JOURNALOF

OPERATIONS
MANAGEMENT
ELSEVIER Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292

Management initiatives and just-in-time manufacturing

Ron McLachlin
Facul~ of Management, Universi~ of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Received 24 January 1996; accepted 4 February 1997

Abstract

Numerous benefits have been claimed for firms that implement just-in-time (JIT) approaches to manufacturing. While a
fair number of Western firms have been successful at such implementations, other firms that could benefit appear to be
addressing only a few features rather than the overall philosophy and system• This paper considers whether each of a number
of management initiatives is necessary for the implementation of just-in-time manufacturing. A case-based research
methodology was used for theory testing at six plants, each which claimed to be implementing just-in-time manufacturing.
Data were obtained via interviews, questionnaires, direct observation, and collection of documents• Of six management
initiatives considered, four were supported as necessary conditions for both JIT flow and JIT quality, as well as for employee
involvement. These four are: (1) promotion of employee responsibility, (2) provision of training, (3) promotion of teamwork,
and (4) demonstration of visible commitment. The other two management initiatives were rejected as necessary conditions.
These are: (1) provision of workforce security, and (2) use of group performance measures. The results also indicated that
employee involvement plays a central role in JIT implementation. © 1997 Elsevier Science B.V.

Keywords: Case study research; Empirical research; Implementation; Just-in-time

1. Introduction ing, non-stock or stockless production, continuous-

Since the late 1970s, just-in-time (JIT) operations
have received much attention from firms in Western
industrialized countries, as the JIT approach was
perceived to be a major reason for Japan's competi-
tive success (e.g., Schonberger, 1982; Hall, 1983;
Lee and Ebrahimpour, 1984; de Treville, 1987;
Shingo, 1988; Lieberman et al., 1990; Mehra and
Inman, 1992; Young, 1992). Numerous benefits have
been claimed for firms that implement systems simi-
lar to JIT. These systems resemble the Toyota pro-
duction system (e.g., Monden, 1983, 1993) but come
under many labels such as just-in-time manufactur-
* Corresponding author.
flow manufacturing, or lean production•
In response to Japanese competition, many firms
in Western industrialized countries attempted to im-
plement JIT or similar manufacturing systems. Many
showed dramatic performance improvements. How-
ever, many other firms, which could conceivably
benefit from such an approach, appeared to be ad-
dressing only a few features, or none at all, rather
than an overall philosophy and system.
1.1. Advantages and benefits of JIT
A JIT or similar approach to production has been
shown to lead to performance improvements (e.g.,
Sugimori et al., 1977; Cusumano, 1985; Suzaki,

0272-6963/97/$17.00 © 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

PI1 S 0 2 7 2 - 6 9 6 3 ( 9 7 ) 0 0 0 10-7
272 R. McLachlin/ Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292

1987; Krafcik, 1988; Lieberman, 1989, 1990; Sakak-
ibara et al., 1990; Schmenner and Rho, 1990; Wom-
ack et al., 1990; Schmenner, 1991; Flynn et al.,
1995; Huson and Nanda, 1995; Lawrence and Hot-
tenstein, 1995). For example, Schmenner (1988b)
concluded, " . . . out of many potential means of
improving productivity, only the JIT-related ones
were statistically shown to be consistently effective"
(p. 12).
As well, a number of authors have provided lists
of benefits claimed for plants implementing JIT
philosophies and systems (e.g., Schonberger, 1982;
Voss and Robinson, 1987). These included reduced
lot sizes, lower inventory, improved quality, reduced
waste and rework, improved motivation, greater pro-
cess yield, increased productivity, increased flexibil-
ity, reduced space requirements, lower overhead,
reduced manufacturing cost, reduced lead time, elim-
ination of certain tradeoffs (e.g., cost vs. quality),
and improved problem solving capabilities.
1.2. JIT implementation by western firms
A number of Western firms realized the potential
of JIT quite early and began programs to emulate
such systems. By the late 1980s, there were high
levels of awareness of JIT (Goddard, 1986; Voss and
Robinson, 1987; Lieberman, 1989). Nevertheless,
while there were successful implementations (e.g.,
Schonberger, 1986, 1987; Sepehri, 1986; Voss and
Clutterbuck, 1989), the number was limited (De-
rtouzos et al., 1989).
Rather than implement a complete system or phi-
losophy, many firms in the West attempted to imple-
ment only particular elements of JIT (Hall, 1983;
Hanlon, 1985; Voss and Robinson, 1987; Im and
Lee, 1989; Ettkin et al., 1990; Gilbert, 1990;
McLachlin and Piper, 1990; Safayeni et al., 1991;
Vastag and Whybark, 1993). Firms were addressing
a subset of elements that were easy to implement
rather than the core elements of JIT that were re-

Table 1
Implementation factors suggested in literature
Factor Sources
Education and training 1, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, (20), 21, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, (38), 39
Employee involvement 1,2,5,9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 18,21,25,39
Employee responsibility 1,3,8, 10, 12, 13, 15,21,34,35,37
Flow and throughput time reduction 1, 3, 10, 19, 22, 23, 34
Group performance measures 17, 18, 28, 29, 30, 40
Job security considerations 5, 6, 8, 21, 26, 28, 31, 35
Quality 1,7, 8,9, 10, 16, 17, 18,22,28,31,35,42
Supplier abilities for J1T 1, 4, 7, 9, 10, 17, 20, 21, 33, 38, 41
Teamwork 8, 16, 21, 24, 27, 35
Top management commitment 2 , 4 , 7 , 9 , 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, (20), 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, (38)

[1] Schonberger, 1982 [15] Voss and Harrison, 1987 [29] Flynn et al., 1990a
[2] Fukuda, 1983 [16] Cosenza, 1988 [30] Flynn et al., 1990c
[3] Hall, 1983 [17] Crawford et al., 1988a [31] Harber et al., 1990
[4] Lee and Ebrahimpour, 1984 [18] Crawford et al., 1988b [32] Lieberman et al., 1990
[5] Hanlon, 1985 [19] Hay, 1988 [33] Montagno et al., 1990
[6] Walton, 1985 [20] Inman, 1988 [34] Schmenner and Rho, 1990
[7] Celley et al., 1986 [21] Krafcik, 1988 [35] Womack et al., 1990
[8] Goddard, 1986 [22] Schmenner, 1988b [36] Ahmed et al., 1991
[9] Im, 1986, Im and Lee, 1989 [23] Westbrook, 1988 [37] Billesbach et al., 1991
[10] Schonberger, 1986 [24] Adair-Healy, 1989 [38] Mehra and Inman, 1992
[11] Walleigh, 1986 [25] Canadian Auto Workers, 1989 [39] Snell and Dean, 1992
[12] de Treville, 1987 [26] Inman and Mehra, 1989 [40] Young, 1992
[13] Myers, 1987 [27] Lieberman, 1989 [41] Brown and Inman, 1993
[14] O'Brien et al., 1987 [28] Wantuck, 1989 [42] Inman and Boothe, 1993

( ) = Suggested that factor was not required.

 R. McLachlin/ Journal of OperationsManagement15 (1997) 271-292
ported to produce greater benefits (Voss and Robin-
son, 1987), that provided quick, tangible returns (Im
and Lee, 1989), or that overlooked the human re-
source policies of Japanese firms (Westbrook, 1988;
Lieberman, 1989). Although the appearance of the
Toyota production system in North America and
Europe stimulated some change, manufacturing im-
provement was transient, superficial, and insubstan-
tial (Shingo, 1988).
Few explanations were offered for these observa-
tions aside from the suggestion that partial ap-
proaches do not entail a commitment to the JIT
concept (Voss and Robinson, 1987) or that Western
manufacturers often see only the existing processes,
rather than the multiple, painstaking steps that have
preceded them (Voss and Clutterbuck, 1989). Conse-
quently, further explanations were sought by review-
ing the literature for problems in JIT implementation,
as well as factors or normative statements claiming
to lead to JIT success. This review focused on
factors that could be influenced by manufacturing
managers. Those suggested by more than a few
sources are reported in Table 1. (With respect to JIT
supply, the table excludes articles that primarily
addressed the JIT buyer/supplier relationship (e.g.,
O'Neal, 1987; Frazier et al., 1988) rather than JIT
implementation.) The literature was mostly descrip-
tive or normative but included roughly twenty empir-
ical studies (e.g., Voss and Robinson, 1987; Schmen-
ner, 1988a; White, 1993).
Management Initiatives
Provide Workforce Security
Promote Employee Responsibility
Provide Training
Promote Teamwork
j . oyee
~ Involvement
Use Group Performance Measures
Demonstrate Visible Commitment
Fig. 1. Researchframework.
273
1.3. An operations management problem
Many authors argue that explanations for Japanese
competitive success must include differences in man-
ufacturing management (Hayes, 1981; Sepehri, 1986;
Krafcik, 1988; Mankin, 1988; Schmenner, 1988b;
Lieberman, 1989; Montagno et al., 1990; Womack et
al., 1990). Part of the evidence is provided by the
experience of Japanese takeovers of plants in the US
(Wheelwright, 1981; Schonberger, 1982; Wantuck,
1983; Sepehri, 1986), as well as by Japanese trans-
plant operations (Cusumano, 1988; Womack et al.,
1990), in which Japanese manufacturing manage-
ment proved to be successful under US conditions.
Thus, successfully responding to such competition
is primarily an operations management problem at
the level of the individual plant. This paper focuses
on the actions of manufacturing managers and con-
siders whether each of a number of management
initiatives is necessary for the implementation of
just-in-time manufacturing.
2. Framework and propositions
The six management initiatives shown as explana-
tory constructs in the framework (Fig. 1) were based
on implementation factors from the literature (Table
1), as one broad conclusion from a review of the
literature was that the plant-level actions of manufac-
Extent of JIT
Row Bements:
sam a0a=tm
~ a a ~ t La~t
SmallLotSize
UniformRantto~__
DamySd~Ue A~eren~
Pul Syst~
Jff DelkeryfromSupplers
Quality Bements:
s~ O u ~ Leva
z~o Defe¢=Ou~y Control
S ~ ProaessControl
UseofChartsandFeed~:=~
274 R. McLachlin/ Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292

turing managers are key in explaining the extent of because there was enough suggestion in the literature
JIT implementation. that it might be a necessary condition for JIT imple-
As well, the literature presented a fairly common mentation. Thus, employee involvement was mod-
theme of JIT being composed of three overall com- eled as both a consequence of various management
ponents, namely, flow, quality, and employee in- initiatives and a necessary condition for JIT.
volvement (e.g., Hall, 1987; Hay, 1988). Thus, JIT is While part of a wider study (McLachlin, 1992),
represented in the framework by these three broad Fig. 1 and Table 1 indicate only those factors rele-
components. The individual elements of JIT have vant to this paper. As well, the framework does not
been suggested by various authors. Those who pro- extend beyond considering the extent of JIT imple-
vided some form of list or classification of JIT mentation as the output measure. That is, it does not
elements are shown in Table 2. As indicated in Fig. include operations performance nor the next obvious
1, this study used a similar set of eleven elements to measure, financial performance. As already outlined,
represent JIT, including the six most suggested. the link between JIT-like operations and operations
The literature also indicated a central place for performance has been demonstrated by other re-
employee involvement. Some authors considered it searchers. As well, it was assumed that improved
to be an element of JIT (e.g., Hay, 1988; Sakakibara operations performance would lead to improved fi-
et al., 1990), while others treated it as a necessary nancial performance. But, as financial performance
condition for JIT (e.g., Myers, 1987; Im and Lee, is influenced by such a variety of non-operational
1989). The latter approach was taken for this study factors, any attempt to draw such a link, without
making it a central concern, would have been well
beyond the scope of this study.
Table 2 Fig. 1 indicates twenty pairs of constructs, sug-
Most frequently suggested JIT elements gesting twenty propositions (Table 3). For each pair,
Element Source one construct is proposed as a necessary condition
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2
for the other. That is, the condition represented by
the independent construct must be present, but may
Setup reduction x x x x x x x x x x x x
Equipment layout x x x x x x x x x x x x
not be sufficient, for the condition represented by the
S m a l l lot s i z e x x x x x x x x x x x dependent construct to occur (Brewer and Hunter,
Uniform plantload x x x x x x x x x x x x 1989, p. 149).
Pull system x x x x x x x x x x x x
JITsupply x x x x x x x x x
mutonomation x x x x x
Quality x x x x x x 3. Methodology
Zero defects x x x x
Design simplicity x x x
Preventive maintenance x x x x x x 3.1. Method and rationale
Employee involvement x x x x x
Multifunction workers x x x x x x x
For over a decade, various authors have called for
[1] S u g i m o r i et al., 1977; M o n d e n , 1981; P e g e l s , 1984 more empirical research in operations management
[2] W a n t u c k , 1983 (Buffa, 1980; Chase, 1980; Miller et al., 1981; Hill
[3] L e e a n d E b r a h i m p o u r , 1984
et al., 1988-1989; Amoako-Gyampah and Meredith,
[4] S u z a k i , 1985
[5] F i n c h a n d C o x , 1986
1989; Meredith et al., 1989; Flynn et al., 1990b;
[6] V o s s a n d R o b i n s o n , 1987 Swamidass, 1991). The more recent of these authors
[7] H a y , 1988 noted that, in spite of earlier calls, the research
[8] S h i n g o , 1988 emphasis in operations management was still heavily
[9] B i c h e n o , 1989
slanted toward quantitative modeling, simulation, and
[10] P i p e r a n d M c L a c h l i n , 1 9 9 0
[11] S a k a k i b a r a et al., 1990
similar techniques. The main argument in favor of a
[12] W h i t e a n d R u c h , 1990 greater emphasis on empirical research was that op-
erations management is primarily an applied disci-
 R. McLachlin / Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292 275

Table 3
Propositions
Management initiatives and employee involvement
Provision of workforce security is a necessary condition for employee involvement.
Promotion of employee responsibility is a necessary condition for employee involvement.
Provision of training is a necessary condition for employee involvement.
Promotion of teamwork is a necessary condition for employee involvement.
The use of group performance measures is a necessary condition for employee involvement.
Demonstration of visible commitment is a necessary condition for employee involvement.

Management initiatives and the extent of JlT

7 Provision of workforce security is a necessary condition for J1T flow.
Promotion of employee responsibility is a necessary condition for JIT flow.
9 Provision of training is a necessary condition for Jrr flow.
10 Promotion of teamwork is a necessary condition for Jr[" flow.
11 The use of group performance measures is a necessary condition for JIT flow.
12 Demonstration of visible commitment is a necessary condition for JIT flow.
13 Provision of workforce security is a necessary condition for JIT quality.
14 Promotion of employee responsibility is a necessary condition for J1T quality.
15 Provision of training is a necessary condition for JIT quality.
16 Promotion of teamwork is a necessary condition for JIT quality.
17 The use of group performance measures is a necessary condition for J1T quality.
18 Demonstration of visible commitment is a necessary condition for .liT quality.

Employee involvement and the extent of JIT

19 Employee involvement is a necessary condition for JIT flow.
20 Employee involvement is a necessary condition for JIT quality.

pline so the p r o b l e m s addressed by a c a d e m i c s should
be r e l e v a n t to practising managers. This study used
one o f the suggested e m p i r i c a l approaches, namely, a
case-based research m e t h o d o l o g y . In particular, the
portion o f the study reported in this paper used cases
for theory testing, rarely d o n e in operations m a n a g e -
ment, rather than for exploratory description or the-
try development.
Y i n (1989) outlined five research strategies,
namely, e x p e r i m e n t , survey, archival analysis, his-
tory, and case study. T h e appropriate c h o i c e depends
on three conditions, namely, the f o r m o f the research
question, whether or not control is required o v e r
behavioral events, and w h e t h e r or not the research
focuses on c o n t e m p o r a r y events (Table 4). Thus,
case studies w e r e the m o s t appropriate for this re-
search because an explanatory question was asked
(how, why), the researcher had no control o v e r be-
havioral events, and the focus was on c o n t e m p o r a r y
events. The rationale for using case studies in opera-

Table 4
Relevant situations for different research strategies (Source: Yin, 1989, p. 17)
Strategy Form of research question Requires control Focuses on
over behavioral contemporary
events? events?
Experiment how, why yes yes
Survey who, what, where, how many, how much no yes
Archival analysis (e.g., economic study) who, what, where, how many, how much no yes/no
History how, why no no
Case study how, why no yes
276 R. McLachlin / Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292
tions management was also outlined by McCutcheon
and Meredith (1993) and McLachlin (1993).
3.2. Validity and reliability
Concerns about validity and reliability are particu-
larly important for case-based research because it has
acquired a poor reputation, partly from not ade-
quately addressing these issues (Yin, 1989). Yin
outlined ways in which four logical tests for judging
a research design may be applied to case research
(Table 5). These four tests are: (1) construct validity,
(2) internal validity, (3) external validity, and (4)
reliability. Careful research design, data collection,
and data analysis can provide rigor and counter some
common, often valid, criticisms of case-based ap-
proaches.
In the following sections, each of these four tests
is defined, along with Yin's suggestions for handling
each for case research and indications of how these
suggestions were followed for this study.
3.2.1. Construct validity
Construct validity is the extent to which we estab-
lish correct operational measures for the concepts
being studied (Yin, 1989, p. 40). The first of Yin's
three tactics to enhance construct validity is to use
multiple sources of evidence. The shared information
from multiple sources helps with convergence on the
intended construct. The more dissimilar the methods
of measurement, the more the irrelevant components
are dissimilar and the more the shared variance
reflects the construct intended (Kidder and Judd,
1986). An example is the way in which Eisenhardt
and Bourgeois (1988) measured 'power centraliza-
tion' using qualitative descriptions and various quan-
Table 5
Case study tactics for four design tests (Source: Yin, 1989, p. 41)
Test Case study tactic
Construct validity use multiple sources of evidence
establish chain of evidence
have key informantsreviewdraft case study report
Internal validity do pattern matchingor explanationbuilding or time-seriesanalysis
External validity use replication logic in multiple-casestudies
Reliability use case study protocol
developcase study data base
titative measures side by side. For this study, sources
of evidence included interview data, questionnaire
data, company documents, and observations.
The second tactic to enhance construct validity (as
well as increase reliability) is to establish a chain of
evidence. In other words, one should proceed so an
external observer could follow the derivation of evi-
dence. For this study, the chain of evidence may still
be followed, as required, from raw data through
summary tables and conclusions.
The third tactic is to have key informants review
the draft case study report. For each firm in this
study, a completed summary was reviewed by the
key informant. The consensus was that the drafts
were accurate, requiring only minor clarification.
3.2.2. Internal validity
Internal validity is the extent to which we can
establish a causal relationship, whereby certain con-
ditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as
distinguished from spurious relationships (Yin, 1989,
p. 40). It is "the approximate validity with which we
infer that a relationship between two variables is
causal or the absence of a relationship implies the
absence of cause" (Cook and Campbell, 1979, p.
37).
To enhance internal validity when testing proposi-
tions, Yin suggested that the researcher do 'pattern
matching'. Thus, in this study, observed patterns
were compared with the patterns expected if certain
propositions were true.
3.2.3. External validity
External validity refers to the domain to which a
study's findings or presumed causal relationships
may be generalized (Cook and Campbell, 1979, p.
Phase of research in which tactic occurs
data collection
data collection
composition
data analysis
research design
data collection
data collection
 R. McLachlin / Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292
37; Yin, 1989, p. 41). The problem of external
validity has been a major barrier in doing case
studies, according to critics of a case-based ap-
proach. However, as Yin pointed out (Yin, 1989, p.
38):
A fatal flaw in doing case studies is to conceive of
statistical generalization as the method of generaliz-
ing the results of the case. This is because cases are
not 'sampling units' and should not be chosen for
this reason.
Elsewhere, he said (Yin, 1989, p. 43):
... such critics are implicitly contrasting the situa-
tion to survey research, where a 'sample' (if selected
correctly) readily generalizes to a larger universe.
This analogy to samples and universes is incorrect
when dealing with case studies. This is because
survey research relies on statistical generalization,
whereas case studies (as with experiments) rely on
analytical generalization. (Yin's emphasis)
Case selection should be based on theoretical
sampling in which extreme cases are chosen to fill
theoretical niches; it should not be based on repre-
sentative random samples (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Thus, with case research, generalization is from
each case to a broader theory (analytical generaliza-
tion), not from samples to populations (statistical
generalization). And, it is possible with analytical
generalization to generalize from only one case,
although such generalization is not automatic (Yin,
1989); the theory should be tested through replica-
tion, which enhances both external validity and con-
struct validity (Cook and Campbell, 1979). For this
study, generalizability was enhanced by such replica-
tion.
3.2.4. Reliability
Reliability is the extent to which a study's opera-
tions can be repeated, with the same results (Yin,
1989, p. 41). This means that, if a later investigator
were to conduct the same case study, exactly follow-
ing the same procedures, the same results should be
obtained. Yin suggested two tactics for enhancing
the reliability of case research.
The first tactic is to use a case study protocol.
This study used two written protocols as guidelines
of topics to be covered during interviews. The sec-
277
ond tactic is to maintain a case study data base. For
this study, the data base consists of raw notes and
files of source data, completed questionnaires, docu-
ments, files reorganized by construct of interest, and
intermediate summary tables.
3.3. Operational definitions
For each construct, the summary ratings were
derived using all qualitative and quantitative evi-
dence. The emphasis was on qualitative evidence,
mainly from interviews, with some from plant tours
and other observations.
3.3.1. Qualitative data
As there are numerous possible qualitative state-
ments that might serve as indicators for a given
construct, it was not possible to outline a complete
set of responses to serve as an operational definition.
This was a major reason a case-based methodology
was chosen. Rather, each statement had to be judged,
in context, to determine the extent to which it should
be considered evidence for the construct in question.
To aid in this, representative responses were devel-
oped for each construct (Appendix A). They pro-
vided guidance for the type of evidence that might
lead to a top (or near top) rating for each construct.
3.3.2. Quantitative data
Multi-item scales were used when available as
further indicators (Appendix B). Well-developed
scales (Flynn et al., 1990c; Sakakibara et al., 1990)
were available for most of the manufacturing prac-
tices constructs but not for the six management
initiatives. No attempt was made, for this study, to
develop new scales. Nevertheless, a few items of
interest that were not tested for validity or reliability
were included on the questionnaire. With case-based
approaches, such information can still be useful as
each additional piece of information is merely one of
a number of indicators for a given construct, not the
entire measure of the construct.
3.4. Sites and data collection
While there is no ideal number of cases, four to
ten cases usually works well (Eisenhardt, 1989). For
this study, six case sites were visited, with each visit
278 R. McLachlin / Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292

lasting at least four days. The sites were a cross
section of plants operating in different industries,
ranging from those that had attempted JIT for a
number of years to those just beginning efforts at JIT
implementation.
Each plant (Table 6) had been represented as
being engaged in JIT-like approaches to manufactur-
ing. Each was located in central Canada, was en-
gaged in repetitive manufacturing, employed 3 5 0 -
900 people, had sales in the C a n $ 2 0 - 3 0 0 million
range, and produced fabricated metal products,
mainly on an assemble-to-order basis. As well, all
but one had US parent firms and all but a different
one were unionized. Two of the plants were original
equipment manufacturers and four were suppliers,
The typical mix of informants included the plant
manager and immediate subordinates, some supervi-
sors, some line workers, and the manager of human
resources. The mix sometimes included others such
as engineers or union representatives, as circum-
stances warranted. On average, sixteen interviews
were conducted at each plant site, each lasting more
than an hour. As well, data collection included ob-
servations from plant tours, company documents,
and questionnaires concerning manufacturing prac-
tices completed shortly after interviews. Question-
naires were completed by only those seven or so
informants at each plant, identified by the key infor-
mant as most knowledgeable about the extent of JIT
implementation.
As well, the way in which data were collected
indicates a temporal sequence between management
initiatives and current manufacturing practices. Ques-
tionnaire data, concerning the extent of JIT flow, JIT
quality, and employee involvement asked for ' n o w '
and 'before' responses for each item. 'Before' meant
before the date identified by the key informant at
each plant as the beginning of 'major efforts to
implement Japanese-like approaches to manufactur-
ing'. On the other hand, interview data, which fo-
cused on the actions of management, covered the
period of time from this date to the time of the visit.
Thus, the temporal sequence consists of manufactur-
ing practices before JIT efforts began, subsequent
management initiatives, and manufacturing practices
at the time of the visit.
3.5. Analytical procedures
The analytical procedures primarily followed ad-
vice found in Refs. Yin (1989) and Miles and Huber-
man (1984), but including Glaser and Strauss (1967)
and Eisenhardt (1989).
The process for reducing and displaying the large
amount of data collected followed suggestions by
Miles and Huberman (1984) in which there are three

Table 6
Site demographics
Plant
A B C D E F
Revenue: CanS, million 22 212 78 300 79 98
Employees: direct 305 675 600 800 480 375
salaried 50 90 125 70 90 190
total 355 765 725 870 570 565
Industry electric appliances timber appliances metal stamping farm implements
motors harvesting
Main products AC motors washers saw chain fridges control arms loaders
blowers dryers saw bars ranges yokes rotary cutters
fans dishwashers sprockets hinge pillars utility vehicles
Major product lines 3 3 3 2 4 3
Average level in bill 5 6 4 5 4.5 3.5
of materials
Supply chain status supplier OEM supplier OEM supplier supplier/OEM
Unionized? yes yes no yes yes yes
US subsidiary? yes yes yes yes no yes
 R. McLachlin / Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292 279

Table 7 (literal replication), the support becomes stronger.

Cross-site summary ratings And, if patterns can be shown not to hold for under-
Plant standable reasons for dissimilar cases (theoretical
A B C D E F replication), then the support becomes stronger yet.
Management initiatives Each of the twenty propositions was considered in
Provide employment security 1 1 2 0 0 0 turn and tested on a case-by-case basis. Each propo-
Promote employee responsibility 2 6 5 4 2 4 sition was supported or rejected according to just the
Provide training 1 5 6 3 3 4
one case under consideration at a given time. Thus,
Promote teamwork 0 6 5 3 2 3
Use group performance measures 1 3 5 1 1 2
the test was quite severe, as each proposition was
Demonstrate visible commitment 2 5 4 4 3 3 falsifiable by the evidence from one case. That is, if
any case presented data that were clearly counter to
Employee involcement 2 5 5 4 2 4
the proposition, the evidence was strong enough to
Flow elements reject it, regardless of the evidence in the other
Setup reduction 2 4 4 2 2 2 cases. On the other hand, evidence consistent with a
Equipment layout 4 4 4 3 3 4
proposition merely provided further confirmation (or
Small lot size 3 6 3 6 4 3
Uniform plant load 1 4 3 4 3 2 did not provide strong enough evidence to draw any
Daily schedule adherence 0 3 3 2 3 3 conclusion), regardless of the number of cases.
Pull system 2 5 2 3 3 2 Thus, each case was considered a complete study
JIT delivery from suppliers 2 4 4 4 4 3 leading to definite conclusions, either supporting or
Overall flowelements 2.0 4.3 3.3 3.4 3.1 2.7
rejecting each proposition; it is the conclusions, not
Quality elements the individual variables or patterns, that are the
Supplier quality level 3 4 5 4 3 4 object of replication (Yin, 1989, p. 57).
Zero defects quality control 4 3 4 3 3 3
Statistical process control 3 3 5 3 2 2 3.6. Coding
Use of charts and feedback 0 4 3 3 3 3
Overall qualityelements 2.5 3.5 4.3 3.3 2.8 3.0 For testing propositions, the magnitude of each
construct was either the existence or the nonexis-
0 - no evidence; 3 - neutral; 6 - extensive evidence. tence of a condition, based on high, neutral, and low
ratings. The purpose of having a neutral range, for
concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data which no conclusions would be drawn, was to avoid
display, and conclusion drawing/verification. making mistakes between high and low ratings.
Briefly, for each site visited, the raw data, originally However, a two-step approach was used in order to
grouped by informant, was recorded electronically, have a useful way to establish the boundaries of the
coded with standard codes, and grouped by construct neutral ranges for JIT flow and JIT quality, each
category. For each construct, summary paragraphs composed of averages of a number of individual
and associated ratings were derived using all avail- ratings. First, numerical ratings were assigned; then
able evidence, qualitative and quantitative. The con- they were translated into high, neutral, and low
densed information was placed in a summary display ratings.
for the particular plant. Finally, the summary dis- For each site, a summary rating was assigned
plays from the individual plants were used to pro- (Table 7) to each construct, using all available evi-
duce a cross-site display of ratings for each construct dence. These ranged from 0 (no evidence) to 6
of interest (Table 7). (extensive evidence). A value of 4 or better was
Data analysis was based on Yin's 'pattern match- considered sufficient evidence for a high rating for
ing' procedures. With case-based procedures, each the existence of a phenomenon at the plant, a rating
case is treated as a whole study, from which conclu- of 2 or less as sufficient evidence to conclude that a
sions are drawn. If, for a single case, it can be shown phenomenon did not exist in any serious form, and a
that actual data patterns match proposed patterns, rating of 3 as inconclusive or neutral evidence. As-
there is good evidence for a given proposition. If signments of more extreme values simply repre-
these patterns can be replicated in similar cases sented stronger evidence on either side of neutral.
280 R. McLachlin/ Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292
The data were coded with this in mind. So, for
example, the assignment of a 4 meant that the evi-
dence was definitely judged to be on the high, not
neutral, side.
To determine high, neutral, and low ratings for
averages (JIT flow and J r r quality), a rule defining
the neutral range was needed. Establishing it was not
intended to be overly statistical, given that ratings
were derived from both qualitative and quantitative
data. Nevertheless, the rule was based on the general
notion from statistics that as the sample size in-
creases, the standard error decreases by the square
root of the number of elements. Thus, if three repre-
sented neutral for individual ratings (which may be
seen as a neutral range of 2.5-3.5), a range of
2.81-3.19 defined neutral for JIT flow (seven ele-
ments) and 2.75-3.25 defined neutral for JIT quality
(four elements). The subsequent high, neutral, and
low ratings were used to test the propositions.
Finally, while Yin's suggestions for attempting to
ensure reliability in case-based approaches were fol-
lowed, it is not possible to ensure that a different
rater would inevitably give the same score (0-6) to
each construct. Nevertheless, a different rater, fol-
lowing exactly the same procedures and conducting
the same case study over again, should arrive at the
same high, neutral, and low scores. While it is
possible that another rater might draw a different
conclusion at the margin (high vs. neutral or neutral
vs. low), the use of a neutral range should ensure
that there would be no instance in which different
raters provided high and low ratings for the same
data.
4. Analysis
As space doesn't allow the analysis for all twenty
propositions to be outlined in detail, examples of
tests of the first two propositions are provided; the
other eighteen were tested in similar fashion. Fur-
thermore, even for the first two propositions, space
doesn't allow all six cases to be reviewed in detail.
Rather, some of the specific evidence is provided for
only the first two plants (A and B); the other four
were evaluated in similar fashion.
4.1. Proposition 1
Provision of workforce security is a necessary
condition for employee involvement.
4.1.1. Plant A: provision of workforce security (rat-
ing: 1, low)
For Plant A, there was no real indication of any
management intention to provide any form of em-
ployment guarantee. Direct statements included:
Plant Manager: " W e intend to keep a base level
of employees that we will never violate. But, no,
there are no specific promises."
A line supervisor: "There is no protection for
improvements. Management is trying to automate
and cut positions. People know that they are not safe.
For example, in the press area, we all knew what
was needed and that jobs would be lost. All it needed
was money. Now there is money . . . . If there hadn't
been a new line to go to, management would have
just cut them."
The union representative: "But, no, there is no
security promise."
Human Resources Manager: "But, no, [Plant A]
can't provide job security so it's not a negotiating
issue. But, protection is a big issue in collective
bargaining, particularly in [this region] which has
been hard hit by closures."
4.1.2. Plant A: employee involvement (rating: 2,
low)
For Plant A, there was no real evidence of em-
ployee involvement - aside from isolated cases of
individual employees taking some initiative in their
own area. For example, one employee found a way
to run his machine to allow the next operation to be
bypassed but used this knowledge to take extra
breaks, not to help the plant improve. Direct state-
ments included:
Plant Manager: "Once the big operations prob-
lems are out of the way (i.e., when 99% of the items
are good first time), we can look at throwing prob-
lems out to the groups. But, now we only bring in
selected individuals to the meetings."
Manufacturing Engineering Manager: "There's
not much teamwork with groups of direct workers."
In-Process Inspector: "[The boss] has a new me-
chanical engineer in the meetings now. I noticed my
name is no longer there. It rubs others the wrong
 R. McLachlin/ Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292
way if I come up with things they should know. I
have to prove everything, keep evidence, etc., for all
I say. But there is no recognition . . . . No, the Japanese
have team meetings, etc. But, we're running hot, etc.
There is no time. It's frustrating at times." (She had
been represented by others as the star example of
involvement.)
A line supervisor: "No, the managers just come
up with ideas and put them in place . . . . They used to
have a suggestion program here. They paid for sug-
gestions up to a maximum of CanS2000, but it was
not run fairly, some people were chosen regularly for
rewards. But it died. They tried to bring it up again
but they only offered T-shirts and coffee mugs."
(This is supported by operational data in which the
average number of improvement suggestions per em-
ployee per year was reported as nil.)
Quality Control Supervisor: "No, there are no
quality circles, etc. When we jumped into [the new
line], quantity became so important."
As well, the questionnaire results suggested recent
improvements but current values were still below a
neutral rating of 3.0 for both small group problem
solving (from 1.67 before to 2.56 at the time of the
visit) and employee involvement (from 1.70 before
to 2.93 at the time of the visit).
4.1.3. Plant B: provision of workforce security (rat-
ing: 1, low)
At Plant B, there were no specific employment
guarantees and there was some insecurity as a result
of recent layoffs. Direct statements included:
Employee Involvement Program and Training
Manager: "What I see with [Plant B] is that they are
just cutting people. They want to do more with less
people. They have been doing so for ten years.
Everyone knows that there are too many people.
They are all insecure. Top management should se-
cure their people. The middle managers are so inse-
cure. They think [the firm] has restructured so it is
easier to get rid of them. There is a climate of
nonconfidence."
A shop floor worker: "Now, everyone is scared
about their jobs. They're not at ease. I can't say I'll
have a job in ten years. Myself, I've been here
twenty years. For ten or fifteen years, I felt secure.
Now everyone is worried."
281
Plant Manager: "No, we're not giving specific
guarantees."
Manager, Manufacturing Systems: "There is no
explicit tradeoff of job security for participation and
flexibility, as employees apparently understand the
competitive nature of the business."
An assembly line supervisor: "They know that
productivity means survival. We show them sales,
costs, etc. We don't hide anything. A few may lose
their jobs, but others will keep their jobs. This is
better than everyone losing their job. For example, if
they improve by reducing from six people to do a
job to five, the [least senior] person somewhere in
the plant gets bumped out. But this is accepted as
necessary for survival."
4.1.4. Plant B: employee involvement (rating: 5,
high)
With respect to employee involvement at Plant B,
there was evidence to support a high rating. Quality
circles had been used for the past decade, with
meetings held weekly. The groups chose their own
problems and called others as needed. There were at
least 33 volunteer quality circles, comprising about
25% of the workforce. As well, some other involve-
ment activities were reported, such as working on
service call rates, preventive maintenance, and kan-
ban (most groups had kanban teams).
One example of employee involvement was re-
ported by a number of employees in a particular
area. They dealt with the threat of jobs being con-
tracted out to Mexico by improving the process so
much that the work was saved along with half of the
jobs (rather than lose them all). Having been told by
management that they were losing money on the
parts, a few of them refused to accept this and said
they could do something about it. They worked on
solutions for two to three months, without direction
from management. Direct statements included:
An assembly line supervisor: "Some workers are
here for the pay. But we have twenty volunteer
quality circles. They are proud to work for [Plant
B]." (Most interviewees mentioned the quality circle
and involvement activities in one form or another,
including examples of management's attempts to
promote employee involvement.)
Manager, Reliability: "There is not much concem
282 R. McLachlin / Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292
here . . . . If you give employees responsibility, they
really do know about competitive problems. They
know that participation is survival, so they do it and
think about it. They know that the layoffs are from
the recession, not a result of participation. The worst
part is the recession because it forced us to layoffs.
I ' m worried that the trust has diminished even though
they understand that it's because of the recession.
I ' m worried about their participation once we start
moving teams around as a result of the layoffs. The
question is how not to lose all that."
Manager, Human Resources: " T h e employees
were then telling us that they liked their work and
they were even going home to work on problems at
night. There were even two cases where we laid off
people but two members still came to participate in
quality circle meetings without pay. And, they didn't
know if they would be called back."
The previous observations were reinforced by
questionnaire results well above a neutral rating of
3.0 for both small group problem solving (from 3.67
before to 4.57 at the time of the visit) and employee
involvement (from 2.56 before to 3.77 at the time of
the visit).
4.1.5. Conclusions: Proposition 1
Plant: A B C D E F
Provision of workforce security L L L L L L
Employee involvement L H H H L H
Overall, for proposition 1, the evidence for Plants
A and E suggested low ratings for both 'provision of
workforce security' and 'employee involvement', of-
fering no reason to reject the proposition. For Plant
B, the high rating for employee involvement, in light
of the low rating for job security, was strong enough
evidence to reject the proposition regardless of the
evidence at other plants. Nevertheless, Plants C, D,
and F also revealed this pattern, each providing a
replication of the conclusions drawn from Plant B
evidence. Overall, proposition 1 was rejected, based
on strong evidence from four of the plants, any one
of which would have been sufficient to reject. Thus,
the provision of workforce security is not a neces-
sary condition for employee involvement.
4.2. Proposition 2
Promotion of employee responsibility is a neces-
sary condition for employee involvement.
Again, specific evidence is provided for only
Plants A and B; the other four were tested in similar
fashion.
4.2.1. Plant A: promotion of employee responsibility
(rating: 2, low)
At the level of managers and, to some extent,
supervisors, the General Manager assigned goals and
left it to the assignees to determine how to meet
them. There were no organization charts; this was
done purposely to empower managers and supervi-
sors and meant their responsibilities had become
blurred. But, there was no doubt that the General
Manager was in charge.
In spite of these efforts at the managerial level,
there was very little in the way of promotion of
employee responsibility at the hourly level. Hourly
workers were treated as being limited in scope, in
particular with respect to their time horizon and
difficulty of the tasks they could handle. The short
cycle times on the line meant that, although responsi-
bility had been passed down because of the removal
of a layer of management, hourly workers were still
responsible for only limited, repetitive tasks. Em-
ployees had neither the authority nor responsibility
to stop the line for problems and feedback on defects
came from reject analysis sheets, not from the em-
ployees' direct efforts. Direct statements included:
In-Process Inspector: " T h e General Manager calls
the shots here."
Production Manager: " T h e operator doesn't have
control. An operator would not stop production on
her own.' '
Manufacturing Engineering Manager: "Manage-
ment must stop looking at blue collar workers as
dummies. There are still some top managers within
this plant who think that the only function of blue
collars is to get out the work."
The union representative: " W e ' r e not dummies.
Somebody has to work in the factories. This doesn't
say you're 'no-brains'. It's as if my ideas are not as
good if they're not from a supervisor. For example,
this morning, there was a problem putting a cap on.
It's causing sore shoulders, etc., but the new people
are scared and won't complain."
 R. McLachlin/ Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292
4.2.2. Plant A: employee involvement (rating: 2,
low)
As discussed for proposition 1.
4.2.3. Plant B: Promotion of employee responsibility
(rating: 6, high)
At Plant B, there was a strong, consistent message
that management wanted hourly employees to take
ownership and responsibility. Recent decentralization
pushed employee responsibility further down in the
organization. As well, they have used and promoted
quality circles for the past decade. Furthermore,
supervisors and middle managers considered 'coach-
ing' to be their proper role. They provided the
overall goals and guidance rather than simply giving
commands. There was much evidence of operators
taking on and solving problems themselves. Direct
statements included:
Manager, Reliability: " T h e employees are ready
to participate. They want to, but they need the tools.
It won't work if they think you're trying to control
them. For example, I asked my people to come up
with projects. I said I wanted those that they felt
were important, not just the ones they thought I
would want. They came up with different ideas.
They chose their own projects. I help and orient but I
never try to control. I'll suggest but never direct
them. They must make it their project. I ' m the
coach. They never had any goal so I gave them the
challenge to reduce the cycle. That is, I gave the goal
and they solved their own problems towards this
goal. To do this, they went around talking to others
and so forth. You need to support them; you must
focus them on their own autonomy."
A product line manager: " W e try to have a team
approach but also to delegate. That is, I want my
guys to make their own decisions. They must handle
their own projects. They know the priorities, which
are company goals that I've passed on. But they
decide on how to meet them."
Another product line manager: " I t must also be
their business; they must feel ownership. They must
be treated the same as upper management. That is,
they must get information when it is available. And
we must let them give us information. We must train
or help them. And, we must allow time for people to
come along."
Manager, Manufacturing Systems: "Another rea-
283
son [for no incoming inspection] is that line workers
are responsible for quality of incoming parts, so, if
there is a problem, the supplier will hear about it
quickly."
Manager, Human Resources: " . . . we decided to
give employees more responsibility, for example, by
eliminating inspector positions. This wasn't done
formally; it was just a natural thrust."
Materials Manager: " I always said people who
touch, feel, etc. are the ones who know. He's forgot-
ten more than we could ever know. The old regimen-
tal way was based on, 'You do, I think'. But, I
wouldn't be satisfied until my employee knew more
than me. This is where we get into employee in-
volvement. With a plant of 1000, if you can tap that
mass, you can move mountains . . . . For example, we
gave them CanS1000 to spend without having to get
authorization. Sometimes it's frivolous, but usually,
this is paid back in no time; there is a return on
investment often in weeks. We must support the
operators even though they'll make mistakes. For
example, I put a phone in so the transmission guys
can talk to the suppliers' operators. As well, we took
operators on the bus to visit suppliers' plants. That's
where management should get involved. Now we are
readjusting; now we need teams to assume owner-
ship. Before, they would say, '[The Materials Man-
ager] is always there so we don't have to worry
about materials'."
Plant Manager: "With respect to customer ser-
vice, we must provide sensitivity with the shop floor.
We have shop people go along to see the dealers,
etc. I am involved with some of this now."
4.2.4. Plant B: employee involvement (rating: 5,
high)
As discussed for proposition 1.
4.2.5. Conclusions: Proposition 2
Plant: AB CDEF
Promotion of employee responsibility L H H H L H
Employee involvement L H HH L H
Overall, Plants A and E had low values for both
'promotion of employee responsibility' and 'em-
ployee involvement'. This evidence could not be
used to reject the proposition. On the other hand,
Plant B showed high values for both constructs,
supporting the proposition, as did Plants C, D and F.
284 R. McLachlin / Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292
These replications offered strong confirmation, al-
though not proof, that the promotion of employee
responsibility is a necessary condition for employee
involvement. Overall, proposition 2 was supported.
5. Summary
5.1. Tests of propositions
Of the twenty propositions, six were rejected and
fourteen were supported. However, for two of the
supported propositions, only a strong association
could be demonstrated, as the temporal sequence was
not clear. All six rejections involved two of the
management initiatives, namely, 'provision of work-
force security' and 'use of group performance mea-
sures'. The other four management initiatives (pro-
motion of employee responsibility, provision of
training, promotion of teamwork, and demonstration
of visible commitment) were supported as necessary
conditions for each of the dependent constructs (JIT
flow, JIT quality, and employee involvement).
With respect to 'provision of workforce security',
there was no evidence of any firm in the study ever
providing any substantial degree of workforce secu-
rity. Nevertheless, Plants B, C and D had high values
for each of the dependent constructs and Plant F had
a high value for employee involvement. The reason
for the rejections probably lies with the notion of job
security being provided directly by management,
rather than flowing from a firm's ability to be com-
petitive. No firm in the study had considered any
type of contractual obligation. During interviews,
questions about formal provision of job security
were typically dispensed quickly; there was no hint
of any 'weighing of pros and cons' on the part of
those interviewed.
Table 8
Plants showing support for propositions
Independent construct Dependent construct
Employee involvement
Promote employee responsibility B CDF
Provide training B CF
Promote teamwork B C
Demonstrate visible commitment B CD
Each letter indicates a particular plant.
The other three rejections of propositions centered
around the independent construct 'use of group per-
formance measures'. These rejections were based on
the situation at Plant D where there was little evi-
dence of group performance measures, either at the
time of the study or in the past. Nevertheless, there
were high values for the dependent constructs. As
the reasons for these rejections were not clear, a
further review of the data for possible explanations
was undertaken for all six plants. It suggested that
the absence of piece rate incentive systems may be
good enough to allow a plant to move forward with
JIT initiatives (even though systems of group mea-
surement may be preferable).
It is not surprising that the use of group measures
was rejected as a necessary condition. Snell and
Dean (1994) hypothesized that certain changes in
compensation practices (including group measures)
would follow from the introduction of integrated
manufacturing (of which JIT is part), opposite to the
propositions in this paper, in which group measures
precede JIT implementation. They did find that when
jobs are upgraded in conjunction with integrated
manufacturing, there was more tendency for employ-
ees to be paid via group incentives, salary, and
seniority-based pay. But, they also pointed out that
reward systems are slow to change and the relation-
ship between compensation and integrated manufac-
turing is much more complicated than previously
implied.
Finally, a temporal sequence between employee
involvement and either JIT flow or JIT quality could
not be demonstrated. For example, of the four plants
where employee involvement was being actively
pursued, two of them (B and C) reported employee
involvement as the first process change pursued and
two of them (D and F) reported it as the last. Thus,
JIT flow JIT quality
BCD BCD
BC BC
BC BC
BCD BCD
 R. McLachlin/ Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292
only a strong association could be demonstrated for
the last two propositions (Table 3).
5.2. Implications for management
5.2.1. Role of employee involvement
Employee involvement played a central role in
JIT implementation. Four management initiatives
were supported as necessary conditions for JIT flow
and quality, as well as for employee involvement.
Table 8 shows these relationships for each plant that
showed support for the propositions (i.e., both the
independent and dependent constructs had high val-
ues). As may be seen looking across the rows of
Table 8, there was no instance, for any plant, where
any of these four management initiatives led to a
high level of JIT flow or JIT quality without also
leading to a high level of employee involvement. So,
while temporal sequences between employee in-
volvement and JIT flow and JIT quality could not be
demonstrated, the association was quite strong. Man-
agers would be wise to involve shop floor employees
when implementing JIT.
5.2.2. Provision of workforce security
It was not necessary, at any plant in the study, for
management to provide workforce security. It may
make sense to address other considerations such as
employees' sense of security or concern about job
loss (not addressed in this study). But, the formal
provision of workforce security (e.g., through negoti-
ated contract guarantees or via decree) is not a
necessary condition for successful JIT implementa-
tion. Thus, while managers should probably be sensi-
tive to security issues, they shouldn't feel compelled
to make promises.
5.2.3. Use of group performance measures
This study also found that, although group perfor-
mance measures may make sense in a JIT context,
management need not view their use as a necessary
condition. A minimum condition for moving towards
JIT, however, appears to be the absence of piece
rates. Managers should consider removing piece rate
incentives before attempting to implement JIT, even
if group measures are not adopted.
5.2.4. Other management initiatives
Finally, there was strong support that four man-
agement initiatives (promotion of employee respon-
285
sibility, provision of training, promotion of team-
work, and demonstration of visible commitment) are
each necessary conditions for each of employee in-
volvement, JIT flow, and JIT quality. Thus, man-
agers planning to implement JIT should ensure that
these four initiatives are undertaken.
5.3. Limitations
In spite of attempts to reduce bias, this study is
limited by the usual problems of interpreting qualita-
tive data. In particular, there is potential bias due to a
single rater. There was an attempt to counteract such
bias by operationalizing constructs through represen-
tative examples of qualitative responses (Appendix
A), but such efforts can only go so far.
As well, while multiple sources were used, in line
with Yin's suggestions to enhance construct validity,
the emphasis was on collecting data via qualitative
interviews, with questionnaires, document collection,
and observations used to augment the interview data.
Furthermore, quantitative scales were used when-
ever existing scales were available. However, there
were no available scales for the management initia-
tive constructs. Future research could include the
development and testing of valid and reliable scales
to measure the extent of various management initia-
tives.
Finally, the results are generalizable to only the
type of plants studied, namely, repetitive, mainly
assemble-to-order manufacturers, employing about
350-900 people, with sales about Can$20-300 mil-
lion, and producing a variety of fabricated metal
products.
Appendix A. Qualitative operational def'mitions:
representative examples
A.1. Management initiatives
A. 1.1. Provide workforce security
Evidence for provision of job security could in-
clude the following: (a) management indicates that
there will not be layoffs as a result of productivity
improvements; (b) there is a policy or corporate
286 R. McLachlin/ Journal of OperationsManagement15 (1997)271-292
culture of retaining employees through economic
downturns; (c) there are formal contract provisions
that restrict layoffs; (d) management promises first-
line supervisors and mid-level managers that new
roles will not affect their employment; and (e) there
are good severance packages in case of exigencies.
A.1.2. Promote employee responsibility
Evidence for promoting employee responsibility
could include the following: (a) management indi-
cates it wants employees to take more responsibility;
(b) inspector positions are eliminated; (c) operators
are expected to perform basic maintenance; (d) oper-
ators interact with suppliers and/or customers; (e)
operators are included on various project teams; (f)
business information is shared with all employees;
(g) hourly employees choose their own improvement
projects; (h) operators, not a quality assurance de-
partment, are responsible for quality; (i) operators
have the responsibility and authority to stop produc-
tion; (j) operators do their own setups, housekeeping,
problem solving, and/or scheduling; (k) hourly
workers and supervisors have responsibility and au-
thority for standards setting; (1) employees have
mandates to implement process changes within their
own work areas without formal approval; and (m)
supervisors, mid-level managers and staff become
supporters and facilitators as well as perform tasks
previously done by higher-level management.
A.1.3. Provide training
Evidence for provision of training could include
the following: (a) there are ongoing rather than ad
hoc training programs; (b) training is aimed at all
employees, not just salaried employees; (c) training
is aimed at more than purely technical skills; (d)
there is cross-training for multiple skills; (e) typical
topic areas for training include JIT, SPC, problem
solving skills, quality, continuous improvement, setup
reduction, maintenance, team approaches, or
scheduling; and (f) there is extensive initial training
upon hiring.
A. 1.4. Promote teamwork
Evidence for promotion of teamwork could in-
clude the following: (a) higher management has made
it clear that the plant is proceeding in the direction of
using teams; (b) time is available for team meetings;
(c) people are trained to operate in groups; (d)
consultants are brought in to set up teams; (e) team
approaches have clear management priority; (f)
hourly employees are included on initial JIT teams;
and (g) there are trained team facilitators.
A.1.5. Use group performance measures
Evidence for the use of group performance mea-
sures could include the following: (a) there are few
individual incentives; (b) key indicators are aimed at
items such as quality, throughput, and customer ser-
vice for an entire team or department rather than for
individuals; (c) there are few pay classifications; and
(d) line workers are paid a day rate or a salary. As
well, there could be negative indicators such as an
existing individual incentive scheme (piece rates).
A.1.6. Demonstrate visible commitment
Evidence for the demonstration of visible commit-
ment could include the following: (a) management
clearly supports those who stop production for qual-
ity (e.g., by refusing to allow defects to leave the
factory regardless of short-term financial considera-
tions); (b) managers are on the shop floor checking
closely on progress; (c) managers try to help em-
ployees resolve problems; (d) employees are retained
during tough times; (e) top management gives JIT a
clear high priority; (f) continuous improvement is a
central part of each manager's responsibilities; (g)
management is clear about the results it expects from
JIT efforts, the process is top-driven; (h) employees
know that it is acceptable to make mistakes while
trying to improve the production process; (i) employ-
ees clearly understand where management is headed;
(j) management initiates, rather than simply supports,
process improvement efforts; (k) management uses
deliberate stress to gain continuous improvement
(e.g., forced inventory reductions, tight linkages,
conveying a sense of urgency); and (1) management
takes action that is difficult to reverse (e.g., closing a
warehouse).
A.2. Extent of JIT flow elements
A.2.1. Setup reduction
Evidence for setup reduction could include the
following: (a) changeovers are done in minutes rather
than hours; (b) changeovers are eliminated com-
 R. McLachlin/ Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292
pletely; (c) there is use of video techniques a n d / o r
other forms of practice and learning; (d) special
fixtures are developed to aide the setup; (e) there are
special setup reduction teams and projects; (f) there
is elimination of adjustments during setups; (g) oper-
ators do their own setups; and (h) the next setup is
organized while the machine is still running.
A.2.2. Equipment layout
Evidence for equipment layout could include the
following: (a) there are cells with equipment ar-
ranged according to product flow rather than ma-
chine function; (b) there are layout changes to ac-
commodate multiprocess handling; (c) the use of
conveyors is reduced to short linkages or eliminated;
and (d) full work control methods are used.
A.2.3. Small lot size
The criterion for evidence of small lot size is
simply typical lot sizes that approach 'one', but
realistically are 100 or less.
A.2.4. Uniform plant load
Evidence for a uniform plant load could include
the following: (a) there is a fixed and level schedule;
(b) they produce the same mix of end items or
families each day, and possibly each hour (to match
daily demand rates); (c) there is a reduction in
upstream inventory swings and panic reactions to
schedule demands; and (d) there is little or no expe-
diting.
A.2.5. Daily schedule adherence
Evidence for daily schedule adherence could in-
clude the following: (a) the schedule leaves time for
fixing quality problems, attending meetings, a n d / o r
performing preventive maintenance; and (b) the pro-
duction schedule is met exactly each day.
A.2.6. Pull system
Evidence for a pull system could include the
following: (a) kanban or similar signals are used to
authorize production at a workstation; (b) the sched-
ule or production rates are issued to final assembly
operations only; (c) a fixed number of standard
containers are used for movement and storage of
goods; and (d) there is strict control of work-in-pro-
cess inventory levels.
287
A.2.7. JIT delivery .from suppliers
Evidence for JIT delivery from suppliers could
include the following: (a) there are long-term rela-
tionships with certified suppliers; (b) suppliers have
a long-term schedule but deliver according to pull
signals; (c) the plant makes fixed 'milk runs' to pick
up supplies from groups of suppliers; (d) suppliers
are required to produce to a schedule rather than ship
from finished goods; (e) there are restrictions on the
type of allowable containers; (f) most suppliers are
in proximity; (g) there are reduced inventory buffers
for incoming goods; (h) incoming materials go
straight to the point of use; (i) there are frequent,
small-lot deliveries; and (j) the plant provides ad-
vance information and assures suppliers that they can
believe the numbers.
A.3. Extent of JIT quality elements
A.3.1. Supplier quality level
Evidence for supplier quality could include the
following: (a) there are long-term relationships with
certified suppliers; (b) the plant promotes and en-
courages suppliers who can add value; (c) the plant
minimizes the number of suppliers; (d) there is little
incoming inspection; (e) personnel from the plant go
to supplier plants to help improve suppliers' pro-
cesses; (f) the plant requires suppliers to have partic-
ular programs (e.g., SPC); (g) there is an active
supplier audit and certification program; (h) the plant
provides some supplier training in the new methods;
(i) suppliers are involved in new product develop-
ment; and (j) suppliers are selected on the basis of
quality more than price.
A.3.2. Zero defects quality control
Evidence for zero defects quality control could
include the following: (a) use of mistake-proof (poka
yoke) devices; (b) operators perform 100% source
inspection at the immediate workstation; (c) the op-
erator who makes a part is responsible for its quality;
(d) the time to discover defects is minimized; (e)
there are efforts to eliminate the source of quality
problems rather than simply address symptoms; and
(f) the plant considers the acceptable level of defects
to be zero.
288 R. McLachlin / Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292
A.3.3. Statistical process control
Evidence for statistical process control (SPC)
could include the following: (a) much of the process-
ing in the plant is represented as being subject to
SPC; (b) SPC charts are evident and appear to be
actively used; (c) many hourly employees have taken
some SPC training; (d) there are well-documented
procedures outlining what employees are expected to
do whenever their SPC charting goes out of limits;
(e) there are SPC instructions and sketches for the
operators at each workstation; and (f) solutions to
problems are attributed to the use of SPC (such as
reduced complaints from subsequent operations).
A.3.4. Use of charts and feedback
Evidence for the use of charts and feedback could
include the following: (a) information on current
operations is visibly available to all employees; (b)
there is an overhead 'scoreboard' showing produc-
tion targets (scheduled vs. actual), typically by the
hour; (c) there are quality boards, showing defect
rates over time; and (d) there are other charts such as
kanban markings, boards for incoming purchased
parts, job skills of individuals in work teams, and
charts of machine breakdown and maintenance, to
name a few.
A.4. Employee involvement
A. 4.1. Employee involvement
During interviews, evidence for employee in-
volvement could include the following: (a) there are
a substantial number of process improvement sug-
gestions per employee; (b) employees take the initia-
tive to resolve specific problems; (c) employees do
extra work without extra reward; (d) there are indica-
tors that hourly employees make frequent small pro-
cess improvements; (d) there are a substantial num-
ber of group problem-solving teams; (e) employees
volunteer for group activities and projects; (f) hourly
workers are included on problem-solving teams; (g)
there are indicators of improvements being made by
teams; (h) hourly employees share knowledge con-
cerning methods; and (i) team members' opinions
are sought and considered.
Appendix B. Quantitative operational defmitions
Following are items used in the manufacturing
practices questionnaire for those constructs ad-
dressed in this paper. The items were distributed
randomly in the questionnaire.
Sources: [1] Flynn et al., 1990c; [2] Sakakibara et
al., 1990.
Set-up time reduction (Source: [2]; reliability
0.68):
1. Our crews practice setups to reduce the time
required.
2. We have converted most of our set-up time to
external time while the machine is running.
3. We have low equipment set-up times in our plant.
4. We are aggressively working to lower set-up
times in our plant.
Equipment layout (Source: [2]; reliability 0.60):
1. We have organized our plant floor by means of
manufacturing cells.
2. We have eliminated many long material convey-
ors.
3. Our machines and processes are laid out in close
proximity to each other.
Small lot production (Source: [2]; reliability 0.62):
1. We have large lot sizes in our plant. (reverse
scored)
2. We tend to have large lot sizes in our master
schedule. (reverse scored)
3. We are aggressively working to lower lot sizes in
our plant.
Repetitive master schedule (uniform plant load)
(Source: [2]; reliability 0.54):
1. The master schedule is level-loaded in our plant
from day to day.
2. Our master schedule repeats the same mix of
products from hour to hour and day to day.
3. We make every model every day.
Daily schedule adherence (Source: [2]; reliability
0.60):
1. There is no time in the schedule for machine
breakdown or production stoppages. (reverse
scored)
2. We usually meet the production schedule each
day.
3. Our schedule is designed to allow time to make
up for production and quality problems.
Pull system (Source: [2]; reliability 0.65):
 R. McLachlin/ Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292
1. We use a pull system to control our production.
2. We use a backflushing system, where components
are subtracted from inventory records after each
product is made.
3. Direct labour is authorized to stop production for
quality problems.
4. The control of production is in the hands of the
workers.
5. Our machines and processes are laid out in close
proximity to each other.
Pull system (additional items):
1. Production rates are issued only to final assembly.
2. Production at a workstation is triggered by a
signal from a following workstation.
3. We have a strict maximum inventory level for
each component.
Kanban (Source: [2]; reliability 0.88; used as
indicator of pull system):
1. We use kanban squares, containers or signals for
production control.
2. Our suppliers deliver to us in kanban containers,
without the use of separate packaging.
3. We use a kanban pull system for production
control.
4. Vendors fill our kanban containers, rather than
filling purchase orders.
JIT delivery from suppliers (Source: [2]; reliabil-
ity 0.63):
1. We have long-term arrangements with our suppli-
ers.
2. Our suppliers are certified or qualified for quality.
3. We receive daily shipments from most suppliers.
4. Our vendors supply us on a just-in-time basis.
Supplier quality level (Source: [1], [2]; reliability
0.73):
1. Our suppliers are actively involved in our new
product development process.
2. Quality is our number one criterion for selecting
suppliers.
3. We rely on a small number of high quality suppli-
ers.
4. We strive to establish long-term relationships with
suppliers.
Zero defect quality control (additional items):
1. We try to minimize the time between the occur-
rence and detection of a defect.
2. We typically inspect all processed items at the
workstation doing the work.
289
3. Human error in processing is usually caught by
100% checking devices.
4. The only acceptable level of defects at this plant
is zero.
5. We make ongoing efforts to eliminate the causes
of defects, rather than simply 'firefight'.
Statistical process control (Source: [1]; reliability
0.77):
1. Processes in our plant are designed to be 'fool
proof'.
2. A large percentage of the equipment or processes
on the shop floor is currently under statistical
quality control.
3. We make extensive use of statistical techniques to
reduce variance in processes.
4. We have standardized process instructions which
are given to personnel.
Use of charts and feedback (Source: [1]; reliabil-
ity 0.77):
1. Charts showing schedule compliance are posted
on the shop floor.
2. Charts plotting the frequency of machine break-
downs are posted on the shop floor.
3. Information on quality performance is readily
available to employees.
4. Charts showing defect rates are posted on the
shop floor.
5. Information on productivity is readily available to
employees.
Small group problem solving (Source: [1], [2];
reliability 0.71):
I. Our plant forms teams to solve problems.
2. During problem solving sessions, we make an
effort to get all team members' opinions and ideas
before making a decision.
3, Many problems are being solved through small
group sessions.
Employee involvement (additional items):
1, We attempt to improve our processes even when
there are no pressing problems.
2. Employees are constantly eliminating activities
that don't add value.
3. Employees frequently make small process im-
provements at their workstations.
4. Employees provide a high rate of formal process
improvement suggestions.
5. Employees frequently develop new and better
standard operating methods.
290 R. McLachlin/ Journal of Operations Management 15 (1997) 271-292
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