Zomato - Company Update: in Pole Position

ZOMATO – COMPANY UPDATE
In pole position
• Headroom for growth in order volume and average order value

• Increased penetration into Tier 2/3 cities to spur growth and profitability
• Strong cash balance to aid aggressive participation in M&A opportunities
September 24, 2020
▪ SOUMITRA CHATTERJEE  soumitra@sparkcapital.in  +91 22 6176 6805

▪ OMPRAKASH KAVADI  omprakashkavadi@sparkcapital.in  +91 44 4344 0096
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Zomato Outlook
POSITIVE
In pole position
The online food tech market size in India stood at US$4bn in 2019 (vs. global market of US$ 75bn) and is expected to grow by ~25% CAGR during 2019-22 to US$8bn. The
online food delivery market in India has witnessed the entry of players such as Just Eat and FoodieBay (Zomato) followed by Foodpanda, TinyOwl, Swiggy & Uber Eats COMPANY UPDATE
amongst others. A series of consolidation and market exits resulted in duopoly in the market, dominated by Zomato and Swiggy. Zomato has increased its delivery 24 September 2020
capabilities post acquisition of Runnr in 2017 and has gained an edge over Swiggy post acquisition of Uber Eats, a distant third player, in 2020. However, Amazon testing
the waters with its pilot online food delivery operations in Bengaluru could increase the competition in an otherwise duopoly market. With ~50-55% market share in
India, Zomato provides end-to-end services including listings, discovery, reviews, ordering and delivery with operations spread across 24 countries and 10k cities. The 20%
growth in online food tech market and thus Zomato is likely to be driven by 1) increased percentage of online spend on food services vs. total spend on food. At present, 10%
the % of online spend on food is ~4% in India compared to ~10% in U.S. and 13% in China, 2) accessibility to capital by Zomato (US$ 1bn+) and Swiggy (US$ 1.6bn+),
which would help penetrate the market, 3) increase in ordering frequency by consumers, although the average order value could moderate, 4) increased penetration 0%
Closing price
into Tier 2/3 cities (35% of order volume mix for Zomato), which also provides tailwinds to profitability and 5) expanding network of restaurants on food tech platforms -10%
in a post Covid world. We believe Zomato is well-positioned with strong cash balance (expected to be US$600mn post current round of capital raise) and all-round
offerings to capture the growing market & maintain leadership position in the online food tech industry with scope to diversify as well as strengthen its presence in -20%
adjacent markets such as grocery, cloud kitchen, hyperlocal delivery & private labels amongst others. Expect revenue for Zomato to grow by 22% during FY21-23E. With -30%
Zomato planning to get publicly listed in CY2021, we arrive at a valuation of US$5bn for Zomato by assigning 10x EV/Sales multiple to our FY23E revenue expectations.
We maintain ADD rating for Info Edge and increase our TP to Rs. 3600/share (Rs. 3500 earlier) led by increase in our valuation for Zomato (US$5bn vs. 4bn earlier). -40%
Nov-19
Jul-20
Sep-19
Sep-20
May-20
Jan-20
Mar-20
Zomato – Well-positioned to capture the expanding online food delivery market in India
Consolidation in online food delivery market is a global phenomenon – China represents the largest online food delivery market with Meituan Dianping and Ele.me
together capturing >90% of the market, a structure similar to that in India. Meituan Dianping is the global leader in online food delivery followed by Just Eat Takeaway.com Sensex Index NSEIT Index
(Europe), which is in the process of merger with Grub Hub (U.S.) to form a formidable but a distant second player. Just Eat (U.K. listed entity) & Takeaway.com
(Netherlands listed entity) announced a merger in July 2019 and received an approval in April 2020. Further, the merged entity, Just Eat Takeaway.com, entered into an
Stock performance (%)
agreement with Grub Hub to acquire 100% shares, which is expected to happen in 1QCY2021. In U.S., Uber Eats, which had a failed attempt to acquire Grub Hub, has
announced to acquire Postmates for US$2.7bn in July 2020. The online food delivery market is undergoing a consolidation wave, which is resulting in large players 1m 3m 12m
expected to benefit from economies of scale. However, the gross merchandise value (GMV) of food delivery transactions in 2019 for Meituan Dianping (EUR 50.8bn) is 3.7x
the GMV of proforma combined entity (Just Eat Takeaway.com + Grub Hub), signifying the huge gap between the first and second largest players in the world. CNXIT 10.0% 34.9% 29.1%
Headroom for growth in order volume and average order value –The order volume for Zomato during 1HFY20 (214mn) is merely ~6% of that registered for Meituan Sensex -3.0% 12.4% -3.6%
Dianping, the largest online food delivery player in China. Also, the average order value (AOV= GMV/order volume) stood at US$3.8 during 1HFY20 for Zomato vs. US$6.7
during CY19 for Meituan. The AOV is also considerably low compared to the peers in developed countries - Just Eat (~US$14-15 across Europe), Takeaway.com (~US$23-24
across Netherlands & Germany) and Grub Hub (US$33) in 2019. We expect the order volumes to grow strongly at a CAGR of 35% during FY21-24E, while the AOV could
moderate over long-term, as Zomato tries to penetrate more into Tier 2/3 cities and establish leadership position. The management commentary from Zomato indicated
that the GMV of the industry has reverted to 75-80% of pre-COVID levels by Aug 2020.
Increased penetration into Tier 2/3 cities to spur growth and profitability – Zomato derives ~65% of the order volumes from top 15 cities while the rest is from Tier 2/3
cities. Zomato has gradually expanded its operations from 13 cities in FY17 to 500 cities in 2019. In the last 2 years, food aggregators have started penetrating into Tier 2/3
cities to tap the potential market, while the cost economics in these cities provide tailwinds to profitability. For Zomato, while the AOV is lower in non-metro cities by 20%, RESEARCH ANALYSTS
the cost of delivery is lower by 50%, thus making operations in non-metro cities to be more profitable than metro cities. The operating costs and customer acquisition
costs are lower in Tier 2/3 cities. With increasing penetration into Tier 2/3 cities, we expect profitability to improve for Zomato although the revenue would be impacted to SOUMITRA CHATTERJEE
some extent. The contribution margin for Zomato has improved to Rs. 27/order in 1QFY21 vs. loss of Rs. 47/order in 1QFY20 led by higher delivery fees, lower discount and soumitra@sparkcapital.in
higher AOV. While the current levels of profitability are unlikely to sustain, the contribution margin per order is expected to normalize to ~Rs.12-15/order. +91 22 6176 6805
Strong cash balance and continued funding - Zomato has a cash balance of US$250mn and expects to reach US$600mn cash reserves post the closure of current round of OMPRAKASH KAVADI
capital raise. Zomato has raised a total of US$1bn+ in capital till date compared to US$1.6bn+ by Swiggy. The latest round of capital raise for Zomato includes US$250mn
omprakashkavadi@sparkcapital.in
approval from Tiger Global, Temasek & Kora Capital, out of which, $60mn from Temasek and $100mn from Tiger Global have been received. We believe Zomato is in a
strong position to capture the expanding market pie with innovative offerings like Zomato Gold, Zomato Treats and Food@work, which would complement the food +91 44 4344 0096
delivery business. Also, the strong cash balance would help Zomato to participate in M&A opportunities and fight competition in various areas of the business.
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Zomato – Company Update
Zomato – An overview of operations across the globe
▪ Zomato was founded by Deepinder Goyal and Pankaj Chaddah in 2008. It was launched as foodiebay.com and the
name was later changed to Zomato
▪ The idea behind foodiebay.com was to provide a scanned list of menu cards with an objective to help customers pick
their choice of restaurant
▪ Foodiebay.com was rebranded as Zomato in Nov 2010, as the company intended to increase the scope of offerings to
include recommendation engine that suggests the best places to order home delivery or dine out, and not restrict to
just restaurant discovery platform. Further, the company also wanted to avoid confusion with the brand ebay.
▪ Zomato entered into online food ordering business in 2015 and got its own delivery
fleet in 2017 post acquisition of Runnr
▪ With Runnr, Zomato started providing end-to-end

Canada
services including listings, discovery, reviews, ordering
UK and delivery. Also, the delivery base is increased with
Poland
Czech Republic more restaurants on the platform, who otherwise
Ireland
USA
Slovakia would not have delivered by their own
Portugal
Turkey ▪ At present, Zomato is present in 24 countries and
Italy Lebanon
Qatar operate across 10k+ cities globally.
India
UAE
The Philippines
Malaysia
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Brazil Indonesia
Australia
Chile South Africa

New Zealand
Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research
Page 3
Zomato – Timeline of major events
2008 2010 2011 2014 2015
▪ Started operations in the ▪ The name was changed to ▪ After establishing ▪ Zomato acquired 5 companies ▪ Zomato acquired 4
name of foodiebay.com by Zomato. First investment monopoly in Delhi, across New Zealand, Poland, companies across Turkey,
listing menu and contact ($1mn) by Info Edge Zomato expanded its Italy, Czech Republic and U.S. and India during
details of restaurants operations to other cities Slovakia during CY2014 CY2015, taking the total
like Pune, Bangalore, number of acquisitions to
▪ Increased presence to 100 cities
Hyderabad, Chennai and 9 during 2014/2015
in India and across 18 countries
Ahmedabad
covering 69k restaurants
overseas
2020 2019 2018 2017 2016
▪ Zomato acquired the India ▪ Zomato has gradually ▪ Zomato valued at ▪ The online food ordering ▪ Post acquisition of MapleGraph in April 2015,
business of UberEats at a transformed the revenue $1.1bn giving it a service crossed the Zomato launched Zomato Base, a cloud based POS
valuation of $206mn in an streams to transaction Unicorn status, milestone of 3mn orders per product for restaurants. Zomato Base is Android-
all stock deal, wherein, based model post funding of month based POS system that offers restaurants a host of
UberEats gets 10% stake $200mn from Ant features including menu, recipe and inventory
▪ The revenue from ▪ With acquisition of Runnr,
in Zomato Financials in Feb management, a built-in payment solution that
transactions contributed Zomato got its own delivery
2018 accepts debit and credit card payments, CRM, and
▪ The company indicated to 85% of overall revenue fleet. In FY18, the revenue
real time analytics
that it intends to do IPO in the month of Mar 2019 from food ordering
during first half of 2021 compared to 100% contributed to 30% of ▪ Zomato ventured into table bookings with the
revenue from advertising overall revenue vs. 17% in acquisition of US-based online table reservation
three years ago FY17 platform NexTable, since renamed Zomato Book
Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research
Page 4
Zomato – Shift to a transaction based platform from that of an Advertisement based platform
The contribution of Ad revenue decreased over a period of time With increasing contribution from transaction based revenue, the business
While advertisement segments have been restructured into Delivery, Dining out and Sustainability during FY19
88%
revenue used to be the
75% major contributor to
Revenue by segments (US$mn)
62% the overall revenue in
FY16, gradually the 323
transaction based 192%
revenue picked pace CAGR
and represented 85% 155
of overall revenue in 56
38 30 49
the month of Mar 0 2 15
24 27 38 51 46 74 2019
Delivery Dining Out Sustainability
FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19
FY18 FY19 FY20
Ad sales revenue (US$mn) Total Revenue (US$mn) Ad revenue as % of Total
Note: Numbers are restated for FY19 during FY20. Comparable FY19 numbers for Delivery/Dining out
Source: Company data, Spark Capital segments are $144mn/47mn
Operating losses are contained in FY20 vs. FY19 despite strong growth in revenue
Sustainability
Dining 3.7%
Revenue and Operating cash burn(US$mn) Revenue and Operating cash burn (US$mn)
Out
14.2% 500 394
192
206
Revenue Mix 85
51 66 74
FY20
-15 -11
Most of the losses are on account of

food delivery business in India -277
Delivery -294 -293
82.0% FY17 FY18 FY19 FY19 FY20
Total Revenue Total Cost Operating cash burn Revenue (US$mn) EBITDA (US$mn)
Source: Company data, Spark Capital Note: Numbers are restated for FY19 during FY20
Page 5
Online Food Delivery Industry
Page 6
Food Tech Industry in India to grow 25-30% CAGR over next 3 years; Online food service penetration low at 4%
Food Tech Industry - India Online buyer base (mn) Online spending (US$bn)
130
$7.5-8bn 800
25-30% 700
CAGR 25%+
CAGR
$3.5-4bn
300
40
2019 2022 2015 2020 2025 2020 2025
Source: Industry reports
The online food delivery market witnessed entry of players

Online food service as % of total food service spend such as Just Eat and FoodieBay in 2006. Further, many other
13.0%
players like Foodpanda, TinyOwl, Swiggy and Uber Eats
entered the market over a period of time. The industry has
Opportunity for witnessed consolidation and market exits resulting in
growth in the 9.4% 9.5% duopoly, with Zomato and Swiggy being prominent players.
Indian Food Also, in the last few years, there has been growth in cloud
Tech Industry kitchens with players like Freshmenu, Box8 and Rebel Foods
amongst others
4.0% 4.3% The online spend on food service as % of total spend on food
service is one of the lowest for India at 4.0% compared to 13%
2.0% for China, implying good headroom for growth
Increase in internet and online buyer base, higher order
frequency, expanding reach of food tech players across Tier-
2/3 cities and increased number of restaurants on online food
Indonesia India Singapore U.K. U.S. China
tech platforms are likely to drive growth in Food Tech
industry in India
Source: Euromonitor, BCG analysis
Page 7
Capital raise in food tech industry in India has spiked over the last 2-3 years
% of total funding in last 3 years Internet led businesses received more than 70% of overall funding in last 3 years
Represents 1 Company
10 – Current unicorns in
India Internet led business
34%
8– Funding received by
the sector in last 3
years 2017-19 ($bn)
14% 13%
10% 6–
4–
E-Commerce Food Tech & Online Logistics Fintech
Grocery
Source: Industry reports 2–
Capital raise in food tech has increased over the last 2-3 years. Food US$mn
delivery segment has attracted majority of the capital infusion 0–
1 5 10 15
Food delivery apps account for ~83% of the 34 Sector Valuation ($bn)
total funding in food tech space 22
Source: Industry reports
4
165 Top food service start ups include
66
3 12 1,672
28 10
12 129
81 89 102
60
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Online Food Delivery Cloud Kitchen Online Table Reservation
Source: Industry reports, Tracxn
Page 8
Zomato vs. Global Peers
Page 9
Prominent players in the food tech industry across the globe
Meituan
is the largest player in online
food delivery industry in the
world while the second
largest player is Just Eat
Takeaway.com, which is in
the process of merger with
UK
Grub Hub. However, the gross
The Netherlands Germany merchandise value (GMV) of
USA food delivery transactions in
China 2019 for Meituan Dianping
India (EUR 50.8bn) is 3.7x the GMV
of proforma combined entity
(Just Eat Takeaway.com +
Grub Hub), signifying the
Brazil huge gap between the first
and second largest players in
the world
Source: Spark Capital Research

Page 10
Financials of the global peers vs. Zomato
Revenue (US$mn) Gross Margins(%)

7,940
91%
90%
90%
86%
84%
82%
82%
81%
73%
73%
72%
62%
61%
57%
53%
52%
52%
47%
5,762
40%
38%
25%
19%
14%
14%
8%
NA
NA
3,113
-8%
1,385
1,312
1,041
-120%
1,007
-124%
798
786
704
683
513
509
493
466
394
378
362
321
274
206
188
184
124
85
74
51
28
27
NA
Meituan Delivery Hero Grub Hub Just Eat Takeaway.com Zomato Meituan Delivery Hero Grub Hub Just Eat Takeaway.com Zomato
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Source: Company data, Spark Capital. Note: Food delivery segment for Meituan Source: Company data, Spark Capital. Note: Food delivery segment for Meituan
EBITDA Margins (%) PAT margins (%)
18%
16%
12%
12%
11%
10%
10%
30%
29%
26%
25%
24%
22%
22%
18%
8%
10%
0
2%
NA
-1%
-2%
-20%
-23%
-24%
-25%
-6%
-26%
-17%
-18%
-18%
-18%
-39%
-26%
-37%
-40%
-43%
-61%
-61%
-44%
-73%
-74%
-92%
-80%
-93%
-160%
-168%
-167%
-237%
-254%
Delivery Hero Grub Hub Just Eat Takeaway.com Zomato Delivery Hero Grub Hub Just Eat Takeaway.com Zomato
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Source: Company data, Spark Capital Source: Company data, Spark Capital
Page 11
Global peers – Meituan Dianping (China) is the global leader with distant second being Just Eat Takeaway.com (Europe), which is in the process of
getting merged with Grub Hub (U.S.)
Gross Merchandise Value in EURbn - 2018 Revenue in EURmn - 2018
36.2 1411
Meituan is a global leader in online food
delivery services headquartered in Beijing, 1213
which also provides other services including
car-hailing, movie ticketing, travel booking
and entertainment/lifestyle services 854
687 642
7.3 339
6.7
4.5 4.3
1
Meituan Just Eat + Uber Eats Delivery Hero Grub Hub Postmates Meituan Just Eat + Grub Hub Delivery Hero Uber Eats Postmates
Takeaway.com Takeaway.com
Source: Company data, Spark Capital. Note: Food delivery segment for Meituan Source: Company data, Spark Capital. Note: Food delivery segment for Meituan
Just Eat Takeaway.com has entered into an

Just Eat (U.K. listed entity) and Takeaway.com (Netherlands listed entity) announced merger Revenue and EBITDA trend in EURmn - 2019 agreement with Grubhub (U.S. listed entity)
in July 2019 and got approval from the competition authority in April 2020. As of April 2020, to acquire 100% shares of Grubhub Inc. The
2,694 shareholders of Grubhub are expected to
the merger was valued at GBP 6.2bn
2,259 own 30% of combined entity. Expected
completion in 1Q CY 2021
1,465
Just East
850
Takeaway.com 402
Overlapping
Country
-431 -405
Joint Ventures/
Partnerships -1,235
Just Eat Takeaway.com + Uber Eats Delivery Hero Doordash
Grub Hub
Revenue EBITDA
Source: Company data, Spark Capital. Note: Assuming proforma consolidated number
Source: Company data, Spark Capital. Note: Food delivery segment for Meituan
for Just Eat Takeaway and Grub in 2019
Page 12
Global peers – Merger between Just Eat Takeaway.com and Grub Hub to form a formidable, but still distant second player
2019 Active customers Orders GMV Revenue Adj Ebitda EBITDA Margins
Just Eat Takeaway.com 48mn 413mn EUR 8.4bn (US$9.4bn) EUR 1.5bn (US$1.7bn) EUR 234mn (US$260mn) 15.6%
Grub Hub 23mn 180mn EUR 5.3bn (US$5.9bn) EUR 1.2bn (US$1.3bn) EUR 168mn (US$186mn) 14.0%
Combined Entity 71mn 593mn EUR 13.7bn (US$15.3bn) EUR 2.7bn (US$3.0bn) EUR 402mn (US$447mn) 14.9%
Source: Company data, Spark Capital
Geographical presence of combined entity

(Just Eat Takeaway.com and Grubhub) ✓ 25 countries
✓ +360k Restaurants GMV (EURbn)

5.3
✓ >70mn Active 4.6
Consumers 3.4
✓ >700mn Addressable
Population
✓ ~10% penetration 2017 2018 2019
Revenue (EURbn)
Grubhub
1.2
Joint Ventures/ 0.9
Partnerships 0.6
Just Eat Takeaway.com
– No. 1 position
Just Eat Takeaway.com
– Company presence 2017 2018 2019
Source: Company data, Spark Capital Source: Company data, Spark Capital
Page 13
The order volumes for Zomato during 1HFY20 is ~6% of that registered for the global leader, Meitual Dianping
Zomato - Order Volume (mn) Meituan Dianping - Order volumes (mn) Takeaway.com - Order volume (mn)
Netherlands
214 92.4% 8,722 69.5
Germany
CAGR
Other markets
6,393 51.7
38
4,090 32.7 32.6
27.4 28.6
23.9
55 16.9
1,585
637
1HFY19 1HFY20 CY15 CY16 CY17 CY18 CY19 2017 2018 2019
Grub Hub - Order volumes (mn) Just Eat - LTM (as of Nov/Dec - 2019) Order volumes (mn)
21.4% 180 165

CAGR
159
131
122
100
83
57
45
13
CY15 CY16 CY17 CY18 CY19 UK Canada Europe ANZ Brazil/mexico
Page 14
Zomato – Exploring Business Segments
01 Delivery
02 Dining Out
03 Sustainability
Page 15
Zomato – Company Update 01 Delivery
Food delivery forms the majority of the business with 82% of revenue mix
Sustainability Delivery – revenue mix Delivery operations in India - Number of cities

Dining 3.7%
Out
Revenue in $mn
14.2%
500
Top 15 cities (Tier-1/2)
contributed to 65% of the order
155 124% 323 volumes by end of 1HFY20 and
doubled over the previous 12
308% months
Revenue Mix 38
FY20
75.3% 82.0%
200
55.9%
13 15
Delivery
82.0%
FY18 FY19 FY20 FY17 FY18 FY19 1HFY20
Source: Company data, Spark Capital Note: FY19 revenue comparable to FY20 is $144mn
Order Volume (mn) Gross Merchandise Value ($mn) Value per order (Rs.)
Value per order is
1496 calculated as Gross
214 317 merchandise value
upon order volume
108%
821
718
55 $4.6
223% 268
254
$3.8
1HFY19 1HFY20
Order Volume (mn) 1HFY19 FY19 1HFY20 FY20 1HFY19 1HFY20
Page 16
Food delivery business - Acquisition of Runnr resulted in captive fleet of delivery personnel for Zomato
▪ Zomato has acquired Runnr in Sep 2017 in order to build a captive fleet of delivery
personnel (~1500)
▪ Prior to acquiring Runnr, Zomato was using the services of Grab and Runnr for executing
the deliveries. Also, Zomato has acquired a minority stake in Grab in Sep 2015
▪ With Runnr, Zomato started providing end-to-end services including listings, discovery,
reviews, ordering and delivery. Also, the delivery base is increased with more restaurants
on the platform, who otherwise would not have delivered by their own
▪ Runnr continued to function as an independent logistics company (owned by Zomato)
offering full stack of logistics services to players other than Zomato – e.g. pharma, grocery,
e-commerce etc
Runnr was a product of a
▪ However, Zomato has always maintained that the efficient way of delivering food would
merger between hyperlocal
be by using the restaurant’s own delivery personnel. The restaurants could utilize the
delivery start-up Roadrunnr
same staff during off peak hours
and food-ordering start-up
TinyOwl
Delivery Partners (000's)

230
The average pay out

Delivery partners who
150 comes to around Rs.
execute deliveries 8
9400, because many
hours a day and 5 days
delivery partners
74 a week take home
deliver part-time and do
around Rs. 20k every
not process enough
8 month
deliveries every month
FY18 1HFY19 FY19 1HFY20
Page 17
Food delivery business – Revenue model

Jan 2019 ▪ Zomato has adopted a staggered delivery charge depending on distance, order value and restaurant. Customers pay in the range of
Rs. 16, which is base fee, to Rs. 45 for small value orders. Also, in few cases, there was surge fee of Rs. 25 for delivery in peak hours
▪ Swiggy has raised its charges to 18-23% of order value during end of CY19 compared to 12-18% earlier
▪ Zomato and Swiggy have gradually raised the delivery fees during 2H of CY19, introduced
Jun 2019 dynamic discounting and tightened the cancellation rules
▪ Zomato has introduced ‘on time or free delivery’, if a customer opts to pay additional
Rs. 10 on select restaurants
▪ The delivery fee charged to the

customers is very dynamic in nature and
Nov 2019 depends on many factors alongside the
strategy adopted by the company in
terms of gain in market share,
monetization of its platform and
improving profitability
Aug 2020
Delivery Charges
Determining
Factors
Old Rs. 0 & Rs. 20 Rs. 0 to Rs. 20

Order Value
New Rs. 25 & Rs. 35 Rs. 16 – Rs. 47 Peak/non-peak hours

Swiggy Super Zomato Gold
Old Rs. 49 & Rs. 179 Rs. 1,499 (1 Year)

Restaurant Zomato charges ~17-18% of order value as
commission from restaurants for delivering
New Rs. 79 & Rs. 349 Rs. 1,800 Distance covered food using its own fleet. In case restaurants
use their own delivery fleet, the commission
▪ Levy Cancellation Fees ▪ Levy surge fees during
would be ~6-7%
▪ Dynamic discounting peak hours
Page 18
Food delivery business – The average monthly active delivery partners stood at 200k during 1HFY20
Delivery Partners (000’s) - Zomato
1HFY20 230
FY19 150
1HFY19 74
FY18 8
Description 1HFY19 1HFY20
Average user order frequency (per month) 3.1 3.6
Average monthly transacting users (mn) 3.6 11.2
Average monthly active restaurants (K) 43 119
Average monthly active delivery partners (K) 49 200
Source: Company data, Spark Capital Source: Company data.Note: Data as per 1HFY20 report
Page 19
Food delivery business – The acquisition of Uber Eats by Zomato resulted in an overall market share of 50-55% for Zomato
▪ The first big consolidation in the online food delivery market happened in Jan 2020,
when Zomato acquired the Indian operations of Uber Eats
▪ The acquisition of Uber Eats, the food delivery business run by Uber, happened through
an all-stock transaction valuing the company at $350mn. Post the transaction, Uber
holds ~10% stake in Zomato
▪ The users on Uber Eats platform have been seamlessly moved to Zomato’s platform
▪ Uber entered the Indian food delivery business in 2017 and relied heavily on
discounting to acquire and retain users. While Uber Eats has been able to establish its
position in few towns and cities, the competition for market leadership has always been
The combined entity (Zomato + between Swiggy and Zomato
Uber Eats) now commands market
share of 50-55% in terms of number
and value of orders ▪ The average order value (AOV) on Swiggy
ranged anywhere between Rs 243- Rs 300
during Oct-Dec 2019,
▪ AOV on Zomato stood between Rs 252-Rs
278 during Oct-Dec 2019
Daily Order Numbers (mn) in Dec 2019 Average Order Value (Rs.) in Dec 2019
1.4 285
272
1.2
170
0.4
Swiggy Zomato Uber Eats Swiggy Zomato Uber Eats
Source: RedSeer Consulting, Spark Capital Source: RedSeer Consulting, Spark Capital
Page 20
Food delivery business – In COVID world

Zomato – Overall Business Zomato – Overall Business The monthly burn rate is expected to land under $1mn
in July 2020, while revenue is likely to reach ~60% of
Operating losses are contained 394 41
pre-COVID peaks ($23mn per month)
in FY20 vs. FY19 despite strong Also, as of July 2020, Zomato expects to make
revenue growth complete recovery in the subsequent 3-6 months while
continuing to maintain tight control on
293
277 costs/profitability
192
17 The online food delivery industry witnessed peak
volumes of 3.2-3.5mn per month in Oct 2019. COVID-
12 19 hit the industry with order volumes getting as low
as 10% of the peak levels in April/May 2020. By Aug
2020, the GMV of orders for the industry has reverted
1.5
to 75-80% of Pre-COVID levels.
As per Zomato, ‘out of the 83% restaurants that are
FY19 FY20 1QFY21 June 2020 not open for business, 10% restaurants have already
shut down permanently and an additional 30%
Revenue (US$mn) EBITDA Loss (US$mn) Revenue (US$mn) EBITDA Loss (US$mn) restaurants are unlikely reopen at all’.
Food Delivery Unit Economics

▪ The GMV of food delivery business was 80% down in the last week of Mar 2020, compared
to the peak pre-Covid week (in mid February)
▪ By July 2020, the food delivery GMV has recovered to 60% of pre-COVID levels
▪ The unit economics of the food delivery business has improved over the last 1-1.5 years.
Zomato lost Rs. 25 per delivery in the month of March 2019 compared to Rs. 44 per
delivery in the month of March 2018. Also, the cost for last mile delivery has reduced
from Rs. 86 in the month of March 2018 to Rs. 65 in the month of March 2019
▪ The contribution margin stood at negative Rs. 47 per order in 1QFY20, which has
improved to positive Rs. 27 per order in 1QFY21
▪ The improvement in contribution margin is led by lower discounts, reduction in delivery
cost and increase in average order values
▪ While the current contribution margin of Rs. 27 per order is unlikely to sustain, the INR -47
company expects the contribution margin per order to normalize between Rs. 15-20
Page 21
Growth drivers for Food delivery business – Increased number of restaurants on online food tech platforms
Impact of online ordering on partner restaurants Industry research Market size ($mn) of food app industry in India
Restaurant Revenue Break up indicates that
1.3X 4.2
21.4% restaurants which are
present on online
30% platforms of food
10%
Additional 5% aggregators witnessed
20% increased in overall 150%
X revenue 5%
through online revenue by 30%
channel
130%
80%
70%
The profitability of the 150%
restaurants is likely to 150%
increase with higher
Pre-Online Post-Online utilization of kitchen
Dine In Phone based ordering Take Away Online ordering
infrastructure
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Source: RedSeer Consulting
Restaurants Customers
Concerns Concerns
Deep discounting by food aggregators
Benefits Benefits Increase in delivery charges by
could reduce the foot fall in
aggregators
restaurants
The utilization of infrastructure
would be high for restaurants with Access to wide variety of cuisines
increase in volumes
The visibility of brand name of the Discounted Price
restaurant would increase with
presence on online platform Convenience of ordering any
time/place
Access to customer base is increased
More supply from cloud kitchens
Page 22
Growth drivers for Food delivery business - Increased penetration into Tier – II/III cities to spur growth and improve profitability
Food app use by Geography - India Top 10 Cities in India

Highest revenue
65% generation is from
cities like Bengaluru,
Delhi NCR, Hyderabad, ▪ Tier 3/4 cities contribute to 35% of
Increased penetration in Tier- Mumbai and Pune.
2/3 cities could be one of the monthly order volume
growth drivers for the industry Delhi ▪ Delivery minutes are 3 minutes lesser
Jaipur compared to the delivery in larger cities
Ahmedabad Kolkota ▪ Operating costs are lower and customer

In the recent years, acquisition costs are negligible
20%
food aggregators as
Mumbai
Pune Hyderabad well as cloud kitchens ▪ While average order value is lower in
10% have started
5% non-metro cities by 20%, the cost of
penetrating to the Tier-
2 and Tier-3 cities to delivery is lower by 50% making the
Bengaluru
Chennai tap potential economics superior as compared to the
Top 10 cities 11-30 cities 31-50 cities Rest Coimbatore customers metro cities
Source: RedSeer Consulting
Delivery operations in India - Number of cities Spread of Operations for Zomato
500 Trivandrum (Kerala) Nov 2018 50th City

Top 15 cities (Tier-1/2) contributed to ▪ The company has announced in Oct 2019
65% of the order volumes by end of that it has successfully penetrated into
1HFY20 and doubled over the Jamnagar (Gujarat) Dec 2018 100th city
previous 12 months
500 cities and plans to expand the
operations by 100 more cities by Dec 2019
Solan (HP) April 2019 200th city
200 ▪ By Oct 2019, Swiggy has around 2.1 lakh
Jalpaiguri (West Bengal) Jun 2019 300th city
active delivery partners and connects to
customers to over 140k restaurant
partners
13 15 Chittor (AP) Jul 2019 400th city
FY17 FY18 FY19 1HFY20 Leh Aug 2019 500th city
Page 23
Growth drivers for Food delivery business – The average order value is significantly low compared to developed markets
Average Order Value (US$) - Zomato Average Order Value (US$) - Meituan DianPing Average Order Value (US$) - Grub Hub
4.6 32.9
3.8 6.7 6.5 31.8
6.2 31.0
5.6
29.9
China 28.4 U.S.A.

India 3.9
1HFY19 1HFY20 CY15 CY16 CY17 CY18 CY19 CY15 CY16 CY17 CY18 CY19
The average order value is very low in India compared to developed markets and emerging markets. The average order value for developed markets is in the range of $14 – 33,
while the AOV for emerging markets is in the range of $5 – 7 compared to $4 in India
Average order value trend (includes Zomato, Swiggy, Just Eat - Average Order Value (US$) across geographies Takeaway.com - Average Order Value (US$)
Uber Eats and Foodpanda) 24.3
24.1 24.0
18.4 18.2
15.7 15.1
14.6
13.8 14.1 13.6 23.4
22.8 22.7
6.3
4.9
UK Canada Europe ANZ Mexico CY17 CY18 CY19

Q1CY17 Q3CY17 Q1CY18 Q3CY18 Q1CY19
2017 2018 Netherlands Germany
Source: RedSeer Consulting Source: Company data, Spark Capital
Page 24
Zomato vs. Swiggy – Scope of operations

Swiggy access was launched in Nov 2017 with an Zomato launched Zomato Infrastructure Services (ZIS) in
investment of Rs. 2.5bn. Swiggy services over 1.5 2016. Each Zomato Kitchen can accommodate 5-6
million orders per month from over 500 cloud restaurants at once with each restaurant getting space of
kitchens through its cloud kitchen initiative by Dec ~300 sqft. While the delivery related logistics would be
2019. In areas where Swiggy Access kitchens are handled by Zomato, the specific equipment for
present, they contribute around 15-20 percent of the preparation of food need to be taken care by the
overall orders on the platform. By April 2020, the Cafeterias restaurant
company has builit up a network of 1000 cloud Grocery Delivery (Food@Work)
kitchens (Swiggy Stores)
Zomato acquired Food@work start-up,

Cloud Kitchens Wholesale Tonguestun, in Sep 2018. Tonguestun is the
(Swiggy access, Z (HyperPure) largest player in the Food at Work segment and
omato Kitchens) provides 1500+ meals on daily basis to office-
Swiggy launched its Swiggy Stores goers. It has affiliation with 1000+ food
feature in Feb 2019 in Gurugram. partners. Through Zomato app, customers can
This service is aimed at delivering Food Delivery order food and pick up from their cafeterias
daily essentials including groceries, when ready. As per 1HFY20 report, Zomato is
flowers and medicines to customers doing 3mn orders a month for food@work
within an hour. Later this feature
was extended to Bengaluru and
Hyderabad
Hyperlocal Delivery Dining
(Swiggy Go) (Zomato Gold) Hyperpure is an initiative launched in Aug 2018 by
Zomato to supply fresh and quality ingredients to
restaurants through its platform. It allows restaurants to
buy everything from vegetables, fruits, poultry,
groceries, meat, seafood, dairy products and beverages.
The first warehouse was set up in Bangalore in Feb 2019,
followed by another warehouse in Delhi in Mar 2019
Swiggy has launched ‘Swiggy Go’ for
instant pick-up and drop services in
Bengaluru in Sep 2019. Swiggy Go can be Daily order volume in Dec Average order value in Dec
used to pick up and drop off laundry, get Gold members can enjoy benefits on food and drinks.
forgotten keys, send lunch boxes from
2019 (mn) 2019 (Rs.) Zomato Gold is available across 10 countries including
home to office or even deliver Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, Phillippines,
1.4 272 285 Indonesia, Turkey and Lebanon. Zomato has more than
documents or parcels to clients 1.2
6k+ restaurants on Zomato Gold program in India. The
number of restaurants participating in Gold outside
India stood at ~6.5k. In addition to this, there are over
Swiggy Zomato Swiggy Zomato 13k restaurants on Gold Delivery program
Page 25
Zomato – A comparison with market leader in China
Order volume (mn) Gross Merchandise Value (US$mn)
Zomato Meituan Dianping Zomato Meituan Dianping

1496 56,855
The order volume for
214 8,722 The GMV of
Zomato during 1HFY20
Zomato during
is ~6% of that
FY20 is ~2.6% of 42,719
registered for Meituan
6,393 that registered for
Dianping
Meituan Dianping
821
718 25,326
4,090
55
1,585 254 8,833
637 2,483
1HFY19 1HFY20 CY15 CY16 CY17 CY18 CY19 1HFY19 FY19 1HFY20 FY20 CY15 CY16 CY17 CY18 CY19
Meituan Dianping - Commission as % China’s online food delivery market size is ~US$39bn and is dominated by Market share of Online Food Delivery
of GMV Meituan Dianping and Ele.me who together captures more than 90% of the market - China
market share. The industry structure is similar to that in India, where Zomato Others,
12.6% 12.6% and Swiggy capture more than 90% of the market
11.9% 8%
8.9% In India, the commission/delivery charges by Zomato/Swiggy ranges between

Rs. 15 – Rs. 45 while the order value ranges between Rs. 250-300. This implies
Ele.me,
commission to be ~5%-18% of the overall order value
27%
Commission/Delivery fee (Rs.)
Order
value (Rs.) 15 45 Meituan
1.1% Dianping,
250 6.0% 18.0% Commission as %
65%
of GMV
CY15 CY16 CY17 CY18 CY19 300 5.0% 15.0%
Page 26
Zomato – A comparison with market leader in China
Average value per order (US$) Gross Margins (%) Revenue mix from Delivery as % of total online
food delivery business
4.6
54.0% 53.0% 48.8%
30.3% 37.7%
3.8 13.7%
ZOMATO 82.0%
-120.4% 75.3%
55.9%
-166.2%
FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19
1HFY19 1HFY20 Zomato Swiggy FY18 FY19 FY20
Average Order Value (US$) - Meituan Dianping - Gross Margins (%) Meituan Dianping - Commission as % of total
Meituan DianPing Online food delivery business
13.8% 18.7%
6.7 8.1% 100.0%
6.5
6.2 98.3%
-7.7% 96.4%
5.6
93.6%
MEITUAN 90.5%
DIANPING
3.9
-123.7%
CY15 CY16 CY17 CY18 CY19 CY15 CY16 CY17 CY18 CY19 CY15 CY16 CY17 CY18 CY19
Page 27
Zomato – Company Update 02 Dining Out
Dining Out business forms 14% of overall revenue mix for Zomato
Restaurant listings/Advertisement Restaurant Listings in 000s
revenue
India Global
1500
Infinity Dining 1200
Dining Out Infinity Dining program is exclusive for Gold
14.2% subscription members. This program allows
subscribers to have unlimited food & drinks for a 270
110
Revenue Mix fixed per-person price
Delivery
FY20
82.0% Table reservations – Zomato Book 1HFY19 1HFY20
Zomato has grown from 800k booked covers in Jan

2019 to 1.3mn+ booked covers in Sep 2019 Restaurants pay advertisement revenue to zomato for getting themselves listed
on the platform. Post launch of food delivery, commission is charged from
Sustainability organically and with no additional investment restaurants to give preference in the search
3.7%
Subscription Programs
Zomato Gold | Zomato Treats Zomato Gold Paid Subscribers (mn)

1.7
Events like Zomaland 1.4
Revenue mix from Dining Out The objective of Zomaland, Zomato’s festival 1
venture, is to showcase the best culinary talent
available in a city to the users. The first Zomaland 0.5
event was organized in Delhi, Pune and Bengaluru 0.17
which included variety of food stalls, music,
entertainment and games FY18 1HFY19 FY19 1HFY20 FY20
Food@work
Zomato acquired Food@work start-up, Zomato Treats
Tonguestun, in Sep 2018. Tonguestun is the largest Zomato Treats member gets a complimentary dessert for every order from one
player in the Food at Work segment and provides of the partner restaurants in India or the UAE. Treats is priced at Rs. 299/year in
44.1% 1500+ meals on daily basis to office-goers. It has India and 39 AED/6 months in the UAE
23.8% affiliation with 1000+ food partners. Through

14.2% Zomato app, customers can order food and pick up
from their cafeterias when ready. By 1HFY20,
FY18 FY19 FY20
Zomato is doing 3mn orders a month for
Source: Company data, Spark Capital food@work
Page 28
Zomato Gold – Timeline
Zomato Gold Paid Subscribers (mn)
1.7mn
1.4mn
FY20
1mn 1HFY20
▪ The objective was to get the FY19
BEST restaurants on board 0.5mn Zomato Gold turns
rather than all of them. Only 1% Zomato rolls out Gold program Zomato Pro - June 2020
of the restaurants were on delivery - Sep 2019
targeted out of 100k+ ▪ All Zomato Gold
restaurants Launched Infinity Dining ▪ The Gold delivery benefits are
0.17mn members across 10
in July 2019 made available from over 13k
▪ By April 2018, the number of 1HFY19 restaurants across 41 cities. The
countries will
subscribers stood at 200k All You Can Eat & Drink automatically get
existing customers of Gold
spread over 5 cities upgraded to Zomato
▪ Infinity Dining program, subscription would get a free
FY18 upgrade
Pro starting Aug 01,
Zomato Gold launched in India which is exclusive for Gold 2020. 50% more
– Nov 2017 Zomato Gold contributed to 12% of subscription, lets ▪ Gold members will only be able to restaurants,
monthly revenue by end of FY18 members to have unlimited unlock benefits once a day, and a exclusive delivery
food & drinks for a fixed maximum of two Gold unlocks will offers and 15-20%
per-person price. To begin be allowed per table faster delivery are
▪ Zomato had to impose a limit on the
with, Zomato Infinity Dining the features of Pro
total number of subscriptions due to ▪ Zomato on delivery offers the
offered 350+ restaurants
FY17 the overwhelming response second-highest priced item on the
and bars across Delhi, NCR,
received. The objective is to ensure order for free, except for combos,
Mumbai and Bengaluru
that the restaurant partners could MRP items and special dishes. It
Zomato Gold launched accommodate and deliver the applies on minimum order values
in Lisbon and Dubai – promised experience to the Gold of Rs. 300 with discount capped at
Mar 2017 users seamlessly Rs. 300 per order
Page 29
Zomato Gold – Business model
Zomato Gold across globe
Flat discount restaurants

1+1 Dish 2+2 Drinks
(up to 40% off)
Benefits of Zomato
▪ Gold members can enjoy benefits on food and drinks at separate partner Turkey
restaurants Portugal
▪ For benefits on food, the member gets the second most expensive dish in the UAE
Philippines
order as complimentary. For benefits on drinks, the member gets one
India
complimentary drink for every drink ordered, up to a maximum of 2
complimentary drinks. The complimentary drink will be the same as the first Indonesia
drink ordered
▪ For 1+1 and 2+2 benefits, the member can unlock Gold only once on a given day Australia
at a partner restaurant. However, during the membership duration, the
member can unlock gold any number of times at each partner restaurant. In New Zealand
case of flat discount restaurants, Gold membership can be used any number of
times in a day at a partner restaurant
▪ Gold partner restaurants offering benefits on delivery can be different from
Gold partner restaurants offering benefits on dining
▪ Zomato Gold is available across 10 countries including Australia, New Zealand,
Portugal, Phillippines, Indonesia, Turkey and Lebanon
▪ Zomato has more than 6k+ restaurants on Zomato Gold program in India. The
Research findings indicated that Gold Partners number of restaurants participating in Gold outside India stood at ~6.5k
have witnessed ~35% average growth in bill
▪ In addition to this, there are over 13k restaurants on Gold Delivery program
volumes after partnering with Zomato Gold
Page 30
Zomato Gold – A win-win offering for restaurants and consumers

Pricing during launch in India - Nov 2017 Pricing Now
Early Bird
Regular Offer
Offer
6 Months Rs. 999
3 Months Rs. 299 Rs. 599
12 Months Rs. 1800

12 Months Rs. 1099 Rs. 1499
Research Findings Indicate Restaurants Getting More Profitable Business

Logout Campaign by NRAI with Zomato Gold
▪ Food joints which have logged out of Zomato Gold have witnessed 20% decline in
▪ The Logout movement was started on August 14, 2019, when 300 restaurants under the bill volumes
NRAI started a twitter campaign with the hashtag #Logout to announce that they
▪ 90% of Zomato Gold Members try out new restaurants just because of the
were delisting themselves from platforms such as Zomato Gold, EazyDiner,
programme. Dine-out frequency for Gold members has increased from 2.8 to 3.3
Dineout’s Gourmet Passport, Nearbuy and MagicPin among others
times/month after subscribing to Gold membership and is 50 per cent higher than
▪ The primary issue between NRAI and Zomato was the Zomato Gold Programme. In that of non-Gold members. Also, dine-out spend for Gold members is higher than
September 2019, Zomato has diluted the programme, but introduced the Gold on non-members
Delivery offering, which led to further discontent among the NRAI members ▪ Pre-discount average bill of non-members is Rs 2,170 as compared to Rs 2,400
▪ At the start of logout campaign, Zomato had 6,100 restaurants on Zomato Gold average billing of Gold members. Gold partners have witnessed a 25 per cent
Programme for Dining out increase in bottom-line largely driven by better utilisation of the same infrastructure
▪ In Oct 2019, the company had indicated that despite logout campaign, the number
of restaurants on Gold programme has increased to 6,300 and the restaurants who Considering total restaurant listings of 1.5mn across the globe, the number of
have returned to the platform have witnessed 100% increase in revenue restaurants on Zomato Gold (~6.5k) constitute <5% and indicates strong headroom
for growth going forward
Page 31
Zomato – Company Update 03 Sustainability
Sustainability business contributes to only ~4% of revenue for Zomato
Hyperpure is an initiative
Dining Out launched in Aug 2018 by Zomato
14.2%
to supply fresh and quality
ingredients to restaurants through its platform. It allows
Sustainability restaurants to buy everything from vegetables, fruits, poultry,
Revenue Mix 3.7% groceries, meat, seafood, dairy products and beverages. In
Delivery
FY20
82.0% February 2019, a 30,000 sq. ft warehouse, built to serve 4,000
metric ton capacity per month, was launched in Bengaluru to
cater to 2500 restaurants every day. An even larger 40,000 sq. ft
warehouse in Delhi was launched in March’19.
Revenue (US$mn) - Hyperpure Revenue mix from Sustainability Hyperpure inside tag to restaurants
buying ingredients from Hyperpure
15 which is symbolic of high quality
and trust.
Value
Proposition
Solving supply chain

problems by building a Helping farmers develop
2 ecological model including
3.7% pesticide and chemical
0.9%
plans to integrate free crops and provide
rainwater harvesting and better prices to them
FY19 FY20 FY19 FY20 composting for waste
Page 32
Zomato – Major acquisitions

Acquisitions Date of acquisition Comments
July, 2014 ▪ MenuMania was founded in 2006 and is a restaurant dicovery service firm based out of New Zealand
Sep, 2014 ▪ Gastronauci is a Poland based restaurant search service firm and has been active in Poland since 2007
Dec, 2014 ▪ Cibando is an Italian restaurant search service firm
Lunchtime 2014 ▪ Lunchtime is a Czech Republic based restaurant discovery firm
▪ Obedovat is a Slovakia based restaurant discovery firm. Zomato has paid a total of $3.25mn for acquiring Lunchtime and
2014
Obedovat in total
Jan, 2015 ▪ Mekanist is a Turkey based restaurant discovery firm
▪ UrbaSpoon is a Seattle based food portal. The company was acquired for $52mn and the acquisition marked the entry of Zomato
2015
into U.S., Australia and Canada
▪ MapleGraph is a Delhi based start up and has cloud based point sale product for restaurants called MaplePOS. The product was
April, 2015
renamed to Zomato Base
April, 2015 ▪ NexTable is an online table reservation platform based out of U.S. The platform was later renamed to Zomato Book
▪ Sparse Labs is a Logistics technology based start up operting out of Gurgaon. The acquisition is intended to provide real time
Sep, 2016
delivery tracking data to restaurants and customers and improve the delivery experience
▪ This is an All-stock deal. The acquisition is intended to build a captive fleet of delivery personnel (around 1500). Prior to buyout
Sep, 2017 of Runnr, Zomato used the services of third party delivery partners such as Runnr and Grab to execute deliveries. Runnr was a
product of a merger between hyperlocal delivery start-up Roadrunnr and food-ordering start-up TinyOwl
▪ TongueStun is a Bengaluru based startup founded in 2012 and works as an e-marketplace. The acquisition price was $18mn.
Sep, 2018 Zomato intends to incorporate the capabilities of TongueStun app within Zomato app which will provide a high-frequency use
case for the users.
▪ The India business of UberEats was acquired at a valuation of $206mn in an all stock deal, wherein, UberEats gets 10% stake in
Jan, 2020
Zomato.
Page 33
Zomato – The total funding till date stood at over $1bn

Funding Major Investors
Period Investors
amount ($mn)
Aug, 2010 1 ▪ Info Edge
Sep, 2011 3 ▪ Info Edge
Sep, 2012 2.3 ▪ Info Edge
Feb, 2013 10 ▪ Info Edge
Nov, 2013 37 ▪ Info Edge
Nov, 2014 60 ▪ Info Edge, Vy Capital and Sequoia Capital
Apr, 2015 50 ▪ Info Edge, Vy Capital and Sequoia Capital
Sep, 2015 60 ▪ Temasek and Vy Capital
Oct, 2015 1.7 ▪ Grab Zomato has closed funding of $150mn
from Ant Financials in Jan 2020.
April, 2017 20 ▪ Sequoia Capital However, only $50mn has been
Feb, 2018 200 ▪ Ant Financial received while the rest $150mn is being
stuck post change in FDI rules by the
June, 2018 15 ▪ Loyal Hospitality
govt. of India.
Oct, 2018 210 ▪ Ant Financial
Feb, 2019 40 ▪ Grade Brooke Capital
Mar, 2019 50 ▪ Zomato sold UAE business to Delivery hero for $172mn and got additional investment of $50mn This is part of $250mn funding approval
received from Tiger Global, Temasek
Jan, 2020 50 ▪ Ant Financial and Kora Capital. Zomato received
April, 2020 5 ▪ Pacific Horizon Investment Trust ~160mn from Temasek (~60mn) and
Tiger Global (~100mn) as part of the
Aug, 2020 25 ▪ Raised Rs. 1.8bn from Foodie Bay Employees ESOP Trust funding round
Sep, 2020 62 ▪ Temasek subsidiary (MacRitchie Investments) The latest fund infusion of $100mn
from Tiger Global happened at post
Sep, 2020 100 ▪ Tiger Global Management money valuation of US$3.3bn
Total 1,002
The management of Zomato has indicated that the company has a cash balance of $250mn. Post the completion of ongoing funding round, the management expects the cash
balance to be around $600mn and intends to use this cash for future M&A and fighting off competition in various areas of the business
Page 34
Zomato – Way forward and expectations

Use of data analytics to drive personalization, focused marketing and
Increase in online spending ▪ Online spending to increase to US$130bn in 2025 from network cost optimization
▪ Suggesting food options for Customers including combo options
by ~25% CAGR during US$40bn in 2020
▪ Voice ordering
FY20-25 ▪ Use of technology – Drones for delivery by Zomato
▪ Zomato received a total funding of over $1bn during Cloud Kitchens – Swiggy Access, Zomato Kitchens,
Increase in funding in the 2010-20, with ~$0.8bn coming over last 3 years FreshMenu, Rebel Foods, Box8
▪ Cloud Kitchen industry is projected to become a
food tech space over the ▪ Swiggy received a total funding of over $1.6bn during
$2bn market by 2024 in India from $400mn in
GROWTH DRIVERS
last 2-3 years 2016-20, with $1.5bn coming over last 2 years
2019
Zomato 1HFY19 1HFY20 Leveraging customer base, delivery and

Expect increase in ordering
Average user order frequency (/month) 3.1 3.6 service expertise to diversify into
DIVERSIFICATION
frequency, although Average monthly transacting users (mn) 3.6 11.2 adjacencies including groceries, fresh meat,
average order value is likely medicine etc
POSSIBLE
Average order value (US$) 4.6 3.8
to moderate ▪ Groceries – Swiggy Stores, Zomato
Market – Zomato expanded grocery
▪ While average order value is lower in non-metro cities services to 185 cities and also partnered
Increased penetration into by 20%, the cost of delivery is lower by 50% making the with Grofers for last-mile delivery of
tier-II/III cities to spur economics superior as compared to the metro cities essentials
No. of Cities (India) FY17 FY18 FY19 1HFY20 ▪ Wholesale/Hyperlocal Delivery – Swiggy
growth and improve Delivery Operations 13 15 200 500 Go, Hyperpure (Zomato)
profitability
▪ Expect more restaurants to get on to online platforms.
Private Labels – Bowl Company & Homely by
Expanding network of Few of them have shut down their businesses owing to
Swiggy; Homecravings by Uber Eats in
COVID. Expect them to open for Dining Out gradually.
restaurants on food tech By end of Aug 2020, Dining out is operating at 8-10% of
collaboration with Café Coffee Day, Kitchdi
Experiment by Foodpanda (Ola)
platform pre-COVID levels
▪ Variety of cuisines, discounts and convenience of Possible entry into unrelated businesses
ordering from home to be key reasons for consumers to ▪ The food tech aggregators could use the large customer base to diversify
Convenience of ordering increasingly use online food tech platforms into newer lines of businesses including Hospitality, Hotel booking, Movie
ticketing, Mobility etc
Page 35
Zomato – Estimates and Valuation

FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21E FY22E FY23E FY24E
Total Revenue (US$mn) 27 51 74 206 394 342 425 510 573
YoY growth 81.5% 45.1% 178.4% 105.2% -13.3% 24.4% 19.9% 12.4%
Delivery revenue (US$mn) 38 155 323 306 372 441 490

YoY growth 307.9% 124.4% -5.2% 21.5% 18.5% 11.2%
Transaction revenue (US$mn) 101 275 262 330 399 450

As % of total delivery revenue 12% 25% 38% 65% 85% 87% 89% 91% 93%
% growth yoy 173% -5% 26% 21% 13%
Others (includes Advertising) (US$mn) 54 48 45 42 42 41

As % of total delivery revenue 88% 75% 62% 35% 15% 13% 11% 9% 7%
% growth yoy -11% -8% -5% -2% -2%
Gross Merchandise Value (US$mn) 718 1496 1309 1832 2350 2811
YoY growth 108.4% -12.5% 40.0% 28.3% 19.6%
Order volume (mn) 155 390 325 454 613 798
YoY growth 151% -17% 40% 35% 30%
Average order value (US$) 4.6 3.8 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.5
YoY growth -17% 5% 0% -5% -8%
Transaction revenue as % of GMV 18.4% 20% 18% 17% 16%
Dining Out revenue (US$mn) 30 49 56 28 42 55 66

YoY growth 63.3% 19.4% -50% 50% 30% 20%
Sustainability revenue (US$mn) 0 2 15 7 11 14 17

YoY growth 716.7% -50% 50% 30% 20%
EV/Sales Multiple of listed peers (x)

Meituan 12.2 10.6 7.2 5.4
Takeaway 15.4 6.5 4.8 3.6
GrubHub 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9
Delivery Hero 10.4 6.7 4.0 2.8
EV/Sales multiple for Zomato (x) 10
Zomato Enterprise Value in US$mn 5,100
Page 36
Zomato – Leadership Team
Deepinder Goyal
Gunjan Patidar
Founder and CEO
Head of Engineering
Deepinder Goyal is the Founder & CEO of Zomato. He worked
Gunjan Patidar is the Head of Engineering at Zomato and has
as a management consultant at Bain & Company before
been with the company since its inception. He holds a B.Tech
founding Zomato. He holds an Integrated Masters in
from IIT-Delhi
Mathematics and Computing from IIT-Delhi.
Gaurav Gupta Akriti Chopra

Founder and COO CFO
Gaurav Gupta is Founder and COO of Zomato and has been Akriti Chopra is the CFO of Zomato and has been with the
with Zomato for 5+ years. He has actively been involved in company for 8+ years. She started her journey at Zomato in
building Zomato Gold and Hyperpure. He previously worked the finance team and also worked on multiple fund-raises and
as a Senior Principal with AT Kearney and he holds an acquisitions. She is a CA and graduate from LSR College (Delhi
engineering degree from IIT Delhi and MBA from IIM Calcutta. University).
Mohit Gupta
Daminee Sawhney
CEO – Food Delivery Business
VP Human Resources
Mohit Gupta is the CEO of Zomato’s Food Delivery Business.
Daminee Sawhney is the VP, Human Resources at Zomato and
He has over 20 years of experience and was previously the
has been with the company for 9+ years. She has been
COO- Online at MakeMyTrip. He is a mechanical engineer
actively involved in developing and devising HR strategies and
from Sardar Patel University and holds a PGDM from
other essentials for a workforce.
IIM,Calcutta.
Page 37
Zomato – Financials
Revenue trend (US$mn)
23,759
Profitability Total cash and current investments (Rs.mn)
21,373
53%
178.4%
38%
394
14%
NA
105.2%
10,277
-18%
-23%
-35%
-43%
206
-61%
8,197
81.5%
-80%
-92%
-120%
2,683
45.1%
2,120
-141%
-152%
2,387
2,203
2,081
1,407
-167%
1,642
-168%
1,065
74
51
480
342
27
478
-254%
-237%
FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19
Revenue (US$mn) % growth yoy Gross margins EBITDA margins PAT margins Cash balance Current Investments Total
Rs.mn Rs.mn Rs.mn

Pre tax OCF vs. EBITDA FCF vs. EBITDA Net Debt vs. EBITDA
-690
-798
-838
-838
-838
-896
-1,322
-1,361
-1,361
-1,393
-1,407
-1,416
-1,416
-1,361
-2,120
-2,683
-1,416
-4,388
-4,388
-4,388
-4,527
-5,647
-9,238
-10,264
-21,975
-21,975
-21,975
-23,746
-17,342
FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 -18,069
FY19 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19
Pre tax OCF EBITDA FCF EBITDA Net Debt EBITDA
Page 38
Swiggy (standalone) – Financials
Revenue trend (US$mn) Profitability
54.0%
48.8%
30.3%
547.7%
160
-92.3%
-98.5%
-159.1%
-166.2%
-166.9%
-209.1%
-222.5%
65
-679.6%
147.6%
226.4%
20
3
-682.6%
FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19
Revenue (US$mn) % growth yoy Gross margins EBITDA margins PAT margins
Total cash and current investments (Rs.mn) Net Debt (Rs.mn)

55,816
53,774
-2,013 -1,829
-9,722
8,680 9,863
39 1,974 2,013 255 1,935 2,190 1,183 2,042
FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19

-55,816
Cash balance Current Investments Total FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19
Page 39
CMP 1Y Target Rating
Info Edge Rs. 3,386 Rs. 3,600 ADD
Info Edge - SOTP valuation

Business Metric Sep-22 (Rs.mn) Multiple type Multiple Value (Rs.mn) Per share % contribution
Naukri EBITDA 7,152 EV/EBITDA 40.0 2,86,094 2,230 61.7%
99Acres Sales 2,200 EV/Sales 10.0 21,999 171 4.7%
Jeevansathi & Others Sales 1,738 EV/Sales 2.0 3,475 27 0.7%
Cash 42,586 1.0 42,586 332 9.2%
3,54,154
Shares O/S (mn) 128
Price /share (Rs.) 2,761 76.4%
Investment value (Rs./share) 851 23.6%
Info Edge consolidated value (Rs./share) 3,612
Book value of % Contribution per Contribution to
Investment Particulars % stake Discount % Value (Rs.mn) Per share
investments (Rs.mn) share investments
Zomato Media 22.7% 1,522 Valued at US$5.0bn 84,027 655 18.1% 76.9%
Policy Bazaar 15.1% 5,758 Valued at US$2bn 22,291 174 4.8% 20.4%
International Education Gateway 37.9% 205 25% 154 1 0.0% 0.1%
Shop Kirana 25.4% 604 25% 453 4 0.1% 0.4%
Happily Unmarried 42.3% 333 25% 250 2 0.1% 0.2%
NoPaperForms Solutions 48.1% 337 25% 253 2 0.1% 0.2%
Gramophone 33.2% 204 25% 153 1 0.0% 0.1%
Shoekonnect 32.9% 160 25% 120 1 0.0% 0.1%
Printo 25.1% 159 25% 119 1 0.0% 0.1%
Medcords 22.4% 96 25% 72 1 0.0% 0.1%
Metius Eduventures (Adda247) 17.0% 280 25% 210 2 0.0% 0.2%
Greytip Software 20.3% 350 25% 263 2 0.1% 0.2%
Sunrise Mentors 25.0% 371 25% 278 2 0.1% 0.3%
LLAMA Logisol 10.0% 50 25% 38 0 0.0% 0.0%
Terralytics Analysis 20.0% 50 25% 38 0 0.0% 0.0%
LQ Global Services 16.7% 15 25% 11 0 0.0% 0.0%
Investment from AIF 498 0% 498 4 0.1% 0.5%
Sum of investments 10,992 1,09,226 851 23.6% 100.0%
Page 40
Financial Summary
Abridged Financial Statements
Rs. mn FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21E FY22E FY23E
Profit & Loss
Revenue 7,235 8,021 9,155 10,983 12,727 11,423 13,380 15,970
Gross Profit 3,800 4,097 5,081 6,176 7,097 5,939 7,384 9,353
EBITDA 1,580 2,275 2,973 3,413 4,027 4,168 4,815 6,127
Depreciation 210 241 215 204 414 434 449 460
EBIT 1,370 2,034 2,758 3,210 3,614 3,735 4,366 5,667
Other Income 827 625 971 1,112 876 1,270 1,888 2,101
Interest expense 1 1 1 1 67 61 61 61
Exceptional items 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PBT 2196 2659 3728 4320 4423 4944 6193 7707
Reported PAT (after minority interest) 1,416 2,044 1,824 2,817 2,057 3,699 4,645 5,780
Adj PAT 1,530 2,084 2,737 3,151 3,290 3,699 4,645 5,780
EPS (Rs.) 12.7 17.3 22.6 25.9 27.0 29.2 36.2 45.1
Balance Sheet
Net Worth 17,640 19,831 21,074 23,239 24,317 45,211 47,777 50,928
Deferred Tax liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other liabilities and provisions 489 468 500 543 1,118 1,140 1,261 1,405
Total Networth and liabilities 18129 20299 21575 23782 25434 46350 49038 52333
Gross Fixed assets 1711 1044 1127 1388 2501 2712 2952 3192
Net fixed assets 922 602 529 569 1325 1101 893 673
Goodwill 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capital Work in Progress 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investments 5736 7409 8263 10333 14672 14672 14672 14672
Cash and bank balances 9879 14460 14494 15320 12798 32557 36440 41123
Loans & advances and other assets 1827 1258 2816 2939 2067 2926 2926 2926
Net working capital -235 -3429 -4528 -5379 -5427 -4907 -5892 -7062
Total assets 18129 20299 21575 23782 25434 46350 49038 52333
Capital Employed 17,640 19,831 21,074 23,239 24,317 45,211 47,777 50,928
Invested Capital (CE- cash-CWIP) 13,497 13,842 14,843 16,449 22,603 23,645 22,330 20,796
Net Debt -9879 -14460 -14494 -15320 -12798 -32557 -36440 -41123
Cash Flows
Cash flows from Operations (Pre-tax) 1,912 3,167 4,327 4,425 4,133 3,724 5,922 7,440
Cash flows from Operations (post-tax) 1,091 2,283 3,067 2,956 3,022 2,480 4,373 5,514
Capex 298 89 139 262 240 207 240 240
Free cashflows 792 2,194 2,928 2,694 2,781 2,273 4,133 5,274
Free cashflows (post interest costs) 792 2,193 2,927 2,693 2,715 2,212 4,072 5,213
Cash flows from Investing -300 -1,839 -2,042 -2,233 1,970 1,063 1,648 1,861
Cash flows from Financing -701 -419 -757 -781 -1,420 17,065 -2,139 -2,691
Total cash & liquid investments 9,879 14,460 14,494 15,320 12,798 32,557 36,440 41,123
Page 41
Financial Summary
FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21E FY22E FY23E

Key variables
Number of resumes in Naukri (mn) 46 51 56 62 68 69 76 83
Number of paid listings in 99acres (000') 1,098 1,038 1,153 1,268 1,395 1,325 1,458 1,604
Number of profiles loaded in Jeevansathi (mn) 8 9 8 9 10 11 12 13
Growth ratios
Revenue 18.3% 10.9% 14.1% 20.0% 15.9% -10.2% 17.1% 19.4%
EBITDA -13.3% 44.0% 30.7% 14.8% 18.0% 3.5% 15.5% 27.2%
Adj PAT -26.7% 44.4% -10.8% 54.5% -27.0% 79.8% 25.6% 24.4%
Margin ratios
Gross 52.5% 51.1% 55.5% 56.2% 55.8% 52.0% 55.2% 58.6%
EBITDA 21.8% 28.4% 32.5% 31.1% 31.6% 36.5% 36.0% 38.4%
Adj PAT 21.2% 26.0% 29.9% 28.7% 25.8% 32.4% 34.7% 36.2%
Performance ratios
Pre-tax OCF/EBITDA 121.0% 139.2% 145.5% 129.6% 102.6% 89.4% 123.0% 121.4%
OCF/IC (%) 8.1% 16.5% 20.7% 18.0% 13.4% 10.5% 19.6% 26.5%
RoE (%) 8.9% 11.1% 13.4% 14.2% 13.8% 10.6% 10.0% 11.7%
ROCE (%) 8.9% 11.1% 13.4% 14.2% 14.0% 10.8% 10.1% 11.8%
RoCE (Pre-tax) 12.8% 14.2% 18.2% 19.5% 18.9% 14.4% 13.5% 15.7%
RoIC (Pre-tax) 10.2% 14.7% 18.6% 19.5% 16.0% 15.8% 19.6% 27.3%
Fixed asset turnover (x) 8.2 10.5 16.2 20.0 13.4 9.4 13.4 20.4
Total asset turnover (x) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3
Financial stability ratios
Net Debt to Equity (x) -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8
Net Debt to EBITDA (x) -6.3 -6.4 -4.9 -4.5 -3.2 -7.8 -7.6 -6.7
Interest cover (x) N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A
DSO days 6 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
Working capital days -23 -35 -39 -40 -39 -35 -38 -39
Valuation metrics
Fully Diluted Shares (mn) 128 128 128
Market cap (Rs.mn) 4,34,344 4,34,344 4,34,344
P/E (x) 199.8 146.9 112.4 98.0 94.0 86.9 70.0 56.2
P/OCF(x) 398.2 190.2 141.6 146.9 143.8 175.2 99.3 78.8
EV (Rs.mn) 4,24,465 4,19,885 4,19,850 4,19,024 4,21,546 4,01,787 3,97,905 3,93,221
EV/ EBITDA (x) 268.7 184.6 141.2 122.8 104.7 96.4 82.6 64.2
EV/ OCF(x) 389.1 183.9 136.9 141.7 139.5 162.0 91.0 71.3
FCF Yield 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 1.0% 1.2%
Price to BV (x) 24.6 21.9 20.6 18.7 17.9 9.6 9.1 8.5
Dividend pay-out (%) 15.8% 29.0% 29.7% 23.2% 29.7% 43.9% 44.7% 45.5%
Dividend yield (%) 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6%
Page 42
Crystal Ball Gazing
Info Edge’s revenues and PAT to grow at a CAGR of 18.4% and 25% respectively during FY21-24E primarily driven by growth in
Naukri business. The EBITDA margins are likely to expand to 38.4% in FY23E vs. 31.6% in FY20 led by operating leverage in Naukri
business and positive EBITDA contribution from other business segments. The strong cash balance post QIP could be utilized to
strengthen the position in core markets or make new investments
Strong growth
Revenue and higher
Higher EBITDA margins
growth of margins will
will result in
~18.4% drive
Strong revenue growth primarily driven by

Higher cash flow from operations Higher multiple
recruitment business
FY07-FY11 FY11-FY14 FY14-FY20 FY20-FY24E FY07-FY11 FY11-FY14 FY14-FY20 FY20-FY24E FY24E sales (Rs.
EV/Sales Price target
mn)
Revenues CAGR 20.5% 19.8% 16.6% 10.5% RoE (%) 18.0% 21.1% 12.5% 11.5%
20 18,956 4,146
Gross Margin 59.5% 59.2% 54.4% 56.9% RoCE (%) 18.3% 21.3% 12.6% 11.6%
22 18,956 4,442
EBITDA CAGR 27.9% 18.8% 15.8% 18.1% RoIC (%) 38.6% 24.8% 12.8% 18.4%
EBITDA margin 30.0% 35.0% 29.2% 38.0% Average 1 yr fwd
EPS CAGR 0.3% 33.7% 13.6% 20.3% PE (x) 34.1 31.6 57.3 61.6
Total Asset Turnover (x) 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.3 EV/EBITDA (x) 24.7 23.5 44.4 68.1
Total WC days -73 -65 -36 -38 Peak 1 yr fwd
Pre-tax OCF/EBITDA (%) 99.1% 100.3% 123.2% 113.2% PE (x) 40.5 49.9 83.3 94.5
Post Tax OCF as a % of IC 129.5% 28.0% 15.1% 23.2% EV/EBITDA (x) 29.8 37.6 80.3 102.9
Net Debt/EBITDA -2.9 -2.4 -5.3 -7.0
TOTAL
Entry = Rs. 3,386@ 30x Cumulative Dividends of Exit multiple of 22x FY24E RETURN OF
FY22E EV/Sales Rs. 75 EV/Sales 33%
Page 43
Spark Recommendation History

Rs. Report Date CMP (Rs.) TP (Rs.) Recommendation
Info Edge – 3 Year Price and Rating History 09-Sep-20 3,309 3,500 Add
4,000
13-Feb-20 2,970 3,120 Add
3,000 13-Nov-19 2,567 2,710 Add

14-Aug-19 2,178 2,360 Add
2,000 29-May-19 1,980 2,290 Buy

Price 30-Jan-19 1,690 1,950 Buy
1,000 Target 31-Oct-18 1,578 1,840 Buy
25-Jul-18 1,360 1,570 Buy
0 31-May-18 1,302 1,500 Buy
Sep-17 Mar-18 Sep-18 Mar-19 Sep-19 Mar-20 Sep-20 05-Feb-18 1,330 1,550 Buy
05-Jan-18 1,375 1,580 Buy
Absolute Rating Interpretation

BUY Stock expected to provide positive returns of >15% over a 1-year horizon
ADD Stock expected to provide positive returns of >5% – <15% over a 1-year horizon
REDUCE Stock expected to provide returns of <5% – -10% over a 1-year horizon
SELL Stock expected to fall >10% over a 1-year horizon
Symbol Interpretation
◄► No Change | ▼ Downgrade | ▲ Upgrade
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No
date of publication of the research report
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ZOMATO – COMPANY UPDATE

• Headroom for growth in order volume and average order value

September 24, 2020

▪ SOUMITRA CHATTERJEE  soumitra@sparkcapital.in  +91 22 6176 6805

Zomato – An overview of operations across the globe

▪ With Runnr, Zomato started providing end-to-end

Chile South Africa

Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Zomato – Timeline of major events

2008 2010 2011 2014 2015

2020 2019 2018 2017 2016

Source: Company data, Spark Capital Research

Most of the losses are on account of

2019 2022 2015 2020 2025 2020 2025

Source: Industry reports

The online food delivery market witnessed entry of players

Source: Industry reports 2–

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Online Food Delivery Cloud Kitchen Online Table Reservation

Source: Industry reports, Tracxn

Prominent players in the food tech industry across the globe

Source: Spark Capital Research

Financials of the global peers vs. Zomato

Revenue (US$mn) Gross Margins(%)

EBITDA Margins (%) PAT margins (%)

Just Eat Takeaway.com has entered into an

Source: Company data, Spark Capital

Geographical presence of combined entity

✓ +360k Restaurants GMV (EURbn)

✓ ~10% penetration 2017 2018 2019

21.4% 180 165

CY15 CY16 CY17 CY18 CY19 UK Canada Europe ANZ Brazil/mexico

Source: Company data, Spark Capital

Sustainability Delivery – revenue mix Delivery operations in India - Number of cities

Order Volume (mn) 1HFY19 FY19 1HFY20 FY20 1HFY19 1HFY20

Source: Company data, Spark Capital

Delivery Partners (000's)

The average pay out

Source: Company data, Spark Capital

Food delivery business – Revenue model

▪ The delivery fee charged to the

Old Rs. 0 & Rs. 20 Rs. 0 to Rs. 20

New Rs. 25 & Rs. 35 Rs. 16 – Rs. 47 Peak/non-peak hours

Old Rs. 49 & Rs. 179 Rs. 1,499 (1 Year)

Delivery Partners (000’s) - Zomato

Description 1HFY19 1HFY20

Average user order frequency (per month) 3.1 3.6

Average monthly transacting users (mn) 3.6 11.2

Average monthly active restaurants (K) 43 119

Average monthly active delivery partners (K) 49 200

Swiggy Zomato Uber Eats Swiggy Zomato Uber Eats

Food delivery business – In COVID world

Source: Company data, Spark Capital

Food Delivery Unit Economics

Source: Company data, Spark Capital

Source: RedSeer Consulting

Food app use by Geography - India Top 10 Cities in India

Ahmedabad Kolkota ▪ Operating costs are lower and customer

Source: RedSeer Consulting

Delivery operations in India - Number of cities Spread of Operations for Zomato

500 Trivandrum (Kerala) Nov 2018 50th City

FY17 FY18 FY19 1HFY20 Leh Aug 2019 500th city

Source: Company data, Spark Capital