Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs.

Zamora
FACTS:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings
and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct
joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines
in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the
PNP Chief.[3] In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire... to improve the peace
and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program
including increased police patrols.[4]  The President further stated that to heighten police
visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the
AFP is necessary.[5] Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate
with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.[6] Finally,
the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely
temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such... time when the situation shall
have improved.
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to
annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and
unconstitutional, arguing that: 
I 
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:
A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY,
EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF
ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION; 
B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE
MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN
DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION; 
C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE
MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

ISSUES:
Issue No. 1
Whether or not petitioner has legal standing;
Issue No. 2
Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces
is subject to judicial review.

RULING:

Ruling on issue no. 1

The petition has no merit.
First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to
raise the issues in the petition.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an
actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party... raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[12]
The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.    
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged.[13]  The term
"interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.[14] The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges "such... personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold
the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no
other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the
IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry.
Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the
petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the
questioned... governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly
represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility
patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties
have... been violated by the deployment of the Marines.
ot only is the presumed "injury" not... personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly
speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not
successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it
does not possess the personality to... assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines.
Ruling on issue no.2
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is
clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The
Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own.
However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave...
abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary
power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The... present
petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that
there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to
support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power... to call was
exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over
the military. In the performance of this Court's duty of "purposeful hesitation"[32] before
declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional,... only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President's judgment. To doubt is to
sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of
such power.
The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the
calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII
Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the
President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil
liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to overrule... the President's determination of the
factual basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
Bengzon vs. Drilon

FACTS:

On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of
Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty
(20) years’ service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both,
having attained the age of seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge
the duties of the office. The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the
salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.

However, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 on January 25, 1975 repealing
Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 (amending Republic Act No.
1568 and Presidential Decree No. 578) which authorized the adjustment of the pension of the
retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members of the
Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the
prevailing rates of salaries.

Included in the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1992 (House Bill 16297) are
appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates to be
received by the retired Justices of the SC and CA. The President vetoed the provisions relevant
on the grounds that “they would erode the very foundation of our collective effort to adhere
faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy and standardization of compensation.” Hence, the
retired Justices of the SC and the CA petitioned the constitutionality of the said veto by the
President with the assertions that the subject veto is not an item veto, the veto by the President is
a violation of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, it deprives the rights of the Justices to be
pensioned, and impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:

WON the veto exercised by the President on selected provisions in the General Appropriations
Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 concerning the adjusted pensions for retired Justices in the SC and
CA is constitutional.

RULING:

The SC, speaking through Justice Gutierrez Jr., declared the veto unconstitutional.
Following the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, each branch of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. Included in
the Executive’s constitutionally vested power is the power to veto, which is not absolute for the
President must do so in its entirety or not at all. In the case at bar, when the President must do so
in its entirety or not at all. In the case at bar, when the President vetoed some provisions of the
1992 General Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing Republic Act 1797 which is beyond
her power to accomplish since P.D 644 never became a valid law, placing the former effective up
to the present.

Sec. 3, Art. VIII provides the fiscal autonomy provided for the Judiciary which means freedom
from outside control. It is guarantee given by the Constitution to the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the COA, COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman in allocating and
utilizing resources. To impose restrictions similar to the veto on certain provisions is equivalent
to dictating how the Judiciary should utilize its funds would construe a conflict with Fiscal
Autonomy.

The retired Justices, pursuant to RA 1797, are entitled to be pensioned. The purpose of the
retirement laws is to encourage competent men and women to enter the government service.
There should be no favored misimpression specially on the fact that the Armed Forces officers
and enlisted men are tens of thousands in number compared to the Justices. Where a judge has
complied with the statutory requisite for retirement with pay, his rights to retire and draw salary
becomes vested and may not thereafter be revoked or impaired.
IN RE: COA OPINION

FACTS:

In June 8, 2010, the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on
Audit (COA) issued an opinion which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50
resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the
personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed
this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong
formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles.

ISSUE:

Did the COA err when it issued its June 8, 2010 opinion?

HELD:

The COA's authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal
autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This authority,
however, must be read not only in light of the Court's fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with
the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court
rulings on these matters.

One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal
autonomy. While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the
first instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the
Judiciary's fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government.
If the judicial branch is to perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to
command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the
exercise of) legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a
violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary to
maintain judicial independence and is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the
grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII.

In Bengzon v. Drilon, we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy
in the following manner: "as envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the
Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on
Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require."
De Castro v. JBC

FACTS:

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days
after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90
days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII
(Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s
power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political
vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall
appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one
from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE:

Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.

RULING:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or
in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the
power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers,
if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII,
most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
JAVIER VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head
when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. 
Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing... trial for these murders.  The
incident naturally heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among
the electorate.  Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or
into supporting the candidate of the ruling... party.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to
run true to form.  Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's
proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the... canvass of
the election returns.  His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed
winner by the Second Division of the said body.  The petitioner thereupon came to this Court,
arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a... division and not by the
Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution.  Meanwhile, on the strength of
his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial
board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of
the winning candidate until further orders.[3] On June 7, 1984, the... same Second Division
ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the
outcome of the case before the Commission... before this Court, the proclamation made by the
board of canvassers was set aside... as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day
period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made.

ISSUE:
Was the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision
of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?

RULING:

Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:

"(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all
member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials."

The exception was the election contest involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa, which
had... to be heard and decided en banc.[11] The en banc requirement would apply only from the
time a candidate for the Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed as winner, for it was only then that
a contest could be permitted under the law.
As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections into two, viz.:  (1) over matters arising before the proclamation, which
should be heard and decided by division in the exercise of its... administrative power; and (2)
over matters arising after the proclamation, which could be heard and decided only en banc in
the exercise of its judicial power.

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge"
as the indispensable imperative of due process... we have held that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to... be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play.  Fair play calls for equal justice

The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are
filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent... law.

WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening
events that have legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been granted
and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as... violative of
the Constitution.

Principles:

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of
the government.  The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice.
Demeteria vs. Alba

FACTS:

Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise
known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977".
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the
National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with
general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayer... whose vital
interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for"
Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who
were allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no... justiciable
controversy fit for resolution or determination.  He further contended that the provision under
consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and
that at any rate, prohibition will not lie from... one branch of the government to a coordinate
branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss, setting forth as ground therefor the
abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom
Constitution of March 25, 1986, which has allegedly rendered the instant petition moot and
academic.  He likewise cited the "seven pillars" enunciated by Justice Brande is in Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936)[4] as basis for the petition's... dismissal.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section
16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading
thereof.  Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
"The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in
the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department,... bureau,
or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment."
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:.
"Sec. 16[5] No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads
of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized... to augment any item in the general
 appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations."
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical
under the 1973 Constitution.  However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the
government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility... in the use of
public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the
transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. 
The leeway granted was thus limited.  The purpose and conditions for which funds may be
transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item
and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item... in the appropriation
of the government branch or constitutional body.

ISSUE:
Whether Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977) is unconstitutional.
Whether the Supreme Court can act upon the opposed Executive Act.

HELD:

YES. Par. 1 of Sec 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said
Section 16 (5) of the 1973 Phil. Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department to another office or agency of the Executive Department to
any program or activity included in the General Appropriations Act without regard as to whether
the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item. It does not only completely disregard
the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative
powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.

Par 1 of Sec 44 puts all these safeguards into naught. Such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.

     YES. The Constitution apportions the powers of the government but it does not make any one of
the three departments subordinate to another. If an act is declared void, it is not because the
judges have any control over the legislative power but because the act is forbidden by the
Constitution.

Where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had
assumed to do as void.
League of Cities of Philippines vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines
(LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assail the constitutionality of the
sixteen (16) laws, each converting... the municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws,
hereinafter) and seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting
plebiscites pursuant to subject laws.
By Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions
and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution, specifically
its Section 10, Article X and the equal protection... clause.
The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2, 2009 Resolution boils
down to whether or not the required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited
only to the initial vote on the petition or also to the subsequent voting on the... motion for
reconsideration where the Court is called upon and actually votes on the constitutionality of a
law or like issuances
As earlier stated, the instant petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for
violation of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal-protection
clause. The wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities, the petitioners... bemoan, will
reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), since more cities will
partake of the internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of the LGC of 1991.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the cityhood laws violate (1) Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and (2) the equal
protection clause.

RULING:

By constitutional design and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to create

political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character. But even without any
constitutional grant, Congress can, by... law, create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter
the boundaries of a province, city, or municipality.
In any event, petitioners' constitutional objection would still be untenable even if we were to
assume purely ex hypothesis the correctness of their underlying thesis, viz: that the conversion of
a municipality to a city shall be in accordance with, among other things, the... income criterion
set forth in the LGC of 1991, and in no other; otherwise, the conversion is invalid. We shall
explain.
Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the Court
finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws
to be exempt from the PhP 100 million income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws,...
which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final analysis, to the "criteria
established in the Local Government Code," pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution.
We shall now proceed to discuss this exemption angle.
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting
law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may
render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience,... an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate
this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law
itself,[3 resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its... letter.
It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical inferences derivable
therefrom assume relevancy in discovering legislative intent.
Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in interpreting a statute. In
construing a statute, the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the Legislature
and to adopt the sense that best harmonizes with the context and promotes... in the fullest manner
the policy and objects of the legislature
And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As we see it,
petitioners have not overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the laws in question.
Mendoza v. Court of First Instance

FACTS: