Information Technology (IT)/Business
Alignment as a Strategic Weapon: A Diagnostic Tool
Joseph W. Weiss, Bentley College
Alan Thorogood, University of New South Wales
Abstract: This article presents a diagnostic for identifying a
strategic profile for Business/IT alignments. Based on consulting
and research over the past decade, we have observed executives
who are dissatisfied with their IT program and project alignment
strategies. Technical and process engineering projects rather than
strategic IT-business alignments were favored. Not all IT initiatives
can or should be dedicated to projects and programs that affect
enterprise-wide change; however, prominent IT experts argue
that CIOs are receiving pressure to align IT for strategic purposes
due to competitive market forces. Two case studies illustrate the
processes and benefits of aligning IT-based business outcomes
at the project and program levels using the strategic diagnostic
proposed here.
Keywords: IT Project Management, Strategic Project
Management, Alignment, Leadership
EMJ Focus Areas: Program and Project Management, Strategic
Management, Technology Management
T
he increasing importance of projects in organizations has
been acknowledged (Gray, Clifford, and Larson, 2003);
however, aligning leaders and resources to enterprise
business strategy and objectives at the project level is a recent
development in alignment literature and practice. Hacker and
Doolen’s study (2007) is an example of this recent trend. Their
results showed the impact of top management on project success
in managing large, multi-year technical projects. Many studies
in the project management literature (Gobeli and Larson,
1986; Pinto and Slevin, 1988; Youker, 1999; Brown, 1999) hint
at strategic alignment and top-level leader involvement as
important to project success; however, these studies do not
offer an integrative approach that combines both the internal
and external organizational dimensions with business and
technology objectives.
Two seminal studies on alignment offer examples for
integrating strategic business and IT with external/internal
organizational dimensions: MIT 90s model (Morton, 1991) and the
Strategic Alignment Model (SAM) (Henderson and Venkatraman,
1989). These frameworks are important for projects focusing on
wider strategic initiatives, which is the interest in this research.
The latter model, in particular, identified four domains—business
strategy, IT strategy, organization infrastructure and processes,
and IT infrastructure and processes—requiring integration
when deciding on a strategy. Each domain has an external
and internal component. The external dimension consists of
Refereed research manuscript. Accepted by Editor Doolen.
30
scope, competencies, and governance. The internal dimension
includes infrastructure, skills, and process. The two fundamental
characteristics of the model are strategic fit (relating external and
internal domains) and functional integration (integrating business
and technology). Strategy, infrastructure, and processes are also
linked to process, structure, and people. A fundamental premise
is that change cannot occur in one domain without influencing
at least two of the other three domains. Luftman et al. (1996),
Maes et al. (2000), and Avison et al. (2004) have since expanded
on the SAM model. The underlying assumption of these models
is that alignment, especially with regard to projects that deal with
strategic organizational interests, benefits a firm in three ways: first,
by maximizing return on IT investment; second, by enhancing a
firm’s competitive advantage through IT; and third, alignment
provides direction and flexibility to react to new opportunities.
Effective organizational and project alignment remains
problematic. An annual CIO poll ranked “IT and business
alignment” as the number one priority and concern (Duvall,
2009). Similarly, in a recent Society for Information Management
survey (Luftman, 2008), IT and business alignment was ranked
as the top management concern by CIOs and other executives.
IT strategic planning ranked third and managing change ranked
sixth. Luftman noted from the survey that, “…businesses with good
IT alignment, referred to as ‘mature alignment,’ share common
traits that included effective communications, governance,
understanding of the value of IT, collaboration with IT as a full
partner, systems that extend to customers and partners, and HR
recruiting strategies to attract/retain top IT talent.” Luftman
and McLean (2004) stated that IT executives needed to, “1)
understand the businesses of which they are a part and, 2) work
toward planning for, and achieving, an alignment between the IT
activities they head and the businesses they serve.”
Additional reasons why alignment frameworks are
problematic (Weiss and Thorogood, 2005) include the following
observations: (1) frameworks continue to be too internally
focused—the resulting “how-to” lists for alignments omit
external dimensions (stakeholders, environments, markets);
(2) organizational alignment processes ignore initial steps that
identify the purpose and type of alignment required—the intended
result of the project or initiative is not clearly stated; (3) there are
also no specific means offered to measure the degrees of internal
efficiency and external market engagement resulting from an
organization’s IT-business alignment; and (4) authors describing
alignment processes assume and then prescribe alignment
guidelines as a top-down, lower, or even mid-level process only.
In reality individuals and teams often plan and perform alignment
on an ad-hoc basis (Broadbent and Kitzis, 2005; Ross, 2003). In
this article, we build on previous literature to present a diagnostic
that enables IT and business project leaders to identify strategic
initiatives and projects that targets new markets, partnerships
with external groups, and innovative products and services.
Engineering Management Journal Vol. 23 No. 2 June 2011
 Toward this end we attempted to address some of the gaps
identified above in alignment frameworks by defining three
straightforward alignment profiles according to their intended
end-purpose: 1) technical resource, 2) business enabler, and 3)
strategic weapon (Weiss and Thorogood, 2006). The first profile,
technical resource, does not require significant use of IT in business
processes or within the external market engagement. The second
profile, business enabler, uses IT in selected business processes and
interfaces with critical customers and suppliers. The final profile,
strategic weapon, uses IT to mobilize and extend the enterprise,
requires extensive internal and external IT engagement.
Somewhat related to the prospector type of strategy (Miles and
Snow, 1978), strategic weapon business/IT alignments provide
organizational leaders a logic and approach for entering new
markets through different products and services, and for extending
the enterprise through spin-offs and other arrangements using IT
capabilities. Organizations do not usually identify a profile that
sets the stage for developing strategies at the outset of a major
alignment project.
Organizational and project leaders planning an IT initiative
or project can use any one of these alignment profiles as a guide,
depending on the two dimensions offered in Exhibit 1 to specify
the initiatives’ goal. That is, 1) the degree of internal integration
of organizational resources, and 2) the degree of external market
engagement an initiative requires. Technical resource alignment
requires the least resources and does not focus externally. Business
enabler alignment can require sizable resources and indirectly
enable IT to meet external market objectives. Strategic weapon
alignment demands significant internal resources and mobilizes
the enterprise toward external market objectives. The purpose of
this article is to explain how the third alignment, strategic weapon,
Exhibit 1. IT-Strategy Alignment Framework
Engineering Management Journal Vol. 23 No. 2
can be used to plan the types of projects and programs that are
strategic with regard to an organization’s use of IT in achieving
business objectives.
Aligning IT as a “Strategic Weapon”
Generally, either a combined IT-business strategy or a business
strategy integrating IT capabilities drives the strategic use of IT.
IT and business officers in larger companies that we have studied
claim that re-aligning IT and business can take from two to
five years and involve such enterprise programs as changing a
multinational’s entire marketing cost structure, or implementing a
global Enterprise Resource Planning system to present a single face
to a customer. Collapsing several businesses into two or separating
one business into several across multiple countries and continents
is another example. Small and medium sized businesses also re-
align their IT to support IT-based business strategies. Moving a
business to online selling or developing a new product line that
will generate half a firm’s profit are other examples.
By definition strategic weapon alignments:
1. Directly link to both the external market and the firm’s
performance objectives,
2. Require transformative internal integration of resources,
3. Involve the entire enterprise and, therefore, require a
systems perspective for defining change,
4. Require leaders who understand emerging and existing
technologies and stages of organizational and architecture
maturity from specific applications to modular networks,
5. Need leaders with strategic business and technology
knowledge and creativity to define a vision for the
alignment,
June 2011 31
6. Need behavioral and people skills in transformational team
leaders who must drive the planning and implementation
of new processes, and
7. Require managerial as well as leadership skills for those
who direct these re-alignments.
With these descriptions and definitions, IT-based initiatives
that fit the strategic weapon profile should be easy to differentiate
from, e.g., planning and installing a single technical application,
or planning and implementing a new business process; however,
we have observed that several CEOs and technology leaders have
trouble in identifying changes that enable IT to become a strategic
weapon. Such difficulties relate to a host of obstacles. A significant
barrier is that of competent but rigid mindsets (i.e., mental models,
Senge 1992, 2000) of leaders and professionals who cannot and/or
do not understand or envision how IT can contribute to a firm’s
larger possibilities and opportunities for competitive advantage.
This presents a problem since many strategic, IT-based projects
are mislabeled and treated as business process improvements or
technical band-aids.
While there are several factors that explain why technology
and business executives do not or simply cannot identify IT’s
strategic impact, we observe that one reason is lack of criteria
by which to begin discussions and early planning activities.
Executives can use the following set of illustrative criteria as a
front-end diagnostic for determining whether or not IT aligns
with strategic business initiatives. Executives use these criteria at
the beginning of a planning process before goals are set.
A Descriptive Framework with Questions
Exhibit 2 depicts the common characteristics associated with the
three alignment profiles, placing specific emphasis on the third
profile—strategic weapon. As a diagnostic, Exhibit 1 serves as a
basis for decision-makers to discern whether or not IT-business
alignment is, can, and/or should be a support for strategic
business initiatives. Exhibit 2 is a practical diagnostic to assist
project sponsors in answering the following questions:
• What is the target of this proposed IT investment? For
example, is it for product research and market development?
Will the proposed project affect enterprise performance?
• Do the objectives of the project change the boundaries of the firm?
• From the perspective of this project, is the market opportunity
realistic?
• Will the CEO be involved as a sponsor? Does the CEO
consider the IT in the first order of this initiative?
• Is board sponsorship required? Would the board view the
proposed project as a necessary strategic use of IT resources
and investment contributing to the enterprise’s strategy?
• Will the CIO sign on as a member of the executive team on
this project?
• Will the project include and involve IT specialists from the
business units and central IT?

Exhibit 2. Characteristics of IT-Business Alignment Profiles

Technical Resource Business Enabler Strategic Weapon

Target of IT Investment Administration Core Business Process Product Research and Market
Development
CEO No Involvement Awareness and supporting Exploiting IT as 1st order thinking
IT
Internal Integration Characteristics

Board of Directors No Involvement Probes CEO on Contributes IT knowledge and

competitors’ use of IT suggests strategic use
CIO No Involvement Partners with CEO Valuable member of the executive
team
IT-Business Relationship None or as needed Facilitates knowledge Building relationships as partners
Managers transfer
View of IT Automation Information Transformation
IT Strategy Technology life-cycle React to business needs by Subsumed into business strategy
management seeking alignment and
managing life-cycle
IT Structure Central function Federal Central and Federal
Investment decision-making Annual budget proposal, Multi-year project Multi-year initiatives, refreshing
championed by functional initiatives, championed by infrastructure, championed by CEO,
heads business heads with the CIO and the board
CIO’s support

Typical market objectives None Improve service and/or Extend the enterprise
External Market Characteristics

reduce cost
Sourcing In-house and bureaus: Packaging and out-sourcing Multi-sourcing
departments, functions and
bureaus
Partnerships None IT vendors, other With suppliers and distribution
stakeholders channels
Standards None Open Systems or dominant W3C (consensus building standards
vendor for web technologies) esp. XML
Perception of Markets Non-existent/Threat Balance Opportunity
Industry Most, including farming, Retailing, manufacturing, Finance, e-business, automotive,
mining, health care, education services, government utilities

32 Engineering Management Journal Vol. 23 No. 2 June 2011

• How will this project affect the firms’ industry
competitiveness?
• Does the project require partnerships with suppliers and
distribution channels?
• Does CIO and CEO compensation include performance
options and bonuses with regard to this project’s
deliverables?
• Will investment decision-making for the project require
multi-year initiatives, refreshing infrastructure, and will
the CEO, CIO, and board champion the infrastructure
investment?
A range of executives and professionals across the organization
should be involved in deciding Exhibit 2’s fifteen probes. The next
section presents suggested process guidelines.
This initial planning diagnostic offers several advantages
over traditional planning formats. To start with, decision makers
begin a project planning process by viewing two dimensions
of project requirements: internal integration and the extent
of external market engagement. External market engagement
and related questions are the dimensions that projects most
frequently omit, based on our consulting and research with CIOs.
In addition this particular set of diagnostic criteria and probes
focus on the alignment transformation necessary to support
strategic IT-based initiatives. Decision makers start the planning
process with a broad range of criteria at the outset. Using these
general criteria from the outset helps inform strategic goals and
objectives, and discourages realignment plans from slipping into
business process enablers or technical resources.
The internal integration criteria of Exhibit 2 are necessary
to take a high-level overview beginning with the “target of IT
investments”. While product research and market development
are not the only primary characteristics of IT investments,
these examples offer a starting point for identifying the various
types of IT-based project descriptors. The other dimensions
under internal integration include board, CIO, and business/IT
managers’ roles and responsibilities. Additionally, this profile
supports the importance of the role of IT strategy integrated
with investment decision-making. Again, a strategic weapon
alignment focuses internal integration at the upper level officers
and managers.
The external market engagement dimension includes market
objectives, sourcing, partnerships, standards, and industry
analysis. We have found that identifying and including market
objectives and industry analysis are two dimensions that IT
alignment planning often omits.
Methods
In developing the diagnostic and frameworks, we drew on
engagements with several organizations in our consulting over
the last decade. This study uses examples and information from
two completed programs with different projects. We selected two
companies from several others because these firms were involved
in multiple projects and programs that represented a wide range
of both business and IT objectives. In addition, both companies
provided in-depth information that more fully illustrated our
diagnostic and frameworks. In these engagements, we primarily
used the case study and interview methods with business and
IT executives and senior managers. To guide our interviews and
interpretations, we used qualitative research methods found in
Yin (1993, 1994), Creswell (1994), Marshall and Rossman (1994),
Moustakas (1994), and Gummesson (1991).
Engineering Management Journal Vol. 23 No. 2
Yin (1994) noted where research on specific organizations,
programs, or processes were considered “case studies”. Marshall
and Rossman (1994) stated that, “Case studies rely on historical
and document analysis, interviewing, and typically, some forms
of observation for data collection… Case studies take the reader
into the setting with a vividness and detail not typically present
in more analytic reporting formats.” He continued by stating
that, “Historically, qualitative methodologists have described
three major purposes for research: to explore, explain, or describe
a phenomenon… Many qualitative studies are descriptive
and exploratory: They build rich descriptions of complex
circumstances that are unexplored in the literature.” Relative to
our study, Marshall and Rossman (1994) also commented on in-
depth interview strategies, stating,
“A study focusing on individual lived experience
typically relies on an in-depth interview strategy.
Although this may be supplemented with journal
writing by the participants or other forms of data,
the primary strategy is to capture the deep meaning
of experience in the participants’ own words.
Studies focusing on society and culture in a group,
a program, or an organization typically espouse
some form of case study as a strategy. This entails
immersion in the setting and rests on both the
researcher’s and participants’ worldviews… In-depth
interview strategies are elegant in design, relying on
a single primary method for gathering data… Case
study, the most complex strategy, may entail multiple
methods—interviews, observations, document
analysis, even surveys.”
Finally, Marshall and Rossman’s (1994) emphasis on context
was a primary consideration in our case study methods: “…human
actions are significantly influenced by the setting in which they
occur and that one should therefore study that behavior in those
real-life situations…for qualitative studies, context matters…the
study should be conducted in the setting where all this complexity
operates over time and where data on multiple versions of reality
can be collected.”
We next describe the use of these specific data collection
methods in each of the two case studies.
Case #1: SellWell Data Collection. The SellWell case originated
from the interest of understanding the business value of
information technology. The Australian Graduate School of
Management was a sponsor of this study. The objective was to
describe how e-businesses initiatives can be effectively developed
and executed, and to explore influencing factors on why some
survive and prosper while others do not. SellWell.com is one of
the largest retail sites in the world and the lead researcher worked
there during its establishment, adding personal experience to the
case study.
Data collection followed two approaches. One focused on
SellWell.com, developing a narrative time line and detailing
the operating structures. The other focused on events in the
wider industry and competitor performance. The research team
collected multiple types of data, drawing on the considerable
publicly available information.
Within SellWell.com, respondents were selected based
on a purposive sampling to develop an understanding of the
company from the executives to the engineering and support
functions. Respondents were involved in the decision-making,
June 2011 33
execution, and benefits capture. The wide range of respondents
provided maximum diversity to enable the research team to
compare and contrast data (Carson et al., 2001). The collection
procedures involved reflection on experience, telephone calls,
public and private database searches, emails, questionnaires,
and both individual and group on-line chat sessions, to assist in
triangulation of findings.
The lead researcher initially communicated with people in
SellWell.com by email. The response was enthusiastic, reinforced
by the purpose of the research and the confidentiality agreement,
but perhaps also buoyed by a sense of pride. Participants included
the CIO; the Director of Systems Operations; managers from
marketing, merchandizing, and fulfillment; and key members of
the Creative Development and Technical Operations groups.
All respondents received an email containing a two-page
questionnaire to establish the timeline of major events. The
researchers compared the results and consolidated a narrative
timeline that was then sent back to the participants for
confirmation and/or revision. This process was repeated until a
timeline was agreed on.
The researchers needed a more interactive mechanism
than asynchronous email to enable richer exchanges, but visits
to the physically distant SellWell.com were not a viable option,
and demands on the respondents’ time made it difficult to
secure appointments for telephone calls. Further complicating
communication was the large time zone difference between the
subjects and the researchers. Internet chat was the solution.
Participants received an invitation to join an Internet chat
group. Nine accepted, which may reflect the technical background
of the participants. Those who did not join remained accessible
via email and telephone. Chat sessions lasted for up to four hours
and were active at various times of the day and night (approaching
24/7), to conform to the respondents’ availability. Sessions had
up to five participants who sent documents, diagrams, and other
information back and forth as discussions took place, providing
timely responses to questions and confirmation on specific
information. The researcher recorded all chat sessions with
the applicants’ tracking function and kept a journal reflecting
on conversations and information. The journal’s unformatted
conversation data is 2 MB and the journal contains 10 MB of file
transfers.
In parallel to the focus on SellWell.com, a separate enquiry
established the operating structure of both SellWell and SellWell.
com. Questionnaires were used that focused on identifying
the structure of SellWell.com and its fit with the larger parent
company. In addition, company reports, past and current
organizational charts, financial and sales performance figures,
sales growth estimates, profits, transaction volumes, and other
relevant figures were collected and reviewed.
The industry-focused approach was simultaneously building
an understanding of the state of the industry, and the dynamics
of the e-business market in which SellWell.com competed.
Here, the objective was to establish a separate timeline to
represent the external events influencing alignment of the case
organization. To accomplish this, relevant published materials
on consumer electronics retailing, online retailing (e-tailing),
Internet consumerism and trends in Information Technology
were extensively scanned and collected. Although academic
and proprietary databases were referenced, the most relevant
information was publicly available on the Internet. More than
32 articles provided reference data for the industry time-line and
analysis of direct competitors’ performance.
34
The first step in the analysis of the findings was to synchronize
the two timelines, which surfaced and validated external factors
affecting the organization. A joint narrative timeline of the
industry events was then constructed. Rich local events were
attached to the consolidated timeline. All respondents then
received the resulting narrative for review. Several chat sessions
discussed and validated the case and further resolved the data.
The CIO and the Director of Systems Operations, the most senior
participants in the study, approved the final case transcript.
The research took place over a three-year period with data
collection concentrated on the six months from January to June,
2003, and analysis was undertaken over an extended period from
July to December 2003. The decision to spin off an online store and
operation were taken with serious deliberation and commitment
to follow-through by the parent firm. Further refinement and
input from a number of academic sources and the 2005 Americas
Conference on Information Systems contributed to the case.
Case #2: Crown Limited Data Collection. Crown was a
retrospective case study of managing IT at Crown between
1998 and 2008. This study is part of a larger project that seeks to
understand how IT functions should be structured and managed
in the second decade of the 21st century (2010-2019). This research
used the case study method because it was able to provide a rich
source of data in the context of a real-life setting and permits
analysis from a fresh perspective (Benbasat et al., 1987; Bonoma,
1985; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1993, 1994).
The study is based on eight interviews conducted between
February and July 2008. The key informants were the CIO and
general manager of the gaming business (a major business of
Crown), along with supporting interviews from four of the CIO’s
direct reports. The researchers maintained field notes in order
to record the data. As Marshall (1994) stated, “Observation
entails the systematic noting and recording of events, behaviors,
and artifacts (objects) in the social setting chosen for study. The
observational record is frequently referred to as field notes—
detailed, nonjudgmental, concrete descriptions of what have been
observed.”
The interviews were supplemented with publicly available
information such as annual reports, news releases, presentations
to annual general meetings and stock-market analysts, newspaper
reports, and some internal reports. Together the multiple data
sources enabled triangulation of evidence, facilitating construct
validity and reliability (Yin, 1994). NVivo™ was used to index, and
in some cases, contain the material within a case database.
The interviewers and research team were aware of biases that
could influence the interpretations of the findings. Based on this
awareness, the following criteria from Carson et al. (2001) were
used: 
• Researching in the respondent’s own surroundings—
interviews were conducted in respondents’ offices,
• Purposive sampling rather than statistical sampling was
used,
• Comparing results across context—business and IT
interviewees results were compared,
• Depth and intimacy of interviewing—interview guidelines
were used,
• Prolonged and persistent observation—interviews occurred
over 6 months,
• Negative case analysis—the analyses were partially validated
with external data,
• Debriefing by peers was observed,
Engineering Management Journal Vol. 23 No. 2 June 2011
• Maintaining journals or memos—field notes were kept,
• Triangulation of data from several sources—external sources
were used,
• Asking respondents to comment on drafts and their
interpretations—debriefs and circulation of case were
systematically followed,
• Independent audits were not used because of expense,
• Multiple interviewers—three interviewers were used,
• Presenting findings to respondents—the case study was
reviewed by Crown for reasons of commercial confidentiality
and individual reputation; no material changes were made.
The interview design and execution was based on Yin (1994).
Interviews were semi-structured, open-ended conversations,
with the objective of encouraging informants to describe Crown
IT developments from their own perspective. This involved
open-probe questions around the MIT90’s constructs (strategy,
structure, process, roles and skills, and technology) and focused-
probing questions to explore topics relevant to the specific roles
and interests of the informants.
Follow-up interviews with the CIO were more structured.
The follow-up interviews focused on changes and specific issues
raised during earlier interviews. In addition, these interviews
sought to clarify and verify data collected from other sources.
All interviews were with a single informant. The duration of
interviews was from 1-1 1/2 hours. The interviews were recorded
and transcribed. Between interviews, the interviewers reviewed
their approach and refined the protocols.
Follow-up interviews with the CIO were more structured,
with a focus on reflecting on changes and specific issues
raised during earlier interviews, or clarifying and/or verifying
data collected from other sources. All interviews were with a
single informant. The duration of interviews was from 1-1 1/2
hours. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. Between
interviews, the interviewers reviewed their approach and refined
the protocols.   Group to guide business operatives on the capabilities and
Case Summaries
Case #1: Consumer Electronics—IT Becomes the Business. A
large consumer electronics retailer created an online store that
we factiously named, SellWell.com (Custodio et al, 2006). The
strategy was to leverage the parent’s business model, which relied
on attracting customers to stores using low-priced specials, and
to cross-sell products in an exciting retail environment. SellWell.
com (the online start up) was to offer free shipping and low-priced
items to attract customers. As an executive with the company
noted, “It’s only a web site. What could be so difficult about that?”
Black Friday, however, brought SellWell.com a business crisis. At
that time, SellWell.com was in transition from being a dynamic
development shop to becoming an industrial-strength, large-
scale e-tailer, with customers forcing the pace.
Industry Trends. The most popular forms of e-business are
business-to-business (B2B)—where companies use electronic
means to sell to one another, and business-to-consumer (B2C)—
where business sells directly to consumers via web sites (Trombly,
2000). Responding to these customers, some companies were
offering combined channels, or a “bricks and clicks” business
model (Weill and Vitale, 2001). For home video equipment, more
than 12% of customers reviewed specifications online and then
went to a store to review and purchase, compared with only 2%
buying online. The Internet empowered consumers with access
Engineering Management Journal Vol. 23 No. 2
to product information and easy price comparisons. (The article,
“A Perfect Market” in the Economist, May 13, 2005, explains how
trends are reshaping industries such as this one).
Specialty retailers such as Circuit City, Silo, and the parent
company, SellWell, were all growing. Consider Circuit City—one
of SellWell’s competitors. Customers came to Circuit City stores
intending to purchase an advertised item. Commissioned sales
people waited in those stores. The SellWell strategy was to create a
sense of excitement in the store. Supported by a large advertising
campaign, SellWell attracted tens of thousands of customers to
its stores. SellWell also had to deal with customers informed by
information sites of companies such as Sony and IBM.
Business Strategy. SellWell created a separate e-commerce
company to operate the Internet retailing that would offer
customers cross-channel services such as store pick-up and
return, online catalogue services for customers’ research before
going to a store, discounts through electronic coupons, and in-
store “kiosk ordering” in case the store ran out of stock.
SellWell announced the Internet initiative in a January news
release. Six months later, the Internet retail site was launched.
SellWell.com was a separate company from the large bricks and
mortar operation of the parent for two reasons. One, if kept in-
house, the internet strategic initiative could easily disrupt the
existing IT function’s core business of running the tills, managing
stock flow, and placing orders. The other reason for spinning off
SellWell.com was to protect the initiative itself. The culture for
the new business was incompatible with that of the established
SellWell operation. SellWell.com would have a younger workforce;
a highly creative culture; and a fluid, high-pressure environment.
SellWell.com planned and implemented multiple projects
simultaneously, with one-half focused on the technical and
business adjustments needed to operationalize the site, and the
other half developing new functionality. Each project also used
business liaisons from the SellWell.com Systems Operations
limitations of systems and technologies.
SellWell.com’s implementation plan drew on the parent’s
proven marketing and sales approach developed over the years
for launching new stores in the traditional retailing channel. As
the holiday season approached, testing and quality assurance
cut corners to get the site to market. Keeping the pressure
on, both online and traditional competitors were launching
campaigns, requiring SellWell.com to react and change the site’s
specifications. Halfway through the development, the parent
company intervened and “tweaked” the business model. SellWell.
com had to react to competitors’ online campaigns and the
campaigns of an aggressive physical parent, while it dealt with the
already complex work of stabilizing the web site for the holiday
season.
Execution. In an address to SellWell.com’s Operations Group
upon his appointment, the CIO acknowledged the lingering
technical and operational issues and the diminishing time to
fix them, as the holiday shopping season loomed closer. One
August initiative of the Development Operations Team was to
clean up code and data. A September initiative by the Systems
Operations Team aimed to improve infrastructure performance.
(For example, the web, application, and data servers received
operating system and database upgrades). This would form a
Software Architecture Team to establish software development
standards, create a Release Management Team and release
June 2011 35
procedures to coordinate the entire software delivery and data
synchronization process, improve the version control process,
and use a robust configuration management system. It would also
simplify the management of the site through the implementation
of a comprehensive Site Management System.
On November 13, SellWell.com implemented a code freeze
to stabilize the site for the holiday season. Everybody worked
hard to ensure an excellent customer experience for those
visiting the site, and few customers experienced problems—until
November 23, Thanksgiving Day. On Black Friday, SellWell.com’s
site availability was at less than 50%.
In response, the Director of Systems Operations approved the
Software Delivery System (SDS) initiative. This “re-architected”
the entire infrastructure, consolidating functions into industry-
proven integrated systems. The Site Management System (SMS),
which began implementation in Q1, was another technology
project proposed by SDS to address the problematic builds.
The Release Management Team, Data Management, Systems
Operation, and Architecture Groups clarified and re-aligned their
functional and service boundaries. Business operatives received
comprehensive rules of engagement to obtain services from the
Technical Operations Group.
By supporting standards, policies, and procedures, along with
changes to the Release Management Team, Developers’ Portal,
Configuration Management System, and the Release and Deployment
Process, SMS began to establish stability for SellWell.com.
Key business and technical personnel integrated into
the SellWell IT and business units to assimilate the learning,
while the rest remained in the new Web Operations Group to
operate the web site and develop the next generation of business
requirements.
Strategic Outcomes. In comparison with its competitors, SellWell
had better capabilities in satisfying multi-channel consumers. It
had the virtual marketing reach and online service delivery of its
website along with support from the bricks and mortar operation
to integrate in-store fulfillment. For SellWell.com, the “brick-
based” fulfillment channel worked. Home deliveries were largely
on time, stores handled customer collections efficiently, returns
and exchanges operated flawlessly. In an effort to concentrate its
efforts on its core competencies, SellWell outsourced its entire IS
operations to Accenture, including the SellWell.com technical
support function. SellWell.com succeeded by creating a dynamic
development environment and sourcing capabilities through a
prime contractor. By complementing the existing business model of
the parent company, SellWell.com experienced a surge in demand
just as it began the transition from development to production.
SellWell.com worked 24 hours a day to overcome this obstacle and
deliver what is now one of the world’s busiest web sites.
Case #2: Crown Limited—Going for Growth. Crown Limited
started with a temporary casino in 1994, developing the Crown
casino and entertainment complex in Melbourne in 1996
(Reynolds 2008). Crown is now building a position as a global
provider of gaming services (DFAT, 2007) and is leveraging the
Crown brand where appropriate to add value to VIP gaming
operations.
Ric Lamb joined Crown Limited in May, 1999, as Executive
General Manager—Management Information Systems and CIO.
Lamb came to Crown Limited from the IT subsidiary of a large
Australian mining company, that did about 30% of its work
outside its parent organization. Lamb stated,
36
“The Crown IT organization was half way out the
door… They had set-up a separate company and
moved all the IT people into it. They were looking
to sell services back to Crown and to other casinos
around the world. In fact, they were already doing
some work for a casino in Connecticut.”
At Crown, Lamb could see there was limited support from
the parent company executive, and the team was achieving results
through sweat, hard labor, and by working weekends. Company
support and resources were scarce for the team. Lamb noted, “The
first thing I did was transfer these people back to Crown.”
Building Internal IT Capabilities. Lamb immediately set about
establishing the necessary professional IT management skills,
developing project-management capabilities, and ensuring he had
the necessary technical capabilities that encompassed approximately
65 people who held key functions and specialist skills.
Lamb also hired a new Head of Applications Development,
who was previously with a local software development company. He
also introduced formal requirements and cost estimation with the
business. On the business-systems side, Lamb inherited one of the
early IT employees, Peter Herring, who he appointed as the person
in charge of business relationship management. This manager has
since taken a position in the gaming part of the business as general
manager for product strategy for gaming machines.
Lamb explains the differences between other types of
projects and IT projects: “It’s like us building a third hotel—we
completely design the thing and then we go to tender. But, for
IT, it is sometimes a bit hard to draw the blueprints upfront,
and that’s where people get into trouble. Crown operates its
development processes to CMM Level 2. We have repeatable
process: requirements, project management, testing, contract
management...” He sees this as optimal for Crown.
Business Alignment. Lamb describes Crown as a “taker” of off-
the-shelf packages for most solutions, except in gaming where
IT in Crown also does its own development and partners with
suppliers. “Crown has a reputation in the gaming industry as an
innovator and good user of IT.”
Crown’s IT scope includes “front of house”—table and slot
machine management control and bank systems; and “back-
of-house”—food, beverage, hotel management, security, and
car parking systems. These are integrated into the loyalty
tracking, patron management, and VIP management system.
A spectacularly successful example of an innovation at Crown
was the development of a semi-automated table-game—Rapid-
Roulette. The idea was born between the IT function and the
gaming business, and was developed in a joint venture with
gaming supplier StarGames.
Describing the business problem, Lamb explained that
one of the critical issues of the business with table games is the
labour costs. Herring noted how Crown has been able to capture
ideas from people coming from other casinos both in Australia
and internationally. As he stated, “Crown owns its own casino
management system—CMS. The system was for a U.S. casino,
but Crown tailored it for a global market and local regulations,
while the gaming industry-packaged solutions are dominated by
a small number of suppliers who focused on the needs of larger
casinos in Las Vegas.”
Crown has continued to benchmark themselves against
leading packaged casino management systems each year, meeting
Engineering Management Journal Vol. 23 No. 2 June 2011
with key suppliers and evaluating their offerings. Herring said,
“Now we’re de-coupling our systems so that our table automation
system is now separated from our casino management system.”
In addition, before deciding whether to buy or build, the Head of
Applications focuses on the business solution by instituting the
following questions that teams had to address: What are your
business processes? What are the business rules?
When commenting on the culture within IT at Crown, Lamb
says, “Crown also has quite a good customer service recognition
program, which IT people get to participate in.” One of Lamb’s key
sources of staff is recruiting from within Crown, which exploits a
number of its organizational strengths. The brand power of Crown
Casino helps with external recruitment. Lamb noted, “People will
come in the door for a job because they’ve heard about Crown,
and there’s something about Crown they like the sound of.”
In terms of business strategy, Lamb says, “We are part of the
process of growing revenue.” Herring seeks to institutionalize
the business system’s thinking. Lamb continues, “Identify the
need within the business, identify the big drivers from a margin
perspective or top line revenue, and then use the IT department
within Crown or external IT companies to help drive shareholder
value.” In addition, Herring forecasts ongoing changes.
For example, Lamb was considering the strategic questions of
whether or not to operate the Crown IT function as a service
provider to multiple entities, or replicate its in-house model
within each Casino. These were the types of questions that each
Casino’s IT and business counterparts discussed.
Working in IT in Crown is “being part of the business,”
rather than “working in IT as part of Crown.” Crown’s in-sourcing
practices tailor processes and skills to ensure cost-effective yet
successful delivery of IT services. The IT staff has co-developed
innovative new products, maintained and further developed an
excellent casino management system, and integrated many other
packaged solutions.
Although Crown’s primary strategic focus is on growth,
Lamb must still deliver cost reduction, maintain access to new
technology and skills, and focus on Crown’s core business.
Taking “cost reduction” as an example, Lamb has contained costs
by having multi-skilled staff; selectively bringing in specialty
resources only when needed; working with the business on the
highest value-adding IT development functions; adopting a level
of CMM that is optimal for Crown; and recruiting, developing,
and retaining staff from the business. Other best-in-class practices
Crown follows include:
• Focus on business solutions: IT at Crown seeks to free the
business from the constraints of established products and
existing practices to deliver innovative solutions.
• Embed IT in the business: Structurally, Crown treats IT as
another business function rather than a service provider.
People sit within the revenue generating part of the business
and work to understand issues and develop ideas. IT only
charges discretionary work back to the business, where it is
subject to normal business decision processes.
• Understand internal systems capabilities relative to the
market: While primarily a “taker” of packaged solution,
Crown seeks, where appropriate competitive advantage from
ongoing development of its own systems.
• Select the appropriate level of process and risk: For example,
Crown sees CMM level 2 as optimal for its business needs
and risk appetite.
• Build a project-management competence: Crown’s IT is
highly regarded by the business for getting the job done.
Engineering Management Journal Vol. 23 No. 2
Lamb’s team takes accountability for project delivery and
only uses external resources where appropriate.
• Harness the diversity of people—Recruit and develop people
from the business: Crown recruits staff from the gaming floor
and other parts of the business where there is a strong pool of
people undertaking further study. It develops their IT skills
while capturing their close business links and company loyalty.
IT Strengths at Crown. Crown IT has two key strengths. The
first is its proximity to the business. In house IT presents few
barriers to building relationships with the business, whereas
outsourcing requires significant processes and ongoing efforts to
align stakeholder interests. Crown’s in-house strategy has made it
easy to position IT as part of the business and deliver innovation.
Within Crown’s growth environment, where requirements are
often unclear, this has facilitated strong alignment of technology
and strategy. The second strength of in-sourcing at Crown is their
ability to match IT risk and business risk. Crown has consciously
embraced other IT and business links, such as recruiting graduates
from the gaming floor and leveraging the brand to recruit and
retain people. Organizations that choose in-house IT exploit
the strengths it offers, which include close alignment with the
business and the ability to match IT and business risk.
Analysis
SellWell.com started as an online spin-off from its successful
parent—a large consumer electronics retailer. The spin-off
transitioned, with support from its parent, to a large-scale,
successful e-tailer. Crown Limited started as a temporary casino
before developing into an entertainment complex and global
provider of gaming services. Both companies required IT
capabilities in order to survive and grow. Both companies had
to build, develop, and integrate IT capabilities with business
objectives in order to drive their growth. While the companies
represent different industries, leadership, visions, cultures, and
products, both had to decide how and to what extent to view and
use IT within their business strategies. We argue that “strategic
weapon” dimensions and characteristics were essential for the IT-
business alignment in the companies in their marketplace success.
A discussion of strategic alignment similarities and differences
are presented next.
Exhibit 3 summarizes the IT alignment results from the two
case studies of SellWell.com and Crown Limited. The two firms
are more similar than dissimilar on 10 of the 15 dimensions of
“strategic weapon” characteristics. The dissimilarities were found
in 1) the involvement of the CEO and board of directors in IT-
business strategic alignment activities and initiatives, 2) the firms’
view of IT and IT strategy, and partly in 3) the companies’ IT
structures. At SellWell.com the board of directors and CEO were
more instrumental and actively involved in exploiting IT as a
strategic business resource. At SellWell, the parent company CEO
participated directly in the projects and even selected software
configurations. While the CEO was involved at Crown Limited,
Ric Lamb (the CIO and Executive General Manager) executed the
IT/business strategies. Since SellWell.com was a calculated spin-
off that depended on technology from its inception, the parent
firm’s CEO had a lot at stake in its survival. At Crown, on the
other hand, IT capabilities were not as valued before a General
Manager/CIO was hired. This person became the champion
for IT and enlisted the support of business leaders. Without
this champion who had both business and IT vision, skills, and
execution ability, Crown’s story would have been different.
June 2011 37
Exhibit 3. Strategic Weapon Characteristics of IT-Business Alignment Profiles

Strategic Weapon
SellWell.com Crown Limited
Comparisons
Internal Integration
Characteristics
Target of IT Investment New distribution channel for Build new products Similar
existing products otherwise buy IT for
commodity processes
CEO Parent’s CEO had direct CEO less involved Dissimilar
involvement to the point of
selecting software
configurations
Board of Directors Board actively endorses Board less involved Dissimilar
strategic use of IT
CIO CIO becomes CEO of the CIO/Executive General Similar
startup .com Manager
IT-Business Relationship IT has become the business IT facilitates relation- ships Similar
Managers business functions
View of IT Industry-wide transformation More limited to product Dissimilar
embedded
IT Strategy IT is the business strategy IT enables new products Dissimilar
IT Structure Highly centralized Centralized with strong Similar, with a variation
projects
Investment decision-making Strategic initiative with board Multi-year projects Similar
approval
External Market
Engagement
Typical market objectives IT used to encourage IT drives new products Similar
customers into stores; defend such as Rapid-Roulette and
market share from online leverages Casino
attackers Management System
Sourcing In-house and strategic Packaging for commodity Similar
partnerships business processes and in-
house for embedded
products
Partnerships Extensive and evolving Extends to other casinos Similar
for using new products
Standards Extensive through W3C Open systems Similar
(consensus building standards
for web technologies)
Perception of Markets Opportunity and emerging Opportunity for new Similar
threats products
Industry Electronics and e-businesses Gaming (also seen as Similar
Financial Services)

SellWell saw IT as transformational. Crown viewed IT as
an embedded characteristic of the products. IT was the driver of
business strategy in both firms. “IT strategy” in strategic weapon
profiles is “subsumed into the business strategy.” At SellWell,
this was the case. At Crown, IT enabled new products that were
profitable for the company. Crown’s overall business strategy of
“growing revenue” by using the IT department within Crown
and through external IT companies to “help drive shareholder
value” set the strategic platform for the projects summarized in
the case. Compared to SellWell, the alignment in Crown’s case
is less complete due to Crown’s narrow focusing of IT on new
product lines. Although this approach is strategic, it does not
have as transformative an impact across the firm’s value-chain
as was evidenced with SellWell. Nevertheless, it is interesting to
note how the alignment in Crown’s case is contingent upon the
strategic use of IT. For commodity business processes, Crown
utilizes packages as a way of “sourcing-in” technology; for new
business products, it in-sources the technology and maintains
control. For SellWell.com, IT was a mission critical capability.
38
“IT structure” in strategic weapon profiles is both centralized
and decentralized. At SellWell, IT structure remained highly
centralized, and effectively so. The centralization of IT at SellWell
was also accelerated in part because of the “Black Friday” technical
website crisis. The fix to this problem required a “re-architected”
infrastructure that consolidated functions and integrated business
and technical personnel at the business unit level. At Crown, IT
structure was centralized, resulting in stronger and value-added
products. IT is also embedded in the business. As the case stated,
“Crown treats IT as another business function rather than a
service provider. People sit within the revenue generating part of
the business…”
Four notable comparisons of the two firms are made
based first on four internal characteristics using Exhibits 2
and 3. First, CIOs at both firms used strategic weapon alignment
profiles to identify business goals driven by technology projects
and capabilities. SellWell used IT as a strategic weapon for two
purposes: to retain its market share as well as to establish a new
distribution channel. In essence, IT became the business itself,
Engineering Management Journal Vol. 23 No. 2 June 2011
causing it to be centralized. Additionally, the IT strategy merged
and became one with the overall business strategy—another
outcome we had not anticipated in our original diagnostic. The
CIO of SellWell’s parent company became the CEO of the startup.
Finally, SellWell.com is broadening the boundaries of the firm on
the supply-side by maintaining far-reaching partnerships within
the IT industry.
Second, the “target of the IT investment” (Exhibit 2) for
SellWell.com was a “new distribution channel for existing
products”; for Crown it was “building new products otherwise buy
IT for commodity processes.” Both targets were clearly strategic
in nature, leading to projects in both firms that required internal
and external resources and alignment capabilities in the firms
(Exhibit 1). These targets also promised returns on investments
that would enhance the respective enterprises.
Third, the role of “IT-business relationship managers” is to
“build relationships as partners.” As noted earlier, at SellWell
IT became the business. IT-business relationship managers
(“business liaisons”) worked effectively, creating cross-functional
teams in order to meet project objectives. At Crown, these
managers were effective in eliminating bureaucratic barriers inside
and outside the organization to achieve their projects’ strategic
business objectives.
Finally, “Investment decision-making” is “multi-year,
refreshing infrastructures, championed by CEO, CIO, and the
board.” At SellWell the strategic initiatives had board approval. At
Crown, investment decisions resulted in multi-year projects.
When compared based on external integration, the following
six important similarities between the two firms are noted. First,
“Typical market objectives” in strategic weapon profiles are
generally aimed at “Extending the enterprise.” At SellWell, IT was
used to encourage customers into stores and to defend market
share from online attackers. At Crown, IT was used to create new
products and leverage a management system. Second, “Sourcing”
in the strategic weapon profile is used for “Multi-sourcing”
(Exhibit 2). At SellWell, sourcing was used in-house and to build
strategic partnerships. At Crown, sourcing was used for packaging
commodity business processes and in-house for embedded
products. Third, “Partnerships” in strategic weapon profiles are
characterized in Exhibit 2 as “suppliers and distribution channels.”
SellWell formed partnerships with a number of external groups.
The firm outsourced its entire IS operation to Accenture. Crown
developed a joint venture with StarGames, a gaming supplier.
These findings suggest that “joint ventures” and “consultants” be
included in this dimension in Exhibit 2. Fourth, “Standards” are
characterized by “W3C, exp. XML” in Exhibit 2. SellWell used
W3C. Crown used open systems. Fifth, “Perception of Markets”
is characterized as “Opportunity” in Exhibit 2. At SellWell, the
perception was both opportunity and threat. Both firms acted as
prospectors and analyzers in their strategic choices to innovate
in the market. And finally, “Industries” that use strategic weapon
profiles are not limited to those listed in Exhibit 2, “Finance,
e-business, automotive, and utilities”. Since SellWell was in the
electronics business and Crown in gaming, other industries can
and are being added to this dimension.
This analysis indicated more general similarities than
differences as shown in Exhibits 2 and 3, although the differences
are significant and can be attributed to a number of factors
(industry opportunities and pressures, leadership styles and
capabilities, types of markets selected to enter, and visions).
Organizational culture also played a significant role in explaining
some of the two firms’ strategic differences. SellWell’s parent
Engineering Management Journal Vol. 23 No. 2
company culture was balanced, somewhat conservative, and
willing-to-take calculated risks. The leadership perceived markets
as opportunities and threats, was willing to risk initiating a start-
up with the goal of protecting its Internet initiative. SellWell
executives later discovered that its parent corporate culture was
incompatible with the start-up. This cultural context was reflected
in the decisions the CIO took, the execution of the different teams
to balance technical and business objectives, and the strategic
outcomes. One such outcome was the decision to protect
SellWell’s core competencies by outsourcing the IS function that
led to increased profits.
Crown’s culture also reflected a move from a somewhat
conservative culture to one that balances risk and innovations
with cost reduction strategies. The CIO took risks more with
products than with core business resources. From the cultures in
both cases, the company CEOs empowered and assigned the CIOs
the authority and responsibility to move forward with strategic
weapon profiles to extend the enterprise, whether through new
products or a spin-off business, into new markets.
Concluding Comments
This study expands the understanding of the characteristics of
firms that have effectively implemented strategic IT/business
projects. Four limitations of the study are as follows: First, cases
and examples of firms that tried and failed to plan and implement
such strategic alignments were not identified. A follow-up study
of unsuccessful implementations would be a good follow-up
contribution. Second, the findings are based only on two cases.
We opted for more detail over a larger number of firms. This is not
a survey or sample. Third, while these two cases do not optimally
match for comparison purposes, they are suitable for illustrating
“strategic weapon” types of IT/business alignments in their
separate domains. The two cases also show how such alignments
are deliberately chosen. Other studies comparing more closely
matched companies within the same industry with similar size
and types of products, for example, would also be helpful. Finally,
our diagnostic is macro-level and does not provide detailed
metrics for planning complex strategic projects. Additional case
studies could inform and extend our findings by reporting on how
business and IT leaders prepare business initiatives and projects
across different industries, organizations, and environments.
At this stage of research, the case study approach is
appropriate. There is a potential external validity threat and the
question remains: “Are the findings specific to these two cases
or can they be generalized to other situations?” The absence of
substantive empirical testing across a range of other settings in
this study reflects the research focus on theory building, which, in
itself, is a contribution to IS research (Weber, 2003; Zmud, 1998).
Future empirical testing is required in other contexts to establish
external validity.
This study has argued that moving to a strategic weapon
alignment requires behavioral, technical, and strategic
competencies of both business and technology leaders and
project managers. Such alignments in projects and programs
are not necessarily dependent on the availability of resources an
organization has or that an environment may provide. Leaders at
different levels in the organization may need to plan on a strategic
breakthrough in order to survive. The two cases presented from
this research illustrate how the IT-Strategy alignment framework
can help provide a comprehensive view with different project
profiles necessary to build a momentum for change. Use of these
profiles can also surface the strategic versus tactical orientations
June 2011 39
of leaders and can be used to help plan projects and programs
that meet the needs of the organization in its environment.
Broadbent and Kitzis (2005) argued that the next wave
of CIOs must compete in a more global economy. According
to these authors, “new CIO leaders” must perform tasks and
satisfy priorities such as create a vision for how IT will build the
organization, share and inform expectations for an IT-enabled
enterprise, weave business and IT strategies together, manage
new enterprise and IT risks, and communicate IS performance
in business-relevant language. There is a growing emphasis to
align IT to support business strategy at the project level. A 2008
McKinsey survey of 548 executives (McKinsey, 2008) supports
this observation. The study found that 59% of their companies
developed multiyear IT plans—an increase from 52% in 2007,
and that 56% stated, “…their IT strategies include technology-
driven business innovations, versus 42% last year.” Two-thirds
of the executives said that it is necessary to integrate business
and IT strategy more closely in order to achieve more. For
example, “They favor a process where IT strategy and the ‘art
of the possible’ in technology influence the development of
business strategy, closing the loop in strategy development… This
joint development of strategy by business and IT would reduce
risks of surprise disruptions and better involve IT in bolstering
competitive advantage.”
Implications for Leaders and Project Managers
Five significant implications of this study for IT and business
leaders and project engineering managers follow. First, strategic
weapon IT-business alignments cannot succeed without CEOs
and CIOs who champion the vision and execution of enterprise
strategies. While business and functional level professional and
team participation is necessary, top-down capable leadership
is essential. Both cases in this article clearly show this finding.
Second, large-scale strategic weapon alignments are generally
motivated by an initiative, need, and/or mandate that requires
business urgency and IT capabilities. SellWell.com illustrated
that initiative—growth was the impetus at Crown. Third, IT
technology and business project managers must collaborate
with company leaders to plan strategic weapon alignments. As
stated at the outset of this article, not all projects are or should
be strategic weapon alignments. Many projects and initiatives
solve technical problems. A major point here is that firms in need
of strategic change in order to survive and compete combine
business strategy with IT capabilities in bold, innovative ways.
This process requires collaboration among leaders and managers
across functional, expertise areas. As the two cases illustrated,
the CIOs working with the CEOs in both companies took charge
in defining new ideas and visions. Project managers across both
companies and IT-business relationship managers were then
involved throughout the planning and implementation processes.
Fourth, “Begin with the end in mind” (Covey 1989)—defining an
initiative or project as a technical resource solution, a business
process enabler, or a strategic weapon profile at the outset can save
time, resources, and costs (Weiss et al., 2006). IT leaders in both
cases in this study had the business and technical expertise and
practical understanding to define the strategic business goals and
technology drivers before any program or project was initiated.
At SellWell and Crown Limited, the projects were part of larger
business opportunities that could and did move products and the
organization into new markets. Finally, IT/business projects are
also strategic alignments—defining and configuring IT projects
as alignments among business strategy, culture, structure, people,
40
resources, and environment is not new (Benjamin and Levinson,
1993). What is different is defining IT/ business projects as larger
strategic weapon profiles and initiatives that are grounded in
enterprise strategies that seek to innovate organizations as well as
products and services.
Note: This article is based in part on an earlier paper delivered
at the 39th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences,
Kauai, Hawaii, January, 2006. We thank Renita Patel, Bentley
University MBA graduate, for her assistance in helping update
and extend our content in this article.
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About the Authors
Joseph Weiss is Professor at Bentley University, Massachusetts,
co-chair of HICSS IT/Project Management Track, and past
Chair of the National Academy of Management’s Consulting
Division. He was a Fulbright Senior Program Specialist and
is a management consultant. His current research analyzes
ethical issues, the broadband digital divide, and aligning
technology leaders and teams. He has consulted with Fortune
500 and 1000 firms on project and change management and
leadership development.
Alan Thorogood is an international consultant who
specializes in developing improvements to IT investment
decisions. He is also a visiting senior fellow at UNSW. He
received his Ph.D. in strategy at UNSW in 2006. The Australian
Graduate School of Management awarded him an MBA in
2003 with the Australian Business Limited Prize for the top
academic performance and the BCG Prize in Strategy.
Contact: Joseph William Weiss, PhD, Bentley University,
175 Forest St., Waltham, MA 02452; phone: 617-484-8510;
fax: 617-484-4713; jweiss@bentley.edu
June 2011 41
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