Copyrighted material licensed to SYSTRA, for licensee's use only. 400198032 25 Sep 03 130-96, 10.6.7. An alternate site(s) to fimetion efficiently during an ‘emergency in the event the CSS is out of service For any reason, shall be selected and equipped or shall have equipment readily available 10.6.8 ‘The CSS shall be located in an area separated from other occupancies by hour fire resistance construction, 10.6.9. The area shall be used for the CSS and similar activi ties and shall not be jeapardized by adjoining or adjacent occupancies. 10.6.10° The CSS shall be protected by fire detection, protec- tion, and extinguishing equipment so that there shall be early detection and extinguishment of any fire in the CSS. 10.7 Liaison. 10.7.1. An up-to-date listing ofall Faison personnel from par- ticipating agencies shall be maintained by the authority and shall he parCof the emergeney procedure plan. 10.7.2. The listing shall include the full name, ttle, agency, business telephone number(s), and home telephone number fof the liaion. An alternate liaison with the same information also shall be listed 10.7.3. Atleast once every’3 months, the list shall be reviewed and tested to determine the ability contact the liaison yith= ‘out delay, 10.8 Command Post. 10.8.1 During an emergency on the system that requires in- voking the emergency procedure plan, a command post shall de established by the mcident commander for the superision and coordination of all personnel, equipment, and resources, At the scene of the emergency. 10.82 The emergency procedure plan shall clearly delineate the authority or participating agency that isin command and ‘hac is responsible for supervision, correction, orallevition of the emergency. 10.8.3. Participating agencies shall each assign a liaison tothe ‘command post 10.84 Radio, telephone, and messenger service shall be used iipating agencies operating at an 10.8.5* Approved markers shall be used 10 identify the com ‘mand post. 108.6 The emergency procedure plan shall preseribe the specific identification markers to be used for the command post and for personnel assigned thereto. 10.9 Auxiliary Command Post. When an emergency opers- tion requires an ausiliary command post because of the extent of the operation, the person in command shall establish an auxiliary command post(s} dha will unetion asa subordinate control 10,10 Training, Exercises, Drills, and Critiques. 10.10.1. ‘The authority and participating agency personnel shall be trained to function efficiently during an emergency. 1010.11 The training shall cover all aspects of the gency procedure plan 2000 Eaton FIXED GUIDEWAY TRANSIT AND PASSENGER RAIL SYSTEMS 10.10.2. Exercises anel drills shall be conducted at least twice per year to prepare the authorityand participating agency per- sonnel for emergencies. 10.10.3 Critiques shall be held afer the exercise, dill and actual emergencies, 10.10.4 Drills shall be conducted at various locations on the system as well asa various times ofthe day so as to familiarize asmany emergency response personnel as possible, 10.11 Records. Written records and telephone and radio re- ‘cordings shall he kept atthe CSS, and written records shall be kept at the command post and auxiliary commanel post(s) during fire emergencies, exercises, and drills, 10,12 Removing and Restoring Traction Power. 10.1.1 During an emergency, the authority and participat- \gagency personnel shall be supervised so that only the mini- ‘mum number of essential persons operate on the trainway: 10.122 The emergency procedure plan shall have a defined procedure for removing and restoring traction power. 10.123. Prior to participating agency personnel operating on the tainway, the traction power shall be removed. 10.124 When uaction power is removed by activation of ‘emergency traction power disconnect switch, the CSS shall contacted by telephone or radio and given the full name, ttle, agency, and reason for removal of the traction power by the person responsible 10.12.5 When shutdown of traction power is no longer re- aquired by a participating agency, control of such power shall be released to the authority Chapter 11 Communications 11.1 General. A communication systems shall be established in accordance with this chapter 11.2 Central Supervising Station (CSS) and Command Post 2-1. During normal operations, the CSS shall be the primary iol for the system, 11.2.2 During emergency operations, the command post es- tablished at the scene of the emergency shall be responsible for controlling, supervising, and coordinating personnel and, equipment working to correct or alleviate the emergency. 11.2.8 The command post and CSS shall cooperate and coor inate 1o have an efficient operation. 11.24 The CSS shall be responsible for operation of the sys tem except for the immediate emergency area. 11.8 Radio Communication. ALB. Afixed guideway transit or passenger ra system shall Ihave at least one radio network that is capable of two-way com: imtinication with personnel on trains, motor vehicles, and all, locations of the system, 11.3.2 Wherever necessary for dependable and reliable com munications, a separate radio network capable of two-way radio, ‘communication for fire department personnel t the fire depart. ‘ment communication center shall be provided, Copyrighted material licensed to SYSTRA, for licensee's use only. Single user license only, copying prohibited.Copyrighted material licensed to SYSTRA, for licensee's use only. ‘400198032 25 Sep 03, ANNEX A 11.3.3 A radio network shall comprise base transmitters and receivers, antennas, mobile transmitters and receivers, pore table transmitters and receivers, and ancillary equipment 11.4 Telephon ALA. An emergency telephone (ETEL) shall be provided along the traimway at each blue light station and at other loca tions deemed necessary by the authority having jurisdiction. MA. The system shall have a telephone network of fixed telephone lines and handsets capable of communication with all stations, fire command centers, structures, offices, power stations and substations, control towers, ancillary rooms and spaces, and locations along the tainway in accordance with AIPA 72, 1.4.3 The location and spacing of telephones along the train ‘way Shall be determined by the authority having jurisdiction, M44 Telephones slong the a signs and/or lights for identifi 11.5 Portable Telephones and Lines. 11.5.1 The authority shall maintain portable communica: tions equipment and arrange for the dispatch to an emer 1ey scene when required for emergency operations or re: {quested by emergency responders. away shall have distinetive 11.5.2. The authority having jurisdiction shall approve the | ype of communication equipment. 11.6 Public Address (PA) System. 11.6.1. All stations, as determined by the authority having Jurisdiction, shall have a PA system for communicating with passengers and employees. (Por communication requirements for wehicles, see 8.9.2.) 11.6.2 The CSS shall have the capability of using the PA sys tem to make announcements throughout stations 11.6.8 Authority supervisory employees and emergency re sponse personnel at stations shall have the capability of making annoumeements throxighout public areas on the PAsystem, 11.6.4 During interruptions of t in service or delays for any sociated with an emergency, fire, or sinoke, the pas Sengersand employees shall be kept informed by means ofthe PASssic 11.6.5 Attimes of emergency; the PA system shall be used to ‘communicate with passengers, employees, and participating agency personnel, 117 Portable Powered Speakers (Audiohailers). During emergency operations, portable powered speakers shall be ‘made available by te authority where other forms of commu: nication are not available, Annex A Explanatory Material Annex Ais nol pre ofthe repuirements ofthis NFPA docioment is included for informational purposes only. This amex contains explanatory material nunc to comespond withthe applicable text paragraphs A3.2.1 Approved. The National Fire Protection Association ‘does not approve, inspect, oF certify any installations, proce- ‘lures, equipment, or materials; nor does it approve or evalu- testing laboratories. In determining the aceeprability of 130-37 installations, procedures, equipment, or materials, the author- ity having jurisdiction may hase acceptance on compliance with NEPA'or other appropriate standards, In the absence of sich standards, said authority may require evidence of proper installation, procedure, or use, The authority having jurisdic tion may also reler to the listings or labeling practices of an ‘organization that is concerned with product evaluations and is thus in a position to determine compliance with appropriate standards for the current production of listed items. A322 Authority Having Jurisdiction. The phrase “authority ‘having jurisdiction," or its acronym AH, is used in NFPA docu ments i a broad manner, since jurisdictions and approval agencies vary, as do their responsibilities. Where public safety is primary, the authority having jurisdiction may be a federal, state, local or other regional department or individual such as, a fire chief; fire marshal: chief of a fire prevention bureau, labor department, or health department; building oficial electrical inspector; or others having statutory authority. For insurance purposes, an insurance inspection department, rat ing bureat, oF other insurance company representative may be the authority having jurisdiction. In many circumstances, the property owner or his or her designated agent assumes the role of the authority having jurisdiction; at goverament instal Intions, the commanding officer or departmental official may be the authority having jurisdiction, A3.24 Listed. The means for identifying listed equipment ‘may vary for each organization concerned with product evalt ation; some organizations clo not recognize equipment as listed wiles itis also labeled. The authority having jurisdic. tion should utilize the system employed by the listing organi ‘ation to identify listed product AS.8.11 Critical Radiant Flux. Critical radiant flux is the property determined by the test procedure in NEPA 253, The Uunit of measurement of eritical radiant flux is watts per square centimeter (W/cm) AS.LL This chapter is written for fixed gu sions but ean be useful for passenger ral st leway transit sta A5.2.3.5.1 Because of the difference in the potential level of hazard between various stations (ie., open stations as com- pared t0 enclosed stations), alternative methods to fie separa tion could be considered. 5.5.1.1 At multilevel stations, it ean be reasonable to con- sider only entraining (or entraining plus detraining) loads for nonincident levels for determining required egress capacity at points where egress routes converge. Nonineident platform loads that do not adversely impact the egress route need not be considered, A.5.5.2.5 Consideration of control of access (0 platforms might be necessary to provide the appropriate level of safety. A5.5.2.8.2(1) ‘The surge factor of 1.3 is typical based on su ‘eys of transit system patronage data oblainied from four tran sitsystems from 1972 through 1981, Additional surge factors from 1.15 through 2.75 have been reported. A.5.5.2.8.8(1) The surge factor of 1. is typical basedl on sur- veys of transit system patronage data obtained from four tran sit ystems from 1972 through 1981. Additional surge factors, from 1.15 through 2.75 have been reported, AS.5.2.84 The maximum fora calculated train load should be the most passengers capable of occupying the largest train, 2009 Eaton Copyrighted material licensed to SYSTRA, for licensee's use only. ‘Single user license only, copying prohibited.Copyrighted material licensed to SYSTRA, for licensee's use only. ‘400198032 25 Sep 03, 130-38, A.5.5.33.2 Stairs should be positioned in close proximity t0, Dut not necessarily adjacent to, escalators tallow emergency ex iting no matter in which direction the escalstor(s) is operating A5.5.4.1(1) Its intended that escalators be as noncombus- tible as possible, realizing that certain components such 2 rollers oF headlrails might not currently be available in nom combustible materials. The authority having jurisdiction should review each installation proposal for compliance to the _greatest extent possible AS.7.1.2 Discrete zone indi manned stations, AB.7.14 Separate zones on the annunciator panel to monitor main control valves on standpipe ystems should he established, ATA Itis desirable to locate fire department connections, near one oF more station access points ions are desirable for un. A5.7.6 Where an underground station is part of another building or building complex, consideration should be given to creating a combined fire command center AG..1 This chapter is written for fixed guideway transit traimiays but ean be useful for passenger rail stations. AG.14.1. The placement of blue light stations atthe ends of station platforms should be governed by actual need. For in- stance, an at-grade system that has stations in dedicated streets and overhead power supply would not need blue light stations atthe ends of platforms 6.2.8.6 The trainway, ahough used for ventiation, should not be considered) as an air plenum for purposes of mounting. electrical appurtenances. 6.2.4.2 Previous editions of NEPA 130 addressed this require- iment by prescribing the maximum travel distance toan exit. The tent OF this requirement was often misinterpreted. NFPA 101 requires, ata minimum, two means of egress be provided within a building or structure and prescribes the maximum travel dis tance oan exit. This same requirement is applied in NEPA 130. Where twa means of egress ate required, the maximum travel distance to an exit occurs at the midpoint. For example, in a building with to exits, inthe event ofa fire adjacent to an exit, rendering that exit unavailable, NEPA 101 recogpizes that an in- dividual in proximity to the affected exit must travel uvice the prescribed! exit travel distance to the alternate exit Since two means of egress are required at any one point in a tunnel, the ceils cannot be more than wiee the travel distance, or 762 mn (2500) apart. AG.24.5.8 Where exit hatches are installed in spaces such as ‘walkways or access areas, appropriate design features such as ‘readily visible signs, markings, oF bollards should be provided to prevent blockage of the exit hatch. In addition, provisi should be inchuded in the design to protect the exterior side ff the hatch, ineluding the outside latch, from aecurnulation Of ice and stow, which could render the hatch inoperable, AG.24.7.5 This value is a minimum maintained point mea sured at any locadion on the walkway, taking into account the total light loss factor (ditt depreciation, humen depreciation, etc.) that will be experienced by the luminiare. A6.24.8 Directional signs are provided (o assist emergency fevacuation of passengers. The signs should be of reflective or Athuninsated materials and readily visible by passengers within the ttainvay. Inclusion of distance to the station or portal is discour- aged sinee that might influence passenger evacuation route, ‘whl eomlel contract the emergency evacuation strategy 2009 Eston FIXED GUIDEWAY TRANSIT AND PASSENGER RAIL SYS AG.2.5.1.1 The primary hazards presented by the elect third rail in the trainvay are electrical shack to employees and ‘other personnel in the tainway and the heat and smoke gen ‘erated by the cable or third rail eaused by combustion result. ing from grounding or arcing. "The life safety and fire protection requirements for the traction power substations, fe breaker stations, and power dis. ‘wibution and control cabling are deseribed in other parts of this standard, 6.3.8 The life safety and fire protection requirements for the traction power substations, tie breaker stations, and power distribution and control eabling ave deseribed in other parts of this standard, AGA3_ The life safety and fire protection requirements for the traction power substations, tie breaker stations, and power distribution and control cabling are described in other parts ff this standard. AJZALL Separate vention systems for tannels and under ground stations can be provided, but are not required. Annex B. [provides information on ypes of mechanical systeins for normal ‘entilation of fixed guideway transit eystems and information for determining a tenable environment AZ2.7 The wainway, akhough used for ventilation, should, not be considered as an air plenum for purposes of mounting ‘electrical appurtenances, ABS.1 I is recognized that the tests cited in this chapter ‘might not accurately predict the behavior of materials under hostile fire conditions, Therefore, the use of tests that evaluate materials in subassemblies and! fllscale configurations ise ‘couraged where such testsare more representative of foreseeable fire sources, heat lux levels, and surface areatowoluine ratios {ound in vehicles designed in conjunction with this standard, A83.2.2 The purpose of this requirement i to isolate poten- ‘ial ignition somvees from fel and combustible material and to contral fire and smoke propagation. ASALL5 Annex Econtains additional guidance describing the ‘overall process that could be used to conduct a performance- Daseel Nazard analysis, using the test procedures imckuded in Annex D, ABAL1.5.3 ‘The test methods in ASTM E 1587 (for upholstered furniture, 19 KW exposure) and ASTM E1590 (for mattresses, ISKW exposure) are deemed to be adequate procedures for test ing individual stems of upholstered furniture or mattresses for purposes of fine hazard assessment in some public oecupancies However, sch individual stand-alone (not fixed in place) items, are not those normally present in rail uansportation vehicles. ‘Thas, the applicability of the test methods to ral transportation vehicles has not been validated, and they probably are not ently representative of the situation andl might require some modifications for better applicability. The use of alternative igni- tion sources (by varying the location, the gas flow intensity or the ‘expostte time) for ASTM E1537 or ASTM F.1590 might be a ‘means of adlressing some very high challenge fire scenarios po- tially present in rail transportation vehicles. Examples of more powerful ignition sources that could be used inelude a 50 kW gus burner (Hirschler, 1997], shown to be relevant to de. tention mattresses or the oil bumer used for aircraft seat cushy ions [FAR 25.853(c)], but the measurements should involve the ‘sme fire properties in ASTM E 1587 or ASTM E 1590. Ifthe ‘gnikion source used for a test method i i the result Copyrighted material licensed to SYSTRA, for licensee's use only. ‘Single user license only, copying prohibited.Copyrighted material licensed to SYSTRA, for licensee's use only. 400198032 25 Sep 03 ANNEXA can be misleading: it has been shove that upholstered furniture and mattresses that are totally consumed when using the appro- Drinte ignition source appear to perform well when wing the Ignition sources in ASTM E 1587 and ASTM E 1390, respectively AB8.4.1.5.11 Testing for heat release and smoke obscuration by using NFPA 271 or ASTM E 1354 is required only as an alternate approach to testing by the test methods for flamma- bility and smoke obscuration in Table 84. A8A4.1.5.18 Only one specimen need be tested. A propor tional reduction can be made in the dimensions of the sp men, provided the specimen representsa true test of the abil ity of the structural flooring assembly to perform as barrier against undervehicle fires. AB5.2.2 In selecting air clearance distances, special consid: ‘eration should be given to the presence of contaminants en ‘coaching on the air clearances, A8.5.2.3.1 Appropriate creepage distances ean be selected from Annex F. A.8.84 Previous editions of NFPA 120 did noc address means of femergency egress irom the rall vehicles. Several emengency inc- denis have occurred that demonstrated the necessity to provide passengers with a means to manually operate, without tool, ‘means of emergency egress in the event of a power failure. Op- ‘rational issues to he considered inelude the need to discourage tse under nonemergency conditions while permitting efletive passenger use in an emergency, particularly if members of the train crew are injured or otherwise unavailable, Since 1980, the Ferleral Railroad Administration (FRA) has required that each rail passenger car be provided with atleast four emergency window exits. In 1999, the FRA issued a pas- senger equipment rule that required each intercity and com- imuter nil ci to be equipped wich a minimum number of two side doors per ear and at least four emergency window exits For each main level, Each sleeping compartment must also be provided with an emergency window exit, Because fixed guideway vehicles historically have been provided with at least {wo sets of bileaf side doors, one on each side, emergency exit ‘windows sally are not provided. NEPA 130 cid not previously addvess marking of the loca: tion of means of emergeney egress and instructions for the ‘operation of egress (access) facilities for fixe guidevray transit and passenger rail vehicles from the interior ABS The United States Federal Aviation Administration (EAA) requires the installation of independently powered floor proximity path marking to delineate the path to emergency exits. ‘The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) has also ised standard that requires this same concept of marking ‘o be installed in intercity and commuter rail eas. “The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) issued a rule ‘in 1098 that required marking and instructions for the opera tion of emergency exit winclows and doors used! for emergency ‘egress. Although the FRA requires that the marking be con= spicuous and legible, specific objective performance criteria were not included APTA has issued a standard that contains extensive pro sions for the marking of and instructions for emergeney egress {ilies that are operated trom the inside of the vehicle. ‘These minimum performance criteria include letter height, ccolor contrast, andl ininance levels, 4130-39 ‘The APTA standard requires that marking and instructions use either electrically powered or high-performance photo hi- minescent (HPPL) material. The HPPL material must be charged with an adequate light [53.8 Ix (5 footcandles) for at least 1 hour) but offers the advantage of providing a far ‘greater luminance (brightness) over a far longer time period, ‘while not being dependent on emergency power. The HPPL. material has been certified by the FAA for use as floor proxim= ity path marking on certain aircrafi AB.LL1 Annex E includes comments and information useftl {in considering application of this design approach. Chapter 8 presents and describes requirements for use of performance based lite safety design that can be used to develop fixed, guideway transit and passenger rail vehicles for use in specified /specific operating environments, The criteria asso Gated with the life safety goals that must be attained are stated in Section 4.2, ‘The performance option of this standard establishes ac: ceptable levels of risk to occripants of vehicles. This was ad= {dressed in earlier versions of NFPA 130 in what was then Chap- ter 5. While the recently developed performance option of this standard does contain goals, objectives, and performance criteria necessary t provide an acceptable level of risk to 0 Ccupants, it does not deseribe how to meet the goals, objectives, and performance eriteria, That is up to the fire science engi heer practitioner to accomplish. Design ancl engineering ex pertse are needed to develop solutions that meet the provisions ‘of Chapter 8. The SFE Enginering Guide lo Poformancobasel Po- tetion Amadyss and Design of Busllngs provides a framework for these assessments, Other useful references include ASTM E 2061 and APTA'S Recommended Practice for Fie Safely Analysis of Pxisting Passenger Rail Pyuigment ‘Scenarios are used to assess the adequacy of designs consid ‘ered and ultimately selected. As such, initiating events as ref cerenced from ASTM E2061 are specified for study for whieh, ‘ensuing outcomes must be satiskietory. Approaches and con siderations found in APTA’s Recommend Practice for Poe Safety Analysis of Existing Passenge Rail Equipment are also worthy of consideration, the outcome predicted by evaluation of the scenarios is bound by the performance eriteria stated, then the objectives will have been met, and the lie safety characteristis of a pro: posed design should he considered to be consistent with the goals of this standard. Athough not explicitly part ofthis stan- dard, it must be assumed that if a design fails to comply with these goals, ic wil be changed and reassessed iteratively until satisfactory performance levels are attained, Documentation of assessment parameters stich as those used with scenatios is eitical. The approval and acceptance of a life safety design are dependent on the quality of the docu- mentation used in this process, AB.IL2 Section 4.3 includes speci achieve desired goals. objectives necessary to AB.11.3. This requirement considers the qualifications of thove being considered to conduct performance-based design activities. These qualifications should include professional ex- perience, edveation, and credentials that demonstrate know? ‘edgeable and responsible use of applicable models and meth~ fds, as well as necessary experience with fixed guideway and passenger rail systems ALA This provides qualifications of a third-party or peer reviewer, which should be a qualified person or group of per- sons chosen by the authority having jurisdiction to review pro: posed performance-based designs. 2008 Eton Copyrighted material licensed to SYSTRA, for licensee's use only. Single user license only, copying prohibited.Copyrighted material icensed to SYSTRA, for licensee's use only. ‘400198032 25 Sep 03, 130-40 AAALT This subsection addresses continued compliance {rt the goals and objectives of the standard, which etals Cheung that carve nantaned consistent wth the oige mal design requirements for ire safety. In practice, such com pliance mvoltes numerous important factors and all eoris Inustbe directed at ensoring tat the fire performance of he design selected il not diminish due to either foreseeable Sging or actvies related to maintenance for lck thereof) ‘This dieu, fnovinposible, tomandate in aconstructon Standard but sill mist headdress. ‘hice consrucion — including doors other emergency exists terior fish and fea serene constrain sind the vehi and fire protection systems most be mai tained co retain the sme level of performance ass provided for in the origina sccepted design parameters As wilh any other fie safey application, suchas chinge of occupany, ec tse Should not be changed wo any degree without being addresed immerltelyAs sch, changer Oat comprise oighal as tone mate wth respect to etupant charters combs Sy of fring, unin crew and fist rexponder characteris, ahd existence ofa comprehensive hnplace sytem salty plan must not be made, Abo, actions ceded o maintain the etait th ofall assocted sytem a the acipate level «0 meet the inital desig tern mt he memorized and made known to theabij and the sem operator A.1.8 This subsection specifies measures that must be ad- dressed in determining whether the objectives are or have Deen met by a particular design or designs. AB.11.82 This paragraphaddresses the need toavoid exposing ‘occupants to untenable conditions. Itis of extreme importance especially for vehicles operated in tunnels or rightofways, where exiting trom vehicles might be eillicult or impossible. ‘To make the needed assessment, the design team might wish to set detailed performance criteria that ensure that oc- eupants are not incapacitated by fire effects, the limits of ‘which are a fairly contentious issue technically at present. The SFPE Engineering Gude to Prrformance-Based Fie Protection Analy- iis and Design of Buildings describes a process of establishing such tenability limits, although the exact limits used are sub- jecc to change based on research currently under way in the United States and the European Union. The practitioner is lunged fo consult this literature directly. ‘Conversely, to be successful the design team ean demonstrate that for each design fire scenario and the design specifications, conditions, aid assumptions, each compartment or area of af- fected vehicles will be fully evicuated before the smoke and toxic gas layer in that compartinent descends to a level lower dan 1.8m (GR) above the floor. Lnisimplict in such a finding that the timing of an evacuation must be such that no occupant is exe posed to fire effects, Such an evacuation requires calculation of the locations, movement, and behavior of occupants, because Fie effects and occupants are kept separate by moving the acet- pants. level of 1521 (5 ft) is often used in calculations, but at ‘hat level, large fraction of the population would not be able to stand, walk, of ran normally and sill avoid inhalation of toxic gases. They would have to hend over or otherwise move their heads closer to the floor level ‘Alternatively, for each design fire scenario and the design specifications ancl assumptions, the design team ean demon: strate that dhe smoke and toxie gas layer will not descend to a Tevel lower than 18 1 (6 ft) above the floor in any occupied compartment. The advantage of this procedure is that it con- | scriatively requires that no oceupant be exposed (0 fire effects, 12008 Eston FIXED GUIDEWAY TRANSIT AND PASSENGER RAIL SYSTEMS regardless of where occupants are or where they move. This re ‘moves the need to make any calculations regarding occupants including their behavior, movement locations, prefire character istics, and reactions to fire effects. This procedure is even more conservative and simpler than the procedure described in the preceding paragraph because it does not allow fire effects in oc- ‘cupid rooms to develop to a point where people could be a fected at any time daring the fre Finally, for each design fire scenario and the design specitiea- tions and assumptions, the design team can elemonstrate that no fire effects will ach any occupied compartment. The advantage ofthis procedure is that tremoves the need to makeany ealeula- sions regarding occupants, imcluding their behavior, movement, locations, prefire characteristics, and reactions to fire effects. A further advantage is that it also removes the need for some ofthe ‘modeling of fire effects, because itis not necessary to model the filling of rooms, only the spread of fre effects to those rooms. ‘This procedure is even more conservative and simpler than both, of the preceding procedures because it does not allow any fire ‘eflectsn occupied rooms. ‘The last three approaches are generally preferable, inas- much as they are free of the complex technical issues involved in ealenlating reliable ineapacitation data directly. AAL9 This subsection describes input needed for design specifications and includes the observation that certain re: tained prescriptive requirements are meluded. ABALQL The requirements apply to systems and features required by the standard that reference applicable standards and to any additional systems or features included in the de- ‘Sign at the discretion of the design team. The referenced stan- dards are expected to state maintenance, testing, and other requirements required or necessary to provide positive assurance fof an acceptable level of reliability. The referenced standards themselves can be prescriptive based or performance based ABALIO_ This subsection indicates that all assumptions re- lated fo the life safety design and the probable response of vehicles and occupants to a fire-related emergency must be clearly stated, Design specifications and other conditions will form dhe input to evaluation of proposed designs as relates to 8.11.12, ‘Where a specification or condition is not known, a reasonable ‘estimation is permitted. However, the design team will need to take steps to ensue that the estimation is valid during the life fof the vehicle, and any and all such estimations must be docu ‘mented according to 8.11.14 A..ILI0A_ This paragraph addresses lite satery ystems such A automatic fire suppression and fire alarm systems. Perfor: ‘mance issues that need to be documented include response time indexes, discharge densities, and distribution patterns. Caleulations should address amounts of extinguishing agent and, for example, must not inelude an unlimited supply of extinguishing agent if only a limited supply will be carried by an “affected” vehicle AB.11.10.5.1 This paragraph addresses features that might bbe incorporated in a car design to modify expected occupant, beliavior characteristics, The type of ridership as well as av able staffing impacts such features. ‘Such features might inclade addressing crew issues as part of the design process or hardware built in to be used! for emer. igencies. Examples of crew ises inchide training crew or staf And developing crew or staff activities to be undertaken in femergencies to assist passengers and (0 provide notification. ‘An example of hardware might be the type of notification ap- pliance(s) used. Copyrighted material licensed to SYSTRA, for licensee's use only. ‘Single user license only, copying prohibited,Copyrighted material licensed to SYSTRA, for licensee's use only. 400198032 25 Sep 03, Homan factors constitute a lange body of knowledge that can be applied in considering design issues. Four basic charac teristics are considered to be a minisnum set of mutually exelu- sive human performance characteristies that can affect the ability ofa fire safety system to meet life safety objectives (1) Sensibility to physical cues, especially the sounding of an alarm (2) Reactivity, or the ability «0 correctly interpret cues and take appropriate action (3) Mobility, or the speed of movement (A) Susceptibility to products of combustion In applying those four characteristics to emengency siti tions, assumptions can be used to address. larger number of Factors that are components of these basic performance char acteristics. Examples of characteristics that have an impact on. individual and group performance include the following: (2) Alermes: Awake asleep, can depend on time of day (2) Responsiveness: Ability 19 sense cues and react (3) Commitment: Degree to which occupant is committed to an activity underway before the alarm (4) Fora! point: Point at which an oceupant’s attention is fo- ‘eused, for example, to the front ofa classroom. stage, or server in business environment; hand of cards in a gam- bling casino (8) Physical anal metal capabilites: Can affect abibty t0 sense, respond, and react t© cues; might be related to age or dlsability (6) Role: Can determine whether occupant will lead oF follow others (7) Banilianty with environments Can depend on time spent in vehicle prior to emergency or prior participation in emer. gency training (8) Soriad afiiation: Extent to which an occupant will act/ react as an individual or a8 a member of a group (9) Goudition: Over the course of the fire, the effects — both physiological and psychological — of the fie and its com- bustion products on each oceupant ‘A8.11.10.5.6 This paragraph relates toa vehicle's capacity | which should represent the maximum number of people ‘expected that will be contained in a comparunent or area, Capacity should be based on the peak hour or crush load. patronage anticipated for each design's worst-case or most conservative loading. AB.11.10.5.7 This paragraph addresses the staff character isties that should be considered, such as number and types fof personnel, their location and their quality, and fre- {quency of training. Both onboard and station personne! should be considered. AB8.11.10.7 This paragraph addresses design proposals and requires that the proposals explicitly state all design specifies sions or requirements regarding system safety program plans, inspection programs, or other ongoing programs associated with the performance-based design agreed upon. These data are crucial to meet the stated goals and objectives, and their reliable performance is necessary for occupied and operie tional vehicles Examples of sch programs include maintenance, train- ing, labeling, or certification programs required t0 enstre op- terational status oF reliability in vehicle ystems or features. ANNEXA, 130-41 A8.11.10.9 This paragraph refers to interrelations assumed, ‘among the performance of vehicle elements and systems, oc- feupant behavior, or emergency response actions that might conflict with each other. For each fire scenario considered, it Js necessary to ensure that confliets in actions do not occur. Typical conflicts could include the following: (1) Assuming a door will remain closed during the Fire to contain smoke, while aceupants use the same door during ‘egress from the avea (2) Assuming fire apparatus will arrive immediately from a distant location to provide water to fire department con- nections and similar situations AB8.11.10.10 This paragraph addresses provisions that ex ceed basic requirements covered by referenced codes and. standardls, typical design requirements, and operating proce dures. It includes provisions stich as more frequent periodic testing and maintenance to increase the reliability of fire pro tection systems, redundant systems to increase reliability, om board guard service to enhance detection of fires and aid in fire response procedures, additional staff raining to address hazards particular to a given rightofway, and availabilty ane performance of emergency response personnel AB.LL.L1 This paragraph addresses design fire seenatios that define the challengea vehicle isexpected to withstand. Design, Fire scenarios are used to capture and limit value judgments ‘on the type and severity ofthe fire challenge to whieh a pro posed fire sfety system needs to respond. The system consid tered must include any and all aspects of the proposed design that are intended to mitigate the effects of a fite, such as egress, ntomatic detection and suppression, barriers, staff training, and placement of manual extinguishers, and unusual rightobway characteristics. Design fire scenarios can come from two sources: those thatare specified in §.1LLLL.3 and those that are developed by the design team based on the unique characteristics of the vehicle as required by 8.11.11.2. In all cases, it will be necessary to test Vehicle design against more than one de- sign fire scenario. ‘Once the set of design fire scenarios is established for a given project, each scenario needs to be quantified into a for- ‘mac that can be used for the evaluation of proposed designs. The SHPE Engineering Guide to Permance-Based Five Protection Analysis and Design of Buildings andthe ASTM’s Guide for Fe Hazard Azsssment of Rail Trnsporiation Vehicles outline pro- ‘cesses and identify tools and references that ean be used at ‘each step of this process AB.ILIL3 This subsection addresses the desirability of con- range of fire scenarios to evaluate the life safety of vehicle designs. Fire scenarios should not be limited to worstcase fire scenarios but should address the range of stations that an operating system might encounter sand should take into account detection and suppression capa- bilities as wel Descriptive terms sed to indicate the rate of fire growth for the scenarios are intended to be generic, and the excep- ‘ion in this section is for application to each active or passive fire protection stem individually, Two characteristics of the design must be evaluated and approved by the authority have ing jurisdiction ce in the absence of the system being analyzed 2008 elon Copyrighted material licensed to SYSTRA, for licensee's use only. Single user license only, copying prohibited.