Apportionment and Voting

Apportionment

• A method of dividing a whole into various part.

• Has its roots in the U.S. Constitution.
• The apportionment of seats in the House of
Representatives is based on the relative
population of each state.
Methods of Apportionment

• 1790-1832 Jefferson method

• 1842 Webster method
• 1850-1900 Hamilton method
• 1910,1930 Webster method
• 1920 (none)
• 1941-2010 Huntington-Hill method
 Consider the fictitious country of
Tajunga
Tajunga is a new republic located in Zootopia. It is made up of six states:
Alabam, Brussel, Cala, Disney, Estrelle, Feliz (A, B, C, D, E, F for short).
According to the new constitution of Tajunga, the congress will have 250
seats, divided among the six states according to their respective population.
The population figures for each state are given as follows:
Table 1 Republic of Tajunga (Population Data by State)
STATE A B C D E F Total
POPULATION 1 646 000 6 936 000 154 000 2 091 000 685 000 988 000 12 500 000
P – total population of the country
M- number of seats to be apportioned
𝑃
𝐷=
𝑀
Standard divisor (D). The number of citizens
represented by each representative
Standard quota (Q). The whole number part of the
quotient of the population (of the state) divided by
the standard divisor.
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 ′ 𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑄=
𝐷
 𝑃
𝐷=
𝑀
12 500 000
𝐷=
250
𝐷 = 50 000
Table 2: Republic of Tajunga (Standard Quotas for each state)
STATE A B C D E F Total
POPULATION 1 646 000 6 936 000 154 000 2 091 000 685 000 988 000 12 500 000
STANDARD QUOTA 32.92 138.72 3.08 41.82 13.70 19.76 250

Table 3: Conventional Rounding DOESN’T ALWAYS WORK

STATE POPULATION STANDARD QUOTA ROUNDED TO
A 1 646 000 32.92 33
B 6 936 000 138.72 139
C 154 000 3.08 3
D 2 091 000 41.82 42
E 685 000 13.70 14
F 988 000 19.76 20
TOTAL 12 500 000 250 251
The Hamilton Plan
• This method is credited to Alexander Hamilton.

1. Calculate each state’s standard quota.

2. Give
to each state (for the time being) its lower
quota.
3. Give
the surplus seats one at a time to the states with
the largest fractional parts until we run out of surplus
seats.
Tajunga is a new republic located in Zootopia. It is made up of six states:
Alabam, Brussel, Cala, Disney, Estrelle, Feliz (A, B, C, D, E, F for short).
According to the new constitution of Tajunga, the congress will have 250
seats, divided among the six states according to their respective population.
The population figures for each state are given as follows:
Table 4: Republic of Tajunga: Apportionment Based on Hamilton’s Method
STATE POPULATION STANDARD LOWER FRACTIONAL SURPLUS FINAL
QUOTA QUOTA PART SEATS APPORTIONMENT
(STEP 1) (STEP 2) (STEP 3)
A 1 646 000 32.92 32 0.92 1 (1st) 33
B 6 936 000 138.72 138 0.72 1 (4th ) 139
C 154 000 3.08 3 0.08 3
D 2 091 000 41.82 41 0.82 1 (2nd ) 42
E 685 000 13.70 13 0.70 13
F 988 000 19.76 19 0.76 1 (3rd ) 20
TOTAL 12 500 000 250 246 4.00 250
The Quota Rule

A state’s apportionment should always be either its

upper quota or its lower quota.
 Apportionment Paradoxes
1. Alabama Paradox. This paradox occurs when an increase in the
number of total representatives results in a state losing a
representative.
2. Population Paradox. This paradox occurs when changes in
apportionment do not accurately reflect changes in population.
3. New States Paradox. This paradox occurs with Hamilton’s method
and appeared when Oklahoma became a state in 1907.
The Jefferson Plan

• This method is credited to Thomas Jefferson.

• He introduced the modified standard divisor (𝐷𝑚 ) that
yields to the correct number of representatives by trial
and error so that the sum of the standard quotas is equal
to the number of representatives

• Note: 𝐷𝑚 < 𝐷
m –modified lower quota
The Jefferson Plan

1. Find a number 𝐷𝑚 such that when each state’s modified

quota (states population divided by D) is rounded down
(modified lower quota), the total is the exact number of
seats to be apportioned.
2. Apportion to each state its modified lower quota.
Tajunga is a new republic located in Zootopia. It is made up of six states:
Alabam, Brussel, Cala, Disney, Estrelle, Feliz (A, B, C, D, E, F for short).
According to the new constitution of Tajunga, the congress will have 250
seats, divided among the six states according to their respective
population. The population figures for each state are given as follows:
Table 5 Republic of Tajunga: Calculations using Modified Divisor 𝐷𝑚 =49 500
STATE POPULATION STANDARD QUOTA MODIFIED QUOTA MODIFIED LOWER
POPULATION/49 500 QUOTA
A 1 646 000 32.92 33.25 33
B 6 936 000 138.72 140.12 140
C 154 000 3.08 3.11 3
D 2 091 000 41.82 42.24 42
E 685 000 13.70 13.84 13
F 988 000 19.76 19.96 19
TOTAL 12 500 000 250 252.52 250
The Adam’s Method

• John Quincy Adams proposed this method

• A method that was a mirror image of Jefferson’s Plan.
• It was based on exactly the same idea but instead of being
based on the modified lower quota, it was based on the
modified upper quota.

• Note: 𝐷𝑚𝑢 > 𝐷

mu –modified upper quota
 Tajunga is a new republic located in Zootopia. It is made up of six states:
Alabam, Brussel, Cala, Disney, Estrelle, Feliz (A, B, C, D, E, F for short).
According to the new constitution of Tajunga, the congress will have 250
seats, divided among the six states according to their respective
population. The population figures for each state are given as follows:

Table 6 Republic of Tajunga: Calculations for Adam’s Method Based on D=50 500

STATE POPULATION STANDARD MODIFIED QUOTA MODIFIED

QUOTA POPULATION/50 500 UPPER QUOTA
A 1 646 000 32.92 33.59 33
B 6 936 000 138.72 137.35 138
C 154 000 3.08 3.05 4
D 2 091 000 41.82 41.41 42
E 685 000 13.70 13.56 14
F 988 000 19.76 19.56 20
TOTAL 12 500 000 250 247.52 251 TOO MUCH!
Table 7 Republic of Tajunga: Calculations for Adam’s Method Based on D=50 700
STATE POPULATION STANDARD MODIFIED QUOTA MODIFIED
QUOTA POPULATION/50 700 UPPER QUOTA
A 1 646 000 32.92 32.47 33
B 6 936 000 138.72 136.50 137
C 154 000 3.08 3.04 4
D 2 091 000 41.82 41.24 42
E 685 000 13.70 13.51 14
F 988 000 19.76 19.49 20
TOTAL 12 500 000 250 246.55 250 BINGO!
The Webster’s Method

• This method is credited to Daniel Webster.

• Round the quotas to the nearest integer, the way we round
decimals
• Find a modified divisor 𝐷𝑚 such that when each state’s
modified quota (state’s population divided by D) is rounded
the conventional way (to the nearest integer) is the exact
number of seats to be apportioned.
• Apportion to each state its modified quota rounded the
conventional way.
 Tajunga is a new republic located in Zootopia. It is made up of six states:
Alabam, Brussel, Cala, Disney, Estrelle, Feliz (A, B, C, D, E, F for short).
According to the new constitution of Tajunga, the congress will have 250
seats, divided among the six states according to their respective
population. The population figures for each state are given as follows:

Table 8 Republic of Tajunga: Calculations for Webster’s Method Based on D=50 100

STATE POPULATION MODIFIED QUOTA MODIFIED UPPER

POPULATION/50 100 QUOTA
A 1 646 000 32.85 33
B 6 936 000 138.44 138
C 154 000 3.07 3
D 2 091 000 41.74 42
E 685 000 13.67 14
F 988 000 19.72 20
TOTAL 12 500 000 249.49 250
Table 9 Republic of Tajunga: A tale of four methods
STATE POPULATION STANDARD HAMILTON JEFFERSON ADAMS WEBSTER
QUOTA
A 1 646 000 32.92 33 33 33 33
B 6 936 000 138.72 139 140 137 138
C 154 000 3.08 3 3 4 3
D 2 091 000 41.82 42 42 42 42
E 685 000 13.70 13 13 14 14
F 988 000 19.76 20 19 20 20
TOTAL 12 500 000 250 250 250 250 250
Huntington-Hill Apportionment Method

• The method is credited to Edward Vermilye Huntington

and Joseph Adna Hill.
• Method of equal proportions
• Used by the House of Representatives since 1940
Huntington-Hill Rounding Rules
• If the quota falls between L and L+1, the Huntington – Hill cut
off for rounding is
𝐻 = 𝐿(𝐿 + 1)
If the quota is below H, we round down, otherwise round up.
• Find a number D such that when each state’s modified quota
(state’s population is divided by D) is rounded according to the
Huntington – Hill rounding rules, the total is the exact number of
seats to be apportioned.
• Apportion to each state its modified quota, rounded using the
Huntington – Hill rules.
Huntington-Hill Apportionment Method

 Take for example if the state has a modified

quota of 3.48, under the Huntington – Hill method
this state would get 4 seats since the cut off for
rounding this quota would be 𝐻 = 3(4)≈3.464
Example: A small country consists of 3 states. We want to apportion the 100
seats in its legislature to the 3 states according to the population figures shown
in table 1.
Table 1
STATE A B C TOTAL
POPULATION 3 480 46 010 50 510 100 000

Table 2
STATE A B C TOTAL
STANDARD QUOTA 3.48 46.01 50.51 100

Table 3
STATE POPULATION STANDARD QUOTA WEBSTER’S APPORTIONMENT
A 3 480 3.48 3
B 46 010 46.01 46
C 50 510 50.51 51
TOTAL 100 000 100 100
Table 4
STATE POPULATION STANDARD WEBSTER’S ROUNDED UNDER
QUOTA APPORTIONMENT HUNTINGTON – HILL
(D=1000) RULES TO
A 3 480 3.48 3 4
B 46 010 46.01 46 46
C 50 510 50.51 51 51
TOTAL 100 000 100 100 101

Table 5
STATE POPULATION STANDARD ROUNDED UNDER
QUOTA HUNTINGTON – HILL
(D=1001) RULES TO
A 3 480 3.477 4
B 46 010 45.964 46
C 50 510 50.460 50
TOTAL 100 000 100 100
Balinski-Young Impossibility Theorem

“Any apportionment method either will violate

the quota rule or will produce paradoxes such as
the Alabama paradox.”
Introduction to Voting
 Example: The MTAP – TL (Mathematics Association of the
Philippines – Tertiary Level) election
The MTAP – TL is holding its annual election for president.
There are four candidates running for president: Aimee,
Becky, Cheena, and Dindi ( A, B, C, D for short). Each of the
37 members of the organization votes by means of a ballot
indicating his/her 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th choice (ties are not
allowed in a ballot)
Table 1 Preference schedule for the MTAP-TL Election

Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A

Preference ballots- ballots in which a voter is asked

to rank all the candidates in order of preference
Plurality Method of Voting

• Each voter votes for one candidate, and the candidate

with the most 1st place votes wins.
• The winning candidate does not have to have a majority
of the votes.

• Note:
Majority vote: More than 50% of the people voting must
vote for the candidate to win.
 The MTAP – TL (Mathematics Association of the Philippines –
Tertiary Level) election
The MTAP – TL is holding its annual election for president.
There are four candidates running for president: Aimee,
Becky, Cheena, and Dindi ( A, B, C, D for short). Each of the
37 members of the organization votes by means of a ballot
indicating his/her 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th choice (ties are not
allowed in a ballot)
 Table 1 Preference schedule for the MTAP-TL Election

Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A
Aimee – has 14 1st place votes Becky – has 4 1st place votes
Cheena - has 11 1st place votes Dindi – has 8 1st place votes

Using Plurality Method of voting the winner is Aimee.

Example: 50 people were asked to rank their preference of
five varieties of Frapuccino using 1 for their favorite and 5
least favorite. The results are shown below. Which variety
would win the taste using the plurality voting system?
Rankings
Caramel 5 4 4 4 2 4
Chocolate 1 5 5 5 5 5
Coffee 2 3 2 1 3 3
Mocha 4 1 1 3 4 2
Vanilla 3 2 3 2 1 1
Number of
votes
17 11 9 8 3 2
 Rankings
Caramel 5 4 4 4 2 4
Chocolate 1 5 5 5 5 5
Coffee 2 3 2 1 3 3
Mocha 4 1 1 3 4 2
Vanilla 3 2 3 2 1 1
Number of
votes
17 11 9 8 3 2

Using plurality method of voting

Caramel – 0 Chocolate – 17 Coffee – 8
Mocha – 20 Vanilla - 5
Borda Count Method of Voting

• Each voter ranks all of the candidates; that is, each

voter selects his or her first choice, second choice, third
choice, and so on.
• If there are 𝑘 candidates, each candidate receives 𝑘
points for each first-choice vote, (𝑘 − 1) points for each
second-choice vote, (𝑘 − 2) points for each third-choice
vote, and so on.
• The candidate with the most total points is declared the
winner.
 The MTAP – TL (Mathematics Association of the Philippines –
Tertiary Level) election
The MTAP – TL is holding its annual election for president.
There are four candidates running for president: Aimee,
Becky, Cheena, and Dindi ( A, B, C, D for short). Each of the
37 members of the organization votes by means of a ballot
indicating his/her 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th choice (ties are not
allowed in a ballot)
Table 1 Preference schedule for the MTAP-TL Election

Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1st choice 4 pts A:56 C:40 D:32 B:16 C:4

2nd choice 3 pts B:42 B:30 C:24 D:12 D:3
3rd choice 2pts C:28 D:20 B:16 C:8 B:2
4th choice 1 pt D:14 A:10 A:8 A:4 A:1

A gets 56+10+8+4+1 =79 pts B gets 42+30+16+16+2=106

106 pts
C gets 28+40+24+8+4=104 pts D gets 14+20+32+12+3=81 pts
Using Borda Count method Becky is the winner
Example: 50 people were asked to rank their preference of
five varieties of Frapuccino using 1 for their favorite and 5
least favorite. The results are shown below. Determine the
favorite using the Borda count method.
Rankings
Caramel 5 4 4 4 2 4
Chocolate 1 5 5 5 5 5
Coffee 2 3 2 1 3 3
Mocha 4 1 1 3 4 2
Vanilla 3 2 3 2 1 1
Number of
votes
17 11 9 8 3 2
 Rankings
Caramel 5 4 4 4 2 4
Chocolate 1 5 5 5 5 5
Coffee 2 3 2 1 3 3
Mocha 4 1 1 3 4 2
Vanilla 3 2 3 2 1 1
Number of
votes
17 11 9 8 3 2

Caramel: 1(17)+2(11)+2(9)+2(8)+4(3)+2(2) = 89 pts

Chocolate: 5(17)+1(11)+1(9)+1(8)+1(3)+1(2) = 118 pts
Coffee: 4(17)+3(11)+4(9)+5(8)+3(3)+3(2) = 192 pts
Mocha: 2(17)+5(11)+5(9)+3(8)+2(3)+4(2) = 172 pts
Vanilla: 3(17)+4(11)+3(9)+4(8)+5(3)+5(2) = 179 pts
Plurality with Elimination

• Electoral version of the principle of survival of the

fittest
• Eliminate the candidate with the smallest number of
first-place votes.
• Cross out the name of the candidates eliminated from
the preference schedule and recount the first place
votes.
• Continue until only one candidate remains.
 The MTAP – TL (Mathematics Association of the Philippines –
Tertiary Level) election
The MTAP – TL is holding its annual election for president.
There are four candidates running for president: Aimee,
Becky, Cheena, and Dindi ( A, B, C, D for short). Each of the
37 members of the organization votes by means of a ballot
indicating his/her 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th choice (ties are not
allowed in a ballot)
Table 1 Preference schedule for the MTAP-TL Election

Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A
Aimee – has 14 1st place votes Becky – has 4 1st place votes
Cheena - has 11 1st place votes Dindi – has 8 1st place votes
Table 1 Preference schedule for the MTAP-TL Election
Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A

Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1st choice A C D D C
2nd choice C D C C D
3rd choice D A A A A

Aimee – has 14 1st place votes Cheena - has 11 1st place votes
Dindi – has 12 1st place votes
Table 1 Preference schedule for the MTAP-TL Election
Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1st choice A C D D C
2nd choice C D C C D
3rd choice D A A A A

Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1st choice A D D D D
2nd choice D A A A A

Aimee – has 14 1st place votes

Dindi – has 23 1st place votes Dindi – is the winner
Example: The Mathematics club has a superb marching band. They were
invited to march at five different bowl games. The Amethyst Bowl (A),
Bernabe Bowl (B), Candy Bowl (C), Dahlia Bowl (D), and Emerald Bowl
(E). An election was held among the 126 members of the band to
decide in which of the five bowl games they will march. The results are
shown in the table.

Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 5 1 4 3
Banana Bowl 1 4 5 2 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 4 5 2
Dahlia Bowl 4 2 3 1 4
Emerald Bowl 5 3 2 3 5
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18
 Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 5 1 4 3
Banana Bowl 1 4 5 2 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 4 5 2
Dahlia Bowl 4 2 3 1 4
Emerald Bowl 5 3 2 3 5
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18

Amethyst Bowl – 25 1st place votes

Banana Bowl – 51 1st place votes
Candy Bowl – 30 1st place vote
Dahlia Bowl – 20 1st place votes
Emerald Bowl – 0 1st place votes
 Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 4 1 3 3
Banana Bowl 1 3 4 2 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 3 4 2
Dahlia Bowl 4 2 2 1 4
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18
Amethyst Bowl – 25 1st place votes
Banana Bowl – 51 1st place votes
Candy Bowl – 30 1st place vote
Dahlia Bowl – 20 1st place votes
 Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 3 1 2 3
Banana Bowl 1 2 3 1 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 2 3 2
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18
Amethyst Bowl – 25 1st place votes
Banana Bowl – 71 1st place votes
Candy Bowl – 30 1st place vote
 Rankings
Banana Bowl 1 2 2 1 1
Candy Bowl 2 1 1 2 2
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18

Banana Bowl – 71 1st place votes Banana Bowl – winner

Candy Bowl – 55 1st place vote
Pairwise Comparison Voting Method

• Sometimes referred to as the “head-to-head method”.

• Each voter ranks all of the candidates; that is, each voter
selects his or her first choice, second choice, third choice,
and so on.
• For each possible pairing of candidates, the candidate
receives 1 point for a win, 0.5 for a tie and 0 for a loss.
• The candidate with the greatest number of points win the
elections.
 The MTAP – TL (Mathematics Association of the Philippines –
Tertiary Level) election
The MTAP – TL is holding its annual election for president.
There are four candidates running for president: Aimee,
Becky, Cheena, and Dindi ( A, B, C, D for short). Each of the
37 members of the organization votes by means of a ballot
indicating his/her 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th choice (ties are not
allowed in a ballot)
Table 1 Preference schedule for the MTAP-TL Election
Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A

AIMEE VS BECKY AIMEE BECKY CHEENA DINDI

14 10 AIMEE X B
8 BECKY X X
4 CHEENA X X X
1 DINDI X X X X
 Table 1 Preference schedule for the MTAP-TL Election
Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A

AIMEE VS CHEENA AIMEE BECKY CHEENA DINDI

14 10 AIMEE X B C
8 BECKY X X
4 CHEENA X X X
1 DINDI X X X X
Table 1 Preference schedule for the MTAP-TL Election
Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A

AIMEE VS DINDI AIMEE BECKY CHEENA DINDI

14 10 AIMEE X B C D
8 BECKY X X
4 CHEENA X X X
1 DINDI X X X X
 Table 1 Preference schedule for the MTAP-TL Election
Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A

BECKY VS CHEENA AIMEE BECKY CHEENA DINDI

14 10 AIMEE X B C D
4 8 BECKY X X C
1 CHEENA X X X
DINDI X X X X
Table 1 Preference schedule for the MTAP-TL Election
Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A

BECKY VS DINDI AIMEE BECKY CHEENA DINDI

14 8 AIMEE X B C D
10 1 BECKY X X C B
4 CHEENA X X X
DINDI X X X X
Table 1 Preference schedule for the MTAP-TL Election
Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1

1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A

CHEENA VS DINDI AIMEE BECKY CHEENA DINDI

14 8 AIMEE X B C D
10 4 BECKY X X C B
1 CHEENA X X X C
DINDI X X X X
 Table 1 Preference schedule for the MTAP-TL Election
AIMEE BECKY CHEENA DINDI
AIMEE X B C D
BECKY X X C B
CHEENA X X X C
DINDI X X X X

NAMES AIMEE BECKY CHEENA DINDI

TALLY 0 2 3 1

By Pairwise Comparison Method, Cheena is the winner.

Example: The Mathematics club has a superb marching band. They were
invited to march at five different bowl games. The Amethyst Bowl (A),
Bernabe Bowl (B), Candy Bowl (C), Dahlia Bowl (D), and Emerald Bowl
(E). An election was held among the 126 members of the band to
decide in which of the five bowl games they will march. The results are
shown in the table. Use the pairwise comparison method to determine
the food preference of the club.

Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 5 1 4 3
Banana Bowl 1 4 5 2 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 4 5 2
Dahlia Bowl 4 2 3 1 4
Emerald Bowl 5 3 2 3 5
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18
 Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 5 1 4 3
Banana Bowl 1 4 5 2 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 4 5 2
Dahlia Bowl 4 2 3 1 4
Emerald Bowl 5 3 2 3 5
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18
AMETHYST VS. BANANA
25 33
30
20
18
 Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 5 1 4 3
Banana Bowl 1 4 5 2 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 4 5 2
Dahlia Bowl 4 2 3 1 4
Emerald Bowl 5 3 2 3 5
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18

Amethyst Bowl Banana Bowl Candy Bowl Dahlia Bowl Emerald Bowl
Amethyst Bowl x B
Banana Bowl x x
Candy Bowl x x x
Dahlia Bowl x x x x
Emerald Bowl x x x x x
 Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 5 1 4 3
Banana Bowl 1 4 5 2 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 4 5 2
Dahlia Bowl 4 2 3 1 4
Emerald Bowl 5 3 2 3 5
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18
AMETHYST VS. CANDY
33 30
25 18
20
 Amethyst Bowl Banana Bowl Candy Bowl Dahlia Bowl Emerald Bowl
Amethyst Bowl x B A
Banana Bowl x x
Candy Bowl x x x
Dahlia Bowl x x x x
Emerald Bowl x x x x x
 Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 5 1 4 3
Banana Bowl 1 4 5 2 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 4 5 2
Dahlia Bowl 4 2 3 1 4
Emerald Bowl 5 3 2 3 5
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18
AMETHYST VS. DAHLIA
33 30
25 20
18
 Amethyst Bowl Banana Bowl Candy Bowl Dahlia Bowl Emerald Bowl
Amethyst Bowl x B A A
Banana Bowl x x
Candy Bowl x x x
Dahlia Bowl x x x x
Emerald Bowl x x x x x
 Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 5 1 4 3
Banana Bowl 1 4 5 2 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 4 5 2
Dahlia Bowl 4 2 3 1 4
Emerald Bowl 5 3 2 3 5
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18
AMETHYST VS. EMERALD
33 30
25 20
18
 Amethyst Bowl Banana Bowl Candy Bowl Dahlia Bowl Emerald Bowl
Amethyst Bowl x B A A A
Banana Bowl x x
Candy Bowl x x x
Dahlia Bowl x x x x
Emerald Bowl x x x x x
 Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 5 1 4 3
Banana Bowl 1 4 5 2 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 4 5 2
Dahlia Bowl 4 2 3 1 4
Emerald Bowl 5 3 2 3 5
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18
BANANA VS. CANDY
33 30
20 25
18
 Amethyst Bowl Banana Bowl Candy Bowl Dahlia Bowl Emerald Bowl
Amethyst Bowl x B A A A
Banana Bowl x x B
Candy Bowl x x x
Dahlia Bowl x x x x
Emerald Bowl x x x x x
 Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 5 1 4 3
Banana Bowl 1 4 5 2 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 4 5 2
Dahlia Bowl 4 2 3 1 4
Emerald Bowl 5 3 2 3 5
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18
BANANA VS. DAHLIA
33 30
18 25
20
 Amethyst Bowl Banana Bowl Candy Bowl Dahlia Bowl Emerald Bowl
Amethyst Bowl x B A A A
Banana Bowl x x B D
Candy Bowl x x x
Dahlia Bowl x x x x
Emerald Bowl x x x x x
 Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 5 1 4 3
Banana Bowl 1 4 5 2 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 4 5 2
Dahlia Bowl 4 2 3 1 4
Emerald Bowl 5 3 2 3 5
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18
BANANA VS. EMERALD
33 30
20 25
18
 Amethyst Bowl Banana Bowl Candy Bowl Dahlia Bowl Emerald Bowl
Amethyst Bowl x B A A A
Banana Bowl x x B D B
Candy Bowl x x x
Dahlia Bowl x x x x
Emerald Bowl x x x x x
 Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 5 1 4 3
Banana Bowl 1 4 5 2 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 4 5 2
Dahlia Bowl 4 2 3 1 4
Emerald Bowl 5 3 2 3 5
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18
CANDY VS. DAHLIA
33 25
30 20
18
 Amethyst Bowl Banana Bowl Candy Bowl Dahlia Bowl Emerald Bowl
Amethyst Bowl x B A A A
Banana Bowl x x B D B
Candy Bowl x x x C
Dahlia Bowl x x x x
Emerald Bowl x x x x x
 Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 5 1 4 3
Banana Bowl 1 4 5 2 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 4 5 2
Dahlia Bowl 4 2 3 1 4
Emerald Bowl 5 3 2 3 5
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18
CANDY VS. EMERALD
33 25
30 20
18
 Amethyst Bowl Banana Bowl Candy Bowl Dahlia Bowl Emerald Bowl
Amethyst Bowl x B A A A
Banana Bowl x x B D B
Candy Bowl x x x C C
Dahlia Bowl x x x x
Emerald Bowl x x x x x
 Rankings
Amethyst Bowl 2 5 1 4 3
Banana Bowl 1 4 5 2 1
Candy Bowl 3 1 4 5 2
Dahlia Bowl 4 2 3 1 4
Emerald Bowl 5 3 2 3 5
Number of Ballots 33 30 25 20 18
DAHLIA VS. EMERALD
33 25
30
20
18
 Amethyst Bowl Banana Bowl Candy Bowl Dahlia Bowl Emerald Bowl
Amethyst Bowl x B A A A
Banana Bowl x x B D B
Candy Bowl x x x C C
Dahlia Bowl x x x x D
Emerald Bowl x x x x x

NAMES Amethyst Bowl Banana Bowl Candy Bowl Dahlia Bowl Emerald Bowl
TALLY 3 3 2 2 0

Using pairwise comparison method, the winners are Amethyst Bowl and
Banana Bowl.
Fairness Criteria
1. MajorityCriterion. The candidate who receives a majority of the
first-place votes is the winner.
2. MonotonicityCriterion. If candidate A wins an election, then
candidate A will also win the election if the only change in the
voters’ preferences is that sup- porters of a different candidate
change their votes to support candidate A.
3. Condorcetcriterion. A candidate who wins all possible head-to-
head matchups should win an election when all candidates
appear on the ballot.
4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives. If a candidate wins an
election, the winner should remain the winner in any recount in
which losing candidates withdraw from the race.
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

“There is no voting system method involving

three or more choices that satisfies all four
fairness criteria.”