the nineteenth
century who aimed to protect Japanese culture from the incursions of the Western
powers?9 Or is it a manifestation of the mhonjinron belief in the uniqueness and
superiority of a Japanese sensibility, the 'logic' of which will forever remain in-
accessible to outsiders?

It would be foolish to deny that these forces may well play a part in the thinking of
the Japanese architects we are discussing. Nevertheless, it would be too hasty to
dismiss that thinking out of hand on the grounds of irrationality or xenophobia. This
paper will argue that the notions of a simultaneous rejection of Western rationality
and acceptance of technology can be supported by arguments drawn from the
Western philosopher, Heidegger, on the one hand, and from the Japanese Buddhist
tradition on the other. It will also argue that these notions are not of merely parochial
interest within the Japanese context, but are relevant to our Western understanding
of how we are to cope with technology in this era of its ubiquitous dominance.

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Architectural Theory Review Vol. 2, No. 2,1997

The Instrumental Metaphor of Technology

Technology is most usually discussed in terms of a metaphor of instrumentality. This
supposes that we use technology to effect certain useful results in the same way that
we use technological equipment to manipulate and control objects. Technology, in
this metaphor, is a means to an end; it is used to control nature, with the aim of
producing things for human benefit, consumption or use.

Implicit in the metaphor of technology as an instrument is the notion of control,

which in turn is based on the concept that humans and technology stand over
against each other in the manner of a workman and a tool. The notion of
instrumentality thus involves a basic duality, with humanity on one side and
technology on the other.

Debates concerning technology are usually conducted within the framework of this
humanity/technology dichotomy. On the one hand there are those who think that
humanity has lost control of technology, and on the other there are those who
disagree. The former say that technology is destroying rather than enhancing the
quality of life, and holds the potential for catastrophe. They point to global warming,
ozone holes, nuclear arsenals, pollution, smart bombs, genetic engineering, user-
friendly means of mass extermination, and a host of other potentially destructive
phenomena to support their argument that science and technology are running
amok, and have escaped human control in the manner of a speeding machine whose
brakes have failed.

Their opponents, by contrast, are convinced that technology remains under human
control. Technology has immeasurably improved our standards of life, and the
disasters cited by their opponents are merely the mishaps that are liable to occur in
any human activity; but humans, by way of science and technology, can find means
of controlling any deleterious effects that may accompany the advance of tech-
nology. The dangers posed by technology are problems which science, under human
control, can solve.

Technology as a Cybernetic System

The instrumental metaphor of technology is 'correct' as far as it goes but, as does
every metaphor, it only reveals a partial aspect of its referent. It conceals as well as
reveals. 10 The adequacy of the instrumental metaphor of technology can be queried
when we look at how technology now functions.

Heidegger likens the functioning of technology in the modern world to that of its
'culminating achievement,' cybernetic systems." The word 'cybernetics' comes

S>6
Translating Tradition

from a Greek word meaning 'steersman,' and in its present use refers to a system in
which information is steered back upon itself in feedback loops so as to monitor its
own functioning. The machine becomes self-regulating. Technology, Heidegger
argued, now operates in the manner of a cybernetic system. It is no longer under
the control of human agency, but functions and expands by feeding back into itself
in accordance with its own self-controlling mechanisms. Technology is now able to
perpetuate, regulate and generate itself without human intervention. It now func-
tions as a completely self-enclosed information system, an enormous feedback
circuit in which all things become calculable statistics, a system which is not oriented
towards some telos, but gyrates in a spiral of ever-expanding self-generation. It is no
longer a means to an end, but an end in itself. The goal of technology becomes
efficiency and control for their own sakes.

Technology is now self-organizing, self-ordering, self-perpetuating and self-

dominating, and in this sense has a life of its own. Machines are no longer merely
means to the attainment of some local and specific end, owned and controlled by
particular individuals or groups, but form part of a global system of production that
is quite beyond the control or 'ownership' of any individual, group, class or
community. It is impossible to begin to imagine how any dismantling of this
world-wide system could take place.

In this system the nature of the 'object' changes. Things are no longer objects, but
cogs in a system. In this technological era a telephone, for example, is not seen as
an object or instrument which extends the range of the voice, but as an element in
the global communication system; a Boeing 747 is not an object which serves as a
means of getting us from one place to another, but is part of a world-wide
transportation system, involving bewilderingly complex sets of interactions and
involvements.

The outcome of this self-propelling drive to efficiency is that logistical systems

become the controlling mechanism not only of the natural but also the human world,
dictating patterns of behaviour, modes of discourse, the validity of modes and objects
of inquiry, the direction and purpose of education, in short, every aspect of life. In
this way logistical information about objects impinges directly on humanity and its
actions. As Heidegger noted, the advent of cybernetics heralded the reduction of
logos to logistics.14 "Humanity becomes its own object," 15 and technology "steers
our evolution. We become manipulable objects contributing to the productive
enterprise, the logistical equivalents of pieces of equipment or raw materials,
statistics in a chain of production and consumption.

In the light of these developments it is no longer appropriate or more than partially

revealing to speak of technology in instrumental terms of human control. The
metaphor is obsolete. We no longer control, but are controlled by technology;

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Architectural Theory Review Vol. 2, No. 2,1997

technology no longer belongs to us, but we belong to technology; and we do not

stand over against technology, but are part of its structure. The human/techno-
logical differentiation deconstructs.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason

It might be assumed that the arguments supporting this dismantling of the
humanity/technology duality begin to bridge the gap between Western thinking on
technology and the attitude of the New Wave architects. The assumption is
dubious. The arguments construct no bridges, or anything else. Bridges need
foundations, and these arguments are without foundation. They simply replace one
metaphor with another, which is equally vulnerable to dismantling. Push the
cybernetics metaphor far enough and it, too, collapses.

Both Heidegger and the Japanese 'reason' from a position where reason itself gives
no support. If we are to understand the Japanese view insofar as it reflects the
Japanese tradition, and if we are to understand Heidegger's thinking on technology,
we must not ask for 'reasons.'

For Heidegger, to ask for reasons is to subscribe to the principle of sufficient reason,
the principle that "nothing exists unless a sufficient reason for its existence is able
to be rendered." This principle demands that every thing must have a reason or
a cause for its existence, or else is not real.

The principle of sufficient reason is the driving force of science, which is usually
taken to epitomize rationality. Science and the principle of sufficient reason go
together and are inextricably merged. Science seeks the reasons for things so as to
exercise a rational control over them. It is based on the premise that the behaviour
of phenomena has a cause and is rationally explicable, and that access to reasons
and causes allows predictions, and thereby control, of that behaviour. This style of
thinking, imbued with notions of instrumental control, constitutes technological
rationality.

Technological rationality, which Heidegger calls "calculative thought," has become

all-pervasive and hegemonic in the modern world.

... [T]he demand for the delivery of grounds [i.e., reasons], now speaks
unconditionally and incessantly throughout modernity and sweeps over us
contemporaries. ... [It] has slipped in between thinking man and his world in
order to take possession of human representing in a new way.

The principle of sufficient reason is the primary and overarching principle of the

&&
Translating Tradition

metaphysics of modernity; and technological rationality, thus defined in terms of

the principle of reason, is now uncritically accepted by many as the only mode of
rationality. It governs how we are to think, and also what we are to think about. It
only allows those things to come to presence which can be accounted for and thereby
ordered, represented, regulated, organized, managed, manufactured for some
purpose. Unless a reason can be given for a thought or an action, it is 'irrational,'
unfounded, unsupported and unsupportable. It is without justification and cannot
be validated. 18

In the modern world everything is treated in terms of control and is ordered in

accordance with the demands of technological rationality. The sole reason for the
existence of things is to serve technological needs. The world is set within a
framework in which all things are seen as waiting to be accumulated, manipulated,
and calculated. All things thus become part of a global store of resources, a
'standing reserve' (Bestcmd) of raw materials to feed the self-propelling expansion of
technology. 20

Humans believe that the power of reason gives them mastery over nature and the
world, but technological rationality governs humans as well as things. Humans set
upon (stellen) nature, dominating it by rational rule; but are themselves set upon by
the power of the rule of reason.

The universal dominance of the principle of reason, says Heidegger, constitutes the
nihilism of our age. In demanding that every thing, whether natural or human,
have a reason, we have lost our respect for them. If no reason can be given, the thing
is no real thing, but no thing, a nothing (nihil).

The Enframing of Thought

There is, therefore, a profound paradox embedded in talk about technology or its
control. To give reasons to support an argument concerning technology is to
reinforce the all-pervasive hegemony of the technological way of thinking. In order
to discuss or criticize notions of technology we are constrained to use the language
of technological rationality, structured in accordance with the framework of the
principle of sufficient reason. T o think or talk about technology is to think or talk
within the limits of its own modes of thought, that is, in terms of sufficient reason
and thus in terms of the control of objects and in a logic which is modelled on the
notion of the manipulation of objects. The 'questioning' of technology does not in
fact question technology, but merely rearranges technologically pre-determined
tokens located in a technologically predetermined thinking-space. To question
technology is to ask for reasons, to ask how it 'works', and how to control it, all
notions which are fore-structured in accordance with the limitations, metaphors,

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Architectural Theory Review Vol. 2, No. 2,1997

pre-assumptions and rules of technological rationality.

Employing reason to question technology is counter-productive; it simply tightens

the grip of technological rationality. We are trapped within technological modes of
reasoning as in an enframing structure.

For Heidegger this enframing (Gestell) is the essence of technology. 22 In its essence,
technology is not technological equipment and techniques of production, but is the
way in which we think about, interpret and view the world within the framework
set up by technological rationality.

The 'supreme danger' that technology poses is not the reduction of humankind to
statistics and objects for use; nor is it the threat of some technological catastrophe.
Predictions of cataclysm are symptoms of a more general and deeper problem. The
greatest danger, says Heidegger, is that posed by the possibility that technological
rationality should become the only way of seeing reality, excluding all modes of
thinking which lie outside the framework predetermined by technology. 23

The paradigmatic example of the exclusivist enframing of thought and praxis is

scientific method, which wholly dominates science by prescribing in advance what
is real. Before any scientific investigation begins the real has already been reductively
defined as what can be measured and calculated mathematically to show causal
relationships. If the phenomenon escapes the net of causal reasons, it is irrational
and a figment. In this enframing of thought and action, things are only present to
us if they have a reason; they are only revealed to us if they can be as seen as raw
materials to be mathematically calculated, measured, manipulated and made into
objects for use. Those things that are not disclosed rationally, which is to say, in a
mathematically formalizable manner that gives them a reason and renders them
amenable to control, are as if absent, and therefore wholly negligible.24

The enframing of thought here takes a totalitarian turn. It becomes self-enclosed

and self-referential, with no external criteria by which it may be judged. All other
ways of thinking or seeing are strictly excluded.

The Principle of Reason is Without Reason

There is a profound irony in the enframing of modern thought by a technological

rationality based on the principle of sufficient reason, since reason is itself without
reason. The principle of reason, forming the foundation of the thought and praxis
of the modern era, itself has no foundation. The principle of reason questions all
things; it asks why they are; and if no answer can be found counts them as nothing.
But when we query reason, when we demand to see its reason, and ask why all things

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Translating Tradition

must have a sufficient reason, the answer is silence. No ultimate reason can be found
to support the principle of reason itself. To give reasons for the principle of reason
is to go round in circles, since to give reasons is to have recourse to the principle
that is being questioned. If reasons can be found to base the principle, then they
must also be asked their grounds, and so on to infinite regress.

Technological rationality hides from itself that it has no fundamental justification.

Its quest for causes and reasons stops at reason itself. If pressed, it masks its lack of
grounding by justifying its existence in terms of utility; but ultimately it cannot
validate itself. It follows that its claims to certitude, to exclusive and hegemonic
authority, or to sole access to truth, are invalid.

Technology as the Disclosure of Being

For Heidegger the emergence of technological rationality in Western history and

its domination of modern thought are not the fruit or fault of any human doing or
willing. They are not ascribable to human causes nor do they result from human
thought, but are the 'mission' of Being, the particular way in which Being discloses
itself in this modern epoch; and "Being is no product of thinking. On the contrary,
indeed, essential thinking is an event (Ereignis) of Being." 26

Technology in its essence is not to be thought of as the application of the findings

of science, nor as the use of machines, equipment, and technical processes to
manufacture products for use. It is, rather, the way in which a certain aspect of
reality, that which is enframed by technological rationality, is revealed to us.

This leads to a profoundly significant conclusion: we cannot hope to control

technology because its essence, which is coincident with Being, lies outside our
willing. If the essence of technology

... is Being itself, then technology can never be mastered, neither positively nor
negatively, through a mere self-dependent human action. Technology, whose
essential being is Being itself, can never be overcome by man. This would mean
that man would be the lord of Being.28

This negates the notion that technology is neutral and that it only poses a threat
because of human misuse. 29 Ifthe essence of technology, the Gestell, is a 'mission of
Being' and beyond human control or intervention, then the core problem lies
neither with machines nor with the way humans use them, but with the possibility
that the mode of Being disclosed by technological rationality comes to exclude
all other modes of disclosure, with a consequent distortion of the essence of
humanity. 30

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Architectural Theory Review Vol. 2, No. 2,1997

There is no point in asking what caused the emergence of technological rationality

or why it exists. For Heidegger the event (Ereignis) of Being allows of no explanation.
We cannot say why the essence of technology has come to dominate Western think-
ing and now spreads out to dominate the thinking of all peoples; there is no 'answer'
to the 'question' of Being. This being so, then "What does there remain to say?
Only this: the Event of Appropriation comes to pass (das Ereignis ereignet)."32

Heidegger leads us to the edge of the abyss. He tells us that technological rationality,
the only mode of thought now available to us in this present era, is groundless. He
then further compounds our perplexity by asserting that technological rationality is
a supreme danger in that it threatens what it is to be human, but that no human
agency can alter this state of affairs. Technological rationality is a disclosure of Being
that we can neither prevent nor alter. Our interventions, our attempts at tech-
nological control and ecological management, only deal with the symptoms of
technology, but cannot reach its essence.

If all thought and all action ultimately lack reason, then the only response seems to
be a passive acceptance of fate. The way ahead seems to lead into nihilism and chaos.
Everything is founded on the void.
• • •

Heidegger's conclusions will, in certain aspects, have a familiar ring to those coming
from the Mahayana Buddhist tradition of Japan. We should not imagine that we
are the first to reach the furthermost edge of perplexity, and to see the looming
of the abyss. In the second century A.D., or thereabouts, Nagarjuna showed that
when we apply the criteria of logic to logic's own foundations, those foundations
crumble. Logic itself, judged by its own rules, is logically incoherent and incon-
sistent. No assertion, without exception, can be sustained by reason, including even
the assertion that no assertion can be sustained by reason. Illogic inheres within
all logic. When logic is reflectively applied to itself, it collapses. Reason can give no
absolute and certain support for knowledge.

Heidegger's thinking 'rings together' with Nagarjuna's. The two bodies of thought,
separated by nearly two millennia, arrive at similar conclusions. Both follow a path
that seems to lead to nihilism.

To show the basic Emptiness of reason, however, is not necessarily to espouse

nihilism. The Madhyamika school of Buddhism, teaching Nagarjuna's dismantling
of reason, has been widely influential wherever Mahayana Buddhism has flourished.
It is a fundamental influence in every Mahayana mode of thinking and practice,
and is studied by Buddhist scholars in Japan to this day. Its deep and long-lasting

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Translating Tradition

influence, however, has not encouraged nihilism nor engendered chaos. Quite on
the contrary, the Madhyamika launched an enduring and profound culture, one
based not on a foundation of certainty, but on a non-foundation of the voidness of
all attempts, rational or otherwise, to grasp the nature of reality. Nagarjuna's
dismantling of logic did not presage the end of thought and culture. Nor did the
thinkers who followed after Nagarjuna reject his demolition of reason as leading to
the edge of the abyss, but criticized him for not going far enough. Rather than
shrinking back, they took his deconstructive strategies as merely the first step on
the Way, the Tao, leading further and further into the Reality of Emptiness. 35

How is it possible that a way of thinking that denies reason's sovereignty could
flourish without fostering nihilism nor, as will be shown, negating an active involve-
ment in everyday practicalities? The Buddhist answer to this question also has
overtones which 'ring together' with Heidegger when he talks of the notion of
'letting-be.'

Letting-be
Heidegger proposes that the only way to deal with technology is not to deal with it
at all, but to leave it alone to reveal itself. If the essence of technology is a disclosive
mission of Being, and neither human agency nor thought can control Being, then
the choice confronting us would seem to be either to submit passively to our fate
and do nothing or ignore the baselessness of notions of control and carry on as usual.
There is, however, a third alternative. We can learn to 'listen' to what Being reveals,
and open ourselves to its disclosure.

Heidegger calls this opening up to Being 'letting-be' (GelasserJ\eit) . 36 It involves a

new way of thinking, a thinking which, unlike technological rationality, does not
ask for the reason of things, but accepts them as they are and allows them to disclose
themselves in their own way. To let-be is to abstain from the interrogation of either
Being or beings, to cease from challenging them to give an account of themselves
or to show their why in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason. It is to
grant that things do not need a reason to exist. Heidegger sums up this way of
thinking by citing a short poem of Angelus Silesius:

The rose is without why; it blooms because it blooms

It cares not for itself; asks not if it's seen. 37

The rose has no reason for existing; it simply is, and simply reveals itself. While it is
correct that technological rationality and its methods of investigation can find
causes for the rose's blooming and give reasons for its existence, such explanations
are not a full disclosure of what it is to be a rose, but reveal only one aspect of the

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Architectural Theory Review Vol. 2, No. 2,1997

rose's reality at expense of others.

Any disclosure of reality, of Being, says Heidegger, is simultaneously a concealing. 38

Explanations enframed in technological rationality occlude other aspects of reality,
in a manner analogous to that in which focussing on a foreground figure causes other
figures to 'withdraw' into the obscurity of the background, or that in which using
a telescope to view the surface of the moon blocks out any sense of its general
position in relation to other stars. So similarly, to 'explain' the rose in causal terms
recognizes the disclosure of one aspect of its reality even as its closes over others.

Technological rationality asks the why of the rose; but the rose itself demands no
answers and is without why. If we allow the rose to disclose itself to us, without
interrogation, it reveals its own reality. The same applies to all things, not only to
roses and things of beauty. If we make no demands, asks no whys, all things, whether
attractive or repulsive, have their own reality to disclose. As with the rose, so also
with technology. T o interrogate technology, to ask its reason, is to focus exclusively
on that aspect of Being which technological rationality reveals, and thereby preclude
the 'emergence' of other aspects of Being. T o allow other aspects of Being to be
disclosed, we must relax our focus on the why of technology, and prepare ourselves
for another disclosure. We must accept that, like the rose, Being, and its revealing
in technological rationality, are without why. The question "why is this?" must give
way to the simple statement "because it is so."

Letting-be is a simple recognition of the finitude of human powers of control and

understanding. As Heidegger says, "We are so finite that we are not able by our
own decision and will to bring ourselves originally face to face with the Nothing." 40
This being so, we must allow the Nothing to disclose itself to us.

Letting-be involves not only being open to the reception of those aspects of reality,
those other modes of thinking, which technological rationality exclude or conceals,
but also being open to the 'Mystery' that is concealed within the technological world
itself.41 Openness to the Mystery may allow technology to disclose intimations of
another 'world,' 42 to reveal glimpses of a 'pristine techne,'4 ways of making which
do not exploit nature, but have a respect for things and allow them to reveal
themselves as they are in themselves. T o be open in this way is to displace
technological rationality from its position of absolute dominance, and to open a way
for a reconciliation of the human and the technological. 44

Letting-be is a non-willing. It is the giving up of all willing, even of willing not to

will. Heidegger thus speaks of negative and positive modes of letting-be. Willing not
to will is the negative and 'ascetic' mode of letting-be, in which we seek to free
ourselves from attempts to explain Being—which is to say, the essence of tech-
nology, technological rationality—by way of'reasons'; it is an acceptance that Being,

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like the rose, is without why. This negative willing is a 'preparation' for a final and
positive stage of letting-be, in which every trace of willing is absent, and in which
there is a will-less opening up to Being.46 In this second stage of letting-be all willing
has given way to a simple openness which "lets Being be." 47

Letting-be and Buddhism

This talk of letting-be and of "coming face to face with the Nothing" will sound
familiar to Mahayana Buddhists. Once again, the thinking of the philosopher
'sympathetically resonates' with the doctrines of the tradition. 4

Heidegger's notions of the disclosure of technological rationality from Being as 'the

Nothing' (das Nichts) can be reconciled with the Buddhist doctrine that all things
come out of Nothingness. Phenomena, for Buddhism, are 'thus-come' and 'thus-
gone' (tathdgata, Jap. nyorai); they emerge from and return to Emptiness (sunyatd,
Jap. ku), without a reason.

Buddhists will also hear familiar overtones in Heidegger's notions of'letting-be,' for
Buddhism also speaks of a 'letting go,' a non-grasping, in which things are not asked
their why but simply seen in their Suchness (tathatd, Jap. shinnyo).

Variations on the concept of letting things alone to be what they are pervade the
doctrines of every sect of the Mahayana. The concept is particularly evident in the
J6do-shin sect of Japanese Buddhism, which makes it the focus of both its doctrine
and 'practice.' J6do-shin advocates 'non-doing' so as to let Buddhahood reveal
itself in oneself, kono-mama, 'just as one is,' and in all things, sono-mama, 'just as
they are.' This teaching of 'non-action' (mu-i) is encapsulated in the phrase jinen-
honi, which refers to the spontaneous 'working' of Emptiness, jinen is 'of itself and
honi is 'it is so because it is so'; the (non-) practice of jinen-honi is to set aside the
illusion of one's own power (jiriki) so as to allow the power of the Other (tariki),
which is the power of Emptiness, spontaneously to disclose itself in all things and in
oneself.52

Active Non-Action

Some will interpret letting-be as an injunction to give up and do nothing in the face
of the onslaught of technology, allowing it free rein to wreak havoc as it will. But
neither in its Heideggerian or Buddhist modes does letting-be have anything in
common with a permissive and quiescent passivity.

At the level of everyday practicalities and as it relates to ways of coping with

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technology, letting-be in both modes means playing our role in the technological
world, accepting the benefits of technology and doing our best to minimize its
dangers, while yet retaining a critical skepticism concerning its truth claims,
adopting an attitude in which, as Heidegger says,

We are able to use technological objects and yet with suitable use keep ourselves
so free of them that we are able to let go of them at any time. We are able to
make use of technological objects as they ought to be used. But we are also able
simultaneously to let them alone as something which does not concern what is
innermost in us and proper to us. 53

This means working within the framework of technological rationality, seeking

causes, predicting outcomes and fixing breakdowns as best one can, but with a full
awareness that our actions are circumstantial and occasional responses to circum-
stantial and occasional situations and have no firm foundation in certainty. It is to
act as the technological ethos demands, but with a clear recognition that concepts
of controlling technology are only valid within limits, that we are not applying
universal laws which are permanently and statically embedded in the very nature
of things. We are compelled to do our best to prevent and clean up oil spills, to save
the whale, to contain nuclear expansion, to query the ethics of genetic engineering,
but this compulsion does not entail an uncritical acceptance of technological
rationality. We are not compelled to accept technological rationality as the only way
of reacting to technology.

This incredulity towards the truth claims of technology does not entail the rejection
of technology itself. Heidegger says that talk about rejecting technology is 'foolish-
ness.' He specifically denies the suggestion that he advocates "some kind of renais-
sance of presocratic philosophy," and he asserts that any attempt to turn back the
clock would be "idle and foolish."54 Any turn against the use of technological
equipment would be equally vain. There is no point in attempting to renounce the
trappings of technology. As Heidegger says,

The equipment, apparatus, and machines of the technological world are for all
of us today indispensable, for some to a greater extent, for others to a less extent.
It would be foolish to blindly assail the technological world. It would be
shortsighted to wish to condemn the technological world as the work of the
devil. 55

Conclusion

Familiarity with Heidegger's notions of letting-be puts us in a better position to

understand what Kurokawa and the New Wave are about when they unequivocally

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employ technology to translate their tradition into a form that is relevant to the age
of technology. We can now better understand what Kurokawa means when he says
that he will push technology so far that it reveals its human face. Such statements
come from within a tradition of non-dual thinking; he is reaffirming the insight that
all dichotomies, including that which separates humanity and technology, are only
one way of seeing reality. Equally true is the non-dual view which sees them in their
fusion. He is reaffirming the Buddhist doctrine that all things—humans, machines,
technological rationality—come from Emptiness, return to Emptiness, and yet are
not in any way separate from Emptiness. He is reaffirming that all things—the things
of ugliness and danger that technology brings, as well as the things which give us
joy—are so many manifestations of the Void.

Most commentators, I imagine, will see the architecture of Kurokawa and the New
Wave as an exercise in aesthetics, to be placed alongside the works of those
post-Modern architects in other parts of the world who plunder the past, using the
tradition as a standing reserve (Bestand) of forms and ideas to be manipulated in the
service of a new style.

On the other hand, if Japanese New Wave architecture is an authentic translation

of the Buddhist tradition, it will not be concerned with aesthetics for its own sake.
Even Zen, which is often associated with an appreciation of simple things and the
beauties of nature, is not concerned with beauty as such but primarily, as in
Buddhism generally, with suffering, mortality, ignorance, and other such un-lovely
things. Buddhism only points to beautiful things if they act as expedient means
conducive to a seeing of ail things, whether ugly or beautiful, benign or threatening,
as they are in themselves and as they are in their Emptiness. It lets all things be,
both pleasant and repulsive, and allows them to lie forth. This applies as much to
hydrogen bombs or nuclear plants as to roses and tea bowls.

Again, if this architecture is a genuine translation, its acceptance of technology will

have little in common with the simple-minded adulation of scientism and the
uncritical acceptance of visions of a technological Utopia which characterized the
Modern Movement. It will, by contrast, be fully aware not only of the dangers posed
by some aspects of technology, but also of the ' g r e a t e s t danger,' that posed by the
possibility of totalitarian sovereignty being invested in the essence of technology, its
rationality.

In sum, the work of Kurokawa and the New Wave has, it is hoped, more than an
aesthetic interest, and holds the potential to open up new ways of coping with
technology in the era of its total, or near total, dominance.

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The practice of architecture today, like all else, is enframed within the structurings
of technological rationality. Architects seem to be faced with a choice between an
uncritical acceptance of technology, taking for granted that it inevitably leads to a
better world; or else a partial or total rejection of technology, involving a turning
back from the present to the past. Either way they are caught in a dualistic way of
thinking, trapped in the oppositions that inhere within the logic of technological
rationality. Whatever their choice, it strengthens the entanglements of that ration-
ality. The thinking of Kurokawa and the New Wave is significant as pointing
towards a Middle Way that merges these oppositions, and thus leads out of the
enframing. Following this path could possibly lead to a realm where technology, in
translating tradition, is itself transformed.

Notes
1 See Kisho Kurokawa, Rediscovering Japanese Space, New York and Tokyo: Weatherhill,
1988; and Intercultural Architecture: The Philosophy of Symbiosis, London: Academy
Editions, 1991. Aspects of the ideas collected together in these two books also appear in a
number of articles, including "Toward a Rhyzome World or 'Chaosmos'," Japan Architect
63, 376 (Aug 1988): 8-11; "Toward the Evocation of Meaning," Japan Architect 64, 382
(Feb 1989): 6-13; "An Architecture of Symbiosis: The Two-faced God Janus," Japan
Architect 61, 354 (Oct 1986): 40-2; "The Philosophy of Symbiosis: From Internationalism
to Interculturalism," Japan Architect 60, 334 (Feb 1985): 12-16.
2 Kurokawa, Rediscovering Japanese Space, p. 19; "The Philosophy of Symbiosis."
3 The 'New Wave' is named for an exhibition which toured the United States in late 1978,
entitled "A New Wave of Japanese Architecture." It includes Hasegawa Itsuko, Ito Toyo,
Aida Tekefumi, Hara Hiroshi, Ando Tadao, Mozuno Kiko, Fuji Hiromi and Sakamoto
Kazunari. At the time of that exhibition, Ada Louise Huxtable ("The Japanese New Wave,"
The New York Times, 14th. Jan., 1979) tematked, "... if there is an active avant-gatde
today, this is it." For a discussion of the New Wave, see Botond Bognar, Contemporary
Japanese Architecture, New York: van Nostrand Reinhard, 1985; Noburu Kawazoe,
Contemporary Japanese Architecture, Tokyo: Kokusai Koryu Kikin (Japan Foundation),
1973.
4 For the New Wave critique of modern Japanese society, the city, and architecture, see
Hajime Yatsuka, "An Architecture Floating on the Sea of Signs: Three Generations of
Contemporary Japanese Architecture," Architectural Design 58,5-6 (1988): 6-13; Yatsuka,
"Architecture and the Urban Desert: a Critical Introduction to Japanese Architecture After
Modernism," Oppositions 23 (1984), p. 23; Kazuo Shinohara, "Chaos and Machine," Japan
Architect 63,373 (May 1988): 25-32; Katsuhiro Kobayashi, "Where to Go, What to Fight?"
Japan Architect 63, 379/380 (Nov/Dec 1988): 94-6; Atsushi Katagi, "Against the
Consumption of Architecture," Japan Architect 63,379/80 (Nov/Dec 1988): 76-7; Bognar,
"Archaeology of a Fragmented Landscape," Architectural Design 58, 5-6 (1988): 14-25;
Kazuhiro Ishii, "The Intellectual and Today's Urban Hopelessness," Japan Architect 55
(May 1980), etc.
5 Kurokawa, Rediscovering Japanese Space, pp. 22-3.
6 This is particularly so in the work of Ando Tadao. See Tadao Ando, "From the Periphery
to Architecture," Japan Architect 57 (May 1982): 12-20; "New Relations Between the

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Space and the Person," Japan Architect 52 (Oct/Nov 1977): 44-6; "A Concrete Teahouse
and a Veneer Teahouse," Japan Architect 61,354 (Oct 1986): 29; "The Wall as Territorial
Delineation," Japan Architect 53 (June 1978): 12-3; Hiroshi Watanabe, "Tadao
Ando—The Architecture of Denial," Japan Architect 57 (May 1982): 50-5; and cf.
Kenneth Frampton (ed.), Tadao Ando—Buildings, Projects, Writings, New York: Rizzoli,
1984.
7 For discussions of these strategies, see Itsuko Hasegawa, "3 Projects," Japan Architect 61,
355/6 (Nov/Dec 1986): 54-5; Hasegawa, "Architecture as Second Nature, "Japan Architect
64,391/2 (Nov/Dec 1989); Hiroshi Hara, "A Style for the Year 2001," Japan Architect 59
(March 1984): 39-40; Lynne Breslin, "From the Savage to the Nomad: Critical
Interventions in Contemporary Japanese Architecture," Architectural Design 58, 5/6
(1988): 27-31; Takefumi Aida, "Architecture, Fluctuation and Monument," Japan
Architect 64, 382 (Feb 1989): 18-21; Toyo ko, "Architecture Sought After by Android
(sic)," Japan Architect 63, 374 G u n e 1988): 9-13; Bognar, "Architecture, Nature and a
New Technological Landscape—Itsuko Hasegawa's Works in the 80s," Architectural
Design 61, 3-4 (1991): 33-7. O n the concept of'primary landscape,' see Fumihiko Maki,
"An Environmental Approach to Architecture," Japan Architect 48 (March 1973);
Yatsuka, "An Architecture Hoating on the Sea of Signs," pp. 9-10;
8 Ma, literally 'betweenness,' is the pregnant pause in movement, the rest in the melody, the
gap allowing a glimpse of imagined space and so on. See Richard B. Pilgrim, "Intervals (Ma)
in Space and Time: Foundations for a Religio-Aesthetic Paradigm in Japan," History of
Religion 25, 3 (Feb 1986): 255-277.
9 Wakon yosei is a shortened form of Toyo no dotoku, Seiyo no gakugei, coined by Sakuma
Shozan. It summed up his belief tiiat the way to save the spirit of the Japanese in the face
of Western demands was to adopt the superior technology of the West, while at the same
time preserving traditional modes of thought. See Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de
Bary and Donald Keene (eds.), Sources of Japanese Tradition, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1958, pp. 603 ff.
10 See Adrian Snodgrass, "Models, Metaphors, and the Hermeneutics of Designing," Design
Issues 9, 1 (Fall 1992): 56-74, esp. p. 71.
11 Heidegger's theme of the cybernetic character of modern technology is summarized in
Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics
and Art, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990, pp. 199 ff., where
references are given. Cf. Gerald L. Bruns, Heidegger's Estrangements: Language, Truth
and Poetry in the Later Writings, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, p. 47. For an
overview and bibliography of Heidegger's philosophy of technology, see Albert Borgmann,
"The Question of Heidegger and Technology: A Critical Review of the Literature,"
Philosophy Today 31, 2/4 (Summer 1987): 97-177.
12 Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, pp. 200-1.
13 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in The Question Concerning
Technology and Other Essays, trans, William Lovitt, New York; Harper and Row, 1977,
3-35 (p. 17).
14 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray, New
York: Harper and Row, 1972, p. 21. Cf. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with
Modernity, pp. 199-200.
15 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," p. 18. Cf. Zimmerman,
Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, p. 200. Zimmerman, Eclipse of the Self: The
Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981,
p. xxv) relates this to 'the they' (das Man); and the political entailments of the

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'objectification' of people are discussed by Richard Schmitt, M a r t i n Heidegger on Being

Human, N e w York: R a n d o m House, 1969, and Karsten Harries, "Heidegger as A Political
T h i n k e r , " in Michael Murray (ed.), Heidegger and Modem Philosophy, N e w H a v e n : Yale
University Press, 1979, pp. 304-28; Gregory Schufreider, "Heidegger o n C o m m u n i t y , " M a n
a n d World 14,1 (1981): 25-54; Langdon W i n n e r , Autonomous Technology: Technics O u t
of Control as Theme in Political Thought, Cambridge, Mass.: M I T Press, 1977; e t c .
16 In the original formulation of Leibniz: ... niftil existere nisi cujus reddi potest ratio existentiae
sufficieiis. For t h e following see Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grurtd, 3 , Auflage,
Pfullingen: Verlag G i i n t h e r Neske, 1965, summarized in J o h n D . C a p u t o , Radical
Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project, Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987, pp. 222 ff. Cf. C a p u t o , T h e Mystical Element
in Heidegger's Thought, N e w York: Fordham University Press, 1986, pp. 59 ff. Martin
Heidegger, " T h e Principle of G r o u n d , " trans. K. Hoeller, M a n and World 7 (1974): 207-22,
is a translation of pp. 191-211 of D e r Satz vom Grund , a n d is the source for m u c h of what
follows.
17 Heidegger, " T h e Principle of G r o u n d , " p. 48, cited in C a p u t o , T h e Mystical Element in
Heidegger's Thought, p. 9 3 .
18 O n t h e all-encompassing h e g e m o n y of technological rationality, see Z i m m e r m a n ,
H e i d e g g e r ' s Confrontation with Modernity, passim; G i a n n i V a t t i m o , T h e E n d of
Modernity, t r a n s . J o n R. Snyder, Baltimore: John H o p k i n s University Press, 1991,
Translator's Introduction, p. xiv; Drew Leder, "Modes of Totalization: Heidegger o n
M o d e m Technology and Science," Philosophy T o d a y 2 9 , 3 (Fall 1985): 245-56. It is a
persistent t h e m e in Heidegger.
19 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. J. Stambaugh, N e w York: Harper and
Row, 1969, p. 34-5.
20 For t h e notion of 'standing reserve' (Bestand), see Heidegger, "Question Concerning
Technology," p p . 16-7; Richard J. Bernstein, "Heidegger's Silence? Ethos and Technology,"
in Bernstein, T h e N e w Constellation, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, pp. 79-141 (p. 99);
Z i m m e r m a n , Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, pp. 212-6; John D. C a p u t o ,
Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, D e c o n s t r u c t i o n , and the Hermeneutic Project,
B l o o m i n g t o n a n d Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987, p. 2 2 3 ; Heidegger,
"Question C o n c e r n i n g Technology," Translator's Introduction, p. xxix; S h a u n Gallagher,
Hermeneutics and Education, Albany, N.Y.: State University of N e w York Press, 1992,
p. 176; Leder, "Modes of Totalization," p . 246; etc.
21 Michael E. Z i m m e r m a n , "Beyond 'Humanism': Heidegger's Understanding of Technology,"
in T h o m a s S h e e h a n (ed.), Heidegger: T h e M a n and the Thinker, Chicago: Precedent
Publishing, 1981, p p . 219-27 (p. 225).
22 For 'enframing' (Gestell), see Heidegger, "Question C o n c e r n i n g Technology," pp. 22 ff;
Heidegger, T h e Question Concerning Technology, Translator's Introduction, p. xxix-xxx,
xxxiii-vi; Bernstein, "Heidegger's Silence," pp. 101 ff.; Kathleen Wright, " T h e Place of the
W o r k of A r t in the Age ofTechnology, Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (1984): 565-83
(pp. 573-4); Leder, "Modes of Totalization," pp. 248-9; Gallagher, Hermeneutics a n d
E d u c a t i o n , p p . 176 ff.; C a p u t o , Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 223-32; Gerald L. Bruns,
Heidegger's Estrangements: Language, Truth, and Poetry in the Later Writings, N e w
H a v e n : Yale University Press, 1989, pp. 41 & 4 8 ; Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation
w i t h Modernity, pp. 216-22; Zimmerman, "Beyond 'Humanism'," p. 223; etc.

23 M a r t i n Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. J. M. A n d e r s o n and E. H. Freund, N e w

York: Harper a n d Row, 1966, p. 56; Hubert L Dreyfus, " O n the Ordering of Things: Being
a n d Power in Heidegger a n d Foucault," Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 Supplement

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(1989): 83-96 (pp. 88 ff.).

24 See Dreyfus, "On the Ordering of Things," p. 88.
25 See Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought, pp. 51 ff.; Caputo, Radical
Hermeneutics, pp. 222 ff.; Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, pp.
235-6. Cf. also Gallagher, Hermeneutics and Education, p. 291, where he cites similar
notions from Derrida Oacques Derrida, "The University in the Eyes of Its Pupils," Diacritics
13 (1983): 3-20) to show that the universities, bastions of reason, are themselves 'without
reason.'
26 Martin Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?" trans. W. F. C. Hull and A. Crick, in Werner
Brock (ed.), Existence and Being, Chicago: Regnery Co., 1949, pp. 325-61 (p. 356). Cf.
Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought, pp. 76-7, etc. On Heidegger's
notions concerning disclosure, see James J. DiCenso, Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of
Truth: A Study in the Work of Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur, Charlotteville: Unversity
Press of Virginia, 1990, Ch. 2; Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology,
Translator's Introduction, passim; Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with
Modernity, Ch. 14; John Haugeland, "Dasein's Disclosedness," in Hubert L Dreyfus and
Harrison Hall (eds.), Heidegger: A Critical Reader, Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell,
1992, pp. 27-44; Joseph P. Fell, "The Familiar and the Strange: O n the Limits of Praxis in
the Early Heidegger," in Dreyfus and Hall, Heidegger: A Critical Reader, pp. 68-80; Jean
Grondin, "Hermeneutical Truth and Its Historical Presuppositions: A Possible Bridge
Between Analysis and Hermeneutics," in Evan Simpson (ed.), Anti-Foundationalism and
Practical Reasoning: Conversations Between Hermeneutics and Analysis, 1987, pp. 45-58,
where disclosure is related to Ereignis, the 'happening' or 'event' (p. 53); Zimmerman,
"Beyond Humanism," pp. 221 ff.; Sandra Lee Bartky, " Heidegger's Philosophy of Art," in
Sheehan), Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, pp. 257-273 (pp. 265 ff.); John Sallis,
"Into the Clearing," in Sheehan, Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, pp. 107-115; David
E. Cooper, Metaphor, London: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 252-7, where it is related to
metaphor; Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 74-5; Bernstein, "Heidegger's Silence," pp.
95 ff. and 106; etc.
27 On the disclosive 'mission' of Being, see Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's
Thought, pp. 76-7, etc.; Theodore K. Kisiel, "On the Dimensions of a Phenomenology of
Science in Husserl and the Young Dr. Heidegger," Journal of the British Society for
Phenomenology 4, 3 (October 1973): 217-234 (esp. p. 232); Berndt Magnus, Heidegger's
Metahistory of Philosophy: Amor Fati, Being and Truth, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970;
Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition, trans. Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene,
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970; Michael Allen Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger,
and the Ground of History, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984; Sandra Lee Bartky,
"Heidegger and the Modes of World Disclosure," Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 40,2 (Dec 1979): 212-36.
28 Martin Heidegger, "The Turning," trans. K. R. Maly, Research in Phenomenology 1 (1971):
3-16 (pp. 5-6).
29 On the non-neutrality of technology, see e.g., Heidegger, "The Question Concerning
Technology," p. 4; Bernstein, "Heidegger's Silence," p. 9 1 ; Don Ihde, Technology and the
Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
1990; Don Ihde, Instrumental Realism: The Interface Between Philosophy of Science and
Philosophy of Technology, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991;
Don Ihde, Philosophy of Technology: An Introduction, New York: Paragon House, 1993.
30 Martin Heidegger, "The Thing," in Poetry, Language and Thought, trans. A. Hofstadter,
New York: Harper and Row, 1971, pp. 163-82 (p. 166).

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31 Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. J. Stambaugh, New York: Harper and Row,
1972, p. 20; Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. P. D. Hertz, New York:
Harper and Row, 1971, pp. 71-2.
32 Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 24.
33 See Nagarjuna, esp. the Mula-madhyamika-karikas and the Maha-prajnaparamita-sastra,
cited in T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1955; Vicente Fatone, The Philosophy of Nagarjuna, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1 9 8 1 ; K. V e n k a t a R a m a n a n , Nagarjuna's Philosophy As Presented in the
Mahd-Prajnaparamita-Sastra, Rutland, Vermont and Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1966;
Richard H. Robinson, Early Mddhyamika in India and China, Madison, Milwaukee:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1967; and for Candraktrti's Commentary on Nagarjuna, see
Mervin Sprung, Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: The Essential Chapters from the
Prasannapada of Candrakirti, Boulder: Prajna Press, 1979; Kamaleswar Bhattacharya,
"The Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna," Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1 (1971): 217-261;
Charles Crittenden, "Everyday Reality as Fiction: A Madhyamika Interpretation," Journal
of Indian Philosophy, 9 (1981): 323-33; Douglas D. Daye, "Japanese Rationalism,
Madhyamika, and Some Uses of Rationalism," Philosophy East and West 24, 3 (1974):
363-8; Frank J. Hoffman, "Rationality in Early Four Fold Logic," Journal of Indian
Philosophy, 10 (1982); 309-37; Kenneth K. Inada, Nagarjuna: A Translation of his
Mularnadhyamikokarika, u>ith an Introductory Essay, Tokyo, 1978; Jacques May, "On
Madhyamika Philosophy," Journal of Indian Philosophy, 21, 1 Qan 1971): 233-41; G. C.
Nayak, "The Madhyamika Attack on Essentialism," Philosophy East and West 29, 4
(1979): 479-90; Kitaro Nishida, Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness,
Honolulu: East West Center, 1958; Keiji Nishitani, "Emptiness and History," Eastern
Buddhist n.s., 12, 1 (1979): 49-82; Frederick J. Streng, Emptiness: A Study of Religious
Meaning, New York: Abingdon, 1967; Streng, "The Process of Ultimate Transformation
in Nagarjuna's Madhyamika," Eastern Buddhist 11, 2 (Oct 1978): 12-32; Streng,
"Metaphysics, Negative Dialectic, and the Expression of the Inexpressible," Philosophy East
and West 25, 4 (Oct 1975): 429-47; Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti, "Nagarjuna's
Conception of 'Voidness'," Journal of Indian Philosophy 9 (1981): 273-82; Ives Waldo,
"Nagarjuna and Analytic Philosophy," Philosophy East and West 25,3 Quly 1975): 281 -90.

34 Nagarjuna is not attempting to replace the logic he dismantles with some alternative. He
is simply pointing out that logic cannot sustain itself.
35 In the Mahayana view Nagarjuna's demolition of logic and reason is only the first step on
the pathway into Nothingness. Accordingly, Kobo Daishi, in his Ten Stages of Mind (see
the Jujushinron, Taisho 77, no. 2425) places Nagarjuna's dismantling of logic at only the
seventh of the ten stages, at the stage of the 'provisional Mahayana,' so called because it is
only the beginning of the deconstructive process. See Adrian Snodgrass, The Matrix and
Diamond WoAd Mandalas in Shingon Buddhism, 2 vols., Sata-Pitaka Scries Nos. 354-5,
New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 1988, pp. 7 ff.
36 There is an excellent treatment of this topic in Caputo, The Mystical Element in
Heidegger's Thought, pp. 173-83, 200-1 6k 247-9. Cf. Zimmerman, Heidegger's
Confrontation with Modernity, pp. 109-12; 163-5, 229-47; Cooper, Metaphor, pp. 252-6;
Bruns, Heidegger's Estrangements, p. 33; Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 81, 99-102,
224 ff.; Wright, "The Place of the Work of Art...," p. 576; Gallagher, Hermeneutics and
Education, pp. 144 ff; etc. For a less sympathetic review, see Reiner Schiirmann, "Heidegger
and Meister Eckhart on Releasement," Research in Phenomenology 3 (1973): 95-119.
37 Angelus Selesius, The Book of Angelus Selesius, With Observations by the Ancient Zen
Masters, trans., drawn and handwritten by Frederick Franck, New York: Knopf, 1976, p.
66. Heidegger quotes the poem and develops its theme in Der Satz vom Grund.

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38 Heidegger expresses this in terms of the strife of'world' and 'earth': world is self-revealing
and earth is self-concealing. See, e.g., Bartky, "Heidegger's Philosophy of Art," pp. 263 ff.;
Joseph J. Kockelmans, Heidegger on Art and Art Works, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1985, pp. 154 ((■ Cf. Cooper, Metaphor, pp. 254 ff; Bruns, Heidegger's Estrangements, pp.
29ff.; etc.
39 Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld, p. 50. Cf. Ihde, Philosophy of Technology, p. 111.
40 Heidegger, "What is Metaphyisics," pp. 343-4.
41 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 55.
42 Martin Heidegger, "The Turning," trans. K. R. Maly, in Research in Phenomenology 1
(1971): 3-16, p. 10.
43 Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought, p. 187, citing Heidegger, Die
Technik und die Kehre, Pfullingen: Verlag Gunther Neske, 1962, p. 34.
44 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 54-
45 Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," trans. E. Lohner, in W. Barret and H. Aiken (eds.),
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 3, Contemporary European Thought, New York:
Harper and Row, 1971, 192-224 (p. 194).
46 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 54-5.
47 Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," p. 220.
48 A number of writers have pointed out the proximity of Heidegger's thinking and the
teachings of Buddhism. Heidegger entered into a direct dialogue with several aspects of
Buddhist thinking. Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. P. D. Hertz, New
York: Harper and Row, 1971 (see esp. p. 19), is an exchange between 'the Inquirer' and a
Japanese, Kuki Shuzo. On the Asian influences in Heidegger's thinking, see Reinhard May,
Heidegger's Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on His Work, London and New York:
Routledge, 1996. On Heidegger and Zen see Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's
Thought, pp. 203-17; Borgmann, "The Question of Heidegger and Technology," pp.
147-51; Peter Kreeft, "Zen in Heidegger's Gelassenheit," International Philosophical
Quarterly 11, 4 (December 1971): 521-45; Linda Leonard, "Toward an Ontological
Analysis of Detachment," Philosophy Today 15, 4 (Winter 1972): 268-280; Carl Olson,
"The Leap of Thinking: A Comparison of Heidegger and the Zen Master Dogen,"
Philosophy Today 25, 1 (Spring 1981): 55-62; Reiner Schurmann, "Trois penseurs de
delaissement: Maitre Eckhart, Heidegger, Suzuki," Part 1, Journal of the History of
Philosophy 12,4 (October 1974): 455-477; Part 2, ibid., 13,1 Qanuary 1975): 43-60; John
Steffhey, "Man and Being in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism," Philosophy Today 25,1 (Spring
1981): 56-54; Takeshi Umehara, "Heidegger and Buddhism," Philosophy East and West
20,3 Quly 1970): 271-81. Philosophy East and West, 20, 3 Quly 1970) is given over to the
proceedings of a conference on "Heidegger and Eastern Thought," held at the University
of Hawaii in 1969. A number of papers stress the affinity of Heidegger's thought and
Buddhism. Cf. Also Graham Parkes (ed.), Heidegger and Asian Thought, Honoloulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1987. The proximity of Heidegger's thought and certain aspects
of Buddhism, however, is to be taken with reservations. It would be a distortion of both
Buddhism and Heidegger to suggest that they coincide. It is not to be imagined, for example,
that Heidegger's 'the Nothing' (das Nichts) can be identified with Buddhist Emptiness. There
may be proximity, but not coincidence. Heidegger refers to the Thomist notion of an
'analogy of proportionality' when he specifies the relationship his thought has to theology
(cf. James Robinson, "The German Discussion," in James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb
(eds.), The Later Heidegger and Theology, New York: Harper and Row, 1963, pp. 42-3).
The reference is to Aquinas's distinction of analogy of proportion (analogia proportionis) and
analogy of proportionality (analogia proportkmalitatis). The former is the analogy between

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two things which have a direct relationship. To say "the brain is a computer," is to assert
that there is a direct relationship between them, and that one works just like the other.
Analogy of proportionality, by contrast, is the analogy between two things which are not
directly related but share a certain 'similarity of proportions,' as in the metaphor "Juliet is
the sun." This is a 'proportion of proportions' or a 'relation of relations.' Heidegger has
suggested that the 'ratio' of his notions of Being and thinking is not directly proportional to
that of God and thinking conducted within faith, in the form Being : thinking = God :
thinking within faith, but nevertheless has an indirect proportionality, in the form Being :
thinking :: God : thinking within faith. For a development of this theme, see Caputo,
Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought, pp. 143 ff. I suggest that a similar analogy of
proportionality exists between Heidegger's notions of Being and letting-be on the one side
and the Buddhist notions of Emptiness and non-action (mid) on the other, in the form
Being : letting-be :: Emptiness : non-action.

49 This in a manner of speaking and as the expression of an expedient means, leading to the
deeper insight that nothing comes and nothing goes, or alternately, Nothing comes and
Nothing goes.
50 'Non-grasping' is a basic tenet of both the Theravada and the Mahayana. The notion of
'letting-be' in the Mahayana is a development of the Theravada concept of non-grasping.
51 See Alfred Bloom, Shinran's Doctrine of Pure Grace, Tucson: University of Arizona Press,
1965; D. T. Suzuki, Shin Buddhism: Japan's Major Religious Contribution to the West,
London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970; D. T. Suzuki, Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist,
London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957, Section 2; etc.
52 Suzuki, Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist, pp. 154-5.
53 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 54.
54 Heidgger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," trans. W. Kaufmann, in W.
Kaufmann, (ed.), Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, Cleveland: Meridian Books,
1956, pp. 206-21, p. 210. Cf. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought, p.
186.
55 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 53; cf. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans J.
Stambaugh, New York: Harper and Row, 1969, p. 40.
56 Kurokawa, Rediscovering Japanese Space, p. 24-

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