AFF – AIIB Updates Wave 1 – MMT

SOLVENCY
 at: china say no
China says yes
Japan Times ’15 (Kyodo, “China’s AIIB ‘still open to U.S.’ despite TPP snub,” 10/22/15,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/22/business/chinas-aiib-still-open-u-s-despite-tpp-snub/#.V2rkS9ecF21)//PS
WASHINGTON – Jin Liqun, president-designate of the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, said Wednesday the doors will be kept open for the
United States to join the China-led multilateral lender, even though China is not part of the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership
trade pact. “China is interested in joining the TPP,” Jin said after an address at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “Even though, for some reason,
China is not part of the TPP, the door remains open for U.S. membership of the AIIB .” Of the gesture, the former deputy finance minister
said, “It is a very interesting question: Why do you still welcome the U.S. even though the U.S. rejects China from the TPP? It’s very
simple. We are inclusive. We are more generous.” His remarks came as U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman said in a teleconference on Oct.
15 it was premature to discuss China’s participation in the TPP framework as the country is far from meeting its high standards. The United States, Japan and 10
other countries concluded the massive free trade deal covering some 40 percent of global output on Oct. 1. Jin also signaled that the first batch of projects the
AIIB will invest in may be decided as early as next April. The Beijing-based AIIB is expected to be established by year-end with nearly 60 founding members,
mostly Asian economies but also including some major industrialized countries, such as Britain and Germany.
AT: DA – FRAGMENTATION
 no link
China wants to use AIIB to work with existing institutions
Economic Times ’16- (Reuters, “China says AIIB should work closely with World Bank, others”, 6/25/16,
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/china-says-aiib-should-work-closely-with-world-bank-
others/articleshow/52911098.cms)//PS
BEIJING: Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli said on Saturday that the China-lead Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank should forge
close partnerships with the World Bank, Asia Development Bank and others. It is crucial for the AIIB to comply with multilateral agency
procedures and rules, Zhang added.

No fragmentation – AIIB will work with existing institutions

Japan Times ’16 – (Ben Blanchard, “China touts AIIB’s greater understanding of developing world”, 6/26/16,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/26/business/economy-business/china-touts-aiibs-greater-understanding-developing-
world/#.V3AV8tecF21)//PS
BEIJING – The China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will be different from institutions like the World Bank because it has a
greater understanding of the developing world’s needs, officials said Sunday at its first annual meeting. Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the
bank two years ago and it began operations in January, with 57 founding member countries and $100 billion in committed capital, which it plans to invest in
projects across the region. The AIIB, which intends to invest $1.2 billion this year, has said it is aiming to meet international standards
of governance, though some members say there is still work to be done. Speaking on the final day of the bank’s inaugural annual meeting,
Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei said the AIIB needs to establish its niche. “The AIIB needs to establish its comparative advantage
relative to existing multilateral development banks like the World Bank,” Lou said. “… Compared with the Asian Development Bank, World Bank
and other multilateral development banks, the AIIB’s advantage lies in its keener understanding of the successful experience and lessons
of developing countries’ years of development.” The AIIB’s board approved its first four deals worth $509 million on Friday, with three projects co-
financed with the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the United Kingdom Department for International Development and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development.
AT: DA – CONTAINMENT
 n/u – no containment
There is no containment now
Shannon Tiezzi ‘15, The Diplomat, 8-8-2015, "Yes, the US Does Want to Contain China (Sort Of)," Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/yes-the-us-does-want-to-contain-china-sort-of/, WG
On one level, this is absolutely true. But at the same time, it’s false. It all depends on how we define the term “containment” and what that
actually implies about the United States’ goals vis-à-vis China. Let me explain. First, the word “containment” is problematic . It
specifically refers to a previous U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, which involved using military, political, and economic
policies to halt Soviet expansion and influence. To this end, as critics have rightly pointed out, it’s ridiculous to charge the U.S.
with adopting a containment policy toward China when the U.S.-China relationship today is in no way comparable to the morbid
state of U.S.-USSR ties during the Cold War. Washington and Beijing have scores of annual high-level bilateral and multilateral
dialogues and do nearly $600 billion in bilateral trade each year (by comparison, U.S.-USSR trade totaled only $24 billion for
the entire period from 1985-1992). “Containment” as it’s classically envisioned is not what we’re seeing today . However, the
sentiment behind the containment policy of the Cold War is at play in today’s U.S.-China relationship. A 1950 National Security Council memo to then-U.S.
President Harry Truman laid out the framework of the U.S. response to the Soviet Union. The end goal: achieving “the process of Soviet accommodation to the
new political, psychological, and economic conditions in the world” – with those “new conditions” of 1950 being the post-war international order that serves as
today’s status quo. In this sense, the U.S. goal toward China – seeking to shape its growth so that Beijing will be a “responsible stakeholder” in the U.S.-led world
order – is the same goal Washington had for its relationship with Moscow. So the word “containment” is not quite right. Saying the U.S. wants to
“check” or (to use an even more anodyne word) “channel” China’s rise might be a more accurate phrasing. In other words, the U.S. does not
want to prevent China from growing powerful , per se, but does want to prevent the use of that power in ways unacceptable to the
United States. This is what Obama meant when he said in January 2011, “[W]e welcome China’s rise. We just want to make sure … that that
rise occurs in a way that reinforces international norms and international rules, and enhances security and peace, as opposed to it being a source
of conflict either in the region or around the world.”

Engagement now and inevitable

Watanabe 14 (Tsuneo Watanabe, "US Engagement Policy toward China: Realism, Liberalism, and Pragmatism (3) — The
Tokyo Foundation," 1-31-2014, http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2014/us-engagement-policy-toward-china3
The future trajectory of US policy toward China’s rise beyond the Obama administration is very difficult to predict. China’s
international behavior is an important element that will shape this policy. At the same time, we need to keep an eye on the
interaction among not only policy subgroups within US administrations but also domestic political groups. As long as China’s
assertiveness and show of strength are well balanced with US economic interests, US policy is likely to stay within the
engagement paradigm for the foreseeable future . At the same time, it would be very difficult for China to pursue a modest
foreign policy because the new political leadership in China needs to address growing domestic contradictions and frustrations in
a rapid growing society. As the result, US policy toward China will no doubt continue to occasionally stress the hedging and
hawkish elements within the engagement paradigm. Although US policy toward China appears to swing, the range of policy
options are limited . A more drastic paradigm shift in US policy would result only in the light of more dynamic changes in the
balance of power between China, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies, on the other.
 n/u – not revisionist
China intends on maintaining the current international order, not challenging it
Nicolas ’15- Lieutenant, United States Navy B.S., United States Naval Academy (David Nicolas, Calhoun Institutonal Archive
of the Naval Postgraduate School, Chinese infrastructure in South Asia: a realist and liberal perspective,” December 2015,
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47829/15Dec_Nicolas_David.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y) // HF
Despite China’s desire to modify the system, evidence of its intent to maintain the international order is displayed in the structure
of the AIIB. As a Japanese editorial stated, “we should be pleased the Chinese have opened up such an institution in the
traditional mold. At a time when the world is wondering what to make of the rise of China, the adoption of a traditional approach
suggests they are intent on being a member of the current global order rather than challenging the status quo.” Essentially,
China recognizes that its own growth is the result of the current economic order and it seeks to “actively reform the current
system” instead of attempting to replace it.

Their authors misread hedging as revisionism – accommodation is key

Wang 15, Assistant Professor at the University of Notre Dame, (Dong, Assistant Professor of University of Notre Dame, Big
Data Analytics, Social Sensing, Cyber -Physical-Social Systems,  “Is China trying to push the U.S. out of East Asia?” Strategic
Studies, http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S2377740015500049 ) / LL
One of the key questions for understanding the future trajectory of regional order is whether or not China is trying to push the United States out of East Asia and
build a China-dominated regional order. Some Western analysts accuse China of pursuing the Monroe Doctrine and excluding the
United States from the region. This article argues that the Western discourse of China practicing the Monroe Doctrine is a misplaced
characterization of China's behavior. Rather than having intention of pushing the United States out of East Asia and build a
China-dominated regional order, China is pursuing a hedging strategy that aims at minimizing strategic risks , increasing freedom of
action, diversifying strategic options, and shaping the U.S.' preferences and choices. This can be exemplified in five issue areas : China's ties with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and China's foreign policy
activism, China-Russia relations, the Conference on Interactions and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and the New
Asian Security Concept, as well as China-U.S. relations. Beijing has explicitly acknowledged the U.S. predominance in the
international system and reiterated its willingness to participate in and reform the existing system . It concludes by suggesting that, for a
more peaceful future to emerge in East Asia, the U nited States and China, as an incumbent power and a rising power, will have to
accommodate each other, and negotiate and renegotiate the boundaries of their relative power, as well as their respective roles in the future regional
order where Beijing and Washington would learn to share responsibilities and leadership .
 no link u
Already cooperating despite not joining – thumps their perception links
Keatley 15 (Robert Keatley, former editor of The Asian Wall Street Journal and the South China Morning Post, “China's AIIB
Challenge: How Should America Respond?” The National Interest, 4-18-2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-big-
strategic-blunder-not-joining-chinas-aiib-12666?page=show)KMM
Realizing that it chose a faulty course, the Obama Administration has already begun tacking in the new bank’s direction . After a recent
Beijing visit, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said “the US stands ready to welcome new additions to the international development
architecture”—a sharp contrast to late last year when senior White House officials were criticizing the AIIB as unsound and
unneeded, and pressuring allies to stay away. But Lew repeated a major American caveat: to be truly worthwhile, the AIIB must “share the
international community’s strong commitment to genuine multilateral decision-making and ever-improving lending standards and safeguards.” In other words,
member states must not let the bank become an agency for advancing narrow Chinese economic interests in corrupt ways at the expense of local citizens and
the environment. These concerns show that the initial American reaction, however unwise, was not irrational. The Chinese record as a lender to developing
nations is spotty at best. Too often it has provided loans to kleptocratic regimes that finance Chinese companies using imported Chinese workers on projects that
mainly ship energy and raw materials back to Chinese industry; sometimes bribes grease the way, while the local environment and economy can suffer. Some
experts say the Chinese record in Africa, for example, is no better than that of 19th century European colonialists. Other Chinese loans, such as $86 billion to
Venezuela, were made primarily for political reasons and may never be repaid. A few countries, most recently Sri Lanka and Myanmar, have canceled Chinese-
funded projects on grounds that corruption paved their way and they serve no basic local purpose. During his successful campaign, Sri Lanka’s new president,
Maithripala Sirisena, described local Chinese projects as “robbery taking place before everybody and in broad daylight….if this trend continues for another six
years our country would become a colony and we would become slaves.” Since taking office, he has suspended work on a $1.5 billion Beijing-funded port
project. But from the first, the AIIB was promised as something quite different, a bank that would follow international norms and be devoted to economically
sound projects of value to the borrowers. Jin Liqun, the Chinese official expected to become its first secretary general, has vowed that operations will be “lean,
clean and green,” with at least half its staff recruited from overseas. Jin, a former Chinese deputy finance minister and ADB vice president, also has said its
operations will be both corruption-free and transparent, two traits seldom found in Chinese governance. Governing board members elected from other member
states, such as Great Britain and Canada, are expected to ensure those guidelines are followed. Washington’s next move is unclear. To join would require a
capital commitment, something a Republican Congress is unlikely to provide even if President Obama asks. After all, the AIIB was born partly because Congress
consistently has refused to authorize a larger voice for Beijing in international agencies that the United States dominates, which would give China a role reflecting
its new economic strength. For example, for five years it has ignored legislation authorizing a cost-free (to U.S. taxpayers) revision of International Monetary
Fund quotas despite administration urging. Even so, the administration should swallow its pride and explore the possibility of getting inside
the tent, perhaps with Japan, rather than remain a lonely outsider . On the positive side, Jim Yong Kim, the American who leads the
World Bank, already plans talks about future cooperation with the AIIB .
 no link
Link logic is false and ahistorical
Aneja 15 (Atul Aneja, writer for Frontline, “The Chinese century?” 5-1-2015, http://www.frontline.in/world-affairs/the-chinese-
century/article7098498.ece)KMM
As its flock dispersed, the U.S. response barely managed to mask the rage within. “We are wary about a trend toward constant accommodation of China, which
is not the best way to engage a rising power,” an unnamed U.S. official admonished Britain after it announced its intention to join the AIIB. But many feel
that the U.S. has failed to come to terms with the new ground realities of a rapidly changing world . An article in Financial Times pithily
summed up Washington’s anachronistic perception of the hierarchy of economic and geopolitical power, following the escalating decay of a unipolar world: “As
China approaches the status of the world’s largest economy, it has become an integral part of the global financial system. It is both bad policy and an
ahistorical view that any strengthening of China regionally is necessarily damaging to U.S. interests in Asia ,” the write-up said. It
added: “The U.S. would be better served if we did not continue to treat China as a junior partner in its own backyard, and form a
diplomatic partnership instead that recognises China’s importance to the development of Asia and as an intermediary funnelling domestic
surpluses into high-value investments around the globe. “It is true that we started this century believing that we would enjoy centre stage in a permanently
unipolar world, but that is just not the case anymore. China differs from previous rivals we have historically faced in one crucial way in that its strategic goals are
driven largely by economics and a desire to maintain internal social and economic stability.”
 link turn
Engagement in AIIB is NOT appeasement, it’s accommodation – bolsters deterrence and facilitates
cooperation
Pongsudhirak, PhD, 15 (Thitinan Pongsudhirak, is a Thai political scientist, speaker and Associate Professor at Faculty of
Political Science, Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, where he is the Director of the Institute of Security and International
Studies (ISIS), Faculty of Political Science. “Asia-Pacific Consequences of Global Disorder.” 8/21/15. The Bangkok Post.
<http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib. umich.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?
docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T24287977595&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T24287977599
&cisb=22_T24287977598&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=410348&docNo=2> //LVF
As the rules and institutions that were crafted after the Second World War increasingly unravel, tensions and fissures in the
global system will become more salient. We are already seeing the manifestations of global instability from American and Europe
to the Middle East and Asia owing to the incongruence between set rules that do not match aspired roles. The global environment has
never been all smooth and calm but in the five decades after 1945 it was more predictable when nation-states knew their place. Now many states are dissatisfied
with their space and role, and a host of non-state players are clamoring for a place at the table. For the Asia-Pacific region, the implications of global
disorder are far-reaching. Unless rules and institutions are refashioned to suit newer players in a more equitable redistribution of
power and place in the global system, the likelihood of tension leading to confrontation and conflict will grow. We can already see that
the global trade and financial systems are no longer effective and workable. This means the status quo in the wake of the Second World War no longer holds.
There are peoples, states and non-state players that want to change the status quo. For them that status quo is no longer acceptable. So disorder prevails as a
result. Some revisionism has emerged; some people say the Chinese are revisionist and want to change the status quo in their own eyes, perhaps Russia as
well. We are seeing a system that is degenerating increasingly into a kind of "self-help". When we have order and peace, there is collaboration, coordination,
cooperation, and general observation of rules, norms and institutions. When it becomes unilateral, self-help and more disorderly outcomes prevail. We can
see examples in the rivalry between the United States and China, the tension between China and Japan, and the apparent
realignment between China and Russia. The China-Japan mistrust, in particularly, runs deep across a gamut of issues centering
on historical grievances from the past century. China also has problems with maritime Asean members, particularly the
Philippines and to some extent Vietnam. US preoccupations have weakened its "pivot" and "rebalance" strategy. The US
rebalance towards Asia was a big deal a few years ago, but it doesn't have the same credibility now. One emerging theme is Asia is
China's dominance in mainland Southeast Asia. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand (CLMT) have a collective market of 150 million, a combined GDP in
excess of half a trillion dollars. The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) which includes the southern Chinese provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan, comprises a huge
market of 350 million people with an overall GDP of more than a trillion dollars. Thus, mainland Southeast Asia is really China's backyard. The South China
Sea has a host of teething problems. China is alarmingly and dangerously making land out of the sea. China's land reclamation
in the South China Sea is changing the status quo dramatically and bodes ill for regional stability. The Chinese have built
facilities that include a 3-km runway that can accommodate advanced military aircraft. This will profoundly change the status quo. If it is not
stopped, we are headed for a lot of tension and probably some kind of confrontation. The South China Sea is clearly a theatre of future conflict. Unsurprisingly,
Asean has been divided over China. Mainland Asean countries are more sympathetic and beholden to Beijing but maritime states tend to be more adversarial.
The US is still preeminent in the maritime domain, but so far Washington has been non-confrontational vis-AÂ -vis China. Japan is a maritime power with a lot of
mainland interests, and may find standing up to China unavoidable. Other countries are in the mix from the European Union and South Korea to Australia and
New Zealand but the main action is around the East China Sea and the South China Sea and the states around them. While Asean has much going for it from a
large combined market of 620 million and the world's fasting-expanding growth trajectory to a combined GDP of 2.5 trillion dollars, the interests of its mainland
and maritime members are diverging. It will remain together but may seem increasingly adrift. The Asean Community will be more rhetorical than real; it will be
more on paper and less in practice, but it is important to maintain that momentum of togetherness. What does it mean for New Zealand, Asean and all of us? It
means we will see a protracted global "Groundhog Era" which drags on perpetually. There is no final war as such, but there is an ongoing unruly, unwieldy
environment with ongoing and exacerbating tensions. Reshaping the global order without war is our chief challenge. How do we get order without war?
We got order from the Second World War, which was an offshoot of the First World War. This is the existential challenge for all of
us. The established rules and institutions need to be recalibrated. Why should the IMF always be headed by the French, the
World Bank by an American, and the ADB a Japanese? No wonder the Chinese are proposing the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) which it can spearhead. China wants to have a larger role that current institutional arrangements do not
allow. More rules are needed where there have been none. The South China Sea has been working on a rules-based Code of Conduct for years,
but the Chinese are unlikely to ever sign up to it. They will keep working on it and keep talking about it, but it won't be a reality. The Mekong River and its dams
There has to be
will be a big problem. One of our paramount dilemmas and questions is, "What do the Chinese want, and how do we handle China?"
some accommodation of China -- accommodation without appeasement. The Japanese and Americans should join the AIIB and
allow China to take the lead. The AIIB's development finance can be good for Asia's emerging economies. If we recognize and
give some space to the Chinese, perhaps they will back off in other areas, such as the South China Sea. Perhaps China can be
enticed to play by the rules if it is given more recognition and respect. The same goes with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is dominated by
the US and excludes China. The TPP is divisive for Asia. It has only four of 10 Asean economies. Many Asian countries prefer the looser but still useful Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership for trade liberalisation. The real economic integration we are likely to see will be in mainland Southeast Asia. Now it is
possible to drive from Myanmar to Vietnam, and the rail development to follow will further boost connectivity on the ground. There are rail lines planned from
Southern China through Laos to the Gulf of Thailand, through Myanmar to the Indian Ocean. But mainland Southeast Asia is not without problems, including
human and drug trafficking, transnational crime, and so on. But, the labour market is quite integrated. There are five million Myanmar, Cambodian and Lao
workers in Thailand already. There is a lot of border trade; borders don't matter as much in mainland Southeast Asia. I see it reverting to what it used to be
before the imperialists came. There are no structured borders and people now crisscross the land like they used to. Again, we are seeing glimpses of the past
manifesting on the horizon. And what does it mean for all of us? It means we have to help promote international efforts to reshape and recalibrate, revamp and
reinvent rules and institutions so that the established players can move over and make space for new players without feeling threatened and insecure. If the older
players and established states that benefitted from the earlier era don't make way, they will be forced to make way. We don't want to see that.

Opposition is wrecking containment now

Aneja 15 (Atul Aneja, writer for Frontline, “The Chinese century?” 5-1-2015, http://www.frontline.in/world-affairs/the-chinese-
century/article7098498.ece)KMM
“Pivot to Asia” in shambles The decision by the core members of the Atlantic alliance to abandon Washington in their quest for the
AIIB has left Washington’s “Pivot to Asia” or “rebalance” strategy in a shambles . The “pivot”— viewed by Beijing as the military end
of a China-containment policy—would result in beefing up the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). Once the “pivot” is fully in place, 60 per cent of all
American forces would fall under its wings. Already, China’s anxieties have been fuelled by the existing presence of 3,60,000 personnel under PACOM. Besides,
PACOM has positioned 200 ships, which include five aircraft carrier strike groups, concentrating enormous capacity to project power, in the region, with China
and North Korea as the prime concerns. Under the “rebalance” doctrine, U.S. troops’ presence would also be enhanced in South Korea,
Japan and Australia. A more active military role is envisaged for countries such as Singapore, which are closer to the Malacca
Straits. But with South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Australia already joining the AIIB , and therefore deepening their stakes in China’s
economic well-being, the logic of being at the front end of a China-containment policy has been undermined . With the breach in the Atlantic
alliance and its off-shoots already visible, new questions are being raised about the salience of the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP is widely
viewed as the economic flank of the “rebalance” as it excludes China but includes 12 Pacific economies, such as Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia
and Canada, as part of a highly intrusive free-trade deal. But at last year’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing, the grouping backed
the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP)—China’s free trade proposal, which is far more inclusive and free from the zero-sum mentality than the patently
exclusionary TPP. The process of AIIB’s materialisation has rendered a stunning blow to the U.S., which has so far failed to adjust
itself to sharing economic and geostrategic power with an emerging multipolar world . In an article in the Global Times, Martin Jacques,
author of the bestseller When China Rules the World, has summed up the American dilemma about adjusting to the dispersal of global power from the developed
to the developing world. Dilemmas of a declining power He points out that ever since the 1990s, if not earlier, the U.S. has been a declining economic power in
East Asia: in trading terms, for example, China and the U.S. have more or less swapped places, with China now occupying the position that the U.S. once had.
The U.S. Congress has also been a roadblock to reforms in Western-backed institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, by denying upcoming developing
countries such as China a greater say in decision-making. Jacques then elaborates on what he calls “the dilemmas that the U.S. faces as a declining power”. “It
[the U.S.] seeks to preserve the position and authority of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the two major institutions of the post-1945
international economic order. But, as Western-made institutions, they are creatures of the West, above all the U.S. As the centre of economic gravity moves from
the developed world to the developing countries, they are threatened with becoming an anachronism. To survive, they must reinvent themselves, so they are no
longer the preserve of the West but are representative, above all, of the developing countries. But how to do that without losing control: this is the American
dilemma.” Jacques correctly concludes that the more the U.S. refuses to join Chinese-inspired institutions like the AIIB, the more isolated
it will become. With each passing day, new institutions on the lines of the AIIB will replace the old institutional structure, which will decline and decay.

Opposition is undermining the Asia pivot and alliance leadership

Keatley 15 (Robert Keatley, former editor of The Asian Wall Street Journal and the South China Morning Post, “China's AIIB
Challenge: How Should America Respond?” The National Interest, 4-18-2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-big-
strategic-blunder-not-joining-chinas-aiib-12666?page=show)KMM
Washington’s next move is unclear. To join would require a capital commitment, something a Republican Congress is unlikely to provide even if President
Obama asks. After all, the AIIB was born partly because Congress consistently has refused to authorize a larger voice for Beijing in international agencies that
the United States dominates, which would give China a role reflecting its new economic strength. For example, for five years it has ignored legislation authorizing
a cost-free (to U.S. taxpayers) revision of International Monetary Fund quotas despite administration urging. Even so, the administration should swallow its pride
and explore the possibility of getting inside the tent, perhaps with Japan, rather than remain a lonely outsider. On the positive side, Jim Yong Kim, the American
who leads the World Bank, already plans talks about future cooperation with the AIIB. To date, the political payoff for Washington has been
entirely negative. According to Singapore academic and former diplomat Kishore Mahbubani, a persistent America-basher, the AIIB’s creation marks “the
end of the American century and the arrival of the Asian century.” The claim is nonsense—the bank is not that important, and the United States remains the
world’s leading economy, most powerful military force, and a central figure in the region; most Asian states want to keep close relations with America. But
Washington’s efforts to stiff the new bank, and persuade friends to do the same, made it seem churlish, while Beijing appeared
outgoing and generous. It also fed the political divide between Japan and China, a major U.S. worry. Most countries ignored Washington’s
advice and signed up for their own reasons; Britain perhaps to ensure that London (rather than Frankfurt) remains a center for trading the Chinese
yuan, while others saw investment opportunities or a source of needed finance. All this produced soft diplomacy gains for China at America’s
expense, undermining the official U.S. policy of tilting Asia’s way .
 containment fails
Containment fails – economic leverage makes credible threats impossible
Shines ’15 Robert Shines Is A Writer For Geopoliticalmonitor Intelligence Corporation, An International Intelligence Publication
Which Provides Comprehensive Geopolitical Analysis. Having Previously Consulted In Ukraine, His Area Of Focus Is U.S.-
Russia Relations. He Received His Mba From The Thunderbird School Of Global Management With A Focus On U.S.-China
Relations., 12-21-2015, "Yuan's accession marks end to any containment of China," Global Risk Insights,
http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/12/yuans-accession-marks-end-to-any-containment-of-china/ , WG
Since the early days of warming U.S.-China relations, China’s economic importance to the world has only exponentially
increased . With its participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement as well as initiatives
such as the BRICS Development Bank, it is not possible to marginalize China anymore. Slowing of its own economy has only accelerated
its formation of regional initiatives explicitly designed to take advantage of proximate lower labor costs and abundant natural resources. These include the
aforementioned AIIB, the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative, comprising China’s Maritime Silk Route and Silk Economic Road, as well as China’s interest in the
Arctic. The American pivot to Asia is also a factor in China vigorously pursuing more regional initiatives . If its military power is to be
proscribed on a maritime basis, then its economic power most assuredly will not be, on an inland basis. Additionally, exclusion of China from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and attempts to convince states not to sign up to be founding members of the AIIB look even
more anachronistic now in the wake of the IMF decision. Lastly, it is not possible for the U.S. to marginalize, much less
“contain”, the largest foreign holder of its public debt . Contain the “Containment” The only way “containment” could ever work is if
China was not the foundation of the global economy it is today and if it could be checked by strong local powers such as Russia,
India, and Japan. However, this kind of thinking is a relic of the Cold War and fails to take into account the foundation of legitimacy in
the 21st century: economic power. The aforementioned local powers and ASEAN may hedge against China’s military rise, but without exception they all
realize the importance of China’s economy to their own. Economic prosperity for their respective constituencies is the foundation upon
which all leaders’ platforms , democratic or otherwise, rest nowadays, especially in the post-Recession world, and will increasingly form the basis
for economic pragmatism over ideological fear mongering.

Perception of containment is the problem – refusal to join alienates allies

Kennedy ‘15, Deputy Director of the Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
"Washington’s Big China Screw-up," Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/26/washingtons-big-china-screw-up-aiib-
asia-infrastructure-investment-bank-china-containment-chinafile/; WG
The Obama Administration has obviously made a major strategic blunder in resisting the establishment of the AIIB . Many of
America’s most loyal allies have rejected the folly of this intransigence . By opting to join this start-up international lending institution, they will
be much better positioned to shape the governance of the AIIB as insiders, rather than voicing criticism as outsiders, as the United States apparently prefers.
Washington’s Cold-War style criticism of its allies for their “constant accommodation” of China is a new and embarrassing low in
the China debate. It is both ironic and hypocritical that Washington’s response is to circle the wagons around the existing Bretton
Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The U.S. Congress has repeatedly dragged its feet
on IMF reforms. And lending programs of the U.S.-dominated World Bank have done little to address infrastructure deficiencies
in any part of the world. The ADB estimates an Asian infrastructure void of some $8 trillion over the 2010 to 2020 period. Clearly new lending capacity is
needed to meet this daunting challenge. Nor does the AIIB pose a threat to more established and experienced international lending
institutions. Its initial capital base of $50 billion is less than a third of that which supports the ADB and less than a quarter of that
held by the World Bank. Surely, an $80 trillion global economy can afford to support much greater lending capacity than is the case today. But there is a
more sinister aspect of Washington’s resistance to this China-sponsored initiative. It is but the latest in an increasingly worrisome string of anti-
China actions. The Obama Administration has focused on the TPP as its signature initiative on trade liberalization; unfortunately,
it excludes China, the source of America’s largest trade imbalance. Yet another anti-China currency manipulation bill has been introduced in the U.S.
Senate. And there are ongoing frictions over cyber issues, as well as over territorial claims in the China Sea. Suddenly, America’s
Asian pivot seems like nothing more than a thinly veiled China containment strategy . Is the rise of China a risk or an opportunity?
Washington is clearly fixated on the threat – all but ignoring the benefits that are likely to come with the emergence of a
consumer-led Chinese economy. This shouldn’t be so surprising. History tells us that dominant powers always have trouble with rising powers.
Washington is bristling over China’s ascendancy. China, with the baggage of 150 years of a perceived sense of deep humiliation by the West, doesn’t take kindly
to that reaction. The AIIB folly only deepens concerns over an increasingly troubled relationship. A rethink by Washington is
urgently needed .
 impact turn
US containment policy is not working. Engagement in AIIB allows peaceful China rise.
Shahjehan 15 Hassan Shahjehan, political scientist and writer, “A New Strategy for US-China
Cooperation.”DailyTimes.May3,2015<http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2pi/results/docview/docview.dodocLin
kInd=true&risb=21_T24287854290&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29T24287854294&cisb=2
2_T24287854293&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=381931&docNo=23> //LVF
Now, when China is a near-competitor of the US, it can no longer afford to adopt the policy of isolationism When the international order is making
space for China and shifting the balance towards multi-polarity, ties between the US and China will shape the future global order:
global peace, prosperity and governance. From Russia’s relationship with the west, particularly over the Ukrainian crisis, to the disturbing situation in
the Middle East, agreements or disagreements between both the states will have implications for the rules that govern the world. At present, it seems that
powerful forces in both the US and China are on a collision course. In China, the current leadership of Xi Jinping is working on a
proactive foreign policy and using its economic leverage to attract the world to its side. The formation of the Asia Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) , for example, is not only a reaction to the US policy of downgrading China in the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB), but also the Chinese policy of controlling the developmental
narrative, particularly in Asia. By developmental narrative is meant that China is expanding its clout in the region by financing the infrastructural and
developmental needs of developing nations on its own terms and conditions without any influence of the US. Naturally, this will bring Asian countries closer to
China than the US. In the present world order, the economy has substituted ideology and countries will go where they find funding. Under Xis assertive
leadership, China is no longer isolating itself by following Deng Xiaoping’s injunction that the country should "hide its strength, bide its time and never take the
lead" in international affairs. By following Dengs theory of dealing with the outside world, China has successfully managed to develop its economy, which has
spurred it onto the world’s stage. Now, when China is a near-competitor of the US, it can no longer afford to adopt the policy of isolationism. This is the
reason why China seems to have jumped onto the world stage. It has flexed its muscles and is pursuing its territorial claims in
the South China Sea. Also, it is resisting the continuation of US dominance in the region through its economy and military. There
is a growing perception among the Chinese that the US policy towards Asia is intended to isolate and undermine China. On the
USs re-balancing strategy, China believes that the US focus towards Asia is only meant to contain China. Under the strategy, the
US seems to be achieving two objectives: contain China economically and militarize Japan. On the economic side, the US is
working on the Trans-Pacific Partnership and, for the second objective, the US is encouraging Japan to come out of its pacifist
constitution and build its military to counter the growing threats of today. Whatever may be the USs policy, the famous discourse
is that the US is intent to remain the only dominant power, especially in Asia. Such intentions of the US can be found in a report
for the Council of Foreign Relations by Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis, arguing that the USs grand objective must be
"preserving US primacy in the global system" and, for that, the report suggests aggressive economic, political and military
measures to "balance" China. Very cleverly, the word "containment" is replaced by the world "balance" but, in essence, both
connote the same meaning: countering Chinas rise to sustain the USs dominance. If such a US strategy continues, there is
every reason to believe that a Sino-US conflict is bound to arise in the near future. To stop that from happening, there is the need to have a
new strategy, called "constructive realism" by Kevin Rudd, former Australian prime minister and now the head of the Asian Society Policy Institute. In a new
report for the Harvard Kennedy Schools Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, Rudd outlines the blueprint for future US-China cooperation.
According to Rudd, issues such as Taiwan, the South and East China Seas and Chinas military modernization are areas that are hard to deal with. Any
solution to such issues requires careful management or it risks open confrontation between the US and China. But there are
other areas of cooperation and collaboration between both countries. For any progress and collaboration to take place, the US
needs to recognize China as an equal partner and appreciate its importance in the present world order. It needs to be clear on
the fact that China has emerged as a rising power, sometimes substituting the USs influence and, at other times, complementing
it. There are many difficult issues challenging global peace and order that require a constructive approach by the US and China.
On issues such as terrorism, cyber security and nuclear proliferation, there is great room for both the countries to engage
bilaterally, regionally and globally to systematically sustain the world order. Bilaterally, both the US and China can work for a joint intelligence
task force for countering the menace of international terrorism. On the issues of nuclear proliferation, the US can involve China in making new rules to counter
the proliferation of nuclear technology. For that matter, a good start would be mutual ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. On a regional
level, both countries - the US and China - could collaborate on the strategies to solve North Koreas nuclear issue. Also, the joint strategies could work on
harmonizing trade agreements. If the Sino-US collaboration continues constructively, it can tackle the lingering sore of Japans war history. At the global level,
both the US and China have a common interest in combating climate change. Thus, this is one of the important areas for both countries to cooperate and bring
forward a joint agenda to tackle the issue of global warming. More importantly, the US needs to work together with China to internationalize the renminbi, giving
China a greater role in the IMF and World Bank. The over-reaction by the US over the formation of the AIIB will not solve the problem
unless systematic structural changes are introduced in the Bretton Woods institutions. Also, there is a need to reform other key institutions within the UN system
to bring them in line with the changing post-World War II ground realities. In the present world order, Chinas rise will continue and it has to be
accommodated by the US. This time, the containment strategy will not work.
 at: realism
Realist theory is wrong in the context of the AFF – no evidence to support the claim that the AIIB is a
challenge
Nicolas ’15- Lieutenant, United States Navy B.S., United States Naval Academy (David Nicolas, Calhoun Institutonal Archive
of the Naval Postgraduate School, “Chinese infrastructure in South Asia: a realist and liberal perspective,” December 2015,
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47829/15Dec_Nicolas_David.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y) // HF
As addressed in the previous chapter, the funding for China’s expansive infrastructure network is funneled through two new financial
institutions, the AIIB and the SRF . Initially seeking only to modernize the current institutions in order to represent the changing
global economy better, a failed attempt at ratification in the U.S. Congress forced China to move away from the Bretton Woods
system. Not wanting to engage in over $600 billion of bilateral loans, Beijing followed a multilateral approach and founded the AIIB. Since its founding in
October 2014, membership has grown to 57 countries, as of June 1, 2015, and the organization places China center stage in the effort to find a
multilateral solution to overcome a $750 million annual infrastructure gap, an issue the Japan and U.S.-led ADB has been unable
to resolve. For realist scholars , the fear is that the founding of these institutions is a deliberate attempt by Beijing to challenge
the Bretton Woods system, establish a new regional and global order centered on China, and advance the strategic interests of
the Belt and Road initiative through selective funding . In addition to the lack of transparency, a central concern when comparing the AIIB to the
current system is the division of voting shares. For example, where China held a 5.48% voting power in the ADB and mere 4% in the IMF, in the AIIB, Beijing’s
vote carries 26.06%. This in comparison to Washington’s leading vote share of 12.75% in the ADB and 17.68% in the IMF.126 As a result, the significant
increase in voting power could allow China to dictate the use of funds and the selection of projects. To date, the United States has opted not to join this new
Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) over fears that the bank does meet the “high standards” set by western-led international institutions. Fearing that these
banks lack the required transparency needed to be effective and beneficial to Asian markets, of which South Asia is set to be a prime candidate, President
Obama addressed the topic in a joint press conference with the Japanese Prime Minister in April 2015: What we have said [regarding the AIIB] and what we said
to all the other countries involved is exactly what Prime Minister Abe said, which is, if we’re going to have a multilateral lending institution, then you have to have
some guidelines by which it’s going to operate. That’s how the World Bank operates. That’s how the IMF operates. There may be weighted votes in terms of
who’s the biggest contributor, but you’ve got to have some transparency in terms of how the thing is going to operate— because if not, a number of things can
happen. Number one, money could end up flowing that is misused, or it doesn’t have high accounting standards, and we don’t know what happens to money that
is going into projects…And if, in fact, the Asia Infrastructure Bank that is being set up ends up having those kinds of safeguards, is run in a way that ultimately is
actually going to lead to good infrastructure and benefit the borrowing countries, then we’re all for it…But if it’s not run well, then it could be a negative thing. And
what we don’t want to do is just be participating in something and providing cover for an institution that does not end up doing right by its people. Because when
these countries borrow money, even from a development bank, for a boondoggle project that doesn’t work, they’re oftentimes still on the hook for paying that
money back. Those in favor of the bank claim these statements by the United States are hypocritical because of previous criticisms
against China for failing to shoulder the responsibilities of a major power. Instead, proponents argue that the AIIB does indeed
demonstrate a leadership attempt by China and deserves U.S. support. In addition, the fact that the AIIB is a multilateral
institution in which China does not hold a majority share of the vote, demonstrates restraint by Beijing. Through this process, China is
accepting limits on its own influence. Nevertheless, realists continue to believe that this attempt to revise the system of multinational
development banks is representative of Beijing’s desire to diminish Washington’s role in the developing world , specifically South Asia
and the Indian Ocean, by creating a power play at the United States’ expense . As Asia security analyst Jeff Smith describes, “China is now
operating beyond the reach of a U.S. veto, capable of reshaping the international order unilaterally. The AIIB will grant China a virtuous cycle of benefits,
expanding its political and economic leverage across Asia, and aiding its efforts to elevate the yuan as an international reserve currency.” If successful, that could
Regardless of realist speculation,
mean greater influence and the ability for China impart a more nationalist trajectory within its strategy in South Asia.
to date, there is not enough conclusive evidence to assess China’s motivations behind AIIB. However, what to watch for are the same
indicators that the President addressed: funds that are utilized to support projects based on the needs of the region, examples of transparency and high
standards in all transactions, and affordable interest rates that do not cripple a state’s economy.
AT: DA – JAPAN
 no link u
Already cooperating despite not joining – thumps their perception links and proves engagement doesn’t
jeopardize assurance
Keatley 15 (Robert Keatley, former editor of The Asian Wall Street Journal and the South China Morning Post, “China's AIIB
Challenge: How Should America Respond?” The National Interest, 4-18-2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-big-
strategic-blunder-not-joining-chinas-aiib-12666?page=show)KMM
Realizing that it chose a faulty course, the Obama Administration has already begun tacking in the new bank’s direction . After a recent
Beijing visit, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said “the US stands ready to welcome new additions to the international development
architecture”—a sharp contrast to late last year when senior White House officials were criticizing the AIIB as unsound and
unneeded, and pressuring allies to stay away. But Lew repeated a major American caveat: to be truly worthwhile, the AIIB must “share the
international community’s strong commitment to genuine multilateral decision-making and ever-improving lending standards and safeguards.” In other words,
member states must not let the bank become an agency for advancing narrow Chinese economic interests in corrupt ways at the expense of local citizens and
the environment. These concerns show that the initial American reaction, however unwise, was not irrational. The Chinese record as a lender to developing
nations is spotty at best. Too often it has provided loans to kleptocratic regimes that finance Chinese companies using imported Chinese workers on projects that
mainly ship energy and raw materials back to Chinese industry; sometimes bribes grease the way, while the local environment and economy can suffer. Some
experts say the Chinese record in Africa, for example, is no better than that of 19th century European colonialists. Other Chinese loans, such as $86 billion to
Venezuela, were made primarily for political reasons and may never be repaid. A few countries, most recently Sri Lanka and Myanmar, have canceled Chinese-
funded projects on grounds that corruption paved their way and they serve no basic local purpose. During his successful campaign, Sri Lanka’s new president,
Maithripala Sirisena, described local Chinese projects as “robbery taking place before everybody and in broad daylight….if this trend continues for another six
years our country would become a colony and we would become slaves.” Since taking office, he has suspended work on a $1.5 billion Beijing-funded port
project. But from the first, the AIIB was promised as something quite different, a bank that would follow international norms and be devoted to economically
sound projects of value to the borrowers. Jin Liqun, the Chinese official expected to become its first secretary general, has vowed that operations will be “lean,
clean and green,” with at least half its staff recruited from overseas. Jin, a former Chinese deputy finance minister and ADB vice president, also has said its
operations will be both corruption-free and transparent, two traits seldom found in Chinese governance. Governing board members elected from other member
states, such as Great Britain and Canada, are expected to ensure those guidelines are followed. Washington’s next move is unclear. To join would require a
capital commitment, something a Republican Congress is unlikely to provide even if President Obama asks. After all, the AIIB was born partly because Congress
consistently has refused to authorize a larger voice for Beijing in international agencies that the United States dominates, which would give China a role reflecting
its new economic strength. For example, for five years it has ignored legislation authorizing a cost-free (to U.S. taxpayers) revision of International Monetary
Fund quotas despite administration urging. Even so, the administration should swallow its pride and explore the possibility of getting inside
the tent, perhaps with Japan, rather than remain a lonely outsider . On the positive side, Jim Yong Kim, the American who leads the
World Bank, already plans talks about future cooperation with the AIIB .
 link turn
Japan will join now – giving up opposition bolsters assurance, alliance credibility and leadership in Asia
Desai & Vreeland 15 (Raj M. Desai and James Raymond Vreeland, staff writers for the Washington Post, “How to stop
worrying and love the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” 4-6-2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2015/04/06/how-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/)KMM
China launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in October of 2014 and has met with nothing but opposition from the U nited States.
Officially, the objection cited by the United States is a lack of clarity about AIIB’s governance, as well as concerns about whether the AIIB will adhere to strict
environmental and labor standards in its operations. It is clear, however, that U.S. opposition also derives from fears that the AIIB — spearheaded by China and
part of China’s “New Silk Road” strategy — will diminish U.S. leadership in the region. But if the AIIB jeopardizes U.S. leadership in Asia, it will be
a result of the manner in which American authorities have responded to the organization. Through its intransigence, the U nited
States continues to push Asian countries — including certain key allies — away. By refusing to participate in this new institution,
the United States gives up a vital role in shaping the Asian regional development agenda. And by goading other bilateral and multilateral donors to resist
the AIIB, the U.S. government may end up cutting American investors off from the potential benefits of private investment in Asian infrastructure. Despite its
efforts, the United States has been unable to keep its allies from joining the AIIB . Earlier this year, Saudi Arabia applied for membership. Last
week, the United Kingdom announced that it would join as a founding member — a move that received a rare, public rebuke from the White House. Now a trio of
European powers — France, Germany and Italy — have also applied for membership. Ironically, the founding of the AIIB is partly a result of the United States’
unwillingness to reform the Bretton Woods institutions. Since 2010, the U.S. Senate has refused to ratify an agreement on governance reform that would have
doubled resources available to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by increasing capital contributions from emerging market countries, which would
proportionately expand their voting power on the IMF Executive Board — where current quotas treat France as though it were more economically dominant than
China, and Belgium more dominant than Brazil. Nevertheless, the United States has used its blocking vote at the IMF to keep countries such as China, India and
Brazil underrepresented. Late last year, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde warned that governments would be forced to look for “alternative options” by
which development financing could be provided. Not surprisingly, the New Development Bank — the so-called “BRICS Bank” — was launched by Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa to fund development projects in member countries outside of the traditional multilateral channels. As we have pointed out, the
BRICS bank will be managed by governments with little in common beyond their dissatisfaction with the Bretton-Woods institutions. The AIIB is yet another
creation whose aim is to challenge the hegemony of institutions dominated by the United States, Western Europe and Japan. Unlike the BRICS Bank, whose
main shareholders may face coordination problems due to the equal distribution of voting shares, the AIIB faces no such difficulty since China will provide the
largest share of resources. It also, of course, has a far more focused mission than the BRICS Bank. In fact, the developmental logic behind the AIIB is
paramount. Asia faces a massive infrastructure gap. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that Asia will need $8 trillion over the next decade for
energy, transportation, telecommunication and water/sanitation. Private investment in infrastructure, according to the ADB, hovers at $13 billion a year, the
majority of which is concentrated in low-risk projects. Official development assistance adds another $11 billion a year in financing. If true, this means that the
shortfall exceeds $700 billion a year. The United States, as a result, places itself in opposition to regional investments that can expand trade, support financial
market development and macroeconomic stability, and improve environmental, health and social conditions. Were the current group of international financial
institutions capable of plugging the gap, it is unlikely that the AIIB would gather worldwide support. But existing institutions cannot hope to fill this hole. The ADB
and the World Bank have a combined capital base of less than $400 billion, which must support a wide variety of lending programs beyond infrastructure.
Moreover, there is little chance that bilateral donors — including the biggest bilateral donor, the U.S. government — will increase its funding for foreign aid in the
current political climate. The AIIB has an initial capital base of $50 billion, with authorized capital up to $100 billion. According to one estimate, using similar
loans-to-equity ratios of the World Bank and ADB, the AIIB could commit some $30 billion in loans devoted exclusively to infrastructure (the World Bank’s own
infrastructure financing was $24 billion in 2014). In effect, the United States is informing fast-growing Asian nations: We are not going to increase official funding
for your important needs anytime soon; we are also going to prevent the institutions we control from increasing their funding for those needs; and lastly, we are
going to admonish others from devising other ways of funding you. No wonder that Asian governments have jumped on the AIIB bandwagon .
Australia, Indonesia and South Korea were conspicuously absent from inauguration ceremonies last year when they shared U.S. concerns. But now
they have all warmed to the idea of joining the AIIB (Indonesia became a founding member, while Australia and South Korea have applied for
membership). Moreover, ADB and World Bank officials have extended a cautious welcome to the new China-led bank, saying they see room for collaboration.
But the clearest signal of the AIIB’s appeal has come from officials in Taipei, who have announced that Taiwan, too, will join the organization as Taipei,
China. If Japan also joins — as is now expected — it will leave the U nited States isolated among major donor nations. Not only does the
United States endanger its own regional influence through its refusal to participate , it also threatens private American investment. Unlike most
types of private investment, infrastructure projects tend to have extremely high up-front costs and longer maturities. This leaves infrastructure investors much
more vulnerable to sovereign risk, regulatory instability, shifting political winds, and the threat of expropriation. For this reason, multilateral development banks
play a critical role in attracting private infrastructure investment to developing countries through “additionality,” that is, by contributing their own funding, bringing
financing partners into specific deals (through syndications or co-financing), and by using risk guarantees and other tools. Importantly, multilateral development
banks cannot offer support to investors from non-member countries. Should the AIIB develop its own system of risk insurance and partial guarantees, they will
not be available to American investors. Asia, the United States — and for that matter, the whole world — would be better off if the U nited States
were to participate in the AIIB. What better way to encourage the Chinese to implement a transparent regime that adopts global best practices in financing
infrastructure than to be a voting member? If anything, China’s move towards multilateralism should be welcomed. Rather than rebuke others for
joining, the U.S. should consider doing the same .
 at: abe
Their links are old or assume Abe, who’s the only hold out – support from other allies will overwhelm
opposition
Aneja 15 (Atul Aneja, staff writer for The Hindu, “Pressure mounts on Japan and U.S. to join China-led bank,” 3-22-2015,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/pressure-mounts-on-japan-and-us-to-join-chinaled-bank/article7020697.ece)KMM
Tokyo could consider participation in AIIB, provided a credible mechanism for providing loans could be guaranteed, said Japan's Finance Minister. Japan now
appears divided, and the United States is being strongly advised to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), whose
formation is beginning to be viewed as the dawning of a multipolar world. Opposed to participation so far, the Japanese were emitting mixed
signals about prospects for joining the bank. Japanese Finance Minister Taro Aso said Tokyo could consider participation in AIIB ,
provided a credible mechanism for providing loans could be guaranteed. "We have been asking to ensure debt sustainability taking into account its impact on
environment and society," he told reporters after a cabinet meeting. "We could [consider participating] if these issues are guaranteed,” he observed. However,
Reuters is quoting a senior official in the ruling coalition that Japan's participation "is not going to happen under the [Shinzo] Abe
administration". The Australians appear close to dropping their earlier opposition, and are likely to formally announce their decision to join the bank, following
a cabinet meeting slated for Monday. Major European powers — Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Switzerland — were first to break the shackles
imposed by Washington against participation in the Beijing-led lender, which already had emerging countries like India, as well as Singapore, Kuwait and Qatar
in the list of founding members. “The story of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is turning into a diplomatic debacle for the U.S. By setting up and then
losing a power struggle with China, Washington has sent an unintended signal about the drift of power and influence in the 21st century,” wrote the Financial
Times. In an editorial, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (SCMP) opined that the acceptance, however reluctant, of a Beijing-led bank meant that
the unipolar world had entered its sunset years. “China's bank is causing a landmark acceptance of the new multipolar world order and a willingness to work with,
not against, it,” the daily observed. With most allies already backing, or in the process of doing so , influential sections of the western media are
arguing that instead of choosing confrontation, Washington too should join the AIIB . Another article in the Financial Times slams the U.S. for being
obstructionist. It points out that Washington has “correctly urged China to exercise leadership consistent with its expanding power and to provide more resources
to support development and other global goals”. It adds: “When the Chinese move in those directions, as they are doing with the AIIB, it is short-sighted and
hypocritical for the U.S. to seek to block them. This is especially true when the Obama administration has not persuaded Congress in four years to adopt
legislation to provide enhanced roles for China and other emerging economies in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as agreed by all other countries; and
has opposed increasing the capital of the Asian Development Bank.” Hoping to minimise resistance in Washington, Lou Jiwei, the Chinese finance minister has
said that AIIB will complement and not compete with established international lenders, including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
"History revisited, the establishment of regional investment banks including the ADB andthe European Bank for Reconstruction and Development did not weaken
established [institutions], rather they reinforced the multilateral financial organisations and more vigorously push forward the global economy," observed Mr. Lou.
The Chinese finance minister said that although the deadline of founder application is March 31, other countries can still join the bank as common members after
this date.

Japan is engaging behind the scenes already – just doesn’t want to upset the U.S. – the plan resolves that
The Economist ’15 (The Economist. “To join or not to join,” http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21652351-will-japan-lend-
its-muscle-chinas-new-asian-infrastructure-bank-join-or-not-join) //HF
Some in Japan argue that taking part would improve strained ties between the two countries. On May 22nd a 3,000-strong delegation of
Japanese tourism and local-government officials led by a pro-China senior member of the LDP, began a three-day trip to Beijing. They were warmly welcomed
there by China’s president, Xi Jinping, in the latest sign that relations are on the mend. Supporters in Japan of their country’s membership say Japan could act as
a counterbalance to China’s influence inside the bank. Yet officials close to Mr Abe say he continues to view the AIIB with deep suspicion , as
a means to expand China’s strategic and economic power. Since it would be almost impossible for America to join the AIIB against the will of Congress, with its
many critics of China and abhorrence of funding any new international bank, Japan would be breaking ranks with its ally should it join . It would look
especially odd so soon after a trip by Mr Abe to Washington in April that was aimed at strengthening Japan’s alliance with America. Japan is likely, then, to
wait at least a few more months—perhaps beyond the expected debut of the AIIB’s lending operations early next year . Even so,
much talk is going on behind the scenes between Japanese and Chinese officials over how to make the bank’s lending
standards open and fair. Progress on the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free-trade agreement that includes America and Japan and other Asian
countries but pointedly excludes China, is erratic. Alastair Newton, a political analyst at Nomura, says that if the government decides not to join the AIIB, and no
deal is reached on the TPP, Japan could see its economic influence in the region fade further. China would not be upset.
 at: interests
Their authors are wrong – Japan’s interests favor joining and they’ll follow our lead regardless
Takahashi & Zhou 15 Political analysts, Bloomberg News (Maiko, Xin, news, political analysis, commentary, long-form
features, “Why Japan Should, or Shouldn’t, Join the China-led AIIB: Q&A” 2/4/15, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
06-04/why-japan-should-or-shouldn-t-join-the-china-led-aiib-q-a) /LL
When Japan’s finance minister meets his Chinese counterpart in Beijing on Saturday, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will loom large in the talks. While
56 nations signed up to the new $100-billion lender being established by China, Japan hasn’t. In a recommendation compiled for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on
Thursday, lawmakers in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party urged caution on joining . Taro Aso, the finance minister, has repeatedly raised
concerns about what the AIIB’s governance will look like. Japan is boosting spending in the region to counter China’s rising influence, using its Asian
Development Bank to expand funding for infrastructure projects to about $110 billion over the next five years. Below are the pros and cons of Japan joining the
lender for both governments in Tokyo and Beijing: What’s in it for the Japanese? - Joining would help give Japan stronger influence on
policy and investment decisions in Asia, said Masahiro Kawai, a professor at Tokyo University and former dean of the ADB’s think tank. - Japan’s entry
could improve ties between the governments in Tokyo and Beijing, according to the LDP’s recommendation. - It would help the Japanese
economy by raising the odds that Japanese companies -- seeking expansion overseas as the domestic market contracts -- are
chosen to build infrastructure projects. Banks would also benefit . Why not sign up then? - China has failed to explain how the AIIB will be
governed, Aso said last month at the ADB’s annual meeting in Baku, Azerbaijan - It would add to Japan’s debt burden, the world’s heaviest - By keeping its
options open, Japan can use its position as a diplomatic card, said Toru Nishihama, chief economist at the Dai-Ichi Life Research Institute. - Japan has to
move in line with the U.S., which also hasn’t joined, said Hiromichi Shirakawa, chief Japan economist at Credit Suisse Group AG .
Why would China want Japan in? - China can gain technology and expertise from Japan, which has headed the ADB since its founding in 1966, said Chen
Fengying, a senior fellow researcher with the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations. - Having Japan on board would show regional solidarity,
said Shi Yinhong, professor of International Relations at Renmin University in Beijing. - Zhang Dejiang, China’s chairman of the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress, urged LDP vice president Masahiko Komura to join when they met in Beijing on May 5, Kyodo News reported. The only thing
President Xi Jinping told Abe during an April meeting was that the proposal “has been welcomed in the international community,” according to the Xinhua news
agency. Why wouldn’t China want Japan to join? - China is frustrated with the regional influence of the Japan-led ADB, and concerned that Japan would seek to
counter its influence in the AIIB. - China and the other founding members will have little problem getting the capital together, said Renmin’s Shi. - Chinese
Finance Minister Jiwei Lou has said that there are no such things as “best practices” in development finance. So what could China learn from Japan? What is the
timeframe for joining? - Lou said May 22 that founding members have agreed to sign a charter in Beijing in the latter half of June, and Xi has said he wants to
start the AIIB in December. - Practically, it would be next year as the amount of capital is fixed and would need to be specially expanded if Japan were to join. -
“For the situation now, without Japan, it might be a bit easier for China to finalize the agreement of associations and detailed structure with the existing founding
members,” says Renmin’s Shi.

Alliance interests outweigh domestic preference – the only reason they opposed in the first place was
because they always follow our lead
Lehmann 15, (“China, Japan, and the US—A Complex Combustible Triangle” 4-5-2015
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jplehmann/2015/04/05/china-japan-and-the-us-a-complex-combustible-triangle/#126dd58d1a53)
Taro Aso, Japanese Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, announced on 2 April that Japan would not join the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) out of loyalty to the US. He is the grandson of Shigeru Yoshida. Yoshida, a wily highly capable diplomat, was
Japan’s prime minister during the immediate post-World War II years; he was the principal interlocutor with the Supreme Command Allied Pacific, General
Douglas MacArthur, and is considered the architect of post-war Japan. After him is named the “Yoshida Doctrine” according to which Japan focuses on
economics and to that end forsakes independence in foreign affairs in exchange for being protected militarily by the US . In 1952 the
Japan-US security treaty was signed. (See illustration below: Yoshida signing the security treaty.) Shigeru Yoshida, Taro Aso and indeed all Japan have
ample reasons to be highly grateful to the US. Having invaded China, Japan joined Nazi Germany in World War II to fight against the allies,
proceeding to bomb Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 and expelling all European imperialist powers from their Southeast Asian colonies. Following the two
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, Japan surrendered. Four years later, in October 1949, came the “Liberation” in China, as the
government of General Chiang Kai-shek was overthrown by the forces of Mao Zedong, Japan was overnight transformed from the US’ erstwhile hated enemy to
become its pampered protégé.
AT: DA – DIP CAP
 no internal
No internal link – dip cap is already overstretched – and adding agenda items doesn’t trade off – prefer
experts
Ribar 14 [Matthew- guest contributer to the Diplomatic Courier, “How Much Diplomacy is Too Much?,” DiplomaticCourier.com,
June 6th, http://www.diplomaticourier.com/how-much-diplomacy-is-too-much/] Skoulikaris and Aralis
President Obama’s recent commencement speech at West Point (full transcript here) provoked a variety of reactions, but one frequently heard claim is that the
President is trying to do too much in terms of diplomacy, stretching too thinly the U.S.’s limited supply of diplomatic capital . For
example, Shannon Tiezzi at The Diplomat argues that President Obama is once again ignoring his much-vaunted pivot to Asia in favor of embroiling himself in
the Middle East. The speech, Tiezzi asserted, showed that the administration’s diplomatic efforts are overstretched, and that “the Asia-Pacific region still
plays second fiddle to more traditional areas of U.S. concern.” These criticisms come in the wake of Secretary of State John Kerry’s involvement in the failure to
secure a deal at peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The collapse of the talks, some say, confirms allegations that Kerry overestimates his
capabilities as Secretary of State. Senator John McCain has called Kerry a “human wrecking ball.” Kori Schake argues that Kerry must “prioritize,” and that
“Many countries in the region argue that if only the United States would put a little effort and attention to the problem, if it would lean just a little on the Israelis
over whom we have such enormous leverage, there could be justice for Palestinians, thus removing a major obstacle to public support for the United States
throughout the region.” By the sound of the pundits and foreign policy wonks, general agreement exists in the foreign policy community that Kerry and Obama
have bitten off more than they can chew. However, on Monday, the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (T.R.I.P.) project at the College of William &
Mary published the results of the most recent snap poll. Though a small number of individual I.R. scholars write blogs or publish in policy journals like Foreign
Policy or Foreign Affairs, the snap polls are an innovative way to provide systematic evidence on the views of I.R. scholars regarding contemporary policy issues.
These snap polls aim to connect academia to the policy world by identifying and communicating opinions of scholars in the academic I.R. community. On the
most recent snap poll, scholars were asked if “heavy diplomatic involvement by the United States in Ukraine, Syria, the South China Sea, and Iranian nuclear
talks hampered U.S. efforts to facilitate Middle East peace talks.” This question has direct relevance to President Obama’s speech: if the U.S. has too much on
its plate in terms of diplomacy, then it would be counterproductive to lean even more heavily on the already overstretched diplomatic tools available to U.S. policy
makers. In fact, there is broad consensus amongst I.R. scholars . Of the respondents, 71.4 percent of scholars reported that heavy diplomatic
involvement by the U.S. around the world did not hamper U.S. efforts to facilitate Middle East peace talks. Only 16.8 percent of
scholars answered “yes” (11.8 percent responded “don’t know”). Often, the academic community faces allegations of liberal bias. These range from memoirs
about a conservative academic being met “with enmity, suspicion, and a refusal to engage in reasoned debate” to Senator Rick Santorum’s famous response to
President Obama wanting every American to go to college: “what a snob.” So, perhaps liberal professors are blindly following the president in foreign policy. If
this were the case, one would expect a much larger ratio of “yes” answers among conservatives. The following chart shows responses to the snap poll question
broken down according to political ideology and gender: Matt Ribar Graph 2 Variations are underwhelming, and consensus is again strong: 18.8 percent of
conservatives replied that the U.S. is stretched too thin diplomatically, whereas 16 percent of liberals also agreed. That difference, 2.8 percent, is minuscule.
Gender played a bigger role in responses than ideology, with women more likely to say that the U.S. is overstretched. But even amongst women, 60.7 percent
replied “no.” T.R.I.P. also conducts more substantive polls every few years. One question asked on the larger 2011 T.R.I.P. poll was “how much influence, on a
scale of one to ten, will the U.S. have on the world in 2020.” An answer of 10 means that the scholar thought the U.S. would be very influential in 2020. Broadly,
scholars who think the U.S. will be more influential in 2020 are less likely to say that the U.S. is overstretched diplomatically. Even amongst those with the
gloomiest opinions of the U.S.’s future effect on the world overwhelmingly answer “no.” Only 16.6 percent of those who said the influence of the U.S. would be
from 1 to 2 and 23.2 percent of those who responded with answers from 3 to 4 said that the U.S. was overstretched diplomatically. Matt Ribar Graph 3 Despite
frequent criticism that the administration needs to focus on a smaller number of diplomatic initiatives, there is actually an
overwhelming consensus amongst I.R. scholars, irrespective of gender, ideology, or predictions of the future of U.S. power. The takeaway is that
even though there are certainly plenty of critiques to be made of the president’s foreign policy, there is agreement amongst I.R.
scholars that diplomatic multitasking is not one of them.
 thumper – dysfunction
Bureaucratic dysfunction and Congressional obstructionism thump
Tay ’15, Gabriel Rui Lin. BSs Economics, from Singapore Management University, second major finance (Lin Tay, “Pivotal
Moments – United States’ lessons from the AIIB episode” https://project-firefly.com/-node/19153)//SW
Left out in the cold, Obama-self Despite US recognizing the need for such institutions and Catherine Novelli, US Under Secretary for Economic Growth stating in an interview with
CNBC that US supports the AIIB’s goal in infrastructure development, the US government has been lobbying her western allies against being part of the new initiatives. Much to
Washington’s dismay, some of her closes allies, including the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy have already expressed interest in becoming founding members of the AIIB.
The defiance of her closest European allies seemed to have left US out in the cold alone. The entire episode clearly highlights how dysfunctional
Washington has become , especially in her foreign policies, as well as the extent of Washington’s influence over her western allies. As the list of countries
eager to sign up for the AIIB grows ever longer, maintaining her stance will make US seem ever more insular. As US Secretary of Defence
Ashton Carter began a tour of Asia in an attempt to breather new life into US’s “pacific pivot”, the US has clearly encountered a
fresh stumbling block. This embarassing diplomatic blow may yet catalyze Washington’s much needed reforms through the many lessons US stands to learn from this episode.
Bye-partisanship Former US Treasury Secretary, Lawrence Summers, had clearly singled out the root of the problem. “They can quite
legitimately ask, ‘excuse me, you guys have had 5 ½ years to support a reasonable role for us in the IMF, and you have not done
it,’” he said as a campus forum in Cambridge. To understand China’s motive behind the new initiative, one need only look at the allocation of voting rights in the US-led IMF. China
has merely 3.81% of voting rights in the IMF. In contrast, US and Japan have 16.8% and 6.23% respectively. An 85% majority is needed for any resolution to be passed. With US
congress continuously blocking the much needed IMF reforms and depriving emerging economies of stronger voices, US
lawmakers’ inaction had landed her country somewhere between a hard place and a rock. Washington’s current state of bipartisanship is clearly
dysfunctional. Barely two years ago, the US Federal Government shutdown of 2013 clearly exposed the free country’s flawed political system on the international stage. More recently,
47 Republican senators wrote an open letter to Iran, blindsiding their own President with regards to Iran’s nuclear deal. Until US lawmakers
can muster sufficient political will to push through reforms for such structural failures in Washington , we may yet expect further
erosion of US influence and, along with it, any chance of success in her pacific pivot. Tackling the political gridlock may be a long shot. However,
establishing proper frameworks to reduce impact of political gridlocks in Washington from affecting IMF and World Bank may be more plausible. Infrastructure development should not
be politicized. While US lawmakers play armchair politics, citizens across continental Asia do not have access to basic necessities such as clean water, proper sanitation
and healthcare. The continuous lack of US lawmakers’ approval to IMF reforms undermines the IMF and its ability to instill confidence when there
are substantial uncertainties surrounding emerging markets. This has to change. Integrating China Much of the attention of US’ pacific pivot has been focused on the use of deterrence.
While this is a crucial component of maintaining peace and stability in the pacific region, a two-pronged approach, which includes diplomacy in the mix, may prove to be more
sustainable. US must not lose sight of the importance of diplomacy and recognize that the rise of China is inevitable. Instead of swimming against the tide, US should seek to integrate
China into the international community. US’ stance on the AIIB makes herself to be perceived by the international community as insular, overly paranoid and, to some extent, small-
minded. While the issue of governance raised by Washington in the AIIB may be legitimate and well grounded, US cannot simply urge Beijing to play a greater role when it is in US
interest to do so (as in the case of dealing with Russia and North Korea) and then view her through lens of suspicion when otherwise. Harvard’s Allison Graham also noted that the odds
of war due to transition of superpowers, since the 1500s, are about 3 to 1. Integrating China to the global community can help prevent the 2 countries from falling into the Thucydides
trap. That should be the top priority of US foreign policy. Through integration, China, along with any other countries, will be so economically entangled that the cost of conflict would
outweigh any benefits an aggressor can hope to achieve. The wrong part of Asia As Singapore’s late founding father Lee Kuan Yew often said, “America will remain the world’s
dominant power in the 21st Century only if it is the dominant pacific power.” The future will neither rest on the success of Iran’s nuclear deals nor the outcome of the Yemen conflict. It
will be shaped by how existing powers handle the rise of another superpower. With US up in her neck trying (but failing) to broker peace in the Middle East, US does not have sufficient
resource for her pacific pivot. The Middle East has had at least 65 conflicts since the end of World War 2 and Yemen has been in a state of constant conflict for the better part of the
century. Perhaps it is time for Washington to consider the option of letting the Middle Eastern countries continue their feuds and civil wars, while redirecting her focus to the Asia Pacific
region. The best way to win the game US official response to opposing the AIIB relates to the issues of governance. However, fear of China’s expanding geopolitical influence may be
closer to the truth. Even if the official response do hold water, excluding herself in shaping policy, and hence the governance of the AIIB, sounds like a poor move. Besides, given that
the bank will be under close scrutiny, the AIIB is likely to adopt international best practices. By resisting the AIIB, US had missed an excellent opportunity to help shape policies in the
AIIB. What US lawmakers failed to understand was that the best way to influence the game is to play, instead of sitting along the sidelines. US may have missed an
opportunity in shaping the future of AIIB, but it is definitely still has game, if she plays her cards right. Going forward, it is important that US seeks to use diplomacy in addition to the use
of deterrence in shaping her pacific pivot. It may also be timely to fast track the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) treaty which may help US gain some political capital from participating
countries, especially those who are also founding members of the AIIB.
 no link u
Failure to join the bank is hurting dip cap now
Dollar 15 [David- Senior Fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution and the U.S. Treasury’s
former economic and financial emissary to China, having previously served as the World Bank’s Country Director for China and
Mongolia, “China’s Rise as a Regional and Global Power”, brookings.edu, Summer 2015,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/07/15-china-rise-as-regional-and-global-power-dollar/china-rise-as-
regional-and-global-power.pdf]
These initiatives are largely welcomed by China’s Asian neighbors and this essay’s next section will examine how they can contribute positively to Asian integration. However, the
thinking in China that these initiatives can be a major solution to China’s excess capacity problems is largely misguided. The
contributions that these initiatives together make to China’s demand are likely to be too small to be macroeconomically meaningful. The domestic response to China’s
over-capacity problem is a set of reforms that emerged from the Third Party Plenum in November 2013 . Together, these form a coherent set
of measures that would rein in wasteful investment, increase innovation and productivity growth, and enhance consumption. A further section of this essay reviews the key reform
China’s initiatives in
measures, as well as progress to date with regard to reform. Success in this area will enable China to continue to grow well for another decade or more.
Asia are seen in many quarters as a setback for the United States. The U.S. government contributed to this narrative through its
efforts to discourage allies from joining the new AIIB . In the end, major American allies, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and South Korea, did join the
Chinese initiative, and Japan is seriously considering becoming a member. However, this is likely to be a temporary diplomatic setback for the United States.
 link turn
Dip cap is wasted now trying to persuade allies NOT to join – the plan solves
Yglesias 15 [Matthew- reporter for Vox World, “How a Chinese infrastructure bank turned into a diplomatic fiasco for America,”
VOX World, April 1st, http://www.vox.com/2015/4/1/8311921/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank] Skoulikaris and Aralis
Last fall, China rolled out a new regional economic initiative — the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank — on which it was partnering with India and a range of smaller Asian
countries. The
United States swiftly announced its opposition to the plan, which it said would undermine the existing global financial
architecture, and began leaning on allies around the world to give the bank the cold shoulder. This March, America's AIIB
diplomacy suddenly and dramatically collapsed, as the United Kingdom — over the objections of the UK's own Foreign Office — said it would
join the bank. And that opened the floodgates. Germany, France, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, Spain, Korea, and Brazil are now all on board. The US is isolated,
America is sniping at its closest foreign allies, and the Obama administration has been dealt a humiliating diplomatic defeat. The
practical impact of the debacle is as of yet unclear, but it offers a telling window into 21st-century geopolitical anxieties —
congressional dysfunction undermining American grand strategy, European Union disunity causing the world's largest trading bloc to punch under its weight,
UK foreign policy adrift, and global thirst for hypothetical Chinese riches. What kind of bank is this, exactly? One of the tragicomic elements of this story is that the AIIB does not exist
and Chinese authorities have not been very clear about what it is supposed to look like. Broadly, though, the idea is that there will be a bank that is owned by a range of sovereign
states and that it will have the mission of making loans to support infrastructure projects in Asia. This is similar to what the World Bank already does. But while China controls just 5.71
percent of the voting stock in the World Bank, the AIIB is being structured so that China will have the largest voice by far in its affairs . The bank will
raise somewhere between $50 billion and $100 billion in initial capital, but with non-Asian contributions capped in a way that essentially ensures a dominant role for China. That
contrasts with the World Bank and the IMF, which were set up by the USA and Western European countries in the wake of World War II and were designed to give the US and Europe
The
dominant roles. By informal agreement, the US and Europe coordinate to ensure that the World Bank is always led by an American and the IMF is always led by a European.
United States regards the AIIB as an effort to undermine the World Bank, and takes the view that issues with the Bank — both
lack of funds and underrepresentation of newer economic powers such as China — should be tackled through a reform process.
But the official position of World Bank President Jim Yong Kim is to welcome the AIIB: "From the perspective simply of the need for more infrastructure spending, there's no doubt that
Interest in joining the AIIB
from our perspective, we welcome the entry of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank." Why are America's allies signing on to the AIIB?
comes down to a hazy and unconfirmed belief that China will provide unspecified commercial benefits to countries that
participate. America's allies have to weigh this hazy notion against their commitment to the US-led alliance system . With each new
defection from the American camp, the benefits of holding out seem scarcer, so the hazy economic argument seems more compelling. Consider Japan. With the exception of the United
States, the country most opposed to the AIIB was Japan. Japan is a regional rival of China's. And much as the US dominates the World Bank and Europe dominates the IMF, there is a
Japan-dominated legacy institution called the Asian Development Bank that the AIIB would in some sense undermine. But on March 30, Japan's ambassador to China told the Financial
Times that Japan will likely join. Masato Kitera told the FT, " The
business community woke up late, but now they have mounted a big campaign for
the AIIB which appears to be very effective." After all, the economic upside to AIIB membership may be small. But it's something. The idea of boycotting
the AIIB was that countries shouldn't give legitimacy to a Chinese pet project. But once Korea, Australia, Germany, and the UK
had all signed on, the legitimacy horse was out of the stable . One domino fell after another , meaning the UK's decision to sign
on very rapidly made the American position untenable. So is this all David Cameron's fault? That's more or less how it looks from Washington. The Obama
administration's pique is re-enforced by the fact that, as Jamil Anderlini and Kiran Stacey reported for the Financial Times, the United Kingdom's decision to join the bank was made
if David Cameron's government took this decision
over the objections of the UK Foreign Office. As Thomas Wright of the Brookings Institution writes, "It appears as
because it wanted to be the first to join and to get the credit from China for doing so." This haste to obtain nonspecific
commercial advantages at the expense of following America's lead on grand strategy is seen by many in DC as crass and
opportunistic. From a British viewpoint it looks more like common sense. Accommodating China's rise is a reasonable strategy for a midsize country on the other side of the
planet. The American alliance is important, but snubbing China just because America wants it to offers no upside . Wouldn't the EU have
had more leverage if they'd negotiated as a bloc? Yes. For precisely this reason, in theory the European Union is always working to present more of a united front in foreign affairs —
especially when it comes to commercial matters. In practice, despite the considerable concentration of authority in Brussels, European politics still happens on a national basis. Each
incumbent party or politician needs to try to deliver prosperity to its national population to retain popularity and electoral support. What's more, institutionally speaking European Union
members jealously guard their ability to be individually represented in multinational institutions. The IMF is always run by "a European" but the IMF shares that lay the groundwork for
European dominance are held by individual European states. The
AIIB was also structured along these lines, with European countries being
individually invited to participate or not. In theory, it might have made sense to approach the situation collectively — but the default mode is to handle it individually, and
the Chinese were able to take advantage of that. How does congressional dysfunction play into this? The Obama administration more or less foresaw this problem years ago. That's
why back in 2010 it negotiated a deal to increase China's role in the IMF and World Bank. This plan, if approved, would lift China from number six to number three at the IMF while also
enhancing the positions of India and Brazil and giving the IMF more overall resources. The proposal has secured the support of most of the IMF's 188 members, including all the major
powers. The problem is that Congress keeps blocking the plan at the behest of conservative activist groups. As former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers says, this creates a
situation in which the Chinese "can quite legitimately ask, ‘excuse me, you guys have had 5½ years to support a reasonable role for us in the IMF, and you have not done it.'" So
basically Chinese diplomats are running circles around the West? It sure looks that way in this case. But Chinese diplomacy in general tends toward clumsiness and incompetence. This
particular coup required a very particular nexus of American gridlock, European incoordination, and British cravenness that is not present at every issue. What's more, the actual stakes
here are not so clear. Had the Obama administration not chosen to pick this fight, it's far from obvious that the creation of a Chinese-dominated multilateral bank capable of financing a
modest number of Asian infrastructure projects would be a blow to American interests. Conversely, it's far from obvious what kind of commercial bonanza Cameron and other European
leaders think they are going to reap from currying favor from China in this regard. One clear moral of the story, however, is that the United States and its traditional European allies
simply see the east Asian situation differently. European countries — including our special friends in Britain — simply aren't interested in sacrificing economic opportunities for the sake
of American ideas about how the region should be structured.
 solves mideast
The AFF externally resolves their impact – AIIB boosts diplomatic and economic cooperation in the MidEast
Lai and Lingwall 15 [David and Noah- Research Professor of Asian Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the
U.S. Army War College and an intern at the Strategic Studies Institute and a student at the Schreyer Honors College of
Pennsylvania State University, “China: A Solution for the Middle East?” The Diplomat, June 18th,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/china-a-solution-in-the-middle-east/] Skoulikaris and Aralis
It is also important to note the role that the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will play in uniting Middle Eastern factions, while
simultaneously supporting the development of the Silk Road. The AIIB provides the funding and investment necessary to turn the
“One Belt, One Road” vision into a reality. Egypt has joined the AIIB as a founding member and Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan,
Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait have signed on as associate members. Membership in the AIIB grants these nations a fast track to Chinese
investment funds and will unite them under a common economic interest. On both ends of the Arab-Israeli dispute, military
exchanges and economic cooperation will serve as major building blocks for bilateral relations . Israelis and Palestinians recognize that
Chinese investment is invaluable in sustaining their economies. To court future investment from this great power, nations on both sides of the ethnic
and religious divide will be forced to moderate their demands. When compared with Washington’s Middle East policies, Beijing’s
new approach lays the foundation for more peaceful and prosperous relations. Perhaps it is time to give China a chance.
 dc fails mideast
Diplomacy fails in the Mideast – ongoing violence and disagreements over negotiating stances
Simon 15 [Steven- scholar at Dartmouth College, “A Violent Uprising in the West Bank,” Council of Foreign
Relations, July 15th, http://www.cfr.org/palestine/violent-uprising-west-bank/p36842] Skoulikaris and
Aralis
Renewed violence in the West Bank would reduce Washington's already diminished ability to advance a two-state solution,
which has long been a core U.S. foreign policy objective. The second intifada persuaded many Israelis that a two-state solution could not be effectively
secured, and the subsequent diplomatic stalemate has made many Palestinians equally dismissive of a two-state solution. Renewed fighting, given the probable loss
of life, destruction of physical infrastructure—much of it rebuilt after the second intifada—and the likely reimposition of
comprehensive controls on movement within the West Bank would compound their doubts. Another violent uprising could also
strain an already fraught U.S.-Israeli relationship and pit the United States against its European allies at a time when their
cooperation on a range of other important issues is required. At this stage, relations between Washington and Jerusalem are likely to remain
turbulent owing to differences over issues—Iran's regional role and nuclear ambitions and the peace process—regarded as strategic by one or both sides. The gap
between increasingly anti-Israeli European public opinion and European governments' tolerance for Israeli policies is widening .
Israeli actions to suppress an uprising in the West Bank would be assessed internationally as very different from Israel's periodic confrontations with Hamas in Gaza. Unlike Hamas, the
PA has rejected violence; its success in the United Nations is a sign of growing legitimacy. Several European governments have recognized Palestinian statehood and others are likely
to follow. In the context of a third uprising, European leaders would try to narrow the gap between their policy and European public opinion by intensifying international, multilateral, and
bilateral diplomatic pressure on the United States to rein in Israel's response. Regional
states, particularly Qatar and Turkey, which have long been accused of supporting
Hamas, could also undermine efforts to resolve the crisis. Finally, heightened insecurity in Israel could increase congressional opposition to the P5+1 agreement on
Iran's nuclear program.
AT: DA – AGENDA POLITICS
 no link
No link – doesn’t require Congress
Keatley 15 (Robert Keatley, former editor of The Asian Wall Street Journal and the South China Morning Post, “China's AIIB
Challenge: How Should America Respond?” The National Interest, 4-18-2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-big-
strategic-blunder-not-joining-chinas-aiib-12666?page=show)KMM
Whatever American officials do about the bank eventually, they could well relax a bit. If it does operate on promised terms, the AIIB should be a useful contributor
to Asia’s economic development. But it cannot possibly dominate the Asian financial arena, nor replace other institutions. According to the ADB, Asia needs $800
billion annually for a decade to meet its infrastructure needs, a vast sum far beyond the combined capabilities of all international agencies. (The ADB, for
example, has provided only $13 billion annually in recent times though it hopes to do more.) Huge amounts of national and private capital are also needed, and
no single government or institution can provide it alone. If the United States works to remain engaged in Asia, it will; even a successful AIIB will not let China
displace it. So Washington’s best course could be to join up if possible. If a Republican Congress blocks the effort, the administration
should work with the AIIB directly, as well as through friendly members and agencies like the World Bank and ADB, to keep it on the promised
“lean, clean and green” course. If the new bank succeeds, Asia will benefit significantly. And if it degenerates into another corrupt organization designed to
extract resources for Chinese industry, Beijing will suffer the political consequences.
 thumper – tpp
TPP thumps
Chen ’16- Chief Washington Correspondent of China Daily and Deputy Editor of China Daily USA (Weihua, China Daily USA,
“China, US take fresh views on TPP and AIIB”, 6/10/15, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-
06/10/content_20957082.htm)//PS
China is adopting a more welcoming attitude for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a US-led free-trade agreement now being
negotiated by 12 countries. Zhang Jianping, director of the department of international economic cooperation at the Institute for
International Economic Research of the National Development and Reform Commission, said China's attitude is clear. "That is
we are very happy to see those TPP members can make consensus, because we think TPP will be a possible approach for
promoting Asia-Pacific economic integration," Zhang said at a seminar on Tuesday at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) in Washington. His words came at a time when the Obama administration is trying to pressure the House of
Representatives to pass the fast-track Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) needed to negotiate TPP and other free-trade
agreements. The bill cleared the Senate on May 21, but in the House, Obama still is lobbying his own Democratic Party's
Congress members. The US and Japan are still haggling over the opening of the auto and agricultural markets under TPP, while
Malaysia and Vietnam face some major hurdles in the negotiations. Kathy Santillo, regional managing director of the US-ASEAN
Business Council, said on Tuesday that there is no crystal ball as to whether the TPP can meet the deadline. The Obama
administration hopes to make TPP his major presidential legacy.
 thumper – isis
Obama’s top priority is ISIL
Obama ’16- President of the entire United States (Barack, annotated by Melanie Garunay, the White House, “President
Obama: ‘My Top Priority Is to Defeat ISIL"’, 3/23/16, https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/03/23/president-obama-my-top-
priority-defeat-isil)//PS
"I’ve got a lot of things on my plate. But my top priority is to defeat ISIL and to eliminate the scourge of this barbaric terrorism
that's been taking place around the world. And we see high-profile attacks in Europe, but they're also killing Muslims throughout
the Middle East -- people who are innocent, people who are guilty only of worshipping Islam in a different way than this
organization. They are poisoning the minds of young people everywhere." "So there's no more important item on my agenda
than going after them and defeating them. The issue is how do we do it in an intelligent way. And our approach has been
continuously to adjust to see what works and what doesn’t. What has been working is the airstrikes that we're taking on their
leadership, on their infrastructure, on their financial systems."