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American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 2015, 105(5): 638–643

http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20151118

Child Gender and Parental Inputs:


No More Son Preference in Korea?†
By Eleanor Jawon Choi and Jisoo Hwang*

Son preference has persisted across many Panel A. Selected countries


generations, particularly in patriarchal Asian 118

Number of boys per 100 girls


societies. This is well represented by the grossly 116 China
skewed sex ratio at birth: 111 in China, 112 in 114 India
India and Vietnam, and 113 in Hong Kong.1 112
Korea
Taiwan
Advanced technologies that allow prenatal sex 110 US
selection and the increasing desire for smaller 108
families have induced more parents to opt for 106
their preferred—male—child. 104
However, South Korea—henceforth, Korea— 102
which shares many of the traditional norms with 100
nearby countries, seems to be heading toward

05 05
0
55 55

− 0
65 65

− 0
75 75

0
85 85

0
95 95

10
00 00
60 96

70 97

80 98

90 99

20 −20

20
19 19

19 19

19 19

19 −19

19 −19
gender neutrality. Sex ratio at birth, which sur-
19 −1

19 −1

19 −1

19 1

20 −2


0−


passed 116 in 1990, is now 105, the natural ratio
5
19

(see Figure 1, panel A).


Panel B. Korea, by birth order
Does the recovery of a natural sex ratio imply
210
that son preference has disappeared in Korea?
Number of boys per 100 girls

200
This paper studies differences in parents’ time Total
190 First
and monetary inputs by the sex of their child. 180 Second
Although the decline in sex ratio at birth may 170 Third +
reflect changes in underlying preferences 160
regarding child gender overall, it is also possi- 150
ble that discrimination still exists in how boys 140
and girls are treated after birth. In the latter case, 130
gender differences in parental treatment could 120
result in non-trivial differences in human capital 110
100
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
2099
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
11
19

* Choi: College of Economics and Finance, Hanyang


University, 222 Wangsimni-ro, Seongdong-gu, Seoul
133-791, Korea (e-mail: choiej@hanyang.ac.kr); Hwang: Figure 1. Sex Ratio at Birth
Department of International Economics and Law,
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 107 Imun-ro, Sources: Panel A: Data for China, India, Korea, and
Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul 130-791, Korea (e-mail: jhwang@ United States are from United Nations, World Population
hufs.ac.kr). We thank Sunyoung Jung, Hyun Hak Kim, Kevin Prospects: The 2012 Revision. Data for Taiwan are from the
Lang, and Chulhee Lee for helpful discussions; the Bank of Department of Household Registration (statistics for 1950–
Korea and Korean Educational Development Institute for 1979 are not available for two counties in Taiwan—Kinmen
providing data; Tiffany Yu for sharing Taiwanese birth statis- and Lienchiang). Panel B: Data from Korean Vital Statistics.
tics; and Yoonju Jung for research assistance. Choi gratefully
acknowledges financial support from Hanyang University
(HY-2014-G). Hwang thanks Hankuk University of Foreign
Studies for the research fund. All remaining errors are our
own. accumulation and career choices. Korea is a par-
† 
Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20151118 to visit
the article page for additional materials and author disclo-
ticularly interesting case to study in this context
sure statement(s). because it is the only Asian country escaping the
1 
2014 estimates from the CIA World Factbook.  imbalanced sex ratio at birth but still ­lagging
638
VOL. 105 NO. 5 NO MORE SON PREFERENCE IN KOREA? 639

behind other developed countries in female I.  Empirical Strategy


labor market outcomes.2
To study parental time and monetary invest- Boy-girl differences in parental inputs can be
ments on various dimensions, we use data measured using a regression model as follows:
from several sources, including Korean Labor
and Income Panel Survey, Korean Time Use (1) ​y​ i​  =  α + βBo​y​ i​ + ​X′i​ ​ ​ γ + ​ε ​i​, ​
Survey, Korean Education Longitudinal Study,
and Private Education Expenditures Survey. Our where ​y​ i​is the parental input of interest for child​
empirical strategy exploits randomness of the i​ , ​Bo​y​ i​is an indicator that equals one if the child
first child’s sex to overcome potential bias from is male and zero otherwise, ​X​ i​is a vector of fam-
endogenous fertility decisions, following Dahl ily characteristics, and ​εi ​​ is an error term. The
and Moretti (2008). OLS estimate of ​β​ captures the average effect
Our findings reveal that parental inputs and of child gender on parental investments if child
expectations differ by child gender. More spe- gender is randomly assigned or exogenous con-
cifically, we find that first, mothers of girls are ditional on covariates.
more likely to be working compared to moth- Although child gender can be considered
ers of boys, as women are more likely to return being randomly determined at conception, the
to work when their first-born child is female. boy-girl difference parameter in (1) may not
Second, girls spend twice as much time as boys be consistently estimated using observational
in housework activities. That is, even at young data for two reasons. First, in societies where
ages, stereotypical gender roles seem to arise in sex-selective abortions are prevalent, girls are
the household. Third, monthly expenditures on less likely to be born into families with strong
private out-of-school education are on average son preference. Second, even in the absence of
23 dollars higher for first-born boys than for sex-selective abortions, child gender would not
first-born girls. Fourth, parents expect their chil- be exogenous if parents make fertility decisions
dren to receive slightly more education and to based on the gender of previous children. In
work in higher-income professions when their many countries including the United States and
first-born child is male. India, parents are less likely to have additional
Our article contributes to the literature on children following a son than a daughter (i.e.,
child gender effects by providing evidence son-biased fertility stopping rules).
on how boy-girl differences may not arise in In Korea, there has been no evidence of prena-
terms of sex ratio at birth, but may appear after tal sex selection among first-born children since
birth in forms of parental inputs. In developing 1991 and thus it is reasonable to assume that first
­countries, there is serious sex imbalance in abor- child gender is exogenous during our sample
tions and infant health outcomes (Jayachandran period (see Figure 1, panel B).3 However, there
and Kuziemko 2011; Barcellos, Carvalho, and are signs of son-biased fertility stopping rules for
Lleras-Muney 2014). In developed countries, higher-order births (see online Appendix Table
child gender is shown to affect marital stability 1). Under son-biased fertility stopping rules,
and time use of parents, but the effect is usually a representative sample of children in all birth
small in magnitude (Lundberg and Rose 2002; orders would result in a sample of parents in
Dahl and Moretti 2008). The Korean case helps which son-biased parents are underrepresented
bridge the gap in existing research between and gender-neutral parents are overrepresented
developing and developed countries and also has (Bharadwaj, Dahl, and Sheth 2015). With the
important implications for other Asian countries selective sample of parents, boy-girl difference
where son preference remains strong to this day. estimates would be biased downward.
To address this concern, we exploit random-
ness of the first child’s gender following Dahl
and Moretti (2008). Then, ​Bo​y​ i​ in ­regression
2 
According to OECD Employment Outlook 2013,
employment to population ratio among women aged 15–64
in Korea ranks 25th out of 34 OECD countries (at 53.5 per- 3 
Sex-ratio at birth in Korea has been remaining within
cent), and the gender earnings gap remains the largest (at the normal range of 104–107 for first births since 1991, for
37 percent).  second births since 2003, and for total births since 2007. 
640 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2015

model (1) indicates whether the first child is members older than age ten. Unfortunately,
male and the estimation sample would only KTUS does not contain information on which
consist of first-borns. Note that girls end up hav- child an activity was carried out with nor the birth
ing more siblings than boys under son-biased order of the child. Thus, we examine time diaries
fertility stopping rules. Thus, the identification reported directly by the children in the study and
strategy relying on the first child’s gender con- focus on the amount of time they spend doing
sistently estimates the total effect of child gen- household chores. The idea is that although we
der on parental inputs, including any indirect cannot directly assess the time parents spend
effects through subsequent fertility choices that with their first-born son versus daughter, the
may depend on the gender of the first-born child. time boys and girls spend on housework would
provide suggestive evidence of the expectations
II.  Data and Results parents have of their sons versus daughters, at
least in terms of gender roles.4
The results of estimating regression model (1) The second row of Table 1 reports the effect
are reported in Table 1. Each entry represents of child gender on hours spent on housework
the effect of child gender when the dependent among respondents between age 10 and 18. The
variable is mother’s employment, child’s house- coefficient on ​Boy​ is negative and statistically
work hours, expenditures on child’s private significant, and indicates that on average, boys
out-of-school education, and parent’s expecta- spend about 0.9 hours (per week) less on house-
tions regarding child’s educational attainment, work than girls. The magnitude is non-trivial
respectively. All regressions are run conditional when considering that the mean housework
on baseline parental characteristics and regional time of all children is only one hour per week.
dummies. Although not reported here, when we run the
First, we look at parental time inputs, as regression separately by year, the gender gap in
measured by maternal employment. We focus housework time is shown to decline over time.
on mother’s labor supply because women still Next, we investigate whether there are
bear the bulk of responsibility for childrearing boy-girl differences in parents’ monetary
in Korea. We use data from the Korean Labor inputs. We analyze expenditures on children’s
and Income Panel Survey (KLIPS), a longitudi- private out-of-school education as this type of
nal study of a representative sample of Korean private education spending is a major compo-
households and individuals living in urban areas. nent of childrearing expenses in Korea.5 The
We use all 13 waves spanning 1998–2010 and ­analysis uses a nationally representative sam-
construct a sample of women who were observed ple of middle school students covered by the
some time before as well as after first childbirth. Korean Education Longitudinal Study (KELS)
We find that the probability a woman works 2005–2007. The survey asks parents about
after first childbirth is 8 percentage points monthly expenditures on private out-of-school
lower when the first-born is male than when it education of Korean, Math, and English, key
is female, even after controlling for her work subjects of the college entrance exam.
status prior to childbirth. That is, boys are more The third row of Table 1 presents that parents
likely to live with stay-at-home mothers than whose first child is male spend about 23 dollars
girls. We obtain nearly identical results when we more per month for their eldest child’s private
shorten the time span to ever worked five years education on the three key subjects compared to
pre- and post- first childbirth. This result is more those whose first child is female. The difference
surprising given that Korean families are less is about 9 percent at the mean.
likely to have additional children following a The fourth and fifth rows of Table 1 use the
son, as aforementioned. 2007–2012 Private Education Expenditures
Another way to analyze parental time inputs
is to observe the kind of activities parents share
4 
with their children at home. We use the Korean Housework time encompasses hours spent on activities
Time Use Survey (KTUS), which reports how such as food preparation, washing dishes, doing the laundry,
and cleaning the house. 
much time per day individuals spend on various 5 
Private out-of-school education indicates private tutor-
activities. The study was conducted in 1999, ing, cramming schools, and online courses, but does not
2004, and 2009 and each wave covers ­household include private school fees. 
VOL. 105 NO. 5 NO MORE SON PREFERENCE IN KOREA? 641

Table 1—Time Inputs, Monetary Inputs, and Expectations, by Child’s Gender

Coefficient Mean
Dependent variable on ​Boy​ [SD] Observations Data source
Mother’s employment −0.08* 0.51 493 KLIPS 1998–2010
  after first childbirtha (0.044) [0.50]
Child’s housework timeb −0.91*** 0.98 29,455 KTUS 1999, 2004, 2009
 (hours per week) (0.036) [2.53]
Private education spending 23.34*** 262.25 8,820 KELS 2005–2007
  on academic subjectsc,d (6.480) [322.72]
Private education spending 2.52*** 196.41 481,114 PEES 2007–2012
  on academic subjectsc,e (0.711) [226.13]
Private education spending −5.04*** 45.10 481,114 PEES 2007–2012
  on non-academic subjectsc,e (0.320) [94.67]
Expected years of educationd 0.24*** 17.32 8,986 KELS 2005–2007
(0.044) [2.22]

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard deviations in brackets. The estimation sample includes single and
two-parent families. Missing values in covariates are imputed with mean values and dummies for missing observations are
also controlled.
a
 One observation per mother. Mother’s employment after first childbirth is a dummy equal to 1 if a woman worked anytime
until the first-born reached age 18. Control variables include whether mother was ever employed before childbirth, parents’
age at time of first childbirth, age squared, and dummies for parents’ education (less than high school, high school, college or
more), year and region. Ever employed before childbirth may be anytime between 1–11 years prior to childbirth.
b
 Estimation uses survey weights. Control variables include child’s age, age squared, parents’ age, age squared, and dummies
for parents’ education (less than high school, high school, college or more), year, and region.
c
 Expenditures on private out-of-school education are in thousands of 2010 South Korean wons (KRWs). 1000 KRWs are worth
approximately 1 USD.
d
 Control variables include parents’ age, age squared, and dummies for parents’ education (less than high school, high school,
college or more), year, and urban rural classification (Seoul, large cities, small cities, rural).
e
 Estimation uses survey weights. Control variables include dummies for parents’ age (20–39, 40–49, 50+), parents’ education
(less than high school, high school, college or more), child’s school level (elementary, middle, high), year, and urban rural
classification (Seoul, large cities, small cities, rural).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

Survey (PEES) sample of students attend- the boy effect is nearly zero for primary school-
ing primary and secondary schools to ana- ers and the effect for secondary schoolers has
lyze private education spending on academic substantially decreased over time.7
and ­ non-academic subjects, separately. Higher expenditures on private out-of-school
Non-academic subjects include art, music,
­ education for boys may reflect higher expecta-
sports, and hobby activities.6 The results show tions on their academic achievement and labor
that the effect of ​Boy​ on private education market outcomes. Our study using the KELS
spending is positive for academic subjects as data finds that parents’ expectations on their
in the KELS sample, whereas it is negative for children’s educational attainment are on a­ verage
non-academic subjects. That is, parent’s private 0.24 years longer for first-born sons than for
education spending pattern differs by the gender first-born daughters (see the last row of Table 1).
of the child. The size of the boy-girl difference The difference is small but statistically signifi-
for academic subjects is smaller compared with cant at all conventional levels and exists despite
the one found from the KELS sample because
7 
When we restrict the analysis to middle school students
6 
Academic subjects in the PEES cover not only Korean, in the PEES 2007, the boy effect estimate becomes similar
Math, and English, but also Science, Social Science, other to the one obtained from the KELS 2005–2007 although we
foreign languages, computer programming, and critical cannot distinguish the birth order of children in the PEES
writing.  data. 
642 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2015

the recent reversal of the gender gap in college over time. Even if it is true that boys have more
entrance rates. health and behavioral problems than girls, it is
We also find that there is a substantial boy-girl difficult to argue that these problems are much
difference in parent’s aspirations for their chil- larger for boys in Korea than in the US, or in
dren’s career choices. The KELS asks parents to the past than nowadays. Second, parents expect
select two occupations that they would like their longer educational years for their sons than their
children to have in the future. Online Appendix daughters and focus on different subjects when
Figure 1 plots the fraction of parents who select spending on private education. If parents allo-
each occupation by first child’s gender. Parents cated monetary inputs unequally because boys
of sons are more likely to select high-wage pro- fared worse than girls in school, it is difficult
fessions or those that require advanced degrees, to explain why parents then expect higher edu-
such as doctor, professor, lawyer, and CEO, than cational attainment for the former. Third, data
parents of daughters. from the Korean Value Survey that asks adults
In sum, whether we look at parental time “Suppose you could only have one child. Would
or monetary inputs, or parents’ expectations you prefer that it be a boy or a girl?” shows that
regarding child’s education or occupation, boys 23.5 percent say “boy” and 16.1 percent say
and girls in Korea are not treated equally at “girl” in 2008.
home. Compared to girls, boys are more likely Korea is in a transitional phase where son
to live with full-time housewife mothers (rather preference is no longer salient before and at time
than working mothers), spend much less time on of birth, but where child gender effects appear
household chores, receive more financial sup- in more subtle ways afterwards via parental
port for private education on academic subjects, inputs and expectations. The significant boy-
and are expected to obtain higher education and girl difference in parental treatments on various
have higher-profile careers. dimensions points toward the conclusion that
child gender still matters and that stereotypical
III. Discussion gender roles continue. Thus, on top of economic
development, policies promoting gender equal-
One natural interpretation of our findings ity could be particularly important in Korea and
above is that there is still son preference in other Asian countries where son preference is
Korea. Although the preference is no longer entrenched. By directly influencing economic
strong enough to distort sex ratios at birth, it may incentives as well as by accelerating the change
remain in the form of gender-biased childcare. in cultural norms, such policies would not only
Both cultural and economic factors may lead to improve the overall status of women, but also
the persistence of son preference. For example, diminish reasons for differential treatment
parents traditionally relied on their eldest son for during childhood.
old-age support and men continue to earn more
than women in the labor market. REFERENCES
Alternatively, it is possible that child gender
effects exist not because parents prefer boys Barcellos, Silvia Helena, Leandro S. Carvalho, and
over girls but because there are gender-specific Adriana Lleras-Muney. 2014. “Child Gender
constraints: boys may have different needs from and Parental Investments in India: Are Boys
girls. For example, if boys tend to have more and Girls Treated Differently?” American Eco-
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