608
2, MARCH 2015
Electric Vehicle Charging Stations With Renewable
Power Generators: A Game Theoretical Analysis
Woongsup Lee, Member, IEEE, Lin Xiang, Student Member, IEEE, Robert Schober, Fellow, IEEE,
and Vincent W. S. Wong, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we study the price competition among
electric vehicle charging stations (EVCSs) with renewable power
generators (RPGs). As electric vehicles (EVs) become more pop-
ular, a competition among EVCSs to attract EVs is inevitable.
Thereby, each EVCS sets its electricity price to maximize its
revenue by taking into account the competition with neighboring
EVCSs. We analyze the competitive interactions between EVCSs
using game theory, where relevant physical constraints such as the
transmission line capacity, the distance between EV and EVCS,
and the number of charging outlets at the EVCSs are taken into
account. We show that the game played by EVCSs is a supermodu-
lar game and there exists a unique pure Nash equilibrium for best
response algorithms with arbitrary initial policy. The electricity
price and the revenue of EVCSs are evaluated via simulations,
which reveal the benefits of having RPGs at the EVCSs.
Index Terms—Electric vehicle (EV), electric vehicle charg-
ing station (EVCS), game theory, pricing, renewable power
generation.
I. I NTRODUCTION
MART GRID is the next generation power grid. It is
S foreseen that the generation of electricity from renewable
sources will constitute a large portion of the total electricity
generation in smart grid [2]. Thus, renewable generation will
play a significant role in smart grid and analyzing its effects
is important.
An interesting aspect of the future smart grid is the impact
of the expected large number of electric vehicles (EVs).
Although the effect of a single EV is small, the aggregate
Manuscript received January 28, 2014; revised June 7, 2014,
August 16, 2014, and October 15, 2014; accepted November 16,
2014. Date of publication December 18, 2014; date of current version
February 16, 2015. This work was supported in part by the Information
and Communication Technology (ICT) Research and Development Program
of Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning/Institute for Information
& Communications Technology Promotion (1491104001, Development of
Public Safety-Long-Term Evolution System and Terminal for National Public
Safety Service); and in part by the Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future
Planning, Korea, in the ICT Research and Development Program 2013 under
Grant 2014-044-003-002. This paper was presented in part at the IEEE
SmartGridComm 2013 [1]. Paper no. TSG-00064-2014.
W. Lee is with the Department of Information and Communication
Engineering, Gyeongsang National University, Tongyeong 650-160, Korea
(e-mail: wslee@gnu.ac.kr).
L. Xiang and R. Schober are with the Institute for Digital Communication,
Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen D-91058,
Germany.
V. W. S. Wong is with the Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4,
Canada.
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available
online at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TSG.2014.2374592
1949-3053 c 2014 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, VOL. 6, NO.
influence of a large number of EVs on the smart grid can be
substantial. Therefore, EVs are considered to be one of the
major consumers of electricity in smart grid [3]. As a conse-
quence, analyzing the effect of EV charging on smart grid and
designing an optimal charging strategy for EVs are crucial.
One strategy for charging EVs is to charge them when the
price of electricity is low, e.g., at night time [4]. In [3], the
fluctuation of the power level of the grid is controlled by
adjusting the charging of EVs. The effect of power losses in
the transmission line is taken into account in [5]. Moreover,
state-of-the-art mathematical techniques such as mean-field
game and particle swarm optimization have been used to ana-
lyze and optimize EV charging. A mean-field game model is
considered in [6] to analyze the behavior of EVs that want to
be charged at minimum cost. In [7], the EV charging schedule
is optimized by using particle swarm optimization. Moreover,
in [8], a distributed congestion control algorithm for inter-
net traffic is modified to control EV charging in a distributed
manner. In addition, the users’ preferences are investigated for
different EV charging strategies in [9].
Most of the existing works on EV charging assume that
the charging takes place at home. However, given that vehi-
cles employing internal combustion engines are refueled at gas
stations, EVs can also be charged at electric vehicle charging
stations (EVCSs) [10]. The use of EVCSs is attractive for the
following reasons.
1) An EVCS can buy electricity from the power grid at a
lower rate compared to the rate that an EV owner has
to pay to charge at home,1 such that EV charging at the
EVCS can be cheaper than charging at home.
2) An EV may run out of electricity while traveling and
immediate charging becomes inevitable. There are some
previous works that consider the operation of EVCS.
In [12], the optimal deployment of EVCSs is investi-
gated, and in [13], the effect of local energy storage at
EVCSs is studied.
When multiple EVCSs coexist under different ownerships, a
price competition among the EVCSs to attract EVs is unavoid-
able, e.g., an EVCS can attract more EVs by offering a lower
electricity price compared to its neighboring EVCSs. Then, the
electricity price can be different for different EVCSs which is
analogous to the heterogeneity of the gas price at different gas
stations.
1 For example, in the U.S., the rate of electricity for the residential sector
is 30% higher than that for the commercial sector [11].
 LEE et al.: EVCSs WITH RPGs: A GAME THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Most of the previous work in smart grid do not consider the
price competition between EVCSs. Although some previous
works have studied the price competition between gas stations,
(see [14]), the analysis for conventional gas stations cannot be
applied to EVCSs. This is because unlike gas stations, EVCSs
are able to produce electricity without introducing additional
generation cost by installing their own renewable power gener-
ators (RPGs), e.g., photovoltaic (PV) generators. Specifically,
unlike gas stations, EVCSs can obtain revenue by produc-
ing electricity and also earn commission by selling electricity
to EVs.
Herein, we consider the price competition between EVCSs
with RPGs. The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) We model the price competition between EVCSs with
RPGs using a game theoretical framework. Moreover,
the supermodularity and the convergence of the consid-
ered game are proved. These properties justify the use of
the adopted game model for predicting the competitive
interactions between EVCSs.
2) We study the price of electricity and the revenue of the
EVCSs based on computer simulations. In the simu-
lations, realistic system parameters, e.g., the expected
renewable generation profile of the EVCS generated
from measurement data, have been used. Results show
that the generation of renewable energy at the EVCSs
decreases the electricity price and increases the revenue
of the EVCS. Thus, it is beneficial to adopt RPGs at
EVCSs for both the EVs and EVCSs as long as the cost
incurred by RPG is not too high.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We
present the system model in Section II. In Section III, the
game theoretic model for competing EVCSs is developed.
Simulation results based on empirical data are provided in
Section IV and Section V concludes this paper.
II. S YSTEM M ODEL
In this section, we present an analytical model for EVs and
EVCSs. The considered system model is depicted in Fig. 1.
A. EVs
In order to focus on the competitive behavior of the EVCS,
we only consider EVs which want to charge their batteries at
EVCSs. Other charging options, e.g., charging at home, are not
considered in this paper. We assume that the EVs which want
to charge their batteries at an EVCS are uniformly distributed
in a given area. An EV selects an EVCS based on the electric-
ity price offered by the EVCS, its distance from the EVCS, and
its own preference for a certain EVCS. Let the negative effects,
e.g., the increased driving time and energy consumption, that
distance has on the selection of an EVCS be modeled by a
function g(di,j ), where di,j is the distance between EVCS i and
EV j. In this paper, we assume that g(di,j ) is a monotonically
increasing function of di,j ≥ 0. Moreover, we assume that EVs
can be categorized into L preference groups, i.e., EVs which
belong to the same preference group have the same preference
profile regarding the EVCSs. Furthermore, let μl,i denote the
preference of the EVs in preference group l for EVCS i, where
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609
Fig. 1. Illustration of the interaction between EVCSs and EVs.
l is the preference group index of EV j. Let J denote the set
of EVs. Then, if EV j ∈ J selects EVCS i, the utility can be
written
 
−g di,j − pi + μl,i . (1)
The EV chooses the EVCS which maximizes its utility.
Therefore, EVCS i∗ , which is chosen by EV j, can be found as
 
i∗ = argmin g di,j + pi − μl,i (2)
i∈I
where I is the set of all EVCSs and pi is the electricity price
charged by EVCS i.
Note that in this paper, we assume that EVs select an EVCS
independent of the behavior of other EVs. On the other hand,
in practice, EVs may take into account the behavior of other
EVs when making their selection because they may suffer from
long waiting times if they choose an EVCS which has a large
number of customers. However, in this paper, we consider a
myopic EVCS selection scheme to make the analysis tractable.
B. EVCSs
We assume that there are multiple EVCSs under different
ownerships and the EVCSs are capable of producing electric-
ity with RPGs without incurring additional generation cost.
We also assume that an EVCS has to keep its electricity price
fixed for at least a time period of t and the amount of elec-
tricity that EVCS i can generate within t from its own RPGs
is Wi . Although we assume the RPGs generation cost is negli-
gible, the cost of initial installation and maintenance is taken
into account. In particular, we assume that the cost incurred
by RPG in time interval t is zi , which is assumed to be
proportional to the generation capacity of RPG. Furthermore,
we assume that the EVCSs do not have local energy storage
facilities,2 because of the high cost of storage and the fact
that frequent charging and discharging may severely shorten
the lifetime of storage units [15]–[17]. In addition, we assume
that EVCS i has Oi charging outlets, i.e., at most Oi EVs can
be charged at the same time.
2 The deployment of energy storage would change the EVCSs’ strategies
significantly, because EVCSs can store electricity generated from RPGs for
later usage. As a result, the different EVCSs’ pricing strategies are coupled
in a time-dependent manner and the competition between the EVCSs turns
into a stochastic game, which is difficult to analyze.
 610
The total expected amount of electricity demand at EVCS
i within t is denoted by γi , and Ni is the expected num-
ber of EVs which choose EVCS i. Ni can be calculated
based on (2). Moreover, let Cavg be the expected amount
of electricity required for charging one EV. Furthermore, let
Bavg be the mean battery capacity of each EV and Savg SoC be
the mean state-of-charge (SoC) of an EV visiting an EVCS,
SoC represents the ratio of the electricity remaining in
i.e., Savg
the battery and the capacity of the battery. In addition, we
assume that each EV is fully charged at the EVCS. Thus,
Cavg = Bavg (1−Savg SoC ) and γ = C
i avg ·min(Ni , Oi ). The EVCSs
have two options for selling the electricity generated by their
RPGs. First, EVCS i can sell its electricity to the power grid
wp
at price pup . Second, it can sell the electricity at price pi to
wp
EVs by charging them, see Fig. 1. The value of pup is deter-
mined by the power grid and is likely to be identical to the
wholesale electricity price. However, EVCS i can freely set
wp
pi to maximize its revenue and pi will be larger than pup ,
because otherwise there is no incentive for EVCSs to sell their
electricity to EVs.
If γi > Wi , the amount of electricity generated by the RPG is
insufficient to satisfy the electricity demand within t. Then,
EVCS i buys additional electricity from the power grid at retail
wp wp
price pdn , and correspondingly, the EVCS pays pdn (γi −Wi ) to
the power grid. Otherwise, if γi ≤ Wi , the amount of electricity
generated by the RPG of EVCS i is sufficient to satisfy the
electricity demand of the EVs visiting EVCS i within t. In
this case, its excess electricity, i.e., Wi −γi , is sold to the power
wp
grid at price pup . The revenue that EVCS i can obtain from the
wp
power grid by selling the excess electricity is pup (Wi − γi ). In
wp wp
this paper, we assume that pup ≤ pdn , i.e., the wholesale price
wp wp
pup is equal to or lower than the retail price pdn . It should be
wp wp
noted that our formulation also includes the case pup = pdn .
In this case, EVCSs will be less eager to sell their electricity
to EVs since they can obtain a sufficiently high revenue by
selling their electricity to power grid, and as a consequence,
the price competition between EVCSs will be weaker.
Finally, due to physical constraints, the amount of electricity
that can be transferred over a power line is limited [18]. We
let κi be the capacity of the power line connecting EVCS i to
the power grid, i.e., the amount of electricity traded between
the EVCS and the power grid cannot exceed κi .
C. Coverage of EVCSs
We define the coverage of EVCS i as the region in which
the EVs will visit EVCS i for charging. The coverage of
EVCS i can be found by solving (2) for the considered area.
Apparently from (2), the coverage of EVCS depends on the
type of EV, i.e., which preference group an EV belongs to.
Let νl be the proportion of EVs in preference group l and
assume that the distribution of EVs which want to charge their
batteries is uniform with density λ. Moreover, let Dli be the
coverage area of EVCS i for preference group l. Then, γi can
be calculated as
 

L 
γi = Cavg · min Oi , νl Dl λdxdy . (3)
l=1 i πi pi , p−i = pi γi pi , p−i + f γi pi , p−i − Wi − zi (4)
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The shape of the coverage area of the EVCSs for prefer-
ence group l depends on the selection criterion in (2). For
general functions g(·), the boundaries of the coverage areas
will have curvature. Therefore, in general, the coverage areas
of the EVCSs are not polygons which complicates the analysis.
However, it is shown in the following lemma that if and only if
g(·) in (2) has a unary quadratic form such that g(di,j ) = ζ1 di,j
2 ,
where ζ1 is a nonnegative constant which characterizes the
severity of the penalty of distance, the coverage area of each
EVCS is a polygon.
Lemma 1: The coverage area is a polygon and each bound-
ary of the coverage area is orthogonal to the line adjoining
the two EVCSs which share the boundary if and only if
g(di,j ) = ζ1 di,j
2 .
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
III. P RICE A DJUSTMENT G AME
In this section, we formulate the price competition between
EVCSs as a supermodular game and investigate the character-
istics of the considered game.
A. Game Model
Under our system model, the EVCSs will not cooperate
because they belong to different owners. As a consequence,
each EVCS will set its electricity price independently and
selfishly by taking into account the effect of the electricity
price of neighboring EVCSs such that its own revenue is
maximized. Thus, we formulate the competitive interactions
between EVCSs as a noncooperative game where each EVCS
makes decisions independently as follows.
1) Price Adjustment Game Between EVCSs.
a) Players: EVCSs.
b) Strategy: The strategy of the players is the adjust-
ment of the electricity price for charging EVs. In
other words, the strategy of EVCS i is setting pi ,
where pi ∈ R+ . We will use p−i to denote the vec-
tor of the electricity prices of all EVCSs except
EVCS i.
c) Payoff: The payoff of EVCS i, πi ( pi , p−i ), is the
monetary revenue that EVCS i obtains.
In our system model, EVCS i can generate revenue by
charging EVs and selling the excess electricity to the power
grid. The amount of revenue is pi γi +pup [Wi −γi ]+ . Moreover,
wp
EVCS i has to purchase additional electricity from the power
grid if the amount of electricity from its own RPG is not
sufficient to satisfy the electricity demand of the EV request-
ing charging service. In this case, the amount of payment is
pdn [γi − Wi ]+ . Furthermore, the cost incurred by RPG, i.e.,
wp
zi , has to be taken into account. Finally, due to the limited
capacity of the transmission line [18], the amount of electric-
ity being traded between EVCS i and the power grid has to be
less than the line capacity, κi , i.e., |Wi −γi | < κi . To ensure that
the line capacity is not violated, we let the payoff of EVCS i
be −∞ when |Wi − γi | ≥ κi . Therefore, the total revenue of
EVCS i, πi ( pi , p−i ), can be expressed as
       
 LEE et al.: EVCSs WITH RPGs: A GAME THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
where f (x) is given by
 wp
pup [−x]+ − pdn [x]+ ,
wp
for |x| < κi
f (x) =
−∞, otherwise.
Here, γi is a function of pi and p−i , because the demand at
EVCS i depends not only on the electricity price at EVCS i
but also on the prices at the other EVCSs, i.e., p−i .
In this paper, we assume each EVCS uses a best response
algorithm to set its electricity price to maximize its own
payoff. Therefore, EVCS i has to solve the following max-
imization problem to determine its electricity price pi :
 
maximize πi pi , p−i . (6)
p ∈R+
i
The solution of problem (6), p∗i , can be written as
 
p∗i = argmax πi pi , p−i .
pi ∈R+
Note that p∗i can only be found numerically, since
πi ( pi , p−i ) involves function γi ( pi , p−i ), [see (3)], which
cannot be expressed in closed form.
B. Supermodularity and Convergence of the Game
In the following, we show that the price adjustment game
between EVCSs is a supermodular game, and based on this
supermodularity, we show the convergence of the game. First,
let S be the set of strategies that players can choose. Then,
the supermodularity of payoff function πi (x) is defined as
follows [19].
Definition 1: Payoff function πi (x) is supermodular if and
only if the following inequality holds:
πi (x ∧ y) + πi (x ∨ y) ≥ πi (x) + πi (y), ∀x, y ∈ S
where x ∧ y and x ∨ y are the component-wise maximum and
minimum of vectors x and y, respectively.
If function πi (x) is twice differentiable, then πi (x) is
supermodular if the following inequality holds [19]:
∂ 2 πi (x)
∂xi ∂xj ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ S, j = i. (9)
Let Si be the set of strategies of player i. Also, let si and
s−i be the strategy of player i and the strategies of all players
except player i, respectively. Then, a supermodular game is
defined as follows [19].
Definition 2: A game is a supermodular game, if 1) the set
of strategies of player i, Si , is a compact subset of R and 2) πi
is continuous in si and s−i , and 3) πi is supermodular.
Supermodular games have some nice properties.
Specifically, pure Nash equilibria exist in supermodular
games and the convergence of best response algorithms to a
Nash equilibrium is guaranteed [19]. Now, we will show that
the price adjustment game of the EVCSs is a supermodular
game if and only if the monotonically increasing function
g(·) is a unary quadratic function. The supermodularity of the
game is formally stated in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: The electricity price adjustment game of the
EVCSs is a supermodular game, if and only if a monotonically
increasing function g(·) is a unary quadratic function.
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
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611
Remark 1: In Theorem 1, we show that g(·) has to be
a unary quadratic function for the considered game to be
a supermodular game. Considering Huff’s work [20] on the
(5)
attractiveness of competing facilities which have different dis-
tances to customers, this assumption seems valid. Huff has
shown that if two facilities are competing with each other to
attract customers, the probability that a customer goes to one
facility is inversely proportional to the square of its distance
to the facility. From this, we conjecture that the preference
of customers for one facility is inversely proportional to the
square of the distance and the penalty of distance in EVCS
selection is proportional to the square of the distance.
Based on Theorem 1, a pure Nash equilibrium can be
achieved with best response algorithms in the price adjustment
game. However, it is not guaranteed that the Nash equilibrium
is unique and that the equilibrium can be achieved when the
(7)
initial strategies are arbitrarily chosen and the strategy of each
player is updated at an arbitrary time instant. Therefore, in the
following theorem, we show that a unique pure Nash equi-
librium can be achieved by any best response algorithm and
with any initial policy if each EVCS has a sufficient number
of charging outlets such that Ni ≤ Oi .
Theorem 2: The electricity price adjustment game for
EVCSs has a unique pure Nash equilibrium and the equilib-
rium can be achieved by any best response algorithm with any
initial policy, if g(di,j ) = ζ1 di,j
2 , ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J , and ζ ≥ 0,
1
and Ni ≤ Oi .
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
Theorem 2 reveals that even if each EVCS sets its electricity
price selfishly and in a distributed manner, the electricity prices
of all EVCSs converge to unique values such that the result
of price competition can be accurately predicted by using our
(8)
game model. This justifies the usefulness of our game model.
IV. P ERFORMANCE E VALUATION
In this section, the electricity price and revenue of the
EVCSs are investigated and the effect of renewable electricity
generation is illustrated.
A. Simulation Environment
Our performance evaluation is conducted based on a real-
istic simulation environment. In particular, we assume that
the electricity price of EVCSs can change every 30 min, i.e.,
t = 30 min, because it takes about 30 min to fully charge
the battery of an EV if fast charging is used [13]. We also
assume that eight EVCSs, i.e., |I| = 8, are located randomly
in a 5 km-by-5 km square area in Elizabeth City, NC, USA,
based on the actual density of gas stations in this region and
an EV market penetration of 17%.3 Moreover, we assume that
the density of EVs that visit the eight EVCSs in 30 min is
λ = 1.34 EVs/km2 . Therefore, the average number of EVs
that visit EVCSs every 30 min is 33.5. We also assume that
g(di,j ) = 1/2 di,j
2 , ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J , where the unit of d
i,j is
meters and the maximum amount of power that can be sent
3 There are 46 gas stations in Elizabeth City and the density of gas stations
is 1.85/km2 . Therefore, eight EVCSs will be located in a 5 km-by-5 km square
area, if the EV market penetration is 17%.
 612
TABLE I
S IMULATION PARAMETERS
over the power line is 4 MW, i.e., κi = 4 MW. Moreover, we
assume that the number of charging outlets in each EVCS is
15, i.e., Oi = 15.
We let the battery capacity of each EV be 41.8 kWh
which corresponds to the battery capacity of a Toyota RAV 4.
Moreover, we assume that the remaining SoC of EVs arriving
at an EVCS is uniformly distributed4 between 0 and 0.2 such
that Cavg = 37.62 kWh. Furthermore, we assume two different
preference groups for EVs: 1) EVs which prefer EVCSs with
RPGs (referred to as eco-friendly EVs); and 2) EVs which
do not have a preference for specific EVCSs (referred to as
noneco-friendly EVs). For noneco-friendly EVs, μl,i = 0 and
for eco-friendly EVs, μl,i = 1 if EVCS i has RPG and μl,i = 0
otherwise. In addition, we assume that the proportion of EVs
in each preference group is 50%.
We assume that the RPG employs PV generation.
Accordingly, we use the hourly electricity generation data
which was measured at Elizabeth City State University in
North Carolina during June 2012 [21]. We scale the gener-
ation profile according to the size of the PV panel. From the
generation profile in [21] it is obvious that PV generators pro-
duce electricity only during day time as expected. For the
electricity prices, we adopt the average wholesale and retail
electricity prices in North Carolina in June 2012, i.e., the aver-
wp
age wholesale electricity price is set to pup = 4.018 cents/kWh
wp
and the average retail electricity price is set to pdn = 8.66
cents/kWh [11]. The simulation parameters are summarized
in Table I.
To determine the revenue of the EVCSs, we assume that
the cost incurred by RPG for the time interval t, i.e., zi , is
proportional to the size of the PV panel. Based on the product
price for PV generators listed in [22], the expected lifetime
of a PV panel (20 years), and the average cost of operation
and maintenance of PV generators, we set zi = 9.81 cents for
RPGs with a PV panel size of 100 m2 , and the cost of RPGs
with different PV panel sizes can be calculated accordingly.
B. Hourly Electricity Price
First, we evaluate the hourly electricity price in the price
adjustment game between EVCSs when a best response algo-
rithm is used. In this section, we assume that only EVCS 1
4 The SoC does not correspond to the battery level of the EV when it decides
which EVCS to visit but to the battery level of the EV when it actually arrives
at the EVCS.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Coverage areas of EVCSs. (a) Eco-friendly EVs.
(b) Noneco-friendly EVs.
Fig. 3. Hourly electricity price for EVCSs.
has an RPG whose PV panel size is 900 m2 , and the other
EVCSs do not have RPGs.
In Fig. 2, the coverage areas of the EVCSs at 11 A . M .
(renewable energy is available) and 11 P. M . (zero renewable
energy) are shown for the different preference groups of EVs.
First, we can see that the coverage areas are indeed poly-
gon, as we have proved in Lemma 1. Second, EVCS 1 has a
larger coverage area at day time (11 A . M .) than at night time
(11 P. M .), because the energy from the RPG (i.e., PV genera-
tor) leads to a lower electricity price of EVCS 1, which helps
to attract more EVs for higher revenue. Finally, we observe
that the coverage area of EVCS 1 is larger for eco-friendly EVs
(left hand side) than for noneco-friendly EVs (right hand side),
because the eco-friendly EVs prefer an EVCS with RPGs and
they might visit EVCS 1 even if it is far from them.
The hourly electricity prices for EVCSs over one
day are depicted in Fig. 3. During day time (between
9 A . M . and 4 P. M .) when EVCS 1 has nonzero renewable
energy, the electricity prices keep changing due to the varia-
tion of the amount of renewable energy generated. Specifically,
because of its renewable energy, EVCS 1 can reduce its
electricity price to attract more EVs. As a consequence, neigh-
boring EVCSs also have to reduce their electricity prices in
order to avoid losing their customers and eventually the over-
all electricity price drops due to this competitive behavior of
the EVCSs.
C. Effect of Renewable Electricity Generation at EVCS
In Figs. 4 and 5, we show the average electricity price per
day and the average monthly revenue of EVCSs as a function
of the size of the PV panel which corresponds to the renewable
electricity generation capacity. In the simulations, the positions
 LEE et al.: EVCSs WITH RPGs: A GAME THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Fig. 4. Average electricity price versus the size of PV panel.
of the eight EVCSs are randomly selected. To evaluate the
effect of the penetration level of renewable generation at the
EVCSs, we consider three scenarios.
1) Only EVCS 1 has an RPG (referred to as Scenario 1).
2) EVCSs 1–4 have RPGs (referred to as Scenario 2).
3) Only EVCS 8 does not have an RPG (referred to as
Scenario 3).
Then, the electricity price and the revenue of the EVCSs
with RPG (e.g., EVCS 1 in Scenario 1) and the EVCSs with-
out RPG (e.g., EVCS 8 in Scenario 3) at each realization are
averaged separately.
We observe from Fig. 4 that the average electricity price
of EVCSs with RPGs can be slightly higher than that of
EVCSs without RPGs when the size of the PV panel is small,
because eco-friendly EVs prefer EVCSs with RPGs even if
these EVCSs charge a higher price. However, as the size of the
PV panel increases, EVCSs with RPGs decrease their prices
to attract more EVs. Eventually, the price charged by EVCSs
with RPGs becomes much lower than that of EVCSs without
RPGs. Therefore, having renewable electricity generation with
high generation capacity is beneficial to the EVs because the
price of electricity decreases.
It is important to note that the price competition between
EVCSs becomes more severe as the penetration level of renew-
able generation increases, i.e., the price competition is the most
severe in Scenario 3, which has the lowest electricity price, as
can be seen in Fig. 4. Moreover, the price competition between
EVCSs also becomes more severe as the size of the PV panel
increases, because the EVCSs with RPGs are eager to sell
their excess electricity to EVs such that the amount of power
sent over the power line does not exceed the limit, κi . As
a result, the electricity price of EVCSs with RPGs can be
even lower than the retail price for the commercial sector, i.e.,
8.66 cents/kWh, which is the price that EVCSs have to pay
for buying electricity from the power grid.
In Fig. 5, we can observe that the revenue of an EVCS with
RPG is higher than that of an EVCS without RPG even when
the cost incurred by RPG is taken into account. The main rea-
son for the higher revenue of EVCSs with RPG is that they can
sell their excess electricity to obtain additional revenue which
surpasses the cost incurred by RPG. Although not shown here,
√ 
the revenue of EVCS with RPG can be very low if the cost
incurred by RPG is very high. However, such high RPG cost
√  = √ (11)
may not be realistic. We also observe from Fig. 5 that if
the penetration level of renewable generation is sufficiently
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613
Fig. 5. Monthly revenue of EVCSs versus the size of PV panel.
high (e.g., Scenarios 2 and 3), the revenue of EVCSs with-
out RPGs drops severely due to the price competition with
the EVCSs having RPGs, which will motivate all EVCSs to
install RPGs.
V. C ONCLUSION
In this paper, the price competition between EVCSs with
renewable electricity generation in smart grid was explored.
We modeled the competitive price adjustment of EVCSs as
a game and proved the convergence of the game based on
supermodularity. Through simulations, we investigated the
electricity price and the revenue of EVCSs as a function
of the generation capacity of RPGs and found that adopting
RPGs at the EVCSs is beneficial for both the EVs and the
EVCSs providing that the cost incurred by adopting RPG is
not extremely high.
An interesting extension of this paper is the consideration
of the use of local storage units at the EVCSs such that the
EVCSs can store their surplus renewable energy for future use.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to consider other charging
options for EVs, e.g., charging at home, in the EV charging
market.
A PPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
Without loss of generality, assume that EVCS i is located
at (0, 0) and EVCS k which adjoins EVCS i, is located at
(dm , 0). Also, let Bl be the set of coordinates of the boundary
between EVCS i and EVCS k for preference group l. Then,
(x̄, ȳ) ∈ Bl has to satisfy the following equality:
   
g x̄2 + ȳ2 − g (dm − x̄)2 + ȳ2
= pk − pi − μl,k + μl,i . (10)
If the coverage area of the EVCS is a polygon and the
boundary of the coverage area is orthogonal to the line adjoin-
ing the EVCS and its neighboring EVCS, (10) is satisfied for
any ȳ and accordingly the derivative of (10) with respect to ȳ
has to be zero. In this case, we have
ġ x̄2 +ȳ2
√
x̄2 +ȳ2
ġ (dm −x̄) +ȳ
2 2 (dm −x̄) +ȳ
2 2
where ġ(·) is the first derivative of g(·).
 614 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, VOL. 6, NO. 2, MARCH 2015

Given that dm , x̄, and ȳ can be arbitrarily chosen by which we refer to as f̄ (x), is given by
adjusting pk and pi , (11) should be satisfied  for any dm , x̄, ⎧ wp wp
⎪ pup −pdn wp
and  ȳ. Then, from (11), we can express ġ( x̄2 + ȳ2 ) and ⎪
⎪ (x + δa )2 − pup x, for |x| ≤ δa
⎪
⎪
4δa 


ġ( (dm − x̄) + ȳ ) as
2 2 ⎪
⎪ −
wp
− 1
+ κi −x
− κi −δa
,
⎪
⎪ p δa x log δa δa
  ⎪
⎨
dn

ġ x̄ + ȳ = x̄2 + ȳ2 · α1 (x̄, ȳ)

2 2 (12a) f̄ (x) =

for
κi − δ a ≤ x ≤ κi
⎪
⎪ wp
− pup + δa x + log δa − δa ,
1 κ +x κ −δ
⎪
i i a
  ⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
ġ (dm − x̄)2 + ȳ2 = (dm − x̄)2 + ȳ2 · α1 (x̄, ȳ). (12b) ⎪
⎪ for − κi ≤ x ≤ −κi + δa
⎪
⎩f (x), otherwise.
It should be noted that α1 (·, ·) can be a function of both (15)
x̄ and ȳ.
We note that for δa → 0, we have f̄ (x) → f (x). Therefore,
In the following, we show that α1 (·, ·) has to be a constant.
f (x) can be approximated by f̄ (x) by using a sufficiently small
First, by exchanging  we obtain α1 (x̄, ȳ) =
 x̄ and ȳ in (12a),
α1 (ȳ, x̄) because ġ( x̄2 + ȳ2 ) and x̄2 + ȳ2 are unchanged if
x̄ and ȳ are exchanged. Moreover, by replacing x̄ in (12a) by
dm − x̄, we obtain
  of R and πi is continuous in pi and p−i . Thus, according
ġ (dm − x̄) + ȳ = (dm − x̄)2 + ȳ2 · α1 (dm − x̄, ȳ).
2 2
(13)
Then, from (12b) and (13), we know
α1 (x̄, ȳ) = α1 (dm − x̄, ȳ) for arbitrary dm and accord-
ingly, α1 (·, ·) has to be a function of ȳ only. Moreover, given
that α1 (x̄, ȳ) = α1 (ȳ, x̄), we can conclude that α1 (·, ·) has to
be a constant.
As a consequence, we find that g(·) has to be a unary
quadratic function for (12a) and (12b) to be satisfied, because
  
α1 (·, ·) is a constant. In other words, unless g(·) is a unary
quadratic function, (12a) and (12b) cannot be satisfied for any
dm , x̄, and ȳ, and accordingly, the coverage area of the EVCSs
cannot be a polygon whose boundary is orthogonal to the line
adjoining two EVCSs which share the boundary.
When g(·) is a unary quadratic function, i.e., g(di,j ) = ζ1 di,j
2 ,
from (10), we obtain
 coverage areas of EVCS i and EVCS k share a com-
ζ1 x̄2 − (dm − x̄)2 = pk − pi − μl,k + μl,i . (14)
From (14), we find that the boundary of the coverage area
of two EVCSs is a straight line which is orthogonal to the
x-axis and accordingly, we know that the coverage area of an
EVCS is a polygon and the boundary of the coverage area is
orthogonal to the line adjoining the EVCS and its neighboring
EVCS.
Proof of Theorem 1
Before proving Theorem 1, we note that f (x) is a piecewise
wp wp
linear and concave function because pup ≤ pdn . However,
f (x) is not continuous in two points, i.e., κi and −κi , and is
not differentiable at 0, κi , and −κi . Given that we have to
differentiate πi ( pi , p−i ) with respect to pi to prove the super-
modularity of the considered game, these nondifferentiable and
noncontinuous points are problematic. To overcome this prob-
lem, we approximate f (x) by smoothing the function around
x = 0, κi , −κi , such that the function is continuous and differ-
entiable in the entire range of x. The approximation of f (x),
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δa . Moreover, f̄ (x) is concave because (∂ 2 f̄ (x)/∂x2 ) ≤ 0. In
Appendix, f̄ (x) will be used instead of f (x).
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 1. In the game
model, the set of strategies for players is a compact subset
to Definition 2, we need to verify whether πi is super-
modular, i.e., (∂ 2 πi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi ∂pk ≥ 0, to determine
whether the considered game is a supermodular game. First,
(∂πi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi can be expressed as
∂πi ( pi ,p−i ) ∂γ ( p ,p )
∂pi = γi ( pi , p−i ) + pi i ∂pi i −i
∂γ ( p ,p )    
+ i ∂pi i −i f̄˙ γi pi , p−i − Wi . (16)
Thus, (∂ 2 πi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi ∂pk can be written as
= i ∂pi k −i + pi + f̄˙ γi ( pi , p−i − Wi )
∂ 2 πi ( pi ,p−i ) ∂γ ( p ,p )
∂pi ∂pk
∂ 2 γi ( pi ,p−i ) ∂γi ( pi ,p−i ) ∂γi ( pi ,p−i )
× ∂pi ∂pk + ∂pi ∂pk
   
× f̄¨ γi pi , p−i − Wi . (17)
For any monotonically increasing function g(·), it is obvi-
ous that if pk increases, γi ( pi , p−i ) will increase when the
mon boundary, i.e., when the two EVCSs are adjacent
to each other, and γi ( pi , p−i ) will be unchanged other-
wise. Therefore, we can check that (∂γi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pk ≥ 0.
We can also verify that for any monotonically increas-
ing function g(·), (∂γi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi is negative because the
coverage of EVCS i decreases when it increases its elec-
tricity price. Therefore, we find that (∂γi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pk +
(∂γi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi (∂γi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pk f̄¨ (γi ( pi , p−i ) − Wi ) ≥ 0,
as (∂γi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pk ≥ 0, (∂γi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi ≤ 0, and
f̄¨ (x) ≤ 0 due to the concavity of function f̄ (x).
When (∂ 2 γi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi ∂pk > 0, we can make
(∂ πi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi ∂pk < 0 by choosing sufficiently large
2
values for pup and pdn , such that pi + f̄˙ (γi ( pi , p−i ) −
wp wp
Wi ) < 0 and |pi + f̄˙ (γi ( pi , p−i ) − Wi )| can be very large.
Otherwise, if (∂ 2 γi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi ∂pk < 0, we can make
(∂ 2 πi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi ∂pk < 0 by increasing pi and p−i by the
same amount, such that pi + f̄˙ (γi ( pi , p−i ) − Wi ) becomes
very large, because as we can see from (10), the coverage
area of the EVCSs does not change when the electricity
prices of all EVCSs are increased by the same amount.
 LEE et al.: EVCSs WITH RPGs: A GAME THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 615

Therefore, (∂ 2 γi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi ∂pk has to be zero to ensure the and ȳ specify the boundary. Furthermore, (19) should be satis-
super-modularity of πi ( pi , p−i ). fied for any dm and accordingly we can choose dm = 2x̄. Then,
In the following, we will show that given that (∂ 2 x̄)/∂pi ∂pk = (∂ 2 ȳ)/∂pi ∂pk = 0, the following
(∂ 2 γi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi ∂pk = 0 if and only if g(di,j ) = ζ1 di,j 2 . equality holds:
Given that γi is the summation of the demand of the EVs in
√ 
g̈ x̄2 +ȳ2
different preference groups, we can consider the case for each
√  = √ 1 . (20)
ġ x̄2 +ȳ2 x̄2 +ȳ2
preference group independently. Therefore, we only consider
the demand from preference group l, which we denote as
γ̄il in the following. For this preference group, we prove our
theorem by dividing the problem into two cases.
1) The coverage areas of EVCS i and EVCS k do not share
a common boundary.
2) The coverage areas of the two EVCSs share a common
boundary.
First, when the coverage areas of EVCS i and EVCS k do
not share a common boundary, γ̄il ( pi , p−i ) is independent of
pk for any g(·). Therefore, (∂ γ̄il ( pi , p−i ))/∂pk = 0, and as a
consequence (∂ 2 γ̄il ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi ∂pk = 0 for any g(·).
Next, consider the case when the coverage areas of the
two EVCSs share a common boundary. To characterize
(∂ 2 γ̄il ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi ∂pk , let EVCS i be located at (0, 0) and
its neighboring EVCS k, which shares an edge of the cover-
age area with EVCS i, is located at (dm , 0). Then, the edge
between EVCS i and EVCS k, which we denote as (x̄, ȳ), is
characterized by the following equality:
   
g x̄2 + ȳ2 − g (dm − x̄)2 + ȳ2
= pk − pi − μl,k + μl,i .
By differentiating (18) with respect to pk and pi , sequen-
tially, we obtain

Let z̄ = x̄2 + ȳ2 . Then, (20) becomes
g̈ (z̄) 1
= . (21)
ġ (z̄) z̄
Equation (21) is satisfied only when ġ (z̄) is a linear function
and accordingly, g(·) is a unary quadratic function, i.e., (20)
can be satisfied only when g(di,j ) = ζ1 di,j 2 . Hence, for other
types of g(·) except a unary quadratic function, πi ( pi , p−i )
cannot be supermodular since (21) cannot be satisfied.
If g(·) is a unary quadratic function, from Lemma 1,
we know that the change of the boundary of the coverage
area by varying pi and pk is orthogonal to the y-axis when
EVCSs i and j are located at (0, 0) and (dm , 0), respec-
tively. As a result, (∂ ȳ)/∂pi = (∂ ȳ)/∂pk = 0, and from (19),
we can easily see that (∂ 2 x̄)/∂pi ∂pk = (∂ 2 ȳ)/∂pi ∂pk = 0, i.e.,
(∂ 2 γ̄il ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi ∂pk = 0. Therefore, the price adjustment
game is a supermodular game if and only if g(di,j ) = ζ1 di,j 2 .
Proof of Theorem 2
To prove Theorem 2, we need the following two lemmas.
(18) Lemma 2: If g(di,j ) = ζ1 di,j
2 , then π ( p , p ) is a strictly
i i −i
concave function of pi , i.e., (∂ 2 πi ( pi , p−i ))/(∂pi )2 < 0.
Proof: First, we calculate (∂ 2 πi ( pi , p−i ))/(∂pi )2 as

∂ 2 πi ( pi ,p−i )    
= 2 i ( ∂pi i −i ) + pi + f̄˙ γi pi , p−i − Wi
   ∂γ p ,p
  ∂ x̄ ∂ ȳ
x̄ ∂p +ȳ ∂p
∂ x̄
x̄ ∂p +ȳ ∂p
∂ ȳ (∂pi ) 2
i i k k

g̈ x̄2 + ȳ2 ∂ 2 γi ( pi ,p−i ) ∂γi ( pi ,p−i ) 2
x̄2 +ȳ2 × + ∂p
   (∂pi ) 2 i
  x̄ ∂ x̄ +ȳ ∂ ȳ x̄ ∂ x̄ +ȳ ∂ ȳ    
∂pi ∂pi ∂pk ∂pk × f̄¨ γi pi , p−i − Wi . (22)
− ġ x̄2 + ȳ2 3
(x̄2 +ȳ2 ) 2 We note that (∂γi ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi < 0. We also know that the
  ∂ x̄ ∂ x̄ ∂ 2 x̄ ∂ ȳ ∂ ȳ ∂ 2 ȳ coverage area of each EVCS for each EV preference group
∂pi ∂pk +x̄ ∂pi ∂pk + ∂pi ∂pk +ȳ ∂pi ∂pk
+ ġ x̄ + ȳ
2 2 √ is a polygon and the boundary changes in the orthogonal
x̄2 +ȳ2 direction of the boundary if pi changes. Moreover, by dif-
  
  (x̄−dm ) ∂ x̄ +ȳ ∂ ȳ (x̄−dm ) ∂ x̄ +ȳ ∂ ȳ ferentiating (18) with respect to pi for g(di,j ) = ζ1 di,j
2 , we
∂p i ∂p i ∂p k ∂p k
= g̈ (dm − x̄)2 + ȳ2 obtain
(dm −x̄)2 +ȳ2
  ∂ x̄
∂pi = − 2ζ11dm . (23)
− ġ (dm − x̄) + ȳ
2 2

   It should be noted that (∂ ȳ)/∂pi = 0 in this case.

∂ x̄ ∂ ȳ ∂ x̄ ∂ ȳ
(x̄−dm ) ∂p +ȳ ∂p (x̄−dm ) ∂p +ȳ ∂p From (23), we find that the rate of change of the coverage
i i k k
× 3 area is a constant regardless of pi and p−i , and accordingly,
((dm −x̄)2 +ȳ2 ) 2
  (∂ 2 γi ( pi , p−i ))/(∂pi )2 = 0. Furthermore, f̄¨ (γi ( pi , p−i ) −
+ ġ (dm − x̄)2 + ȳ2 Wi ) ≤ 0. Therefore, (∂ 2 πi ( pi , p−i ))/(∂pi )2 < 0.
Lemma 3: Let Bri (p−i ) be the best response of EVCS i
∂ x̄ ∂ x̄ ∂ 2 x̄ ∂ ȳ ∂ ȳ ∂ 2 ȳ when the electricity price of the other EVCSs is p−i . Add η
∂pi ∂pk +(x̄−dm ) ∂pi ∂pk + ∂pi ∂pk +ȳ ∂pi ∂pk
√ . (19) to all components of p−i and let this modified electricity price
(dm −x̄)2 +ȳ2 η η
be p−i , i.e., pk = pk + η for k = i. Then, if g(di,j ) = ζ1 di,j 2
η
Moreover, (∂ 2 γ̄il ( pi , p−i ))/∂pi ∂pk = 0 means that the and η > 0, Bri (p−i ) + η > Bri (p−i ). In other words, even if
change of the boundary of the coverage area with respect to pi all other EVCSs increase their prices by η, the best response
and pk is zero, i.e., (∂ 2 x̄/∂pi ∂pk ) = (∂ 2 ȳ/∂pi ∂pk ) = 0, since x̄ of EVCS i is to increase its price by less than η.

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 616 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, VOL. 6, NO. 2, MARCH 2015

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for all EVCSs. We can find that px  py , where  is the May 2003.
componentwise inequality. Then, the following equality can [20] D. L. Huff, “Defining and estimating a trading area,” J. Mark., vol. 28,
no. 3, pp. 34–38, Jul. 1964.
be obtained: [21] (Dec. 2013). Solar generation profile at Elizabeth City State University.
y  y    y   [Online]. Available: http://rredc.nrel.gov/solar/new_data/confrrm/ec/
pi = Bri p−i ≤ Bri px−i < |pxi − pi | + Bri px−i [22] (Dec. 2013). Prices on Solar Panels. [Online]. Available:
y y
= pi − pxi + pxi = pi (26) http://www.wholesalesolar.com
Woongsup Lee (S’07–M’13) received the B.S.
where the first inequality in (26) comes from the mono- and Ph.D. degrees in electrical engineering from
tonicity of supermodular functions5 [19] and the second the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and
Technology, Daejeon, Korea, in 2006 and 2012,
inequality is due to Lemma 3. Therefore, there is a contra- respectively.
diction in (26) and the game has a unique Nash equilibrium. Since 2014, he has been a Professor with the
The convergence of any best response algorithm with any Department of Information and Communication
Engineering, Gyeongsang National University, Jinju,
initial policy to this equilibrium can be proved based on Korea. His current research interests include cogni-
Theorems 1 and 2 in [19]. tive radio network, future wireless communication
systems, machine-to-machine networks, and smart
5 If a function is supermodular and x  y, then Br (x) ≤ Br (y) [19]. grid system.
i i

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 LEE et al.: EVCSs WITH RPGs: A GAME THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 617

Lin Xiang (S’14) received the Bachelor’s and Vincent W. S. Wong (SM’07) received the
Master’s degrees in communications and information B.Sc. degree from the University of Manitoba,
systems from the Huazhong University of Science Winnipeg, MB, Canada; the M.A.Sc. degree from
and Technology, Wuhan, China, in 2009 and 2012, the University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada;
respectively. He is currently pursuing the Ph.D. and the Ph.D. degree from the University of British
degree from the Friedrich-Alexander-University of Columbia (UBC), Vancouver, BC, Canada, in 1994,
Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Germany. 1996, and 2000, respectively, all in electrical
From 2010 to 2011, he was an Exchange Student engineering.
at the University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy, under From 2000 to 2001, he was a Systems Engineer
the support from the Erasmus Mundus Programme. at PMC-Sierra Inc., Sunnyvale, CA, USA. He
joined the Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering at UBC in 2002, and is currently a Professor. His current research
interests include protocol design, optimization, and resource management of
communication networks, with applications to the internet, wireless networks,
Robert Schober (S’98–M’01–SM’08–F’10) was and smart grid.
born in Neuendettelsau, Germany, in 1971. He Dr. Wong is an Associate Editor of the IEEE T RANSACTIONS ON
received the Dipl. (Univ.) and the Ph.D. degrees C OMMUNICATIONS. He has served on the editorial boards of the
in electrical engineering from the University IEEE T RANSACTIONS ON V EHICULAR T ECHNOLOGY and the Journal of
of Erlangen-Nuermberg, Erlangen, Germany, Communications and Networks. He is the Technical Program Co-Chair of
in 1997 and 2000, respectively. the IEEE SmartGridComm’14. He has served as the Symposium Co-Chair
From 2001 to 2002, he was a Post-Doctoral of the IEEE SmartGridComm’13—Communications Networks for Smart Grid
Fellow at the University of Toronto, Toronto, and Smart Metering Symposium, and EEE Globecom’13—Communication
ON, Canada, sponsored by the German Academic Software, Services, and Multimedia Application Symposium. He is the Chair
Exchange Service. Since 2002, he has been of the IEEE ComSoc Emerging Technical Sub-Committee on Smart Grid
with the University of British Columbia (UBC), Communications.
Vancouver, BC, Canada, where he is currently a Full Professor. Since
2012, he has been an Alexander von Humboldt Professor and the Chair for
Digital Communication at the Friedrich-Alexander-University of Erlangen-
Nuremberg, Erlangen. His current research interests include the broad areas
of communication theory, wireless communications, and statistical signal
processing.
Dr. Schober was the recipient of several awards, including the 2002
Heinz Maier Leibnitz Award of the German Science Foundation, the 2004
Innovations Award of the Vodafone Foundation for Research in Mobile
Communications, the 2006 UBC Killam Research Prize, the 2007 Wilhelm
Friedrich Bessel Research Award of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation,
the 2008 Charles McDowell Award for Excellence in Research from UBC,
the 2011 Alexander von Humboldt Professorship, and the 2012 Natural
Sciences and Engineering Research Council E.W.R. Steacie Fellowship.
He was also the recipient of the Best Paper Awards from the German
Information Technology Society; the European Association for Signal,
Speech, and Image Processing; the IEEE Wireless Communucations
and Networking Conference 2012, the IEEE Globecom 2011; the IEEE
International Conference on Ultra-Wideband 2006; the International Zurich
Seminar on Broadband Communications; and the European Wireless 2000.
He is a Fellow of the Canadian Academy of Engineering and a Fellow of
the Engineering Institute of Canada. He is currently an Editor-in-Chief of
the IEEE T RANSACTIONS ON C OMMUNICATIONS.

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