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State, nation, identity: The quest for legitimacy in

Bangladesh
a
Tazeen M. Murshid
a
University of North London
Published online: 08 May 2007.
To cite this article: Tazeen M. Murshid (1997) State, nation, identity: The quest for legitimacy in Bangladesh , South Asia:
Journal of South Asian Studies, 20:2, 1-34, DOI: 10.1080/00856409708723294
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00856409708723294
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South Asia, Vol. XX, no. 2 (1997), pp. 1-34.
STATE, NATION, IDENTITY: THE QUEST

FOR LEGITIMACY IN BANGLADESH*
Downloaded by [Stony Brook University] at 12:50 25 October 2014
Tazeen M. Murshid
University of North London
HE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO DEMONSTRATE THE CONTEXTUAL NATURE OF
T the formation of states, nations and identities, by examining the case of

Bangladesh prior to the 1996 elections. Nationalists engaged in the
quest for legitimacy and power have formulated and reformulated these so
that they may exercise political control over the state and its resources.1
Specifically, the paper will explore how the search for legitimacy by
successive regimes in Bangladesh has contributed to the rise of the religious
right in politics, thus posing a challenge to the secular order visualised by the
liberal intelligentsia.
The appropriate means of achieving legitimate authority in a democracy
is through the political process in the form of elections to ascertain popular
opinion, and through other consensus-building activities which are usually
aimed at homogenising the population.2 Popular mobilisation often takes
place around particular conceptions of the social and moral order which
appeal to ties of language, culture and religion. Some, like Geertz and Shils,
argue that these ties are primordial and underived; whereas others, like
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at The Thirteenth European Conference of
Modern South Asian Studies in Toulouse in Sept. 1994 and in a seminar at the Institute of
Commonwealth Studies, London in Oct. 1995. I would like to thank the participants for their
lively contributions which I found very useful.
1 1 The term nationalist is used loosely to include all those who are engaged in conceptualising
homogenous nations based on their particular world view, such as elites, intellectuals, political
parties, decision makers and officers of state, etc.
2 2 For the usage of the term, homogenise, see U. Phadnis, Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South
Asia (New Delhi, Sage, 1989), pp. 80-1.
2 SOUTH ASIA
Andersen, Hobsbawm and Ranger, contest this position in favour of an

instrumentalist interpretation, which explains identities as constructed,
imagined, even invented.3 From the arguments of the latter, it follows that
collective and national identities are fluid, plastic and malleable; that a nation
is not a static category, but is the outcome of historical processes in the course
of which group identity is reformulated. Brass identifies three phases through
which an ethnic group can become a nation. In the first phase, people are
distinguishable by cultural markers of identity, such as race, religion or
language, but do not pursue social and political goals based on these. In the
next phase, they emphasise their distinctiveness as an ethnic group in order to
lay claim to status, and use these markers of distinctness as symbols to
achieve internal cohesion. In the final phase, they may act as an interest
group, or pursue the politics of nationalism, become a nationality and demand
either secession, federation or autonomy.4 However, in the process of
political and social mobilisation, nationalists often project an imaginary
homogeneity in order to construct a new national identity or visualise a
Utopia. But Utopias may be in conflict when competing nationalisms based on
alternative interpretations of history, religion and culture generate demands
for alternative state structures.5 The history of Bangladesh offers clear
examples of this.
The experience of Bangladesh bears out the arguments of Brass, Eller

and Coughlan, for it clearly demonstrates that there is nothing primordial or
given about ethnic and national identity.6 These have been derived through
social and political interaction. Elites in competition for political power and
economic advantage have constructed and given form and content to national
group identity. While the ruling elite has played a decisive role in ensuring
state patronage for the promotion of its particular world view, counter Elites
have risen to challenge its hegemony. Recent examples of elite conflict have
3 C. Geertz, 'The integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New
States', in C. Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States: the Quest for Modernity in Asia and
Africa (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 105-57; B. Anderson, Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, Verso, 1983), pp. 5-7; E.
Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1983). Ranger has since modified his position to argue like Anderson that identities are
imagined rather than invented. See T. Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition revisited: the Case of
Colonial Africa', in T. Ranger and O. Vaughan (eds), Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth
Century Africa (Houndmills, Macmillan, 1993), pp. 62-111.
4 P.R. Brass, 'Ethnicity and Nationality Formation', Ethnicity, Vol. 3, no. 3 (Sept. 1976),
pp. 225-40.
5 For a discussion of the idea of Utopias in conflict, see A.T. Embree, Utopias in Conflict:
Religion and Nationalism in Modern India (Delhi, Oxford Univ. Press, 1992), pp. 1-18.
6 P.R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (New Delhi, Sage, 1991), pp.
15, 71-2; J. D. Eller and R. M. Coughlan, 'The Poverty of Primordialism: the demistification of
ethnic attachments', Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 16, no. 2 (Apr. 1993), pp. 195-6.
STATE, NATION, IDENTITY 3
focussed on differences regarding the war of liberation of Bangladesh and the

role of Islam in social and political life. Death sentences passed by fatwa
(religious decree) courts on persons accused of atheism have given rise to
particularly volatile situations. Among them were nationally eminent figures
such as the scholar, Ahmad Sharif and the poet, Shamsur Rahman, as well as
the feminist writer, Taslima Nasreen. Alongside others, they reflect a secular
challenge to the rising forces of religious extremism at a time when the state
appeared to countenance the religious right. The phenomenon is striking
when examined in the context of the emergence of Bangladesh as a fledgling
secular democracy in 1971.
Religion has periodically played a dominant role in shaping the nature of

politics in South Asia. It has been used as a marker of identity in the process
of political mobilisation alongside other markers such as language and has
been presented as a primordial bond of identity by scholars such as Geertz
and Robinson.7 Certain Islamist political groups and parties claim to know
the ultimate truth in matters pertaining to religion and demand the right to be
the sole interpreters of Islamic law as experts in the field. Such groups
declare certain principles of the faith to be uncontestable, such as the finality
of the prophethood of Muhammad and the Quran as the supreme source of
divine law. But it can be argued that there is no essentialised Islam in a world
where its interpretation and practice has varied from place to place, where
there are many sects among Muslims and four major schools of Sunni Islamic
jurisprudence, all with equal claims to legitimacy.8 There is, therefore,
potential for conflict at many levels, at the level of interpretation and the use
of ijtihad (individual reasoning), as well as in relation to the position of
religious minorities and the role of liberal intellectuals in determining the
nature of the state.
The rise of the religious right during the power elite's search for
legitimacy in Bangladesh also serves to illustrate the process in which
concepts of state, nation and identity are formulated.9 Competing political
elites from among the religious orthodoxy, the liberal intelligentsia and the
army who are engaged in a struggle for power, seek to achieve a consensus
about their world view in order to form a majority among the electorate.
They appeal to distinctive cultural markers of identification based on shared
experiences including xenophobia, linguistic specificities and religious
7 7 C. Geertz, The Interpretations of Cultures (New York, Basic Books, 1973), p. 259; F.
Robinson, Separatism among Indian Muslims, 1860 -1923 (Delhi, Vikas, 1975), p. 13.
8 8 It is claimed that there are 72 sects among Muslims. See speech by Suhrawardy, Constituent
Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, 6 Mar. 1948, p. 262. The four schools of Sunni Islamic
jurisprudence are Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali.
9 9 The term power élite is used to refer to decision makers in the same sense as C. Wright Mills,
The Power Élite (London, 1966), p. 3.
4 SOUTH ASIA
affiliation and project these as symbols of group solidarity. The process has
been described by Brass as 'symbol manipulation'.10
The religious orthodoxy, using the tools of modern democracy, seeks to
forge a nation defined by Islam and a state based on shariah laws,
notwithstanding the fact that large segments of the diasporic Muslim
population belonging to other spatial, cultural and political locales cannot be
included within this construct. But this conception of the state and nation is
theoretically discriminatory to religious minorities whose status would suffer
under shariah laws for they could be barred from high office and compelled
to pay jizya, or protection tax. Hence, the liberal intelligentsia has rejected
this view and emphasised other identity markers such as Bengali language and
common cultural roots of the Bengali peoples as discussed below. Their

vision of the secular pluralist state acknowledges that a large majority of the
subject population share their nationalities with others beyond their political
frontiers, such as the Bengalis of the plains and the Chakmas of the hills.
However, those who argue that the raison d'etre of a juridical state must
lie in its distinctiveness as a nation, are at odds with the position of the liberal
intelligentsia, and have engaged themselves in constructing such a distinct
nation, described as Bangladeshi after the name of the new state: segments of
the army enjoy pride of place among the proponents of this view. Thus, while
one can agree with Gellner and Hobsbawm that nationalists aim at a
congruence between national and state boundaries, effectively, this is often
illusory.11 Following the arguments of Hugh Seton-Watson as opposed to that
of A.D. Smith, I make a distinction between state and nation in that a state is
territorially bounded and governed by a set of legal and political institutions
through which it maintains order.12 A nation, on the contrary, may not have
such institutional structures, but may nevertheless share a common history,
10
See P. Brass,' Élite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity Among the Muslims of
South Asia', in D. Taylor and M. Yapp (eds), Political Identity in South Asia (London, Curzon
Press, 1979), pp. 35-76.
11
E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983), pp. 1-6; E. J. Hobsbawm,
Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1990, second edition 1992), p. 9.
12
H. Seton-Watson distinguishes thus between states and nations: 'States can exist without a
nation, or with several nations among their subjects; and a nation can be coterminous with the
population of one state, or be included together with other nations within one state, or be
divided between several states'. Some states existed before nations and vice versa. Every state
is not a nation, and all sovereign states are not national states. 'A state is a legal and political
organization with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens. A nation is a
community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common
culture, a national consciousness'. See H. Seton-Watson, Nations and States: an Enquiry into
the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism (London, Methuen, 1977), p. 1. For an
opposite view see A.D. Smith, 'The Problem of National Identity: Ancient, Medieval and
Modern?', Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 18 (1995), pp. 375-83.
language or other cultural markers of identity, symbolic or otherwise, while

being territorially dispersed.13 In the conception of neither the religious
orthodoxy nor the liberal intelligentsia of Bangladesh is there an exact
correspondence between state and national boundaries. However, there is an
expectation that the state and nation should be congruous. Therefore, some
members of the political elite do aspire to such congruity.
In attempting to explain the relative positions of the religious and secular
forces in the politics of Bangladesh this paper will first outline the historical
processes through which new identities and nations were constructed out of
the old. The religious nationalism on which Pakistan was based gave way to
Bengali nationalism as new elites emerged to engage in the political
manipulation of symbols of cultural identity, which may be termed as

'cultural politics',14 thus arousing the emotive issues of linguistic identity and
cultural heritage, to galvanise Bengali opinion against subjugation by the
culturally and ethnically distinct Punjabis who also dominated the political
and economic scene. The paper will then show that secular Bangladesh had its
challengers among the Islamic right and the communist left who either
wanted a Muslim Bengal or did not recognise the new state. However,
following the change in leadership which occurred as a consequence of the
military intervention in state affairs in 1975, the religious right began to exert
a greater political influence. Its impact was most marked in the area of state
policy: a new ruling ideology based on religion was gradually introduced.
The paper next examines the contemporary scene wherein this ideology is
contested in the realm of politics, in the streets and at the elite-intellectual
level. This is done by exploring the controversy over recent feminist
literature. In particular, the paper analyses the manipulation of the works of
Taslima Nasreen by the religious right to create a climate favourable for the
construction of an Islamic state. In conclusion, the paper looks at the
implications of such a possibility for the continuity of the democratic process.
Background: the Pakistan phase - Islam in danger vs Jai Bangla

The history of Bangladesh and its search for a national identity is replete with
tensions between perceptions based on religious orthodoxy and secular
rationalism.15 Hence, national identity and state ideology remain contested.
The national and political boundaries of Bangladesh have been reconstituted
13
H.J. Gans, 'Symbolic Ethnicity and Symbolic Religiosity: Towards a Comparison of Ethnic
and Religious Acculturation', Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 17 (4 Oct. 1994), pp. 577-92.
14
For a discussion of the term 'cultural polities' see R. Cheran, 'Cultural Politics of Tamil
Nationalism', South Asia Bulletin, Vol. XII, no. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 42-56.
15
See T.M. Murshid, The Sacred and the Secular: Bengal Muslim Discourses, 1871-1977
(Calcutta, Oxford Univ. Press, 1995).
6 SOUTH ASIA
several times reflecting the fluid and contextual nature of identity selection.
The emergence of Pakistan in 1947 was accompanied by a strong assertion of
Muslim nationalism and an emphasis on Islam as the basis of identity and
unity, binding together disparate groups. Indian Muslims felt deprived as
Muslims vis-a-vis the Hindus and hence the emphasis on their religious and
communal identity. The emergence of Bangladesh drew support from a rising
Bengali ethnic consciousness. The Muslims of East Pakistan felt their relative
deprivation as Bengalis vis-a-vis the non-Bengalis of West Pakistan who used
religion to control Bengali aspirations. In both instances, the basic struggle
was for economic emancipation.16 However, the formulation of new
ideologies and identities served to mobilise popular support and provide
legitimacy for that struggle through which new imagined nations were
emerging. In both cases such reformulations achieved a fragile unity.
After the creation of the new states, the delicate consensus on ideology
and identity seemed to break down in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Secular
politicians had rallied Muslim support for Pakistan with slogans of 'Islam in
danger'.17 In the new state, created ostensibly to guarantee Muslims the right
to live in their own way, there were several contenders for power challenging
the authority and ideology of the ruling party, the Muslim League. For
example, the Awami Muslim League broke away from the Muslim League in
1951 because it sought to open up its membership to all communities,
irrespective of religion, and subsequently dropped the word Muslim from its
name. Other challengers were the Jama'at-e-Islami which demanded an
Islamic state ruled by shariah laws; and there was also an underground
communist movement which rejected the partition of India. Notably, the
Muslim League was routed in the first provincial elections in East Bengal in
1954.
The emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, unlike that of Pakistan, was

sudden - the inevitable aftermath of a genocide perpetrated by the West
Pakistan dominated junta in defence of its decision not to share power or
resources with East Pakistan. The struggle of Bengalis in 1971 was one for
sheer survival rather than a self-conscious attempt to build a secular polity,
even though inspiration was sought in slogans like Jai Bangla (victory to
Bengal) which had no religious connotations whatsoever. Yet, Bangladesh
came to be associated with secular symbols and ideologies, until the state
16
T.M. Murshid, 'A House Divided: the Muslim Intelligentsia of Bengal', in. D. A. Low, The
Political Inheritance of Pakistan (Houndmills, MacMillans, 1991), pp. 165-6.
17
Sir Stafford Cripps to Butler, Under-Secretary of State for India, Letter dd. 24 Aug. 1936, in
'Elections in India in 1937. Interference by Public Servants, Bengal', India Office Records,
L/P&J/7/1126.
controlled reversals in the aftermath of the assassination of the first prime

minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in 1975.
The history of the region demonstrates that the process of identity
selection was not constant; the cultural markers adopted were not fixed.
Therefore, ethnic, cultural and national identities were in a state of flux, their
boundaries constantly changing, but being located in specific contexts. Here,
nationhood has been defined and re-defined three times within a quarter of a
century. However, shifts in political identity did not necessarily imply a
change in cultural identity. While the citizenship status of the people changed
from Indian to Pakistani in 1947 and to Bangladeshi in 1971, they continued
to share their Bengali nationality and other social and cultural affinities with
people in West Bengal across their national frontiers. Subsequently, however,

competing political elites continued to engage in reformulating national
identities in order to drive a wedge between the shared linguistic and cultural
identities of Bengalis by contesting Bengali with Bangladeshi nationalism.18
The heritage: state intervention and elite roles in the process of identity
construction
Bangladesh has inherited a tradition of state intervention in the process of
identity construction from Pakistan, where the state subscribed to Islamic
ideology, albeit superficially. For example, in an effort to contain the
opposition, the ruling party of Pakistan, the Muslim League, claimed for
itself the sole right to interpret 'what Islam is'. 19 It equated itself with the
state, Pakistan, and with the religion of the majority, Islam. Henceforth any
criticism of the party was interpreted as an attempt to disintegrate Pakistan as
well as an attack on Islam itself. The state introduced religion into politics.
Even its anti-Indian stance was projected as Islamic. A great deal of effort
went into drawing a distinction between the cultures of East and West Bengal.
In fact, any stress on cultural similarities between these two regions was
interpreted as a desire for unification of the two Bengals. Thus the struggle to
establish Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan was perceived to be
a major threat to the ideology of Pakistan, as Bengali was one of the cultural
links between the two parts of Bengal. In contrast, the state took no steps to
build an Islamic society or polity.
18
T.M. Murshid, 'Bangladesh: the Challenge of Democracy -- Language, Culture and Political
Identity', Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 2, no. 1 (1993), pp. 67-73. A.G. Chowdhury,
Bangali na bangladeshi? (Dhaka, 1994).
19 Speech by Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, at the first session of the Pakistan
Muslim League Council held on 20 Feb. 1949 in Khaliqdina Hall, Karachi, Government of
Pakistan Publication (English translation of Urdu speech).
8 SOUTH ASIA
In such a context, discussions about the identity of Bengal Muslims was

fraught with controversy as Bengali and Muslim were presented as
incompatible in state parlance, following a tradition from colonial times.20
For many, this was deeply problematic. Madrasahs taught Urdu rather than
Bengali. Because it was written in the Arabic script Urdu enjoyed greater
status and was considered an Islamic language by many. The non-Bengali
upper classes who dominated politics and the economy as well as sections of
the upwardly mobile Bengali population tended to look down upon the
Bengali language as inferior. It was in this context that experiments were
made to write Bengali in the Arabic script.21 This attitude to Bengali, the
mother tongue of the majority, was however resented by the upwardly-
mobile, middle classes and the vernacular intelligentsia. Hence a tension

ensued between a religious and a secular basis of identity.
The religious basis of identity acquired a special importance because

religion was politicised in Pakistan. The pull towards a secular definition
was, however, inevitable in East Pakistan not only because of the Bengal
Muslims' natural attachment to their local cultural roots, which predate their
history of conversion to Islam, but also because of their heritage of eclectic
cultural patterns, which arguably carry a secular connotation.22 Local
cultural patterns such as the use of alpana (floor decoration with rice paint) at
weddings, or wearing colourful bindi (cosmetic dots) on the forehead, or
making offerings at the shrines of pirs or holy persons, also common in the
Middle East, were projected by the ruling elite as being essentially Hindu
and, as such, opposed to Islamic culture.23
Another important factor which contributed to the religious-secular

tension was related to the schizophrenic or culturally ambivalent self-image
of the intelligentsia - its basic inability to come to terms with the evident
facts of its identity. While the intelligentsia idealised ashraf ethics and values
supposedly derived from the Middle East, the harsh reality was that the
majority of them were descended from converts, were of peasant stock, spoke
20
For a discussion of colonial perceptions see, T.M. Murshid, '"Race", Ideology and Difference:
Identity Formation in Bangladesh', Nibandhamala, (Collection of research articles) (published
by Fakrul Alam, Centre for Advanced Research in Humanities, Univ. of Dhaka, 1994), pp.
225-8. Also see, Badruddin Umar, Sanskritir sankat (Dhaka, 1967).
21
Report of the East Bengal Language Committee, 1949-50 (Government of East Pakistan,
Dacca, 1958), pp. 6-26; Badruddin Umar, Bhasa andolan prasanga: katipay dalil. Vol. 1
(Dacca, 1984), p. 139.
22
Murshid, The Sacred and the Secular, Introduction.
23
See Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, 1871-1906: A Quest for Identity (Delhi, Oxford
Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 67-9.
Bengali and shared little with the ashraf apart from religion.24 Hence, the fear
that Bengali Islam was contaminated by local and un-Islamic practices. The
orthodoxy was harsh on those who practiced local customs and rituals. They
have been referred to as a 'class of fossilized imbeciles and fogies, who live
in a cloud of un-Islamic superstitions inherited from the local pagan
traditions'.25 The dichotomous self-image was not as devastating for the
intelligentsia in the 1940s and 50s as it was till the 1920s, when they were
still talking in terms of choosing their mother-tongue.26 Nevertheless, ashraf
ideals determined cultural and linguistic choices, until groups could break
away from the established mould to assert that culture and identity be defined
by secular criteria.
In the immediate post-partition period, the Bengal Muslim intelligentsia

was acutely aware of the need to define its social, cultural, linguistic and
political identity. The concerns of this period had their roots in pre-partition
ideologies covering a wide spectrum - the orthodox, pan-Islamist, humanist
and communist. Maududi and his Jama'at-i-Islami with its mouthpiece Al-
Islam, followed the orthodox path of Indian Muslim thought in prescribing a
strongly Islamic state. The New Values group deeply influenced by humanist
thought, envisaged a liberal democratic society where culture belonged to a
neutral, or secular sphere. It was an amorphous group of university teachers
who contributed to a journal called New Values, which was published from
Dhaka in the 1950s and 60s. Contributors were influenced by the rationalism
of the Sikha group of the twenties and thirties. Organisations such as the
Yuva League or Youth League, deeply influenced by communist ideas
undertook politico-cultural activities with decidedly secular objectives. Other
organisations such as the Tamaddun Majlis, which had deep religious
orientations nevertheless recognised a secular dimension to questions of
language, identity and culture.27
Intellectual preoccupations among prose writers in the years after 1947

focused on an anxiety to assess contemporary society in the light of post-
independence experiences. One central question was the rightful place of
Islam in society. In the ensuing deliberations, the religious ideal was
24
Bengal Muslim society was traditionally divided into ashraf or noble born and atrap or low
born. The former could claim a degree of foreign or upper caste origin and was divided into
Syed, Mughal, Pathan and Sheikh; the latter had primarily local roots being descended from
local converts. See S.M.N. Karim, Changing Society in India and Pakistan (Dhaka, 1956),
p. 12; R. Ahmed, op.cit., pp. 10-12.
25
This was the view of Maulana Maududi the founder of the Jama'at-i-Isami. See Al-Islam,
Karachi, 5 Dec. 1961.
26
Banga Nur, 1st Year, 3rd no. Magh, 1326 B.S. (1920).
27
Abul Kasem, 'Memoir', Ekusher Sankalan, 1980 - Smriticharan (a collection of memoirs)
(Dacca: bangla Academy, 1980), pp. 2-10.
10 SOUTH ASIA
constantly measured against the secular ones of freedom, democracy and

humanism.28
The multiple and often mutually contradictory identities of Bengali
Muslims, have been shifting constantly. These have been affected by a wide
range of factors - cultural, religious and political. However, the pulls of
symbol manipulation by elites in competition for power have created a range
of problems. Some of these relate to the duality in their self-perception,
discrepancy between the ideal and practice, coming to terms with their social
origins, not to mention the trauma of twice forging new states out of old
territories, each time involving the need to redefine the nation, nationhood
and national boundaries.

The tradition of distinguishing between a Bengali and a Muslim
provided grounds for some of the problems of self-perception which
confronted Bengali Muslims later on.29 In Pakistan, this issue appeared to
have lost significance at least initially. Research conducted among university
students in the mid-1960s indicated that there was no perceived conflict of
identities in East Bengal between being a Bengali, a Pakistani, and a
Muslim.30 However, the movement leading to the emergence of Bangladesh
in 1971 induced once again the need to define national and group identity. In
a sense, Bengali stood for a secular definition emphasising the ethnic and
cultural dimension; whereas, Pakistani had implied a continuing belief in the
two-nation theory and an emphasis on Islam as an overall guiding principle.
But in fact, the distinction was not as clear-cut as this. Abul Mansur Ahmed,
a politician and writer, saw the emergence of Bangladesh as a 'restoration of
the Lahore Resolution'.31 His basic faith in the two-nation theory had
remained intact. But at the time this was not a widely-held view.
The secular phase and the rise of the Muslim Bengal movement
Independent Bangladesh came to be associated with a secular ideology
because of a number of factors. The autonomy movement of the 1960s which
was a sequel to the language movement of the 1950s addressed itself mainly
to economic and political issues. The language movement had already created
a secular cult and carried the message that culture be allotted a neutral, non-
28
The heart searching is summed up in article by Syed Sajjad Hussain, 'Contemporary Non-
fictional Prose Writing in East Bengal', New Values, Vol. 7, no. 1 (Jan. 1955), p. 22.
29
For an analysis of the consequent culture conflict, see B. Umar, Samskritir samkat.
30
Howard Schuman, 'A Note on the Rapid Rise of Mass Bengali Nationalism', American
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78, no. 2 (Sept. 1972).
31
Abul Mansur Ahmed, End of a Betrayal and Restoration of Lahore Resolution (Dacca, 1978).
The Resolution had envisaged Pakistan as a confederation of states.
religious and to that extent, a secular zone. The non-communal, eclectic

cultural ethos of East Bengal also had a secular dimension to it. Another
reason was that the 1972 Constitution enshrined secularism as one of the four
pillars of state ideology.
However, there was no absolute national consensus about what
secularism meant. Sheikh Mujib was at pains to explain:
Secularism does not mean the absence of religion...No
communal politics will be allowed in the country.32
But there was confusion even among educated intellectuals, not to
mention the deeply religious masses. Although in the context of South Asia,
the term may be defined in opposition to communalism and religiosity, as
well as in terms of non-interference of the state in matters of religion, which
is treated essentially as a private matter, some believed secularism to be a
form of atheism, or absence of religion. They could not appreciate the
concept of religious tolerance in public life along with religiosity in personal
life as a practicable possibility.33 Yet in the 1973 elections, which were
regarded by the ruling party as a referendum on the four principles of state
policy - nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism - the Awami
League won a massive victory. It secured 73.17 per cent of the votes cast and
two hundred and ninety-two of the three hundred seats contested.34
Mujib faced strong opposition from two fronts: the fragmented left and
the Islamic right. Neither recognised the basis of the new state. While
political parties from the Islamic right such as the Jama'at-i-Islami and the
Nizam-e-Islam parties had been banned, most of the pro-Chinese factions of
the Communist Party had gone underground. The Islamic right had already
challenged the foundation of Bangladesh at the very inception of the new
state by the assassination of intellectuals, like Munier Chowdhury on 14
December 1971, two days before the Pakistan Army surrendered to the
combined forces.35 It may be assumed that the Islamist parties still had some
following despite their support to Pakistan's war effort aimed to keep East
Bengal from sharing power in a united Pakistan and offering active resistance
32
English translation of speech, Dacca, External Publicity Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1972, pp. 16-17.
33
Ali Anwar (ed.), Dharmanirapekshata (Secularism) (Dacca, 1973), pp. 86-7.
34
The Bangladesh Observer, 8-10 Mar. 1973.
35
New York Times, 26 Dec. 1972, p. 12, column 3. The Al-Badr, an action front of the Jama'at-i-
Islami, was responsible for a mass murder in Muhammadpur. The only survivor, D. Hossain
recounted the events. More recently, the British media has uncovered war criminals belonging
to the militant Al-Badr and Al-Shams, currently living in exile in Britain, 'Despatches',
Channel 4 Television, United Kingdom, 1995.
12 SOUTH ASIA
to the inevitable struggle for the liberation of Bangladesh. The 'Islam-pasand'

parties, which included the Jama'at-i-Islami, Pakistan Muslim League
(Council), Pakistan Muslim League (Convention), the Pakistan Democratic
Party, the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam and the Nizam-e-Islam, had altogether
polled 12.72 per cent of the votes cast in the 1970 elections in East Bengal.36
It may be assumed that some of the following of these groups persisted after
liberation. In addition, the Awami League too had non-secular elements
among its members.
It was thus no wonder that a Muslim Bengal movement emerged shortly
after liberation. Kamal Hossain, the then foreign minister noted in a recent
interview that the idea of Muslim Bangla came from a Radio Pakistan
Broadcast on 17 December 1971, a day after Pakistan's surrender. In the
broadcast, Pakistan welcomed the formation of Muslim Bangla and the
restoration of the original spirit of the 1940 Lahore Resolution which
envisaged Pakistan as a federation of independent states.37 It is surprising,
however, that this movement received support from some of the underground
communist groups because of shared anti-Indian and anti-Awami League
feelings. The East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) claimed
Muslim Bengal as its ally in their underground paper Janayuddha.3* Several
factions of the pro-Chinese Communist Party - which either did not support
the liberation war or fought a dual war against both the Pakistan Army and
the Mukti Bahini - insisted that colonialism and exploitation persisted in
Bangladesh, which was a client state of India and therefore there was
continued need for struggle. They refused to recognise Bangladesh and
described her as East Bengal or East Pakistan.39
The relative success of the movement to alter the identity of the new
state is evident in the policies adopted since the assassination of Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman, who is acknowledged as the father of the nation, and
addressed by many as Bangabandhu, friend of Bengal. That act was one in a
series of events which led to the adoption of Islam as an instrument of state
policy and rendered possible a return to the theocratic fold of Pakistan.
Some scholars have argued that Mujib himself contributed to the
process by invoking Islam in state affairs, adopting 'ill-defined secularist
goals' and pursuing recognition by Muslim countries which had favoured
36
See Report on General Elections, Pakistan, 1970-71, Vol. 1, Election Commission, Manager
of Publications (Karachi, 1972), pp. 216-17.
37
Author's interview with Dr Kamal Hossain, 27 Aug. 1994, Oxford.
38 Janayuddha, May-June 1973, p. 33, cited by Fazl Huq, op. cit., p. 52.
39
For a detailed discussion of the role of the left in the Liberation war and in Bangladesh, see T.
Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dacca, 1980), pp. 141-53, 169-
75, 175-9; Fazl Huq, op. cit., pp. 49-55.
Pakistan in 1971.40 While it was imperative for him to diversify his

international alliances beyond the Indo-Soviet bloc because of the need for
financial assistance to rebuild the war-torn economy, it may be suggested that
there was, indeed, some discrepancy in the theory and practice of Mujib's
secularism. In order to preempt being misrepresented by propagandists he was
keen to reassure the populace that he was not encouraging godlessness. He
replaced a television and radio programme called 'Speaking the Truth' based
on secular ethics with one based on citations from the scriptures of Islam,
Hinduism, Christianity and Buddhism, thus, allowing equal opportunity to all
faiths.41 This is somewhat more in keeping with the Indian perception of
secularism as sarba dharma sama bhaba, or religious tolerance, rather than
that inscribed in the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh as dharmanirapekshata,

or religious neutrality. It must be added that in neither conception does the
state dissociate itself from religion, but rather, attempts to act as an impartial
broker between various religious communities. However, it must be
acknowledged that Mujib's actions brought religion to the public domain
instead of keeping it in the private sphere as was his stated goal.
It may be argued that the multi-faith broadcasts, Mujib's participation in

the Islamic Summit held in Pakistan in 1974, as well as the General Amnesty
awarded to collaborators of the Pakistan army, represented at best an
appeasement of and at worst a capitulation to the forces which had been
antagonistic to the creation of Bangladesh, both nationally and in the
international context. But these must also be regarded as strategic moves
under trying circumstances. The amnesty, for example, was motivated as
much by a desire to neutralise Pakistan's threats to try and court martial
stranded Bangladeshis in Pakistan as to prevent the witch-hunting of
collaborators at home, in the course of which personal grievances were being
settled.
Several scholars such as Talukder Maniruzzaman and Zillur Rahman

Khan have argued that Mujib's secular policies resulted in a Muslim
'backlash' because he underestimated the religiosity of the people, recalling
explanations of the rise of the Hindu supremacist Bharatiya Janata Party as
attributable to the failure of Nehru's secularism.42 Hashmi postulates that
40
Syed Anwar Hussain, 'Islamic Fundamentalism in Bangladesh: Internal Variables and External
Inputs' in Rafiuddin Ahmed (ed.), Religion, Nationalism and Politics in Bangladesh (New
Delhi, South Asian Publishers, 1990), pp. 141-2,150.
41
He has therefore been ridiculed for adopting a 'multi-theocracy' model of secularism. See
Talukder Maniruzzaman, 'Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends', in Rafiuddin
Ahmed (ed.), Islam in Bangladesh: Society, Culture and Politics (Dhaka, Bangladesh Itihas
Samiti, 1983), p. 193.
42
Maniruzzaman examines the 1973 Interim Report of the Education Commission and argues that
at least 71 per cent of the 'western educated elite' preferred to incorporate modern religious
14 SOUTH ASIA
among other causes 'Islamic resurgence' in Bangladesh was 'a reaction to

Mujibism', that is, for example, to his four principles of state policy already
cited, including Mujib's alliance with India. He falls short of saying that it
was a consequence of the birth of the new nation. He holds the exaggerated
view that 'the India-factor is the key element in the whole discourse on Islam
in Bangladeshi politics'.43 But such logic could also be applied to debate the
importance of the Pakistan-factor. Such post-facto rationale fails to appreciate
the role of the religious right, geo-political imperatives and the impact of the
enormous problems facing the new administration. The government was
struggling to rebuild a war-ravaged economy, rehabilitate the destitute,
restructure local administration, and secure the surrender of arms from the
disbanded soldiers, freedom fighters, communists and razakaars, as well as

pursue a delicate diplomatic role in relation to its allies abroad.44 Under the
circumstances Mujib was unable effectively to counter the propaganda against
his administration from his pro-Pakistan-USA-China opponents.
Zia and symbol manipulation: Bengali nationalism challenged

With military entry in state affairs, the political elite was actively engaged in
forging new identities in the hope of gaining new allies and popular
legitimacy. The outcome, however, was nationally divisive. Nationality,
which was defined in terms of Bengali ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity
since independence, was, after the 1975 coup, being redefined on the basis of
political calculations. Although there were no popular demands for such
education with the general system of education. This is derived from the finding that 'only 159
or 5.54 per cent of the respondents were Madrassa-educated. Thus it was the active
Westernised elite's view that was reflected in the answers to the questionnaires'. However, the
non-madrasah educated include graduates of vernacular establishments and various colleges
and university departments who do not all belong to the Westernized elite. See Talukder
Maniruzzaman, op.cit., pp. 190-9. For a refutation of his arguments see A. N. Shamsul
Hoque, 'Comments on T. Maniruzzaman's paper' in R. Ahmed (ed.), op. cit., pp. 220-5. Zillur
Rahman Khan, 'Islam and Bengali Nationalism' Asian Survey, Vol.. 25, no. 8 (Aug. 1985),
pp. 845-8. For a critique of Khan, see Tazeen Mahnaz Murshid, 'Review II: Islam and Bengali
Nationalism', in R. Ahmed (ed.), Bangladesh: Society, Religion and Politics (Chittagong,
Barnarekha Press, 1985), pp. 42-4.
43
His article is primarily an indictment of the 'failings' of the Mujib regime which was in office
for barely three years after a devastating war, receiving inadequate international assistance to
regenerate the economy. The Awami League is distinguished from all other parties which arc
identified as 'Islam loving'. See Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, 'Islam in Bangladesh Politics', in Hussin
Mutalib and Taj ul-Islam Hashmi (eds), Islam, Muslims and the Modern State: Case Studies of
Muslims in Thirteen Countries (London, St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 100-38.
44
While the war effort was sustained by Indo-Soviet assistance, the financial support required for
post-war reconstruction had to be obtained from a wider source. This was a difficult task
because of the hostility of the USA and the Gulf States. On the international responses to the
1971 war see R. Sisson and L.E. Rose, War and Secession: pakistan, India and the Creation
of Bangladesh (Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1990).
reformulation, the measure was expected to win over new support bases. The
new definition required that a distinction be made between the languages of
East and West Bengal, where the former would be distinct from the
Sanskritic Bengali of West Bengal. The basis for such an argument had been
provided by Abul Mansur Ahmed in the period after partition when he chose
to describe the language of East Bengal as Pak Bangla, but there was little
support for this proposition at the time.45
In 1978, under President Zia-ur-Rahman's military regime, citizens of
Bangladesh were designated 'Bangladeshi', replacing the appellation of
'Bangalee' as stated in the Constitution of 1972. This was a strategic move in
that the term specifically demarcated the area and population of the new
juridical state. Zia may also have been motivated by an underlying
xenophobia which plagued sections of the population, particularly, segments
of the religious right, the pro-Chinese left, and factions within the army
which had inherited the anti-Indian traditions of the Pakistan army.46 At one
level, Zia's actions were an assertion of sovereignty in relation to India which
not only dominated the region geo-politically but also had a sizeable Bengali
population. At another level, he was discarding the pro-India sympathies of
the previous regime, unpopular among his new following. Instead, he began
to woo Pakistan and its supporters in the USA, Saudi Arabia and Libya,
which incidentally resisted the emergence of independent Bangladesh.
However, Zia went further in implying that Bangladeshis were a culturally
distinct entity, and hence a nation in their own right. Zia suggested in a
speech that Bangladeshis were different from the Bengalis of India and so
were their culture and language: the latter had to be moulded 'in our own
way', he argued.47 His message recalls Jinnah's famous statement
distinguishing the cultures and religions of Hindus and Muslims as two
different social orders. Zia thus not only asserted the precedence of religio-
political identity over the ethno-cultural, but also, as his subsequent policies
indicate, attempted to redefine that ethno-cultural identity as well. In
ideological terms, this was something of a rejection of Mujib's secular stance.
45
Abul Mansur Ahmed, 'Cultural Identity of East Pakistan', Concept of Pakistan, Vol. 3, no. 1
(1966); also see his Bangladesher Kalchar (Dhaka, 1985). For a discussion of his ideas see
T.M. Murshid, 'Bangladesh: the Challenge of Democracy -- language, culture and political
identity', p. 70.
46
Several authors have commented on the strong xenophobia in Bangladesh particularly in
relation to India, and fears about national sovereignty against the designs of a big and powerful
neighbour. See B. M. Monoar Kabir, 'The Politics of Religion: the Jama'at-i-Islami in
Bangladesh', in Rafiuddin Ahmed (ed.), Religion, Nationalism and Politics in Bangladesh, p.
123; Syed Anwar Husain, 'Islamic Fundamentalism in Bangladesh: Internal Variables and
External Inputs' in Rafiuddin Ahmed (ed.), ibid., pp. 141-2; Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, op. cit., pp.
105-7.
47
Zia's speech in 1978, cited by Abul Fazl Huq, 'The Problem of National Identity in
Bangladesh', The Journal of Social Studies, no. 24 (Apr. 1984), p. 58.
16 SOUTH ASIA
Although the preference for 'Bangladeshi' over 'Bangalee' had no strong

religious connotation, it was accompanied by another development:
'secularism' was discarded as a principle of state policy through a
constitutional amendment in 1977.48 Aware that a non-secular stance would
be regarded as communal or, anti-Hindu, he asserted through the manifesto of
his political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, that Bangladeshis had
freed themselves from 'the evils of communalism' because of the 'great
teachings of Islam'. The statement, however, has little basis in reality as is
indicated by the desecration of Hindu temples in retaliation for the demolition
of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in 1992. Zia's actions, nevertheless, implied
a reassertion of the distinct and separate identity of Bengali Muslims vis-a-vis
the Bengali Hindus. To this extent, he acknowledged once again the concept
of two-nations on which Pakistan had been founded and which had been
rejected through the war of liberation in 1971. The basic complexities in the
problem of culture and identity which existed during Pakistani rule thus
persisted in Bangladesh.
Zia-ur-Rahman came to power after a series of military coups: the first

of these had overthrown the civilian government of Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman.49 In his search for legitimacy, he failed to win over Mujib's
following or sympathisers of the ousted Awami League. He was therefore
compelled to seek allies elsewhere, for example, among the opponents of the
Awami League which included the extreme left and the extreme right,
neither of which had believed in Bangladesh.50 His primary motive was to
stabilise his rule rather than promote an Islamic upsurge, although this was
the long-term result of the strategies he adopted.
Compared to his predecessor, Zia resorted to policies explicitly aimed at

giving an Islamic gloss to the state. Hence, the Islamic University Act 1980
and Islamic Education and Research Act 1980 were enacted.51 Not only was
he seeking to maintain the allegiance of his new allies but he was also
expecting to obtain approval from the Arab bloc which, thus far, had little
48 Syed Anwar Hussain argues that Zia theoretically Islamized the constitution with this
amendment known as the Fifth Amendment. See S.A. Hussin, op. c i t . , p. 150.
49
There were seven coups in quick succession. These were both anti-Indian and pro-Indian;
some were led by officers, others by the rank and file; ideologically leftist and rightist, etc. For
a discussion of these military coups and the rise of the military in Bangladesh politics, see L.
Lifschultz, Bangladesh: the Unfinished Revolution (London, Zed Press, 1979), part II.
50 In April 1979, Shah Azizur Rahman was made Prime Minister of Bangladesh. He was a
member of the counter vernacular intelligentsia who resisted the movement to establish Bengali
as one of me state languages of Pakistan. See Eclipse of Secular Bangladesh. A Radical Asia
Publication (London, 1981), p. 17.
51
On his Islamisation policies, see Acts No. XXXI, XXXVII, A Collection of Acts and
Ordinances, 1980, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Bangladesh
(Dacca, 1980).
regard for the break-away state of Bangladesh because of its great sympathy
for Pakistan, but held the promise of economic support. In exchange for a
religious posture it would be possible to obtain Arab aid. Mujib before him
had been lured by similar considerations when attending the Islamic Summit
in 1974; but he was less successful than Zia because of his commitment to
secularism. Although the amount offered to Zia was not large in global
terms, it was politically advantageous for it signified a degree of acceptance
by the community of Islamic nations. Of particular interest to Bangladesh
were the following: import of crude oil at a concessionary rate, which was
not granted; and export of manpower to the Gulf states, which, though small
in comparison with that of India and Pakistan, was a lucrative source of
remittance.52
The Zia period ushered in a new ruling ideology determined primarily

by concerns for its own survival rather than any ideological convictions. The
new ideology was reflected in the usage of a new political and cultural
vocabulary aimed at a shift away from Bengali linguistic nationalism. The
slogan of Jai Bangla, linguistically of Bengali origin, was replaced by
Bangladesh Zindabad where Zindabad is of Urdu and Persian derivation.
Bangladesh Betar was relabelled Radio Bangladesh recalling the earlier
terminology of Radio Pakistan, and the Bengali language was given a new
name, Bangladeshi language, to emphasise a distinction from the language
used in West Bengal.53
Undoubtedly, the rise of the military in politics provoked a legitimacy
crisis. In its search for new support bases, the leadership adopted the measures
discussed above which may be described as policies of inclusion and
exclusion. Clearly, Islamists and the forces opposed to Bengali language and
the liberation of the Bengali people from the control of Pakistan were
included. Quite ironically, Zia, the freedom fighter excluded the major force
behind the liberation of the new nation, the Awami League, which was also
the champion of secularism and inclined favourably towards India. By the
same token he excluded Hindus and syncretists. Among the latter were people
from literary circles, musicians, artists, dancers and painters, people who
drew their inspiration from the common cultural heritage of Bengal.
52 The World Bank, Bangladesh Economic and Social Development Prospects, Report No. 5409,
1985, Vol. iv, p. 11; Bangladesh Bureau of statistics, Monthly Statistical Bulletin of
Bangladesh (Dhaka, 1991), p. 8. Also see S.A. Hussain, op. cit., pp. 144-49; and T.M.
Murshid, The Sacred and the Secular, p. 369.
53 Eclipse of Secular Bangladesh, p. 13. Maniruzzaman argues that Mujib himself had begun to
use a similar vocabulary based on religious connotations, such as 'Khuda Hafiz' and
'Inshallah' instead of 'Jai Bangla'. But in fact, he always used such language. His famous
speech of 7 Mar. 1971 at Suhrawardy Udyan, Dhaka, bears testimony to this.
18 SOUTH ASIA
Zia thus rejected Bengali nationalism without ever acknowledging the

implications of the switch for national politics and international relations.
Nationally, the formerly rejected right and left took his policies as signals
inviting them to re-enter the political scene and stake their claims. The move
was facilitated by the 1976 Political Parties Resolution which lifted the ban
on religion based politics. This was perhaps the most significant development
which contributed to the gradual rehabilitation of the Islamist parties, which
re-entered politics in 1979. At the international level, a deteriorating
relationship with India corresponded with growing overtures of friendship to
Pakistan. Pakistani industrialists like the Dawoods and the Ispahanis, who had
lost their factories in the former East Pakistan as a result of the war, were
invited back to run these and paid compensation. Military rule in Bangladesh
signalled a reversal in trends whereby the country was quietly headed towards
becoming Muslim Bangla.
The rise of the religious right

Although Zia's primary objective was to maintain himself in power,
effectively he laid the foundations for the rise of the Islamic right and the
forces favourable to closer ties with Pakistan. At the time, however, no one
suspected a potential threat to the forces of Bengali nationalism: the Bengali
nation was complacent in the belief about its integrity, and united in its
shared experience of Pakistani oppression in the name of religion. This
complacency was shattered in the 1990s when it appeared as if the Bengali
nationalists had lost the initiative while the Islamists were setting the political
agenda and determining its tempo. The forces of liberalism and rationalism
were caught unawares as those of totalitarianism and theocracy penetrated
influential positions of government and emerged with a blueprint plus an
armed cadre to enforce their vision of an Islamic state.
The question to ask is, how did the Islamists orchestrate such a
comeback? Ershad's succession to the Presidency, following the assassination
of Zia in 1981, signalled the end of the influence of freedom fighters in
politics and ushered in repatriated officers from Pakistan to the helm of
affairs. Ershad, a repatriated officer, was a usurper like Zia, but lacked the
legitimacy enjoyed by him as a freedom fighter. It has been argued that 'the
Islamic quantum of state orientation increased with decreasing legitimacy of
the ruling elite'.54 It was no wonder that he pursued Zia's Islamising policies
but with greater vigour. He too identified the Islamic right as a potential ally.
In order to woo them Ershad emphasised the Islamic character of the state,
led Friday prayers, made periodic attempts to control the norms of social
54 54 See S.A. Hussain, op. cit., p. 149.

behaviour, dress and manners, and more importantly, initiated policy changes
which replicated constitutional measures adopted in Pakistan. Through the
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, Islam was given the status of state
religion in 1988; even its wording was similar to the provision made for an
Islamic state in the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. No lessons had been learnt
from Bhutto's predicament in Pakistan, who gave the country its first Islamic
constitution in order to appease the orthodoxy, but was nevertheless ousted
and hanged by one of its members, a Jama'at supporter. Referring to General
Zia-ul-Huq in his statement before the Supreme Court, Bhutto said, 'I
appointed a Chief of Army, belonging to the Jama'at and the result is before
all of us'. 55 The moral of the tale, that the forces of religious extremism will
not be placated until they have control over political power, was lost to
Ershad. Eventually, the religious right including the Jama'at was party to his
fall from grace in 1990.
Ershad's strategies were controversial, particularly the Eighth

Amendment: it was deemed that his parliament had no authority to make such
changes. Women's groups contested it as an infringement on human rights;56
and secularists feared mat the country was sliding towards becoming an
Islamic state. The spectre of Pakistan stood clearly before them, where,
constitutional change under military rule had cleared the path for the
introduction of shariah laws in 1979. In Bangladesh, even the Jama'at-i-
Islami and the Muslim League protested on the grounds that it was a ploy to
prevent the establishment of an Islamic Republic based on the principles of
the Quran and sunnah (traditions of the Prophet). However, various other
Islamic organisations such as the Jamiat-i-Ulama, Jamiat-ul-Mudarresin, Sirat
Mission, as well as the Pir of Sarsina were pleased with the developments.57
Nevertheless, it may be argued that the Eighth Amendment was a major

gain for the Islamists in general, who now appeared closer towards realising
the Pakistan model. They were also making gains elsewhere. Their changing
influence in the sphere of education was manifest in the number of madrasahs
and recruitment of teachers and students (see Tables 1 and 2).While there has
generally been a steady increase in the number of madrasahs, student intake,
and in the expenditure for such education, periodically there were dramatic
fluctuations. Table 1 indicates that under the Mujib government, between
1972/73 and 1974/75, there was a slight decline in the total number of
55
Afzal Iqbal, Islamization in Pakistan (Lahore Vanguard, 1986), p. 106. In the years after
partition, the political leadership took no chances and kept Maududi at arms length. While
religious forces were allowed a social and educational role, they were barred from all political
roles until the fall of Ayub Khan. That policy was disregarded by subsequent rulers of
Pakistan.
56
Sangbad (Bengali Daily), Dhaka, 17 Apr. 1988.
57
Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, op. cit., p. 115-17.
20 SOUTH ASIA
madrasahs of all types accompanied by a small increase in student numbers,

although both had experienced better growth in 1973/74. This was a period
when Mujib was keen to allay fears that secularism did not mean irreligiosity.
Steady growth continued under Zia, although more rapidly for student intake.
For example, in the case of government and affiliated madrasahs, secondary
level and above, the numbers increased from 1,976 in 1977/78 to 2,259 in
1978/79 for institutions and from 375,200 to 543,579 for student enrolment
during the same period.58 However, Table 2 below demonstrates a drop
again in enrolment by 1981/82 indicating either an ambivalence, or perhaps
some uncertainty about the future of madrasah education. A very different
picture emerges during the period of Ershad's rule between 1981 and 1990:
as Table 2 shows, there was more than a hundred fold increase in the number
of government and affiliated madrasahs and nearly three hundred per cent
increase in the number of staff and enrolment of students. Increased
allocation from the education budget and direct financial assistance to these
institutions from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and Pakistan have contributed
to these developments.59 The curriculum of these institutions, kept secret
until recently, contain a distorted history of the liberation of Bangladesh.60
The graduates of these institutions along with those of the newly established
Islamic universities, the first of which opened in 1985, began to receive
specialized training and enter the professions. They have become doctors,
lawyers, engineers, theologians of seminaries, imams of mosques, teachers of
educational establishments and directors of Islamic missions and foundations.
Inevitably, Bangladesh witnessed the emergence of two nations once again.
58
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Statistical Pocket Book of Bangladesh,
1979 (Government of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Secretariat, Dacca, 1979), table 8.16, p. 424.
59
S.A. Hussain, op. cit., pp. 144-50.
60
Interview with Dr. Kamal Hossain, Oxford, 27 Aug. 1994.
Table 1: Student enrolment in madrasahs (1970/71 to 1975/76)
Year Number of Number of Students

Madrasahs +
1970/71 6,260 716,202

1972/73 6,565 739,163
1973/74 6,807 844,479
1974/75 + 6,471 756,235
1975/76 ++ 7,971 808,000
+ Includes all types of madrasahs: reformed, old scheme

senior and junior, recognised and unrecognised.
++ Includes forquania madrasahs as well.
Sources: Statistical Digest of Bangladesh, no. 8 (1972),

table, 13.1, pp. 252-3; Statistical Year Book of
Bangladesh
(SYB) (1975), table 7.1, p. 177; SYB (1978), pp. 252-3.
Table 2: Students and teachers in government and affiliated madrasahs

(1977/78 to 1991/92)
Year Number of Number of Number of

Madrasahs +++ Students Teachers
1977/78 1,976 375,200 21,579

1981/82 2,864 388,000 29,608
1990/91 5,959 1.028,000 83,761
1991/92 6,025 1.735,000 94,961
+++ From secondary level and above - government and

affiliated only
Sources: Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocketbook of

Bangladesh, various issues, based on information
obtained from the Madrasah Board.
Another significant gain made by the Jama'at and its supporters occurred
in 1991. During the elections none of the major parties achieved an absolute
22 SOUTH ASIA
majority: the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) emerged as the majority

party with one hundred and forty seats; the Awami League led eight party-
alliance trailed behind with one hundred. The Jatiya Party of Ershad won
thirty-five seats, while the Jama'at-i-Islami, polling a similar proportion of
votes, secured eighteen seats.61 Unable to form a government with an
alliance with the deposed Ershad's Jatiya Party, or with the Awami league
whose ideological position was diametrically opposed to their own, the BNP
achieved a majority in parliament with the support of the Jama'at. Thus, for
the first time in the history of the new state the Jama'at gained a direct and
influential role in government, whereby it could determine some key cabinet
appointments: there is widespread speculation with some justification that
these are Home, Information and Education.62
The alliance was a recognition of the Jama'at's rehabilitation at the state

level. However, the matter was far from resolved in the streets. The secular
forces represented by the literary-intellectual circles, musicians, dramatists,
writers, and bereaved families of martyred freedom fighters, - who were
perhaps neutralized by the fear of being crushed by military rule, were jolted
into action under the freedom and tolerance permitted in the relatively
democratic atmosphere of the post-election phase. Their concern was to
counter the influence of the religious right and keep alive the threatened
memory of the liberation war: of this there was ample evidence, such as the
omission from school text books and state controlled television of the name
of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of the nation.63 In particular, the
selection of Goolma Azam, as the amir of the Jama'at-i-Islami provoked a
massive protest organised by the newly established Ekatturer Ghatok Dalai
Nirmul Committee (Committee for the Elimination of the Killers and
Collaborators of 1971) which demanded his trial for war crimes. It was
widely believed that Goolma Azam aided and abetted Pakistan's war effort in
Bangladesh, and was guilty of incitement to murder intellectuals in 1971.
With the defeat of the Pakistan army he escaped to Pakistan. Subsequently, in
1973, he lost the right to Bangladeshi nationality. In 1978, he was allowed to
return from exile by Zia. As a Pakistani citizen, he carried on advising the
Jama'at from behind the scenes until the nineties when he was emboldened by
electoral gains to seek a higher public profile. His election as amir was a
highly provocative act: it was a contravention of Article 38 of the
61
BAMNA ( Bangladesh Mukto Nirbachan Andolan) (ed.), A Report on the Elections to the
Fifth National Parliament, 27 February 1991 (Dhaka, BAMNA, 1991), pp. 62-3. The Jama'at
had obtained 12 per cent of the votes caste.
62
BNP officials admit that the Home Minister was a Jama'at sympathizer and that in return for
Jama'at support, it was offered two of the 30 reserved women's seats. Interview with Dr
Moeen Khan, Minister of State for Planning, 5 Jan. 1995, Dhaka.
63
Interview with Syed Hassan Imam, Secretary to the Nirmul Committee, London, 25 Aug.
1994.
Constitution, as well as a painful and humiliating experience for those who

lost their loved ones in the war.64
A movement was spearheaded by the founder president of the Nirmul
Committee, a retired school teacher and writer, a woman called Jahanara
Imam, who had lost her son in the liberation war.6S It achieved a wide
following among otherwise non-political people and eventually drew the
support of the Awami League which was attracted by the large following
generated by the movement. The BNP government was reluctant to
investigate the charges: not only was it dependent on Jama'at support to
establish its rule, but also it had been committed to pursue Zia's policies
which had countenanced such linkages. The organisers were intimidated in
various ways: some including Jahanara Imam, were manhandled by the

police; they were refused permission by the administration to hold rallies and
observe the Bengali New Year in the agreed venue. Frustrated, they
eventually set up a gana adalat, or people's court, which was convened on 26
March 1992. This court found him guilty as charged and recommended the
death penalty; it demanded that the state take steps to mete out justice to the
people of Bangladesh.66 The state, however, declared this court
unconstitutional, arguing that the law of the land should follow its course.
Goolma had already been taken into protective custody on 24 March; and
warrants were issued for the arrest of twenty-four eminent citizens involved
with the gana adalat, although on 29 June, the cases against them were
dropped. Subsequently, a trial was staged to determine the citizenship status
of Goolma Azam, to examine whether there was a constitutional bar to his
election as amir. If the aim was to divert attention from the war crimes issue,
the ploy was unsuccessful. However, the administration did gain time to
formulate a response. In April 1993, the High Court declared his previous
loss of citizenship under the Mujib government to have been unconstitutional;
he was deemed a citizen by birth under Article 2 of the President's Order
Number 149 of 1972. The court therefore concluded that his election as amir
did not contravene the Constitution, but, it made no comment on Golam's
failure to apply for citizenship of Bangladesh before the onset of this
controversy.67 The subject of trial for war crimes under a special tribunal was
totally fudged.
64
Eastern Eye, London, No. 124, 28 Apr. 1992; Surma (Bengali Weekly), London, 17-23 Apr.
1992.
65
At the same time, a counter movement was launched, Bangladeshi Chetona Bikash Kendra,
which sought to 'eliminate' the Nirmul Committee. Members took its motto literally and began
a campaign of terror directed at individual members of the Nirmul Committee, blasting bombs
at their homes, etc.
66
Bangladesh Observer, 27 Mar. 1992
67
Bangladesh Observer, 23 Apr. 1993; also see T.M. Murshid, 'Democracy in Bangladesh:
illusion or reality' Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 4, no.2 (1995) p. 207.
24 SOUTH ASIA
Secular-rationalists challenged
This outcome gave the Jama'at a new lease of life. In the next few months it
pursued strategies to determine the national political agenda and maintain the
initiative. It began a violent counter-offensive against the forces of
secularism, rationalism and humanism: the process had already been
underway since the Nirmul Committee had begun its movement. The
objective now was to divert attention away from Goolma Azam and increase
the momentum of their campaign for the establishment of an Islamic state
based on shariah laws. The feminist writer Taslima Nasreen offered them a
timely pretext. As a lone woman perceived to have stepped out of acceptable
social bounds she was an easy prey. Her anger and frustration in a society
which sanctioned injustices against women in the name of religion and her
attempt at a rational approach to Quranic liturgy provided fodder to her
persecutors. A barrage of propaganda was directed at her from the pulpit and
in public platforms. Taslima was accused of subverting the cultural and
religious values of society and hence was depicted as a traitor to the state and
religion, rashtradrohi and dharmadrohi. A process of psychological
manipulation of the popular psyche was carefully orchestrated. Extracts from
her works were presented out of context to portray her as one who insults
Islam, hates men and is a woman of loose moral standards. In one leaflet, she
is charged with accusing God to be a liar, of making fun of the Day of
Judgement, of going against the dictates of religion by insinuating that the
birth of a son or daughter has nothing to do with God's will but is determined
by chromosomes.68
Taslima advocates the freedom of women to determine the size of their

families, which she provocatively describes as the 'freedom of the womb',
jarayur swadhinata. In the campaign of calumny against her she is accused of
campaigning for free sex, a charge she vehemently refutes.69 Quotations from
her book, Lajja, have been bandied about to prove that she deems Muslims to
be unworthy of trust and the state to be communal and discriminatory to
religious minorities.70 This is a misreading of her essential message: Taslima,
the social critic is shaming her country for failing its minorities and
challenging it to show some understanding and magnanimity. Lajja depicts
the insecurity of a Hindu family in Bangladesh caught in the reprisals against
Hindus in retaliation for the destruction of the sixteenth century Babri
Mosque in Ayodhya by Hindu extremists in 1992. The moral of her tale
applies to minorities everywhere: they can not assimilate into the majority
68
Leaflet, Dharmadrohi o deshdrohi nastikder rukhe darao, 26 June 1994 (Dhaka, Oitijhya
Sangsad).
69
Taslima Nasreen, Nashta Meyer, Nashta Gadya (Dhaka, 1992, 1993), pp. 60-1.
70
Leaflet, Dharmadrohi, pp. 4-7. Taslima Nasreen, Lajja (Calcutta, Ananda, 1993), p. 31.
community however hard they try; an invisible line demarcates them even if
there is no obvious visible distinction; it clearly follows that a minority
cannot survive without the help of the majority. Taslima shames a nation for
betraying itself - for she believes Hindus and Muslims to be one nation - and
challenges it to confront some unpalatable truth about itself.
Her harshest critiques were levelled against pirs, mullahs and razakaars.
In her columns she noted that the Pir of Pabna abused girls, the Pir of
Shimulia had many wives, the Pir of Sarsina opposed Bangladesh in the war
of Liberation, most pirs such as the Pir of Sarsina engaged in politics, and the
Pir of Atroshi was reputed to make or break ministers. Then comes her
scathing attack: 'The image of a pir is no longer that of a good and pure
Muslim - pirs mean evil, worthless and tremendously lustful men'. 71 It is
thus no wonder that these men of religion wanted her dead.
The Jama'at and its various front organisations took full advantage of
the fact that Taslima's provocative message, language and style had alienated
large segments of Bengali society. Women accused her of 'derailing the
feminist movement'.72 Politicians held her responsible for the bad press
Bangladesh was receiving abroad. Religious bigots insinuated that she was
pandering to the West, India and the religious rightwing party, the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP). Intellectuals implied that she was after cheap publicity.
Literary competitors considered her work shallow. Others envied her success,
while most men were annoyed at her audacity: in one of her poems, 'Dour
dour', she advises women to flee from men, for they carried syphilis, in the
same way that one ran away from dogs which had rabies.73 Taslima was all
too painfully aware that she had no champion, as she says in one of her
columns: 'Like a dot I am alone in this universe'.
Even the expected did not happen. The Awami League, which was the
proponent of a secular democratic state gave her no backing, not even when
fatwas were thrice declared by mullahs for her death on the ground that she
had insulted Islam.74 Taslima's outspokenness had rendered her a political
liability. In addition, the Awami League was loathe to jeopardise its
undeclared alliance with the Jama'at.75 These opposition parties were engaged
in a struggle to force the BNP government to amend the constitution in order
71
Taslima Nasreen, Nirbachita Column (Dhaka, Vidyaprakash, 1991, 1992) pp. 27-8. All
translations of extracts are by the author.
72
View of Mahila Parishad and various other women's organisations.
73
Taslima Nasreen, 'Dour, dour' in her Nirbachita Kabita (Calcutta, Ananda, 1993), p. 12.
74
Fatwas were given in Sylhet in Oct. 1993 and twice in June 1994 in Bogra and Khulna,
Bangladesh. In Sylhet a price of Tk. 50,000 (approximately US $ 1,500) was put on her head.
75
Barrister Sarah Hossain, interviewed for 'Newsnight', BBC 2, London, 4 Aug. 1994.
26 SOUTH ASIA
to make provisions for the establishment of a caretaker government, which

would then be entrusted to conduct future elections in a free and fair manner.
The BNP government too was hostile. The protection which she had
secured only after a court injunction was obtained after the first fatwa, was
suddenly withdrawn, a striking contrast to the protective custody offered to
Goolma Azam. Then on the 4 June, the Home Ministry obtained a warrant
for her arrest on the grounds of hurting the feelings of Muslims, but it took
no action against those who violated the law through incitement to murder.
This act was not only a sharp contrast to its handling of the People's Court,
but also placed the government on one side of the argument. A sharp outcry
ensued from foreign governments, where there were strong movements in

favour of women's rights and freedom of expression, including some
countries of the European Union - Sweden, Norway - and the United States.
Some of these countries threatened to withdraw aid, while others thought it
prudent to negotiate.76
Nationally, however, the state had played into the hands of mullahs.
Interpreting government and opposition roles as tacit support for their stand,
they contemplated victory and intensified their campaign for Islamic rule at
various fronts. There were demands for the introduction of blasphemy laws as
in Pakistan, the execution of all atheists and apostates (nastik and murtad), a
ban on all publications by such people, Ahmadiyas to be declared non-
Muslims etc. These were accompanied by massive demonstrations, meetings
and the setting up of organizations such as the Sanmilita Sangram Parishad
and branch committees with names such as Student Soldiers of Islam or
Islami Chhatra Sena to spread the message into villages.77 Through the
repeated publication of misinformation and unproven accusations the
psychological manipulation of a large segment of the population was effected.
Taslima was even condemned by those who had not read her work. A mass
hysteria was effectively created. Taslima had been transformed into a monster
in the popular imagination and many were prepared to destroy that monster.78
The immediate background to this hysteria was a much publicised

interview in The Statesman, Calcutta on 9 May 1994. In it Taslima is quoted
to have advocated a revision of the Quran. Her disclaimer to the effect that
she referred only to shariah laws fell on deaf ears. The propaganda leaflets
76
The office bearers of the international Penn Club for writers induced the Swedish government
to negotiate with the government of Bangladesh to allow her safe passage out of the country.
Discussion with Prof. K. S. Murshid, who was involved in the negotiations, Sept. 1994.
77
Inquilab, Dhaka, 12. Aug. 1994.
78
Interview with her defense lawyer, Dr Kamal Hossain, Oxford, 27 Aug. 1994.
repeatedly quoted fragments of the Statesman interview but not her denial,
while the Statesman stood by its story.
The government action provoked a crisis for Taslima: faced with
imminent danger she went into hiding.79 She re-emerged two months later on
the 4 August once she was assured safe passage and bail at a higher court,
where she was more likely to obtain a fair hearing than at a lower court.80
Barrister Kamal Hossain defended her with the opening statement: 'We have
come to test whether the country has a constitution'; he was assured that it
The controversy surrounding Taslima Nasreen makes some sense if it is

seen in the context of a struggle between the forces of religious extremism

and secular liberalism, which are both vying for the hearts and minds of the
people in Bangladesh. These forces are engaged in symbol manipulation to
secure the social and political order they desire. The main difference
however, is that the former is well organised, armed and carrying out a well
thought out plan of action much of which had already been tried out in
Pakistan.82 The latter is disorganised, unarmed and believe, perhaps
complacently, that Bengalis will not turn into religious fanatics.
But Taslima is only one of the many victims of the vengeance of

fanatical forces. She survived because of the publicity, the foreign interest
and the support of a few who rose to defend the rule of law. Others were less
fortunate: the recent events in Bangladesh include the instance of one woman
who was stoned to death for alleged adultery whereas, in fact, the lustful gaze
of a mullah had fallen on her. Another woman was forced to commit suicide
79 Taslima went into hiding for she could not even present herself at court in safety. She emerged
from hiding on 4 Aug. 1994 after assurances and armed protection was secured through the
intervention of her lawyers.
80 As in Pakistan, lower courts tended to be manned by conservative people, often influenced by
Jama'at ideology, and hence less sympathetic to women believed to be transgressors.
81 Interview with her defence lawyer Dr. Kamal Hossain, Oxford, 27 Aug. 1994.
82 Jama'at activism in Pakistan had followed a similar pattern: infiltration into the army,
bureaucracy, lower echelons of the judiciary; implementation of shariah courts; campaigning
for blasphemy laws and declaration of Qadianis as non-Muslims. Some believe that the
Jama'at-Shibir Jubo Command have training camps in the border areas of northeast
Bangladesh. Kamal Hossain, who was the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh until 1975 and
founder of the Gano Forum, a break-away party from the Awami League, said in an interview,
that he had requested the Home Ministry to set up a Committee to investigate this, but to no
avail. Also see Leaflet, Elimination Committee, Dhaka, 6 June 1992. There is also ample
newspaper coverage of the clandestine trafficking in arms in which members of the Jama'at
have been involved. Newspapers have also covered campus violence in Rajshahi, Chittagong,
Dhaka and elsewhere extensively where the Shibir has been more successful in inflicting
severe casualties on their opponents. See Bangladesh Observer, 7 Feb., 12 May 1993;
Sangbad, various issues, Mar. 1991, Dec. 1992, 12 Aug. 1994, p. 6.
28 SOUTH ASIA
to evade the shame of alleged zina crimes. Several intellectuals and writers
like the poet Shamsur Rahman and the scholar Ahmad Sharif also face death
threats because they subscribe to secular, rationalist, non-communal and
democratic values. But they have been spared the same degree of witch-
hunting as Taslima, although they too have had to go into hiding
periodically.83 Religious extremists have described them as deshdrohi,
rashtradrohi and dharmadrohi, traitors to the nation, state and religion.84
A series of such provocative actions have virtually led to the
establishment of a parallel structure of authority in remote areas far from the
reaches of officialdom. Various front organizations of the Jama'at supported
by their own armed cadre have begun to impart Islamic justice. They derive
their authority from the fatwas given by local mullahs and not from any
court. Not only have thieves lost their limbs and adulterers been stoned, but
opposition newspapers have lost access to various distributors and their
clients.85 Women have been targeted for the most vicious attacks.86 Many
rural women have been divorced by fatwa for practicing birth control. Such a
situation is novel in the history of the region. Women are also losing their
marital status for taking bank loans for their small businesses. It is being
argued that economic independence for women is undesirable because it can
give them a status superior to men, which was not part of God's plan.87 Here,
economic competition under conditions of unemployment and poverty cannot
be ruled out as a more mundane explanation. Incidentally, the Jama'at itself
has set up Islamic banking and loan-giving facilities. Non government
organizations like BRAC and their workers have been attacked by madrasah
students for allegedly spreading Christianity. BRAC schools for girls have
been burnt in protest against westernised female education. Here coercion is a
method of neutralising the sources of alternative ideologies. Various women's
groups and legal bodies have gathered evidence and successfully convicted
some of the fatwabaj mullahs.™ But the trend persists unabated while the
police find themselves inadequately armed to face the challenge.89
83
Recounted by a close friend and associate of Shamsur Rahman, Prof K. S. Murshid, Sept.
1994, London.
84
Leaflet, Dharmadrahi.
85
An editor of a Bengali weekly thus adversely affected was Shafiq Rahman. See Anis Alamgir,
'Shafiq Rahman Ebong Bichar', Janomat (Bengali weekly), 1-7 July 1994.
86
Ain-O-Shalish Kendra, 'Threats of Violence and Violation of Human Rights by Imams of
Mosques and the Religious Right in Bangladesh', a collection of cases compiled for the period
1992-94 (unpublished, Dhaka, 1994).
87
Inquilab, 12, 19 Aug. 1994.
88
Ain-o-Shalish Kendra, "Threats of violence and violations of human rights by imams of
mosques and the religious right in Bangladesh'.
89
In Chittagong, the police confessed their inability to control the Shibir- Yuva Command
because their own weapons were inferior. There was evidence to suggest that arms were
The strategy of the religious right has been to pursue all means at its
disposal, both constitutional and unconstitutional, to achieve its goal of
establishing an Islamic state, whether it be through persuasion, intimidation
or coercion. One of the constitutional methods resorted to has relied on its
successful infiltration into the lower courts in small towns like Rangpur and
Maulavibazaar. Its modus operandi followed a particular pattern which took
advantage of the existing legal system. First, a mullah decreed a fatwa.
Subsequently, one of the faithful filed a case in a lower court where the
magistrate was a sympathiser or supporter of the Jama'at-Shibir. The
magistrate immediately issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused without
hearing his defence. Such warrants were issued against the editors of
Janakantha, Bhorer Kagaj, Ajker Kagaj and Jai Din who were accused of
hurting the sentiments of Muslims.90 For example, an issue of Jai Din

contained a cartoon involving the letter alif of the Arabic alphabet. The editor
was compelled to obtain bail from three different courts for the same
offence.91 Such persistent harassment is calculated to achieve conformity if
not consensus.
These developments have been accompanied by provocative statements

by some members of the religious right in key positions which raise serious
questions about their commitment to democracy and the nature of the state,
nation and religion envisaged. The Pir of Charmonai declared at a meeting on
29 July 1994 that 'all non-fundamentalists were of illegitimate birth'. At the
same meeting, the khatib (head) of the Baitul Mukarram Mosque, Maulana
Ubaidul Huq stated that Pakistan was divided in 1971 as a result of the
gaddari, 'treachery, of certain western educated individuals' who were
currently involved in similarly deceiving the people.92 Later, in an interview
on 4 August, he announced that 'the state should be run by a fatwa committee
consisting of the ulama'', thus voicing the thoughts of Maududi for which
Ayub Khan kept him behind bars for many years.93 The statements provoked
an outraged protest from teachers, students, freedom fighters, political groups
and a large section of the ulama numbering two hundred and twenty-seven.
This indicates that there were divisions in the ranks of the ulama on the
interpretation of history and on state policy. The khatib lost his lucrative job
and a case was filed against him and the pir on the grounds of hurting the
coming to specific Shibir members from Pakistan by post among other means. See Dainik
Sangbad, Dhaka, Friday, 12 Aug. 1994, p. 6.
90
Anis Alamgir, 'Shafiq Rahman Ebong Bichaar', Janomat, 1-7 July 1994, p. 22. Apart from the
editor of Janakantha, the others were released on bail.
91
Comment of the Co-editor, Taleya Rahman, Saturday, London, 17 Aug. 1994.
92
Janomot, London, 19-25 Aug. 1994; Saptahik Bichitra, Dhaka, Year 23, No. 12, Friday 12
Aug. 1994, p. 27.
93
Saptahik Bichitra, ibid., pp. 27-33.
30 SOUTH ASIA
religious sentiments of crores of Muslims. Unconfirmed reports have since

been received of his reinstatement. However, such measures put a check on
their activism albeit temporarily.
It would be pertinent to assess the strengths of the Jama'at for these
contributed to its increasing assertiveness. An important source of strength for
the Jama'at-i-Islami has been its ability to forge alliances with various groups
depending on the issues. It built strategic links with the BNP and the Awami
League, thus neutralising them sufficiently to lever open greater political
space for itself. It was thus in a position to pursue its own political agenda
more openly and contribute to a shift in the national discourse to the right. It
also established a broad front with various parties and organizations which
had similar objectives, i.e. the establishment of an Islamic state based on

shariah laws. It successfully brought the Wahabis within its fold and
developed a modus operandi with the Nizam-e-Islam, Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-i-
Islam and Freedom Party and other like-minded bodies. Politically, however,
the Jama'at remained the most powerful of the Islamist groups, as is evident
from the 1991 election results.
This may be attributed to some extent to its methods of mobilisation

which have been most successful among the lower middle classes. It followed
a strict method of recruitment based on a lengthy initiation process common
to the style of communist parties. To maximise gains it worked at various
levels, not entirely unlike other parties: it had youth and student organisations
such as the Islami Chhatra Shibir which tended to be militant aiming to gain
control over university campuses.94 There were women's branches whose
members made door to door contact with sympathisers. Unlike other parties,
however, it set up trust funds to support charitable causes such as schools,
clinics and hospitals; and opened Islamic banks aimed to support income
generating activities.95
Notably, Jama'at membership and resources received a boost over recent

years despite the setback in the immediate post-liberation period. Based on
interviews with unidentified important party members U.A.B. Razia Akter,
Banu states that between 1981 and 1987 full membership of the Jama'at rose
from six hundred and fifty to two thousand, while associate membership rose
from one hundred thousand to two million. In December 1986, the Islamic
94 94 Politicians tend to regard the control of university campus student politics to be indicative of
political strength nationally. As a result, the extent of campus violence has multiplied in the
nineties tremendously. As against 7 deaths a year in the eighties there were about 25 such cases
annually in the nineties. Ganoforum, Eto Laash Rakhbo Kothai? (Dhaka, 1994), p. 30.
95 95 For a further discussion of the Jama'at's ideology, programme and method of recruitment see,
U. A. B. Razia Akter Banu, 'Jama'at-i-Islami in Bangladesh: Challenges and Prospects', in
Mutalib and Hashmi (eds), op. cit., pp. 83-94.
Chhatra Shibir, its primary source of recruitment, had three hundred full
members, six thousand associate members and forty thousand workers,
whereas these were two hundred and twenty-six, two thousand, and fifteen
thousand respectively in 1980. The Jama'at has established sixty-two trusts,
of which twelve were based in Dhaka; and it has founded two hundred private
schools in Dhaka and outlying areas.96 The Jama'at admit to receiving
indirect assistance from Saudi Arabia although others have charged it with
receiving direct monetary assistance. In May 1984 Goolma Azam was
apparently sent a cheque for US dollars three hundred and twenty-seven
thousand from Saudi Arabia which went astray in the mail.97
The Jama'at has certainly demonstrated both its capacity for survival and
its potential as a serious political contender. However, its harsh methods of

dealing with opponents upholding alternative ideologies do give rise to
profound misgivings. In the long run, such political style is likely to limit its
wider appeal. Although a full assessment is beyond the scope of this paper,
notably, in the June 1996 elections, the Jama'at won only three out of three
hundred seats and approximately 8.7 per cent of the votes caste, compared to
12.1 per cent in 1991.98 The Awami League became the majority party after
twenty-three years in opposition, winning one hundred and forty-six seats
with 37.5 per cent of the votes polled, gaining 3.8 per cent more votes than in
the previous elections contested. The BNP got one hundred and sixteen seats
with 33.4 per cent of the votes, an increase of 2.6 per cent. The Jatiya Party
made the most significant gains winning sixteen per cent of the votes cast,
four per cent more than before, although this translated into thirty-one seats
only. The remaining four seats were won by independents and smaller parties:
these were among the seventy-seven other parties which together polled the
remaining 4.4 per cent of the votes.99 The balance of power has thus shifted
from the Jama'at to the JP which has pledged its support to the AL. The
Jama'at lost much of its support base to the BNP in some areas such as
Rajshahi and Chittagong. The high rate of female participation could not have
favoured the Jama'at because of its opposition to the economic emancipation
of women and atrocities committed against women in the name of religion as
96
Ibid., pp. 86, 89, 94.
97
See Bichitra (Bengali weekly), Dhaka, 1 June 1984; also see Syed Anwar Hussain, op. cit.,
p. 146.
98
Bharer Kagaj, 14 June 1996, p. 1.
99
Re-elections were held in 27 constituencies on the 19 June because of violence in 123 of the
60,000 polling centres. A high voter turn-out of 73.61 per cent with a high representation of
women went in favour of the primarily rural based AL. 'News', BBC World Service
Television, 13-15, 20 June 1996; Bharer Kagaj, 14, 20-21 June 1996; Sangbad, 14 June 1996.
According to The Daily Star, voter turn-out was 73.19 per cent, 14 June 1991, p. 1.
32 SOUTH ASIA
cited above.100 Despite the setback, the party is likely to continue to play an
important role because of the changed political climate: the ideological shift
to the right, the pledge by the majority party to pursue a policy of national
reconciliation and run the country on the basis of a national consensus.101
Conclusion: Implications for democracy and the role of the state

The paper raises serious questions about the future of a pluralist secular
liberal democracy under conditions where the relative autonomy of the state
is week. A democratic system is essential for a country that has religious,
ethnic and ideological diversity which must be accommodated if fratricidal
tendencies and ethno-religious conflicts are to be avoided. Clearly, the state

can play a role in containing the forces of ideological conflict and in restoring
a semblance of order in civil society. The history of Bangladesh shows that in
the interest of legitimacy the state has been instrumental in defining
ideologies, identities, states and nations, and that it can enforce the rule of
law if it sees fit. Essentially, whatever its ideological predisposition, a state
must guarantee minimum human rights: to life, to property and to
persuasion; challenge public violations of the legal system, including the
authority of fatwas; and contain all forms of violence. It must recognize
diversity, help build a non-communal, democratic ethos and propagate the
values of civil society.
These have been difficult tasks for the outgoing BNP government not
only because of the frequent crises besetting it, but also because its relative
autonomy to carry them out has been weakened by its centrist appeal.102 As
the ruling party does not represent any ideological monolith, its options for
manoeuvre are limited. Its support comes from both the right and the left:
Islamists and secularists, pro-liberation and anti-liberation forces, Bangladeshi
nationalists who are anti-Indian but not pro-Pakistani, and those who are pro-
Pakistani, those for whom the language martyrs day is meaningful and those
for whom it is not. Naturally, these various opinions were reflected in key
100
The election Commission has not given an exact figure yet, but both national and international
observers of the election comment on this as remarkable. See The Daily Star, Dhaka, Friday,
14 June 1996, p. 1
101
The Daily Star, 14 June 1996, p. 12.
102
Following the Magura by-elections of 1992 when the Awami League lost a safe seat to the
ruling party attributed to unfair practices, a lengthy political and constitutional crisis ensued
resolved by the formation of a caretaker government in Mar. 1996 and elections in June. It
included a lengthy boycott of Parliament followed by the mass resignation of all opposition
Members on 28 Dec. 1994 in an attempt to force a constitutional amendment for the provision
of caretaker governments empowered to conduct elections, thus enabling a smooth transfer of
power. The opposition boycotted the elections held in Feb. 1996 because this demand was not
met In the meantime, the administrative machinery of the country collapsed.
official appointments. As already mentioned, some of these have been

particularly controversial. The Ministers of Information, Home and
Education, Najmul Huda, Abdul Matin Chowdhury and Zamiruddin, have
been identified as belonging to a strong pro-Pakistan lobby. The manipulation
of history in school text books and the unchecked rampage by gun-toting
members of the Jama'at-Shibir have been attributed to these appointments.103
Significantly, the Home Ministry conducted no public investigation into the
armed attacks on the BNP student wing in Chittagong where they protested
alongside other student groups when Golam Azam held a mass rally.104 State
inaction under the circumstances indicate a collapse in governance.
The state of Bangladesh is caught in an ideology trap. While secularists
accused the BNP government of pandering to the Jama'at, the Jama'at

charged the BNP government with not doing enough for Islam. However, in
the interest of gaining access to power within a democratic system, political
parties have entered into alliances which obfuscate their ideological
differences to some extent. The Awami League has worked closely with some
of its ideological foes on some issues. It has campaigned with the Jama'at and
Jatiya Party on the caretaker government issue and has been offered JP
support after the June 1996 elections.105 However, there can be no room for
complacency. The Jatiya Party had allowed privileges to the assassins of the
first head of state whereby Dalim was allowed to continue as a diplomat,
while Farouk and Rashid were allowed to engage in party politics through the
Freedom Party. The Jama'at believed in a religious order, had collaborated
with the Pakistan army and killed Bengali intellectuals. Unlike other parties,
the religious right have a very clear objective - the methods of achieving
which have been tried and tested in Pakistan - the establishment of an Islamic
state based on their interpretation of shariah laws. If successful, it could lead
to the emergence of a one-party theocratic state wherein all power would be
vested in the men of religion and not in any representative body. If
103
The Information Minister was charged in the press with spreading disinformation by
attempting to rewrite the history of the liberation of Bangladesh which denied the contributions
of Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League while building up the image of the Jama'at-i-Islami as
patriots, see Janomot, 19-25 Aug. 1994; Khabarer Kagaj, 28 June 1994; Yasif Akbar,
'Shiksha Pratisthane Santras: rajnitite ashani sanket', Purnima, Yr. 7, No. 6, 29 Sept. 1993, p.
23; view of Syed Hasan Imam, Secretary, Nirmul Committee, London, 25 Aug. 1994;
interview with Dr. Kamal Hossain, op. cit.
104
Sangbad, 12 Aug. 1994, p. 6. Sangbad correspondent, Bangsi Saha attributes the failure of
Chowdhury to win a seat in the 1996 elections to his inability to contain violence. See
Sangbad, 14 June 1996, p. 12.
105 JP chairman Mizan Chowdhury offered to support the party which would help obtain Ershad's
release from prison, see Dainik Sangram, 14 June 1996; Dainik Inquilab, 14 June 1996;
Sangbad, 14 June 1996. However, it joined the incumbent AL government led by Sheikh
Hasina Wajed, daughter of the late Sheikh Mujib, without any such public assurances, 'News',
BBC World, Satellite Television, Mon. 24 June 1996.
34 SOUTH ASIA
Maududi's dictum were followed to the letter, and some do aspire to it, then
general elections would be dispensed with. This would pose a threat to the
democratic aspirations of the majority, endanger minority rights and render
the state irrelevant to the needs of the people.106
Therefore, what is needed is a vigilant state that can rise above
ideological differences, create alternative national interests based for example
on economic considerations, accommodate pluralistic structures, and generate
a climate where democracy would have a chance to mature. Such a state
cannot afford to pamper the forces of coercion, communalism or sectarian
conflict. But there are only a limited number of options available to the state
if it is to achieve these objectives. It can choose to exclude communal and
fascist parties from the political process by banning them through

constitutional measures as Mujib did after liberation, forcing these
underground, eventually risking a backlash. It can render such bodies
ineffective by delineating the terms of reference within which these may
operate, such as prohibiting the use of religion in politics, which too was once
constitutionally guaranteed in 1972 but reversed under Zia. It can offer
alternative ideologies and value structures based on humanist thought in order
to maintain a climate favourable to democratic dialogue. It can enforce the
existing laws of the land to ensure that fundamental human rights are not
violated. But such measures may be possible only if the power 61ite itself is
not compromised. Herein lies the problem with the state of Bangladesh which
was threatened with becoming irrelevant as the country became increasingly
ungovernable. The state was unable to mediate between the various 'demand
groups' in the street and outside, because the interests of the ruling elite were
identified with specific segments of society and its actions were yet to rise
above partisan interests.107 However, given the massive poverty and economic
hardship facing the country, the state could attempt to separate the ideological
from the economic problems, and steer the country towards resolving the
latter issues. This could help reformulate a national agenda based on an
understanding of the general good. It would be one way of re-establishing the
relative autonomy of the state so that it could mediate impartially between the
various interest and demand groups.
106 For a discussion of the idea of the irrelevant state see Julius O. Ihonvbere, 'The irrelevant state,
ethnicity, and the quest for nationhood in Africa', Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 17, no. 1
(Jan. 1994), pp. 44-50.
107
The term 'demand groups' has been coined by the Rudolphs in Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph,
In Pursuit of Lakshmi: the Political Economy of the Indian State (Chicago, 1987), pp. 15, 247,
252. For discussion of the term also see TJ. Byres, 'A Chicago view of the Indian state: an
Oriental grin without an Oriental cat and political economy without classes', The Journal of
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1988), pp. 257-8.

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This article was downloaded by: [Stony Brook University]

On: 25 October 2014, At: 12:50

South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies

State, nation, identity: The quest for legitimacy in

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00856409708723294

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STATE, NATION, IDENTITY: THE QUEST

HE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO DEMONSTRATE THE CONTEXTUAL NATURE OF

T the formation of states, nations and identities, by examining the case of

Andersen, Hobsbawm and Ranger, contest this position in favour of an

The experience of Bangladesh bears out the arguments of Brass, Eller

focussed on differences regarding the war of liberation of Bangladesh and the

Religion has periodically played a dominant role in shaping the nature of

common cultural roots of the Bengali peoples as discussed below. Their

language or other cultural markers of identity, symbolic or otherwise, while

manipulation of symbols of cultural identity, which may be termed as

Background: the Pakistan phase - Islam in danger vs Jai Bangla

The emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, unlike that of Pakistan, was

controlled reversals in the aftermath of the assassination of the first prime

people in West Bengal across their national frontiers. Subsequently, however,

In such a context, discussions about the identity of Bengal Muslims was

mobile, middle classes and the vernacular intelligentsia. Hence a tension

The religious basis of identity acquired a special importance because

Another important factor which contributed to the religious-secular

In the immediate post-partition period, the Bengal Muslim intelligentsia

Intellectual preoccupations among prose writers in the years after 1947

constantly measured against the secular ones of freedom, democracy and

and national boundaries.

religious and to that extent, a secular zone. The non-communal, eclectic

to the inevitable struggle for the liberation of Bangladesh. The 'Islam-pasand'

Pakistan in 1971.40 While it was imperative for him to diversify his

that inscribed in the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh as dharmanirapekshata,

It may be argued that the multi-faith broadcasts, Mujib's participation in

Several scholars such as Talukder Maniruzzaman and Zillur Rahman

among other causes 'Islamic resurgence' in Bangladesh was 'a reaction to

disbanded soldiers, freedom fighters, communists and razakaars, as well as

Zia and symbol manipulation: Bengali nationalism challenged

Although the preference for 'Bangladeshi' over 'Bangalee' had no strong

Zia-ur-Rahman came to power after a series of military coups: the first

Compared to his predecessor, Zia resorted to policies explicitly aimed at

The Zia period ushered in a new ruling ideology determined primarily

Zia thus rejected Bengali nationalism without ever acknowledging the

The rise of the religious right

54 54 See S.A. Hussain, op. cit., p. 149.

Ershad's strategies were controversial, particularly the Eighth

Nevertheless, it may be argued that the Eighth Amendment was a major

madrasahs of all types accompanied by a small increase in student numbers,

Table 1: Student enrolment in madrasahs (1970/71 to 1975/76)

Year Number of Number of Students

1970/71 6,260 716,202

1975/76 ++ 7,971 808,000

+ Includes all types of madrasahs: reformed, old scheme

Sources: Statistical Digest of Bangladesh, no. 8 (1972),

Table 2: Students and teachers in government and affiliated madrasahs

Year Number of Number of Number of

1977/78 1,976 375,200 21,579

+++ From secondary level and above - government and

Sources: Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocketbook of

majority: the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) emerged as the majority

The alliance was a recognition of the Jama'at's rehabilitation at the state

Constitution, as well as a painful and humiliating experience for those who

various ways: some including Jahanara Imam, were manhandled by the

Taslima advocates the freedom of women to determine the size of their