ART.

1614
Each one of the co-owners of an
undivided immovable who may have sold
his share separately, may independently
exercise the right of repurchase as regards
his own share, and the vendee cannot
compel him to redeem the whole property.
(1516

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RULE WHEN CO-OWNERS SELL THEIR SHARES
SEPARATELY (ARTICLE 1614)

although it is the policy of the law to avoid

division, it would be unjust, if the sale was made
separately and indecently, to require the co-owners
to come to an agreement with regard to the
repurchase of the thing sold, and certainly, it would
be worse to deprive them of their right in case they
fail to agree. The very purpose of the article is to
prevent such injustice.

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Redemption in separate sales by co-owners
of undivided immovable.
Although it is the policy of the law to avoid
indivision, it would be unjust, if the sale was made
separately and independently, to require the co-
owners to come to an agreement with regard to the
repurchase of the thing sold, and certainly, it would
be worse to deprive them of their right in case they
fail to agree.
The very purpose of the article is to prevent
such injustice. (10 Manresa 332.)

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EXAMPLE:
In the preceding example, if A, B, and C sold
their respective shares to D with the right of
repurchase in separate instruments and at
different dates, each one of them may exercise
his right independently of the others and D
cannot compel him to redeem the whole
property.

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 ART. 1615
If the vendee should leave several heirs, the
action for redemption cannot be brought against each
of them except for his own share, whether the thing
be undivided, or it has been partitioned among them.
But if the inheritance has been divided, and the thing
sold has been awarded to one of the heirs, the action
for redemption may be instituted against him for the
whole. (1517)

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Redemption against heirs of
vendee

The vendor a retro can exercise the right to redeem

against the heirs of the vendee a retro with respect only
to their respective shares, whether the thing be undivided
or it has been partitioned among them.
However, if by partition the entire property has
been adjudicated to one of the heirs, the vendor can
exercise the right to redeem against said heir for the
whole.

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EXAMPLE
A sold his parcel of land to B with a right to
repurchase. Then B died leaving C, D, and E, his
children, as heirs.

In this case, the right of redemption by A is

against each of the heirs only for his respective
share or for one-third of the property.

If the property has been awarded to C by

partition, then the action for redemption may be
instituted against him for the entire property.

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 ART. 1616
The vendor cannot avail himself of the
right of repurchase without returning to the
vendee the price of the sale, and in addition:
(1) The expenses of the contract, and any
other legitimate payments made by
reason of the sale;
(2) The necessary and useful expenses
made on the thing sold. (1518)

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Obligation of vendor a retro in
case of redemption.
Article 1616 defines the obligations of the vendor who desires to
exercise his right of repurchase. (see Gargallo vs. Duero, 1 SCRA 134 [1961].)
He must return to the vendee a retro:
(1) The price. — The law speaks of “price of the sale” and not the value of
the thing. It is lawful, however, for the parties to agree that the price to be
returned will be more or less than the original sum paid by the vendee (10
Manresa 338-339.);
(2) Expenses of contract and other legitimate expenses. — If the
expenses for the execution and registration of the sale were paid by the
vendee, the same shall be reimbursed by the vendor. (see Art. 1497.) But
they need not be paid at the very time of the exercise of the right since
they are unknown amounts. They may be paid later. The same is true of
necessary and useful expenses (Decision of Supreme Court of Spain,
Dec. 31, 1897; 10 Manresa 338.); and
(3) Necessary and useful expenses. — The first are expenses incurred for
the preservation of the thing or those which seek to prevent the waste,
deterioration or loss of the thing, while the second are which increase the
value of the thing or create improvements thereon, such as a house.

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(a) The necessary expenses which must be
repaid to the vendee are not those which are
ordinary and simple expenses of
preservation because these expenses are
incident to the enjoyment of the thing and
should be borne by the vendee. (10 Manresa
339-342.)
(b) Useful expenses are refunded to the vendee
a retro because he is considered a
possessor in good faith. (Art. 546, par. 2.)
(c) The vendor a retro is given no option to
require the vendee a retro to remove the
useful improvements on the land subject of
the sale a retro, unlike that granted the owner
of a land under Articles 546 and 54713 of the
Civil Code
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(d) The vendor a retro must pay for the useful improvements
introduced by the vendee a retro; otherwise, the latter may retain
possession of the land until reimbursement is made. (Gargollo vs.
Duero, 1 SCRA 1311 [1961].) It has been held, however, that
considering the purpose of the law on homesteads (Public Land Act,
C.A. No. 141, as amended.), which is to conserve ownership in the
hands of the home steader and his family, Article 1616 should be
construed in conjunction with Articles 546 and 547.To allow a vendee
a retro of a homestead the right of retention until payment of useful
expenses is made by the redemptioner would be to render nugatory
the right of repurchase granted by law to a homesteader because all
a vendor a retro can do to prevent repurchase is to build something
on the homestead beyond the capacity to pay of the homesteader
who seeks to repurchase. (Calagan vs. CFI of Davao, 95 SCRA 498
[1980].)

(e) The payment of land tax has been as neither necessary nor
useful. It is a charge against the property. The object of the land tax is
to contribute to the expenses of the government in the protection of
the vendee’s right as owner and it is but just that he should bear said
charges. (Cabigao vs. Valencia, 53 Phil. 646 [1929].) Taxes on the
property may be considered necessary expenses in the sense that if
they are not paid, the property may be sold for tax delinquency or
forfeited to the government.

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ILLUSTRATIVE CASE
Property subject to right of repurchase was embargoed by the government and
vendor a retro redeemed the property from the government and not from vendee a
retro who subsequently sold the property.

Facts:
S sold in December, 1897 to B a property with right to repurchase within six (6) months.
S was not able to effect the repurchase in May, 1898 by reason of the fact that B was
absent from his place of residence on account of the war. About that time the revolution
broke out and the property was seized by the revolutionary government from B. The
property was redeemed by S from said government in November, 1898. Subsequently,
B sold the property to C. S brought action against C to recover the property.

Issue:
Was the sale made by the revolutionary government to S valid, with the result that B
had no right to transfer to C the property in question?

Held:
No. What S did was to attempt to reacquire the ownership of the property transferred to
B from a third person to whom the property had not been transferred by B in any man
ner whatsoever. Therefore, the payment made by S to the revolutionary government
which should have been made to B in order to redeem the property, could not have
extinguished the obligation incurred by him in favor of the latter. (Panganiban vs.
Cuevas, 7 Phil. 477 [1907].)

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Offer to redeem and tender of
payment generally required.
(1) Offer to redeem must be bona fide. — The mere declaration of the vendor of his
intention to exercise the right of repurchase is not sufficient to preserve the right of
redemption. The law requires that the offer must be a bona fide one and accompanied by
an actual and simultaneous tender of payment or consignation of the full amount agreed
upon for repurchase. (see Torrijos vs. Crisologo, 6 SCRA 1984 [1962]; Catangcatang vs.
Legayada, 84 SCRA 51 [1978].) Thus, the mere sending of letters by the vendor
expressing his desire to repurchase without an accompanying tender of the redemption
price falls short of the requirement of the law. (Uy Lee vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA
196 [1975]; see State Investment House, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 734
[1992].)
(2) When tender of payment not necessary. — Neither is it necessary to tender payment
of the repurchase price if the vendee has already flatly refused to reconvey. (Gonzaga vs.
Go, 69 Phil. 778 [1940]; Catalan vs. Rivera, [C.A.] 45 O.G. 4538; Torrijos vs. Crisologo,
supra; Lafont vs. Pascasio, 5 Phil. 391 [1905]; Fructo vs. Fuentes, 15 Phil. 362 [1910].)
This rule is premised on the ground that under such circumstance the vendee will also
refuse the tender of payment. (Uy Lee vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 196 [1975].)
Where the vendor a retro had consigned or deposited in court the redemption price when
the action was filed, prior tender could be excused. (see De la Cruz vs. Marcelino, 84
Phil. 709 [1949]; Torio vs. Del Rosario, 93 Phil. 800 [1953]; Torrijos vs. Crisologo, supra.)

If the tender is made after the period of repurchase has expired, its acceptance would
amount only to a promise to sell on the part of the vendee because the right of repurchase
having expired, there was no more right that could have been preserved. (Tan Queto vs. Vda.
de Maquiling, 2 C.A. Rep. 150.)

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Consignation of price generally
not required.
It is not a legal requisite for the vendor to make a consignation or judicial deposit of the
price if the offer or tender is refused. (Canuto vs. Mariano, 37 Phil. 849 [1918]; see Rumbaoa vs.
Arzaga, 84 Phil. 812 [1949].) He is not a debtor. He has a right, not an obligation, to repurchase.
(Villegas vs. Capistrano, 9 Phil. 416 [1907].) It is enough that a sincere and genuine tender of
payment is made and refused, although consignation may serve to provide additional security for
the vendor and to indicate the veracity of his desire to exercise the right of repurchase. (Legaspi vs.
Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 82 [1986].)

(1) Where right of repurchase judicially declared. — Where the right of the vendor a retro to
repurchase had been judicially declared to exist, the effect of the judgment is to definitely fix
the relation of the vendor a retro and the vendee a retro, as that of debtor and creditor,
respectively, in the amount and within the period fixed in the judgment. Should the vendee
(creditor) refuse to accept the amount of the redemption price offered, the vendor (debtor)
must deposit it in court. (Torrijos vs. Crisologo, supra.)
(2) In case of absence of the vendee a retro. — In such case, the right of redemption may still
be exercised as a vendor who decides to redeem a property sold with pacto de retro, in a
sense, stands as the debtor and the vendee as the creditor of the purchase price. The vendor
can and should exercise his right of redemption against the vendee by filing a suit against him
and making a consignation with the court of the amount due for redemption (Catangcatang vs.
Legayada, supra; Rivero vs. Rivero, 80 Phil. 802 [1948].), not that deposit or consignation is
legally essential to preserve his reserved right of redemption but because he should be
regarded as having done that which should have been done to terminate the right of the
vendee over the property where the redemption price is already due and payable. (Rumbaoa
vs. Arzaga, supra; see Legaspi vs. Court of Appeals, supra.)

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END OF MY PRESENTATION
ARTICLE 1614-1616

THANK YOU!
GEMOTO, RACEL JOYCE C.
NEU COLLEGE OF LAW
JD-SALES BLOCK B
SATURDAY 3:00-5:00PM