215

Chapter Five

Local Authorities, Women’s Resistance and Dilemmas of Social Change

On October 25, 2005 a young Arab woman’s body was found hanging in an olive

grove in the Arab village of Shfa ‘Amr, in the lower Galilee. Samar Hassoon, aged

22, had been missing for three weeks and her body showed signs of violence. It

was immediately announced that the killing appeared to have been committed on

the basis of “family honor.” Her father and two uncles were suspected and

arrested. A Jerusalem Post article reported that her uncle drove her to a remote

cemetery where another uncle and her father were waiting. The three beat her to

death before hanging her body from an olive tree. Samar, a member of the Druze

sect, had apparently disgraced her family by dating a Muslim man from another

village. 1 What was even more horrifying and upsetting to Israeli-Arab women’s

organizations was the statement made by Faraj Khneifes, a member of the local

council of Shfa ‘Amr municipality: “The result is fitting for the deed.”2 This

outright condoning of an “honor killing” by a local public figure reflects the

strained relationship between Arab local authorities and Israeli Arab women

today.3 It is a symptom of the low status of Arab women and of the influence of

the traditional social structures that administer their local affairs.

1
Derfner, L. (2005, December 16). Family, Honor, Killing. Jerusalem Post.
2
The “result” refers to the murder and the “deed” refers to the so-called violation of family honor.
The statement was made to a female Arab journalist. Arab Women’s organizations intended to file
a lawsuit against the Shfa’Amr city council member for inciting violence.
3
One of Samar’s uncles was convicted of abducting and murdering her and her father and another
uncle were still standing trial. Eyadat, F. (2007, April 22). Shfaram man convicted of murdering
niece in ‘honor killing’. Downloaded from the Internet at http://www.haaretz.com on April 22,
2007.
 216

In an article published in 2002 and focusing on the issue of “honor killings,”4

Manar Hasan discusses at length the relationship between Arab women, their

traditional society, and the state.5 Hasan extensively illustrates the state’s

forgiveness and leniency exhibited to those who perpetrate “honor killings,” even

though those killings are “premeditated, carried out in cold blood and carefully

preplanned.”6 In line with Lustick’s, and Al-Haj and Rosenfeld’s state-centered

explanations for the strengthening of hamula structures, Hasan argues that the

“Israeli authorities and their policy of fostering the hamula and its values produce a

hothouse in which the poisonous plants of patriarchal oppressive tradition can

thrive.”7 Hasan asserts that the Israeli state’s “deference to the patriarchal

leadership for reasons that are clearly and unmistakably in the interest of the

state….bolsters the practice of honor killing and its associated patriarchal

politics.”(Emphasis added)8 Dramatically, Hasan states that by leniency and

deferral to the traditional Arab society “the state almost says: we will compensate

your lost national honor with ‘necklaces’: a few dozen women’s corpses each year

will symbolize the boundaries of the territory that we are leaving to you, the broad

4
Hasan explains that “family honor” refers to the honor of the family as a patriarchal unit, mainly
the honor of males in the family. She further explains that this term is broad and expresses an entire
code of behaviors, actions, and even desires and thoughts incumbent upon females. See Hasan, p. 3.
5
Hasan, M. (2002). The Politics of Honor: Patriarchy, the State and the Murder of Women in the
Name of Family Honor. Journal of Israeli History. Vol. 21:1, 1-37.
6
Hasan, p. 29.
7
Hasan, p. 25.
8
Hasan, p. 18.
 217
expanses of tradition.”9 In short, Hasan argues that the state policy of appeasing the

traditional Arab sentiments compensates the Arab citizens for their embitterment

about the discrimination they experience and tempers their discontent as an

oppressed minority.10

In this chapter, I explore the status of Arab women in Arab local politics. This

status cannot be divorced from their status as women in Israel or as Arabs in Israel.

The above discussion of how the state and the local authority deal with “honor

killings” shows that women are wedged between the policies of the state and their

own traditional social structures. State policies and practices that serve to quench

the Arab nationalist struggle by encouraging the more fragmentary traditional

structures have been researched and discussed at length by Lustick, and Rosenfeld

and Al-Haj, as discussed in the introduction to this study, and by Hasan (focusing

on “honor killings”) and Barzilai (focusing on the state’s use of religious

multiculturalism, discussed in Chapter Two). By entrenching traditional social

structures these state policies and practices greatly influence the status of women in

Israel in general and in local politics in particular.

However, state policies and structures are not the only factors affecting the status

of Arab women in Israel and their relationship with Arab local authorities. My

study has shown thus far that there are internal dynamics within the Arab society in

9
Hasan, p. 25.
10
Hasan, p. 25.
 218
Israel that contribute to the entrenchment of the male dominated hamula politics on

the local level. Namely, when presented with the possibility of change that may

erode the dominance of their traditional social structures, many members of the

Arab minority have defended their traditional institutions against change

implemented through state institutions. This resistance to change is made in the

name of protecting their limited cultural autonomy as an Arab national minority

from the intrusion of the Jewish state (see discussion in Chapter Two). Moreover,

Arab political parties preoccupied with gaining Knesset seats, and with

championing the Arab minority’s national struggle, have neglected the Arab

residents’ interest in efficient and equitable local administration. In their

competition among themselves and with Zionist political parties, they have

strengthened hamulas by accommodating them on the local level in return for the

hamula vote in Knesset elections (see discussion in Chapter Three). In this

chapter, I will expand on my previous arguments by showing that the Arab political

parties’ focus on the national struggle and on winning Knesset votes has had

ramifications for the inclusion of women in national politics. By not placing

women in realistic positions on their election lists they have catered both to the

general traditional sentiments of their Arab voting public as well as to the

traditional hamulas who are the main mobilizers of votes for Arab political parties.

At the same time, on the local level, hamula control of local politics has reinforced

itself as the patriarchal systems that are in charge have worked to keep women on

the margins of Arab local politics. That is to say, both Arab political parties at the
 219
national level and hamulas on the local level perpetuate their male dominance and

place hurdles that prevent the advancement of women. Wedged between state

policies and their traditional hamulas, women on the local level have paradoxically

turned back to the state for assistance to address their issues, as the case studies

will show. Thus, this chapter delves further into deconstructing the complex

relationship between the Israeli state and the Arab minority. It illustrates that state

and society relationships are intertwined, that Arab society is not a homogenous

entity with unitary interests, and that segments of the Arab minority at times will

turn to the state to support them in protecting their interests.

The remainder of this chapter consists of two parts. In Part I, I present an

overview of the status of Arab women in Israel, in general, and the factors affecting

their representation on Arab local authorities, in particular. In order to understand

the relationship between Israeli Arab women and Arab local authorities and the low

status of Arab women in local politics, it is important to understand the multiple

layers of domination to which they are subjected. First, as women, they are part of

a male dominated system where their gender is sorely under-represented in Israeli

politics in general. Second, as Arab women, they are part of a national group that

is marginalized and has very little influence in the national political arena. Third,

as women in their patriarchal local communities, they are excluded from the local

public sphere and their role is confined to the private sphere of the family. Arab
 220
women want to participate in local public life but in order to do so they have to

face the complexity of this multi-layered domination.

Part II of this chapter presents case studies of three Arab women’s grassroots

movements which challenged Arab local authorities in the past few years in an

attempt to make them more attentive to their demands. The case studies illustrate

that Arab women’s issues have been marginalized by the hamula dominated local

authorities, that these local authorities place hurdles that hinder women’s ability to

fight for their needs, and that their gains and successes have been facilitated by

assistance and cooperation from state agencies and institutions. Thus, hamulas on

the local level perpetuate their male dominated authority by keeping women out of

local politics, but women are finding ways to slowly erode that domination.

Part I: Arab Women in Israel: Multiple Layers of Domination

Political maneuvering between secular and religious forces in Israel shaped the

status of women from the inception of the state. The religious element of the

Jewish state has a direct impact on its Jewish female citizens and an indirect impact

on its Arab female citizens.11 Barbara Swirski and Marilyn Safir (1991) explain

that in 1948, Mapai won the largest number of votes to the Knesset without

winning the majority of seats. In order to form a government, Mapai made a deal

with the National Religious Party (NRP) whereby the NRP agreed to join Mapai in

11
Swirski, B. & Safir, M. (1991). Living in a Jewish State: National, Ethnic and Religious
Implications. In Swirski, B. & Safir, M. (Eds.) Calling the Equality Bluff (7-17). New York:
Pergamon Press.
 221
a coalition and Mapai agreed to integrate Jewish law into Israeli state law.12 This

arrangement is known as the “status quo.” According to Swirski and Safir:

The arrangement involved making Saturday the legal day of rest, on which
there was to be no public transportation, stipulating that every
institutional kitchen observe the Jewish dietary laws; granting
Rabbinic courts jurisdiction over personal status laws, and preserving
the separateness and autonomy of the religious school systems….The
“status quo” is, in effect, a compromise between socialist men and
Orthodox men, at the expense of women. A similar bargain was
struck between the state authorities, socialist men, and Arab religious
leaders, also men. The latter agreed to cooperate with the government
in return for, among other things, control over “their own” women.
Thus for Moslems, Christian, and Druze (recognized as an
independent religious community in 1957), matters of personal status
were left to the jurisdiction of the respective religious courts. For
years, state authorities did not enforce compulsory education for
Moslem (including Bedouin), Christian and Druze girls (Swirski,
1990), and to this day “family-honor” murders of Arab women are
treated with leniency by the Jewish legal and law-enforcement
system. 13

The delegation of personal status laws to the religious courts makes inter-religious

marriage difficult. It thus serves the Zionist ideology as well as the interest of

those in the Arab minority who want to maintain religious or national separation by

preserving the purity of each national group and by keeping them separate.

Religious laws discriminate against women in various ways and subject them to the

patriarchal religious establishment.14 Nitza Berkovitch explains the impact of

Jewish religious laws on Jewish women:

12
Swirski and Safir, p. 11.
13
Swirski and Safir, pp. 11-12.
14
Swirski and Safir, pp. 12-15.
 222
Jewish religious law does not view husbands and wives as equal partners,
and stresses both gender differentiation and women’s dependence on
their husbands….This dependence is justified by the reference to the
distinct roles women fulfill within the family and, consequently, in
society at large--“consequently” since it is through their role in the
family that women attain social status. Although this view is strongest
in the Jewish–religious worldview, it does indicate the manner in
which women are constructed within society at large.15

Suad Joseph expands on this point in the context of the Middle East region and

argues that this concession of personal status issues to the religious courts erodes

the state’s ability to protect women, who often:

Have nowhere other than the state to turn to for protection from domestic
violence, familial coercion, discriminatory religious practices, and the
oppression of oppositional political parties or movements….All
Middle East states except Turkey and Tunisia defer personal status
issues to legally recognized religious authorities, subjecting women to
the patriarchal control of male relatives and clerics in their
communities.16

Thus, Joseph contends that the state is complicit in constructing patriarchal

communities.17 In short, the creation of the state of Israel as a Jewish state and the

political maneuvering between secular and religious groups in the early years of the

state have entrenched patriarchy for both Jewish and non-Jewish women in Israel.

Among the implications of this patriarchy is the low participation of women in

Israeli politics. A report entitled “Women in the Knesset” issued in February 2007

15
Berkovitch, N. (1996). Women and the Women’s Equal Rights Law in Israel. Middle East
Report, 198 (January-March), 19-21, p. 21.
16
Joseph, S. (1996). Gender and Citizenship in Middle Eastern States. Middle East Report, 198
(January-March), 4-10, pp. 4 & 7.
17
Joseph, S. (1997). The Public/Private-The Imagined Boundary in the Imagined
Nation/State/Community: The Lebanese Case. Feminist Review, No. 57 (Autumn), 73-92, p. 84.
 223
stated that the percentage of women in Israeli political life in general and the

Knesset in particular was much less than the percentage of women in the

population.18 The report, which was presented to the Knesset Committee for the

Advancement of Women, showed that only 14 percent (17 out of a total of 120

members) of the members of the 17th Knesset (elected in 2006) were women.

While the participation of women in national politics has been limited, the

participation of Arab women, in particular, has been more so. Only two Arab

women have served as Members of the Knesset: MK Husnieh Jbarah (Meretz),

who served in the 15th Knesset from July 1999 to February 2003, and MK Nadia

Hilu (Labor), who was elected for the17th Knesset in March, 2006. Therefore,

women in Israel in general, both Jewish and Arab, are under-represented in

national politics.

Despite the under-representation of women in the Knesset since its establishment,

Jewish women MKs have brought along with them their awareness and desire to

make a place for women in local and national politics and have initiated and

supported legislation for that purpose.19 Female Jewish MKs have been influential

in shaping domestic laws that affect women in Israel.20 For example, there were

amendments to the Equal Pay Law in 1964, 1978, and 1996, the Equal

18
Zvebner S. & Lotan O. (2007, February 4). Nashim baknesset. Mugash lev’adat kidum ma’amad
ha’isha likrat yashivat yom holedetah ha-58 shel haknesset. Center for Research and Information,
The Knesset.
19
Mosawa Survey (2005, July). Skirah Odot: Hayoe’tsot lekidum m’amad ha’isha berashuyot
hamakomiyot ha’araviyot, p 6.
20
Chazan, N. (2003, October 25). Women in Public Life. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Downloaded from the internet on September 18, 2006 at http://www.mfa.gov.il
 224
Employment Opportunity Law was enacted in 1988, and the Sexual Harassment

Law was enacted in 1998. In 1992, the Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty

was enacted but it did not expressly include the right to equality. Some courts in

Israel have interpreted the Basic Law to include women’s equality within its

dignity provision.

While these laws apply to Jewish and Arab women alike, the realities are different.

Women who belong to a minority group are subjected to different patterns of

oppression from men of their own group and women belonging to the majority

group.21 Arab women’s plight is worsened by the fact that Arabs in general are

discriminated against in Israel. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the

Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) reported that Arabs fill only six

percent of the 55,448 civil service positions in Israel.22 Thus, when a report states

that “60 percent of employees in the civil service and the public sector are women”

this report does not take into account the under-representation of Arab women in

that percentage. 23

21
Baker, A. (2005). On Gender, Nationalism and Universalism: The Legal Issue of Representation
for Women in Israel. Adalah’s Newsletter, Volume 20, November.
22
Association for Civil Rights in Israel (2002, November 14). A Status Report-Equality for Arab
Citizens of Israel.
23
The report referred to is: Chazan, N. (2003, October 25). Women in Public Life, supra.
 225
For example, the Government Corporations Law of 1975 was amended in 1993 to

require government ministers to give suitable representation to both sexes on the

board of directors of every government corporation.24 One year after the

amendment, the Israel Women’s Network (IWN) petitioned the Supreme Court

claiming that the continued failure to appoint suitable women constituted a

complete disregard of the amendment and requested that the Court mandate

suitable representation for women.25 The Court ruled that the ministers had

ignored the directives of the law, and the percentage of women on the boards of

government corporations significantly increased after the ruling. In November

1995, the percentage of women rose to 15 percent from 7 percent the previous year;

in 1996 the percentage rose to 26 percent, and in 2001 to 37 percent. In 2001, 216

women had served on the boards of directors, but only 7 of those were Arab

women.26

On May 30, 2000 there was a further amendment of the Government Corporations

Law of 1975 which stipulated that government corporations must provide suitable

representation for Arabs. Out of 584 directors there were only 25 Arabs, including

the seven women. Adalah petitioned the Supreme Court of Israel to require

suitable representation for Arab women as a distinct discriminated group. Their

petition was denied and the Supreme Court refused to grant special protection for

24
Amendment 6 (article 18 a) approved by the Knesset on 16 March 1993.
25
Baker, A. (2005), p. 2.
26
Baker (2005), p. 2.
 226
Arab women, as distinct from Arabs in general or from women in general. 27 This

denial delivered a double blow to Israeli-Arab women who were not able to receive

protection from the state; neither from the discrimination they experienced as

women in general nor from the discrimination they experienced as Arab women, in

particular.

The Israeli Supreme Court’s refusal to grant special protection to Arab women

demonstrates a problem that is known to the feminist literature. Kimberle

Crenshaw (1991) analyzed three cases in which U.S. courts denied special

protection to African-American women. Crenshaw criticizes the failure of the

courts to “embrace the complexities of compoundedness,” which she explains was

“due to the influence of a way of thinking about discrimination which structures

politics so that struggles are categorized as singular issues.”28 She argues that:

Because the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism and
sexism, any analysis that does not take intersectionality into account
cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in which Black women
are subordinated.29

To summarize, Arab women in Israel are subjected to the same gender limitations

as their Jewish counterparts and to the same national limitations as Arab men.

These limitations together compound the burden on Arab women and the Supreme

Court was not willing to alleviate this burden by granting them special protection.
27
Baker (2005), p. 3.
28
Crenshaw, K. (1991). Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics [1989]. In Bartlett,
K. & Kennedy R. Eds. Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and Gender (57-81). Boulder:
Westview Press, p. 73.
29
Crenshaw, p. 58.
 227

Considering this general vulnerable status of Arab women in Israel, it is not

surprising that their presence in national Israeli politics is low. As indicated above,

only two Arab women have been elected to the Knesset since its inception. The

first was Husniyeh Jbarah, a Muslim Arab woman who was elected on a Meretz list

and served in the fifteenth Knesset. The second is Nadia Hilu, a Christian Arab

woman who was elected in the seventeenth Knesset and was considered a

trailblazer because she was the first Arab candidate to contend on the national

Labor Party list and not through a slot reserved for Arab candidates.30 In the case

of MK Hilu, her placement in the 15th slot was a good political move for the Labor

party in that they doubly satisfied their Arab voters and their women voters. These

political considerations do not always favor women. For example, in 1998, Neli

Karkabi, a Christian woman from Shfa’Amr, won first place on the Labor party’s

list reserved for Arabs but was pushed down on the list when the Labor party

placed Nawwaf Masalha, a Muslim man, in her stead.31 Therefore, in placing an

Arab woman on the election list, the Labor party served its own political interest

rather than the interest of Arab women.

Furthermore, both Jbarrah and Hilu were shunned by many in the Arab community

and subjected to harsh criticism due to their winning their seats on Zionist party

30
Azoulay, Y. (2006, November 19). Nadia Hilu: ‘I’m a trailblazer here, too’. Ha’aretz, p. 2.
31
Algazy, J. (2002, November 29). Unbreakable, this Glass Ceiling. Ha’aretz.
 228
lists.32 Many members of the Arab community thought it inappropriate to display

any pride in Jbarrah’s being the first Arab woman to be elected to the Knesset

because Meretz is a Jewish party and includes Zionists among its members. Aziz

Haidar, a sociologist with the Van Leer Institute, succinctly explains the objection

to Arab participation in Zionist parties: “There is no overlap between our interests

(Arabs) and those of the party (Zionists) that destroyed us.”33 The intensity of the

disagreement between those who support participation through the Zionist parties

and those who advocate working only through Arab political parties was reflected

in an incident in early February 2007. Arab MKs responded to the invitation of the

Jordanian King Abdullah to visit Jordan in order to discuss recent developments in

the Palestinian occupied territories and other matters. The MKs associated with

Balad declined the invitation when they found out that Nadia Hilu, an Arab MK for

the Labor party, was also invited and planned to attend.34

If Arab political parties shun women’s participation in Zionist parties, why then

have they not included and promoted women on their own lists? Arab political

parties, including Hadash, Balad, and the Islamic Movement, have not been placing

Arab women in realistic spots on their lists of candidates for Knesset elections. 35

By “realistic spots” I mean positions that rank high enough on the list where the

32
Abu Oksa Daoud, S. (2006). Palestinian Women in the Israeli Knesset. Middle East Report, Vol.
240 (Fall), 26-31, p. 27.
33
Galili, L. (2007, February 2). Overall, the Street is Happy. Ha’aretz (Week’s End), p. B6.
34
Nuwab altajamu’ ya’tathirun ‘an almusharaka fi lika’ al’ahel alurduni li anna alwafd damm
alna’iba alsuhyuniyya alhilu (2007, February 9). Kul al ‘Arab, p. 10.
35
Algazy J. (2002, November 29). Unbreakable, this Glass Ceiling. Ha’aretz.
 229
candidate is guaranteed or has a high likelihood of becoming a member of the

Knesset. For example, in the 2006 elections for the 17th Knesset, Hadash listed a

woman in sixth place but only won three seats, Balad listed a woman in seventh

place but only won three seats, and the United Arab List (including the Southern

Branch of the Islamic Movement) listed a woman in eleventh place and won only

four seats.36 Arab political parties, preoccupied with competition among

themselves and against Zionist political parties, are more focused on winning seats

than on advancing Arab women and increasing their political participation.

Zionist and Arab political parties compete for the Arab citizens’ votes. For

example, Ha’aretz reported in December 2005, shortly before the 17th Knesset

elections, that five Arab Bedouin chairmen of local authorities in the north of Israel

had pledged their support for Kadima and that seven Arab local authority chairmen

were still undecided but were leaning to support Kadima.37 Another Ha’aretz

article published the same month reported that Zionist parties still gain between 20

and 30 percent of the Arab vote.38 A third article reported that a poll conducted by

Dr. Elie Rekhess, an expert on Arab politics in Israel, predicted that the number of

Arabs voting for Jewish parties will equal the number of Arabs voting for Arab

36
See the Knesset web site at www.knesset.gov.il
37
Ashkenazi, E. (2005, December 7). Five Beduoin leaders pledge support for Kadima. Ha’aretz,
p. 3.
38
Ushpiz, A. (2005, December 18). The Arab street is split. Ha’aretz.
 230
parties.39 Dr. Rekhess was quoted as crediting the election of Amir Peretz to the

chairmanship of the Labor party and as saying:

When he [referring to Peretz] was elected, he dedicated a lot of attention to

the Arab sector….He declared his intention to appoint an Arab
minister and bring the Arabs into the coalition [meaning the
governing coalition].

Reports of the actual election results varied. Mossawa reported that the Zionist

parties gained only 15 percent of the Arab vote, most of which were votes for

Kadima.40 Abu Oksa reported that the Zionist parties gained 25.5 percent of the

Arab vote, 12.5 percent of which were for Labor, 6.5 percent for Kadima, 2.7

percent for Meretz, 2.8 percent for Shas, and 1 percent for Yisrael Beiteinu.41 Still,

even if the 15 percent of the Arab vote is the correct report, that percentage is not

insignificant considering the low Arab voter turnout for the Knesset elections in

2006, which was 56 percent, the lowest since 1948.

Arab political parties also compete against each other for the Arab vote. Their

competition often takes the form of viscous attacks in the Arab newspapers.42 This

competition, and its ramifications for hamula entrenchment on the local level, has

39
Stern, Y. (2005, December 14). Poll: Arab voters to boost mandates for Jewish parties.Ha’aretz.
The article reported that the poll was conducted under the auspices of the Konrad Adenauer
Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation at Tel Aviv University, which Rekhess heads.
40
Mossawa Press Release, Arab Citizens and the Israeli Elections (2006).
41
Abu Oksa Daoud, S. (2006, April 5). Beyond the Figures: The 2006 Israeli National Elections.,
Palestine Center Information Brief , No. 134.
42
See Odeh, N. (2003, November 10). Intikhabat alsultat almahaliyya kashafat albu’s alsiyasi
walfikri lilahzab al’arabiyya. Al-Ahali, p. 11; Odeh, N. (2003, November 3). Khilsat alhafleh
wahan waqt al’amal. Al-Ahali, p. 11; Reihany, N. I. (2003, November 11). Altajamu’ alwatani:
mabadi’ am shi’ar (2003, November 11). Al Ittihad, p. 11. Altajmu’ al’arabi al haifawi wataniyya
am takhreeb?? (2003, July 11). Al Ittihad, p. 8.
 231
been discussed in Chapter Three. What is relevant for the discussion in this

chapter is the effect of this competition on the placement of Arab women on the

Arab political party election lists.

Suheir Abu Oksa Daoud, an expert on Arab women’s political participation in

Israel, studied the participation of Arab women in the Israeli Knesset and explored

the reasons for the placement of women in unrealistic positions on Arab political

parties’ election lists.43 Even in Arab political parties, like Hadash and Balad, that

clearly state that they support women’s advancement, women do not gain enough

votes in internal party elections to secure a realistic position. For example, Manal

Shalabi, a candidate for Hadash in the 2006 elections was placed in sixth place

after she lost her bid for the fourth place on Hadash’s elections list. Similarly,

Hanin Zu’bi, a candidate for Balad, did not gain enough votes when she competed

for the third place on Balad’s election list. 44 In an interview Abu Oksa had with

Azmi Bishara, former MK for Balad, he succinctly explained: “Arab parties

promote candidates that can turn out the votes. Women do not yet have a great

support base.”45 It is reasonable to conclude that women do not have the support

base because a) Arab society, in general, is a traditional male dominated society,

and b) the traditional patriarchal hamulas are the main mobilizers of votes for the

Arab political parties.

43
Abu Oksa Daoud, S. (2006). Palestinian Women in the Israeli Knesset, supra.
44
Stern Y. & Khoury, J. (2006, February 20). Arab lists leave women out of realistic slots.
Ha’aretz.
45
Abu Oksa Daoud, p. 29.
 232

Abu Oksa explains that “internal” factors such as “traditions, customs and religious

interpretations widespread in Arab society” play a role in excluding women from

political and public life. Abu Oksa interviewed many male Arab politicians who

“suggested that cultural and social norms were the main reasons for the

marginalization of women in Israeli politics.”46 At times the attitudes of influential

party members of the Arab political party reflect the attitudes in the patriarchal

society. For example, Abu Oksa quotes Abdel Malek Dahamsheh, a former

Islamic Movement MK, as saying: “I do not object to women’s participation and

representation in politics, but we have to protect women’s honor. The main role

for women is in the home-raising children and managing the household.”47 In

light of the fact that Arab political parties court the hamula vote, as discussed in

Chapter Three, these parties have to take into consideration the traditional

tendencies of their Arab voters. Isam Makhoul, a former Hadash MK, summarizes

the situation:

Arab society is dominated by men. It is common to hear voices that support

women in politics, but when the moment of truth comes, men guard
their own positions and back off of their statements.48

Therefore, in their attempts to ensure a greater share of the Arab citizens’ vote in

Knesset elections, Arab political parties have placed women in unrealistic spots on

46
Abu Oksa Daoud, p. 29.
47
Abu Oksa Daoud, p. 30.
48
Abu Oksa Daoud, p. 29.
 233
their elections lists. Women’s participation in leadership positions in Arab political

parties has been subordinated to the parties’ interest in gaining a higher percentage

of the Arab vote and more seats in the Knesset. In effect, the advancement of Arab

women in national politics, despite the political parties’ best intentions, has been

relegated to the back seat while these parties compete to champion the cause of the

Arab minority as a national group.

Scholars have pointed out that women’s participation in national politics is often

preceded by their participation in local politics.49 However, Arab political parties

follow the same pattern in local elections as they do in national elections and

continue to place women in unrealistic positions on their local election lists. The

Mada survey, which was carried out in the beginning of October, shortly before the

2003 local elections, indicated that there were only 250 women candidates out of a

total of 5,922 candidates. Most of these women were placed in unrealistic

positions for membership lists and there were no female candidates for

chairmanship.50

49
Hertzog, H. (1999). Gendering Politics: Women in Israel. Ann Arbor: The University of
Michigan Press, p. 13. See also Abu Oksa Daoud, S. (2003). Hayitsug hapoliti shel hanashim
hafalastiniyot bepolitica hamakomit beyisrael-2003.
http://www.mossawacenter.org/en/reports/2003/12/031214.html On this point, Abu Oksa Daoud
cites P. Hollis (1987). Ladies Elect-Women in English Government 1865-1941. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
50
Sabbagh-Khoury, A. (2004). Istitla’ Ra’i hawl alsultat almahaliyya al’arabiyya fi isra’il. Survey
#4. Haifa: Mada-The Arab Center for Applied Social Research , p. 20. Hereinafter MADA Survey.
 234
Women are sorely underrepresented on Arab local authorities, whether as

chairpersons or as members. Since 1948, only 15 women have succeeded in

becoming members of an Arab local authority in Israel and only one woman

succeeded in becoming a chairperson.51 Of the three main religious communities

within the Arab minority, the situation is worst for the Druze. No Druze women

have ever run for the chairmanship of or for membership in a Druze local authority

in Israel.52 In the latest local elections, which took place in October 2003, only

three women were elected as members of local councils (out of 950 membership

seats): two in the city of Nazareth and one in the village of Eilaboun.53 The Mada

survey, mentioned above, surveyed Arab residents’ perception about women’s

qualification to participate in local politics. The survey showed that 57 percent of

those surveyed believe that women have the same qualifications as men, 40 percent

believe that men are more qualified, and 3 percent believe that women are more

qualified. 54 This shows that a large percentage believe that men are more qualified

than women for the administration of local authorities.55 Evidence does not

51
Tawsi’ tamthil alahzab fi lajnat almutaba’ah mashrut bedaman tamthil alnisa’ (2005, November).
Sawt Al Nisa’ (Voice of Women). Nazareth: Association of Women Against Violence; Violet
Khoury became the chairperson of the Kufr Yaseef municipal council in 1970 but served for a short
time. One source says she served for six months and another says she served for two years-either
way she did not complete the full term.
52
Brik, S. (2005). Habchirot berashuyot hamakomiyyot hadruziyot -mashber harashuyot: bein
politica hamulatit leminhal moderni. Mdina vehevra (State & Society), Volume 5, No. 1
(December), 1105-1146. In Brichte, A. (Ed.) Special Volume. The Elections in the Local
Authorities 2003: The Dominance of Independent Lists.
53
Abu Oksa Daud, S. (2006). Hayitsug hapoliti shel hanashim hafalastiniyot bepolitica hamakomit
beyisrael-2003. Two of the women were members of the Jabha and one was a member of the
Islamic Movement. See also Sawt Al Nisa’ (Voice of Women), supra, page 19.
54
Mada Survey (2004), supra, p. 20.
55
Mada survey, p. 26.
 235
support this belief and women do not lack the education, motivation, or capabilities

needed to run civil affairs.56

If there is no lack of qualified women, what explains their absence from the local

political arena, an arena that is so close to home and where women can exert direct

influence to improve the quality of their lives? Women blame the conservative,

patriarchal culture for their lack of representation in decision-making positions

including those in the political realm.57 This placement of blame is not surprising

in light of the influence of hamulas in local politics.

In local elections, where the traditional male dominated hamulas compete for

control of the local authority, the hamula plays a significant role in creating internal

limitations for women’s political participation. In an experiment, a first of its kind,

in the 2003 local elections a women’s group in the village of Daburiyeh nominated

its own list for the membership of the council. The list consisted of women only,

and at the top of the list was Loulou Masalha, a forty-one-year old social activist

who had chaired the women’s committee of the Daburiyeh local authority. The

women had decided to run their own list in response to the feelings of

marginalization they had experienced in previous local elections and were

56
See Golan, A. (2003, June 17). Both Female and Arab. Ha’aretz, p. 5; Ghanem, A. (2005,
December 27). A Vote for Arab Women. Ha’aretz, p. 5.
57
Algazy, J. (2002, November 29). Unbreakable, this Glass Ceiling., Ha’aretz; Ori Nir, O. (2001,
March 13). If things are changing, then what about the women? Ha’aretz, p. 5; Abu Oksa Daoud
(2006), Palestinian Women in the Israel Knesset, supra, 28-30.
 236
confident in their ability to win a membership seat on the local council.58 The

women’s group called on the women in the village to come out and vote for their

list so that they would have a larger voice in matters that affect them directly.

Masalha emphasized that the women’s list was an independent list, not subject to

any hamula or political party influence. However, this list won a dismal number of

votes and was not able to gain any membership seats. Masalha told Abu Oksa in

an interview shortly after the election, that a few days before the election women in

Daburriyeh were subjected to great pressure, sometimes amounting to threats, to

stand by their own hamulas.59 While this was but one example of the hamula

influencing the vote for women candidates, newspaper articles that were published

before the elections predicted that hamula politics were a hurdle for the election of

women in local authorities.60 Thus, the domination of the hamula on the local level

reinforces and perpetuates itself, keeping women out of decision-making positions.

The acute under-representation of women on Arab local authorities has attracted

the attention of various civil society organizations in Israel. For example, in

October 2003, the Jewish-Arab Center for Peace at Giv’at Haviva offered a six-

month course to qualify Arab women for the position of Advisor on Women’s

58
Ka’imah nisa’iyyah fi daburriyeh (2003, October 17). Al Sinnarrah, p. 38.
59
Abu Oksa (2003), supra, p. 11.
60
Shaddad, Y. (2003, September 12). Hal tagheeb almar’ah al ‘arabiyya ‘an alintikhabat al
mukbilah am annaha tajri taharukatiha ‘ala nar hadi’ah? Panorama (Midrama), p. 3; Golan A.
(2003, June 17). Both Female and Arab. Ha’aretz, p.5.
 237
Affairs in local authorities.61 In December 2003, the Association for the

Advancement of Civic Equality in Israel (Sikkuy) with the financial sponsorship of

the British Embassy in Tel Aviv and the British Council in Israel organized a panel

discussion to reflect upon the results of the October elections and to voice concern

about the marginalization of Arab women in local politics.62 Mary-Ann

Stephenson, a UK specialist on the campaign and promotion of women into public

life, was the keynote speaker. While Ms. Stephenson emphasized the importance

of strategies to encourage women to participate in public life and training women

on their right to be heard, she also recommended a campaign to pass a law

requiring quotas for women representation on local authorities. As’ad Ghanem

seems to agree that empowerment and training is not enough. He states that “over

the last two decades there has been diverse activity to empower women in Israel’s

Arab society….[I]ronically, the empowerment of women did not benefit them in

many cases, but rather prompted feelings of helplessness and frustration.”63

Ghanem, the current director of The Arab Association for Research and

Development (Ibn Khaldun), now heads a project that will empower women to

campaign for a law requiring quotas for women on local authority election lists.

The Association has received international financial support that will fund this

project for a year and a half. Ibn Khaldun is receiving legal advice on this project

from The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Adalah, which has

61
Interview with the co-ordinator of the project, February 19, 2007. See also advertisement placed
in Panorama, October 17, 2003, p. 3.
62
Women in Politics, Panel Discussion December 8, 2003, Ha’Maayan Hotel, Nazareth.
63
Ghanem, A. (2005, December 27). A Vote for Arab Women. Ha’aretz, p. 5.
 238
recommended that the quota be achieved through an amendment to the 1965 Israeli

Elections Law.64

The proposed quota law elicited a heated debate during a board and staff meeting at

the Arab feminist organization, Kayan, which took place in Haifa on October 18,

2007.65 The question of whether Kayan would support such a bill was discussed

and the debate revolved around whether supporting such a law without addressing

the issue of hamula control of local politics would hinder or help women. What if

women, like men, began to run under the banner of their hamulas? This question

was not unrealistic considering that hamulas have shown flexibility in the past by

adopting primaries within the hamula and including young educated males. Hanna

Herzog and Taghreed Yahia-Younis have argued that primaries were used as a

means to save the hamula by allowing the young to enter the patriarchal arena

while entrenching the exclusion of women. 66 Some members of the Kayan board

and staff feared that this “modification of the rules of the patriarchal game in

politics,” as Herzog and Yahia-Younis call it, might be replicated if hamulas

became legally bound to include women.

64
Legal Opinion by Adalah attorney, Sawsan Zaher, submitted on May 28, 2007. This legal opinion
was part of a handout distributed at an Ibn Khaldoun meeting in Tamra on July 5, 2007, which I
attended.
65
Personal observation.
66
Herzog, H. & Yahia-Younis, T. (2007). Men’s Bargaining with Patriarchy: The Case of Primaries
within Hamulas in Palestinian Arab Communities in Israel. Gender and Society, Vol. 21, No. 4
(August), 579-602.
 239
Nevertheless, in pursuing the quota route women are again enlisting the support of

the state. In contrast to their turn to the Supreme Court, this time the law would

apply to both Arab and Jewish women and this may help it pass more easily. In

this instance, by proposing a law that transcends their discrimination as an Arab

minority and focuses on their discrimination as women, they might start to erode

the problems associated with their intersectionality. The project is new so its

reception in the Arab community remains to be seen. It is interesting to note that

Nadia Hilu is the MK who has adopted the idea of amending the 1965 Election

Law to include quotas for women. This is “interesting” because the fact that she

belongs to a Zionist party could influence the acceptance of this law by many in the

Arab community who consider anything coming from a Zionist party suspect.

To summarize, Arab women in Israel are discriminated against and dominated both

as women and as Arabs in Israel. They are also dominated within their own local

Arab communities. Thus, in pursuing any social change that they try to make in

their lives they have to navigate through these various layers of domination.

The second part of this chapter examines three case studies where Arab women

challenge their local authority in order to have their needs as women met. These

three case studies will illustrate women’s resistance to the effects of hamula

domination as they work for social change in their communities. Their limited,
 240
albeit significant, success in each case necessitated the involvement of state

institutions.

Part II: Three Case Studies

The Case of Childcare Providers in the Arab Local Authorities

In Israel, there are 2300 family home-based childcare centers that serve children

aged six months to three years, including 1300 centers that are run by Arab

women.67 Each home is allowed up to five children and the cost of care for each

child is split among three parties. Parents pay a sliding scale fee of between 30

percent and 100 percent based on their income, the Ministry of Labor and Social

Welfare pays 75 percent of the balance, and the local authority pays 25 percent of

the balance.68 The portion paid by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is

funneled to the home-based childcare providers through the local authority.69 The

local authorities consider the childcare providers self-employed parties with whom

they contract for services. The family-run childcare system in Israel was

considered revolutionary when it was conceived in the 1970s but in 2002 it was on

the verge of collapse in Arab locales.

67
Al Nisa’ yushamirna ‘an alsawa’ed laysa fakat liljali..bal liltanthim nakabiyyan. (2003, August
18). Al Ittihad, p. 7.
While the number of Arab home-based childcare centers seems disproportionate to the percentage
of Arabs in Israel, this number is not surprising. Day care centers that are not family based are
common in the Jewish sector and less available in the Arab sector.
68
Kayan Report (2002, December). The pay for family home-based childcare in Arab communities,
p.1.
69
Kayan Report.