Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Evaluation
Copyright © 2001
SAGE Publications (London,
Thousand Oaks and New Delhi)
[1356–3890 (200104)7:2; 164–180; 018657]
Vol 7(2): 164–180
Dialogue on Dialogue
TINEKE A. ABMA
Erasmus University, Holland
JENNIFER C. GREENE
University of Illinois, USA
OV E K A R L S S O N
University of Mälardalen, Sweden
K AT H E R I N E RYA N
University of Illinois, USA
T H O M A S A . S C H WA N D T
University of Illinois, USA
G U Y A . M . W I D D E R S H OV E N
University of Maastricht, Holland
The text you are about to read is a dialogical text on dialogue and evaluation.
It is a conversation between a group of scholars who have studied and
published on the concept of dialogue and the value of dialogue for the
practice of evaluation. The text is based on the field notes of a panel meeting
held during a gathering of the European Evaluation Society to discuss this
topic. It also contains an analysis of essays written in preparation for the panel
in answer to the following carefully selected questions. What is your concept
of dialogue? Why do you think dialogue is important for evaluation, especially
for programme evaluation in the public sector and civil society? During an
evaluation, what are the essential characteristics of a meaningful dialogue?
Who participates? What do they talk about? What is the evaluator’s role?
What prior value commitments or facilitating conditions are necessary? What
are desired outcomes? What are the most important cautions we should take
when conducting a more dialogical evaluation and finally, how ‘good’ are the
dialogues we conduct, and what in fact constitutes ‘good’ dialogue?
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Tineke A. Abma
In her evaluation work Tineke has concentrated on approaches that ‘fit’ with
more interactive styles of policy making and takes a special interest in social con-
structionist and postmodern theories. Her practice is mainly located in the health-
care sector (vocational rehabilitation, palliative care), but she has also conducted
evaluation projects in the field of social revitalization, performing-arts education
and aviation infrastructure.
Jennifer C. Greene
Jennifer has been a scholar-practitioner in the evaluation community for over two
decades. In her work she has concentrated on qualitative-interpretive, partici-
patory-collaborative and mixed-method approaches to evaluation. Her evalu-
ation practice is concentrated in the domains of public programmes for children,
youth and families.
Ove Karlsson
Ove is interested in dialectic methods and critical theory. His evaluation practice
has been mainly in the area of education and policy making focussing on mu-
nicipality and county levels.
Katherine Ryan
Kathy takes a special interest in democratic forms of evaluation. Her evaluation
practice centres around educational programmes. She did not attend the panel in
person and her remarks are based on the essay she submitted.
Thomas A. Schwandt
Tom has mostly written on the philosophical and intellectual traditions that
inform interpretive studies in the social sciences and takes a special interest in the
role of moral concerns and moral inquiry in the social sciences. He is more con-
cerned about evaluation as a human activity than as a professional practice.
Guy A. M. Widdershoven
Guy takes a special interest in hermeneutics and empirical ethics. His evaluation
practice has been in the area of mental-health care and psychiatry. He was not
able to attend the panel. His remarks have been constructed from notes, emails
and letters.
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Notions and Aims of Dialogue*
Tineke: Let us start with the first question: the conception of dialogue. Tom, in
your essay you presented some provoking ideas about dialogue as a communi-
cative event rather than a method or technique. Could you explain this distinction,
its relevance and implications for evaluation?
Tom: When I talk about dialogue I do not have in mind debates, quarrels or
exchanges of information. Dialogue as a concept can be – and commonly is –
interpreted as a method to resolve differences in order to improve decision
making. We recognize this instrumental approach in the work of House and
Howe.1 Their work is based on the notion that the activity of the evaluator basi-
cally requires something like a ‘good reasons’ approach to making evaluative
judgement. In other words, evaluators should not only present empirical evidence
and deliver a report with their findings, but also engage in a process of delibera-
tion – using reasons, evidence and the principles of valid argumentation to
combine statements of fact and value and reach a reasoned judgement.
It is assumed that the confusion that accompanies conflicting values and inter-
ests will be reduced and that subsequent use of the evaluation will be enhanced,
once evaluators come to understand dialogue as a particular form of argument
well suited for conducting evaluations in democratic societies. Here dialogue and
deliberation are procedures or means to enhance the use of evaluation. Dialogue
is thus defined as persuasion dialogue. The basic goal is to prove a thesis in order
to resolve a dispute or issue.
Based on the ideas of continental philosophers I take a different perspective,
emphasizing the relationship between dialogue and education, in the sense of
Bildung. Education is often cast in instrumentalist terms. It is about acquiring
power and control so that one can tame and order environment, society and self.
To be educated is to be capable of solving problems in these terms. Bildung, on
the other hand, aims at greater understanding of self and others. In line with
Bildung, dialogue in my view is not an instrument for making decisions, but rather
an event that can foster understanding and respect across difference. This alterna-
tive conception of the aim of dialogue is premised on valuing difference and
embracing diversity rather than on seeking unity, convergence and the resolution
of difference. Efforts to reach an evaluative understanding can be ‘useful’ simply
because they help people to come to a clearer understanding of who they and
others are, to a clearer picture of the meaning of their practices and the extent to
which they are morally responsible for their actions. I think that this alternative
conceptualization of dialogue, evaluation and education comes close to the reali-
ties of thinking and doing in everyday life. This conceptualization acknowledges
that we cannot solve every problem and that human activity – including evaluation
– cannot be regulated and controlled.
* As this is a dialogue piece, we do not want to interrupt the flow with references
in the text; unusually therefore the references are in notes following this article.
Additionally, where an author is referred to repeatedly, the same work is referred
to, and therefore only one note for each will appear.
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about direct, face-to-face conversations. Ove, you have done so in your essay with
reference to the work of Buber,5 a Jewish philosopher and Bohm,6 a quantum
physicist. Could you share this with us?
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Tom: That is exactly how I see it. Virtues are required to facilitate the process.
Tineke: Jennifer, how does this link in with your ideas?
Jennifer: For me a good dialogue is one in which the participants treat each
other respectfully. Where participants are not simply behaving according to their
role, but where they are actually engaging as persons. Another essential charac-
teristic is the willingness to take risks. In one of my evaluation projects I experi-
enced how difficult it can be to have such a dialogue. Participants were not
listening to each other, they were acting as administrators, professional teachers
and, as evaluators, we weren’t able to change this at all.
Michael: Isn’t this a very particular conceptualization and one that is very white
and middle-class? I have had experiences with groups and cross-cultural dia-
logues. Some groups are used to shouting, yelling or telling you things right in the
face. For them a calm conversation is imprisoning and oppressing; or groups, like
native Americans, who are meandering, bringing in tradition, and tying it to
history and ancestors. Administrators like to be to the point and ask ‘Where is
this leading us?’ and ‘What does this have to do with the topic?’. I also think that
dialogues change over time. I have seen groups going through different stages.
First they need time to get to know each other, so there is a lot of confusion. After
that several conflicts may arise, and if the group handles these conflicts well they
may be able to talk sensibly.
Jennifer: Good points. In the situation I was referring to the white, middle-class
people were the rudest.
Ove: For me a good dialogue requires honesty and non-strategic behaviour. But
perhaps it is easier for us to say what constitutes a bad dialogue than to describe
a good dialogue.
Hanne: This reminds me of Habermas’ ideas about an ideal speech situation:
the non-strategic behaviour and absence of power struggles.7 In many situations
these conditions are not met. In a project with psychiatric patients I asked them
why they liked to come to the group or why they did not want to come. About 80
percent related their answer directly to dialogue. In this situation it was not poss-
ible to bring groups of patients and bureaucrats together because of asymmetri-
cal relationships. Bureaucrats acted defensively saying ‘We know that’ or ‘OK,
but that’s Tom’. They were not taking the patients seriously and were not willing
to learn from their accounts. And then there is the problem of language. English
is, for example, not my native language, and this is a barrier when it comes to
joining the conversation. There are, however, many other subtle ways to exclude
people from conversations. One may not pick up questions because they do not
‘fit’ into one’s structure. Another problem is that evaluators are often seen as
belonging to the establishment. This may prevent people from being open.
Tineke: I recognize your point about subtle ways of excluding people. I have
also worked with psychiatric patients and have had similar experiences to those
you mention. Therapists warning me ‘They will become psychotic if you ask them
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Tineke: That is precisely, I think, what Kathy is trying to argue. She emphasizes
the importance of comparing and contrasting various theories about dialogue
with empirical materials reflecting what dialogue looks like in practice. She dis-
tinguishes different dialogical genres including ‘discussion’ and ‘conversation’.
Although she prefers a genuine dialogue, she acknowledges that dialogue in the
form of a debate can also be beneficial.
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then the evaluator’s role as an expert must be re-figured. One suggestion, offered
by Bauman, is that the expert becomes an interpreter.13 The evaluator as inter-
preter does not demonstrate but interprets the experiences and meanings of par-
ticipants in the dialogue. The evaluator may also act as a teacher explaining ideas
to other parties.
Tineke: What you call the teaching role – and what I once referred to as the role
of translator, stressing the importance of helping to clarify the meaning of words
and different vocabularies – is very important because participants are not always
familiar with each other’s cultural vocabulary. In your essay you mentioned the
facilitating role; Guy has done this as well. I think we have already talked about
that role: creating conditions for the process of dialogue, enabling parties to raise
their voices and urging them to listen to one another. In order to stress the impor-
tance of reflecting on the process and how participants deal with differences, I
like to use the term ‘process facilitator’.
Ove, you mentioned the evaluator should act as a ‘critical inquirer’. Could you
share your thoughts with us and explain what you mean by ‘critical’?
Ove: I realize that the role I envisioned is closely related to the idea of
evaluation as a form of social science. The term ‘inquirer’ refers to the process of
gathering and analysing information. ‘Critical’ refers to the comments and
questions an evaluator raises in order to take the dialogue further and to
stimulate self-examination. It is quite similar to what you are doing in this
dialogue: probing into the heart of the matter, asking for explanations and
stimulating reflection on underlying assumptions.
Tineke: This explanation helps. It is surely very different from the associations
that I make when I hear the word ‘critical’. It reminds me of what Tom said about
the Socratic virtue of intervention and what Guy once wrote. Let me quote him.
It seems important that participants are stimulated to examine and probe into each
other’s experiences: what is relevant here for you? That kind of openness is often hard
to realize. It requires the willingness to acknowledge that the other might know some-
thing better than you. It requires a Socratic openness: do we know for sure what we
think we know? But that kind of openness should not lead to an impasse (nothing is
certain . . .) but to an insight into the need for collaboration on the right course of
action.
Kathy wrote something about the responsibilities of the evaluator. She put it as
follows: ‘The evaluator is responsible for balancing many interests including the
interests within which he or she is vested.’ Jennifer, you also mentioned responsi-
bilities related to the dialogical process, and these seem close to Kathy’s ideas.
Could you elaborate on these responsibilities?
Jennifer: Sure. I think the evaluator has two main responsibilities. First, she or
he must provide the interpersonal and analytic space needed for meaningful
stakeholder dialogues. Second, the evaluator must ensure that evaluative claims
are warranted. Let me explain the first responsibility. Our position is one of
engagement with the problems of practice in that evaluative context. We strive
to promote understanding of these problems of practice and to facilitate
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Outcomes
Tineke: In the existing literature on dialogue and evaluation, dialogue is often
associated with resolving different viewpoints and reaching consensus. Tom
already referred to the work of House and Howe. You presented an alternative
notion of dialogue and other aims. Could you elaborate on that in terms of poss-
ible outcomes?
Tom: You are right. I think the outcome of dialogue is understanding. However,
this can take a variety of forms and need not necessarily involve agreement and
consensus. Understanding might include common understanding versus agree-
ment. Here participants in the dialogue do not agree but establish common mean-
ings in which to discuss their differences. The second kind of understanding is the
understanding of differences versus a common understanding: participants
understand but do not entirely bridge these differences. However, through analo-
gies of experience or other indirect translations they can at least partially under-
stand each other’s position. The third form of understanding is respect across
differences. Each participant sees that the other has a thoughtful, conscientious
position and participants come to appreciate and respect these positions even
though they may disagree with them. The Socratic virtues I mentioned earlier are
an important way of keeping the conversation open.
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Tineke: The idea of keeping the conversation open relates to the postmodern
critique of consensus. In line with postmodern thinkers I have argued that striv-
ing towards consensus may be dangerous, because it can easily lead to differences
being neglected and the voices of the marginalized or weak remaining unheard.
I think it might be better to define the outcome of a dialogue in negative terms:
the exclusion and marginalization of voices, and hence of people. In this respect
I really like what Hanne and Ove meant when they said it was probably easier to
define a bad dialogue than a good one.
Guy has criticized this position.14 In line with the work of Gadamer he thinks
a dialogue will result in a ‘fusion of horizons’, but he acknowledges that under-
standing – in the sense of common understanding – is always fragmentary and in
danger of collapse. Failures in understanding are not necessarily problematic;
they can direct us towards other possibilities and invoke a process of learning. He
does not, however, want to give up the notion of consensus and in one of our com-
munications about this issue he explained his view on the relation between differ-
ences and consensus as follows:
I think that hermeneutics and postmodernism are closer than often is considered. Con-
sensus requires contradiction and difference. The existence of other views stimulates
further thinking and searching. Consensus is always temporary, new differences can and
will arise that will disrupt the balance and require new movements. One can learn from
differences. In the context of evaluation one needs to create room for differences and
conflicts. From my perspective it seems crucial to urge parties to listen to each other.15
Jennifer, what I particularly liked about your list of outcomes and what hasn’t
been mentioned is the emphasis on developing better relationships. What do you
have in mind?
Jennifer: One of the possible outcomes is the development of agentic, respect-
ful, trusting, reciprocal relationships among diverse stakeholders – the re-engage-
ment of caring and moral purpose in our inter-relationships with one another and
in our conversations about public issues. Other outcomes I envision include: the
surfacing of diverse stakeholder interests and perspectives, values related to the
evaluand, the generation of evaluative claims that are warranted by inclusion, and
the relocation of evaluation from an instrumental, expert-controlled activity to
an activity that embraces dialogue as a way of engagement with the world.
Cautions
Tineke: It seems to me that everyone has said something about lack of accept-
ance in the evaluation community and society at large. Ove, you talk about the
difficulty of explaining the value of the concept for evaluation practice. Please
explain this concern, its background and the risks you see.
Ove: I indeed think that dialogue is a difficult concept to communicate to the
field of evaluation and there is a danger of it being used in an instrumental way.
The usual rationale for evaluation is that it is a process whereby you collect infor-
mation and present criteria against which information can be judged in order to
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Tineke: I recognize your concern about the difficulty of the concept. People
have asked me many times “But is this an evaluation?” after I had presented one
of my evaluation projects. I think that question directly relates to the dominant
conception of and rationale for evaluation. Tom, I think you see other dangers.
Tom: One of the many dangers we should always be aware of in our efforts to
have a genuine conversation is the mistaken belief that understanding arises in
the first instance from the individual subject who thinks, rather than from the
other – someone or something foreign or unfamiliar – that addresses me. Under-
standing, conversation or dialogue, is the encounter with something that asserts
its claims on me.
Tineke: I agree with that. Dialogue assumes understanding is a relational and col-
lective act while our science and culture is marked by individualism. So, we face
the challenge of creating a context in a (scientific) culture that does not welcome
dialogue and its underlying values. What also seems important for the quality of
dialogue is the art of listening, of giving conversation space to other participants
and of tolerating silences. These values are not much appreciated in our contem-
porary Western culture. Speaking up is more important than listening; loudness
dominates silence; action is valued over reflection. I think people can learn the
qualities of a genuine dialogue, but dialogue cannot be applied like a recipe from
a cookbook. Techniques and recipes do not require thinking, and that’s what
makes them convenient and appropriate for the reproduction of routine solutions
and actions. Techniques are, however, not very suitable for creating breakthrough
thinking or listening in a diverse group of people. This requires a combination of
skill, craft and art. Therefore, I like to think of dialogue as a ‘living art’, ‘living’,
because it is an interactive process; it is shaped by and shapes those who engage
in it.16 Jennifer, do you recognize this and what would you like to add?
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Jennifer: Let me first share an observation. I find it interesting that in this era of
increasing technological communications – where on-line educational oppor-
tunities are expanding exponentially and walkways and airways everywhere are
filled with the beeps of cellular phones – evaluators and other social scientists are
turning to dialogue, to a recapturing of meaningful and engaged human inter-
actions. One caution I notice has already been discussed, namely the lack of
acceptance within the evaluation community and larger society. Ove rightly
pointed out that this kind of evaluation implies a loss of other important func-
tions and roles of evaluation like the provision of credible and impartial evidence
for decision making. Other cautions are few evaluators have the skills and sensi-
bilities to conduct meaningful dialogic evaluation. I am thinking in particular of
the subtle ways of exclusion and difficulties related to diversity.
Tineke: It is an interesting paradox you observe, and I see a danger that relates
to the increasing use of virtual communication technologies. It may lead to a
neglect of the embodied qualities of dialogue: the tone, texture of voices, as-
sociative character of conversations. Meaning is not only derived from the
content of language, but also implied in ways of speaking and non-linguistic com-
munication (e.g. body language, gestures).
Several of us mention the lack of willingness to participate among those who
feel superior or inferior. We have already talked extensively about power imbal-
ances and how to handle these. Dialogue assumes symmetrical relationships. In
many situations we encounter power imbalances, and these create at least two
challenges. How, for example, can we motivate those who may lose power and
influence to join the process and how can the voices of the marginalized be
included? The answer to the first question is complicated by the fact that the
nature of dialogue is such that it cannot be enforced. We can only invite people
to join us, and not force them to do so. The answer to the second question is com-
plicated by the ambivalent feelings a dialogue may evoke when it is presented as
a step towards gaining more autonomy. Can we hold that promise? There is the
danger of using dialogue as another technique that will coerce people in a more
subtle way and where people are not encountered as human beings who are com-
petent and necessary for the process, but as necessary components in the process
of creating commitment for preconceived outcomes. Evaluators have a responsi-
bility to prevent such an instrumental use and to avoid forms of pseudo-partici-
pation.
Tom: You are quite right. It has struck me that much of the current Anglo–
American literature on dialogue in evaluation has an instrumental orientation.
Like I said earlier, we may also redefine ‘use’ in terms of better understanding,
as a step in becoming different sorts of people with different sorts of social
arrangements. Americans are not very familiar with that idea. The Swedes and
Norwegians, on the other hand, have a tradition of debate and discussion to
enhance understanding. Dialogue is grounded in the fabric of their societies.
Ove nods . . .
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Tineke: Well, we talked about how to facilitate the dialogical process and the
role of the evaluator. You might find it interesting to read Ove’s work on the value
of artistic methods, such as the use of metaphors and performance theatre and
story workshops.17, 18
Participant #4: Let me play the devil’s advocate. We have been here for almost
two hours, and this is the first time you have asked the audience what they think.
Isn’t that a little late? I mean, if you talk about dialogue and inclusion shouldn’t
the public participate?
Tineke: Our aim was not to have a conversation with the audience, but a
dialogue amongst ourselves. You could have joined in earlier on as other people
did.
Participant #5: What I missed is how you handle pressure and non-pressure
groups in a dialogue.
Participant #6: As has been pointed out one of the most important things is to
keep the conversation open and fluid. What I missed in this respect is an open
approach to power relationships. Why fix these relations?
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Tineke: Interesting point. Thank you. Thank you for your attention and contri-
bution to the conversation. The critical issues raised have clearly added to the
depth and breadth of our understanding, and I hope you appreciated it.
Hanne: Sure. What about you folks, did you enjoy it?
Notes
1. Where we refer to House and Howe we have the following work in mind: House, E.
R. and K. R. Howe (1999) Values in Evaluation and Social Research. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
2. Widdershoven, G. A. M. (2000) Essay written for the panel on ‘Dialogue and/in
Evaluation’ at the Fourth Conference of the European Evaluation Society: Taking
Evaluation to the People, Lausanne, 12–14 October.
3. Where we refer to Gadamer we have the following work in mind: Gadamer, H.-G.
(1960) Wahrheit und Methode. Tübingen: Mohr.
4. Where we refer to Bakhtin we have the following work in mind: Bakhtin, M.
(1953/1980) The Dialogic Imagination. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
5. Where we refer to Buber we have the following works in mind: Buber, M. (1961)
Between Man and Man. London: Collins.
6. Where we refer to Bohm we have the following work in mind: Bohm, D. (1996) On
Dialogue. London: Routledge.
7. Where we refer to Habermas we have the following work in mind: Habermas, J. (1991)
Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
8. Abma, T. A. (1998) ‘Storytelling as Inquiry in a Mental Hospital’, Qualitative Health
Research 8(6): 821–38.
9. Smith, D. (1987) The Everyday World as a Problematic: A Feminist Sociology. Boston,
MA: Northeastern University Press.
10. Ryan, K. (2000) Essay written for the panel on ‘Dialogue and/in Evaluation’ at the
Fourth Conference of the European Evaluation Society: Taking Evaluation to the
People, Lausanne, 12–14 October.
11. Abma, T. A. (2000) Essay written for the panel on ‘Dialogue and/in Evaluation’ at the
Fourth Conference of the European Evaluation Society: Taking Evaluation to the
People, Lausanne, 12–14 October.
12. Widdershoven, G. A. M. (2000) Personal letter in response to Abma.
13. Bauman, Z. (1987) Interpreters and Legislators: On Modernity, Postmodernity and
Intellectuals. Oxford: Polity Press.
14. See Widdershoven, this issue.
15. Widdershoven, G. A. M. (2000) Personal letter in response to Abma.
16. Ellinor, L. and G. Gerard (1998) Dialogue: Rediscovering the Transformative Power of
Conversation. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
17. See Karlsson, this issue.
18. See Abma, this issue.
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