Chapter 5 - Apportionment and Voting

Mathematics in the Modern World GEC 14 Teachers
CHAPTER 5
APPORTIONMENT AND VOTING
PART 1: INTRODUCTION TO APPORTIONMENT
Objectives: After going through this module, you are expected to:
(1) Define an apportionment.

(2) Use the methods of apportionment in solving the problems.
(3) Explain the fairness in apportionment, apportionment paradoxes
and Balinski-Young Impossibility Theorem.
Apportionment
Definition. Apportionment is a method of dividing a whole into various

parts.
Remark. The apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives is

based on the relative population of each state and has its roots in the U.S.
Constitution (Article 1, Sec. 2). Since 1790, when the House of Repre-
sentatives first attempted to apportion itself, various methods have been
used to decide how many voters would be represented by each member
of the House. The two competing plans in 1790 were put forward by
Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson.
Second Semester page 1 of 30 Math Dept. - CMU

Methods of Apportionment
There are three methods of apportionment, namely:
(1) The Hamilton Method
Definition. Under the Hamilton Plan, the total population of the

country is divided by the number (standard divisor) of representa-
tives that gives a number of citizens represented by each represen-
tative.
Definition. The Standard Divisor (SD) is the number of people/voters
represented by each representative.
total population
SD = number of people to apportion
Definition. Standard Quota (SQ) is the whole number part of the

quotient of a population divided by the standard divisor.
sub- group population

SQ = standard divisor
How To Use Hamilton Method

(a) Using the standard divisor (SD), calculate the standard quota
(SQ) rounded to the nearest whole number (lower quota). Ini-
tially, each sub-group receives a number of seats equal to its
lower quota.
(b) If the sum of the lower quotas equals the number of seats to be
apportioned, the apportionment process is complete.
(c) If the sum of the lower quotas is less than the total number
of seats to be apportioned, then assign a seat to the sub-group
that has the highest decimal part in its standard quota.
(d) Repeat step (c) (using the next highest decimal part) until the
total number of seats has been apportioned.

Example. Hamilton Method

Barangay Dologon is composed of four clusters. There are 350 sacks
of rice to be apportioned among the four clusters according to their
respective clusters total population. The population in each clus-
ter is given in the following table. Find the standard divisor and
standard quotient of each cluster.
Cluster East West South North

Population 1250 985 1420 1595
SD = 5250÷350 = 15
Cluster Population Quotient SQ

East 1250 1250÷15 = 83.33 83
West 985 985÷15 = 65.67 65
South 1420 1420÷15 = 94.67 94
North 1595 1595÷15 = 106.33 106
Total 5250 348
Since the sum of lower quotas is less than the total number of sacks
of rice to be apportioned, we will assign the remaining sacks of rice
to the cluster with highest decimal part in the quotient.
Cluster Population Quotient SQ SQ(Sack of Rice)

East 1250 83.33 83 83
West 985 65.67 65+1 66
South 1420 94.67 94+1 95
North 1595 106.33 106 106
Total 5250 348 350

(2) The Jefferson Method
Definition. Uses a modified standard divisor (MD) that yields to

the correct number of representatives by trial and error so that the
sum of the standard quotas is equal to the number of representa-
tives.The modified standard divisor is always less than the stan-
dard divisor.
How To Use Jefferson Method
(a) Using the standard divisor, calculate the standard quota and
the lower quotas of each sub-group.
(b) If the sum of the lower quotas equals the total number of seats
to be apportioned, the apportionment process is complete, that
is, each subgroup receives a number of seats equal to its lower
quota.
(c) If the sum of the lower quotas does not equal to the number of
seats to be apportioned, choose a modified divisor less than the
standard divisor and calculate the modified quotas and lower
modified quotas.
(d) Repeat step (c) until you find a modified divisor such that the
sum of the lower modified quotas equals the total number of
seats to be apportioned. Each subgroup receives a number of
seats equal to its lower modified quota, and the apportionment
process is complete.
Example. Jefferson Method
Using Example 1: MD = 14.95


East 1250 1250÷14.95 = 83.61 83
West 985 985÷14.95 = 65.89 65
South 1420 1420÷14.95 = 94.98 94
North 1595 1595÷14.95 = 106.69 106
Total 5250 348
Choose another MD since the sum of the quotas is not equal to the
number of sacks of rice to be apportioned.
Using Example 1: NEW MD = 14.92

East 1250 1250÷14.92 = 83.78 83
West 985 985÷14.92 = 66.02 66
South 1420 1420÷14.92 = 95.17 95
North 1595 1595÷14.92 = 106.90 106
Total 5250 350
The new MD is correct since the sum of the quotas is now equal to
the number of sacks of rice to be apportioned.
Comparison of Hamilton and Jefferson Plan
Cluster Population Hamilton Plan Jefferson Plan

East 1250 83 83
West 985 66 66
South 1420 95 95
North 1595 106 106
Total 5250 350 350
Take note that it is not always necessary for the Hamilton Plan and
Jefferson Plan to yield the same result on the sub-group quota.

(3) The Webster Apportionment Method
Daniel Webster (1782-1852) proposed a method similar to Jefferson’s in

1832. It was adopted by Congress in 1842, but replaced by Hamilton’s
method in 1852. It was then adopted again in 1901. The difference is
that Webster rounds the quotas to the nearest whole number rather than
dropping the decimal parts. If that does not produce the desired results
at the beginning, he says, like Jefferson, to adjust the divisor until it does.
(In Jefferson’s case, at least the first adjustment will always be to make
the divisor smaller. That is not always the case with Webster’s method.)
Webster’s Method
(1) Determine how many people each representative should repre-
sent. Do this by dividing the total population of all the states by
the total number of representatives. This is called standard divi-
sor.
(2) Divide each state’s population by the divisor to determine how
many representatives it should have. Record this answer to several
decimal places. This answer is called the quota.
(3) Round all the quotas to the nearest whole number (but don’t forget
what the decimals were. Add up the remaining whole numbers.
(4) If the total from Step 3 was less than the total number of repre-
sentatives, reduce the divisor and recalculate the quota and allo-
cation. If the total from Step 3 was larger that the total number of
representatives, increase the divisor and recalculate the quota and
allocation. Continue doing this until the total in Step 3 is equal to
the total number of representatives. The divisor we end up using
is called the modified divisor or adjusted divisor.
(4) The Huntington-Hill Apportionment Principle
When there is a choice of adding one representative to a number
of sub-groups, the representative should be added to the sub-group
with the greatest Huntington-Hill Number denoted by

( PA )2
H= a ( a +1)
where PA - is the population of the sub-group A;

a- is the current number of representatives of sub-group A.
Example.
Using the result of Hamilton Plan or Jefferson Plan in example 1,
use HHM to which the one new sack of rice should be apportioned.
Cluster Population H
East 1250 (1250)2 ÷83(84) = 224.11
West 985 (985)2 ÷ 66(67) = 219.41
South 1420 (1420)2 ÷ 95(96) = 221.10
North 1595 (1595)2 ÷ 106(107) = 224.30∗
Total 5250 *The North Cluster receives the additional one sack of rice
Huntington-Hill Apportionment Method
In 1920, no new apportionment was done, because Congress couldn’t

agree on the method to be used. They appointed a committee of math-
ematicians to investigate, and they recommended the Huntington-Hill
Method. They continued to use Webster’s method in 1931, but after a
second report recommending Huntington-Hill, it was adopted in 1941
and is the current method of apportionment used in Congress.
The Huntington-Hill Method is similar to Webster’s method, but attempts

to minimize the percent differences of how many people each represen-
tative will represent.

Huntington-Hill Method
(1) Determine how many people each representative should repre-
sent. Do this by dividing the total population of all the states by
the total number of representatives. This answer is called the stan-
dard divisor.
(2) Divide each state’s population by the divisor to determine how
many representatives it should have. Record this answer to several
decimal places. This answer is called the quota.
(3) Cut off the decimal part of the quota to obtain the lower quota,
p
which we’ll call n. Compute n (n + 1), which is the geometric
mean of the lower quota and one value higher.
(4) If the quota is larger than the geometric mean, round up the quota;
if the quota is smaller than the geometric mean, round down the
quota. Add up the resulting whole numbers to get the initial allo-
cation.
(5) If the total from Step 4 was less than the total number of repre-
sentatives, reduce the divisor and recalculate the quota and allo-
cation. If the total from step 4 was larger than the total number of
representatives, increase the divisor and recalculate the quota and
allocation. Continue doing this until the total in Step 4 is equal to
the total number of representatives. The divisor we end up using
is called the modified divisor or adjusted divisor.
Example. Consider a small country with 5 states, two of which are much
larger than the others. We need to apportion 70 representatives. We
will apportion using both Webster’s method and the Huntington-Hill
method.

State Population
A 300,500
B 200,000
C 50,000
D 38,000
E 21,500
Solution. The total population is 610,000. Dividing this by the 70 repre-

sentatives gives the divisor: 8714.286. Dividing each state’s population
by the divisor gives the quotas.
State Population Quota

A 300,500 34.48361
B 200,000 22.95082
C 50,000 5.737705
D 38,000 4.360656
E 21,500 2.467213
Webster’s Method: Using Webster’s method, we round each quota to the

nearest whole number. Adding these up, they only total 69 representa-
tives, so we adjust the divisor down.
State Population Quota Initial Allocation

A 300,500 34.48361 34
B 200,000 22.95082 23
C 50,000 5.737705 6
D 38,000 4.360656 4
E 21,500 2.467213 2
Total 610,000 69
Adjusting the divisor down to 8700 gives an updated allocation totaling

70 representatives.

State Population Quota Initial Allocation

A 300,500 34.54023 35
B 200,000 22.98851 23
C 50,000 5.747126 6
D 38,000 4.367816 4
E 21,500 2.471264 2
Total 610,000 70
Huntington-Hill Method: Using the Huntington-Hill method, we round

down to find the lower quota, then calculate the geometric mean based
on each lower quota. If the quota is less than the geometric mean, we
round down; if the quota is more than the geometric mean, we round up.
These allocations add up to 70, so we’re done.
State Population Quota Lower Quota Geometric Mean Initial

A 300,500 34.48361 34 34.49638 34
B 200,000 22.95082 232 22.49444 23
C 50,000 5.737705 5 5.477226 6
D 38,000 4.360656 4 4.472136 4
E 21,500 2.467213 2 2.44949 3
Total 610,000 70
Notice that this allocation is different than that produced by Webster’s

method. In this case, state E got the extra seat instead of state A.
Other Applications
Nurses can be assigned to hospitals according to the number of pa-

tients requiring care.
Police officers can be assigned to precincts based on the number of
reported crimes.

Math classes can be scheduled based on student demand for those

classes.
Fairness in Apportionment
Definition. The choice of apportionment method affects the number of

representatives to be apportioned. This is to give conditions by which an
apportionment plan is fairly judged.
These are the following criterion of fairness:
(1) Quota Rule. The number of representatives apportioned to a state

is the standard quota or one more than yhe standard quota.
Example. For instance, in Example 1 calculating the standard quota

of west cluster is equal to 66, using Jefferson Plan, it assigns 66 sacks
of rice to that cluster. Thus, the Jefferson Method does not violate
the quota rule. However, for example, if the SQ is 66 and the Jeffer-
son plan assigns 68 sacks of rice to that cluster, which is two more
than quota, this means that the Jefferson Method violates the quota
rule.
(2) Average Constituency(AC). The population of the sub-group di-

vided by the number of representatives from the sub-group and
then rounded to the nearest whole number.
Population of sub-group
AC = number of representatives from the sub-group
Example. Consider the two clusters Jurassic Park and College Park
below:
Cluster Population Representatives Average Constituency
Jurassic Park 16000 10 16000÷10 = 1600
College Park 8340 5 8340÷5 = 1668

Because the average constituencies are approximately equal it seems

natural to say both clusters are equally represented.
(3) Absolute Fairness of an Apportionment. The Absolute Fairness
of an Apportiontment (AUA) is the absolute value of the difference
between the average constituency of sub-group A and the Average
Constituency of sub-group B.
AU A = | AC ( A) − AC ( B)|
Example. Consider the previous example, if Jurassic Park or Col-

lege Park receives the new representative.
Jurassic Park’s AC College Park’s AC AUA

Jurassic Park receives the
16000÷11 = 1455 8340÷5 = 1668 |1668 − 1455| = 213
new representative
College Park receives the

16000÷10 = 1600 8340÷6 = 1390 |1600 − 1390| = 210
new representative
Example. Because the the smaller the absolute fairness of appor-

tionment occurs if College Park receives the new representative, it
might seem that College Park should receive the representative.
(4) Relative Unfairness of an Apportionment. The Relative Unfair-

ness of an Apportiontment (RUA) is the quotient of the absolute
value of the unfairness of the apportionment and the average con-
stituency of sub-group A receiving the new representative.
AU A
RU A = AC of the sub- group receiving the new representative
Example. Determine the RUA that gives a new representative to

(A.) Jurassic Park rather than College Park and (B.) College Park
rather than Jurassic Park.
Solution

213
A. RU A( JP) = 1455 ≈0.146
210
B. RU A(CP) = 1390 ≈0.151
(5) Apportionment Principle. When adding a new representative to

subgroup, the representative is assigned to the sub-group in such a
way as to give the smallest relative unfairness of apportionment.
From the previous example, the RUA of Jurasssic Park is approxi-
mately 0.146 and the RUA of College Park is approximately 0.151.
By the Apportionment Principle, the cluster with smallest RUA is
Jurassic Park, thus will receive the new representative.
Apportionment Paradoxes
There are three apportionment paradoxes, namely:
(1) Alabama Paradox. An increase in the total number of items to be

apportioned results in the loss of an item for a group.
(2) Population Paradox. Group A loses items to Group B, even though
the population of Group A grew at a faster rate than that of Group
B.
(3) New States Paradox. The addition of a new group changes the ap-
portionment of other methods.
Balinski-Young Impossibility Theorem
Definition. Any apportionment method either will violate the quota rule
or will produce paradoxes such as the Alabama Paradox.

Summary of Methods and Possible Flaws
Summary of Methods Flaws
Violation of
and Possible Flaws Alabama Paradox Population Paradox New States Paradox
Quota Rule
Hamilton Plan Cannot Occur May Occur May Occur May Occur
Jefferson Plan May Violate Cannot Occur Cannot Occur Cannot Occur
HH Method May Violate Cannot Occur Cannot Occur Cannot Occur

PART 2: INTRODUCTION TO VOTING
(1) Use the different methods of voting to determine a winner.

(2) Apply the fairness criterion and Arrows’ Impossibility Theorem on
voting methods.
Voting
One of the most privileges that those of us who lived in a democracy is

enjoying the right to vote. Sometimes, however in U.S, it is a fact that
the best candidate did not get elected. Unfortunately, that is because of
the plurality voting system works, it is possible to elect someone or pass
a proposition that has less than majority support. In the Philippines, we
elect someone by a popular vote or pass a proposition by a majority sup-
port.
Methods of Voting
(1) The Plurality Method of Voting

Each voter votes for one candidate, and the candidate with me the
most votes wins. The winning candidate does not have to have a
majority of the votes.
Majority vote: over 50% of the people voting must vote

for the candidate.
Example 1. Determine the winner using the Plurality Voting.

Fifty people were asked to rank their preferences of five varieties of

chocolate candy, using 1 for their most favorite and 5 for their least
favorite. This type of choices is called a preferences schedule. The
results are shown in the table below. According to this table, which
variety would win the taste test using the plurality voting system?
Rankings
Caramel 5 4 4 4 2 4
Vanilla 1 5 5 5 5 5
Almond 2 3 2 1 3 3
Toffee 4 1 1 3 4 2
Cocoa 3 2 3 2 1 1
Number of Votes 17 11 9 8 3 2
Solution.
Rankings First- Place Votes

Caramel 5 4 4 4 2 4 0
Vanilla 1 5 5 5 5 5 17
Almond 2 3 2 1 3 3 8
Toffee 4 1 1 3 4 2 11+9=20
Cocoa 3 2 3 2 1 1 3+2=5
Because Toffee received 20 first-placed votes, this type of candy

would win the plurality taste contest.

(2) The Borda Count Method of Voting

Each voter ranks all the candidates; that is, each voter selects his or
her first choice, second choice, third choice, and so on. If there are
n candidates, each candidate receives n points for each first-choice
vote, (n − 1) points foe each second-choice vote, (n − 2) points for
each third-choice, and so on. The candidate with the most total
points is declared the winner.
Example 2. Using the preferences schedule in Example 1, determine

the winner using Borda Count Method.
Rankings
Caramel 5 4 4 4 2 4
Vanilla 1 5 5 5 5 5
Almond 2 3 2 1 3 3
Toffee 4 1 1 3 4 2
Cocoa 3 2 3 2 1 1
Solution. Using the Borda Count method, each 1st place votes re-
ceives 5 points, each 2nd place receives 4 points, each 3rd place re-
ceives 3 points, each 4th place receives 2 points and last place re-
ceives 1 point.
Caramel Vanilla Almond

1st 5×0 0 1st 5 × 17 85 1st 5×8 40
2nd 4×3 12 2nd 4×0 0 2nd 4 × 26 104
3rd 3×0 0 3rd 3×0 0 3rd 3 × 16 48
4th 2 × 30 60 4th 2×0 0 4th 2×0 0
5th 1 × 17 17 5th 1 × 33 33 5th 1×0 0
Total 89 Total 118 Total 192

Toffee Cocoa
1st 5 × 20 100 1st 5×5 25
2nd 4×2 8 2nd 4 × 19 76
3rd 3×8 24 3rd 3 × 26 78
4th 2 × 20 40 4th 2×0 0
5th 1×0 0 5th 1×0 0
Total 172 Total 179
Almond is the winner (taste favorite) even though it is not the plu-
rality winner.
(3) Plurality Elimination Method
Each person votes for his or her favorite candidate receives a ma-
jority of votes, that candidated is declared the winner. If no candi-
date receives a majority, then the candidate with the fewest votes is
eliminated and a new election is held. This process continues until
a candidate receives a majority of the votes.
Example 3. Using the Preferences Schedule in Example 1, deter-

mine the winner using Plurality with Elimination Voting Method.
Rankings
Caramel 5 4 4 4 2 4
Vanilla 1 5 5 5 5 5
Almond 2 3 2 1 3 3
Toffee 4 1 1 3 4 2
Cocoa 3 2 3 2 1 1
Solution.
Because Caramel received no first-place votes, it is eliminated from
consideration. The rest still be qualified for the new preference
schedule.

Rankings 1st Place Votes Result
Caramel 5 4 4 4 2 4 0 Eliminated
Vanilla 1 5 5 5 5 5 17 Qualified
Almond 2 3 2 1 3 3 8 Qualified
Toffee 4 1 1 3 4 2 20 Qualified
Cocoa 3 2 3 2 1 1 5 Qualified
The new preference schedule is shown below. Because Cocoa re-

ceived the lowest of the first-place votes, it is eliminated from the
next consideration. (Those highlighted ranks are the new ranks in
the new preference)
Caramel Eliminated
Almond 2 3 2 1 2 3 8 Qualified
Cocoa 3 2 3 2 1 1 5 Eliminated
The new preference schedules is shown below. Because Almond

received the lowest of the first-place votes, it is eliminated from the
next consideration. (Those highlighted ranks are the new ranks in
the new preference)


Caramel Eliminated
Almond 2 2 2 1 1 2 11 Eliminated
Cocoa Eliminated
The new preferences schedule is shown below. Because Toffee re-

ceives the highest for first-place votes, it is the Winnertaste favorite.
(Those highlighted ranks are the new ranks in the new preference.)
Caramel Eliminated
Vanilla 1 2 2 2 2 2 17 Eliminated
Almond Eliminated
Toffee 2 1 1 1 1 1 33 Winner
Cocoa Eliminated
(4) Pairwise Comparison Voting Method

Sometimes referred to as the head-to head method. Each voter ranks
all of the candidates; that is, each voter selects his or her first-choice,
second choice, third choice, and so on. For each possible pairing of
candidates, the candidate with the most votes receives 1 point; if
there is a tie, each candidate receives 0.5 point. The candidate who
receives the most points is declared the winner.
Example 4. Using the preferences Schedule in Example 1, deter-

mine the winner using Pairwise Comparison Voting Method.

Rankings
Caramel 5 4 4 4 2 4
Vanilla 1 5 5 5 5 5
Almond 2 3 2 1 3 3
Toffee 4 1 1 3 4 2
Cocoa 3 2 3 2 1 1
Solution.
We will create a table to keep track of each of the head-to-head com-
parisons. Note that the matching between caramel and vanilla is
the same as the matchup between Vanilla and caramel. Therefore,
duplicate cells and the cells between the same candidates are not
considered.
Caramel Vanilla Almond Toffee Cocoa
Caramel
Vanilla
Almond
Toffee
Cocoa
To complete the table, we will place the winner in the cell of each
head-to-head matchup. And whoever is favored between the matchup
should get the number of votes.

Caramel Vanilla
11+9+8+3+2 33 Winner 17 17
vs vs
Vanilla 17 17 To f f ee 11+9+8+3+2 33 Winner
Caramel Vanilla
3 3 17 17
vs vs
Almond 17+11+9+8+2 47 Winner Cocoa 11+9+8+3+2 33 Winner
Caramel Almond
3 3 17+8+3 28 Winner
vs vs
To f f ee 17+11+9+8+2 47 Winner To f f ee 11+9+2 22
Caramel Almond
0 0 17+9+8 34 Winner
vs vs
Cocoa 17+11+9+8+3+2 50 Winner Cocoa 11+3+2 16
Vanilla To f f ee
17 17 11+9 20
vs vs
Almond 11+9+8+3+2 33 Winner Cocoa 17+8+3+2 30 Winner
We will place the winner in the cell of each head-to-head matchup.
Caramel Vanilla Almond Toffee Cocoa

Caramel Caramel Almond Toffee Cocoa
Vanilla Almond Toffee Cocoa
Almond Almond Almond
Toffee Cocoa
Cocoa
From the above table, Caramel has 1 win, Vanilla has no wins, Almond
has 4 wins, Toffee has 2 wins, and Cocoa has 3 wins. Using pairwise
comparison, Almond is the Winner (taste favorite).
Fairness Criteria of Voting Methods
(1) Majority Criterion. The candidate who receives a majority of the

first-place votes is the winner.
(2) Monotonicity Criterion. If candidate A wins an election, then can-
didate A will also win the election if the only change in the voter’s
preferences is that supporters of a different candidate change their
votes to support candidate A.

(3) Condorcet Criterion. A candidate who wins all possible head-to-

head matchups should win an election whem all candidates appear
on the ballot.
(4) Independence of irrelevant Alternatives. If a candidate wins an
election, the winner should remain the winner in any recount in
which losing candidates withdraw from the race.
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
There is no voting method involving three or more choices that satisfies

all four fairness criteria.

PART 3: WEIGHTED VOTING SYTEM
(1) Define the weighted voting system.

(2) Determine the various type of voting system.
(3) Determine a winning coalition and critical voters in a voting sy
(4) Determine the power of voter in a voting system.
Weighted Voting System
Definition. A Weighted Voting System is one in which voters have more

weight on the outcome of an election.
Example. Stockholders of the company, Electoral College, United Na-

tions Security Council, European Union, etc.
A weighted voting system of n voters is written {q : w1, w2, ..., wn},

where q is the quota and w1 through wn represent the weights of each
of the n voters. A quota is the number of votes that are required to pass a
measure. The weight of vote is the number of votes.
Various Voting system
(1) One person, one vote.
Example. { 5:1,1,1,1,1,1,1 }
Each person has one vote and five votes, a majority, are required to
pass a measure.
(2) Dictatorship
Example. {20:21,6,5,4,3 }

In this system, the person with 21 votes can pass any measure. Even
if the remaining four people get together, their votes do not total
quota of 20.
(3) Null System
Example. { 28:6,3,5,2 }
If all the members of this system vote for a measure, the total num-
ber of votes is 16, which is less than the quota. Therefore, no mea-
sure can be passed.
(4) Veto Power System
Example. {21:6,5,4,3,2,1}
The sum of all the votes is 21, the quota. Therefore, if any one voter
does not vote for the measure, it will fail. Each is said to have a veto
power.
Coalitions in Weighted Voting Systems
(1) Coalition. Set of voters each of whom votes the same way, either
for of against a resolution.
(2) Winning Coalition. A set of voters the sum of whose votes is greater
than or equal to the quota.
(3) Losing Coalition. A set of voters the sum of whoe votes is less than
the quota.
(4) Critical Voter. A voter who leaves a winning coalitiion and thereby
turns into a lossing coalition.
(5) Dictator. A voter has a weight that is greater or equal to the quota.
(6) Dummy. A voter who is never a critical voter and has no power.

Number of Possible Coalitions in n Voters
Definition. The number of possible coalitions of n voters is 2n − 1.
Example 1. A weighted voting system is given by {6:4,3,2,1}.
(a) What is the quota? Answer: 6
(b) How many voters are in the system? Answer: 4
(c) What is the weight of voter B? Answer: 3
(d) What is the weight of the coalition {A,C}? Answer: 6
(e) Is {A,D} a winning coalition? Answer: No
(f) Which voters are critical voters in the coalition {A,C,D}?
Answer: A and C
(g) How many coalitions can be formed?
Answer: 2n − 1 = 24 − 1 = 16 − 1 = 15
(h) How many winning coalitions can be formed?
Answer: 7 winning coalitions ( i.e., {A,B}, {A,C}, {A,B,C}, {A,B,D}, {A,C,D},

{B,C,D}, {A,B,C,D}).
(i) How many coalitions consists of exactly three voters?
Answer: 4 coalitions (i.e., {A,B,C}, {A,B,D}, {A,C,D}, {B,C,D})
Example 2. Suppose that the four owners of a company, Awe, Bien, Carl,
and Dean, own, respectively, 500 shares, 375 shares, 225 shares, and 400
shares. There are a total of 1500 votes, with a quota of 751. The weighted
voting system of the company is {Q: A, B, C, D} = {751: 500, 375, 225, 400}
.

(a) Determine the winning coalitions.mine the winning coalitions.
(b) For each winning coalition, determine the critical voters.
Solution
(a) A winning coalitions must represent at least 751 votes.
Winning Coalitions Number of Votes

{A,B} 875
{A,D} 900
{B,D} 775
{A,B,C} 1100
{A,B,D} 1275
{A,C,D} 1125
{B,C,D} 1000
{A,B,C,D} 1500
(b) A voter who leaves a winning coalition and thereby creates losing
coalition is a critical voter.
Winning Coalitions Number of Votes Critical Voters

{A,B} 875 A,B
{A,D} 900 A,D
{B,D} 775 B,D
{A,B,C} 1100 A,D
{A,B,D} 1275 NONE
{A,C,D} 1125 A,D
{B,C,D} 1000 B,D
{A,B,C,D} 1500 NONE

Banzhaf Power Index (BPI)
Derived by John F. Banzhaf lll in 1965. The purpose of this index is to

determine the power of a voter in a weighted voting system. The Banzhaf
Power Index (BPI) of a voter v, is given by,
no. of times voter v is a critical voter

BPI (v) = no. of times any voter is a critical voter
Example 3. Using the result of example 2, determine the BPI of A, B, C,

and D.
Winning Coalitions Number of Votes Critical Voters

{A,B} 875 A,B
{A,D} 900 A,D
{B,D} 775 B,D
{A,B,C} 1100 A,D
{A,B,D} 1275 NONE
{A,C,D} 1125 A,D
{B,C,D} 1000 B,D
{A,B,C,D} 1500 NONE
The number of times any voter is a critical voter is 12. (A- 4 times, B- 4
times, C- 0 times, D- 4 times)
4 1
BPI ( A) = 12 = 3 ≈ 0.33
4 1
BPI ( B) = 12 = 3 ≈ 0.33
0
BPI (C ) = 12 ≈0
4 1
BPI ( D ) = 12 = 3 ≈ 0.33
Therefore, voters A, B, D has the power.

Exercises
1. A total of 25 flat one grades are to be apportioned among seven sections

of MMW Class. The class size in the seven sections are given in the table
below.
Sections BSA1G BSC1A BSC1B BSFT1 BSEMATH BSMATH ABM

Class Size 33 21 27 31 35 38 39
(a) Determine the standard divisor. What is the meaning of

the Standard Divisor in the context of this exercise?
(b) Use the Hamilton Method and Jefferson Method to deter-
mine the number of flat one to be apportioned to each sec-
tion.
(c) Use the Huntington Hill Principle to determine which sec-
tion an additional falt one should be assigned. Use the re-
sult of Hamilton Plan
(d) Which of the Apportionment method violate the quota rule
2. The table below shows how average constituency changes when two
CMU Residence Halls, Mahogany Residence Hall (MRH) and Sunrise
Residence Hall (SRH) , add a new student occupant.
MRH’s AC SHR’s AC
MRH receives new occupant 466 638
SRH receives new occupant 638 489
(a) Determine the relative unfairness of an apportionment that

gives a new occupant to MRH rather than SRH.

(b) Determine the relative unfairness of an apportionment that

gives a new occupant to SRH rather than MRH.
(c) Using the apportionment principle, determine which resi-
dence hall receive the additional student occupant.
3. Suppose a government is composed of four political parties, A, B, C,

and D. The voting system for this government is {26:18,16,10,6}. Deter-
mine the Banzhaf Power Index (BPI) for each voter.

Chapter 5 - Apportionment and Voting

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Mathematics in the Modern World GEC 14 Teachers

APPORTIONMENT AND VOTING

PART 1: INTRODUCTION TO APPORTIONMENT

(1) Define an apportionment.

Definition. Apportionment is a method of dividing a whole into various

Remark. The apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives is

Second Semester page 1 of 30 Math Dept. - CMU

There are three methods of apportionment, namely:

(1) The Hamilton Method

Definition. Under the Hamilton Plan, the total population of the

Definition. Standard Quota (SQ) is the whole number part of the

sub- group population

How To Use Hamilton Method

Second Semester page 2 of 30 Math Dept. - CMU

Example. Hamilton Method

Cluster East West South North

Cluster Population Quotient SQ

Cluster Population Quotient SQ SQ(Sack of Rice)

Second Semester page 3 of 30 Math Dept. - CMU

(2) The Jefferson Method

Definition. Uses a modified standard divisor (MD) that yields to

How To Use Jefferson Method

Example. Jefferson Method

Using Example 1: MD = 14.95

Second Semester page 4 of 30 Math Dept. - CMU

Cluster Population Quotient SQ

Using Example 1: NEW MD = 14.92

Cluster Population Quotient SQ

Comparison of Hamilton and Jefferson Plan

Cluster Population Hamilton Plan Jefferson Plan

Second Semester page 5 of 30 Math Dept. - CMU

(3) The Webster Apportionment Method

Daniel Webster (1782-1852) proposed a method similar to Jefferson’s in

Second Semester page 6 of 30 Math Dept. - CMU

where PA - is the population of the sub-group A;

Huntington-Hill Apportionment Method

In 1920, no new apportionment was done, because Congress couldn’t

The Huntington-Hill Method is similar to Webster’s method, but attempts

Second Semester page 7 of 30 Math Dept. - CMU

Second Semester page 8 of 30 Math Dept. - CMU

Solution. The total population is 610,000. Dividing this by the 70 repre-

State Population Quota

Webster’s Method: Using Webster’s method, we round each quota to the

State Population Quota Initial Allocation

Adjusting the divisor down to 8700 gives an updated allocation totaling

Second Semester page 9 of 30 Math Dept. - CMU

State Population Quota Initial Allocation

Huntington-Hill Method: Using the Huntington-Hill method, we round

State Population Quota Lower Quota Geometric Mean Initial

Notice that this allocation is different than that produced by Webster’s

Nurses can be assigned to hospitals according to the number of pa-

Second Semester page 10 of 30 Math Dept. - CMU

Math classes can be scheduled based on student demand for those

Definition. The choice of apportionment method affects the number of

These are the following criterion of fairness:

(1) Quota Rule. The number of representatives apportioned to a state

Example. For instance, in Example 1 calculating the standard quota

(2) Average Constituency(AC). The population of the sub-group di-

Second Semester page 11 of 30 Math Dept. - CMU

Because the average constituencies are approximately equal it seems

Example. Consider the previous example, if Jurassic Park or Col-

Jurassic Park’s AC College Park’s AC AUA

College Park receives the

Example. Because the the smaller the absolute fairness of appor-