Soviet Views of "The Scientific-Technological Revolution

Trustees of Princeton University
Soviet Views of "The Scientific-Technological Revolution"

The Scientific and Technological Revolution--Its Impact on Management and Education. by
Robert Daglish; Man, Science, Technology: A Marxist Analysis of the Scientific and
Technological Revolution.; Dialectics of the Contemporary Epoch. by Piotr N. Fedoseev; The
Contemporary Scientific-Technological Revolution: Economic Forms and Laws of Development.
by Vladimir D. Kamaev; The Scientific-Technological Revolution and its So ...
Review by: Erik P. Hoffmann
World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Jul., 1978), pp. 615-644
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SOVIET VIEWS OF "THE SCIENTIFIC-
TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION"
By ERIK P. HOFFMANN
ViktorG. Afanas'ev,Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia upravlenie,obra-

revoliutsiia,
zovanie. Moscow: Politizdat,I972, 432 pp. English translationby Robert
Daglish, The Scientificand TechnologicalRevolution-Its Impact on
Managementand Education.Moscow: ProgressPublishers,I975, 320 pp.
Chelovek-nauka-tekhnika.Moscow: Politizdat,I973, 368pp. Unattributed
Man, Science,Technology:A MarxistAnalysisof the
Englishtranslation,
Scientificand Technological Revolution. Moscow-Prague: Academia
(Prague),I973, 387pp.
PiotrN. Fedoseev,Dialektika sovremennoiepokhi [Dialecticsof the Con-
temporary Epoch]. Moscow: Politizdat,I975, 576 pp.
Vladimir D. Kamaev, Sovremennaianauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia:
ekonomicheskieformyi zakonomernosti[The ContemporaryScientific-
TechnologicalRevolution:EconomicForms and Laws of Development].
Moscow: Mysl', I972, 264 pp.
VladimirG. Marakhov,Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiiai ee sotsial'nye
posledstviia[The Scientific-Technological Revolutionand its Social Con-
sequences].Moscow: Vysshaiashkola,I975, I44 pp.
Nikolai V. Markov,Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia:analiz, perspek-
2d ed. [The Scientific-Technological
tivy,posledstviia, Revolution:Analy-
Consequences].Moscow: Politizdat,I973,240 pp.
sis,Perspectives,
Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiiai obshchestvo[The Scientific-Techno-
logical Revolutionand Society].Moscow: Mysl',I973, 480 pp.
Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiiai preimushchestva sotsializma [The
Scientific-TechnologicalRevolutionand the Advantages of Socialism].
Moscow:Mysl',I975, 264 pp.
Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiiai sotsializm [The Scientific-Techno-
logical Revolutionand Socialism].Moscow: Politizdat,I973, 368 pp.
Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiiai sotsial'nyiprogress[The Scientific-
TechnologicalRevolutionand Social Progress].Moscow: Politizdat,I972,
368 pp.
Partiia i sovremennaianauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiiav SSSR [The
Partyand the Contemporary Scientific-Technological Revolutionin the
I974, 336pp.
U.S.S.R.].Moscow:Politizdat,
Ivan E. Rubtsov,Nauchno-tekhnicheskii progressv usloviiakhrazvitogo
obshchestva
sotsialisticheskogo Progressin Developed
[Scientific-Technical
SocialistSociety].Moscow:Mysl',I975, 248 pp.
THE thecoreof recentSovietlitera-

booksunderreviewconstitute
revolution" (nauchno-tekh-
ture on "the scientific-technological
nicheskaia revoliutsiia) (NTR), and on the political, social, and
economic contexts that shape and are shaped by the extraordinary
0043-887I/3004-06l5$01-50/I
WorldPolitics? 1978 Princeton Press
University
For copyinginformation,see Contributor
page

616 WORLD POLITICS
and technical
scientific advancessinceWorldWar II. Of particular
aretheefforts
significance bySovietand EastEuropeansocialtheorists
tounderstand therolethatscienceandtechnology areplayingand can
play in the transitionto new formsof "developedsocialism," and
eventuallyto a "communist" society.AlsonotablearerecentSovietat-
tempts to developa theory of "thescientific management of society"
(nauchnoeupravlenie obshchestvom) (NUO); to affirm thecentrality
ofhumanchoiceand initiative in societaldevelopment; and to assess
thepositiveand negative socialconsequences and techno-
of scientific
logicalchangein socialist,capitalist,
and Third-World countries.'
The majorthemes oftheNTR literature aretheoreticallysignificant
-in thetradition ofMarxistthought, and in comparison to Western
"postindustrial" The booksexaminedanalyzethereciprocal
theorists.
amongman,science,
relationships and technology; thepreconditions
andstimuli social,andeconomic
ofscientific-technical, changeindiffer-
entpolitical
systems; andthefeatures thatdistinguishthecontemporary
NTR fromthetechnical andindustrial revolutions ofthepast,as well
as frompossible"new"scientific and technological revolutionsin the
future.Thesevolumesalsopayconsiderable attentionto thechanging
modesand components of scientific,social,and managerial thought,
to theimportance ofusingnewtechnologies forspecificsociopolitical
and economic purposes,and to theimpactof theNTR on thesocial
ofdifferent
structure theyalsoexamine
polities; theeffectsoftheNTR
on humancapabilities andpersonality as wellas on man'srelationship
to theenvironment. These and otherSovietworksgenerally ignore
somecrucialquestions concerning apparent discrepanciesbetween the
theoryandtheactualdevelopment orexperience oftheNTR insocialist
'In thefirstof a noteworthy seriesof bibliographicalessays,the editorsof Voprosy
identify
filosofii what theyconsiderto be the mostimportant recentSovietstudiesof
the NTR: "Sotsial'no-filosofskie problemynauchno-tekhnicheskoi revoliutsii(issledo-
vaniia I97I-1975 Problemsof the Scientific-Technological
gg.)" [Social-Philosophical
Revolution(ResearchI97I-I975)], No. 2 (i976), 37-53. I examine,in thepresentand
anotherreviewarticle,all of thebookscitedby theeditorsof Voprosyfilosofii on two
majortopics:(i) theessentialcharacteristicsand significance of thecontemporary NTR;
and (2) currentSovietthinkingon the NUO-that is, leadershipand administration
fromPolitburo-level societalguidanceto the "rationalization" of economicplanning
and decisionmaking,and to thestimulation of production and technicalinnovationin
ministries, state committees, factories,and farms.See Hoffmann,"The 'Scientific
Management'of Soviet Society,"Problemsof Communism,xxvi (May-JuneI977),
59-67.
Unfortunately,fewoftheSovietstudiesoftheNTR andNUO havebeentranslated
intoEnglish.Andinmostofthetranslated works(especially Technology:
Man,Science,
A Marxist Analysis and Technological
of theScientific thereare inter-
Revolution),
mittent deletions, fortheoriginal
orfreetranslations
additions, Russian.
Alltranslations
aremyown.WhereEnglishtextsexist,
in thisarticle I havedouble-checked
thetrans-
lationsagainst wherever
theoriginal andmadeanycorrections
possible, necessary.

"SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION" 617
countries,and the interrelationships-existing and desired-between
socialisttheoryand practice.In short,Sovietand East Europeanwrit-
ingson theNTR explicitly and implicitly addressthemselves to funda-
mentaland timelyissues,and raisesignificant questionsaboutthesocial
and ideologicalfunctions of thetheoryof theNTR.
The seriousliteratureon theNTR is a majorevolvingcomponentof
contemporary Marxism-Leninism, and thesestudiesmaybe influencing
or reflectingsomeof thechangingpoliciesand attitudes of communist
politicalelites.The booksunderreviewmakeclearthattheSovietlead-
ershiphas sanctioneda certaindegreeof ideologicalinnovation, cogni-
tivereorientation,and conceptualsearch.The authorsdo notalwaysuse
key conceptsin similarways; theydo not repetitively pose the same
questions;and theycertainly do notarriveat identicalanswers.Indeed,
revo-
nauchno-tekhnicheskaia
themajorwork,Partiiai sovremennaia
acknowledgesthe existenceof diverseSoviet
liutsiiav SSSR, explicitly
viewpointson "theessence,content, basictrends,historicalrole,causes
and consequencesof the contemporary revolu-
scientific-technological
tion"(pp. 8-9),and brieflycontrastssomeofthedifferent current ideas.
To be sure,Sovietworkson the NTR do not overtlychallengetradi-
tionalSovietvalues and precepts.But theydo attemptto rethinkor
"concretize"the interpretations,linkages,and uses of many central
conceptsand ideas under present-day conditions.As JulianCooper
correctly an ongoingdebateis takingplace amongSovietschol-
stresses,
ars on major issuesconcerningthe NTR, and "one cannotyetspeak
of a single,generallyacceptedSoviettheoryof the scientificand tech-
nicalrevolution Thus,
and itssocialconsequences."' a centralfactabout
2Cooper,"The Scientific and TechnicalRevolutionin SovietTheory,"in Frederic
Fleron,Jr.,ed., Technologyand CommunistCulture:The Socio-Cultural Impact of
Technology underSocialism(New York: Praeger1977), i67. Despiteimportant general
areasofintellectual agreement amongSovietwriters and fluctuatingpoliticalconstraints,
Cooper'sconclusionis evenmorepertinent whenone considerstheviewsof East Euro-
peanscholars.Theyoftentakeissuewithone another-andsometimes withtheirSoviet
counterparts-on conceptual,as well as substantive,questionsconcerning theNTR. Most
notably,see Radovan Richta and others,Civilizationat the Crossroads:Social and
Human Implicationsof the Scientificand TechnologicalRevolution(White Plains,
N.Y.: International Artsand SciencesPressi969). Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia
i sotsializmis a revisedSoviet-Czech versionof thiswork.
The Sovietauthorsof Partiiapresenta ratherclearlyformulated theoretical pointof
view-one that has been developingfor about two decades in the Instituteof the
Historyof the Natural Sciencesand Technique (IlEiT). But the importantSoviet-
Czech collaborativeworks,Chelovek-nauka-tekhnikaand Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia
revotiutsiiai sotsializm,do not put forwardfullyconsistent interpretations. Rather,
each studyis an amalgam,or juxtaposition of differentviewpoints-attimesoffering
creativesynthesis, at otherspresenting whatappearsto be thelowestcommondenom-
inatorof agreement amongtheparticipating institutes of Philosophyand
(the Institute
IIEiT of the U.S.S.R. Academyof Sciences,and the Instituteof Philosophyand Soci-
ologyoftheCzech Academyof Sciences).

618 WORLD POLITICS
theNTR literatureis thatSovietand EastEuropeanscholars

and offi-
cialsareposingand studying questionstheanswersto whichare not
presumed to be knownbeforehand.
I. SOVIETTHEORIESOF "THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL

REVOLUION"
Soviettheorists
offera wide rangeof viewsaboutthe nature,or
"essence,"of theNTR. Virtuallyall SovietwritersagreethattheNTR
is a worldwidephenomenon, thatit began in theU.S.S.R. in the mid-
1950's (and somewhatearlierin theWest), and thatit has momentous
and overwhelmingly favorableimplications forthefutureof mankind.
(It allegedlyhastensthedevelopment of socialismand thefall of capi-
talism.)ButsomeSovietauthorsemphasizethattheessenceoftheNTR
lies in specificscientific
or technicalbreakthroughs (such as thegenera-
tion and use of new sourcesof energyand materials),the transfer to
machinesof certainfunctions of intellectuallabor (such as logicaland
controloperations),and theautomationof theprocessesof production
and management.Othertheorists stressthe changingnatureof work,
thegreatlyenhancedproblem-solving capacitiesof socialistleaders,and
the growingcapabilityof socialistsocietiesto shapetheirphysicaland
economicenvironments (for instance,to improvethe productivity of
labor). Stillothertheorists directattentionto thebroadersocialimplica-
tionsof advancesin scientific and technicalknowledge-theirimpact
on human needs and aspirations,job satisfaction,leisure,interpersonal
relations,education,the professions, demographicpatterns,and on
evolvingattitudestowardnatureand ecologicalquestions.And still
othersinsistthatthe NTR consistsof threeinterrelated
elements:the
natural-scientific
and technical,thesocioeconomic,
and thephilosophi-
cal-ideological.The authorsof Chelovek-nauka-tekhnikaofferthe
followingall-inclusivedefinitionof theNTR:
The scientific-technologicalrevolutionis a radical (korennoe) trans-

formation of scienceand technique,of theirconnectionsand socialfunc-
tions,leadingto a universalrevolution(perevorotu)in thestructureand
dynamicsof the productiveforcesin the sense of a changein the role
of man in the systemof productiveforceson the basis of the compre-
hensivetechnologicalapplicationof scienceas a directproductiveforce,
penetratingall componentsof productionand remoldingthe physical
conditionsofhumanlife.In itsessence,
thescientific-technological
revo-
lutionexpressesthelawsofdevelopment (zakonomernosti) oftheepoch
of transitionfromcapitalismto communism, beingsubjectedto them,
and is an elementof thisglobalprocessin thesensethatit establishes
thematerial-technical
historically preconditionsfora communist society,

and thatit can onlybe fullyrealizedand utilizedundersocialism
(p. 352; p. 364of translation-emphasis in originals).
The different approachesmay well reflectdeeper disagreements
amongsocialisttheorists. Hence,efforts to clarifykeyconceptsare not
merelyacademic exercises.Terminologicaldisagreement(regarding
wordssuchas "science,""technology," or "revolution")is a clearsign
ofideologicaldevelopment, and ofthecurrentlack ofan official theory
of the NTR. Some theoristssubsumenumerousempiricalreferents
underthe conceptof theNTR and therebyreduceits analyticalfruit-
fulness.Othersfailto distinguish betweennew technicaladvancesand
thelargersocialand cognitivesystems in whichtheymustoperate,and
thusmake less insightful contributions to Marxism-Leninism. And a
few writers, forinstanceFedoseevin Dialektikasovremennoi epokhi,
infrequently referto theNTR in theiranalysisofthecontemporary era.
Yet,in all ofthebooksunderexamination, one can observethecreative
-and competitive-processes of conceptualredefinition and search.To
be sure,some Soviet and East European scholars,in pressingtheirown
viewpoints, contendthatterminological confusion impedesanalysisand
theexchangeof ideas. But,significantly, mostSoviettheorists criticize
thesubstance ofeachother'sinterpretations,ratherthantheir"deviance"
froman a priorinorm.And, despitemanyvicissitudes and lacunae,
increasingly comprehensive theoriesof theNTR are emerging.
ScholarsfromMoscow'sInstitute of the Historyof the NaturalSci-
i TeIhniIi)
encesand Technique(InstitutIstoriiEstestvoznaniia
(IIEiT) are playinga keyrole in thisdevelopment, and theymake an
importantdistinction between"technical,""production,"and "social
revolutions"(Partiia,29-34if.). Not surprisingly,Soviettheoristscon-
siderthe social revolutionlaunched in October i9I7 to have been the
essentialprecondition for the creationof new "productionrelations"
in SovietRussia,and forthe "progressive" use of the scientificdiscov-
eriesand technicalinnovationsof the i8th and i9th centuries(and
earlier).However,the distinctions between"technical"and "produc-
tion revolutions,"and between"technique" (tekhnika) and "tech-
nology"(tekhnologiia),are moreoriginalelaborations of theideas of
Marx, Engels, Lenin, Bukharin,and others.'"Technique" refersto
specificmechanicalinnovationsand labor-and energy-saving devices,
and the tools,know-how,and skillsessentialto theirefficient use in
3 On the historicaldevelopmentof Marxistand Soviettheoriesof scientific-technical
betweenthe NTR and previous"technical"
and social change,and on the differences
and "productionrevolutions"(e.g., the IndustrialRevolutionof the i8th and i9th
centuries),see Sovremennaia nauchno-tekhnicheskaia issledo-
revoliutsiia-lstoricheskoe
vanie (2d ed., Moscow:Nauka iwo); also Cooper (fn. 2).

620 WORLD POLITICS
accomplishing a specified goal; "technology" is a broaderand less
preciseconcept, whichusuallyincludesknowledge of theregularities
of physical and socialphenomena, thevaluesand purposes to which
scientific
and technical instruments, methods, and capabilities can be
effectivelyapplied,and thesocialorganization (forinstance, division
of labor,man/machine and authority relationships), as well as the
scientific-technical
basesoftheprocesses oflabor,production, andman-
agement(Partiia,32-34; Markov,i08-29). A "technical revolution" is
a majorsetof advancesin technique; a "production revolution" is a
clusterof significant changesin technology. According to theIIEiT
theorists,
theformer mayormaynotleadtothelatter. "History shows
thata technical revolution can sometimes precedea socialrevolution,
buta production revolution canbeginonlyaftera socialandtechnical
revolution" (Partija,34).
Analysisof thiskindreflects an understanding thatnew technical
hardware cannotsimply be graftedontotheexisting processes oflabor,
production, andmanagement, butthattheseprocesses themselves must
undergoconsiderable changein orderto generate and assimilate the
newmachines, materials, andinventions produced bythetechnical rev-
olution.ManySoviettheorists seemto be awarethattechnical break-
throughs canbe effectively utilizedonlyifadjustments aremadein the
largersocialsystems ofwhichthenewtechniques area part.For ex-
ample,theinstallation of computers will surelynotproduce"revolu-
tionary" changesin theformsand organization of production, or in
administrativepowerrelationships and decision-making practices, un-
lessaccompanied bychangesin thecontent andflowoftechnical and
socialinformation (and probably alsoin bureaucratic attitudes toward
information.)4
SomeSovietauthors insistthatthecurrent andnewstyles ofscientific
thought and technological modesofproduction arehaving,and will
continue tohave,a tremendous effecton technical and socialprogress.
NikolaiMarkovasserts that"Technique is produced fromtechnology,
notviceversa.Technology ispredominant inthisrelationship" (p. I24).
Thisviewsupplements thatoftheIIEiT theorists, becauseMarkovis
apparently highlysensitive to theimpactofthesocialrelations ofpro-
ductionon the scientific-technical and humanproductive forcesof
society(STR theorists andotherMarxists usuallystress thedominance
of theproductive forcesin this"dialectical" relationship), and to the
influencesofsocialandpolitical valuesonthedevelopment, notmerely
4See Hoffmann,
"Technology, Values,and PoliticalPowerin the SovietUnion: Do
Matter?"in Fleron(fn.2), 397-436.
Computers

on theuses,oftechnical innovations. He notes,forexample, thattech-
niques-implicitly, techniques ofcapitalist aswellas ofsocialist origin-
havea muchgreater impacton technologies in theU.S.S.R.todaythan
theywillhavein thefuture (p. I24). MarkovandV. G. Marakhov are
amongthehandfulof Soviettheorists whohavebegunto discussthe
"limits"(granitsyi) ofthecontemporary NTR, itsprobable completion
in "lessthanioo years"(a fewSovietwriters say50 to 6o years),and
thecomingof a "new"NTR whosesocialimpactin the2ISt century
willbe vastly greater thanthatofthepresent-day NTR (see Markov,
38-40).Markov merely hintsattheportentous socialandpolitical impli-
cationsof theneedforfutureNTRs and fortechnologies to exert
greaterinfluence andcontrol overtechniques in successivestagesofthe
current NTR.
Nonetheless,Soviettheorists arekeenlyawareofthelargercultural
contexts ofscientificand technical progress, and oftheimportance of
whattheyverybroadlyterm"production relations." Seriousscholars
and ideologues alikeareattempting to explainwhytheNTR creates
greatopportunities to speedthetransition to communism in socialist
societies,
whilesimultaneously exacerbating the"antagonistic contradic-
tions"and hastening theultimate downfall ofdeveloped capitalistna-
tions.The basicSovietargument is thatmanyscientific and technical
advances arevalue-free, butthattheyperform socialandpolitical func-
tionsthrough thevalue-laden technologies inwhichtheyareembedded.
The socialinstitutions thatadaptand utilizethesetechnologies there-
byimpart purposeto techniques. In short, Sovietwriters contendthat
theuseoftechniques (e.g.,forcorporate profit or thewelfare of all)
dependsveryheavilyon theprevailing sociopolitical and economic
relationshipsand values,and thatthesocialconsequences of different
scientific,
technical,andproduction innovations willvaryconsiderably
in differenthistoricalandcultural contexts (see Kamaev,54-55;Mara-
khov,throughout).
Hence,whiletheorists oftheNTR emphasize theneedfor"radical"
changein certaincognitive processes and production relations, they
affirmthat,oncea socialist "cultural revolution" hasbeensetin motion,
thedominant valuesand socioeconomic-political relationshipsarerela-
tivelyimpervious toretrogressive change.Theycontend thattheNTR
is bringing another production revolution to theU.S.S.R.By transfer-
ringmoreandmorephysical andmentalworkfrommentomachines
and to automated systems ofmanagement and control, thesechanges
willeventually create"fundamental socialtransformations in society"
(Partiia,44). Current developments areexpected to spurtheevolution

622 WORLD POLITICS
of socialismto communism, and economic
becausescientific-technical
accomplishmentswill accompany-indeed,be stimulatedby-the
strengthening social normsand relationships.
of collectivist "It is pos-
sibleto constructcommunismonlyby fullyutilizingtheopportunities
theNTR presentsto society-[and onlyby] mastering the revolution
itselfand learningto manageit" (Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia
i sotsializm,6i; emphasesin original). In capitalistsocieties,on the
otherhand,thecurrentNTR will allegedlynotbe able to run itsfull
coursebeforegenerating sufficient fora socialistrevo-
societalpressures
lution,whichin turnwill makepossiblean eventualproduction revolu-
tion.
II. THEORIES OF "THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION" AND

BROADINTELLECTUALISSUES CONCERNINGTECHNOLOGYANDPOLITICS
Theoriesof the NTR addressthemselves to stimulating intellectual

issuesconcerningtechnology and politics.The Sovietworksunderre-
view emphasizethe reciprocalrelationships betweentechnologyand
society.They also stressthe primarilypoliticalcharacterof technologi-
cal development, and theneed forpurposefulplanningand coordina-
tion of scientific-technicaland social progress.Virtuallyall Soviet
theoristsinsistthatthe interrelationships among science,technology,
and productionhave important social and economiccausesand conse-
quences.One writereven assertsthat"thescientific and technological
revolutionis above all a socioeconomicphenomenon";he criticizes
"thosewho seekto reducescientific and technological progressto indus-
trialtechnologyalone or to confineit to its technicaland economic
aspects."'But the same authorquicklynotes(and manyotherSoviet
writerswould agree) that"thecurrent scientific
and technologicalrevo-
lutionin itselfdoes not solveanypressingproblemsfacingsociety....
on itsown [theNTR] has no bearingon thesolutionof thequestionof
the ownershipof the means of productionand the distribution of
materialand culturalvalues,includingtheachievements of scienceand
engineering. These questionscan only be tackledby a social revolu-
tion."6
These two passagestake ratherextremeand perhapscontradictory
positionson some importantissues.It is not certainwhetherthe first
statement normative
is primarily or analytical,butthe emphasisseems
5V. I. Kosolapov,Mankindand the Year 2000 (Moscow: ProgressPublishersI976),

21; emphasisadded.
added.
6 Ibid.,27; emphasis

tobe clearly on theformer. andeconomic
Scientific-technical advances
mustbe madeto servesocialpurposes thatareconsciously determined
bytheSovietpolitical leaders, themajorbureaucracies, andthepublic-
throughauthority relationships looselydefinedin theory, but well
establishedinpractice (e.g.,"democratic centralism"). The secondquo-
tation,on theotherhand,appearsto makeassertions of a primarily
descriptive,rather thana normative, character.
The fruits oftheNTR
arevalue-free or"ambivalent"; theycanbe andarebeingusedforgood
or evil.This statement implicitly drawsa sharpdistinction between
techniques and technologies, whereasthe firstblursthe distinction
between theessence andtheconsequences oftheNTR. The first seems
to emphasize thevalueimplications oftechnocratic thought and tech-
nologicalmodesofproduction; thesecondclearly ignores them.
The mostdistinctive aspectsoftheSoviettheories, however, arethe
presumed malleability and manageability oftheNTR, andtheaccom-
panying optimism aboutthecapacity ofsocialist
societiestomakebene-
ficialuse of,and to be ableto control and copewith,thesocialand
politicalconsequences oftoday'sunprecedented international scientific
and technological changes.Soviettheorists consider socialprogress at
homeandabroadtobean "objective whichcanbe accelerated
necessity"
by "subjective" factors and theapplication of scientific-technicalad-
vancesto "progressive" socialgoals.Here again,Sovietwriters often
operatechiefly in therealmofnormative theory; but,becauseoftheir
strongemphasis on thesociopolitical contextin whichtechnology is
used,thetheory's substance andtoneareofintellectual interest.None-
theless,
Soviettheories oftheNTR arein considerable needofcreative
elaboration and substantiation. All too often,Sovietwriters merely
assertratherthandefendtheirviews,or fall back on the Marxist-
Leninistpatristictextswhichaddressthemselves to thescientific-tech-
nicalandsocialconditions ofverydifferent eras.
The official Sovietbeliefin progress doesnotpreclude-indeed, it
facilitates-the discussion of obstacles,problems, and pitfallsin the
evolution of "developed socialism."The optimism inherent in Soviet
theoriesoftheNTR (e.g.,thegreatopportunities forsocialprogress)
makespossibleclosersocietal"self-examination" than mighthave
occurred otherwise. Consequently, Soviettheorists-explicitly and im-
plicitly-now incorporate in theirstudiesreferences to the"newand
complicated problems"of socialistsocieties, as well as the "many
seriousproblems" ofcapitalist states.
For example,Sovietauthorsexplicitly acknowledge thattheNTR
producessomenegative physicalconsequences in bothcapitalist and

624 WORLD POLITICS
socialistcountries(e.g., exhaustionof fossilfuels,pollutionof the en-
vironment,and ecological imbalancescaused by industrialuses of
oxygenand freshwater; see Marakhov,I3I-32 if.). More significant
perhapsare themuffled Sovietwarningsabouttheactualand potential
development of technocratic consciousnessamongtheirown scientific,
technical,and economicelites.IuriiVolkovdeclares:"In the courseof
the NTR, technocratic and bureaucratictendenciescan arise,[but] it
is not fatallyinevitablethat theybecome stabilized.However,their
neutralization should not be consideredan easy or almostautomatic
matter. Volkov is clearly concerned with the possibly harmful
and valuesthattheNTR can engenderin theU.S.S.R.;
beliefs,attitudes,
like Markovand others,he focusesattention on theprocessesof man-
agement,production, and labor,and not merelyon the end products,
of the NTR. Many Soviettheorists and ideologistswould almostcer-
tainlyrejectthe view thatthe NTR can have no unintendedor unde-
siredeffects of materialand culturalvalues" (cf.
on "the distribution
thepassageby Kosolapovcitedin footnote 6).
In criticizing someSoviettheorists
countries,
capitalist maybe provid-
ing clues to theirapprehensionsabout the possiblenegativeconse-
quencesoftheNTR in socialiststates.Especiallybecauseof thepresent
Sovietemphasison thetransfer
official of wholesystems of technology
fromWestto East,thefollowingstatement may be consideredin this
light:
Capitalistsociety has notonlycreateda highlydeveloped machinesys-
tem but complicated socialmechanisms as well,which"grind"the
individual as efficiently
as machine
production. a man
As a consequence,
doesnotcontrol hismachinetool-themachinetoolcontrols him,that
is,it dictatesto himthenatureand orderof machine-like actions,and
determines thespeedand rhythm ofthelaborprocess. Moreover, he is
theobjectof bureaucratic management at all levels.8
Moreover,Sovietanalystscontendthatautomationand a higherdegree
of labor specializationinevitablyproduce increasedalienationand
"technologicalunemployment" in capitaliststates.A few writersdo
acknowledgethat,afterextensive retraining of man-
and redistribution
powerand a difficultperiodof adjustment of perhapsseveraldecades,
automatedproductionsystemsin the U.S.S.R.-and the new kinds of
specializedlaborthatwill accompanythem-will greatlyenhancelabor
7 "The Systemof Power and DemocraticInstitutions,"Social Sciences (Moscow),
VI,No. 3 (I975), I22.
8 G. N. Volkov,Man and the Challengeof Technology
(Moscow: NovostiI972), II.

productivity,creative work,job satisfaction,
leisure timeforconstructive
pursuits,andoverallself-fulfillment.9
Whatis theexplanation fortheverydifferent socialand political
consequences of automation in different
societies? The official Soviet
answerstrongly reaffirms thedominant roleof "production relations"
and the"classcontent" of varioustechnologies (butnottechniques).
Somecontemporary Soviettheorists,however, seemtosuggest thatthe
newest imported techniques andtechnologies might beproducing more
similarcrossnational effectsthanPartyleadersdesire, and thatcareful
selection,
installation,andmonitoring ofnewproduction andorganiza-
tionaltechnologies maybe essential to preserve thefundamentals of
current Sovietpolitical-institutionaland socioeconomic relationships.
Thesewriters stressthatthe"modernization" of existing relationships
and"socialdevelopment" mustbe conceptualized in terms ofdirecting
orcontrolling, ratherthanbeingmastered by,theNTR.
Atbottom, Soviettheorists makea generalbutimportant assertion-
namely, thatscientific, technical,
andsocialprogress arenotinevitable,
oreasilyachieved, in socialist butthatonlya classless
countries, society
undertheleadership ofthePartyandunder"publiccontrol" possesses
thecapacity to "makefulluse of thepositive aspectsof thescientific
andtechnical revolution forthebenefit ofmanand [to] neutralize its
possiblenegative consequences."10Fortheserious theorist, thelinkages
between scientific-technicalandsocialdevelopment areimportant com-
ponents oftheimageof"developed socialism"thathe is trying to con-
ceptualize,interpret, and prescribe moreclearly.For the ideologue,
theselinkagesare axiomatic. One consequence is thatSovietanalysts
categorically insistthatpoliticaland organizational factorsare and
shouldbe thecrucialdeterminants ofthedevelopment oftheNTR in
anysociety. Theyalsostrongly affirmthedesirability andeffectiveness
oforganizational control overtheuseoftechnical advances (nativeand
imported);efforts to producea contemporary theory of "scientific"
societalmanagement (NUO) constitute a notablepartof theNTR
literature."
ButSoviettheorists
payremarkably littleattention
tothevaluesthat
maybe inherent
in orclosely
associated
withtheeffective
useofspecific
forthepurposes
techniques forwhichtheyweredesigned(especially
complexmachines, butalso systems
and processes).Theyalso place
9See USSR: Scientificand TechnicalRevolution(Moscow: Novosti I973), 36-40
(chapterbyG. N. Volkov).
lo Ibid.,37. 1 See Ioffmann (fn. I).

626 WORLD POLITICS
littleemphasison thedifferent political,
economic, and socialcontexts
in whichnewtechniques and technologies aregenerated. Ratherthan
viewinginternational exchanges of technology as a formof cultural
mostSoviettheorists
diffusion, postulateanalytical distinctions
between
theobjective
andsubjective components oftechnologies, theirformand
content,andtheirdirectand indirect effectson society."2
For example,
one Sovietwritercontends thatsometechnical innovations increase
laborproductivityindirectly through changesin production relations,
whereas othertechniqueshavea direct effectontheprocess andcontent
oflabor"relatively independent of socioeconomic relations-oneand
thesameassembly linecallsforhighlyspecialized, mechanicalopera-
tions,no matterwhether it is installedin a Detroitplantor a plantin
Sverdlovsk.""3
Soviettheorists andofficials arewellawarethattheNTR is develop-
ing mostrapidlyin theUnitedStates,WesternEurope,and Japan;
theyacknowledge, sometimes grudgingly, thatWestern technology and
methods ofmanagement canbe quiteusefulin developing andexploit-
ing"theadvantages ofthesocialist economic system." ButSovietwriters
predictveryconfidently-and perhapsuncritically-that the new
technical advances andmodesofproduction willstrengthen, ratherthan
undermine or significantly alter,thefundamental political,economic,
and socialfeatures ofthepresent system. Throughout theNTR litera-
turethereexistsconsiderable confidence (or simplythetacitassump-
tion)thatimported andindigenous technologicalinnovations can and
willserveonlythosepurposes thatthePartyandstateleadersdeemto
be in thebestinterests oftheSovietpeople.Whether or notthisbelief
is accurate, it is intellectually
interesting foritsemphasis on the"neu-
trality"oftechniques and theircapacity to perform similarfunctions,
incontrast totheirdiverse socialandeconomic effects,indifferent socio-
politicalsystems.
Sovietwriters arequicktoemphasize thedifferent sociopsychological
consequences oftechnological progress in capitalist,
socialist,anddevel-
opingcountries. Butit is apparently notpolitically acceptable evento
implythattheobjective/subjective, form/content, direct/indirect,and
technique/technology dichotomies arethemselves highly subjectiveand
value-laden. Also, it is one to the
thing postulate existence of value-
freeand value-laden components of modernindustrial technology,
processes, and systems; butit is quiteanother to identify thesealleg-
12For elaborationof thesethemes,see Fleron (fn. 2), esp. the editor'sintroductory
and concludingchapters.
13Volkov(fn. 8), 37-38.

edlyseparatecomponents and to analyzetheirinterrelationships in
specificareasin the presentand in thefuture.Ironically, theseas-
pectsof Soviettheoryare reminiscent of the controversial Western
positivistdistinctionbetween"facts"and "values,"suggesting that
Sovietwriters maybe employing a distinctly
Western modeofthought
to denytheexistence of undueWesterninfluences. And it is fairly
obviousthattheseneatSoviettheoretical distinctions
conveniently serve
currentsociopoliticalandideological functions,suchas thejustification
forthegrowing importation ofsophisticated
technology fromtheWest.
Almostall ofthebooksunderreviewstateorassumethatscientific and
technical advancescan be transferred withrelativeease amongstates
withdifferent socialsystems. Buttheyinsist-with varying degreesof
ardorandpersuasiveness-that theendusesandeffects ofscientific
and
technological developments are dominantly influenced by the much
largersetof sociopoliticalrelationsand valuesthatvarygreatly from
country tocountry.
B. M. Kedrov(seniormember oftheU.S.S.R.Academy ofSciences),
S. R. Mikulinskii(current directorofIJEiT),andI. T. Frolov(former
of Voprosy
editor-in-chief declare:"The scientific-technologi-
filosofii)
calrevolution doesnotdevelopin a 'socialvacuum,' and,in turn, exerts
a powerful influence on thedevelopment of theexisting socialrela-
tions"(Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia i sotsial'nyi
revoliutsiia progress,37).
As we haveseen,thewidespread Sovietacceptance of thesegeneral
ideasand concepts invites,ratherthanforecloses,analysis and debate.
Broadassumptions suchas thesecan lead socialistand nonsocialist
theoristsin manydifferent directions,particularlyin analyzingthe
possiblerelationshipsbetween socialandpoliticalendsandmeansand
theactualfunctions performed bya changing ideology.
III. THEORY AND EXPERIENCE: SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS

OF SOVIET VIEWS OF "THE SCIENTIFIc-TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION"
How areSoviettheory and practice and howdo Soviet

interrelated,
politicalleadersand socialtheorists
thinktheyshouldinteract? What
arethekeydomestic political, and socioeconomic
organizational, fac-
torsthatshapethecontent andusesofthetheory andtheactualdevel-
opment oftheNTR in theSovietUnion(to theextent thatan NTR is
reallytakingplace)? How andwhydo thesefactors influence
theideas,
perceptions, andactions
beliefs, oftheSovietbureaucratic
andscientific-
educational elites?To whatextent areinternal
developments affected
byexternal suchas therapidly
forces, changinginternational
political,

628 WORLD POLITICS
economic,military, and scientific-technicalenvironments? What does
thepronouncement that"scienceis becominga directproductive force"
reallysignify, and what are itstheoretical and practicalimplications?
Here,as elsewhere, thereis roomforconstructive debateand "creative"
developmentof Marxism-Leninism; thereis also considerableconfu-
sion and competition in the U.S.S.R. concerningthe social and ideo-
logicaleffects oftheories oftheNTR.
An important case in pointis the"historic"tasksetforthby Leonid
Brezhnevat the24th PartyCongressin 1971, "to combineorganically
the achievementsof the scientific-technological revolutionwith the
advantagesof the socialisteconomicsystem,and to develop more
broadlyour own, intrinsically socialist,formsof combiningscience
withproduction.""4 This appealis frequently reiterated,butis challeng-
ingto interpret. How doesone combinenew techniquesand discoveries
organically withexistingmodesofproduction? Whatis one advocating
when one calls forthe organicfusionof scienceand technology, and
fundamentalchangesin theirinterrelationships? If, as seems clear,
theseare instrumental values,thequestionimmediately arises,"organic
combinationforwhat?" The basic Sovietansweris, "to achieve'de-
veloped socialism.'" But this responseonly raises furtherquestions
about the natureof developedsocialism.What should a more fully
developedsocialistsocietylook like (given the presentofficialand
actual elite values)? What can developedsocialismbe, or what is it
likelyto be (consideringscientific-technical, economic,social,and in-
ternational constraints and trends)? And how mightforecasting and
"prognostics" affectthe conceptualization of thesegoals and patterns,
and of the Soviet leadership'srole in directingsocietytoward the
achievement of elite-definednationalaims?
Brezhnev'smajor declarationwould seem to be a call for Soviet
theoriststo developfreshideas aboutdesirableand possiblesyntheses
betweenmoderntechnology and thefundamental characteristics
of the
Sovietsystem.Of course,the finaldecisionson which characteristics
are fundamental, and whichkindsof changeare acceptableor neces-
sary,are important politicalchoicesto be made by the highestParty
leadership.But manytop SovietleadersunderstandclearlythatParty,
state,and economicofficials mustadaptold principles-suchas central-
ized economicand social planningand "democraticcentralism"-to
rapidlychangingscientific-technical conditions. That is,mostmembers
of thePolitburoand Secretariat apparently believethatattitudinal and
administrative changesare necessaryin orderto createand take ad-
XXIV s'ezda KPSS (Moscow:PolitizdatI97I0,
14Materialy 57; emphasisin original.

vantageof new opportunities foreconomicand socialprogress, as well
as to forestall
new problemsassociatedwiththecomplexities and inter-
dependenciesof the NTR and withthe possibility of an increasingly
unfavorablecompetitivepositionvis-a-visthe highly industrialized
Westerncountries. The idea is to modifyand updatetraditional Soviet
practicesand preceptsin the hope of contributing to and benefiting
fromthe worldwideNTR; it is expectedthatthe NTR will be inte-
gratedwiththeessentialelementsof thepresentSovietsystemand will
transform thatsystemincrementally, increasingits capacityto attain
stillhigherformsof materialand "spiritual"well-being.To thisend,
Brezhnevand otherPartyleadersseem to be urgingSoviettheorists
and officialsto reconsider themeaningof certainMarxist-Leninist con-
ceptsand ideas,and to identify thepossibleimplications of a fewnewly
agreed-uponprinciplesin lightof the presentand anticipatedfuture
characteristicsoftheNTR.
CurrentSovietleadersare encouragingsocialand economictheorists
to assessthe desirability and feasibilityof some medium-and long-
range goals and priorities, and of alternativeways of selectingand
implementing themmore effectively and efficiently.They are asking
theoristsand officialsto impartnew contentto bothold and new ideo-
logicalprecepts. They expectthetheorists notonlyto analyzeand fore-
castthe linkagesbetweenscientific-technical advancesand the transi-
tionto developedsocialism,but also to contribute to an understanding
of what the goal itselfis-that is, to conceptualizewhat "developed
socialism"oughtto be and can be,and how bestto worktowardattain-
ing it under increasingly complex,dynamic,uncertain,transnational
political-economic and scientific-technicalconditions.
Soviettheorists and rankingofficials haverespondedto thischallenge
in countlessbooksand articles, mostnotablyin theworksunderreview.
In a sense,theseauthorsare unobtrusive participants in a restrained
re-examination of Sovietnationalgoals and different waysof creating
alternative futures.Other writers,more cautiousor less imaginative,
primarily applygeneralprinciplesto specificcasesand changingcon-
texts.And stillothersmerelyengagein popularization.But manyof
the questionstheyall raise are theoretically significant,and most of
the answers-whetheror not theyare of intellectual interest-maybe
performing diversesocial and ideologicalfunctions.
The followingSovietassertions providean examplethatconcernsthe
nationalpolicy-making processand the relationship betweenknowl-
edge and power:

630 WORLD POLITICS
... theactionoftheobjective
lawsofhistory linkedwith
is inseparably
thegoalsthatpeople(classesand socialgroups)setforthemselves
and
strivefor,and withthemeanstheyemployto pursuethesegoals....
The present scientific-technological makespossiblefurther
revolution
improvements in themethods offormulating thegoalsofsocialactivity,
primarily by creatingthe conditions forincreasingthe information
potentialof society.Comprehensive investigation
of production and
socialprocesses,
andtheprocessing oflargeamounts ofinformation,are
absolutelynecessarybeforeactionsaretaken.The veryact of decision-
matingregarding socialgoalsis a research
process,
whichis effective
to
theextentthatitconforms tothedemands ofa scientific
approach....
The difficulties
involved in socialmanagement consistprimarilyin the
factthatone has to solvenotonlygiventasksand to securetheimple-
mentationofthegoalsset,butalsocontinuously to workoutnewtasks
and setnewgoalsin thecourseofsocialdevelopment. Fromthisview-
pointmanas thesubject ofmanagement cannotbe replaced (Chelovek-
nauka-tekhnika, 322,I92; 334-35,204 of translation;emphasesadded).
Such statements are unusualin theSovietliterature on theNTR and
NUO, fortheyclearlyimplythatcertainpublicpoliciesmustbe shaped
and reshapedby the vastquantitiesof new information generatedby,
and essentialto thepurposeful management of,theNTR and itssocial
effects.
That is, some Sovietauthorsrecognizethatnationalgoals can
no longerbe established by analyticalmeansalone,and that,by bring-
ing moreand betterinformation intotheprocessesof decisionmaking,
the goals themselvesmaybe reformulated."5 Allegedly,the entiresys-
temof socialrelationsand humanmotivations will undergoa gradual
but significanttransformation-not in responseto anygrowthor tech-
nologicalimperatives, but in accordwiththeplanneduse of scientific-
technicaladvancestoreconceptualize and to carryoutprogressive social
and economicaims. "The dialecticalinteractionbetweengoals and
meansis manifesting itselfespeciallyclearlyat the presenttime....
The spuriousalternative of the 'technical'and 'value' contentof social
goals mustbe totallyrejected.... Socialismdemonstrates thepossibility
and feasibilityof establishingan organicallycombinedprogramof
socialand scientific-technological (Chelovek-nauka-tekh-
progress"
nika, 324-25; 336-37 of translation;emphasis added).
A morecommonthemein Sovietwritingsis thatnumeroustypesof
information mustbe used more expeditiouslyto implementexisting
and organizationalmethodsmust
policies,and that decision-making
15See,forinstance,
theabovequotefromChelovek-nauka-tekhnika;
also A. S.
Akhiezer,Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia i nekotorye
revoliutsiia sotsial'nye problemy
proiz-
vodstvai upravleniia[The Scientific-Technological
Revolutionand Some Social Prob-
lemsof Productionand Management](Moscow; Nauka I974).

be adjustedin responseto unanticipated policyoutcomes and new
opportunities.Sovietsocialand economic theorists insistthatpolitical
leadersneedtremendous amounts ofinformation aboutthefunctioning
ofthesystem (e.g.,information aboutthelikelyconsequences of cur-
rentpolicies)in ordertomanage, andspurthedevelopment
utilize, of
"objective
sociallaws"and"progressive trends." Thisapproach is based
on technically competent administration of centraldirectives and
greater productivity, ratherthanon a broadening ofparticipation in or
increased discussion about"thepolitics ofprinciples." Thisthemedoes
notneedfurther elaboration here.'6The pointis simply thatthereare
variousSovietviewpoints abouttheusesofinformation in policymak-
ing,andthattheseideasmayreflect, or influence, thechanging beliefs
andattitudes ofSovietleaderson somefundamental questions.
In assessingthesocialandideological functions oftheories concern-
ingtheNTR, onemustconsider therolethattheseideasmaybe play-
ingin contemporary Sovietand EastEuropeanpolitics. Clearly, there
areseriouscurrent effortsto explainnewrealities in newideological
termsand to infusenewmeaningintosomeold principles. Bothare
forms ofideological adjustment-in somecasesideological innovation,
inothers "newwinein oldbottles." ButareSoviettheorists developing
"grand"(or "pure")ideology, "operative" (or "practical")ideology,
orboth?"7 Aretheories oftheNTR contributing tothepreservation of
thestatusquo,theadjustment of nationalpoliciesand policy-making
procedures, orthetransformation offundamental characteristicsofthe
Sovietsystem? Is theprimary intentand effect of theseefforts post
factorationalization (of the statusquo or of change); or are new
conceptualizations oftheNTR entering significantly intothe"opera-
tive"ideologyof Sovietleaders(and perhapsinto"grand"ideology,
too),thusreinforcing or reshaping theofficials' politicalmotivations,
calculations,andperceptions ofsituations andoptions, and trulyserv-
ing as "a guideto action"?Soviettheorists of theNTR seemto be
pursuing a variety ofaims,andtheirideasarehelpingtoperform both
functions-post factojustification and theformulation of newcourses
of action.The formulation of new policiesand policy-making pro-
cedures(to promote somechangesandtoforestall others)probably is
themoreimportant function andwillcontinue tobe so forsometime.
16See fn.i.
17On theroleof ideologyin politics-especially
communist politics-see,forinstance,
MartinSeliger,Ideologyand Politics(New York: Free Pressi976); Franz Schurmann,
Ideologyand Organization in CommunistChina (2d ed., Berkeley:Universityof Cali-
forniaPress i'7i); AlfredMeyer,"The Functionsof Ideologyin the SovietPolitical
System,"SovietStudies,xvii (Januaryi966), 273-85;David Joravsky,
"SovietIdeology,"
SovietStudies,xviii (Julyi966), 2-ig.

632 WORLD POLITICS
To be sure,Sovietideologists areclearly usingthetheoretical distinc-
tionsbetween objectiveandsubjective factors, formandcontent, direct
and indirect influences, and technique and technology to justify the
increasing importation of advancedtechnology fromthe West,to
explainthegrowinginternational economicinterdependence, and to
denyanypossiblesociopolitical influenceofcapitalist technical ration-
ality(e.g.,conceptions ofefficiency) onthevaluesoftheSovietpolitical,
scientific,
and technical elites.Someobservers mightconcludethatthe
Brezhnevadministration is thereby rationalizing to itself, theSoviet
population, and theworldtheincreasingly ominousshortcomings of
Sovietscience-technology-production relationships, economicincen-
tives,productivity oflabor,manpower reserves, and methods of man-
agement(forinstance, theorganization and utilization of basicscien-
tificresearch)relative to theperformance of Western nationsunder
present andlikelyfuture conditions. Lesscharitably, somecritics might
suggest thattheSovietrhetoric abouttheNTR is primarily intended
to obscure thefactthatno NTR is in facttakingplaceor is likelyto
takeplacein theU.S.S.R.,evenwiththeaid ofWestern technology,
credits,andtrade.
Moreover, thepresent Sovietleadership appearstoencourage theoriz-
ingabouttheNTR whileatthesametimeseeking topreserve existing
industrial and agricultural institutionalstructures. Westernanalysts
mightdeducethatthesetheories arechiefly intended to legitimize in-
stitutionalarrangements whichin factimpedescientific and techno-
logicalprogress in theU.S.S.R.This maybe thecase,butsurelythe
Sovietleadership doesnotwishto retardscientific-technical and eco-
nomicdevelopment. Theoriesof theNTR and NUO mayindeedbe
helpingto misguide or deludeSovietleadersand maybe supporting
orstrengthening theirbeliefs thateconomic andtechnical development
canbe achieved through present institutionalandsocialstructures, with
someassistance fromWestern technology (forinstance, theimprove-
mentofcentralized economic planning andtheautomation ofproduc-
tionthrough theuseofsophisticated computers). If thatis true,it sug-
geststhatSovietconceptualizations of theNTR are notmerelypost
factojustifications,buthave to
begun permeate theoperational ideology
andpolitical beliefsystems ofsome,andperhaps many,Partyandstate
officials.
Indeed,ideasabouttheNTR mayatthepresent timeincreasingly be
serving as a guideto actionin theU.S.S.R.Sovietpoliticalleadersare
notmerely trying torationalize shortcomings or to denytheexistence
of problems;theyare trying to understand, anticipate, and resolve

problems. LeadingPartyandstateofficials areattempting toformulate
andimplement effectivepoliciesin scienceandeconomics (in conjunc-
tionwithpoliticalgoalsand possibly conflictingaimsin otherissue
areas).Top Sovietleadersarealsoendeavoring toprevent theinfusion
ofcapitalist values;to encourage theadoption ofcertain Western atti-
tudesand beliefs(forinstance, regarding productivity); and to moti-
vateSovietofficials andworkers (thatis,byestablishing sanctions and
rewards)to overcome scientific,technical,economic, and administra-
tiveconstraints on thedevelopment of theNTR. In particular, they
wantthemto "combine"the achievements of Westernscienceand
technology with"theadvantages ofthesocialisteconomic system." The
factthattheSovietleadership is pursuing thisgoal cautiously and in
waysthatmostWestern observers deemineffective doesnotmeanthat
Sovietideasaboutscientific and technical changeare merelybeing
usedforpostfactojustification. On thecontrary, differing viewsof
Sovietleadersaboutthe NTR appearto be shapingor reinforcing
diverseprescriptions aboutpoliticalgoalsand means.
For example,someof theveryhighestSovietleaders(e.g.,Alexei
Kosygin)wantto takefirmactionto reduceorganizational "irration-
alities,"to "optimize"economicdecision-making and administrative
procedures, and,implicitly, to adjustsomepresent-day Partyand state
structuresandrelationships. Others(e.g.,LeonidBrezhnev)thinkthat
theinfusion of Western technology and methods of production and
management-including someWesternattitudes and beliefs, butnot
values-areessentialto Sovieteconomicand technological develop-
to
ment.Brezhnevseems believe that new modesof economicand
managerial thought canbe effectively and changesin organi-
utilized,
zationalbehavior can takeplacewithintheexisting politicaland ecoO
nomicinstitutions. Stillothers(e.g.,MikhailSuslov)appeartobemuch
lessenthusiastic aboutorganizational innovations and theimportation
of Western technology, and are apprehensive aboutthepolitical, ad-
ministrative, social,cultural,and international consequences.
However,the social functions of ideas can undergosignificant
changesovertime;thatis clearlywhathappenedto thedemocratic
and populistaspectsof communist ideology,whichin theyearsim-
mediately beforeand aftertheOctoberI9I7 revolution competed for
recognition as
andadoption Partypolicy, and were laterusedtocreate
andlegitimize thehighly authoritarian Stalinist
forms ofgovernment."8
Likewise, thepurposes andconsequences oftheories oftheNTR have
18 See BarringtonMoore,Jr.,SovietPolitics-The Dilemmaof Power: The Role oj
Ideas in Social Change(New York: Harper& Row 1965).

634 WORLD POLITICS
already oftheconcept
changessincetheintroduction
undergone in the
mid-I95o's,and futurechangesin its functionsare possible.In I957,
Nikita Khrushchevencouragedthe use of the term"NTR" to help
justifymajor institutional reforms(such as the dismantlingof many
nationalministries and theestablishment ofregionaleconomiccouncils)
and efforts to increasetheroleof thePartyin regionaleconomicplan-
ningand management. RhetoricabouttheNTR was also employedin
thei960's in conjunction withtheestablishment of theStateCommittee
on Scienceand Technologyand itspredecessor organizations.
Quitepossibly, thegreatlyincreasedofficial use of theconceptof the
NTR in thelate i960's constituted an attemptto formulateand mobi-
lize bureaucratic and public supportforthe major decisionsof i969-
I970: to pursuedetenteand substantially to increaseEast-Westtrade,
foreigncredits,industrialcooperationagreements, and theimportation
of Westerntechnology. It is also possiblethattheoriesof theNTR are
todayinfluencing Sovietleadersin a muchmoreconservative way,and
that Partyofficialsare consciouslymanipulatingthese conceptsand
ideas primarily to legitimizepreviousdecisions,ratherthanto initiate
or promotechangesof any significance.
But the important pointis thattheoriesof the NTR can rationalize
the preservation of the statusquo or "operatively"contributeto it;
or theycan rationalizeor promotevariouskindsand degreesofchange.
That is, ideas about the NTR can servea veryconservative end in a
rapidlychangingenvironment (by helpingtojustify or to devisemeans
ofpreserving essentialelementsof thepresentpoliticalsystem),or they
can helpto producenew attitudes and behavioramongtheSovietelites
and legitimize sociopolitical,scientific-technical, and institutional
change.Accordingto thesetheories, thepace and natureof theworld-
wide NTR make"radical"or "revolutionary" transformations in many
areas of Sovietlifepossibleand even necessary. If a currentor future
groupof Sovietleaderswishesto initiatesignificant policyor institu-
tionalinnovations, it has at hand much of the languageand manyof
theideasto convinceitselfand to explainto otherswhycertainchanges
(especiallyincremental ones) are necessary, feasible,and desirable.
The basic conceptsand broad outlinesof the NTR theoriesare
sufficientlywell developed(and official supportforthesegeneralideas
so
has been strong under Khrushchev and especiallyBrezhnev) that
futureleaderswho mightwant to disposeof the NTR rhetoricand
literaturewould be facedwitha ratherdifficult problem.The concept
of theNTR could of coursebe relegatedto grandideologyor quietly
dropped.But thecontentand history of thisquasi-theory (to saynoth-

ingoftherapiddevelopment oftheNTR in capitalist countries) form
a kindofpressure forongoingideological innovation ofthe"guideto
action"andpostfactorationalization varieties.
In contrast to thefateof theutopiancommunist "goal culture"of
theearlyBolsheviks, theredoesnotseemto be anything irreversible
abouta possible trendtowardmorejustificatory usesoftheories ofthe
NTR. That is, thebalancebetweentheperceptual and rationalizing
ideologicalfunctions of the conceptof the NTR-which linksan
"ideologyof ends"and an "ideologyof means"muchmoreclosely
thandiditsBolshevik predecessor-would seemlikelyto varydepend-
ing uponthecircumstances. Indeed,a future"collective leadership"
mightinitiateand carryout majorchangesin Sovietpoliticswith
theoristsoftheNTR playinga predominantly propagandistic orapolo-
geticrole.It is theproclivity of leadership groupseverywhere to find
theirownexperts, theirowntheorists, andtheirownsages.
The complexity of contemporary scientific-technicaland socioeco-
nomicproblems, opportunities,andinterrelationships, andthedistaste-
fulbutdistinct prospect of a wideningcivilianand possibly military
technology gapbetween theU.S.S.R.andthemajorWestern industrial
nations havealready inducedtheBrezhnev administration toseekscien-
tificandtechnical counselfrom"responsible" members ofall themajor
Sovietbureaucracies, and to includerepresentatives of manyof these
bureaucracies in thePolitburo. To be sure,mostSovietpolicyadvisors
and theorists will tellpoliticalleadersonlywhattheywantto hear.
But,as notedearlier, Sovietsocialtheorists areincreasingly participat-
ing in theconceptualization of nationalgoals (especially long-range
goals),andthereis a generalbroadening ofspecialized eliteparticipa-
tionin theformulation and administration of current policiesand in
themonitoring of thescientific-technical,economic, and socialcon-
sequencesof thesepolicies.Socialscientists, forexample,employing
survey research techniques andworking closely withandforPartyand
stateagencies(including theKGB), playa growing rolein themoni-
toringofpublicopinionon a widevariety of issues.
It is conceivable,then,thatunderconditions of theNTR, theex-
pandedinteraction betweenSovietpoliticians and experts(scientists
and specialistsin complexmilitary and industrial technologies, econo-
miststo a lesserextent, and socialscientists leastof all) will havea
gradually increasing influence on the thinking, judgment, selection,
andperhaps eventhepowerofnational politicalleaders.Today'smem-
bersofthePolitburo andSecretariat areawarethatscientific and tech-
nicalfactors areof greatimportance in mostareasof nationalpolicy

636 WORLD POLITICS
and administration. Theyarealsoawareofthedifficulties of "manag-
ing"persistent and potentially seriouspolitical, economic, and techno-
logicalproblems in a rapidlychanginginternational economicand
scientific-technicalenvironment, and in a changingdomesticsocio-
economicenvironment. NUO theorists, manyof whomviewpolitics
froma nationalratherthana regionalor particularistic perspective,
urgethatonlythemostbasicdecisions be madeat thecenter, andthat
technicalexpertise andpertinent socialinformation be brought tobear
on policymakingand administration at all stagesand levels,and in
virtuallyall issueareas.
Therewill,of course,alwaysbe important organizational and eco-
nomicsourcesof powerotherthanscientific-technical expertise and
information. Also,theinevitable disagreements amongpolitical leaders
and amongexperts will enhancetheautonomy of politiciansvis-a-vis
experts.
Manyoftoday's topSovietleadersin thePolitburo, Secretariat,
and CentralCommittee (especiallyin theindustrial departments) are
highlytrainedexperts in theirownright, oftenwithbackgrounds in
engineering. But,as theworldwide NTR develops, otherscientific and
technicalskills(suchas a minimal understanding ofmodern economic
concepts)andnewpolitical andmanagerial abilitieswillbe neededin
theSovietcenters ofpower.Diversetechnological, administrative, and
political
contributions arecurrently beingmadeandwillveryprobably
continueto be made through greaterconsultation, co-optation, and
directrepresentation inpolicy-making bodies.In theprocess, theSoviet
leaders'perceptions ofappropriate national policiesandpolicy-making
procedures haveclearly beenchanging in thepost-Stalin period.Their
perspectives willcontinue to change,especially as topPartyand state
officials
recognize morefullytheneedfornewcriteria and standards
to evaluate"scientific," "rational,"and "effective" political-administra-
tivedecisions and methods, and forplanningand managment thatis
betterinformed and ableto takeadvantage ofnew opportunities and
tocopewithnew"problem situations"(Afanas'ev's term).
Far greater policyandinstitutional changesmaybe necessary in the
futureifthereis tobe a realNTR in theSovietUnion-thatis,ifthe
U.S.S.R.is to benefit fromand contribute to whatis at present a pre-
dominantly capitalist it
NTR. But is alsoa distinct possibility-and a
basichopeofmanySovietbureaucrats, whichtheories oftheNTR re-
andsustainthattheU.S.S.R.willbe abletomaster
flect contemporary
andtechnological
scientific developments, enhance itsstatusas a major
worldpower,and promote economicand socialprogress (definedin

Sovietterms, ofcourse),by"modernizing" or"rationalizing" theessen-
tialsofthepresent politicalsystem.'9
Hence,thedevelopment of a more"secularized ethos"in theideo-
logicalthinking and calculations of Sovietelites(JohnMichaelMon-
tias'saptphrase),and of new kindsof technocratic consciousness, is
quitepossible.To theextent thatevolving forms oftechnical rationality
continueto stressthe importance of socialand economicplanning,
theoriesoftheNTR willplay majorrolein identifying
a trendsand
future conditions (maybeevenformulating "scenarios"),clarifying the
valuetrade-offs implicitin alternative courses ofdevelopment, and re-
formulating ideologicalprinciples in anticipation of policychanges.
IdeasabouttheNTR mayalsoplaya majorjustificatory rolein legiti-
mizingthechangingbutstillpredominant positionof thePartyin
Sovietsociety.Furthermore, thedistinctly instrumental theories of the
NUO mayhavea considerable impact on the or
operative pragmatic
ideologiesofSovietleadersand officials-especially ifnewapproaches
(forinstance, cost-benefit
analysis)producetangible economic results.
On theotherhand,iffailures mountandif"objective" orperceived
pressuresforchangeincrease, thePolitburo and Secretariat collectively
(or important coalitionswithinit) are likelyto widenconsultation,
broadenpolitically acceptable alternatives, and mobilizebureaucratic
support forexperimental new ideas that would affect scientific-tech-
nical,economic, and socialplanningand management. In an atmos-
phereofcrisis, unorthodox ideasabouttheNTR andNUO mightplay
rolein shapingtheperspectives
a decisive ofelitesandnationalpolicy.
The desireforpoliticalstability and the predisposition to resortto
proven methods maystillbe strong in manyquarters. Buttherewillbe
a realandperceived needtothinkin newwaysaboutthemeaningof
"societal
"stability," management," and"centralized leadership," and a
muchgreater awareness thatsometraditional practicesandpoliciesare
becoming increasingly dysfunctional.
Iffailurespersist(especially in thescientific-technical and economic
areas),and ifsomeSovietleaders come to believethattheseproblems
are insurmountable withoutmajorchangesin institutional arrange-
mentsandin domestic andforeign policy, theinfluence ofideasabout
theNTR maybe evengreater. After all,perceptions ofthepossibilities
oftheNTR at homeandofitsachievements abroadwillhaveplayed
a notablerolein adjusting thecriteria and standards bywhichSoviet
"9For a major dissidentview, see Roy Medvedev,On SocialistDemocracy(New
York:Knopfi975), esp.chap. i6.

638 WORLD POLITICS
leadersjudge scientific-technical,economic,and, to a lesserextent,
political"success" Dependingon thenatureof thenew
and "failure."
policy-making procedures andpolicies(suchas greater massparticipa-
tionin decisionmakingand internalliberalization or repression),
theories oftheNTR couldcontinue to perform important socialfunc-
tionsofa primarily operativeorjustificatory
nature, andcouldpossibly
reshapegrand,as wellas practical, ideology.
Atpresent, political in theSovietUnionstresses
discourse thecentral-
ityofan NTR, whichseemstohavebecometheframeofreference for
defining situations,identifyingproblems, evaluating alternatives,re-
thinking policieson how to makepolicy,and advocating political-
administrative actions.SovietPartyand stateleadersperceive various
linkages between andsocialchange,andtheselink-
scientific-technical
agesalmostsurelyexistat thelevelof operative or practical ideology.
Theoriesof theNTR probably influence or giveexpression to these
variousassumptions, conceptions, and hopesof Sovietlead-
priorities,
ers.At bottom, theirideasabouttheNTR are a sortof promise(to
themselves and others)thatpoliticalgoalsmustcontinue to be para-
mount, that and
scientific technical
progressmust be viewed in instru-
mentalterms, and thattechnology mustnotbe allowedto getoutof
control.
It is botha factand an articleoffaiththattheNTR is an agentof
portentous change.Top Sovietpolitical leadersand socialtheorists are
exploring waystocopewithforces whichtheydo notunderstand fully,
butwhoseimportance theyclearlysense.Together theyare working
outmethods ofadjusting traditional
valuesandprocedures to an inter-
nationalscientific-technicalrevolutionthatis justbeginning to influ-
ence,andtobeinfluenced by,an emerging production revolution inthe
U.S.S.R.Increasingly presentin theNTR literature is an awareness
thatcurrent Sovietbureaucratic attitudes,
beliefs,and practices-and
possibly certainpoliticalvaluesand institutionalarrangements-must
be creatively adaptedto theNTR, and viceversa.
IV. CONCLUSION: POLITICALIMPLICATIONSOF SOVIETTHEORIES OF

"THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION"
oftheNTR attempt
Soviettheories
Essentially, toreassess
thefunda-
and meaningof thecontemporary
mentalcharacteristics era and to
thequalityandnatureofthechanging
redefine in whichthe
situations
ofthePartymustact.Therefore,
nationalleadership theinitialSoviet
about
to theorize
efforts thecurrent and production
social,technical,

revolutions,and, above all, about theirinterrelationships (causal and
"dialectical"),are potentiallyof considerablepoliticaland ideological
significance.They may have veryimportantshort-and/orlong-range
practicalimplications.20 Althoughthe tentativeconclusionsof NTR
and NUO theorists are in no sensebindingon thepoliticalleadership,
theymaybe influential in variousways.
Of particularimportanceare the perceptionsof Sovietelitesabout
reciprocalrelationships amongthe threemajor kindsof revolutionary
change;thesensesin whichtheyarerevolutionary; theextentto which
"nonantagonistic contradictions" build up pressuresfor change; and
the degreeto whichthesechangescan be controlledin the shortand
longrun.Also of importance is thequestionwhetherthelatest,prima-
rilyWesternmodes of technocratic thoughtand production(for ex-
ample, systemsanalysis,optimizationtheory,businessmanagement
practices)impartorcontainundesirable "capitalist"
values,and whether
theyhave riskyor unacceptablepoliticaland culturalimplicationsin
theSovietor East Europeancontexts. Could a furthersocialrevolution
or a new NTR be necessary in thefuture?If so,whatformsmightthey
takeand whatforcesand trendswill interact to producethem?
The answersto suchquestionsareofimmensepoliticalsignificance-
especiallyif Soviettheoriesof scientificand technicalchangeare not
merelypostfactojustifications. The viewsof top Sovietleaderson the
NTR and thefutureare likelyto influence present-day choices.Social,
economic,and scientific-technical progressnecessitates
effective
decision
makingand planning,which in turndemand clear thinkingabout
social and politicalgoals and abouthow to progressfromexistingto
desiredconditions.Hence, alternative visionsof thefuture(definedin
thepresent)will quiteprobablyhelp to shapethedirectionand nature
ofsocietalchange.
Brezhnevmade thispointin his addressto the25th PartyCongress
in I976.21He has repeatedlycalled forimprovedsocial and economic
20
I shall not discussherethe questionof legitimacy, and the potentiallysignificant
interconnections betweenthe NTR and the changingbases of legitimacy and legiti-
mationclaimsof the Sovietleadership.These issuesare analyzedin RobbinLaird,
"'Developed' SocialistSocietyand the Dialecticsof Developmentand Legitimation in
the Soviet Union," Soviet Union, iv, No. i (I977), I30-49. See also Laird, "Post-
IndustrialSociety:East and West,"Survey,xxi, No. 4 (Autumn1975), I-I7.
21 Brezhnev notedthatat thebehestof top Partyand government organs,"academic
institutes,
workingtogether withministriesand departments,"had preparedthe draft
of a "comprehensive programfor scientificand technicalprogressand its social and
economiceffects for I976-I99o." He wenton to say,"It is necessary
to continuework
on thisprogramforit is an organicpartof thecurrentand long-term planning,pro-
vidingtheorientations (orientiry)withouta knowledgeof whichtheeconomycannot
be directed(rukovodit')successfully." Pravda,February25, i976, p. 6.

640 WORLD POLITICS
planningand forecasting, whichis to be basedon better statistics
and
extrapolation ofcurrent trendsand a clearer, morecomprehensive ex-
positionof basicgoalsand ends-means relationships.DzhermanGvi-
shiani,deputy headoftheStateCommittee on ScienceandTechnology,
has likewiseoftenstressed the"inseparable" linksamongforecasting,
planning, andmanagement.22 In short,thetraditionalSovietideological
commitment to planning-coupled withtheperceived "spontaneity"
of elements of theNTR and thepoliticalnecessity and challengeof
"controlling" its socioeconomic consequences-may well inducethe
nextgeneration ofSovietleaderstoconceptualize nationalgoalsandto
anticipateproblems in evenlonger-range terms.
A particularly important questionis whether and howthedevelop-
mentofMarxist-Leninist theoriesoftheNTR willinfluence theselec-
tionofPartypoliciesand alterthebasicinstitutional relationshipsand
policy-making procedures oftheSovietpolitical system.Contemporary
scientificand technical advancesand theideasof thesocialtheorists
seemleastlikelyto changethepoliticalleaders'cognitive orientations
and basicvalues;theyare somewhat morelikelyto changeselected
substantive policiesand attitudes;and theyaremostlikelyto change
specificpolicy-making methods and beliefs.The natureof political-
administrative and socioeconomic discourse in theSovietUnionis still
evolving. Buta majorshift inthevaluesofthebureaucratic elites-pro-
ducedby somekind of scientific or technological "imperative" or
politicalor intellectualpressurefroma groupof socialand economic
theorists-does notseemeitherimminent or probable.
Bureaucratic groupsdispute themeaning oftheNTR becausediffer-
entideashavedifferent policyimplications andpracticalconsequences.
In hisspeechto the25thPartyCongress, Brezhnev unmistakably im-
pliedthatrecent scientific
andtechnological developments hadchanged
theperspectives ofhigh-levelSovietofficials morethanthoseofmany
of theirsubordinates.23 Quitepossibly, top Partyleadershave been
unableor unwillingto adjusttheprevailing bureaucraticculture-
especially thecareerincentive system-toaccordwiththeirevolving
(albeitdivergent) viewson theneedforvarious kindsofchange.More-
over,thedistinction betweencybernetic ("goal-changing") and non-
22
Gvishiani,Organizatsiiai upravienie[Organizationand Management](ad ed.,
Moscow:Naukai972), I27-28.
23 "The revolutionin scienceand techniquerequiresfundamental
changesin the
style and methodsof economicwork, a determinedstruggleagainst sluggishness
(kosnost') and red tape (rutinerstvo);it requirestrue respectfor scienceand the
abilityand desireto take advice fromand reckonwithscience."Pravda (fn. 21), 6;
emphasisadded.

cybernetic ("goal-seeking") feedback,forinstance, hasenormous policy
import, especially in theSovietcontext. Similarly, theemerging Soviet
profession of"sociologists ofscience"has clearpractical effects
on the
independence ofphysical scientists.24
Atpresent, Western scholarsknow
verylittleaboutthepoliticsof Sovietpublicstatements on theNTR
and NUO, butit is apparent thattheseideasarenotonlypartof the
"ideological struggle" withtheWest,butarealsoan element in,and a
meansof conducting, internal politicalcompetition overpowerand
policy.
In thisregard, it is noteworthy thattheeditors of Voprosy filosofii
havestressed "thegreatpractical andpolitical oftheNTR
significance"
literature-especially "thepractical value"offormulating a "descriptive,
explanatory, and prognostic" theoryof theinterrelationships between
theNTR and Sovietsociety.25 Butwhatis thispragmatic benefit-the
moreeffective justificationofcurrent policiesandpolicy-making meth-
ods,or theadjustment or significantalterationof thesepoliciesand
procedures in accordance withchangingofficial valuesand new ex-
pressions of traditional values?On thiskeypointand numerous spe-
cifics,Sovietsocialtheorists aremuchmorereticent. To be sure,they
stressthegrowingimportance of politicalleadershipin thepresent
and futurestagesof "developedsocialism" and makeclearthatthe
beliefsandattitudes ofthetoppolitical leaders willandshouldundergo
change.Butthesubjectofthepossibly changing valuesofSovietelites
is treatedwiththeutmost circumspection in thebooksunderreview.
Onlyin theconceptualizations ofmore"developed" forms ofsocialism
arethepresent officialgoals,thegapsbetween theoryandpractice,and
thebasiccharacteristics of thecurrent Sovietsystem veryimplicitly
calledintoquestion.
Western scholars stress theneedto study"thestructure andprocess"
oftheinteraction between societyandtechnology, and theactualrela-
24 See Linda Lubrano,SovietSociologyof Science(Columbus,Ohio: American Asso-
ciationfortheAdvancement ofSlavicStudies,i976).
25 Voprosy No. 2 (i976), 38,48,51, 53; "Marksistsko-leninskaia
filosofii, teoriinauchno-
tekhnicheskoi revoliutsii," Voprosyfilosofii, No. 2 (i974), 9-i0. The fact that the
presentcomposition of the editorialboard of Voprosyfilosofii is more "conservative"
thanit has been in the recentpast would seem to strengthen my contention thatthe
NTR literature shouldbe takenseriously.When the presenteditorsrepeatedly stress
"thegreatpracticalsignificance" of the "social-philosophical" studiesof the NTR, it is
morelikelyto reflect theofficialor predominant nationalPartypositionthanit would
havein, say,theearlyI970's. Also,Gvishianihas pointedly assertedthatthepurposeof
researchon theNTR is "notonlyto publishmonographs and articles, but to workout
concretesuggestions, recommendations, and methodswhich planningorgans,minis-
tries,and departments can use." "Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiiai sotsial'nyi
progress," Voprosyfilosofii,No. 4 (i974), 8.

642 WORLD POLITICS
tionships betweentechnical innovations ("thepart") and thelarger

socialcontext in whichtheyareused("thewhole")."2Soviettheorists
strongly agreeinprinciple, butthey(as wellas Western analysts) often
do notheedtheirownadvice.MuchSovietforecasting and theorizing
aboutthefuture is foundedon questionable assumptions and inade-
quateconsideration ofexisting conditionsin theSovietUnionandelse-
where.ManySovietwriters basetheiranalyses largely on theofficially
desired usesoftechnology andonideologically prescribed values, tenets,
and trends. To be sure,Sovietresearchers havebeenconducting more
empirically grounded, middle-range theoreticalstudiesof the major
Sovietbureaucracies inthepastdecade.Butanalysis oftherelationships
between new technology and organizationaldesign and performance
is notoneofthestrengths ofthisliterature.Too oftenSoviettheorists
havesimplyassumedthata homogeneous socialistsociety,Party,or
stateis generating innovations
scientific-technical andis utilizing these
opportunities exclusively forthe publicgood. Problemsof depart-
mentalism, localism, coordination, bureaucratic competition, rolecon-
flict,and center-periphery relationsdeserve-andare beginningto
receive-more seriousanalysisand integration intotheliteratures of
theNTR andNUO.
"Imagesofthefuture,"27 however, appearto be increasingly impor-
tantelements in thethinking oftheveryhighest Sovietleaders, andare
ofcoursecentral components ofsocialisttheoriesoftheNTR. In con-
trasttotheutopiantheorizing oftheKhrushchev years, contemporary
Sovietwriters focuson theprocesses, noton theendresults, of social
change.Thatis,descriptions of a "developed socialistsociety" arenow
consistentlylinkedtotheanalysis ofthetransition to"developed social-
ism";as a consequence, theprescription and evaluation of goalsand
meansare morecloselyintertwined. Sovietleadersexpectsocialthe-
oriststo studythe implications of existingscientific-technical and
socioeconomic trends in ordertodeepentheleadership's understanding
ofdesirable andfeasible courses ofaction, andtooffer practical recom-
mendations (whenrequested) on how to the
bridge gap between the
idealandthepossible. Becauseoftheemphasis on medium-range goals
(to i9wo) and on alternative methods of achieving them,theNTR
26See, for instance,William Leiss, "The Social Consequencesof Technological
Progress:CriticalCommentson RecentTheories,"Canadian Public Administration,
XIII, No. 3 (I970), 252, 260 if.
27This termis centralto the analysisin WendellBell and JamesMau, eds., The
Sociologyof theFuture:Theory,Cases,and AnnotedBibliography (New York: Russell
Sage FoundationI970). For a discussionof Sovietviews of the futureduringthe
Khrushchevyears,see JeromeGilison,The SovietImage of Utopia (Baltimore:The
JohnsHopkinsPressI975).

literaturemaybe growing in policyrelevance. Evensmallcognitive or
analyticaladjustments today make cumulative and significantchanges
inthefuture possible.
Indeed,Sovietpoliciesofthe1970's suggest thattheactionsofParty
leadershavealreadybeenconsiderably shapedbytheirchanging per-
ceptions,expectations, andcalculations aboutthecomplex phenomenon
theytermtheNTR. A primeexampleis thegranddesignor overall
setofcoordinated domestic andforeign policyobjectives detailed at the
24thParty Congress in 197i, key elements of which weredetente with
theUnitedStatesand muchgreater technological borrowing fromthe
highlyindustrialized Western nations.ManyWestern observers con-
siderthepresent Sovietadministration to be inflexible and lethargic;
buttheytendtooveremphasize theimportance oftheremarkable con-
tinuityininstitutional structures andtop-level Partyandstate personnel,
andtheydo notacknowledge thechanges in theattitudes, perspectives,
andbeliefs of various kinds of officials
and, to a lesserextent,in recent
Sovietdomestic and foreign policiesand policy-making procedures.
Someof theseanalysts alsodo notgivesufficient consideration to the
politicalchangesthatmaytakeplacein theU.S.S.R.in thenot-too-
distantfuture-many ofwhichcouldbe directly relatedto thetheory
and experience of theNTR as perceived by thenextgeneration of
Sovietleaders.
One mayconcludethatcurrent Sovietpoliticalleadersare actively
encouraging serious theorizing andresearch oncontemporary scientific-
technicalandsocialchange.The literature produced addresses itselfto
broadintellectual issuesconcerning technology and politics;it is per-
forming evolving socialandideological functions; anditmaybe shap-
ing,as wellas justifying, present andfuture policyand administrative
choices.Theoriesof theNTR, whichare "ideological" in bothsenses
notedabove (thatis,they can serve as "a guide to action" orpostfacto
rationalization),havebeguntoplaya significant partin Sovietpolitical
development. In the immediate future, theseideaswill mostlikely
motivate theSoviet"collective leadership" topursueincremental kinds
ofchangeandtotrytoidentify control and dimlyperceived impersonal
forcesand trends. IdeasabouttheNTR will also influence or reflect
theleaders'conceptualizations ofpolitical opportunities andconstraints.
Theimpact ofthestudies of"scientific management" willdependmore
heavilyon theirimmediate pragmatic or instrumental value-perhaps
especiallytoeconomic production executives. It isproblematical wheth-
era moreunified andsystematic theory oftheNTR,whichmostSoviet
andEastEuropean theorists canaccept, willevolve.Butitis reasonable

644 WORLD POLITICS
to expectthatmorefullydevelopedMarxist-Leninist
theoriesof the
NTR willemergeas theNTR itselfdevelops. Thus,themajorSoviet
and East Europeanefforts
to theorizeabouttheNTR and its social
consequences-asexemplified in the books underreview-deserve
greater in theWestforbothscholarly
attention andpractical
reasons.


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Soviet Views of "The Scientific-Technological Revolution"

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ViktorG. Afanas'ev,Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia upravlenie,obra-

THE thecoreof recentSovietlitera-

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theNTR literatureis thatSovietand EastEuropeanscholars

I. SOVIETTHEORIESOF "THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL

The scientific-technologicalrevolutionis a radical (korennoe) trans-

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II. THEORIES OF "THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION" AND

Theoriesof the NTR addressthemselves to stimulating intellectual

5V. I. Kosolapov,Mankindand the Year 2000 (Moscow: ProgressPublishersI976),

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III. THEORY AND EXPERIENCE: SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS

How areSoviettheory and practice and howdo Soviet

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IV. CONCLUSION: POLITICALIMPLICATIONSOF SOVIETTHEORIES OF

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tionships betweentechnical innovations ("thepart") and thelarger

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Soviet Views of "The Scientific-Technological Revolution

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