The Three Crises in Mathematics: Logicism, Intuitionism and Formalism

Author(s): Ernst Snapper

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Mathematics Magazine, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Sep., 1979), pp. 207-216
Published by: Mathematical Association of America
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2689412 .
Accessed: 27/06/2012 13:53

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Mathematical Association of America is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Mathematics Magazine.

http://www.jstor.org
The Three Crises in Mathematics:
Logicism,Intuitionismand Formalism

Crises in classical philosophy reveal doubts

about mathematicaland philosophical criteria
fora satisfactoryfoundationformathematics.

ERNST SNAPPER
DartmouthCollege
Hanover,NH 03755

The threeschools,mentionedin thetitle,all triedto givea firmfoundationto mathematics.

The threecrisesare thefailuresof theseschoolsto completetheirtasks.This articlelooks at
thesecrises"throughmodemeyes,"usingwhatevermathematics is availabletodayand notjust
the mathematics whichwas available to the pioneerswho createdtheseschools.Hence, this
articledoes not approachthethreecrisesin a strictlyhistoricalway.This articlealso does not
discuss the large volume of current,technicalmathematicswhich has arisen out of the
techniquesintroducedby the threeschoolsin question.One reasonis thatsuch a discussion
wouldtakea book and nota shortarticle.Anotherone is thatall thistechnicalmathematics has
verylittleto do withthephilosophyof mathematics, and in thisarticleI wantto stressthose
and formalismwhichshow clearlythat these schools are
aspects of logicism,intuitionism,
foundedin philosophy.
Logicism
This schoolwas startedin about 1884by theGermanphilosopher, logicianand mathemati-
cian, GottlobFrege (1848-1925).The school was rediscoveredabout eighteenyearslaterby
BertrandRussell.OtherearlylogicistswerePeano and Russell'scoauthorof PrincipiaMathe-
matica,A. N. Whitehead.The purposeoflogicismwas to showthatclassicalmathematics is part
of logic.If thelogicistshad been able to carryout theirprogramsuccessfully, suchquestionsas
"Whyis classicalmathematics freeofcontradictions?" wouldhavebecome"Whyis logicfreeof
contradictions?". This latterquestionis one on whichphilosophers have at least a thorough
handle and one may say in generalthatthe successfulcompletionof the logicists'program
wouldhave givenclassicalmathematics a firmfoundation in termsof logic.
Clearly,in orderto carryout thisprogramof thelogicists,one mustfirst,somehow,define
what"classicalmathematics" is and what"logic"is. Otherwise, whatare we supposedto showis
partof what?It is preciselyat thesetwodefinitions thatwe wantto look through modemeyes,
imaginingthatthepioneersof logicismhad all of present-day mathematics available to them.
We beginwithclassicalmathematics.
In orderto carryout theirprogram,Russelland WhiteheadcreatedPrincipiaMathematica
[10] whichwas publishedin 1910. (The firstvolumeof thisclassic can be boughtfor$3.45!
Thank heaven,only modem books and not the classicshave become too expensivefor the
averagereader.)Principia,as we will referto PrincipiaMathematica, may be consideredas a
formalsettheory. Althoughtheformalization was notentirely complete,Russelland Whitehead
thoughtthatit was and plannedto use it to show thatmathematics can be reducedto logic.
Theyshowedthatall classicalmathematics, knownin theirtime,can be derivedfromset theory
and hencefromtheaxiomsof Principia.Consequently, whatremainedto be done,was to show
thatall theaxiomsof Principiabelongto logic.

VOL. 52, NO. 4, SEPTEMBER 1979 207

 Of course,insteadof Principia,one can use any otherformalset theoryjust as well. Since
todaytheformalset theorydevelopedby Zermeloand Fraenkel(ZF) is so muchbetterknown
thanPrincipia,we shallfromnow on referto ZF insteadof Principia.ZF has onlynineaxioms
and, althoughseveralof themare actuallyaxiom schemas,we shall referto all of themas
"axioms."The formulation of thelogicists'programnowbecomes:Showthatall nineaxiomsof
ZF belongto logic.
This formulationof logicismis based on thethesisthatclassicalmathematics can be defined
as thesetoftheorems whichcan be provedwithinZF. Thisdefinition of classicalmathematics is
far fromperfect,as is discussed in [12]. However,the above formulationof logicismis
satisfactory
forthepurposeof showingthatthisschoolwas not able to carryout its program.
We now turnto thedefinition of logic.

In orderto understand logicism,itis veryimportant to see clearlywhatthelogicistsmeantby

"logic."The reasonis that,whatevertheymeant,theycertainly meantmorethanclassicallogic.
Nowadays,one can defineclassicallogicas consisting ofall thosetheorems whichcan be proven
in firstorderlanguages(discussedbelow in the sectionon formalism)withoutthe use of
nonlogicalaxioms.We are hencerestricting ourselvesto firstorderlogicand use thededuction
rulesand logicalaxiomsof thatlogic.An exampleof sucha theoremis thelaw of theexcluded
middlewhichsays that,ifp is a proposition, theneitherp or its negationmp is true;in other
words,thepropositionpV-,p is alwaystruewhereV is theusual symbolfortheinclusive"or."
If thisdefinition of classicallogichad also been thelogicists'definition oflogic,it wouldbe a
follyto thinkforevenone secondthatall ofZF can be reducedto logic.However,thelogicists'
definition was moreextensive. Theyhad a generalconceptas to whena proposition belongsto
logic,thatis, whena proposition shouldbe called a "logicalproposition." Theysaid: A logical
proposition is a proposition whichhas complete generality and is truein virtueof itsformrather
thanitscontent. Here,theword"proposition" is used as synonymous with"theorem."
For example,the above law of the excluded middle "pV -ip" is a logical proposition.
Namely,thislaw does nothold because of any specialcontentof thepropositionp;it does not
matterwhether p is a proposition of mathematics or physicsor whathaveyou.On thecontrary,
thislaw holdswith"completegenerality," thatis, forany proposition p whatsoever.Whythen
does it hold?The logicistsanswer:"Because of itsform."Here theymeanby form"syntactical
form,"theformofpV mp beinggivenby thetwoconnectives of everyday speech,theinclusive
"or" and thenegation"not" (denotedby V and -, respectively).
On the one hand,it is not difficult to arguethatall theoremsof classicallogic,as defined
above, are logicalpropositions in thesenseof logicism.On theotherhand,thereis no a priori
reasonto believethattherecould notbe logicalpropositions whichlie outsideof classicallogic.
This is whywe said thatthelogicists'definition of logicis moreextensive thanthedefinition of
classicallogic.And now thelogicists'taskbecomesclearer:It consistsin showingthatall nine
axiomsof ZF are logicalpropositions in thesenseof logicism.
The onlywayto assessthesuccessor failureof logicismin carrying out thistaskis by going
throughall nine axiomsof ZF and determining foreach of themwhetherit fallsunderthe
logicists'conceptof a logicalproposition.This would takea separatearticleand wouldbe of
interestonlyto readerswho are thoroughly familiarwithZF. Hence,instead,we simplystate
thatat leasttwoof theseaxioms,namely,theaxiomof infinity and theaxiomof choice,cannot
possiblybe consideredas logicalpropositions. For example,theaxiomof infinity saysthatthere
existinfinite sets.Whydo we accept thisaxiomas beingtrue?The reasonis thateveryoneis
familiarwithso manyinfinite sets,say, theset of the naturalnumbersor the set of pointsin
Euclidean3-space.Hence, we accept thisaxiom on groundsof our everydayexperiencewith
sets,and thisclearlyshowsthatwe accept it in virtueof its contentand not in virtueof its
syntactical form.In general,whenan axiomclaimstheexistenceof objectswithwhichwe are
familiaron groundsof our commoneverydayexperience, it is prettycertainthatthisaxiomis
nota logicalproposition in thesenseof logicism.

208 MATHEMATICS MAGAZINE

 And herethenis thefirstcrisisin mathematics: Since at leasttwoout of thenineaxiomsof
ZF are notlogicalpropositions in thesenseof logicism,it is fairto say thatthisschoolfailedby
about20% in itseffort to givemathematics a firmfoundation. However,logicismhas beenof the
greatestimportance forthedevelopment of modemmathematical logic.In fact,it was logicism
whichstartedmathematical logicin a seriousway.The twoquantifiers, the"forall" quantifierV
and the"thereexists"quantifier 3 wereintroduced intologicby Frege[5],and theinfluenceof
Principiaon thedevelopment of mathematical logicis history.
It is importantto realize thatlogicismis foundedin philosophy.For example,when the
logiciststellus whattheymeanby a logicalproposition (above),theyuse philosophicaland not
mathematical language.Theyhave to use philosophicallanguageforthatpurposesincemathe-
maticssimplycannothandledefinitions of so wide a scope.
The philosophy of logicismis sometimessaid to be based on thephilosophicalschoolcalled
"realism."In medievalphilosophy "realism"stoodforthePlatonicdoctrinethatabstractentities
have an existenceindependent of thehumanmind.Mathematicsis, of course,fullof abstract
entitiessuch as numbers,functions,sets,etc., and accordingto Plato all such entitiesexist
outsideourmind.The mindcan discoverthembut does not createthem.This doctrinehas the
advantagethatone can accept such a conceptas "set" withoutworrying about how themind
can construct a set.Accordingto realism,setsare thereforus to discover,notto be constructed,
and the same holds forall otherabstractentities.In short,realismallows us to accept many
moreabstractentitiesin mathematics thana philosophy whichhad limitedus to acceptingonly
thoseentitiesthehumanmindcan construct.Russellwas a realistand acceptedthe abstract
entitieswhichoccurin classicalmathematics withoutquestioning whetherour own mindscan
construct them.This is thefundamental difference betweenlogicismand intuitionism, sincein
intuitionism abstractentitiesare admittedonlyiftheyare man made.
Excellentexpositions of logicismcan be foundin Russell'swriting, forexample[9],[10] and
[11].

VOL. 52, NO. 4, SEPTEMBER 1979 209

Intuitionism
This schoolwas begun about 1908 by the Dutch mathematician, L. E. J. Brouwer(1881-
1966).The intuitionists wentabout thefoundations of mathematics in a radicallydifferent way
fromthe logicists.The logicistsneverthoughtthat therewas anythingwrongwithclassical
mathematics;theysimplywanted to show that classical mathematicsis part of logic. The
intuitionists, on thecontrary, feltthattherewas plentywrongwithclassicalmathematics.
By 1908,severalparadoxeshad arisenin Cantor'sset theory.Here, theword"paradox"is
used as synonymous with"contradiction." Georg Cantorcreatedset theory,startingaround
1870,and he did his work"naively,"meaningnonaxiomatically. Consequently, he formedsets
withsuch abandon that he himself,Russell and othersfoundseveralparadoxeswithinhis
theory. The logicistsconsideredtheseparadoxesas commonerrors, causedby erringmathemati-
cians and not by a faultymathematics. The intuitionists, on theotherhand,consideredthese
paradoxesas clearindicationsthatclassicalmathematics itselfis farfromperfect. Theyfeltthat
mathematics had to be rebuiltfromthebottomon up.
The "bottom,"thatis, thebeginning ofmathematics fortheintuitionists, is theirexplanation
of whatthe naturalnumbers1,2,3,... are. (Observethatwe do not includethe numberzero
amongthe naturalnumbers.)Accordingto intuitionistic philosophy, all humanbeingshave a
primordial intuition forthenaturalnumberswithinthem.This meansin thefirstplace thatwe
have an immediate certainty as to whatis meantby thenumber1 and,secondly,thatthemental
processwhichgoes intotheformation of thenumber1 can be repeated.Whenwe do repeatit,
we obtaintheconceptof thenumber2; whenwe repeatitagain,theconceptof thenumber3; in
thisway,humanbeingscan construct anyfiniteinitialsegment1,2,... ,n foranynaturalnumber
n. This mentalconstruction of one naturalnumberafterthe otherwould neverhave been
possibleifwe did nothave an awarenessof timewithinus. "After"refersto timeand Brouwer
agreeswiththephilosopher ImmanuelKant (1724-1804)thathumanbeingshave an immediate
awarenessof time.Kant used theword"intuition" for"immediateawareness"and thisis where
the name "intuitionism" comes from.(See ChapterIV of [4] formoreinformation about this
intuitionistic conceptof naturalnumbers.)
It is important to observethattheintuitionistic construction ofnaturalnumbersallowsone to
construct onlyarbitrarily longfiniteinitialsegments1,2,... ,n. It does not allow us to construct
thatwholeclosedsetof all thenaturalnumberswhichis so familiarfromclassicalmathematics.
It is equallyimportant to observethatthisconstruction is both"inductive"and "effective." It is
inductivein thesensethat,if one wantsto construct, say,thenumber3, one has to go through
all thementalstepsof firstconstructing the 1,thenthe2, and finallythe3; one cannotjust grab
thenumber3 out of thesky.It is effective in thesensethat,once theconstruction of a natural
numberhas been finished, thatnaturalnumberhas been constructed in its entirety.It stands
beforeus as a completely finishedmentalconstruct, readyforour studyof it. Whensomeone
says,"I have finishedthementalconstruction of thenumber3," itis likea bricklayer saying,"I
have finishedthatwall,"whichhe can say onlyafterhe has laid everystonein place.
We now turnto the intuitionistic definitionof mathematics. Accordingto intuitionistic
philosophy, mathematics shouldbe definedas a mentalactivityand notas a setof theorems (as
was done above in thesectionon logicism).It is theactivity whichconsistsin carrying out,one
afterthe other,thosementalconstructions whichare inductiveand effective in the sense in
whichthe intuitionistic construction of the naturalnumbersis inductiveand effective. In-
tuitionism maintainsthathumanbeingsare able to recognizewhether a givenmentalconstruc-
tion has thesetwo properties. We shall referto a mentalconstruction whichhas thesetwo
properties as a construct and hencetheintuitionistic definition of mathematics says: Mathemat-
ics is thementalactivity whichconsistsin carrying outconstructs oneaftertheother.
A majorconsequenceof thisdefinition is thatall of intuitionistic mathematics is effectiveor
"constructive" as one usuallysays. We shall use the adjective"constructive" as synonymous
with "effective"fromnow on. Namely,everyconstructis constructive, and intuitionistic
mathematics is nothingbutcarrying out constructs overand over.For instance,ifa realnumber

210 MATHEMATICS MAGAZINE

r occursin an intuitionisticproofor theorem, it neveroccurstheremerelyon groundsof an
existenceproof.It occurstherebecauseithas been constructed fromtop to bottom.Thisimplies
forexamplethateach decimalplace in thedecimalexpansionof r can in principlebe computed.
In short,all intuitionistic
proofs,theorems, etc.,are entirely
definitions, constructive.
Anothermajorconsequenceof theintuitionistic definitionof mathematicsis thatmathemat-
ics cannotbe reducedto anyothersciencesuchas, forinstance,logic.This definition comprises
too manymentalprocessesforsuch a reduction.And here,then,we see a radical difference
betweenlogicismand intuitionism. In fact,theintuitionistic
attitudetowardlogicis preciselythe
oppositefromthe logicists'attitude:Accordingto the intuitionists, whatevervalid logical
processesthereare, theyare all constructs;hence,the valid partof classical logic is part of
mathematics!Any law of classical logic which is not composed of constructsis for the
intuitionista meaningless combinationof words.It was, of course,shockingthatthe classical
law of the excludedmiddleturnedout to be such a meaninglesscombinationof words.This
impliesthatthislaw cannotbe used indiscriminately in intuitionistic
mathematics;it can often
be used,but notalways.
Once theintuitionisticdefinition of mathematics has beenunderstoodand accepted,all there
remainsto be done is to do mathematics the intuitionistic way. Indeed,the intuitionistshave
developedintuitionistic arithmetic, algebra,analysis,set theory,etc. However,in each of these
branchesof mathematics, thereoccurclassicaltheoremswhichare not composedof constructs
and, hence,are meaninglesscombinationsof words for the intuitionists. Consequently, one
cannotsay thattheintuitionists have reconstructed all of classicalmathematics. This does not
botherthe intuitionists since whateverpartsof classical mathematics theycannotobtainare
meaninglessforthemanyway.Intuitionism does not have as its purposethejustification of
classicalmathematics. Its purposeis to givea valid definition of mathematics and thento "wait
and see" whatmathematics comes out of it. Whateverclassicalmathematics cannotbe done
simplyis not mathematicsfor the intuitionist.
intuitionistically We observe here another
fundamental difference betweenlogicismand intuitionism: The logicistswantedtojustifyall of
classicalmathematics. (An excellentintroduction to theactualtechniquesof intuitionism is [8].)
Let us now ask how successfulthe intuitionistic school has been in givingus a good
foundationformathematics, acceptableto the majorityof mathematicians. Again, thereis a
sharpdifference betweenthewaythisquestionhas to be answeredin thepresentcase and in the
case of logicism.Even hard-nosedlogicistshave to admitthattheirschool so farhas failedto
givemathematics a firmfoundation by about20%. However,a hard-nosedintuitionist has every
rightin the worldto claim that intuitionism has givenmathematics an entirelysatisfactory
foundation. Thereis the meaningful of intuitionistic
definition mathematics, discussedabove;
thereis the intuitionistic philosophywhich tells us why constructscan never give rise to
contradictions and, hence,thatintuitionistic mathematics is freeof contradictions.In fact,not
only thisproblem(of freedomfromcontradiction) but all otherproblemsof a foundational
natureas wellreceiveperfectly solutionsin intuitionism.
satisfactory
Yet ifone looksat intuitionism fromtheoutside,namely,fromtheviewpointof theclassical
mathematician, one has to say thatintuitionism has failedto give mathematics an adequate
foundation. In fact,themathematical community has almostuniversally rejectedintuitionism.
Whyhas themathematical community done this,in spiteofthemanyveryattractive featuresof
intuitionism,someof whichhavejust been mentioned?
One reasonis thatclassicalmathematicians flatlyrefuseto do awaywiththemanybeautiful
theoremsthatare meaninglesscombinationsof wordsforthe intuitionists. An exampleis the
Brouwerfixedpointtheoremof topologywhichtheintuitionists rejectbecause thefixedpoint
cannotbe constructed, butcan onlybe shownto existon groundsofan existenceproof.This,by
the way,is thesame Brouwerwho createdintuitionism; he is equallyfamousforhis workin
(nonintuitionistic)
topology.
A secondreasoncomesfromtheorems whichcan be provenbothclassicallyand intuitionisti-
cally.It oftenhappensthattheclassicalproofof sucha theoremis short,elegant,and devilishly

VOL. 52, NO. 4, SEPTEMBER 1979 211

 clever,butnotconstructive. The intuitionistswillof courserejectsucha proofand replaceit by
theirown constructive proofof thesame theorem.However,thisconstructive prooffrequently
turnsout to be about ten timesas long as theclassicalproofand oftenseems,at least to the
classicalmathematician, to have lostall ofitselegance.An exampleis thefundamental theorem
of algebrawhichin classicalmathematics is provedin about halfa page, but takesabout ten
pages of proofin intuitionistic mathematics. Again,classicalmathematicians refuseto believe
thattheircleverproofsare meaningless wheneversuchproofsare not constructive.
Finally,thereare thetheorems whichholdin intuitionism butare falsein classicalmathemat-
ics. An exampleis theintuitionistic theoremwhichsaysthateveryreal-valuedfunction whichis
definedforall real numbersis continuous.This theoremis not as strangeas it soundssinceit
dependson the intuitionistic conceptof a function:A real-valuedfunctionf is definedin
intuitionism forall real numbersonlyif,foreveryreal numberr whoseintuitionistic construc-
tionhas been completed, thereal numberf(r)can be constructed. Anyobviouslydiscontinuous
functiona classical mathematician may mentiondoes not satisfythis constructive criterion.
Even so, theorems suchas thisone seemso farout to classicalmathematicians thattheyreject
any mathematics whichacceptsthem.
These threereasonsfortherejectionof intuitionism by classicalmathematicians are neither
rationalnor scientific. Nor are theypragmaticreasons,based on a convictionthatclassical
mathematics is betterforapplicationsto physicsor othersciencesthanis intuitionism. Theyare
all emotionalreasons,groundedin a deep senseas to whatmathematics is all about.(If one of
thereadersknowsof a trulyscientific rejectionof intuitionism, theauthorwouldbe grateful to
hear about it.) We now have the secondcrisisin mathematics in frontof us: It consistsin the
failureof theintuitionistic school to make intuitionism acceptableto at least the majorityof
mathematicians.
It is important to realizethat,likelogicism,intuitionism is rootedin philosophy. When,for
instance,the intuitionists statetheirdefinition of mathematics, givenearlier,theyuse strictly
philosophical and notmathematical language.It would,in fact,be quiteimpossibleforthemto
use mathematics forsucha definition. The mentalactivity whichis mathematics can be defined
in philosophicaltermsbut this definition must,by necessity,use some termswhichdo not
belongto theactivityit is trying to define.
Justas logicismis related to realism,intuitionism is related to the philosophycalled
"conceptualism." This is thephilosophy whichmaintainsthatabstractentitiesexistonlyinsofar
as theyare constructed by thehumanmind.Thisis verymuchtheattitudeofintuitionism which
holdsthattheabstractentities whichoccurin mathematics, whether sequencesor order-relations
or what have you, are all mentalconstructions. This is preciselywhy one does not findin
intuitionism thestaggering collectionof abstractentitieswhichoccurin classicalmathematics
and hence in logicism.The contrastbetweenlogicismand intuitionism is verysimilarto the
contrastbetweenrealismand conceptualism.
A verygood wayto getintointuitionism is by studying [8],ChapterIV of [4],[2] and [13],in
thisorder.

Formalism
This school was created in about 1910 by the German mathematician David Hilbert
(1862-1943).True,one mightsay thattherewerealreadyformalists in thenineteenth
century
sinceFregearguedagainstthemin the secondvolumeof his Grundgesetze derArithmetik
(see
thebook by Geach and Black under[5],pages 182-233);thefirstvolumeof the Grundgesetze
appearedin 1893and thesecondone in 1903.Nevertheless, themodernconceptof formalism,
whichincludesfinitary reasoning,
mustbe creditedto Hilbert.Sincemodembooks and courses
in mathematicallogicusuallydeal withformalism,
thisschoolis muchbetterknowntodaythan
eitherlogicismor intuitionism.
We willhencediscussonlythehighlightsof formalism
and begin
by asking,"Whatis it thatwe formalizewhenwe formalizesomething?"

212 MATHEMATICS MAGAZINE

 The answeris thatwe formalizesome givenaxiomatizedtheory.One shouldguardagainst
confusing axiomatizationand formalization. Euclidaxiomatizedgeometry in about300 B.C., but
formalization startedonlyabout 2200 yearslaterwiththelogicistsand formalists. Examplesof
axiomatizedtheoriesare Euclideanplane geometry withtheusual Euclideanaxioms,arithmetic
withthe Peano axioms,ZF with its nine axioms,etc. The next questionis: "How do we
formalize a givenaxiomatizedtheory?"
Suppose thenthatsome axiomatizedtheoryT is given.Restricting ourselvesto firstorder
logic, "to formalizeT" means to choose an appropriatefirstorder language for T. The
vocabularyof a firstorderlanguageconsistsof fiveitems,fourof whichare alwaysthesame
and are not dependenton thegiventheoryT. These fouritemsare thefollowing:(1) A listof
denumerably manyvariables-who can talk about mathematics withoutusingvariables?(2)
Symbolsforthe connectivesof everydayspeech,say - for"not," A for"and," V forthe
inclusive"or,"-- for"ifthen,"and -> for"ifand onlyif"-who can talkabout anything at all
withoutusingconnectives? (3) The equalitysign =; again,no one can talkabout mathematics
withoutusingthissign.(4) The twoquantifiers, the"forall" quantifierV and the"thereexist"
quantifier 3; thefirstone is used to say such thingsas "all complexnumbershave a square
root,"thesecondone to say thingslike "thereexistirrationalnumbers."One can do without
some of theabove symbols,but thereis no reasonto go intothat.Instead,we turnto thefifth
item.
Since T is an axiomatizedtheory, it has so called "undefinedterms."One has to choosean
appropriate symbolforeveryundefined termof T and thesesymbolsmakeup thefifth item.For

VOL. 52, NO. 4, SEPTEMBER 1979 213

instance,amongtheundefinedtermsof plane Euclideangeometry, occur "point,""line,"and
"incidence,"and for each one of them an appropriatesymbolmust be enteredinto the
vocabularyof thefirstorderlanguage.Amongtheundefinedtermsof arithmetic occur"zero,"
"addition,"and "multiplication," and thesymbolsone choosesforthemare of course0, +, and
x, respectively. The easiesttheoryof all to formalizeis ZF since thistheoryhas only one
undefinedterm,namely,themembership relation.One chooses,of course,theusual symbolE
forthatrelation.These symbols,one foreach undefinedtermof theaxiomatizedtheoryT, are
oftencalled the"parameters" of thefirstorderlanguageand hencetheparameters makeup the
fifthitem.
Sincetheparameters are theonlysymbolsin thevocabularyof a firstorderlanguagewhich
depend on the given axiomatizedtheoryT, one formalizesT simplyby choosingthese
parameters.Once this choice has been made, the whole theoryT has been completelyfor-
malized.One can now expressin the resultingfirstorderlanguageL not only all axioms,
definitions, and theorems of T, butmore!One can also expressin L all axiomsof classicallogic
and, consequently, also all proofsone uses to prove theoremsof T. In short,one can now
proceedentirely withinL, thatis, entirely "formally."
But now a thirdquestionpresentsitself:"Whyin theworldwouldanyonewantto formalize
a givenaxiomatizedtheory?"Afterall, Euclid neversaw a need to formalizehis axiomatized
geometry. It is important to ask thisquestion,since even the greatPeano had mistakenideas
about therealpurposeof formalization. He publishedone of his mostimportant discoveriesin
differential equationsin a formalized language(verysimilarto a firstorderlanguage)withthe
resultthatnobodyreadit untilsomecharitablesoul translated thearticleintocommonGerman.
Let us now tryto answerthe thirdquestion.If mathematicians do technicalresearchin a
certainbranchof mathematics, say,planeEuclideangeometry, theyare interested in discovering
and provingtheimportant theoremsof thebranchof mathematics. For thatkindof technical
work,formalization is usuallynot onlyno help but a definitehindrance.If,however,one asks
such foundationalquestionsas, for instance,"Why is this branch of mathematicsfreeof
contradictions?", thenformalization is notjust a helpbut an absolutenecessity.
It was reallyHilbert'sstrokeof genius to understandthat formalization is the proper
techniqueto tacklesuch foundationalquestions.What he taughtus can be put roughlyas
follows.SupposethatT is an axiomatizedtheorywhichhas been formalized in termsof thefirst
orderlanguageL. This languagehas such a precisesyntaxthatit itselfcan be studiedas a
mathematical object.One can ask forinstance:"Can one possiblyrunintocontradictions ifone
proceedsentirely formally withinL, usingonlytheaxiomsof T and thoseof classicallogic,all
of whichhave been expressedin L?" If one can provemathematically thattheanswerto this
questionis "no," one has therea mathematical proofthatthetheoryT is freeof contradictions!
This is basicallywhatthefamous"Hilbertprogram"was all about.The idea was to formalize
thevariousbranchesof mathematics and thento provemathematically thateach one of themis
freeof contradictions. In factif,by means of this technique,the formalists could have just
shownthatZF is freeof contradictions, theywould therebyalreadyhave shownthatall of
classical mathematicsis free of contradictions, since classical mathematicscan be done
axiomaticallyin termsof the nine axioms of ZF. In short,the formalists triedto createa
mathematicaltechniqueby means of which one could prove that mathematicsis free of
contradictions. This was theoriginalpurposeof formalism.

It is interesting
to observethatbothlogicistsand formalists
formalized thevariousbranches
of mathematics, but forentirely
different
reasons.The logicistswantedto use sucha formaliza-
tionto showthatthebranchof mathematics in questionbelongsto logic; theformalists
wanted
to use it to provemathematically thatthatbranchis freeof contradictions. Sincebothschools
"formalized," theyare sometimesconfused.
Did theformalists completetheirprogramsuccessfully? No! In 1931,KurtGodel showedin
[6] thatformalization cannotbe consideredas a mathematicaltechniqueby meansof whichone

214 MATHEMATICS MAGAZINE

can provethatmathematics is freeof contradictions. The theoremin thatpaperwhichrangthe
deathbell forthe Hilbertprogramconcernsaxiomatizedtheorieswhichare freeof contradic-
tionsand whoseaxiomsare strongenoughso thatarithmetic can be done in termsof them.
Examplesof theorieswhoseaxiomsare thatstrongare, of course,Peano arithmetic and ZF.
SupposenowthatT is sucha theoryand thatT has been formalized by meansof thefirstorder
languageL. ThenGodel's theoremsays,in nontechnical language,"No sentenceofL whichcan
be interpreted as assertingthat T is freeof contradictions can be provenformally withinthe
language L."Althoughthe interpretation of this theoremis somewhatcontroversial, most
mathematicians have concluded fromit that the Hilbertprogramcannot be carriedout:
Mathematics is notable to proveitsownfreedom ofcontradictions.Here,then,is thethirdcrisis
in mathematics.
Of course,thetremendous importance of theformalist schoolforpresent-day mathematics is
wellknown.It was in thisschoolthatmodernmathematical logicand itsvariousoffshoots,such
as modeltheory, recursive functiontheory, etc.,reallycame intobloom.
Formalism,as logicismand intuitionism, is foundedin philosophy,but the philosophical
rootsof formalism are somewhatmorehiddenthanthoseof theothertwoschools.One can find
them,though,by reflecting a littleon theHilbertprogram.
Let again T be an axiomatizedtheorywhichhas been formalized in termsof thefirstorder
languageL. In carryingout Hilbert'sprogram,one has to talk about the languageL as one
object,and while doing this,one is not talkingwithinthat safe languageL itself.On the
contrary,one is talkingaboutL in ordinary, everyday language,be it Englishor Frenchor what
have you. Whileusingour naturallanguageand not theformallanguageL, thereis of course
everydangerthatcontradictions, in fact,anykindoferror,mayslipin. Hilbertsaid thattheway
to avoid thisdangeris by makingabsolutelycertainthat,whileone is talkingin one's natural
languageaboutL, one uses onlyreasoningswhichare absolutelysafeand beyondany kindof
suspicion.He called such reasonings"finitaryreasonings,"but had, of course,to give a
definitionof them.The mostexplicitdefinition of finitaryreasoningknownto theauthorwas
givenby theFrenchformalist Herbrand([7], thefootnoteon page 622). It says,if we replace
"intuitionistic"
by "finitary":
By a finitary argumentwe understandan argumentsatisfying thefollowingconditions:In
it we neverconsideranythingbut a givenfinitenumberof objects and of functions;these
functionsare well defined,theirdefinitionallowing the computationof theirvalues in a
univocalway; we neverstatethatan objectexistswithoutgivingthemeans of constructing it;
we neverconsiderthe totalityof all the objectsx of an infinitecollection;and when we say
thatan argument(or a theorem)is trueforall thesex, we mean that,for each x takenby
itself,it is possible to repeatthe generalargumentin question,whichshould be consideredto
be merelythe prototypeof theseparticulararguments.

Observethatthisdefinition uses philosophicaland not mathematical language.Even so, no

one can claim to understandthe Hilbertprogramwithoutan understanding of what finitary
reasoningamountsto. The philosophicalrootsof formalism come out intotheopen whenthe
formalistsdefinewhattheymeanby finitary reasoning.
We have alreadycomparedlogicismwithrealism,and intuitionism withconceptualism.The
philosophy whichis closestto formalism is "nominalism."This is thephilosophywhichclaims
that abstractentitieshave no existenceof any kind,neitheroutside the human mind as
maintainedby realism,nor as mentalconstructions withinthe humanmindas maintainedby
conceptualism. For nominalism,abstractentitiesare merevocal utterances
or written
lines,mere
names. This is wherethe word "nominalism"comes from,since in Latin nominalis means
"belongingto a name."Similarly,whenformalists tryto provethata certainaxiomatizedtheory
T is freeof contradictions,
theydo not studytheabstractentitieswhichoccurin T but,instead,
studythatfirstorderlanguageL whichwas used to formalizeT. Thatis,theystudyhowone can
formsentencesin L by theproperuse of thevocabularyof L; how certainof thesesentences
can be provenby the properuse of thosespecial sentencesof L whichwere singledout as

VOL. 52, NO. 4, SEPTEMBER 1979 215

axioms;and,in particular, theytryto showthatno sentenceof L can be provenand disproven
at thesame time,sincetheywouldthereby have establishedthattheoriginaltheoryT is freeof
contradictions.The important pointis thatthiswholestudyof L is a strictly syntactical
study,
sinceno meaningsor abstractentitiesare associatedwiththe sentencesof L. This languageis
investigated by considering the sentencesof L as meaninglessexpressions whichare manipu-
latedaccordingto explicit,syntactical rules,just as thepiecesof a chessgame are meaningless
figureswhichare pushedaroundaccordingto therulesof thegame.For thestrictformalist "to
do mathematics" is "to manipulatethemeaningless symbolsof a firstorderlanguageaccording
to explicit,syntacticalrules."Hence, the strictformalist does not workwithabstractentities,
such as infiniteseries or cardinals,but only with theirmeaninglessnames which are the
appropriateexpressionsin a firstorderlanguage.Both formalists and nominalistsavoid the
directuse of abstractentities,and thisis whyformalism shouldbe comparedwithnominalism.
The factthatlogicism, and formalism
intuitionism, correspond to realism,conceptualism,and
nominalism, was broughtto lightin Quine'sarticle,"On WhatThereIs" ([1],pages
respectively,
183-196).Formalismcan be learnedfromanymodernbook in mathematical logic,forinstance
[3].
Epilogue
Wheredo thethreecrisesin mathematics leave us? Theyleave us withouta firmfoundation
formathematics. AfterGbdel'spaper[6] appearedin 1931,mathematicians on thewholethrew
up theirhandsin frustration and turnedaway fromthephilosophyof mathematics. Neverthe-
less,theinfluenceof thethreeschoolsdiscussedin thisarticlehas remainedstrong,sincethey
have givenus much new and beautifulmathematics. This mathematics concernsmainlyset
theory,intuitionismand itsvariousconstructivist modifications, and mathematical logicwithits
manyoffshoots. However,althoughthiskindofmathematics is oftenreferred to as "foundations
of mathematics," one cannotclaimto be advancingthephilosophy of mathematics just because
one is workingin one of theseareas. Modernmathematical logic,set theory,and intuitionism
withits modifications are nowadaystechnicalbranchesof mathematics, just as algebra or
analysis,and unlesswe returndirectlyto thephilosophyof mathematics, we cannotexpectto
finda firmfoundation forour science.It is evidentthatsucha foundation is notnecessaryfor
technicalmathematical research,but thereare stillthoseamongus whoyearnforit.The author
believesthat the key to the foundationsof mathematics lies hiddensomewhereamong the
philosophicalrootsof logicism,intuitionism, and formalism and thisis whyhe has uncovered
theseroots,threetimesover.
on thefoundations
Excellentliterature of mathematics is containedin [1] and [7].

References
[1] P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam, PhilosophyofMathematics, Prentice-Hall,1964.
[2] M. Dummett, Elements ofIntuitionism,
Clarendon Press,Oxford, England,1977.
[3] H. B. Enderton, A Mathematical Introductionto Logic,AcademicPress,1972.
[4] A. A. Fraenkel,Y. Bar-Hillel, and A. Levy,Foundations of Set Theory,North-Holland, Amsterdam,
Netherlands, 1973.
[5] in Translations
G. Frege,Begriffschrift, fromthePhilosophical Writings ofGottlobFregebyP. Geachand
M. Black,BasilBlackwell, Oxford,England,1970.Alsoin [7]pp. 1-82.
[6] K. Godel,On formally undecidable ofPrincipia
propositions Mathematica and relatedsystems,
in [7]pp.
596-616.
[7] J.vanHeijenoort, FromFregeto Godel,HarvardUniv.Press,Cambridge. Availablein paperback.
[8] A. Heyting, Intuitionism,An Introduction,
North-Holland,Amsterdam, Netherlands, 1966.
[9] B. Russell,Principlesof Mathematics,1sted. (1903)W. W. Norton,New York.Availablein paperback.
[10] B. Russelland A. N. Whitehead, PrincipiaMathematicia,1sted. (1910)Cambridge Univ.Press,Cam-
bridge,England.Availablein paperback.
[11] B. Russell,Introduction to Mathematical Simonand Schuster,
Philosophy, New York,1920.Availablein
paperback.
[12] E. Snapper,Whatis mathematics?, Amer.Math.Monthly, no. 7, 86 (1979)551-557.
[13] A. S. Troelstra,
ChoiceSequences, OxfordUniv.Press,Oxford, England,1977.

216 MATHEMATICS MAGAZINE