POLICIES

After visiting stricken areas by helicopter, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon urged Myanmar’s
leaders to open their borders to massive aid, with a coordinated system so that no villages are left
out. Following a two-hour meeting with junta leader, Senior general Than Shwe, Ban announced that
Myanmar would now accept all aid workers, regardless of nationality.

Senator Richard Gordon, who is concurrently chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is
heading the Philippine delegation to the ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference.

SIIA Presents Special Report, “From Proxy to Principle: Singapore’s Myanmar

Policy”

SINGAPORE, 31 MARCH 2010 - As the government of Myanmar prepares to adopt a new constitution and convene general
elections later this year, the Singapore Institute of International Affairs is releasing a Special Report, “From Proxy to Principle:
Singapore’s Myanmar Policy”, incorporating perspectives and offering considerations for Singapore’s continued engagement
with Myanmar.

“While barring Aung San Suu Kyi seems a step back, there is a need for credible elections, and efforts must be made to ensure
that parties such as the National League for Democracy (NLD) can participate freely,”  says SIIA Chairman Simon Tay.  “The
role of a moral but pragmatic international community cannot be understated. Even if, like an orchestra, different countries
use different instruments and play different notes, the main theme must be consistent. Singapore's unique engagement and its
involvement with ASEAN will make it a key player in addressing the Myanmar situation.”

Myanmar is at a critical juncture. It is important for countries to review their policies towards Myanmar, especially since it has
immediate implications for the Southeast Asia Region. The report discusses Singapore’s Myanmar policy from five perspectives:
government-to-government relations, trade and business, humanitarian aid, public opinion and international pressure. Three
policy options were discussed: the Proxy Approach, where engagement with Myanmar continues normally; the Principled
Approach, where Singapore disengages and sanctions Myanmar, or the Pragmatic Approach, which occupies a middle ground
between the Proxy and Principled Approaches.

The Special Report was derived from a closed-door roundtable with representatives from the business, NGO, think tank and
academic sectors, including those concerned with human rights violations, business and humanitarian assistance in Myanmar,
as well as those more generally concerned with Singapore’s policies towards ASEAN neighbours.

The Special Report forms part of the Asia Society’s Current Realities and Future Directions in Burma/Myanmar, a collection of
reports from leading institutes and experts in nine Asian countries and the United States. The collection underscores the
changing circumstances inside and around Myanmar that could create a context for both risk and opportunity and result in
consequences for the broader region. The initiative was directed by Suzanne DiMaggio, Director of Policy Studies at the Asia
Society.

Initially, India strongly supported the prodemocracy movement in Burma and Aung San Suu Kyi. In
the mid-1990s, it changed course and began to provide weapons and tacit support to the Burmese
junta. India’s about-face regarding its policy toward Burma was driven by four motivations: access to
natural resources, desire to expand Indian influence in Southeast Asia, combat insurgencies in north
east India , and balance against growing Chinese influence. India’s attempt to access Burma’s
natural resources and counter China’s influence have been unsuccessful thus far and are unlikely to
succeed due to Burma’s security considerations. Access to Burma’s oil and gas reserves is probably
the most important consideration in Indo-Burma relations. Yet despite the fact that India has
ignored pressure from Western powers to speak out and take action against Myanmar, the A-1 and
A-3 blocks of gas off the coast of Burma were awarded to China. The concession went to China,
because in January 2007, China exercised the almighty scepter of international relations, its Security
Council veto, against a joint United States and United Kingdom resolution to condemn the Burmese
government’s human rights violations, urge them to release Suu Kyi, and encourage the junta to
begin the process of democratic transition. Although Rangoon’s leaders are known to be
suspicious of Chinese influence over their country, they are also primarily concerned with regime
survival and India does not have the international political influence that China has to stifle claims
for regime change. India has also initiated and agreed to finance the entire Kaladan multi-modal
project which aims to develop the Sittwe port in Myanmar’s south-west as well as waterways and
highways along the Kaladan River to receive goods fromIndia. In the future, India plans to continue
expanding its road and rail links with Southeast Asia through Burma. However, the problem is that
many of the transportation links that India proposes run through areas controlled by ethnic groups
and militants that demand autonomy or a separate state. Consequently, these groups can disrupt
any peaceful India-Burma transportation and India’s desire to use Burma as a conduit for Southeast
Asia will not be secure as long as military junta refuses to accommodate the various ethnic groups
within its national framework. If India does seek to use Burma as a passageway for its
expanded presence in south-east Asia, it has a stake in ensuring that Burma is less repressive of its
ethnic communities and more open to political compromise.