Distribution-System-Reliability Handbook

EL-2651
Formerly EL-81-16-LD
Research Project 1356-1

Final Report, December 1982

Prepared by

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION

Advanced Systems Technology Division
777 Penn Center Boulevard
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15235

Principal Investigators
S. J. Kostyal
T. D. Vismor
R. Billinton

NOTICE
nr THIS REPORT ARE ILLEGIBLE. W
PORTlOk,e
has been
copy to p
ability.

Prepared for

Electric Power Research Institute

3412 Hillview Avenue
Palo Alto, California 94304

EPRI Project Managers

R. Lambeth
W. E. Shula
Distribution Program
Electrical Systems Division

603933' OF THIS
 DISCLAIMER

Portions of this document may be illegible in

electronic image products. Images are produced
from the best available original document.
 ORDERING INFORMATION
Requests for copies of this report should be directed to Research Reports Center
(RRC), Box 50490, Palo Alto, CA 94303, (415) 965-4081. There is no charge for reports
requested by EPRI member utilities and affiliates, contributing nonmembers, U.S. utility
associations, U.S. government agencies (federal, state, and local), media, and foreign
organizations with which EPRI has an information exchange agreement. On request,
RRC will send a catalog of EPRI reports.

auMJ'Pi Bead.

NOTICE
This report was prepared by the organization(s) named below as an account of work sponsored by the Electric
Power Research Institute, Inc. (EPRI). Neither EPRI, members of EPRI, the organization(s) named below, nor any
person acting on behalf of any of them: (a) makes any warranty, express or implied, with respect to the use of
any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this report or that such use may not infringe private­
ly owned rights; or (b) assumes any liabilities with respect to the use of, or for damages resulting from the use
of, any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this report.
Prepared by
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
 ABSTRACT

The overall objectives of this research project were fourfold:

• To determine distribution reliability assessment methods currently

used by the industry

• To develop a general outage reporting scheme suitable for a wide

variety of distributing utilities (reliability model)

• To develop a model for predicting the reliability of future system

configurations (risk model)

• To compile a handbook of reliability assessment methods designed

specifically for use by the practicing distribution engineer

Emphasis was placed on compiling and organizing reliability assessment techniques

that are presently used by the industry or are published in the literature rather
than on researching new areas.

The project examined reliability evaluation from two perspectives:

• Historical assessment

• Predictive assessment

The main objectives of this project were achieved through the development of two
reliability assessment models:

• HISRAM--the historical reliability assessment model

• PRAM--the predictive reliabilityassessment model

Each model was tested in a utility environment by the Duquesne Light Company and the
Public Service Electric and Gas Company of New Jersey. A survey of 56 diverse util­
ities served as a basis for examining current distribution reliability assessment
practices in the electric power industry.

A three-volume final report documents the research performed. This handbook con­
tains the computer programs and a practical guide to distribution reliability.

ni'/V
 EPRI PERSPECTIVE

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The decade of the 1950s should be recorded in history as the era when the major
improvements in distribution electric service reliability evolved. Fuse coordi­
nation alone provided the single most significant improvement. Innovative relay
concepts, supervisory control, improved construction standards, and mobile radio
communications are other significant factors that have brought the quality of
electric service to a plateau where customers place a high level of dependence and
confidence on electric energy for almost all work functions.

While both utilities and the public are aware of and enjoy this improved service, it
is difficult to compare the improved service with service conditions even 20 years
ago. Both the energy applications and the energy requirements have changed.
Further, few records that quantified service reliability were kept before 1950.

Today's electric utilities spend considerable time, effort, and money monitoring
system performance as an "after-the-fact" activity. The historical data obtained
serve both as a means to analyze what went wrong (and correct it) and as a tool to
predict and control future service reliability.

Adequate, consistent, and timely data, then, are the key to electric system perfor­
mance analysis. Distribution, unlike transmission and generation, has suffered
because of the lack of these data. Utilities recognized the importance of history
to predict the future, and in 1977 they issued a Request for Proposal to develop
improved methods to analyze historical performance and to predict reliability of
future systems. This handbook contains the reliability assessment methods and
easily used computer programs to implement the methods developed under RP1356.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this project are to examine reliability evaluation from two
perspectives: historical and predictive assessments. Historical assessment is
examined from the perspective of reliability assessment methods currently used by

v
the industry and used to develop general outage reporting schemes suitable for a
wide variety of distributing utilities. Predictive assessment is examined in terms
of "risk taking"; i.e.. What are the consequences to implementing or not implement­
ing certain system reinforcement strategies? The object is to produce a handbook of
reliability assessment methods and easily used computer programs implementing the
methods.

PROJECT RESULTS

The project objectives were accomplished. Two reliability assessment models were
developed and coded into computer programs: a historical assessment model (HISRAM)
and a predictive assessment model (PRAM). Both computer programs have been success­
fully tested and executed by two participating utilities: Duquesne Light Company
and the Public Service Electric and Gas Company. Both programs are designed specif­
ically for use by practicing distribution engineers.

EPRI Final Report EL-2018, Volume 1 (RP1359), contains the executive summary of this
project. Volume 2 presents the research undertaken to determine present utility
practices in reliability evaluation and the organizations within the utility that
are supported by or require reliability information. The theoretical and utility
background material on which the EPRI reliability assessment models were based is
included in this volume.

Volume 3 describes HISRAM and PRAM in detail. The discussion of HISRAM focuses on
the data requirements for each of the four levels of data analysis. The multilevel
reporting system is designed in a modular manner so that only data required to
support the desired level of analysis must be collected. The output reports are
formatted to display the analyzed data in terms of the standard Edison Electric
Institute system performance indexes.

The principal aim of PRAM is to estimate the reliability of a specific location on

the system. The model provides a means to compare the predicted performance between
alternative system reinforcement strategies. PRAM was incorporated into the distri­
bution feeder planning model developed under RP570. It is emphasized that PRAM
should be viewed as a planning tool and not as a model that will duplicate actual
system performance.

HISRAM, PRAM, and the distribution reliability handbook add to the distribution
planner's repertoire of planning tools. The handbook is available from Research

vi
Reports Center, and the computer programs for HISRAM and PRAM are available from the
Electric Power Software Center.

W. E. Shula, Program Manager

Electrical Systems Division

vi i *•////
 CONTENTS

Section Page

1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 1-1

Scope 1-1
Implementing a Reliability Assessment Strategy 1-2
Reasons for Performing Reliability Analyses 1-2
Electric Power Research Institute Research Project
1356-1 1-3
Organization of This Handbook 1-4
Reference 1-5

2 RELIABILITY MEASUREMENT 2-1

Types of Indices 2-1
System Indices 2-2
Historical Versus Predicted System Indices 2-4
Load-Point Indices 2-6
Absolute Versus Relative Measurement 2-7
References 2-7

3 HISTORICAL RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 3-1

Historical Methods for Compiling System Indices 3-1
Reporting Systems 3-5
Information Systems 3-6
Value of Information 3-6
Accuracy 3-6
Completeness 3-6
Relevance • 3-7
Timeliness 3-7
Accessibility 3-7
Output Design Techniques 3-7
Filtering 3-8
Variance Reporting 3-8
Modeling 3-8

ix
Section Page

Automatic Notification 3-8

Interrogation 3-9
General Design of a Reporting System 3-9
Input and Output of a Reliability Information System 3-10
The EPRI RP 1356-1 Historical Reliability Assessment Model
(HISRAM) 3-12
Structure 3-12
Output 3-14
Input 3-14
Computer-Generated Reporting Forms 3-24
Concluding Remarks 3-24

4 PREDICTIVE RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 4-1

Component Reliability 4-1
Calculation of Load-Point Indices 4-7
Two-Component Series System 4-7
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of Series
Configurations 4-10
Predictive Methods for Estimating System Indices 4-14
Effect of an Alternate Feed on Reliability 4-15
Effect of Solidly Connected Laterals 4-17
Effect of Improper Operation of Protection Devices 4-18
Two-Component Parallel System 4-21
Failure-Modes-and-Effects Analysis of Series-Parallel
Combinations 4-22
Scheduled-Outage Considerations 4-24
Adverse Weather Considerations 4-27
Series Configurations 4-30
Parallel Configurations 4-30
The EPRI RP 1356-1 Predictive Reliability Assessment Model
(PRAM) 4-35
Implicit Perfect Protection System 4-36
Temporary Restoration 4-37
Explicit Perfect Protection System 4-37
Explicit Imperfect Protection System 4-38
Input 4-39
Output 4-41
References 4-46

x
Section Pag
APPENDIX A GLOSSARY A-l
APPENDIX B GENERAL FORMULAE FOR CALCULATING SYSTEM INDICES B-l
APPENDIX C BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM RELIABILITY EVALUATION C-l
APPENDIX D SUPPLEMENTARY EXAMPLES D-l

xi" Xu
 ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page
2- 1 Frequency of Use of Various PerformanceIndices asDetermined 2-5
by an EPRI RP 1356-1 Survey of United States Utilities
3- 1 Definitions of Terms Associated with Multiple Restoration 3-3
3-2 Tabulation of Interruptions by Duration andVoltage Class 3-11
3-3 Relationship Between HISRAM Data Requirements and Output
Capabilities 3-13
3-4 Summary of System Performance Indices 3-15
3-5 Joint Frequency Table 3-16
3-6 Cross-Association (Contingency) Table 3-17
3-7 Sample Listing of Incidents 3-18
3-8 Feeder Trouble List 3-19
3-9 Component Failure Statistics 3-20
3-10 Summary of Switching Operations 3-21
3-11 Sample Reporting Form (Level 4) 3-25
3-12 Guidelines for Keypunching Data Recorded on the Incident Report­
ing Form 3-26
3- 13 Sample Reporting Form (Level 1) 3-27
4- 1 Sample Random Operating History for Transformer Discussed in
the Text 4-2
4-2 Average Operating History for Transformer with the Random
History Depicted in Figure 4-1 4-3
4-3 Two-State Component Representation 4-4
4-4 The Predictive Model Reduces the System Between Source and Load
to a Single Equivalent Component 4-6
4-5 Two-Component Series System 4-7
4-6 Illustrative Series Configuration 4-10
4-7 Simple, Radial Configuration for Illustrating Fai1ure-Modes-
and-Effects Analysis 4-12
4-8 Simple, Radial Configuration with an AlternateSupply Point 4-15
4-9 Two-Component Parallel Configuration 4-21
4-10 Sample Series - Parallel Configuration 4-22
4-11 One of the Two Parallel Supply Paths of Figure 4-10 4-22

xi i i
Figure Page
4-12 Two-State Weather Model 4-28
4-13 Average Performance Profile 4-28
4-14 Example Illustrating IPPS 4-36
4-15 Example Illustrating EPPS 4-38
4-16 Example Illustrating EIPS 4-39
4-17 Load-Point Indices 4-42
4-18 System Indices 4-43
4-19 Summary of Nodes with Worst Mean Failure Rates 4-44
4-20 Capital Cost Summary 4-45
D-l Looped system D-3
D-2 Looped system with automatic sectionalizing and manual ties D-7
D-3 Spot networks D-9
D-4 Substation with manual throwover switching D-l 2

xiv
 TABLES

Tabl e Page
3-1 Incident List for Sample Feeder Serving a Total of 200 Customers
(1000 kVA total connected load) 3-2
3-2 Summary of Information Provided by HISRAM 3-22
3- 3 Data Requirements by Level 3-23
4- 1 Fai 1 ure-Modes-Effects and Analysis of Feeder Depicted in Figure
4-7 4-13
4-2 Bus Statistics for Feeder of Figure 4-7 4-14
4-3 Fai 1 ure-Modes-and-Effects Analysis for Modified Feeder Depicted
in Figure 4-8 4-16
4-4 Fai1ure-Modes-and Effects Analysis for Feeder of Figure 4-7,
Assuming Solidly Connected Laterals 4-17
4-5 Fai1ure-Modes-and-Effects Analysis for Feeder of Figure 4-7
with Imperfect Fusing 4-18
4-6 Summary of Fai 1 ure-Modes-and-Effects Analyses on Feeder of
Figures 4-7 and 4-8 4-20
4-7 Sample Problem Data 4-23
4-8 Sample Problem Data 4-26
4-9 Error Involved in Using Overall Failure Rate Rather than Weather-
Related Rates in Two-Component Parallel Systems 4-32
4-10 Sample Problem Data 4-33
4-11 Data Requirements 4-40
D-l Outage Data for Feeder Depicted in Figure D-l D-3
D-2 Downtime Array D-4
D-3 Analysis of Looped System of Figure D-l D-5
D-4 Summary of Operating Practices for Configuration Shown in
Figure D-2 D-7
D-5 Outage and Switching Data D-8
D-6 Summary of Reliability Calculations D-8
D-7 Outage Data for Figure D-3 D-9
D-8 Analysis of Series Service of Each Substation in Figure D-3 D-10
D-9 Outage Data and Switching Times for Figure D-4 D-12
D-10 Analysis of the Configuration of Figure D-4 D-l 3

xv-Y//
 Section 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

SCOPE

Reliability of existing and planned distribution systems is a concern of all utili­

ties. However, the word "reliability" has a wide range of meaning in the power in­
dustry. At the moment, "adequacy" and "reliability" could be used synonymously in
general utility parlance. Adequacy evaluation encompasses all aspects of assessing
the ability of a component, subsystem, or system to perform its intended function.
Many varied activities such as relay coordination, load flow/contingency analysis,
and equipment sizing rightly fall under this broad definition of reliability evalua­
tion.

This handbook views reliability from a much more restricted perspective which has
its roots in the fields of statistics and probability. Reliability evaluation in­
volves observing outages on the distribution system, noting their causes and effects,
compressing this historical data into relevant summary information, and using this
information to improve the performance of existing systems and predict the perfor­
mance of proposed systems. To this end, two approaches to reliability evaluation
are utilized:

• Historical reliability assessment - the collection and analysis of

system outage data and

• Predictive reliability assessment - combining historical outage data

and theoretical models to estimate the performance of designated
configurations.

Historical methods summarize the actual performance of a distribution system during

a given time period, usually annually, semiannually, or quarterly. The fundamental
datum is a component outage or customer interruption. Each of these incidents is
counted and classified according to some descriptive characteristic such as cause,
duration, or affected area. Measuring past performance includes incident summaries
as well as calculated system indices.

Predictive reliability techniques are more involved and require more effort in data
collection. Realistic, simplifying assumptions are required for practical analysis

1-1
of distribution systems. Predictive techniques rely on two general classes of in­
formation to estimate reliability: component failure statistics and system struc­
ture. Each component is characterized by a failure rate and restoration time. Using
system structure and component performance data, predictive methodologies evaluate
the reliability of specific load points on the system.

Conceptually, historical and predictive approaches to reliability assessment can be

combined to embrace an integrated method for evaluating distribution-system relia­
bility. The ability to recall concise records of past incidents segregated by cause,
location, weather, or voltage class, for example, provides a utility with an excel­
lent means for focusing its attention on specific problems that have plagued it in
the past. The ability to compare the relative merits and deficiencies of proposed
configurations provides a means for utilities to improve future system designs. The
goal of integrated reliability assessment is to ensure that both of these capabili­
ties, supplied from a common source of data (reporting system), are available to
utilities. Discussion of reliability measurement and the review of historical and
predictive methodologies presented in this Handbook reflect an integrated approach
to reliability assessment.

IMPLEMENTING A RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT STRATEGY

The fundamental requirement for performing reliability analyses, historical or pre­

dictive, is-an incident-reporting system. Maintaining the accuracy and relevance of
the reporting system is a large part of the cost of implementing a reliability
assessment strategy. The primary reason that most utilities to date have limited
reliability studies to historical assessment is the additional data which must be
collected to support existing predictive methods. Data collection problems and
costs can be assuaged by designing the reporting system to satisfy a set of well-
defined uses.

Reasons for Performing Reliability Analyses

A hierarchy of uses for data collected by reporting systems was compiled by the
Reliability Task Force of the Edison Electric Institute Transmission and Distribu­
tion Committee in 1971 (1_) and is reproduced below. Additional discussion can be
found in Volume 2 (Section 2) of the EPRI RP 1356 Final Report. Reporting systems
may be used to:

• Furnish management with performance data regarding the quality of

customer service on the electrical system as a whole and for each
voltage level and operating area.•

• Provide data for an engineering comparison of electrical system per­

formance among consenting companies.

1-2
 • Provide a basis for individual companies to establish service con­
tinuity criteria. Such criteria could then be used to monitor sys­
tem performance and to evaluate general policies, practices, stan­
dards and design.

• Provide data for analysis to determine reliability of service in a

given area (geographical, political, operating, etc.) to determine
how factors such as design differences, environment or maintenance
methods, and operating practices affect performance.

• Provide reliability history of individual circuits for discussion

with customers or prospective customers.

• Identify substations and circuits with substandard performance and

ascertain the causes.

• Obtain the optimum improvement in reliability per dollar expended

for design, maintenance and operating programs.

• Provide performance data necessary for a probabilistic approach to

reliability studies. This can be done by comparing and consistently
evaluating the effects on a system's performance of varying the con­
figuration, protective methods, equipment, structural design and/or
operating and maintenance practices. The purpose is to determine
the design, operating and maintenance practices that provide optimum
reliability per dollar expended and, in addition, to use this in­
formation to predict the performance of future transmission and dis­
tribution system arrangements.

A well-defined purpose is a must if a utility wishes to realize a maximum return of

information for the capital invested in creating and maintaining a reporting system.
Discussion of considerations and principles associated with the design of a relevant
reporting system is presented in depth in Section 3 (Historical Reliability Assess­
ment) .

Electric Power Research Institute Research Project 1356-1

EPRI RP 1356-1 was devoted to an analysis of the state-of-the-art in distribution-

system reliability. In addition to this Handbook, it provided for the development
of two reliability models for historical (HISRAM) and predictive (PRAM) performance
evaluation. Both models were designed to reduce the effort involved in implementing
them by eliminating the collection of unnecessary data in favor of a more selective
collection procedure.

The cost of implementing reliability analysis techniques varies greatly, depending

on the needs of a given utility. Both of the models developed under RP 1356-1 are
designed for implementation at any of several levels to reduce effort to the mini­
mum required to fulfill a stated purpose.

1-3
ORGANIZATION OF THIS HANDBOOK

The technical background required to undertake reliability analyses varies with the
type of assessment (historical or predictive) and the complexity of the model. As
stated earlier, historical reliability assessment has its roots in statistics. In
addition to statistics, the field of probability weighs heavily as the basis for
predictive assessment. Some of this background can be gained by consulting the EPRI
1356-1 Final Report; other information can be found in the bibliography in Appendix
C.

This handbook is intended for the distribution engineer with little or no background
in probability and statistics. As mentioned above, rigorous mathematical treatments
can be found elsewhere. The approach used in this book is utilitarian; discussion
is based heavily on examples. The purpose here is to present historical assessment
methodologies in a way that will make the collection and reporting procedure much
more effective and efficient. It is also intended to reduce some of the more com­
plex, yet fundamental, predictive techniques to a level that makes simple calcula­
tions tractable and easily understood.

Organization of the handbook is based on an integrated approach to reliability as­

sessment. Beginning with Section 2, the fundamentals of reliability measurement are
presented. One of the essential elements for inference-making is a way to measure
reliability of service. Standard, consistent indicators of reliability are required
to monitor distribution-system performance and compare the quality of service over
time. Comparison of alternative configurations and protection schemes must also be
based on an established set of indicators (indices). Section 2 contains a discussion
on indices that are similar in their application to both historical and predictive
assessment; it also clearly distinguishes between the calculation techniques of the
two assessment methodologies.

The integrated approach to distribution-system reliability evaluation is demonstrated

by Sections 3 and 4. Section 3 contains a description of historical reliability
assessment with a heavy emphasis on fulfilling established goals. Only in this way
can a utility receive the most benefit from revenue committed to collecting data.
Section 4 is devoted to an explanation of predictive assessment from a cause-and-
effect approach. This reduces the need for vaguely understood equations based on
set theory and probability. In both types of assessment, it is extremely unlikely
that evaluation of large systems can be done by hand. Therefore, both sections are
supplemented with accounts of the two companion computer programs developed under
this contract.

1-4
A glossary of terms can be found in Appendix A. Appendix C contains a bibliography
of reliability literature.

REFERENCE

1. "Guide For Reliability Measurement and Data Collection," Report of the

Reliability Task Force to the Transmission and Distribution Committee of the
Edison Electric Institute, October 1971, unpublished.

1-5
 Section 2

RELIABILITY MEASUREMENT

The ability to weigh the cost of various degrees of system reliability is contingent
upon the ability to make quantitative measurements of reliability. Providing
redundant service paths to each load in a distribution system intuitively appears to
increase distribution-system reliability. However, any analysis of costs versus
benefits requires more than an intuitive feeling of improved reliability. It requires
an answer to the question: How much is system reliability improved by this action?

This section contains a description of some of the popular indicators currently in

use for making quantitative measurements of reliability. These indicators are not
absolute standards; however, they are useful for making relative comparisons between
historical performance and levels of performance deemed acceptable. They provide
common ground for weighing the advantages of one proposed configuration against
another. In addition, they provide valuable inputs to the task of cost-benefit
decision-making. Because these indicators are relative, the magnitude of improve­
ment (reflected in the indices) which will justify increased costs must be decided
by each utility on an individual basis.

TYPES OF INDICES

Generally speaking, the reliability of a distribution system, or any system for that
matter, can be described if two questions are answered:

• How often does the system fail?

• How long does it take to restore the system after a failure has
occurred?

Frequency and duration are the two fundamental aspects of failure which are addressed
in this section on measuring reliability. It is important to realize that there is
no single measure of reliability which may be used to answer these questions. The
emphasis placed on any one index of service continuity varies with application.

Reliability indices may also be classified along spatial dimensions:

2-1
 • Indices of component reliability (component failure statistics)—
indicators which reflect a measure of continuity of service provided
by components.

• Indices of load-point reliability-indicators of continuity of ser­

vice to individual loads. Load-point indices are expressed as
equivalent-component indices; that is, the distribution system is
effectively reduced to an equivalent component which separates each
load from its supply.

• System indices—average indices which reflect a measure of reliability

of service to groups of loads. Traditionally, system indices have
been compiled for the entire distribution system and major subsystems
(for example, voltage class or operating district).

System indices compiled from historical interruptions on the distribution system have
been the most widely used measures of reliability. Although it is possible to esti­
mate system indices (as is shown in Section 4, Predictive Reliability Assessment),
there is a general uneasiness about the additional data required to implement pre­
dictive methods. As viewed here, predictive assessment treats the component as the
fundamental historical entity. By correctly combining component reliability parameter
the distribution system can be reduced to a single, equivalent component separating
any given load from its supply. Based on the load-point equivalents (load-point
indices), estimates of system indices can be computed. Although the specific equa­
tions used to compute historical and predicted system indices differ, the basic con­
cepts are the same.

SYSTEM INDICES

The Edison Electric Institute (EEI) (2_), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) (_3), and the Canadian Electric Association (CEA) (4_) have suggested
a wide range of performance indices. These indices are generally yearly averages of
interruption frequency or duration. They attempt to capture the magnitude of dis­
turbances by weighting the averages with the number of customers interrupted and/or
the amount of interrupted load. A few of the indices are summarized below.

Some performance indices express interruption statistics in terms of system customers:

t The System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) is the average

number of times that a system customer is interrupted during a year.
It is determined by dividing the total number of customers interrupted
in a year by the average number of customers served during the year.
A customer interruption is considered to be one interruption to one
customer.

SAIFI = total number of customer interruptions

total number of customers served

2-2
 § The System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) is the
average interruption duration per customer served. It is determined
by dividing the sum of all customer interruption durations during a
year by the number of customers served.

sum of customer interruption durations (2-2)

SAIDI
total number of customers

• The Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index (CAIFI) is the

average number of interruptions per customer interrupted per year.
It is determined by dividing the number of customer-interruptions
observed in a year by the number of customers affected. The cus­
tomers affected are counted only once regardless of the number of
interruptions that each may have experienced during the year. This
index is generally very difficult to compile due to problems associ­
ated with gathering data on the number of customers affected.

total number of customer interruptions

CAIFI (2-3)
total number of customers affected

• The Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI) is the

average interruption duration for those customers interrupted during
a year. It is determined by dividing the sum of all customer inter­
ruption durations by the number of customers experiencing one or more
interruptions over a one-year period.

sum of customer interruption durations

total number of customers interrupted

• The Average Service Availability Index (ASAI) is the ratio of the

total number of customer hours that service was available during a
year to the total customer hours demanded. Customer hours demanded
are determined as the twelve-month average number of customers
served times 8760 hours. This is sometimes known as the "Service
Reliability Index."

The complementary value to this index, i.e., the Average Service

Unavailability Index may also be used. This is the ratio of the total
number of customer hours that service was unavailable during a year
to the total customer hours demanded.

ASA I = customer hours of available service

customer hours demanded

It is also possible to express service interruption statistics in terms of connected

load rather than in terms of system customers:

• The Average Load Interruption Frequency Index (ALIFI) is the average

kVA of connected load interrupted per year per kVA of connected load

2-3
 served. It is found by dividing the annual load interruptions by
the total connected load.

total load interruptions

ALIFI (2-6)
total connected load

• The Average Load Interruption Duration Index (ALIDI) is the average

interruption duration per kVA of connected load served. It is
determined by dividing the sum of all load interruption durations
by the total connected load.

total load interruption durations

ALIDI (2-7)
total connected load

A third category of indices uses both load and number of customers when computing
system statistics.

• The Average System Curtailment Index (ASCI) is the kVA-hours of con­

nected load interruptions per customer served. It is the ratio of
the total annual curtailment to the number of customers served.

total load curtailment

ASCI (2-8)
total number of customers

• The Average Customer Curtailment Index is the kVA-hours of connected

load interrupted per affected customer per year. It is the ratio of
the total annual curtailment to the number of customers affected per
year.

Average Customer Curtailment Index =

total load curtailment

(2-9)
total number of customers affected

Figure 2-1 shows the degree to which the various indices are accepted by United
States utilities. Indices chosen for inclusion in Sections 3 and 4 of this handbook
are SAIFI, SAIDI, CAIDI, and ASAI. This reflects the predominance of customer-related
indices in widespread use among utilities. In addition, the two load-based indices
ALIFI and ALIDI are included in later discussion.

Historical versus Predicted System Indices

System indices have traditionally been used to evaluate past performance. Their role
in historical reliability assessment and illustrative examples are discussed in Sec­
tion 3. However, as mentioned earlier, the section on predictive reliability

2-4
 CO

o
ce
LU
CQ

SAIDI SAIFI CAIDI CAIFI ASAI ALII OTHER NONE

Figure 2-1. Frequency of use of various performance

indices as determined by an EPRI RP 1356-1
survey of United States utilities.

assessment illustrates ways of estimating system indices from load-point indices.

The natural response to the ability to obtain both historical and predicted system
indices is to make comparisons between the two. Because of the nature of predictive
(probabilistic) methods, results of these kinds of comparisons must be judiciously
applied.

Load-point reliability indices can be used to estimate the system indices produced by
historical models. Although similar indices of system behavior are used by both
approaches to reliability assessment, it is highly unlikely that numerical values
resulting from application of both models to the same system would be identical.
Historical assessment generally summarizes discrete incidents occurring at specific
locations over specific time periods; whereas, predictive assessment estimates the
long-term behavior of systems using component parameters that describe the central
tendency of an entire distribution of possible values. For example, it is possible

2-5
to compile historical indices for a specific feeder by recording only those interrup­
tions which affect it. However, to estimate similar indices using predictive method­
ologies requires incident data from many feeders for an accurate estimate of average
component failure parameters. These component statistics are then combined with
suitable probabilistic models and the feeder configuration to arrive at load-point
indices.

A degree of uncertainty is associated with the average component statistics. A

reasonable way of making comparisons between historical and predicted indices would
be to allow the uncertainty in component parameters to propagate through the calcu­
lations of load-point indices. It would then be possible to place limits on the
estimated system indices. Although historical values cannot be expected to be
identical to predicted values, it is reasonable to expect that they should fall with
in the limits of uncertainty. In addition to uncertainties in component parameters,
there are many underlying postulates about protection-system and electrical-system
operation which affect the size of the uncertainty interval. Propagating uncer­
tainties through calculations is beyond the scope of this handbook and Research
Project 1356-1; thus, the emphasis placed on comparisons with historical averages
should be kept at a minimum.

LOAD-POINT INDICES

Load-point indices are not generally used in historical assessment. However, pre­
dicted values are useful in locating potential trouble areas or substandard circuits
Measures of load-point reliability used in Section 4 are defined below.

Mean Failure Rate U ) is the estimated rate of interruption for

a given load and is measured in failures (interruptions) per year.

Average Annual Downtime (Ugq) is the estimated total annual down-

time and is measured in hours.

t Average Restoration Time (req) is the average interruption duration

and is measured in hours per failure (interruption). It is deter­
mined by dividing the estimated total annual downtime (UeQ) by the
mean failure rate (Aeq). H

U1 /A (2-10)
eq eg' eq

Average Annual Uptime (Agq) is the complement of average annual down­

time and is determined by subtracting the average annual downtime
from the total number of hours in a year.

A' = 8760 - U' (2-11)

eq eq

2-6
 • Steady-State Availability (A) is the probability of a load
being supplied at any time. It can also be expressed as the per­
centage of demand time which is served.

A = A' /8760 (2-12)

eq

ABSOLUTE VERSUS RELATIVE MEASUREMENT

The significance to be placed on predicted indices varies greatly with utilities

and application. Because of uncertainties associated with component failure sta­
tistics and modeling errors, no more than two or three digits may be significant
(if even that many). Thus, decisions should not be based on differences which are
small in magnitude. The relative nature of the results must be emphasized, and the
magnitude of improvement which will justify increased costs must be decided by each
utility on an individual basis.

REFERENCES

1. M. P. Bhavaraju, "Reliability Measures of System Planning," EPRI Journal,

December 1978, pp. 6-13.

2. "Guide For Reliability Measurement and Data Collection," Report of the

Reliability Task Force to The Transmission and Distribution Committee of the
Edison Electric Institute, October 1971, unpublished.

3. IEEE Committee Report, "Definitions of Customer and Load Reliability Indices

for Evaluating Electric Power System Performance," IEEE Paper A 75 588-4.

4. Canadian Electrical Association, Distribution System Reliability Engineering

Guide. CEA, Suite 580, 1 Westmount Square, Montreal, P.Q., H3Z 2P9, March 1976.

2-7
 Section 3

HISTORICAL RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT

Historical assessment has traditionally relied on system indices and various tabula­
tions of descriptive characteristics collected for each incident to evaluate past
performance. Many kinds of data can be collected to fulfill many different goals.
Without careful definition of purpose, the time and capital spent on data collection
may outweigh benefits. The question which is often asked and which must be answered
by each utility on an individual basis is: What kinds of data are required to imple­
ment a given reliability assessment strategy; that is, what data must be collected
to support a given purpose? This section on historical reliability assessment is
devoted not only to the calculation of performance indices, but also to a general
discussion of the design and use of an incident reporting system which best fulfills
the needs of a given utility.

HISTORICAL METHODS FOR COMPILING SYSTEM INDICES

In Section 2 ("Reliability Measurement"), a list of common system indices was pre­

sented. System indices are designed to reflect reliability of service to groups of
loads and can be compiled not only for the entire distribution system but also for
any designated subsystem (for example, operating district or voltage class). The
example presented here is based on a series of incidents which occurred on a single
feeder over a period of one year. The corresponding incident list is shown in
Table 3-1.

Before delving into some sample calculations, it is useful to review some character­
istics used to describe entries in the incident log. The time interval between the
onset of failure and the repair or replacement of outaged equipment is called restora­
tion time. It is common practice among American utilities to restore as many cus­
tomers as possible through switching operations before undertaking the time-consuming
task of replacing or repairing damaged equipment. This practice creates a potential
for associating several restoration steps with any given outage.

Figure 3-1 depicts a two-step restoration procedure. Each step consists of a series
of switching operations used to restore service to a block of customers before

3-1
 Table 3-1

INCIDENT LIST FOR SAMPLE FEEDER SERVING A TOTAL OF 200 CUSTOMERS

(1000 kVA total connected load)

Connected Total Interruption

Customers Load Affected Duration Duration (hrs) for
Affected by Connected by This (hrs) of Customers/Load
Customers This Restoration Load(kVA) Restoration Restoration Affected by This
Incident Interrupted Step Interrupted Step Step Restoration Step Comments

1 40 40 150 150 .5 .5 Tree-related

2 150 100 800 600 2.0 2.0 Transformer failure

50 200 8.0 10.0

3 0 0 0 0 5.0 5.0 Equipment outage

which did not result
in customer inter­
ruption

4 70 70 250 250 1.0 1.0 Scheduled

5 40 40 100 100 3.0 3.0 Line burned down

a.
NUMBER OF CUSTOMERS AFFECTED BY RESTORATION STEI

1ST RESTORATION
STEP
f

100 < TOTAL AREA IS NUMBER OF

CUSTOMER-HOURS INTERRUPTED 2ND
RESTORATION
STEP

v.
r

50 J

TIME (HOURS)

'-------v------ ^ V
2 8
DURATION OF RESTORATION STEP

A, B: TOTAL CUSTOMER INTERRUPTION DURATION FOR CUSTOMERS AFFECTED BY 1ST AND 2ND
RESTORATION STEPS, RESPECTIVELY. A = 2 HRS, B = 2 + 8 = 10 HRS.

Figure 3-1. Definitions of Terms Associated with Multiple Restoration

repairing or replacing damaged equipment. These customers are referred to as "cus­

tomers affected" by the restoration step. Duration of a restoration step is the
elapsed time from the end of the preceding step to the end of the current step.
j. u
Total customer interruption duration for customers affected by the i1 restoration
step is a sum of the durations of all restoration steps leading to the iLn step
(including the i^*1 step). All of these definitions are illustrated in Figure 3-1.

Now consider the incident list shown in Table 3-1. Interruption duration and number
of customers affected are shown for each step used in restoration. This example

3-3
illustrates the fundamental data required for calculating historical performance
indices as described below:

<.ATFT _ total customer interruptions

total customers served

40 + 150 + 70 + 40
200

= 1.5 interruptions for year

On the average, customers served from this feeder experienced

between 1 and 2 interruptions during the year.

total customer-hours interrupted

SAIDI
total customers served

40(.5) + 100(2.0) + 50(10.0) + 70(1.0) + 40(3.0)

200

= 4.55 hours per year

Note that two restoration steps are associated with the second inci­
dent: 100 customers were without service for 2 hours, 50 customers
were without service for 10 hours. Each customer, on the average,
was without service for 4.55 hours during the year.

total customer-hours interrupted

total customer interruptions

40(.5) + 100(2.0) + 50(10.0) + 70(1.0) + 40(3.0)

40+150+70+40

= 3.03 hours per interruption

The average duration of each customer interruption was 3.03 hours.

(Note that CAIDI = SAIDI/SAIFI.)

customer-hours of service provided

ASA I
customer-hours of service demanded

= 200(8760) - 910
(based on 8760 hours/year)
200(8760)

= .999481

This index indicates that 99.948% of demand (customer hours) was met.
Or interpreted another way, the probability that service was avail­
able at any time during the year was .99948.

3-4
 ni tft = total load interruptions
L total connected load

150 + 800 + 250 + 100

1000

= 1.3

This index (analogous to SAIFI) means that, on the average, there

were 1.3 interruptions per kVA of connected load served during the
year.

ni tri = total kVA-hours interrupted

total connected kVA

150(.5) + 600(2.0) + 200(10.0) + 250(1.0) + 100(3.0)

1000

= 3.82 hours per year

This index (analogous to SAIDI) means that each kVA of connected

load was without service for an average of 3.8 hours during the
year.

The calculation of historical performance indices can be generalized into formulae

which are easily programmed on a digital computer. These formulae are sunmarized
in Appendix B.

REPORTING SYSTEMS

The design and implementation of a good incident-reporting system is fundamental to

both historical and predictive assessment for two reasons:

• Of all supporting roles for reliability assessment, data collection

may involve the greatest expenditure of time and money.

• The ability to add to the extent of reliability information provided

by an existing design depends on the flexibility originally built
into it.

The purpose of the remaining discussion of this section is to present some of the
considerations which should be taken into account in the design of a reporting
scheme and to present an example of this design (the Historical Reliability Assess­
ment Model, HISRAM, developed under RP 1356-1). As a background for this discussion,
the following few paragraphs highlight some of the common properties of all informa­
tion systems.

3-5
Information Systems

An information system is any structure which processes data (input) and produces
information (output). An information system is a filter which accepts input (raw
data) and generates output (information) germaine to decision-making. Because
historical reliability assessment is based on processing collected data, insight into
the nature of an effective reliability assessment system is gained by considering
attributes common to all information systems.

Value of information. The function of an information system is to aid its users in

decision-making. How well this function is fulfilled depends on the value of the
information provided. Value placed on an information system depends on cost and on
the anticipated return as measured by the following qualities:

• accuracy,

t completeness,

• relevance,

• timeliness, and

• accessibility.

Generally, value increases with accuracy, completeness, relevance, timeliness, and

accessibility if these qualities are not outweighed by cost.

Accuracy. It is essential that the information used for making a decision is

what it appears to be. Accuracy is a term used to describe how well the output
of an information system reflects the actual state of the monitored environment.
Loss of accuracy is introduced into a system in four principal ways: data col­
lection (measurement) errors, transcription errors, computational errors, and
modeling errors.

Completeness. Information systems are designed to aid users when they encounter
a specified set of decision-making situations. Completeness refers to the extent
to which available information actually satisfies the needs of system users.
Completeness does not imply large volumes of output. A complete information
system includes all output that is necessary to support design decisions and
only that necessary set of information. For example, a reliability information
system designed to support probabilistic models is incomplete if it cannot pro­
duce component failure rates. The inability of such a system to produce cus­
tomer billing information does not indicate incompleteness.

3-6
 Relevance. Information systems produce output on a regular basis or when
queried by users. Relevance is associated with the degree to which system out­
put matches user requests for information. Relevant output displays the infor­
mation that the user has requested and only the information that the user has
requested. For example, an employee in the public relations department of a
utility may require the number of service interruptions on Feeder A during
1979. If the only information that the employee can request consists of a
listing of all distribution system interruptions in 1979, the relevance of the
available information is quite low.

Time!iness. All information systems have an access cycle: occurrence of

reportable events, input of data into the system, data processing, and output
report production. Timeliness refers to the duration of the access cycle, i.e.,
the time lag between the occurrence of a reportable event and its reflection in
system output. If a utility issues a monthly report of system interruptions and
the cycle time of an interruption is two months, the information contained in
the monthly interruption reports is not very timely.

Access!bi1ity. To be useful, needed information should be readily and promptly

obtainable. Accessibility refers to the ease and speed with which requested
information becomes available to the user. If a user must go through several
intermediaries and wait several days to receive output at the cost of consider­
able man-time, the requested information is not very accessible.

Output Design Techniques. In the preceding discussion, five characteristics of use­

ful information were defined. Two of these attributes, relevance and completeness,
depend primarily upon the specific design properties of system output. The over­
riding emphasis in these concepts is to match available output to the needs of the
users; that is, to supply each user with all the information he requires while sup­
pressing all superfluous information. Several techniques are available for tailor­
ing output to user requirements:

• filtering,

• variance reporting,

$ modeling,

• automatic notification, and

• interrogation.

3-7
Appropriate combinations of these dissemination techniques allow the development of
information systems that are both relevant and complete.

Filtering. Many distinct organizational positions require information about

common subjects. However, these positions often differ in the amount of speci­
fic information required. Each position has a threshold of necessary detail
for any particular category of information. The concept of output filtering
implies that information systems should recognize the varying detail thresholds
and supply information accordingly. For example, the chief operating officer
of a utility is concerned with the system's reliability, but does not require
the same level of detail as a distribution planning engineer who is attempting
to maintain current reliability standards in future additions to the system.
The ultimate goal of output filtering is to reduce the total amount of informa­
tion received by a particular decision-maker while increasing the relevant
information he receives.

Variance reporting. A second technique aimed at increasing the relevance of

information is variance reporting. Variance reports exhibit only situations
that violate established guidelines. The underlying concept in variance report­
ing is to reduce output by noting only abnormal circumstances. A device closely
akin to the variance report is the worst-cast summary. A variance report may
include all feeders undergoing at least three interruptions a year. A worst-
case summary could include the ten feeders experiencing the greatest number of
interruptions in some time period.

Modeling. A detailed description of modeling techniques is beyond the scope of

the current discussion. For the purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient
to note that a mathematical model is, in a general sense, an approximate repre­
sentation of a physical process. The use of models is often effective in con­
densing large amounts of data into a concise and relevant form. For example,
the probabilistic reliability models, which are described in later sections,
combine considerable amounts of data concerning component populations, component
uptimes, component downtimes, and proposed distribution system configurations to
predict the number of times that a specific load point on a planned feeder will
experience an interruption.

Automatic notification. The preceding output control techniques concerned what

forms of information should be released from an information system and to whom
it should be released. The following methods describe modes of information

3-8
 release. Automatic notification imples that the system stores data until some
predetermined time. At this point, data is processed and resulting information
is distributed to the appropriate users. The reliability information systems
of most utilities employ this method by issuing annual and subannual performance
summaries.

Interrogation. An alternative to supplying information via automatic notifica­

tion of system users is retrieval of information through specific user queries.
Utilization of the interrogative technique implies that a formal structure must
exist for processing specific information requests from the data base. Informa­
tion requested in this manner must be presented to the user in an acceptable
format. It is important to reemphasize that the design of a relevant, complete
information system often combines all the preceding methods. Hence, an informa­
tion system may supply a filtered set of output, including variance reports, on
a periodic basis while supporting the capability for processing information via
user interrogation when special projects require nonstandard data combinations.

General Design of a Reporting System

The importance of a clear definition of purpose cannot be overstressed in the design

process. Without a lucid definition of intended uses for the information system,
there is no guarantee of completeness, nor is there any assurance of a maximum amount
of information at the least possible cost. Lack of well-defined goals leads to col­
lection of unused data and unnecessary costs. Use of a reliability information sys­
tem need not be limited to an engineering staff. It may also be used by marketing
people, a purchasing department, and a legal staff as discussed in Volume 2 (Section
2) of the RP 1356-1 Final Report.

Another aspect which should be considered in establishing goals is the type of

assessment, historical or predictive, which is desired. Predictive assessment places
greater demands on an incident reporting system than does historical assessment. For
example, the incident list depicted in Table 3-1 contains entries for interruptions
and for outages which do not cause interruptions. If the only purpose in collecting
this data is to compile system indices, then effort is wasted by reporting all out­
ages. On the other hand, interruption-oriented schemes are not capable of providing
the additional detail required in application to predictive assessment. It is
extremely important that an outage-oriented reporting system be used if the ability
to perform predictive evaluation is desired. Even though an equipment outage may not
result in an interruption, the corresponding data is vital to accurate estimation of
component parameters.

3-9
Input and Output of a Reliability Information System

Data requirements vary with the goals of the reporting system. However, a general
summary of the kinds of data which may be collected is useful. Description of an
incident (interruption or outage) generally requires data about precipitating events
and the corresponding action which was taken (restoration).

• Description of precipitating events

--Time of interruption - time at which interruption or outage

occurred as determined by customer reports or other sources

--Component to which the incident can be attributed; that is, the

outaged equipment

--Cause of the incident (if not directly attributed to equipment

failure); for example, tree contact

--Weather conditions in the vicinity at the time of occurrence

--Protection device (if any) which operated to open the circuit

between the outaged equipment and the electrical source

--Location of outaged equipment or affected area

• Description of corrective actions

--Time at which each restoration step is completed

--Switching devices, if any, involved in the restoration step

--Number of customers or amount of load affected (returned to service)

during the restoration step

Output generated by the information system generally consists of incident lists and
performance tables. Classifications of output are summarized below:

• Incident log - list of incidents. These lists may be compiled by

separating recorded incidents by feeder, operating district, or
voltage class. They provide a chronological record of interruption/
outage occurrences within a specified subsystem.

• Performance indices - list of system reliability indices for a speci­

fied portion of the distribution system.

• Performance tables - statistical tabulation of data. For example,

Figure 3-2 depicts a tabulation of interruptions by duration and
voltage class.•

• Component summaries - special case of a performance table in which

component failure statistics are tabulated.

3-10
 EPAI TEST UTILITY
SAMPLE DATA INCIDENT TEST EON 1977 DATA
GENERAL TABULATION OF DATA

TIME PERIOD 1 ---------- ------------------ FREQUENCY OF INCIDENTS BY - -------------- --PER INCIDENT

FROM 1/ 1/77 DURATION (MINUTES) AVERAGE
TO 1/31/77 0- 61- 121- 181- 241- 301- 361- 421- 481- 541- 601- 661- DURATION (MINUTES)
VOLTAGES 60 120 180 240 300 360 420 480 540 600 660 999999

2.3 KV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
3-11

4 KV 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 240.33
12 KV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
13.2/23 K>/ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
23 KV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
23D - 4 KV 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 99.00
23T - 4 KV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
23T - 23D KV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
69 KV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
138 KV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
OTHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00

total 0 2 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 183.80

Figure 3-2. Tabulation of Interruptions by Duration and Voltage Class.

THE EPRI RP 1356-1 HISTORICAL RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT MODEL (HISRAM)

The remainder of this section is devoted to an illustration of the design of a

reliability information system. It is a discussion of the Historical Reliability
Assessment Model (HISRAM) developed under RP 1356-1. HISRAM is a structured program
designed for flexibility. It combines a generalized outage reporting scheme and
report generator into a single FORTRAN program for storing, retrieving, and analyzing
incidents.

Structure* •

HISRAM is structured to allow any one of four levels of implementation, depending on

the needs and resources of a utility. The levels are numbered from one through four;
level one requires the least effort in collecting data. Level one also provides the
least amount of reliability information. Levels one and two are intended for an
interruption-oriented reporting system; levels three and four accommodate outage-
oriented reporting. Upward compatibility among levels ensures that data collected
at a lower level is not lost upon installation of a higher level. A brief summary of
each level appears below. In addition, data requirements for each level are depicted
graphically in Figure 3-3.

• The first level is equivalent to a "log book." Basic data require­

ments are: location of the outage, extent of the outage (customers
and/or kVA affected), time of the outage, duration of the outage,
and restoration steps required. Provision is made for recording
field comments. Output is available at the system level and
includes both system performance indices and a log of incidents.

• The second level permits analysis of user-defined subdivisions of

the distribution system, as well as the system as a whole. Inter­
ruption causes are identified and can be systematically examined
at level two. Additional output available to the analyst includes
contingency tables and frequency distributions (these are discussed
later).

• HISRAM's third level is intended to support detailed analysis of

components. Component outage rates and outage durations are com­
puted. Manual switching time is estimated. Weather conditions
at the time of an outage are noted. Additional output includes
a table of component reliability parameters and the ability to
include components and weather information in statistical tabula­
tions.

• The fourth level gives more details of protection-system operation,

allowing the user to note the isolating device and any device that
failed to isolate.

In addition to the flexibility built into the structure of HISRAM, the program was
designed for portability. The major element in making HISRAM portable is a self-
contained data management system. This data manager only manipulates the specific

3-12
 HISRAM OUTPUT REPORTS

DATA FROM
PERFORMANCE
OUTAGE REPORTING SYSTEM INDICIES

DATE, TIME. DURATION,

CUSTOMERS AND LOAD LOST

ADDITIONAL
RESTORATION SEQUENCE
DATA

CUSTOMER
FEEDER, LOCATION, COMMENTS
TOTALS

CONNECTED
SUBDIVISIONS PERFORMANCE LOAD
SUMMARY
TABLES
COMPONENT
CAUSE
3-13

POPULATIONS

WEATHER
WEATHER
CYCLE

COMPONENT FAILURE
(DEVICE TYPE)

ISOLATION SEQUENCE
(DEVICE TYPE)

IMPROPER ISOLATION
(DEVICE TYPE)

COMPONENT
RELIABILITY
PARAMETERS

Bigure 3-3. Relationship Between HISRAM Data Requirements and Output Capabilities.
data file required by HISRAM. It is not a generalized data base; however, it does
allow utilities that do not have a data base manager to implement HISRAM. For those
utilities which do have a data base manager, HISRAM is designed in a modular fashion
that allows calls to HISRAM1s data file to be conveniently replaced by calls to the
utility data base.

Output

Information generated by HISRAM is described in the following list:

• Summary of system indices for any defined part of the distribution

system (Figure 3-4) - for example, substation, voltage class, or
operating district.

• Frequency distribution tables - for example, distribution of inci­

dents on the entire system based on duration, load, customers, or
time of day. If compiled by subsystem, the resulting two-dimensional
tabulation (Figure 3-5) is called a joint frequency table.

• Cross-association tables - these are a special kind of frequency dis­

tribution. Joint frequency tables in which the attributes of both
axes are qualitative are called contingency tables or cross­
association tables. An example is shown in Figure 3-6.

• List of incidents (Figure 3-7).

t Feeder trouble lists (Figure 3-8) - list of feeders and correspond­

ing number of incidents. Feeders are listed in order from worst to
best based on the number of incidents incurred.

• Tabulation of component failure statistics (which can be used for

predictive assessment) as depicted in Figure 3-9. This includes
tabulation of protection and switching operations as shown in
Figure 3-10.

Of course, each type of information has its own data requirements. Users must
evaluate the kinds of reliability information they require and the resources avail­
able for data collection to get the maximum amount of information possible. To aid
in this evaluation, the list depicted above has been divided into the four levels
described earlier based on data requirements and is reproduced in Tables 3-2 and 3-3.

Input

The contents of Table 3-3, a listing of required data by level, are divided into two
general classifications:

• reported data and

• data which does not come from the reporting system.

3-14
 EPRI TEST UTILITY
SAMPLE DATA INCIDENT TEST FOR 1977 DATA
GENERAL TABULATION OF DATA

TIME PERIOD 1 SAIFI SAIDI ALII CAIDI ASAI

FROM 1/ 1/77-- - - ----------------- 1 N D I C E S----------
TO 12/31/77 CUSTOMER TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE NUMBER NUMBER OF CONNECTED
1NTERUPT. INTERUPT. LOAD IF.'TERUPT. SERVICE OF CONNECTED LOAD
FREQUENCY DURATION INTERUPT DURATION AVAIL8LTY INCIDENTS CUSTOMERS (KVA)
VOLTAGES (IN/SYCUS)(HR/SYCUS)(VA/SYSVA)(HR/CUS)
3-15

2.3 KV 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000000 0 0 0

i KV .6475 .94 30 .5378 1.4564 .999957 64 9200 4 4 500
12 KV 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000000 0 0 0
13.2/23 KV 3.9083 7.2299 3.2384 1.8499 .999670 26 5300 25600
23 KV 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 .6483 0.000000 5 0 0
230 - 4 KV .1420 .2797 .1202 1.9700 .999987 20 2500 12100
23T - 4 KV .0462 .0431 .0373 .9333 .999998 1 130 670
23T - 23D KV 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.000000 0 220 1070
«9 KV 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000000 0 0 0
138 KV 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000000 0 0 0
OTHER 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 .5406 0.000000 2 0 0
total 2.1046 3.0729 1.7423 1 .4601 .999860 lie 1 7350 83940

Figure 3-4. Summary of System Performance Indices.

 EPRI TEST UTILITY
SAMPLE DATA INCIDENT TEST FOR 1977 DATA
GENERAL TABULATION OF DATA

TIME PERIOD 1 --------FREQUENCY OF INCIDENTS BY - ------------------ --PER INCIDENT

FROM 1/ 1/77 DURATION (MINUTES) AVERAGE
TO 1/31/77 0- 61- 121- 181- 241- 301- 361- 421- 461- 541- 601- 661- DURATION (MINUTES)
DIVISIONS 60 120 180 240 300 360 420 480 540 600 660 999999
3-16

NORTHERN 0 0 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 233.50
central 0 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 189.00
southern 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 74.00

TOTAL 0 2 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 183.80

Figure 3-5. Joint Frequency Table.

 £PA1 TEST UTILITY
SAMPLE DATA INCIDENT TEST fOR 1977 DATA
SPECIFIC TABULATIONS

TIME PERIOD 1 ASSOCIATION OF INCIDENTS BETWEEN CAUSE

(ON ROW) AND WEATHER (ON COLUMN)
FROM 1/ 1/77 1 2 1 A 5 6 7
TO FRI WRM HOT FRZWDY WRMWOY HOTWDY FRI RN WRM RN
NO.OF AVE.DR NO.OF AVE.DR NO.OF AVE.DR NO.OF AVE.DR NO.OF AVE.DR NO.OF AVE.DR NO.OF AVE.DR NO.OF AVE.DR
(MIN.) INC D. (MIN.) INC D. (MIN.) INCD. (MIN.) INCD. (MIN.) INCD. (MIN.) INCD. (MIN.) INCD. (MIN.)

1 DISORD/EMCCY 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 350.0

2 EXT.INTERFER 0 0.0 A 80.5 A 157.0 0 0.0 1 303.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 70.0
3 CONSTRUCTION 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
A DELAYS 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
5 ERRORS - MAN 0 0.0 c 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
6 REQUEST 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
7 CUST.EQUIPMT 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
3-17

S INCORRECT OP 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0

9 THERM.-EQUIP 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
10 ELEC.CONDITN 1 210.0 123.5 9 110.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 0 0.0 3 225.7
11 MECH.CONDITN 0 0.0 1 162.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
12 OPER.CONDITN 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
13 M/0 CHANGE 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
1A P.S.FAILURE 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
15 TESTING 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
16 UNKNOWN 1 330.0 7 151 .A 1 29A.0 1 283.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
17 CONTAMINATE 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
IB WEATHER 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 A 168.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
19 OTHER 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
20 PLANNED 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0

Figure 3-6. Cross-Association (Contingency) Table.

 EPRI TEST UTILITY
SAMPLE DATA INCIDENT TEST fOR 1977 DATA
FEEDER TABULATION

(IMF PERIOD 1 FROM 1/ 1/77 TO 12/31/77

SEO.NO. DATE FEEDER DIVISIONS VOLTAGES
/TIME /LOCATION /CAUSE /WEATHER /(FAILED,FAILING COMP,10.NO)/(CLEAR,PROTECTION ,fAILED)/DEPARTMENT
/COMMENT AND STEP RESTORATION DATA WITH EXTENT AND COMPONENTS USED IN SWITCHING

3/ 4/77 NORTHERN 230 - 4 KV

3-18

6608 L 71 3
1700 G05010212647 WEATHER WRMWDY RN OTHER/UNKNWN CUTOUT NOT LISTED
6606MILLDAM RD
1 3HRS . OMlNS• 1 CUST. 5KVA

5040 7/1 2/77 L 71 3 CENTRAL 23D - 4 KV

1721 F05130189964 ELEC.CONDITN HOT RN OTHER/UNKNWN FUSE NOT LISTED
5040E1SELE RD
1 2hrs . 29MINS. 3CUST. 15KVA

7647 9/ 2/77 L713 NORTHERN 23D - 4 KV

1527 F06150210770 WEATHER HOTWDY RN OTHER/UNKNWN FUSE NOT LISTED
7647FIELD CLUB
1 2HRS. 13MINS. 28CUST. 115KVA

Figure 3-7. Sample Listing of Incidents.

 EPRI TEST UTILITY
SAMPLE DATA INCIDENT TEST FOR 1977 DATA
FEEDER TABULATION

TIME PERIOD 1
1/ 1/77 TO 12/31/77
FEEDER TROUBLE LIST

NUMBER OF
FEEDER NO. INCIDENTS

L713 3
D675 2
V701 2
L 790 2
V216 2
V*33 2
V3C9 2
V573 2
D713 2
vacs 2
D681 2
0693 2
0920 2
V292
0676
0680
0683
0694
0704
0711
0714
0740
07r j
0 762
0769
0770
0803
0821
E162
E68S
L620
L622
L640

Figure 3-8. Feeder Trouble List.

3-19
 EPRI TEST UTILITY
SAMPLE DATA INCIDENT TEST FOR 1977 DATA
COMPONENT ANALYSIS

TIME PERIOD PERCENT OF TIME PERIOD

1/ 1/77 NORMAL WEATHER 100.00 AVERAGE SWITCHING TIME .651 HRS.
12/31/77 ADVERSE WEATHER 0.00
3-20

FAILING COMPONENTS
-- AVE. DURATION —---------------------- OUTAGE RATE - - --------------
TOTAL ----- NUMBER OF OUTAGES ------ N-PLAN PLAN. TOTAL NORMAL ADVERS. PLAN. TOTAL
COMPONENT QUANT. NORMAL ADVER. PLAN. TOTAL (HRS./OUTAGE) (OUTAGES/UNIT/YEAR)

1 TP10H CABLE 13540 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
2 TP10M SM.COM 34900 6 0 0 6 4.947 0.000 4.947 .000173 0.000000 0.000000 .000173
3 TP10H LG.CON 24620 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
A TP1UG CABLE 35330 2 0 0 2 5.775 0.000 5.775 .000057 0.000000 0.000000 .000057

Figure 3-9. Component Failure Statistics.

 EPRI TEST UTILITY
SAMPLE DATA INCIDENT TEST fOR 1977 DATA
COMPONENT ANALYSIS

TIME PERIOD 1
1/ 1/77 AVERAGE SWITCHING TIME .651 HRS.
12/31/77
ISOLATING COMPONENTS
----------R £‘ S T 0 R A T 1 ON------ ---------PRO T E C T I ON------
TOTAL TOTAL AVERAGE NU'iBER OF NUMBER OF PROBABILITY
NUMBER OF SWITCHING SWITCHING PROPER IMPROPER OF FAILURE
COMPONENT SWITCHINGS TIME(MIN) TIME(HR) OPERATIONS OPERATIONS (O-MODE)

1 FUSE 0 0 0.000 6 0 0.000000

2 RECLOSER 0 0 0.000 1 0 0.000000

Figure 3-10. Summary of Switching Operations.

3-21
 Table 3-2

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY HISRAM

Levels
12 3 4

Li sting of Incidents
Including Location and Comments X X X X
Including Identification (e.g., serial number)
of Outaged Equipment X

Performance Indices
Tabulated for Entire System X X X X
Tabulated by User-defined Subsystems XXX

Performance Tables
Feeder Trouble List X X X X

Frequency Table Showing Distribution of

Incidents by Duration, kVA, Customers, or
Time of Day
Tabulated for Entire System X X X X
Tabulated by - User-defined Subsystem (Joint
Frequency Table) XXX

Cross-association Tables (Contingency tables)

Based on:
User-defined Subsystems XXX
Cause XXX
Weather XX
Outaged Equipment XX
Protection Device which Cleared Circuit of Outage X
User-defined Category X

Summary of Component Failure Statistics

Component Failure Rates(A-mode) and Restoration Times XX
Manual Switching Times for Protection Devices X
Q-mode Probability of Failure for Protection Devices X

3-22
 Table 3-3

DATA REQUIREMENTS BY LEVEL

Levels
12 3 4

Reported Data
Restoration Steps (Date, Time, kVA, Customers) X X X X
Feeder X X X X
Location# 0 0 0 0
Comment 0 0 0 0
Subdivision of System XXX
Cause XXX
Weather X X
Outage Equipment X X
Identification (e.g., serial number) of Outaged Equipment# 0
Protection Device Which Operated to Clear Circuit of Outage X
Protection Device Which Should Have Cleared Circuit of Outage
(if different from above)+ 0
Protection Device Used in Switching (each restoration step)+ 0
User Defined X

Data Not Supplied by the Reporting System

Number of Customers in System* 0 0 0 0
Amount of Connected Load (kVA) in System* 0 0 0 0
Historical Weather Percentages+ 0 0
Equipment (Component) Populations by Feeder+ 0 0

X = Data are used in level

0 = Data optional in level
# = Required for extra-HISRAM referencing (Data Base)
* = Required only for performance indices
+ = Required only for component analysis

3-23
HISRAM's primary source of data is the incident data recorded in the field (reported
data). Also, small amounts of data must be collected from secondary sources such as
circuit maps and the National Weather Service.

Computer-Generated Reporting Forms

Once a decision has been made on the level of implementation, HISRAM may be used to
generate the corresponding reporting form. Figure 3-11 depicts an example of an out­
age reporting form produced at level four. (Figure 3-13 shows a similar form pro­
duced at level 1, for comparison.) Although the structure of this report is fixed,
the definition of subdivisions, causes, weather, equipment, protection devices, etc.,
is specified by each utility. Thus, each utility uses a unique form which reflects
its own descriptive qualities. In addition to the reporting form, HISRAM produces a
corresponding set of keypunching guidelines (Figure 3-12) for transferring data from
the reporting form to 80-column cards.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

For additional discussion of HISRAM, consult the User's Manual for the Historical
Reliability Assessment Model. Additional information on historical reliability
assessment may be found in the EPRI RP 1356-1 Final Report, and in the bibliography
contained in Appendix C.

3-24
 < > *£PORT NUMCEB

COWENT

RESTORATION OF SERVICE
INTERRUPTED
DATE TINE FEEDER NO ) SWITCHING
( ) ( ) LOCATION ( ) OPERATION
RESTORED NO. OF RESTORED KVA LOAD RESTORE RESTORE
DATE TIME CUSTOMERS RESTORED COMPONENT COMPONENT
1 t
) ( ) < > ( ) ( ) ( )
2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3 < ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( > ( )
4 ( ) ( ) ( } < ) ( > ( )
5 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
REFER TO SEC. 5

1 SUBDIVISIONS
( ) DIVISIONS
10100 NORTHERN 10200 CENTRAL 10300 SOUTHERN

C ) VOLTAGES
20100 2.3 KV 20200 4 KV 20300 12 KV
20400 1.2/23 KV 20500 23 KV 20600 23D - 4 KV
20700 23T - 4 KV 20800 23T - 23D KV 20900 69 KV
21000 138 KV 21100 OTHER

2 CAUSE
( ) CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT
1 DISORD/EMGCY 2 EXT.INTERFER 3 CONSTRUCTION
4 DELAYS 5 ERRORS - MAN 6 REQUEST
7 CUST.EQUIPMT 8 INCORRECT OP 9 THERM.-EQUIP
10 ELEC.CONDITN 11 MECH.CONDITN 12 OPER.CONDITN
13 M/0 CHANGE 14 P.S. FAILURE 15 testing
16 UNKNOWN 17 CONTAMINATE 18 WEATHER
19 OTHER 20 PLANNED

3 WEATHER

( ) WEATHER CONDITION DURING INCIDENT

1 FRZ 2 WRM 3 HOT
4 FRZWDY 5 WRMWDY 6 HOTWDY
7 FRZ RN 8 WRM RN 9 HOT RN
10 FRZWDY RN 11 WRMWDY RN 12 HOTWDY RN
13 FRZ SNW U WRM SNW 15 HOT SNW
16 FRZWDY SNW 17 WRMWDY SNW 18 HOTWDY SNW
19 FRZ RNSNW 20 WRM RNSNW 21 HOT RNSNW
22 FRZWDY RNSNW 23 WRMWDY RNSNW 24 HOTWDY RNSNW

* FAILING COMP
( ) FAILING COMPONENT
< ) 10 NUPBER OF CONPONENT THAT FAILED
1 TP10H CABLE 2 TP10H SM.CON 3 TP10H LG.CON
4 TP1UG CABLE 5 TP1 SU6MAR. 6 TP1 POTHEAO
7 TP20H CABLE 8 TP20H SM.CON 9 TP20H LG.CON
10 TP2UG CABLE 11 TP2 SU6MAR. 12 TP2 POTHEAD
13 STEP TRANSF. 14 REGULATOR 15 sue TRANSF.
16 OTHER/UNKNWN

5 PROTECTION
( ) PROTECTIVE CONPONENT THAT ISOLATED THE INCIDENT
( > PROTECTIVE CONPONENT THAT FAILED TO ISOLATE THE INCIDENT,IF AN*
1 FUSE 2 RECLOSER 3 SECT '.ONALIZR
4 SECTL.SWITCH 5 CUTOUT 6 SUB BREAKER
7 SUPPLY DROP 8 OTHER/UNKWN

7 DEPARTMENT
( > DEPARTMENT
1 SO.*LD. 2 ss.*s. 3 PS.
4 T.*D. 5 MOT LISTED

Figure 21-11. Sample Reporting Form (Level 4).

3-25
COtUKNS DESCRIPTION
6ENERAL INCIDENT DATA

1- t> REPORT NUNSE*

7-12 DATE - LOSS Of SERVICE
13-H U«£ - LOSS Cf SERVICE
10-24 DATE * EIRST OR 0»LT RESTORATION
25-30 TIKE - fJRST OR ONLY RESTORATION
31-30 RHJHSER Of CUSTOKERS
37-42 KVA Of LOAD LOST
43-48 PROTECTION
40-54 PROTECTION
55-00 FEEDER IDENTIFICATION
07-78 LOCATION Of INCIDENT
80 CONTINUATION FLAG

RESTORATION CARD (1)

SECOND AND THIRD STEP

1- 0 REPORT MA9ER
7-12 DATE - SECOND STEP
13-18 TINE - SECOND STEP
10-24 BUK3ER OF CUST. - SECOND STEP
25-30 KVA OF LOAD - SECOND STEP
31-30 PROTECTION SECOND STEP
37-42 PROTECTION SECOND STEP
43-48 DATE - THIRD STEP
40-54 TINE - THIRD STEP
55-00 NUTOER OF CUST. - THIRD STEP
01-00 KVA OF LOAD - THIRD STEP
07-72 PROTECTION THIRD STEP
73-78 PROTECTION THIRD STEP
CO CONTINUATION FLAG

RESTORATION CARD (2)

FOURTH AND FIFTH STEP

1- 0 REPORT NUK3ER
7-12 DATE - FOURTH STEP
13-18 TINE - FOURTH STEP
10-24 NUH8ER Of CUST. - FOURTH STEP
25-30 KVA Of LOAD - FOURTH STEP
31-30 PROTECTION FOURTH STEP
37-42 PROTECTION FOURTH STEP
43-48 DATE - FIFTH STEP
40-54 TINE - FIFTH STEP
55-00 NUMBER OF CUST. - FIFTH STEP
01-00 KVA OF LOAD - FIFTH STEP
07-72 PROTECTION FIFTH STEP
73-78 PROTECTION FIFTH STEP
80 CONTINUATION FLAG

COMMENT CARD

1- 0 REPORT NUMBER
7-80 COMMENTS

SUBDIVISION,CAUSE, AND COMPONENT CARD

1- 0 REPORT NUMBER
7-12 DIVISIONS
13-18 VOLTAGES
43-45 CAUSE
40-48 WEATHER
49-51 COMPONENT INVOLVED IN INCIDENT
52-03 ID OF COMPONENT INVOLVED IN INCIDENT
04-00 PROT. COMP. THAT CLEARED INCIDENT
07-09 PROT. COMP. THAT SHOULD HAVE CLEARED INCIDENT
70-'2 DEPARTMENT

Figure 3-12. Guidelines for Keypunching Data

Recorded on the Incident Reporting
Form.

3-26
( ) import Nufieta

COMHEWT

•ESTORATION Of SERVICE
IWTEaeUPTED
DATE TIME EEEDER MO .( )
( ) ( ) LOCATION ( )
RESTORED MO. Of RESTORED KVA LOAD
CATE TIME C'JSTCRTERS RESTORED
1 ( > ( ) < ) ( )
2 < 3 ( ) ( > ! )
3 ( 3 ( > ( ) ( )
4 ( ) ( > ( ) ( >
5 ( ) ( ) { ) ( )

Figure 3-13. Sample Reporting Form (Level 1).

3-27
 Section 4

PREDICTIVE RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT

Rather than concentrating on theoretical considerations underlying predictive assess­

ment, this section emphasizes more manifest failure-modes-and-effects analyses of
simple problems. Much of the underlying theory can be found in references cited
throughout this section and by consulting the bibliography in Appendix C. This
section discusses various models for calculating load-point indices based on com­
ponent reliability parameters and system configuration. It also illustrates the
estimation of system indices from load-point indices.

Before delving into an analysis of predictive methods, it is useful to reiterate a

warning made earlier: There is no reason for predicted indices and historical in­
dices to be identical. Relevance of estimated reliability indices depends heavily
on the quality of data (component reliability parameters) and on the accuracy with
which system configuration and operation are modeled. Quality of data is a function
of the accuracy with which permanent forced outages can be counted and attributed
to the correct equipment. For example, in many cases, protection-device lockouts
and blown fuses cannot be attributed to a specific component. If these failures
are not correctly accounted for in assembling component reliabilities, there is
little reason to expect similarity between historical indices and the resulting
predicted values.

COMPONENT RELIABILITY

A 50-kVA distribution transformer is installed on the power system. A basic ques­

tion concerning the reliability of this transformer is: When will it fail? Unfor­
tunately, there is no exact answer to this question. The time between the trans­
former's installation and its failure depends on many unforeseen circumstances; for
example, a tree limb may strike it, it may experience a power surge, or it may
encounter no conditions beyond design specifications. A quantity such as time-to-
failure is a random variable* as shown by the sample failure history depicted in
Figure 4-1.

*A discussion of underlying probability distributions for this and other random

variables can be found in references 1 and 2.

4-1
 4 HOURS 6 HOURS 14 HOURS

TRANSFORMER OPERATING

1 YEAR .5 YEAR 1.5 YEARS

TRANSFORMER FAILED
INSTALLATION 1ST FAILURE 2ND FAILURE 3RD FAILURE

TIME ELAPSED SINCE INSTALLATION

Figure 4-1. Sample Random Operating History for Transformer Discussed

in the Text

The random failure history for a component can be described by average values. For
example, although it is difficult to predict time-to-failure, it is possible to cal­
culate an average time-to-failure based on past performance. For the transformer
operating history shown in Figure 4-1,

m = Mean Time to Failure (MTTF)

= 1 + .5 + 1.5
3

=1.0 year (8760 hrs)

In addition to MTTF, consider two other indices of component reliability:

T = Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)

(1 yr + 4 hrs) + (.5 yr + 6 hrs) + (1.5 yr + 14 hrs)

3

= 8768 hrs

4-2
 r = Mean Time to Restore (MUR)

= T - m

= 8 hrs

MTTF, MTBF, and MTTR are all illustrated in Figure 4-2.

Figure 4-2. Average Operating History for Transformer With the Random
History Depicted in Figure 4-1.

The random cycle of failure and restoration may also be viewed from a slightly dif­
ferent perspective. Figure 4-3 shows a two-state component representation; that is,
the component is either available (operating) or unavailable (failed). What are
the rates of transition between the two states? If m is the MTTF, then

A = 1/m = 1/MTTF (4-1)

is the failure (or hazard) rate. This is the rate of transition from the operating
state to the failed state. Similarly,

y = 1/r = 1/MTTR (4-2)

is the rate of transition from the failed state to the operating state; y is called
the restoration hazard rate. Also,

f = 1/T = 1/MTBF

is called the frequency of failure. For the transformer example.

4-3
 A = 1/m

= 1/8760

= .0001142 failures/hr (1 failure/yr)

u = 1/r

= 1/8

= .125 restoration/hr

f = 1/T

= 1/8768

= .0001141 failures/hr (1.00091 failures/yr)

Figure 4-3. Two-State Component Representation.

Note that failure rate and failure frequency are approximately equal. Because they
are nearly equal, the terms "failure rate" and "failure frequency" are sometimes
used interchangeably. There are, however, conceptual differences, as illustrated
below.

MTTF + MTTR = MTBF and

1 _ 1
MTTF + MTTR MTBF

4-4
If MTTF » MTTR, then

1 1
MTTF + MTTR ~ MTTF '

Thus,

1 1
or A as f.
MTTF ~ MTBF

Another aspect of component reliability is the chance of finding a given component

in the available state. For the two-state model, the long-term or steady-state
availability is:

u = m = MTTF
(4-3)
A + y m + r MTBF

Because there are only two component states in this model, unavailability is:

A r MTTR
U = 1 - A = (4-4)
A + p m + r MTBF

For the example above.

MTTF
.999088 and
MTBF

MTTR
.000912
MTBF

A comparison between the component reliability parameters just presented and the
load-point indices introduced in Section 2 reveals some striking similarities. Load-
point indices are calculated by reducing the system between the source and a load
into a single equivalent component (Figure 4-4) whose characteristics describe the
reliability of service to the given load. These equivalent-component (load-point)
indices are completely analogous to the component parameters discussed above.

For example, A denotes the failure rate of a component. The analogous load-point
index is called mean failure rate (denoted A^ for "equivalent-component failure
rate") and represents the average rate of interruption to a given load. It is
important to realize that the distinction between failure frequency and failure

4-5
 A

DISTRIBUTION
4-6

SOURCE B LOADS SOURCE LOADS

SYSTEM

figure 4-4. The Predictive Model Reduces the System Between Source and Load to a
Single Equivalent Component.
rate remains in effect. Because mean time to restore is generally much less than
mean time to failure, it is assumed that the frequency of failure and the mean
failure rate are approximately equal. Thus, mean failure rate is used to estimate
system indices which involve frequency (refer to the sample calculations which ap­
pear on pages 4-12 and 4-13).

CALCULATION OF LOAD-POINT INDICES

The function of probabilistic analysis of circuits and systems is to determine the

effects of component failure and restoration at specific points on a system and for
the system as a whole. In the application of standard circuit theory, electrical
engineers are accustomed to developing the significant characteristics of a system
by seeking series and parallel combinations of component impedances to form an
equivalent component between source and ground. Analogous network reduction tech­
niques are also useful in reliability analysis. In reliability analysis, the ob­
ject is to combine the X's and r's of components between the source and a load point
into one equivalent x and one equivalent r. This equivalent contains the effects of
all intermediate components upon the reliability of the customer. A first step in
the analysis of radial systems is to consider the two-component series system.*

Two-Component Series System

Consider the series system of Figure 4-5. For the load to be served, both components
must operate properly. One technique for evaluating the reliability at the load is
to combine the two components into one equivalent component. Computationally, this
reduction is performed in the following manner.

Figure 4-5. Two-Component Series System.

* The remainder of this section describes techniques for evaluating distribution-

system reliability. Additional examples may be found in Appendix D. References
1,3, 5, 6, and 7 describe the early theoretical development of these techniques.
References 8, 9, and 10 provide useful summaries of techniques for evaluation of
power-system reliability.

4-7
 Aeq A1 * A2 (4-6)

(4-7)
Ueq = U1 + U2 - Ut ■ U2

Xeq = X1 + X2 (4-8)

Xlrl + A2r2 + AlX2rlr2

(4-9)
eq A, + Ao
I L

In many distribution system applications, equation 4-9 can be simplified by ignoring

the second order terms of the numerator. If x];v2r]r2 << Alrl’ ^2r2’ t^ien

Vl + X2r2
(4-10)
eq A-J + A2

Since this equation, in effect, neglects the possibility of failure to the remaining
component after one component has already failed, it is an exact equation and not an
approximation in situations where this type of component behavior holds. Under
these conditions, however, component behavior is not independent, and the system
availabilities cannot normally be obtained by simple multiplication of the component
availabilities.

The first two indicators of load-point reliability, availability and unavailability,

are probabilities. However, probability is not a very physical indicator of system
adequacy and, in many cases, a better appreciation of the system performance can be
obtained by utilizing the failure rate and the average outage time as primary in­
dices. It is possible to express the equivalent unavailability of a system as the
expected number of hours that the system is in the failed state. Such a transforma­
tion gives a physical interpretation to this probability and serves as a useful
index of system performance. This index is often called the average annual outage
(down) time and is designated .

4-8
Consider the two-component system of Figure 4-5 with

A1 = 1.0 f/yr

x2 = 2.0 f/yr

r-j =8.0 hrs

r2 = 4.0 hrs

Using Eqs. 4-4 and 4-5, component availabilities are computed

A-j = 0.999088 U] = 0.000912

A2 = 0.999088 U2 = 0.000912

Now applying Eqs. 4-6 - 4-9, properties of the equivalent component are determined.

A = 0.998177
eq
U = 0.001823
eq
A =3.0 f/yr
eq J
r = 5.3358 hrs/failure
eq

Computing the expected number of hours in the failed state yields

U1 = U (8760) = 15.97 hrs/yr = average annual outage time

If the MTTF of the equivalent component (system) is much greater than its MTTR, then
the average annual outage time can be approximated by

U' = A r (4-11
eq eq eq

which is equivalent to

Ueq Xlrl + X2r2 (4-12)

Computing the restoration and annual outage times with the approximate Eqs. 4-10
and 4-11 yields

r = 5.333
eq

U' = 15.99
eq

4-9
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of Series Configurations

Armed with Eqs. 4-8, 4-10, 4-12, and an understanding of the term "series" in
reliability applications, it is possible to attack many of the reliability problems
encountered in distribution systems. From the perspective of reliability analysis,
a group of n components are in series if failure of any member of the group
renders the remaining components nonfunctional. Consider Figure 4-6. Since a fault
on any of the six feeder segments causes the feeder breaker to deenergize the entire
circuit, all six components are considered to be in series during a reliability
analysis.

Figure 4-6. Illustrative Series Configuration.

Eqs. 4-8, 4-10, and 4-12 describe the reduction of two series components to a single
equivalent component. They are a special case of the n-component reduction equa­
tions :

n
A
eq
2 A.
1 (4-13)
i=l

n
2 Vi
i =l
r (4-14)
eq
iV'

4-10
 n
u eq Airi (4-15)
i=l

The general relationship among A, r, and U'described in Eq. 4-11 remains valid;
that is,

U' = A r
eq eq eq

The phrase "failure modes and effects analysis," as applied in this report, simply
means that given a system configuration for study:

• A point of interest is identified on the configuration.

• Component failures that lead to service interruption at the point

of interest are identified.

• The effect of these component failures on the reliability of the

point of interest is quantified.

For hand calculations, the simplest and clearest approach to failure modes and
effects analysis is to display the process in tabular form. The following series
of problems illustrates this procedure.

Consider Figure 4-7. In this configuration, all switches are normally closed and
the customer load points A, B, and C are supplied from the primary main by fused
laterals. The feeder breaker and the substation supply bus are assumed to be fully
reliable. Component and switching data obtained from historical information are as
follows. For simplicity, all switching operations require the same amount of time:

• Primary main - 0.10 failure/circuit mile/year

3.0 hrs average restoration time

• Primary lateral - 0.25 failures/circuit mile/year

1.0 hrs average restoration time

• Switching - 0.5 hr

Load point A is affected by failures on the 2-mile, 3-mile, and 1-mile sections of
primary main and by failure of the 3-mile primary lateral from which it is served.
Failure of any of these components causes the breaker to open or a fuse to blow.
The mean failure rate, A , for load A is the sum of the failure rates of these
components.

4-11
 2 MILES

2 MILES 3 MILES 1 MILE

3 MILES 1 MILE

Figure 4-7. Simple, radial configuration for illustrating

fai1ure-modes-and-effects analysis.

Ueq)A = (-1 f/mi/yr)(2 mi) + (.1 f/mi/yr)(3 mi) +

(.1 f/mi/yr)(1 mi) + (.25 f/mi/yr)(3 mi)

= (.2+ .3+ .1 + .75) f/yr

=1.35 f/yr

The average annual downtime (U' ) is not simply the sum of individual component
downtimes as given by Eq. 4-15. Due to the existence of sectionalizing devices on
the main, load A will not be without service for the entire restoration time (3 hrs)
required by the 3-mile and 1-mile sections of primary main. By opening the appropri­
ate switch and closing the breaker, downtime is limited to .5 hour. Thus, the average
annual downtime for load A is 1.55 hrs. as shown below.

(Ugq)A = (-2 f/yr)(3 hrs/f) + (.3 f/yr)(.5 hr) +

(.1 f/yr)(.5 hr) + (.75 f/yr)(l hr)

= (.6 + .15 + .05 + .75) hrs/yr

=1.55 hrs/yr

4-12
Using Eq. 4-11,

^req^A ^eq^A^^eq^A

= 1.55/1.35

=1.15 hrs/f

These results are summarized in Table 4-1, which also contains a similar analysis
for loads B and C. Note that average restoration time, r^, is not simply a straight­
forward sum of corresponding component values (Eqs. 4-11 and 4-14).

Table 4-1

FAI LURE-MODES-EFFECTS AND ANALYSIS OF FEEDER

DEPICTED IN FIGURE 4-7

Load Point A Load Point B Load Point C

A r Ar A r Ar A r Ar
Component f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr f/yr hrs/f hrs/y:

Primary Main
2 m section 0.2 3.0 0.6 0.2 3.0 0.6 0.2 3.0 0.6
3 m section 0.3 0.5 0.15 0.3 3.0 0.9 0.3 3.0 0.9
1 m section 0.1 0.5 0.05 0.1 0.5 0.05 0.1 3.0 0.3

Primary Lateral
3 m section 0.75 1.0 0.75 __ __ __ __ __ __
2 m section — — —
0.5 1.0 0.5 --- --- —

1 m section — — —
ZZJ1 —- —- 0.25 1.0 0.25

Total Effect 1.35 1.15 1.55 1.1 1.86 2.05 0.85 2.41 2.05

It can be seen that load point C, despite being at the extremity of the primary main,
has the lowest failure rate due to its relatively short primary lateral. It has the
longest average restoration time, however, due to the fact that all restoration is by
repair rather than by isolation of the faulted section and restoration by switching
action. In the case of load point A, any failures on the primary main other than on
the initial 2-mile section involve restoration by switching rather than by repair.

4-13
Predictive Methods for Estimating System Indices

System indices for the sample feeder (Figure 4-7) can be estimated from the load-
point indices of Table 4-1 and the bus data of Table 4-2. As illustrated below,
system indices are weighted averages of predicted load-point indices.

Table 4-2

BUS STATISTICS FOR FEEDER OF FIGURE 4-7

Load Point A Load Point B Load Point C

Connected Load (kVA) 750 500 250

Number of Customers 250 100 50

total customer interruptions

SAIF I
total customers served

(1.35) (250) + (1.1 )000) + (0.85) (50)

400

1.23

total customer-hours interrupted

SAIDI =
total customers served

(1.55)(250) + (2.05)(100) + (2.05)(50)

400

= 1.74

total customer-hours interrupted

CAIDI
total customer interruptions

(1.55)(250) ’2.05)(100) - (2.05)(50)

(1.35)(250) :i.nooo) h (0.85)(50)

= 1.42

customer-hours of service provided

ASAI =
customer-hours of service demanded

400(8760) - [(1.55)(250) + (2.05)(100) + (2.05)(50)]

400(8760) ~~

= .999802

4-14
 total load interruptions
total connected load

= (1•35)(750) + (1.1)(500) + (0.85)(250)

1500

= 1.18

total kVA-hours interrupted

total connected kVA

(1.55)(750) + (2.05)(500) + (2.05)(250)

1500

= 1.80

General formulae for digital computer applications may be found in Appendix B.

Effect of an Alternate Feed on Reliability

Now, consider the effect of an alternate source on the load-point and system indices
just calculated; Figure 4-8 shows the modified feeder. Although failures on the
primary main still interrupt all three loads, downtimes at B and C are improved by
the ability to backfeed. For example, the switch nearer to the breaker can be opened
to isolate failures on the 2-mile section of primary main. Closing the normally
open alternate supply path provides for backfeeding to loads B and C. This analysis
assumes that a switching sequence which involves closing the tie switch and opening
an isolation device requires 1 hour; other switching sequences require .5 hour, as
before. Calculations are summarized in Table 4-3.

2 MILES

2 MILES 3 MILES 1 MILE ALTERNATE

SUPPLY

3 MILES 1 MILE

Figure 4-8. Simple, Radial Configuration

with an Alternate Supply Point

4-15
 Table 4-3

FAILURE-MODES-AND-EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR MODIFIED FEEDER

DEPICTED IN FIGURE 4-8

Load Point A Load Point B Load Point; C

X r Ar A r Ar A r Ar
Component f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr

Primary Main
2 m section 0.2 3.0 0.6 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.2
3 m section 0.3 0.5 0.15 0.3 3.0 0.9 0.3 1.0 0.3
1 m section 0.1 0.5 0.05 0.1 0.5 0.05 0.1 3.0 0.3

Primary Lateral
3 m section 0.75 1.0 0.75 — — —
--- — —

2 m section — — —
0.5 1.0 0.5 — — —

1 m section — —
—- —
0.25 1.0 0.25

Total Effect 1.35 1.15 1.55 1.1 1.5 1.65 0.85 1 .24 1.05

Based on these load-point indices and the bus data of Table 4-2, the system indices
are:

SAIFI = 1.23
SAIDI = 1.51
CAIDI = 1.23
ASAI = .999827
ALIFI = 1.18
AUDI = 1.50

Table 4-3 illustrates that the load point failure rates are not affected by the
ability to backfeed from an alternate configuration. This applies in all cases in
which the restoration of service is done manually. If automatic switching is used
and customer outage time is considered to be so short that the event is not classed
as a failure, then the overall failure rate will be reduced to a value closely
related to the primary lateral value. However, the ability to backfeed has a pro­
nounced effect on the length of the interruption particularly for those customers
at the extremities of the primary main.

4-16
Effect of Solidly Connected Laterals

It can be seen from the cases studied that the load point failure rates are dependent
upon the components exposed to failure and the degree of automatic isolation of a
failed component in the network. This effect can be easily seen in the network of
Figure 4-7. If each lateral is solidly connected to the primary main, all load
points will have the same failure rate, as any fault will cause tripping of the
feeder breaker. The analysis in this case is shown in Table 4-4.

Table 4-4

FAILURE-MODES-AND-EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR FEEDER OF FIGURE 4-7,

ASSUMING SOLIDLY CONNECTED LATERALS

Load Point A Load Point B Load Point C

X r Ar X r Ar X r Xr
Component f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr

Primary Main
2 m section 0.2 3.0 0.6 0.2 3.0 0.6 0.2 3.0 0.6
3 m section 0.3 0.5 0.15 0.3 3.0 0.9 0.3 3.0 0.9
1 m section 0.1 0.5 0.05 0.1 0.5 0.05 0.1 3.0 0.3

Primary Lateral
3 m section 0.75 1.0 0.75 0.75 1.0 0.75 0.75 1.0 0.75
2 m section 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.5
1 m section 0.25 0.5 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.125 0.25 1.0 0.25

Total Effect 2.10 0.92 1.925 2.10 1.39 2.925 2.10 1.57 3.30

The corresponding system indices are:

SAIFI = 2.10
SAIDI = 2.35
CAIDI = 1.12
ASAI = .999732
ALIFI = 2.10
ALIDI = 2.49

4-17
Effect of Improper Operation of Protection Devices

The results shown in Table 4-1 illustrate the effect on the load point failure rates
of increasing the exposure to failure of the overall configuration. The results
shown in Table 4-1 illustrate the effect of perfect isolation arising from a failure
on a primary lateral. The probability associated with successful isolation of a
primary lateral fault depends upon the design of the protection coordination scheme
and on the operation and maintenance of the scheme. Table 4-5 summarizes the calcu­
lations for the case in which the probability of successful isolation of a primary
lateral fault is 0.9.

Table 4-5

FAILURE-MODES-AND-EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR FEEDER OF FIGURE 4-7

WITH IMPERFECT FUSING

Load Point A Load Point B Load Point C

Y r Ar A r Ar A r Ar
Component f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr

Primary Main
2 m section 0.2 3.0 0.6 0.2 3.0 0.6 0.2 3.0 0.6
3 m section 0.3 0.5 0.15 0.3 3.0 0.9 0.3 3.0 0.9
1 m section 0.1 0.5 0.05 0.1 0.5 0.05 0.1 3.0 0.3

Primary Lateral
3 m section 0.75 1.0 0.75 0.075 0.5 0.0375 0.075 0.5 0.0375
2 m section 0.05 0.5 0.025 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.05 0.5 0.025
1 m section 0.025 0.5 0.0125 0.025 0.5 0.0125 0.25 1.0 0.25

Total Effect 1.425 1.114 1.5875 1.20 1.75 2.10 0.975 2.17 2.1125

It is useful to look at these calculations in some detail; consider, for example,

load A. Because there is a chance that fuses on the laterals serving loads B and C
may not operate to isolate lateral faults, load A may be interrupted by a failure
anywhere on the feeder. The failure rates of the laterals serving loads B and C are
.5 f/yr and .25 f/yr, respectively. Effects of these failures on load A are deter­
mined by multiplying the failure rates on laterals B and C by .1 which is the chance
of improper fuse operation. Thus,

4-18
 (x = (2 mi)(.1 f/mi/yr) + (3 mi)(.l f/mi/yr) + (1 mi)(.l f/mi/yr)
eq A
+ (3 mi)(.25 f/mi/yr) + (l-.9)(2 mi)(.25 f/mi/yr)

+ (1 -.9)(1 mi)(.25 f/mi/yr)

= .2 f/yr + .3 f/yr + .1 f/yr + .75 f/yr + .05 f/yr + .025 f/yr

= 1.425 f/yr

Service to load A can be restored by switching operations (.5 hr) for failures on the
1 mi and 3 mi sections of primary main and on the 1 mi and 2 mi laterals. Hence,

(u; )A = (-2 f/yr)(3 hrs/f) + (.3 f/yr)(.5 hr/f) + (.1 f/yr)(.5 hr/f)

+ (.75 f/yr)(1 hr/f) + (.05 f/yr)(.5 hr/f) + (.025 f/yr)(.5 hr/f)

= (.6 + .15 + .05 + .75 + .025 + .0125) hr/yr

= 1.5875 hr/yr

^eq^A (Ueq^A/^eqU

= 1.114

The corresponding system indices are:

SAIFI = 1.31
SAIDI =1.78
CAIDI =1.36
ASAI = .999797
ALIFI = 1.28
ALIDI = 1.85

Comparing Table 4-5 with Table 4-7 it is seen that imperfect fusing causes failures
on all laterals to contribute to load point unreliability. For example, the two
mile lateral section adds (l-.9)(.5) or .05 to load point A's failure rate in Table
4-5. Load point A was unaffected by this lateral in Table 4-2. Table 4-6 depicts
a summary of the four preceding failure-modes-and-effects analyses.

4-19
 Table 4-6

SUMMARY OF FAILURE--MODES-AND-EFFECTS ANALYSESi ON FEEDER

0F FIGURES 4-7 AND 4--8

CASE

la 2b 3C 4d

Load Point A

>eq f/),r 1.35 1.35 2.10 1.425

r „ hrs/f 1.15 1.15 0.92 1 .114

eq
U' hrs/yr 1.55 1.55 1.925 1.5875
eq J

Load Point B

\ f/yr 1.10 1.1 2.10 1 .20

eq J
r hrs/f 1.86 1.5 1.39 1.75
eq
Ueq hrs/^r 2.05 1.65 2.925 2.10

Load Point C

\ f/yr 0.85 0.85 2.10 0.975

eq J
req hrs/f 2.41 1.24 1.57 2.17

Ueq hrs/vr 2.05 1.05 3.30 2.1125

System Indices

SAIFI 1.23 1.23 2.10 1 .31

SAIDI 1.74 1.51 2.35 1 .78
CAIDI 1.42 1.23 1.12 1.36
ASAI 0.999802 0.999827 0.999732 0.99975
ALIFI 1.18 1.18 2.10 1 .28
ALIDI 1.80 1.50 2.49 1 .85

aBase case shown in Figure 4-7

^Case shown in Figure 4-8, alternate source

cAs in Case 1, solidly connected laterals

^As in Case 1, probability of successful lateral fault clearing = 0.9

4-20
Two-Component Parallel System

The configuration shown in Figure 4-9 consists of two parallel components. If only
one of the components is actually required to carry the total load, then the parallel
structure is said to be "redundant." If both components must be available, then in
a reliability sense, this is a series configuration regardless of the actual physi­
cal connections.

Figure 4-9. Two-Component

Parallel Confi­
guration

redundant configurations,

U = U, • u0 (4-16)
eq 1 2

Aeq = A1 + A2 - A1 A2 (4-17)

A1 (^1 ^2^
Xeq (4-18)
1 + Alrl + J2r2

r 1 r2
req (4-19)
rl + r2

If X-jr-j and ^2^2 << ^

Xeq - ^1^2 + r2^ (4-20)

As an example, let = ^2 = anc* ri = r2 = ^ Then,

0.000428 A1 = A2 = 0-999572

U = 0.183184 x 10'6
e9 yi-on
 Xeq = (0.5) (0.5) ^ = 0.0004281 f/yr

r = = 3.75 hrs/failure
eq 2

Ueq(8760) = 0.001605 hrs/yr = average annual outage time

Fai1ure-Modes-and-Effects Analysis of Series-Parallel Combinations

Consider a redundant supply path from 28 kV to 4 kV as illustrated in Figure 4-10.

Analysis of this configuration requires a combination of series-parallel reductions.
The first step is to find an equivalent component for the series components (Figure
4-11) in each supply path.

28 KV

Figure 4-10. Sample Series - Parallel Configuration.

4 KV
28 KV

Figure 4-11. One of the Two Parallel Supply Paths of Figure 4-10.

Each supply path consists of two circuit breakers, a transformer, and a section of
line. Component characteristics are summarized in Table 4-7. ATI breaker failures
are assumed to be short-circuit failures; stuck-breaker modes are ignored. It is
assumed that the 28-kV bus is completely reliable.

4-22
 Table 4-7

SAMPLE PROBLEM DATA

Component Failure Rate (f/yr) Avg. Repair Time (hrs)

28-kV line 0..519 9

28-kV breaker 0..0066 72
28/4-kV transformer 0.,0126 336
4-kV breaker 0..0050 48
4-kV bus 0..0113 4

Based on component failure statistics tabulated in Table 4-7, the equivalent failure
rate for one supply path is

A = 0.0066 + 0.519 + 0.0126 + 0.0050

eq

= 0.5432 f/yr

The average system downtime per failure is

(0.0066 x 72) + (0.519 x 9) + (0.0126 x 336) + (0;0050 x 48)

req " 0.5432

= 17.72 hrs/failure

Average annual outage time is

U A •r = 9.62 hr/yr
eq eq eq

Now, using Eq. 4-19 and Eq. 4-20, an equivalent for two parallel supply paths can be
derived:

Aeq = (0.5432) (0.5432) (1-7--7^7^017-—}

= 0.0019 f/yr

r 17.71
eq = 8.86 hrs
2

4-23
The 4-kV bus is in series with the parallel configuration. Thus,

A = 0.00119 + 0.0113 = 0.01249 f/yr

eq

(0.00119 x 8.86) + (0.0113 x 4)

req 0.01249

= 4.46 hrs

= 0.0557 hrs/yr

It can clearly be seen that the reliability of the 4-kV bus completely dominates the
load point indices because of the series element aspect. This eliminates much of
the benefit provided by redundancy. In many systems, recognition and awareness of
series element dominance can save considerable computational effort.

Scheduled-Outage Considerations

The outage situations previously considered are forced outages--outages resulting

from emergency conditions which require that the component be removed from service
as soon as possible. Components are also removed from service on a scheduled basis
for preventive maintenance. This activity should be clearly distinguished from
corrective maintenance which is performed after a forced outage to restore a com­
ponent to service. A scheduled outage is one "that results when a component is de­
liberately taken out of service at a selected time, usually for purposes of con­
struction, preventive maintenance or repair"(40. A scheduled outage is deferable
and is not considered a random event; a forced outage is a random event.

In the case of a series system, a scheduled outage will result in loss of customer
service. With proper coordination, however, customers can be notified prior to sus­
pension of service. The scheduled outages can be directly combined with the forced-
outage indices to obtain a set of total outage indices at the load point. The two
situations, though both resulting in loss of service, are not the same. One is a
random event, and the other is a scheduled event. This should be clearly understood
before combining the two to produce an overall set of statistics.

This difference becomes more important when considering a parallel redundant con­
figuration such as that shown in Figure 4-9. It is assumed that a scheduled outage
would not take place if one component is already on a scheduled or a forced outage.

4-24
A forced outage could, however, occur on one component while the other component is
on either a scheduled or a forced outage.

Consider the system shown in Figure 4-9 where, in addition to the A-j, A^, r-j, and
component statistics, the components have maintenance or scheduled outage rates
a!|', x'2 and average maintenance outage times of r!j and r^. The rate at which a
forced outage will overlap a scheduled outage is A^ where

^ = aV . [Probability that Component 2 fails while Component 1 is in

maintenance]

+ Ap . [Probability that Component 1 fails while Component 2 is in (4-21)

maintenance]

= A’’A2r^ + AijA-j r'2

The average duration of the event in which a forced outage overlaps a scheduled out­
age is given by

AiA2ri . rl r2
rm x‘]A2rl + >l2Alr2 rl + r2

(4-22)
A2Alr2 r2 rl
AlA2rl + X2Alr2 r2 + rl

If the two components are identical, the equations reduce to

am = 2a"Ar" (4-23)

r» = .r x. (4-24)
m r" + r

Consider the system shown in Figure 4-10 and add the additional scheduled outage data
shown in Table 4-8.

4-25
 Table 4-8

SAMPLE PROBLEM DATA

Scheduled Outages Avg. Outage Time

Component (outages/yr) (hours)

28-kV line 4.0 8.2

28-kV breakers 1.5 8.0
28/4-kV transformer 2.0 8.0
4-kV transformer 1.5 4.0

Assuming that no simultaneous maintenance is done, the scheduled outage rate for one
side is 9.0 occurrences/year. The average scheduled outage time is given by

r„ (4.0 x 8.2) + (1.5 x 8.0) + (2.0 x 8.0) + (1.5 x 4.0)

9.0

= 7.42 hrs/occurrence

Combining both sides

r = 2[9.0 x 0.5432 x |y||] = 0.00828 f/yr

= 17.71 x 7.42
5.23 hrs
m 17.71 + 7.42

These indices do represent random outages at the load point and can therefore be
combined with the indices obtained earlier for a forced outage overlapping another
forced outage to obtain overall load point indices. Therefore,

= 0.01249 + 0.00828

= 0.02077 f/yr

„ _ (0.01249 x 4.46) + (0.00828 X 5.23)

eq 0.02077

= 4.77 hrs/occurrence

4-26
 U1 = 0.099 hrs/yr

The contribution to the overall load point failure rate due to a forced outage over­
lapping a scheduled outage is quite significant in this system, particularly when
it is noted that the primary contributor to the load point failure rate due entirely
to a forced outage event is the 0.0113 f/yr for the 4-kV bus. This is a single con­
tingency event, i.e., a series element in an otherwise redundant configuration. The
contribution due to a forced outage overlapping a scheduled outage could be reduced
by coordinating the maintenance activity and reducing the number of times one side
is down for scheduled maintenance.

Assume that for one side

a" = 4.0 occurrences/yr

and

r" =8.2 hrs/occurrence

8.2
A" = 2 4.0 x 0.5432 x = 0.00407 f/yr
m 8760

11 = 17.71 x 8.2
5.61 hrs
m 17.71 + 8.2

Scheduled outages are normally used to perform preventive maintenance. If the fre­
quency of this activity is too low, the associated component failure rate will in­
crease, resulting in an overall decrease in load point reliability.

Adverse Weather Considerations

Standard 346-73 (4J subdivides the outdoor environment in which a distribution com­
ponent resides into the three weather classifications of normal, adverse, and major
storm disaster. There are obviously an infinite number of possible classifications
rather than just the three discrete levels selected. The difficulties in using a
large number arise in both system modeling and in data collection and validation.
The major storm disaster category is a special situation which is reserved for major
system difficulties. The random behavior pattern associated with the two-state
weather model involving normal and adverse weather is shown in Figure 4-12 for a
single component. Normal-weather failure rate is designated A and adverse-weather
failure rate is designated A1.

4-27
 ADVERSE WEATHER

FAILURE
RATE
NORMAL WEATHER

-------------------------- ►
► TIME

Figure 4-12. Two State Weather Model.

There are many weather situations which could be considered to be adverse. The key
factor is that adverse weather is deemed to be "weather conditions which cause an
abnormally high rate of forced outages for exposed components during the period
such conditions persist." These situations are then grouped into a single classi­
fication. The duration of the normal weather periods and the adverse weather periods
is considered to be a random phenomenon and can be described by an average value.

Let

N = average duration of a normal weather period,

S = average duration of an adverse weather period, and

Xav = avera9e failure rate, including all failures regardless of weather

conditions

These values are illustrated in Figure 4-13.

FAILURE
RATE

■►TIME

Figure 4-13. Average Performance Profile.

4-28
The overall average failure rate xaw is usually the only statistic available-and,
in the case of a series system, is all that is required. It describes the annual
failure rate of the component or system. If two components are placed in parallel,
a load point prediction based upon average component failure rates can be quite in­
correct if the adverse weather failure rate is significant. This is due to a phe­
nomenon known as "failure bunching." Both components exist in the same environment
and therefore, for the relative short duration of the storm, both exist at the
stress level associated with A', the adverse weather forced outage failure rate.
The relative magnitudes of A' and A can be seen from a simple example.

Assume that

= 0.5 f/year for each component

aV

N = 200 hrs

S = 1.5 hrs

A'
N + S

If the fraction of total failures in adverse weather is F and this value is known,
then

N + S
A = A. 0 - F)
av

+ S
A' = A. [F)
av

If F = 0.5, then

A = 0.5 ~2'o'o~ 0.5 = 0.2519 f/yr of normal weather

201.5
A1 = 0.5 0.5 = 33.5833 f/yr of adverse weather
1.5

It can be clearly seen that during the short duration of a storm, the adverse
weather failure rate of each component is substantially higher than the overall
average annual value. Failure bunching does not imply dependency between two com­
ponents. The only dependency is in terms of the common environment within which
they both reside. Individual component failures are assumed to be independent.
4-29
Series Configurations. An equivalent adverse-weather and normal-weather failure
rate can be calculated for several components in series to obtain an equivalent ele­
ment.

n
A = 2 A, f/yr of normal weather
eq k=l K

n
A1 = 2 f/yr of adverse weather
eq k=1 k

Parallel Configurations. The most common assumption in developing an equivalent out

age rate Ap for a two-component redundant configuration including both normal and
adverse weather elements is to assume that no repair is done during the adverse
weather.

Let

Ap = A + S

where

N
A = X1X2 rl + r2/ + N XlX2rl + XlX2r2
N + S

S 1 + xiX2r2 ]
B = 2A-j A^S + A^ A^r
N + S

and

A rlr2 B rlr2 , ,
r„ = Lrl + r2 J
A + B A + B ri + r2 ^

In the case of two identical components where A A2 = A, A^ = a£ = A' and

^ = r2 = r

A = 2Ar
N + S
x + lA'

4-30
 S
B = 2A A' S + Ar
N + S

B
r S
P A + B

Consider an example consisting of two identical components with the following char­
acteristics.

A = 0.2519 f/yr of normal weather,

A' = 33.5833 f/yr of normal weather,

N = 200 hrs,

S = 1.5 hrs, and

r = 7.5 hrs.

7.5 200
A = 2 (0.2519) 0.2519 + (33.5833)
8760 201.5

= 0.000216

1.5
B = 2 (33.5833) fojtT 33.5833 + 0.2519
8760

= 0.002983

Ap = A + B = 0.003199 f/yr

r
7.5 0.002983
P 2 0.003199

= 5.15 hrs

The Ap value calculated using adverse-weather considerations can be compared with

the value obtained using overall average annual failure rates. In this case

Ap = (0.5) (0.5) (7'-58y6o'5) = 0.000428

4-31
If an Error Factor E is defined on the ratio of the two, then

0.003199
E = 7.47
0.000428

Error depends on the contribution to the individual component indices and the over­
all system failure rate made by adverse-weather failures. Table 4-9 shows this
variation as a function of the percentage of individual component failures occurring
during adverse weather.

Table 4-9

ERROR INVOLVED IN USING OVERALL FAILURE RATE

RATHER THAN WEATHER-RELATED RATES IN TWO-COMPONENT PARALLEL SYSTEMS

Percentage of Component
Failures During Adverse
Weather Failures/yr. Error Factor

0.0 0.000431 1.0068

10.0 0.000542 1.2660
20.0 0.000874 2.0416
30.0 0.001427 3.3333
40.0 0.002202 5.1436
50.0 0.003199 7.4749
60.0 0.004416 10.3153
70.0 0.005855 13.6767
80.0 0.007516 17.5566
90.0 0.009397 21.9505
100.0 0.011500 26.8629

The A and B factors are also required if it becomes necessary to use the two-
component formula to obtain an equivalent component to combine with a third compo­
nent. This approach, however, does not completely recognize the failure bunching
in the three-component system, and it is more accurate to use the equations developed
for a three-component parallel redundant system given in (11).

The application of adverse-weather considerations in a series-parallel configuration

can be illustrated using the system of Figure 4-10. Adverse weather may not have
the same effect on all components. In this case, assume that only the transmission
line is affected and that 50% of its failures occur during adverse weather. Let
N = 200 hrs and S = 1.5 hrs.

4-32
For the line

x = 0.519 0.5 = 0.2614 f/yr

X' = 0.519 (^p^) 0.5 = 34.8595 f/yr

The normal and adverse weather failure rates for each component and for each series
segment are shown in Table 4-10.

Table 4-10

SAMPLE PROBLEM DATA

Component X f/yr X'f/yr

28-kV line 0.2614 34.8595

28-kV breaker 0.0066 0.0066
28/4-kV transformer 0.0126 0.0126
4-kV breaker 0.0050 0.0050
0.2856 34.8837

The two parallel segments can be combined using

X = A + B
P

A = 2(.2856)(1^)(2^5)[.2856 + (34.8837)] = 0.000627

B = 2(34.8837)(Jrt^)[34.8837 (ijfg) * .2856 (|^)] = 0.003402

xp = 0.00403 f/yr

17.72 ,
r ''oo4~fcr (1,5) = 10-12 hrs/failure
P 2

The 4-kV bus statistics must now be included in the analysis as a series element.
The load point statistics now become

Xeq = 0.00403 + 0.0113 = 0.01533 f/yr

4-33
 r = (.00403)(10.12) + (0.0113)(4) = 5_6, hrs/fa(,ure
eq .01533

tOq = 0.086 hrs/yr

Scheduled-outage considerations can also be included in the calculation involving ad­

verse weather effects. It was assumed that, in a two-component redundant system, no
scheduled maintenance is performed if one component is already out of service due to
a forced outage or an earlier scheduled outage. It is also reasonable to assume
that scheduled maintenance does not take place if adverse weather is imminent. Under
these conditions, the component failure rate while maintenance is being performed
is the normal weather rather than the overall average annual value. The overlapping
forced-maintenance outage rate for the system of Figure 4-10 is therefore (refer to
Tables 4-7 and 4-8)

a; = 2 (9.0 x 0.2856 x

= 0.004354 f/yr

('7‘4^+1'l7772 = 5‘23 hrs/fai'lure

r 11
m

The overall load-point indices, including permanent forced outages resulting from
normal and adverse weather and scheduled outage activity, are

Aeq = 0.01533 + 0.004354 + 0.01968 f/yr

(.01533)(5.61) + (.004354)(5.23)
r = 5.525 hrs/failure
eq .01968

U' = 0.1087 hrs/yr

eq J

The load point indices are still dominated by the series effect of the 4-kV bus. As
the percentage of component failures in adverse weather increases, the normal weather
failure rate decreases and, therefore, so does the overlapping effect of forced and
scheduled outage events, provided that no scheduled activity is done in adverse
weather. In the limit, if all failures occurred during adverse weather, then a
forced outage could not occur while maintenance activity is being conducted because
the normal-weather failure rate is effectively zero.

4-34
THE EPRI RP 1356-1 PREDICTIVE RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT MODEL (PRAM)

While some predictive calculations may be done by hand, it is impractical to use a

manual approach on very large problems. Application of a digital computer to the
solution of large systems requires generalization of predictive methods, a way of
describing system configuration, and fundamental postulates about operation of the
protection system. The remainder of this section illustrates a digital computer
program which may be used to evaluate the reliability of large radial distribution
systems. It is a discussion of the Predictive Reliability Assessment Model (PRAM)
developed under RP 1356-1.

The approach used to describe PRAM is intended to emphasize the fundamental concept
of continuity of the electrical path between a source and load. Continuity between
a load and an electrical source is provided by an uninterrupted electrical path
between them. For a radial electrical system, failure of any component in the con­
tinuous path between source and load (called the backpath) causes an interruption
to the load.

Calculation of load-point indices is based on the reliability characteristics of

components in the continuous path between source and load and any other elements
which (due to the protection scheme) may interrupt the load. Integrity of the back-
path is influenced by failures in other parts of the system due to the operation of
protection devices. A significant consideration for a given load is the automatic
opening of a protection device which lies in the backpath, although the failed com­
ponent does not. Another factor is the automatic operation of one of these same
devices in response to faults which should have been isolated by an automatic pro­
tection device closer to the failed component. PRAM attempts to capture these
effects of the protection system by providing three distinct protection-system
models (PSM's):

• Implicit Perfect Protection System (IPPS)

t Explicit Perfect Protection System (EPPS)

• Explicit Imperfect Protection System (EIPS)

Each PSM (IPPS, EPPS, and EIPS, respectively) brings results a step closer to reality
by attempting to provide for an additional mode of protection system operation. How­
ever, each model also requires more effort in collecting outage data.

4-35
Implicit Perfect Protection System

"Implied protection" connotes the assumed existence of an automatic protection de­

vice for each and every component in the system. "Perfect protection" means that
these implied protection devices do not contribute to (cause) interruption of a load.
IPPS uses the concept of continuity at its most fundamental level. Only components
in the direct path between source and load contribute to an interruption of the
load. This is a generalization of the two-component series model which was pre­
sented earlier in this section. Calculation proceeds as a straightforward sum of
failure rates and downtimes for all components in the backpath. Explicit protection
is ignored.

IPPS is equivalent to a protection system having an automatic protection device for

every component. Of course, the equivalence only holds if each of these implicit
protection devices are perfect; that is, they do not fail in any way and operate
only in response to fault conditions (failure of the component being protected).
Thus, IPPS is a PSM for which continuity is broken only if a component in the direct
path between source and load fails.

Consider, for example, the load X in the feeder configuration of Figure 4-14(a).
Because failure or improper operation of existing protection equipment is ignored,
the only components on which the integrity of the backpath depends are the shaded

(a) (b)

Figure 4-14. Example Illustrating IPPS.

4-36
lines indicated in Figure 4-14(b). Outages on either of these two lines will break
the continuity of service to load X.

Temporary Restoration

Modeling the explicit location of automatic and manual protection devices introduces
a new twist to the PSM. Interruption of a load is no longer restricted to the
failure of components in the backpath. As a result, the service interruption ex­
perienced at a load point as a result of component failure may not necessarily last
for the duration of the entire repair/replacement procedure. Temporary restoration
via an alternate source or the original source is a possible means of reducing the
downtime at a load.

Both EPPS and EIPS are based on explicit location of protection devices. Conse­
quently, temporary restoration is a prime consideration in the normal restoration
process. PRAM evaluates possible temporary restoration via alternate feeds, as
well as the original source; however, restoration to the original source is the
preferred means. It may be possible to temporarily restore service to a load via
an alternate feed even if a failed device lies in the backpath.

Explicit Perfect Protection System

In this model of the protection system, response time characteristics of isolating

devices and their location on the distribution system are explicitly specified by
the user. Again, protection devices are "perfect." The accuracy of this model for
reliability is enhanced by the capability to model alternate feeds (normally open
ties between circuits). Although this increases the complexity of the model, it
permits a more realistic consideration of temporary restoration. Unlike IPPS, the
impact of the protection system on reliability is no longer limited to components
in the continuous path between source and load.

In this case, the reliability of service to load X of Figure 4-15(a) is more real­
istically modeled by including the effects of an explicitly defined protection
system. Although protection/isolation equipment is still assumed perfect, its
operation in response to system outages generally results in an increase in extent
over that considered by IPPS. Load X can be interrupted due to operation of the
breaker or fuse (which lies in the supply path to X) in response to component out­
ages which do not occur in the backpath. Component outages which contribute to the
reliability of service to load X are shown by the shaded lines in Figure 4-15(b).

4-37
 BREAKER
FUSE
SWITCH

Figure 4-15. Example Illustrating EPPS.

Explicit Imperfect Protection System

The third PSM, EIPS, extends EPPS to account for failure of protection devices. In
extending the PSM to include imperfect protection devices, it is possible to con­
sider cascading of failure to include a much larger portion of the system than would
ideally be affected. EIPS allows component failure to cascade, at most, to the
first backup device. Two modes of failure are considered:

• failure of the protection/isolation device, which makes it the

primary cause of an outage (A-mode) and

• failure of the protection device to recognize and isolate faults

in its protection zone (q-mode), which results in operation of
backup devices.

Both modes of failure contribute to interruption of the load X as shown in Figure

4-16(b). For example, outages of protection devices in the continuous path to
load X are considered in calculating the reliability of service to load X. In ad­
dition, the fuse which lies in the backpath may operate to clear a fault that
should have been isolated by the branch fuse.

4-38
Input

Data requirements can be divided into three general classifications:

• a description of system topology,

• a description of components, and

• bus-related data.

Component descriptions include integer and alphanumeric identifiers, capital costs,

and failure parameters. Topology is described by a series of connected segments,
each of which represents a component or device. Bus data generally consist of
connected load and number of customers and are used solely for calculating system
indices. General requirements for each class of data are illustrated in Table 4-11.

4-39
 Table 4-11

DATA REQUIREMENTS

PSM
DATA IPPS EPPS EIPS

System Topology
Connectivity X X X
Substations X X X
Location of Protection Devices X X
Alternate Feeds X X

Bus-Related Data
Connected Load (kVA)* X X X
Number of Customers* X X X

Component Description
Nonprotection Components
Capital Cost* X X X
Failure Rate X X X
Restoration Time X X X
Protection Devices
Capital Cost* X X
Failure Rate (A-mode) X
Restoration Time (A-mode) X
Probability of Failure (q-mode) X
Manual Switching Time X X

*Data are optional

4-40
Output

Based on the PSM's presented above, PRAM calculates indices of the reliability of
service to each load in a radial distribution system (Figure 4-17). In effect, for
each load point, PRAM reduces the distribution system to a single component with an
equivalent failure rate and restoration time. Average annual downtime, average
annual uptime and steady-state availability (all of which are really very similar
indices) are also calculated.

PRAM is also capable of calculating (Figure 4-18) the system indices presented in
this handbook. Calculations are based on averages of equivalent load-point indices
weighted by connected load or number of customers served at each bus.

In addition to load-point indices and system indices, PRAM provides other useful
outputs. Nodes are sorted by index and then listed in order of increasing relia­
bility (Figure 4-19). This class of output is referred to as a worst-case sort.
A user can provide capital equipment costs as program input. PRAM responds by com­
piling a summary of capital costs (Figure 4-20), by substation, for the configura­
tion at hand. No attempt is made to provide any analysis of reliability worth.

4-41
 last cast SMStanoM eacaKtas omit

aCLlAVUITV •V *061

WtBM avtaact avtaact sttaar *ta* *ta* avtaact avtaact STfADY

•vs »aui' < •t stoat amjat aMmiAL start BUS ratiuftt atstoat AWWJAl ANNUAl 31A T t
*»•(> BBTC ti»i aovMTint uaum avail Mv*8ta aatt tl*t OOWMTI*f orr jut AVAll
u/tb) Ota/r) (MA/ra) <Ma/TA) (F/YB) <M»/n (HA/YA) (HA/YA)

7000 1.9712 5.7773 17.0? .waosr 7001 7.975? 5.7273 17.02 8742.98 .999057
not 2.9712 3.7??3 17.07 710? 2.9757 5.7723 17.02 87*2.98 .990057
7103 *.9*29 6.9377 33.11 • 7i6.B9 .99t>i20 7104 4.8428 8.6377 33.11 8728.89 .998220
7103 *.9*29 • .8377 33.11 B?i6.»9 .996ii0 7108 4.8428 8.8377 33.11 8728.89 .996220
7199 2.9712 5.7773 17.07 em.9» .99twr 7701 2.9752 5.7223 17.02 8742.98 .996057

7?0J 7.9757 5.7773 17.07 B712.99 .99S017 7203 2.9752 5.7223 17.02 6742.98 .9915057
720* 7.9757 5.7773 17.07 971.1.99 .999017 7205 2.9752 5.7223 17.02 0742.98 .99005’
7301 7.9757 5.7773 17.07 97k2.99 .999017 7307 2.9752 5.7223 17.02 87*2.96 .99605 ’
4-42

7303 7.9757 3.7773 17.0? 97*1.99 .999017 7304 7.9752 5.7223 17.02 07*2.98 .99005 7
7305 7.9757 1.7223 17.07 97*1.99 .999017 7306 2.9752 5.7223 17.02 87*2.96 ^eos*

7401 7.9757 5.7773 17.07 97U.99 .999017 7407 2.9752 5.7723 17.02 07*2.99 .99805 7
7403 2.9712 1.7223 17.07 97*i.99 .999017 7404 2.9752 5.7223 17.02 87*2.90 .998057
7405 7.9757 1.7223 17.07 97*i.99 .999017 7408 7.9752 5.7223 17.02 87*2.90 .996057
7407 7.9757 1.7223 17.0? 97*2.99 .999017 7408 7.9752 5.7223 17.02 87*2.90 .996057
•000 7.9757 1.7223 17.0? 97*2.99 .999017 8101 2.9752 5.7223 17.02 87*2.98 .990057

• 107 2.9712 1.7223 17.0? 97*2.99 .999017 8103 2.9752 5.7723 17.02 67*2.96 .996057
• 104 3.9112 7.8715 79.38 9710.92 .99M*9 8105 3.8552 7.8215 29.38 6730.82 .9900*6
• 701 2.9712 5.7773 17.07 97*2.99 .999017 8702 2.9752 5.7223 17.02 07*2.98 .990057
• 703 2.9712 3.7773 17.0? 97*2.99 .999017 8204 2.9752 5.7223 17.02 67*2.98 .990057
•703 7.9757 5.7773 17.0? 97*2.99 .999017 8208 2.9752 5.7223 17.02 87*2.98 .998057

• 707 7.975? 5.7773 17.0? 97*2.99 .999017 8208 2.9752 5.7223 17.02 87*2.90 .998057
• 301 7.9757 5.7773 17.0? 97*2.99 .999017 8302 4.8426 8.8377 33.11 0728.89 .9902.:O
• 305 4.847a 8.8377 33.11 9726.99 .996220 8308 4.8*28 8.8377 33.11 6728.89 .9902^0
• 307 4.4*78 8.8577 33.11 9726.99 .996220 8308 4.6*28 8.8377 33.11 8720.89 .990220
• 309 4.8478 8.8377 33.11 ' 72- 89 .996220 8*01 2.9752 5.7223 17.02 67*2.90 .99005 7

Figure 4-17. Load-Point Indices.

 CKttKt CASC KO. S — CMAKSt SCRVlCC ASSICNRCNTS

JTSTEM BlLlMIUTT IWOlCtS

4-43

8TSTIN AVCSACI IWTIfiSy^TIOM P*£ttU£«T INOEX. .. . .43X3 SAIEI

UAlLoaiSmAA)
SVSTen AVCftACC iKTlRBUPTSOft {HPtTtM IW*IX .... 3.SXSS S«l»l
(HOUAS/TCAB)

AVEDACI SERVICE AVA1LA31LITT IMOEX..............................................999592 ASAI

CUSTOXCA AVCAA6C lnTERAU^TiO«( 9URATI0M IMOEX .. . 0.1X69 CAIOI

(MOOBS/EAILVAE)

AVERAGE LOAD INTCRAUPTIOa EACCUENCV INDEX .4336 ALlfl

.
<fAILUAES/TEAR)

AVERAGE LOAD IKTERRUATION DURATION INDEX 3.5596 AUDI

.
(HOUXS/YEAR)

Figure 4-18. System Indices.

 CMAW6C CASi NO. 3 — CHANOI StAVICC ASSICNHINTS

HOAST-CASI SUNHAAT

LIST Of NOAtt NAVINO WORST HIAN TAlLUM RATI

4-44

•US •US •US •US BUS BUS

NUMIR IMII NUHSIR !N»C« NUHSIR 1N6ER HUHOIR Index nuhoca INDEX NUHBER INDEX

153*0 .1231 OIOS .5526 0200 .5126 15302 .4326 0100 .3826 0206 .3201
usor .3651 10105 .3526 20106 .3501 OIOS .3401

Figure 4-19. Summary of Nodes With Worst Mean Failure Rates.

 CAfMIAl COST SUnHART

COST Ot MOTCCTIOM 0CV1CIS.............................................. 0.

COST Of MOM-PROTECT10« jEWICES .................................... 3S0S26.

TOTAL CAPITAL COST............................................................... .... 5IM24.

COST COST COST COST

1» or or TOTAL ID or or TOTAL
NUtVIR NAM PROTECTION NON-PROTECTION cost NUNOER NAME PROTECTION NON-PROTECTION COST
(DOLLARS) (DOLLARS) (DOLLARS) (DOLLARS) (DOLLARS) (DOLLARS)

A NARTVAL 0. 120646. 120686. 22 CARTWRI 0. 152910. 152910

34 CHRISTY 0. , 116230. 116230.

Figure 4-20. Capital Cost Summary.

 REFERENCES

1. D. P. Gaver, F. E. Montmeat and A. D. Patton. "Power System Reliability - I -

Measure of Reliability and Methods of Calculation." IEEE Transactions on Power
Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 83, July 1964, pp. 727-737.

2. A. D. Patton. "Determination and Analysis of Data for Reliability Studies."

IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 87, January 1968, pp. 84-9

3. F. E. Montmeat, A. D. Patton, J. Zemkoski and D. J. Gumming. "Power System

Reliability - II - Applications and a Computer Program." IEEE Transactions
on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 84, July 1965, pp. 636-643.

4. "IEEE Standard Definitions in Power Operations Terminology Including Terms for

Reporting and Analyzing Outages of Electrical Transmission and Distribution
Facilities and Interruptions to Customer Services," IEEE Standard 346-1973.

5. C. F. DeSieno and L. L. Stine. "A Probability Method for Determining the Relia­
bility of Electric Power Systems." IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and
Systems, Vol. 83, February 1964, pp. 174-179.

6. Z. G. Todd. "A Probability Method for Transmission and Distribution Outage

Calculations." IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 83, July
1964, pp. 695-701.

7. R. Billinton and K. E. Bollinger. "Transmission System Reliability Evaluation

Using Markov Processes." IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems,
Vol. 97, February 1968, pp. 538-547.

8. R. Billinton. Power System Reliability Evaluation. New York: Gordon and

Breach Science Publishers Inc., 1970.

9. R. Billinton, R. J. Ringlee and A. J. Wood. Power System Reliability

Calculations. Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1973.

10. J. Endrenyi. Reliability Modeling in Electric Power Systems. New York, New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978.

11. R- Billinton and M. S. Grover. "Quantitative Evaluation of Permanent

Outages in Distribution Systems." IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and
Systems, Vol. 94, May/June, pp. 743-741.

4-46
 Appendix A

GLOSSARY

The following definitions are reproduced from IEEE Standard 346-1973, which contains
terms for reporting and analyzing outages of electrical transmission and distribu­
tion facilities and interruptions to customer services.

adverse weather - designates weather conditions which cause an abnormally high rate
of forced outages for exposed components during the periods such conditions
persist, but do not qualify as major storm disasters. Adverse weather condi­
tions can be defined for a particular system by selecting the proper values
and combinations of conditions reported by the Weather Bureau: thunderstorms,
tornadoes, wind velocities, precipitation, temperature, etc.

adverse weather permanent forced outage rate - for a particular type of component,
the mean number of outages per unit of adverse weather exposure time per com­
ponent.

component - a piece of equipment, a line, a section of line, or a group of items

which is viewed as an entity for purposes of reporting, analyzing and predict-
ting outages.

exposure time - the time during which a component is performing its intended func­
tion and is subject to outage.

forced interruption - an interruption caused by a forced outage.

forced outage - an outage that results from emergency conditions directly associated
with a component requiring that it be taken out of service immediately, either
automatically or as soon as switching operations can be performed, or an outage
caused by improper operation of equipment or human error.

interruption - the loss of service to one or more consumers. An interruption is

the result of one or more component outages.

interruption duration - the period from the initiation of an interruption to a con­

sumer until service has been restored to that consumer.

major storm disaster - Designa-tes weather which exceeds design limits of plant and
which satisfies all of the following: (1) extensive mechanical damage to
plant; (2) more than a specified percentage of customers out of service; (3)
service restoration times longer than a specified time.
NOTE: It is suggested that the specified percentage of customers out of
service and restoration times be 10 percent and 24 hours. Percentage of cus­
tomers out of service may be related to a company operating area rather than
to an entire company. Examples of major storm disasters are hurricanes and
major ice storms.

A-l
momentary interruption - an interruption of duration limited to the period required
to restore service by automatic or supervisory-control 1ed switching operations
or by manual switching at locations where an operator is immediately avail­
able.
NOTE: Such switching operations must be completed in a specified time not to
exceed 5 minutes.

normal weather - includes all weather not designated as adverse or major storm
disaster.

normal weather permanent forced outage rate - for a particular type of component,
the mean number of outages per unit of normal weather exposure time per com­
ponent.

outage - describes the state of a component when it is not available to perform

its intended function due to some event directly associated with that compon­
ent. An outage may or may not cause an interruption of service to consumers,
depending on system configuration.

outage duration - the period from the initiation of an outage until the affected
component or its replacement once again becomes available to perform its
intended function.
NOTE: Outage durations may be defined for specific types of outages; for
example, permanent forced outage duration, transient forced outage duration,
and scheduled outage duration.

outage rate - for a particular classification of outage and type of component, the
mean number of outages per unit exposure time per component.
NOTE: Outage rates may be defined for specific weather conditions and type
of outages. For example, permanent forced outage rates may be separated into
adverse weather permanent forced outage rate and normal weather permanent
forced outage rate.

permanent forced outage - an outage whose cause is not immediately self-clearing,

but must be corrected by eliminating the hazard or by repairing or replacing
the component before it can be returned to service. An example of a permanent
forced outage is a lightning flashover which shatters an insulator thereby
disabling the component until repair or replacement can be made.

permanent forced outage duration - the period from the initiation of the outage
until the component is replaced or repaired.

scheduled interruption - an interruption caused by a scheduled outage.

scheduled outage - an outage that results when a component is deliberately taken

out of service at a selected time, usually for purposes of construction, pre­
ventive maintenance, or repair.
NOTE: A simple test can be used to determine if an outage should be classified
as forced or scheduled. If it is possible to defer the outage when such
deferment is desirable, the outage is a scheduled outage; otherwise, the out­
age is a forced outage. Deferring an outage may be desirable, for example, to
prevent overload of facilities or an interruption of service to consumers.

scheduled outage duration - the period from the initiation of the outage until
construction, preventive maintenance, or repair work is completed.

A-2
sustained interruption - a sustained interruption is any interruption not classified
as a momentary interruption.

switching time - the period from the time a switching operation is required due to
a forced outage until that switching operation is performed.
NOTE: For example, switching operations include reclosing a circuit breaker
after a trip-out, opening or closing a sectionalizing switch or circuit
breaker, or replacing a fuse link.

system - a group of components connected or associated in a fixed configuration

to perform a specified function.

transient forced outage - an outage whose cause is immediately self-clearing so

that the affected component can be restored to service either automatically
or as soon as a switch or circuit breaker can be reclosed or a fuse replaced.
An example of a transient forced outage is a lightning flashover which does
not permanently disable the flashed component.

transient forced outage duration - the period from the initiation of the outage
until the component is restored to service by switching or fuse replacement.
NOTE: Transient forced outage duration is really switching time.

A-3
 Appendix B

GENERAL FORMULAE FOR CALCULATING SYSTEM INDICES

The calculation of system indices can be generalized into formulae which are easily
programmed on a digital computer. Those formulae are summarized below.

HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT METHODS

SAIFI = (B-l)

m ki
2 2 c T
i=l j=1 J J
SAIDI (B-2)
C

ki
m
2 2 Cij Tj
CAIDI = i=l j=l (B-3)
m
ci
i =l

m ki
8760C - 2 2
ASAI = ij 1J
i=l j=l (B-4)
8760C

m ki
1
= 1 -
8760C 2 :
i=l J

m
2 L,1
ALIFI i=l (B-5)
L

m ki
2 2 1 i j Tij
ALIDI = i=l j=l (B-6)

B-l
 m = number of interruptions in subdivision (feeder, station, operating
district) for a given time period
k.j = number of restoration steps associated with i^ interruption

C = total customers in subdivision

L = total connected load (kVA) in subdivision

C.j = total customers interrupted by i^*1 interruption

Note:

ki
:i = 2 cii
j=l J
. th
= total connected load (kVA) interrupted by i interruption
Note:

ki
4 - £ bo

c-. = number of customers restored during restoration step

* \J

th
1-. = connected load (kVA) restored during j restoration step
'J

T— = cumulative interruption duration (hours) for customers/load affected

J by j't'1 restoration step associated with the i^-'1 interruption. If T-jg
is the time of the interruption, and T-j], T-j2, x-jg,... are the times
at which restoration steps were completed, then Tij = xij - xig. Also,
if tij is the duration of the restoration step, then

J
Tij 2 S’k
k=l

PREDICTIVE ASSESSMENT METHODS

2 ^eq^b ^b
beB ecl D D
SAIFI (B-7)
2 C
b
beB

2 (U eq^b
beB
SAIDI (B-8)
2
beB

B-2
 2 (U1 )k C,
eq;b b
beB
CAIDI = (B-9)
2 ^eq^b Cb
beB

[8760 - <ueq>b]
2
beB
ASAI = (B-10)
8760 Cb
beB

2
beB
ALIFI = (B-ll)
2 L
b
beB

2
beB
(u;q)b
ALIDI (B-12)
2
beB

B = {all buses in the system]

= number of customers served at bus b

L^ = connected load (kVA) served from bus b

= mean failure rate

eq

lFq = average annual downtime (hrs)

B-3
 Appendix C

BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

RELIABILITY EVALUATION

INTRODUCTION

This bibliography contains pertinent and readily accessible publications con­

cerning the subject of distribution system reliability evaluation. To facilitate
use, the bibliography is segregated into three major topics:

• Analysis and Applications

• Outage Data

t Reliability Economics and Indices

Two sections are associated with each topic:

t Publications List

• Abstracts

The first section lists all selected publications. These publications are ordered
alphabetically by primary author. The abstracts section contains short summaries
of the most significant articles found in the publications list.

ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS

Publications List

Albrecht, P. F. Reliability Evaluation of Substation Bus Arrangements. CEA

Transactions, Vol. 13, Pt. 3, 1974, Paper No. 74-SP-152.

Allan, R. N., R. Billinton, and M. F. De Oliveira. Reliability Assessment of

Power System Networks. Proceedings PSCC-V, 1975, Paper 1.2/4.

Allan, R. N., R. Billinton, and M. F. De Oliveira. Reliability Evaluation of

Electrical Systems With Switching Actions. Proceedings IEE, Vol. 123, April 1976,
pp. 325-330.

Allan, R. N., and M. F. De Oliveira. Reliability Analysis in the Design of

Transmission and Distribution Systems. Transactions of the IEEE Conference on
Reliability of Power Supply Systems, IEEE Conference Publications No. 148,
February 1977.

C-l
Allan, R. N., and M. F. De Oliveira. Reliability Modeling and Evaluation of
Transmission and Distribution Systems. Proceedings IEE, Vol. 124, No. 6, June
1 977.

Allan, R. N., E. N. Dialynas, and I. R. Homer. Partial Loss of Continuity and

Transfer Capacity in the Reliability Evaluation of Power System Networks. -
Proceedings PSCC-VI, 1978.

Beaty, H. Wayne. Switching: Key to Reliability. Electrical World, January 15,

1975, pp. 39-46.

Bhavaraju, M. P., and R. Billinton. Transmission System Reliability Methods. IEEE

Transactions, PAS-91, No. 2, March/April 1972, pp. 628-637.

Billinton, R., and K. E. Bollinger. Transmission System Reliability Evaluation

Using Markov Processes. IEEE Transactions, PAS-97, February 1968, pp. 538-547.

Billinton, R. Composite System Reliability Evaluation. IEEE Transactions, PAS-88,

April 1969, pp. 276-280.

Billinton, R., and M. S. Grover. A Sequential Method for Reliability Analysis of

Distribution and Transmission Systems. Proceedings, 1975 Annual Reliability and
Maintainability Symposium, Washington, D. C., January 1975, Paper No. 1295, pp.
460-469, (IEEE Catalog No. 75-CH0-918-3 RQC).

Billinton, R., and M. S. Grover. Quantitative Evaluation of Permanent Outages in

Distribution Systems. IEEE Transactions, PAS-94, May/June 1975, pp. 733-741.

Billinton, R., and M. S. Grover. Reliability Assessment of Transmission and

Distribution Schemes. IEEE Transactions, PAS-94, No. 3, May/June 1975, pp.724-
733.

Billinton, R., and M. S. Grover. Reliability Evaluation in Distribution and

Transmission Systems. Proceedings IEE, Vol. 122, No. 5, May 1975, pp. 517-523.

Billinton, R., M. S. Grover, and M. S. Sachdev. Transmission Systems Reliability

Studies. CEA Transactions, Vol. 13, Pt. 3, 1974, Paper No. 74-SP-156.

Billinton, R. Power System Reliability Evaluation, (book). Gordon and Breach

Science Publishers Inc., New York, New York, 1970, pp. 299.

Billinton, R., R. J. Ringlee, and A. J. Wood. Power System Reliability Calculations,

(book). M.I.T. Press, Massachusetts, 1973.

Billinton, R., and C. Singh. Reliability Evaluation in Large Transmission Systems.

IEEE Paper No. C 72 475-2.

Billinton, R. Transmission System Reliability Evaluation. CEA Transactions, Vol. 6,

Part II, 1967.

Billinton, R., and E. Zaleski. Reliability Techniques Applied to Transmission

Planning. CEA Transactions, Vol. 9, Part III, 1970.

Bussard, R. W., and R. F. Rainnie. Spare Circuit Ensures Reliability. Electrical

World, October 1, 1975, pp. 56-58.

C-2
Capra, R. L., M. W. Gangel, and S. V. Lyon. Underground Distribution System Design
for Reliability. IEEE Transactions, PAS-88, June 1969, pp. 834-842.

Cartwright, W., and B. A. Coxson. Quantifying the Impact of Manual Emergency

Transfer Switching Upon the Reliability of Distribution Systems. Transactions of
the IEE Conference on Reliability of Power Supply Systems, IEE Conference
Publication No. 148, February 1977.

Chang, N. E. A Modular Design for Underground Residential Distribution. IEEE

Conference Record 76 Chill9-7-PWR, pp. 574-578.

Chang, N. E. Evaluate Distribution System Design by Cost Reliability Indices.

IEEE Transactions, PAS-96, No. 5, September/October 1977, pp. 1480-1490.

Christiaanse, W. R. A New Technique for Reliability Calculations. IEEE Trans­

actions, PAS-89, November/December 1970, pp. 1836-1847.

Christiaanse, W. R. Reliability Calculations Including the Effects of Overloads

and Maintenance. IEEE Transactions, PAS-90, July/August 1971, pp. 1664-1676.

Cohen, R. S., N. R. Schultz, and B. E. Smith. Switching and Fusing of Underground

Distribution Circuits. Proceedings of the American Power Conference, Vol. 35, 1973,
pp. 1208-1214.

Cooper, J. H., and P. B. Shortley. Reliability Procedures for Subtransmission and

Distribution Systems. IEEE Tutorial, Text No. 71 M 30-PWR, pp. 58-65.

Crann, L. B. Service Reliability on Rural Distribution Systems. AIEE Transactions,

PAS-77, October 1958, pp. 761-764.

D'Agostino, R., R. L. Adamson, R. F. Mann, M. A. Lozano, and D. L. Hopkins. Service

Availability as an Approach to Selecting an Optimum Underground Distribution System
Design, Part I - Analysis of Service Continuity. IEEE Paper No. 68 CP 77-PWR.

D'Agostino, R., R. L. Adamson, R. F. Mann, M. A. Lozano, and D. L. Hopkins. Service

Availability as an Approach to Selecting an Optimum Underground Distribution System
Design, Part II - Selection of Optimum Systems. IEEE Paper No. 68 CP 669-PWR.

DeSieno, C. F., and L. L. Stine. A Probability Method for Determining the

Reliability of Electric Power System's. IEEE Transactions, PAS-83, February 1964,
pp. 174-179.

Easley, J. H. The Influence of Service Availability on the Configuration of

Underground Three-Phase Primary Systems. IEEE Conference Paper No. 71 C 42-PWR,
1971.

Editor. Automation Opens the Way to Greater Reliability. Electrical World,

December 15, 1971, pp. 63-67.

Endrenyi, J., and R. Billinton. Reliability Evaluation of Power Transmission

Networks - Models and Methods. CIGRE 1974, Paper No. 32-06.

Endrenyi, J., P. C. Maenhaut, and L. E. Payne. Reliability Evaluation of

Transmission Systems With Switching After Faults - Approximations and a Computer
PFogram. IEEE Transactions, PAS-92, No. 6, November/December 1973, pp. 1863-1875.

C-3
Endrenyi, J., L. E. Payne, and L. Wang. A Computer Program for the Reliability
Evaluation of Power Transmission Systems. CEA Transactions, Vol. 13, Pt. 3, 1974,
Paper No. 74-SP-l51.

Endrenyi, J. Three State Models in Power System Reliability Evaluations. IEEE

Transactions, PAS-90, July/August 1971, pp. 1909-1916.

Esser, W. F., S. G. Wasilew, and D. T. Egly. Computer Programs for Reliability.

PICA Proceedings, May 1967, pp. 513-518.

Gangel, M. W., and R. J. Ringlee. Distribution System Reliability Performance.

IEEE Transactions, PAS-87, July 1968, pp. 1657-1664.

Gangel, M. W., N. R. Schultz, and J. W. Simpson. Predicting Underground Distribution

System Availability. Special Technical Conference on Underground Distribution,
Anaheim, California, May 1969, 69 C 1-PWR, pp. 153-163.

Gaver, D. P., F. E. Montmeat, and A. D. Patton. Power System Reliability - I -

Measure of Reliability and Methods of Calculation. IEEE Transactions, PAS-83,
July 1964, pp. 727-737.

Gilligan, Jr. S. R. Reliability and Design of Low-Voltage Spot Networks. IEEE

Conference Record No. 71 C 42-PWR, pp. 366-370.

Giovannini, M., C. Reynaud, and L. Salvaderi. Selection of Substation Layout in

Power Systems. Transactions of the IEE Conference on Reliability of Power Supply
Systems, IEE Conference Publication No. 148, February 1977.

Good, R. D. Radio Control Cuts Interruption Time. Electrical World, January 1972,
pp. 38-40.

Grover, M. S., and R. Billinton. A Computerized Approach to Substation and

Switching Station Reliability Evaluation. IEEE Transactions, PAS-93, September/
October 1974, pp. 1488-1497.

Grover, M. S., and R. Billinton. Quantitative Evaluation of Maintenance Policies

in Distribution Systems. IEEE Paper No. C 75 112-8.

Grover, M. S., and R. Billinton. Quantitative Evaluation of Overload Outage

Conditions in Substation and Subtransmission Systems. IEEE Paper No. A 76 166-9.

Grover, M. S., and R. Billinton. Substation and Switching Station Reliability

Evaluation. CEA Transactions, Vol. 13, Pt. 3, 1974, Paper No. 74-SP-153.

Guertin, M. B., and Y. Lamarre. Reliability Analysis of Substations With Automatic

Modeling of Switching Operations. IEEE Transactions, PAS-94, No. 5, September/
October, 1975, pp. 1599-1605.

Heising, C. R., and J. R. Dunki-Jacobs. Application of Reliability Concepts to

Industrial Power Systems. American Power Conference, Chicago, Illinois, April
21-23, 1970, also Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the IEEE Industry
Applications Society, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 1972, pp. 280-295.

Heising, C. R. Examples of Reliability and Availability Analysis of Common Low-

Voltage Industrial Power Distribution Systems. IEEE Industrial and Commerical
Power Systems Technical Conference, Los Angeles, California, May 10-13, 1976.

C-4
Heising, C. R., R. J. Ringlee, and H. 0. Simmons, Jr. A Look at Substation
Reliabi1ity. American Power Conference, April 1969.

IEEE Committee Report. Distribution Protection and Restoration Systems: Design

Verification by Reliability Indices. IEEE Transactions, PAS-93, March/April 1974,
pp. 564-570.

Koepfinger, J. L. Automation Improves Reliability. Electrical World, March 15,

1973, pp. 80-83.

Koval, D. 0., and R. Billinton. Evaluation of Elements of Distribution Circuit

Outage Durations. IEEE Paper No. A 77 685-1.

Koval, D. 0., and R. Billinton. Evaluation of Distribution Circuit Reliability.

Paper F 77 067-2 presented at the IEEE 1977 Winter Power Meeting, New York.

Koval, D. 0., and R. Billinton. Evaluating the Effects of Isolation-Restoration

Procedures on Distribution Circuit Reliability Indices. IEEE Paper No. A 78 512-6.

Little, J. B., and J. A. LaDronka. Reliability and Economics of Three-Phase Main

Feeder Switching. IEEE Conference Record No. 71 C 42-PWR, pp. 125-129.

Lonsdale, J. G., and G. B. Hitchen. Reliability Evaluation in the Planning of

Distribution Systems. Transactions of the IEE Conference on Reliability of Power
Supply Systems, IEE Conference Publication No. 148, February 1977.

Mallard, S. A., and V. C. Thomas. A Method for Calculating Transmission System

Reliability. IEEE Transactions, PAS-87, March 1968, pp. 824-833.

Mann, R. F., and D. L. Hopkins. Service Availability - A Yardstick for Evaluating

Underground Distribution Designs. IEEE Conference Record No. 69 C 1-PWR, pp. 164-172.

McNab, W. A. Urban Electricity Supply Systems. Transactions of the IEE Conference

on Reliability of Power Supply Systems, IEE Conference Publication No. 148, February
1977.

McNabb, J. E. Analysis of Feeder Service Continuity. AIEE Transactions, PAS-80,

1961, pp. 458-463.

Montmeat, F. E., A. D. Patton, J. Zemkoski, and D. J. Gumming. Power System

Reliability - II - Applications and a Computer Program. IEEE Transactions, PAS-84,
July 1965, pp. 636-643.

Montmeat, F. E., N. H. Woodley, C. J. Baldwin, and R. U. Benson. Results of

Distribution Expansion Studies by Simulation. Proceedings, American Power Conference,
Vol. 31, 1969.

Neagle, N. M., and D. R. Nelson. The Use of Probability in the Design and Operation
of Secondary Network Systems. AIEE Transactions, PAS-74, August 1955, pp. 567-575.

Nunan, G. A., and P. F. Albrecht. Reliability Evaluation of 69-kV Substation Bus.

Transmission and Distribution, March 1975.

Patton, A. D. A Method for Evaluating Redundant Capacity in Substations. Pro­

ceedings of Southwestern IEEE Conference, 1968.

C-5
Patton, A. D. Substation Reliability Estimation is a Useful Design Tool. Electric
Light and Power, October 1969.

Pope, J. R., and N. H. Woodley. Computer Program Evaluates the Reliability of a

Distribution System. Transmission and Distribution, September 1967.

Ramamoorti, M., and Balgopal. Block Diagram Approach to Power System Reliability.
IEEE Transactions, PAS-89, May/June 1979, pp. 802-811.

Reps, D. N. The Probability of Coincident Primary Feeder Outages in Secondary

Networks. AIEE Transactions, PAS 73, December 1954, pp. 1467-1478.

Ringlee, R. J., and S. D. Goode. On Procedures for Reliability Evaluation of

Transmission Systems. IEEE Transactions, PAS-89, No. 4, April 1970, pp. 527-537.

Ringlee, R. J. Reliability Procedures for Substations. IEEE Tutorial, Text No.

71 M 30-PWR, pp. 51-57.

Schultz, H. R. Elementary Reliability Analysis. Distribution, May 1979.

Schwobel, L., W. E. Shula, S. R. Gilligan, Jr., and R. D. Wood. Reliability

Estimation in the Design of Underground Distribution Systems for Commercial Load.
IEEE Paper No. C 72 477-8.

Schwobel, L., W. E. Shula, S. R. Gilligan, Jr., and R. D. Wood. Reliability

Studies Guide Circuit Design. Electrical World, February 1, 1973, pp. 40-42.

Scott, W. E., L. H. Scott, and M. L. Doyle. Sectionalizers Cut Customer Outages

20%. Electrical World, June 27, 1966, pp. 41-42.

Simpson, J. W. Performance of URD Loops Can be Predicted. Electrical World,

December 16, 1968, pp. 35-37.

Stanton, K. N., and E. F. Moore. Reliability of Overhead Distribution Systems.

IEEE Paper No. 68 CP 614-PWR.

Stanton, K. N. Reliability Analysis for Power System Applications. IEEE Trans­

actions, PAS-88, April 1969, pp. 431-437.

Sverak, J. A Probability Simulation Method for Determining the Reliability of

Switching Stations. IEEE Transactions, PAS-88, November 1969, pp. 1657-1664.

Thomas, V. C., and F. E. Montmeat. Reliability Calculations Help Evaluate

Substation Supply. Transmission and Distribution, June 1968, pp. 72-78.

Todd, Z. B. A Probability Method for Transmission and Distribution Outage

Calculations. IEEE Transactions, PAS-83, Vol. 83, July 1964, pp. 695-701.

Van Miegroet, P., and G. Dienne. Degradation Level: Method of Representing the
Reliability of Small Electric Circuit Arrangements. CIRED-73, International
Conference on Electricity Distribution.

Yerks, Jr. E. C. A Practical Approach to Reliability Analysis. Transmission and

Distribution, January 1974, pp. 36-41.

C-6
Abstracts

Bhavaraju, M. P., and R. Billinton. Transmission System Reliability Methods. IEEE

Transactions, PAS-91, No. 2, March/April 1972, pp. 628-637.
This paper provides a brief survey of the methods presently available
for transmission and distribution evaluation. The conditional proba­
bility approach used earlier by the authors is extended to include
Markov models of load and component states. A comparison of this
method with other techniques is performed using a simple study system.
The effects of normal and adverse weather are included in the analysis.

Billinton, R, and K. E. Bollinger. Transmission System Reliability Evaluation

Using Markov Processes. IEEE Transactions, PAS-97, February 1968, pp. 538-547.
This paper presents the basic concepts of stationary Markov processes
and illustrates their application to transmission system reliability
evaluation. The two state fluctuating weather environment proposed in
Power System Reliability, by Montmeat, Patton, Zemkoski, and Gumming,
is modeled as a Markov process and the approximations involved in these
equations for two and three component parallel systems are examined.
The effect of parameter variations on the calculated indices is examined
for a simple parallel configuration and a series-parallel configuration.
The Markov process concepts enumerated in the paper provides the basic
elements for further application in subsequent publications.

Billinton, R. Composite System Reliability Evaluation. IEEE Transactions, PAS-88,

April 1969, pp. 276-280.
This paper illustrates the application of a conditional probability
approach to the determination of a reliability index at any point in a
composite system. A general design criterion is postulated in terms of
quality of service rather than continuity. Using a Markov approach, it
is shown that the effect of storm associated failures on the system
failure probabilities is dependent upon the degree of redundancy in the
configuration under study. The effects of shunt compensation, on-load
tap changing, and variations in allowable voltage levels on the relia­
bility of a simple configuration are illustrated. Using the techniques
described in this paper, it is possible to arrive at a measure of steady-
state adequacy for any point in a system and, particularly, at those
points at which major transmission terminates and subtransmission begins.

Billinton, R. Power System Reliability Evaluation, (book). Gordon and Breach

Science Publishers Inc., New York, New York, 1970, pp. 299.
This book presents the basic theory required in the reliability evalua­
tion of simple radial, parallel and networked transmission and distribu­
tion systems. In addition to material specifically on these topics, the
book contains sections dealing with the fundamentals of probability
mathematics and reliability theory required in elementary power system
reliability evaluation. The book does not presume any prior knowledge
of the subject and can be used in conjunction with Power System
Reliability Calculations, by Billinton, Ringlee, and Wood, which deals
with more practical applications.

C-7
Billinton, R., and M. S. Grover. Quantitative Evaluation of Permanent Outages in
Distribution Systems. IEEE Transactions, PAS-94, May/June 1975, pp. 733-741.
This paper conducts a basic investigation of the techniques proposed in
Power System Reliability - I - Measure of Reliability and Methods of
Calculation, by Gaver, Montmeat, and Patton, and Transmission System
Reliability Evaluation Using Markov Processes, by Billinton and
Bollinger, and proposes additional equations to remove some of the
inconsistencies which previously existed. Two sets of equations form­
ulated in this paper consider the occurrence and non-occurrence of
repair during adverse weather periods. The fluctuating weather con­
siderations are extended to three components in parallel. The minimal
cut set method is used to evaluate the reliability of a simple series
parallel configuration.

Billinton, R., and M. S. Grover. Reliability Evaluation in Distribution and

Transmission Systems. Proceedings IEE, Vol. 122, No. 5, May 1975, pp. 517-523.
This paper presents a list of equations for including normal and adverse
weather, maintenance considerations, temporary outages and overload
considerations in simple radial configurations. The equations are
given in the Appendix and form the basic elements in applying the minimal
cut set method of evaluation. This technique is presented using a simple
configuration and then applied to several practical configurations. The
consideration of only failure related events provides a fast and com­
putationally efficient technique which can include a wide-range of system
considerations.

Canadian Electrical Association. Distribution System Reliability Engineering Guide.

CEA, Suite 580, 1 Westmount Square, Montreal, P.Q., H3Z 2P9, March 1976.
The Distribution System Reliability Engineering Guide is intended to
provide a comprehensive summary of the various aspects of distribution
system reliability engineering at a level which could be readily under­
stood by anyone concerned with the problem. The main sections are con­
cerned with the definition of terms and indices, data collection systems,
reliability criterion and reliability evaluation. In the latter case,
a group of numerical examples are used to illustrate the application of
the equations presented to simple practical configurations.

Christiaanse, W. R. Reliability Calculations Including the Effects of Overloads

and Maintenance. IEEE Transactions, PAS-90, July/August 1971, pp. 1664-1676.
This paper and associated discussion presents additional material and
technique for incorporating the effects of forced and maintenance outages
and the system load level on calculated reliability indices. The most
important part of the paper is the model used to represent the system
load. The occurrence of various load levels is shown as a two state
renewal process which is statistically independent of equipment outages.
This permits a simplified representation of the effects of overloads on
load point reliability. The techniques proposed are illustrated by
application to a simple parallel configuration.

C-8
D'Agostino, R., R. L. Adamson, R. F. Mann, M. A. Lozano, and D. L. Hopkins.
Service Availability as an Approach to Selecting an Optimum Underground Distribution
System Design, Part I - Analysis of Service Continuity. IEEE Paper No. 68 CP 669-
PWR.
This paper utilizes simple series system reliability concepts to examine
nine basic feeder designs. The applications are practical and require a
minimum of mathematical manipulation. Forced and planned outages are
examined. The effects of component failure rates on the calculated
customer indices are examined together with a brief study of the restora­
tion activities which form the customer outage duration.

D'Agostino, R., R. L. Adamson, R. F. Mann, M. A. Lozano, and D. L. Hopkins.

Service Availability as an Approach to Selecting an Optimum Underground Distribution
System Design, Part II - Selection of Optimum Systems. IEEE Paper No. 68 CP 669-
PWR.
This paper extends the concepts and technique proposed in the previous
paper. It is therefore recommended that these two papers be treated as
one for the purpose of appreciating their overall objectives. Circuit
design, lateral configurations and component failure rates are examined
to determine their effect on customer minutes of interruption. Load
break terminations and temporary cable jumpers are also considered in
terms of their effects on fault isolation and service restoration.
Service Availability as an Approach to Selecting an Optimum Underground
Distribution System Design, Part I - Analysis of Service Continuity, by
D'Agostino, Adamson, Mann, Lozano, and Hopkins, and Service Availability
as an Approach to Selecting an Optimum Underground Distribution System
Design, Part II - Selection of Optimum Systems, by D'Agostino, Adamson,
Mann, Lozano, and Hopkins, present practical application to simple
radial configurations and do not utilize extensive mathematical con­
cepts. They draw some practical conclusions for the configurations
examined.

Gaver, D. P., F. E. Montmeat, and A. D. Patton. Power System Reliability - I -

Measure of Reliability and Methods of Calculation. IEEE Transactions, PAS-83,
July 1964, pp. 727-737.
This paper presents the results of a joint project between Public
Service Electric and Gas Company and Westinghouse Electric Corporation.
The object was to develop analytical techniques which permit the calcula­
tion of a number of important measures of reliability or service adequacy
in general power system networks. The paper presents the basic equations
for reducing series-parallel networks and developing the indices of
customer interruption rate, average customer restoration time and average
total interruption time per customer per year. The paper also introduces
the concept of failure bunching in parallel facilities and presents
equations for incorporating this in the analysis. Equations for main­
tenance outages overlapping forced outages and overload conditions in
parallel facilities are also provided. This is one of the most funda­
mental papers available on transmission and distribution system relia­
bility evaluation and provides the basic concepts upon which many of the
latter publications depend.

C-9
Heising, C. R., R. J. Ringlee, and H. 0. Simons, Jr. A Look At Substation
Reliability ■ American Power Conference, April 1969.
This paper provides a relatively simple application of basic reliability
concepts to substation assessment. Industry statistics of substation
component failures and malfunctions are used to make predictions of the
frequency and duration of station caused circuit interruptions. A
reliability and availability analysis of a breaker and one half scheme
as opposed to a single bus with tie breaker scheme is used as an example.
The breaker and one half scheme is shown to be the more reliable arrange­
ment using the data provided. The paper introduces the concept of com­
ponent failure modes and effect analysis in substation analysis.

Heising, C. R. Examples of Reliability and Availability Analysis of Common Low-

Voltage Industrial Power Distribution Systems. IEEE Industrial and Commercial Power
Systems Technical Conference, Los Angeles, California, May 10-13, 1976.
This paper provides a practical approach to quantitative reliability and
availability predictions for different industrial power distribution
system configurations. Six examples are provided and analyzed in the
paper. These include a simple radial system, a primary-selective system
and a secondary selective system. A brief summary is also provided of
the pertinent reliability data required in order to make these predic­
tions. The paper proposes that these methods can be used to assist in
cost-reliability trade-off decisions in power distribution system design.
The paper does not provide any new theoretical concepts but presents
direct and practical application of existing concepts.

IEEE Tutorial. Probability Analysis of Power System Reliability. IEEE Tutorial

Text No. 71 M 30-PWR, pp. 51-57.
Ringlee, R. J. Reliability Procedures for Substations.
Cooper, J. H., and P. B. Shortley. Reliability Procedures for Subtransmission and
Distribution Systems, pp. 58-65.
These two publications were part of the IEEE tutorial presented in 1971.
As such they do not provide any new material but present simplified
theory and application in basic substation and distribution system
evaluation. They are tutorial in nature and as such are relatively
simple to understand and appreciate.

Koval, D. 0., and R. Billinton. Evaluation of Distribution Circuit Reliability.

Paper F 77 067-2 presented at the IEEE 1977 Winter Power Meeting, New York.
This paper illustrates the inclusion of the probability of a protection-
coordination device not recognizing and isolating a fault can have a
significant impact on customer reliability indices. A relatively simple
method for evaluating the reliability indices of customers in a circuit
including the recognition and isolation characteristics of the protec­
tion and coordination equipment is presented. The approach is illus­
trated by application to a practical configuration. Sensitivity studies
are performed to illustrate the impact of the protective devices on the
customer indices.

C-10
Mallard, S. A., and V. C. Thomas. A Method for Calculating Transmission System
Reliability. IEEE Transactions, PAS-87, March 1968, pp. 824-833.
This paper presents by application to a relatively simple configuration,
a proposed method for analyzing the reliability of a transmission system.
The approach considers generation and transmission system elements,
weather conditions, load cycle, generation dispatch, interconnections
and the effect of scheduled outages. The basic objective is to obtain
indices which describe the reliability of station supply to the low-
voltage buses. Forced and scheduled outage data for the elements used in
the configuration example are provided. The mathematical concepts
utilized in the paper are based upon the approach presented in Power
System Reliability - I - Measure of Reliability and Methods of Calculation,
by Gaver, Montmeat, and Patton, and Power System Reliability - II -
Applications and a Computer Program, by Montmeat, Patton, Zemkoski,
and Gumming. Additional equations and the use of contingency curves
are presented in order to extend the application to non series-parallel
configurations.

Montmeat, F. E., A. D. Patton, J. Zemkoski, and D. J. Gumming. Power System

Reliability - II - Applications and a Computer Program. IEEE Transactions, PAS-
84, July 1965, pp. 636-643.
This paper is an extension of Power System Reliability - I - Measure
of Reliability and Methods of Calculation, by Gaver, Montmeat, and
Patton, and illustrates the application of the concepts proposed in
that paper to a practical configuration. These two papers should
basically be considered as one for the purpose of obtaining an appre­
ciation of the basic concepts proposed, their possible implementation
using a sequential digital computer program and their practical applica­
tion. The paper also presents typical outage and repair data for
various subtransmission and distribution system facilities including
normal and stormy weather information. The digital computer program
described in the paper produces reliability measures calculated at each
bus in the system and also overall measures for the system. The authors
also suggest that a comparison of the calculated and observed indices of
reliability for an actual system indicates good agreement.

Ringlee, R. J., and S. D. Goode. On Procedures for Reliability Evaluation of

Transmission Systems. IEEE Transactions, PAS-89, No. 4, April 1970, pp. 527-537.
This paper presents a step by step procedure for reliability evaluation
in transmission and distribution configurations. Renewal process theory
is utilized to develop simple algebraic equations for predicting the
frequency and duration of transmission contingencies. A ring bus con­
figuration is used to illustrate the application of this approach to
substation and switching station analysis.

Schwabel, L., W. E. Shula, S. R. Gilligan, Jr., and R. D. Wood. Reliability

Estimation in the Design of Underground Distribution Systems for Commercial Load.
IEEE Paper No. C 72 477-8. ~ ——
This paper presents the practical application of simple reliability con­
cepts to the estimation of reliability performance associated with under­
ground distribution systems. The basic material in this paper is also

C-ll
 provided in a more condensed form in Reliability Studies Guide Circuit
Design, by Schwobel, Shula, Gilligan, and Wood. These papers illustrate
the development of reliability profiles for each customer in the new
underground system. Reliability evaluation is used to examine alternate
equipment configurations and to add an important dimension to the evalua­
tion of alternate proposals. The paper uses a minimum of mathematical
concepts and illustrates practical application.

OUTAGE DATA

Publications List

Begian, S. S. Data Collection System for Analyzing Transmission and Distribution

Performance. IEEE Paper No. C 72 441-4.

Billinton, R., T. K. P. Medicherla, and M. S. Sachdev. Common Cause Outages in

Multiple Circuit Transmission Lines. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, Vol. R-27,
No. 2, June 1978.

Billinton, R. Transmission System Reliability Models. EPRI Conference on Power

System Reliability Research Needs and Priorities, Asilomar, California, March 1978,
EPRI Publication WS-77-60.

Canadian Electrical Association. Distribution Systems - Annual Service Continuity

Report of Canadian Electrical Utilities. CEA, Suite 580, 1 Westmount Square,
Montreal, P. Q., H3Z 2P9, March 1978.

Canadian Electrical Association. Distribution System Reliability Engineering Guide.

CEA, Suite 580, 1 Westmount Square, Montreal, P.Q., H3Z 2P9, March, 1976.

Conner, R. A. W., and R. A. Parkins. Operational Statistics in the Management of

Large Distribution Systems. Proceedings of the Institution of Electrical Engineers,
November 1966.

EEI Transmission and Distribution Committee. Guide for Reliability Measurement and
Data Collection, October, 1971.

Electrical Systems and Equipment Committee, and System Planning Subcommittee.

Recording of System Outage and Interruption Data. Edison Electric Institute,
June 1, 1961.

Fifth Annual Report. URD Equipment and Materials Reliability in the Northwest.
Undergrounding, January/February 1973, p. 12.

Ford, D. V. The British Electricity Boards National Fault and Interruption

Reporting Scheme - Objectives, Development and Operating Experience. IEEE
Transactions, PAS-91, No. 5, September/October 1972, pp. 2179-2188.

Fourth Annual Report. URD Equipment and Materials Reliability in the Northwest.
Undergrounding, March/April 1972, p. 16.

Guertin, M. B., P. F. Albrecht, M. P. Bhavaraju, R. Billinton, G. E. Jorgensen,

A. N. Karas, W. D. Masers, A. D. Patton, R. J. Ringlee, and R. P. Spence. List of
Transmission and Distribution Components for Use in Outage Reporting and
Reliability Calculation. IEEE Transactions, PAS-95, No. 4, July/August, 1976,
pp. 1210-1215.

C-l 2
Heising, C. R. Reliability of Electric Power Transmission and Distribution
Equipment. Twenty-Eighth Annual Technical Conference Transactions of the
American Society for Quality Control, Boston, Massachusetts, May 1974, pp. 314-319.

IEEE Committee. Report on Reliability Survey of Industrial Plants - Part I:

Reliability of Electrical Equipment. IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications,
Vol. 1A-10, March/April 1974, pp. 213-235.

IEEE Committee. Report on Reliability Survey of Industrial Plants - Part III:

Causes and Types of Failures of Electrical Equipment, the Methods of Repair and
the Urgency of Repair. IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, Vol. 1A-10,
March/April 1974, pp. 242-252.

IEEE Committee. Report on Reliability Survey of Industrial Plants - Part IV:

Additional Detailed Tabulation of Some Data Previously Reported in the First Three
Parts. IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, Vol. 1A-10, July/August 1974,
pp. 456-562.

IEEE Committee. Report on Reliability Survey of Industrial Plants - Part V: Plant

Climate, Atmosphere and Operating Schedule, the Average Age of Electrical Equipment,
Percent Production Lost, and the Method of Restoring Electrical Service After a ~~
Failure. IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, Vol. 1A-10, July/August 1974,
pp. 463-466.

IEEE Committee. Report on Reliability Survey of Industrial Plants - Part VI:

Maintenance Quality of Electrical Equipment. IEEE Transactions on Industry
Applications, Vol. 1A-10, July/August 1974, pp. 467-476. Correction to Part VI:
Maintenance Quality of Electrical Equipment, Vol. 1A-10, September/October 1974,
p. 681.

IEEE Committee Report. Definitions of Customer and Load Reliability Indices for
Evaluating Electric Power System Performance. IEEE Paper A 75 588-4.

IEEE Committee Report. Proposed Definitions of Terms for Reporting and Analyzing
Outages of Electrical Transmission and Distribution Facilities and Interruptions.
IEEE Transactions, PAS-87, May 1968, pp. 1318-1323. —— __

IEEE Standard Definitions in Power Operations Terminology, 2. Terms for Reporting

and Analyzing Outages of Electrical Transmission and Distribution Facilities and
Interruptions to Customer Service. IEEE Standard 346-1973.

Malone, J. J., R. K. Moore, and N. N. Smeloff. Improvement of Electric Service,

Part I - Service and Facility Performance Records. AIEE Paper No. CP-71-790.

McCoy, M. F. Automated Collection of Transmission Outage Data. Proceedings, 1978

Reliability Conference for the Electric Power Industry.

NELPA Eighth Annual Report. Northwest Utilities Report URD Product Reliability.
Transmission and DistributionT June 1976, pp. 18-23. ——— —

NELPA Seventh Annual Report. URD Equipment Reliability. Undergrounding, January/

February 1975, p. 12.

NELPA Sixth Annual Report. URD Equipment and Materials Reliability in the Northwest.
Undergrounding, March/April 1974, p. 62.

Open Forum: Equipment Failure Reporting Systems. Undergrounding, January/February

1975, p. 32.

C-l 3
Patton, A. D. Determination and Analysis of Data for Reliability Studies. IEEE
Transactions, PAS-87, No. I, January 1968, pp. 84-100.

Paulson, N. L., and W. L. Carey. Outage Analysis Spots Trouble Areas. Electrical
World, March 21, 1966, pp. 88-93.

Rhoten, G. P. A General Program for Processing Distribution Data. Electrical World,

December 18, 1961, pp. 45-48.

Rhoten, G. P. Evaluation of Service Reliability. IEEE Paper No. C 72 153-0.

Saddock, H. G., M. P. Bhavaraju, R. Billinton, C. F. Desieno, J. Endrenyi, G. E.

Jorgensen, A. D. Patton, D. L. Piede, R. J. Ringlee, and J. A. Stratton. Common
Mode Forced Outages of Overhead Transmission Lines. IEEE Transactions, PAS-95,
1976, pp. 859-863.

Abstracts

Conner, R. A. W., and R. A. Parkins. Operational Statistics in the Management of

Large Distribution Systems. Proceedings of the Institution of Electrical Engineers,
November 1966.
The basic fault reporting system used in the United Kingdom was estab­
lished when the supply industry was nationalized in 1948. This paper
illustrates the objects established for the fault reporting system and
provides details of the way in which the necessary data are collected,
analyzed and used in one Area Board. Details are also provided on some
of the conclusions arrived at from the data collection procedure and
some observations are made on reliability and security of supplies. The
paper provides data on various equipment classifications including over­
head lines due to various causes, cable joints and terminations, trans­
formers, switchgear, protective-gear and miscellaneous events causing
customer outages.

Ford, D. V. The British Electricity Boards National Fault and Interruption Reporting
Scheme - Objectives, Development and Operating Experience. IEEE Transactions, PAS-
91, No. 5, September/October 1972, pp. 2179-2188.
The British Electricity Board established a National Fault and
Interruption Reporting Scheme in 1965. It had been working for six
years at the time this paper was published. The paper describes the
Scheme and presents some of the first results from it. The objectives
and scope are described in detail together with the basic elements
involved in the reporting procedure. A description of the two annual
reports produced is provided. The paper also provides annual failure
rates for selected major components over the six year reporting period.

Guertin, M. B., P. F. Albrecht, M. P. Bhavaraju, R. Billinton, G. E. Jorgensen,

A. N. Kasers, W. D. Maswers, A. D. Patton, R. J. Ringlee, and R. P. Spence. List
of Transmission and Distribution Components for Use in Outage Reporting and
Reliability Calculation. IEEE Transactions, PAS-95, No. 4, July/August, 1976,
pp. 1210-1215.
This paper was prepared by the Working Group on Performance Records for
Optimizing System Design of the IEEE Power Systems Engineering Committee.

C-l 4
 It identifies composite systems and major components of transmission and
distribution equipment for which outage data are recorded. The paper
proposes a standard component list and a set of descriptions which would
enhance data pooling and thereby increase the data base. It was sug­
gested that the paper could be used as a guide by the utility industry
in setting up a standard transmission and distribution equipment outage
data bank.

IEEE Committee. Report on Reliability Survey of Industrial Plants. IEEE Transactions

on Industry Applications, Vol. 1A-10 March/April 1974.
Part I - Reliability of Electrical Equipment, pp. 213-235.
Part HI - Causes and Types of Failures of Electrical Equipment, the Methods of Repair
and the Urgency of Repair, pp. 242-252.
Part IV - Additional Detailed Tabulation of Some Data Previously Reported in the First
Three Parts, pp. 456-562.
Part VI - Maintenance Quality of Electrical Equipment, pp. 467-476. Correction to
Part VI: Maintenance Quality of Electrical Equipment, p. 681.
These reports. Report on Reliability Survey of Industrial Plants - Part
1: Reliabi1ity~of Electrical Equipment, by IEEE Committee, Report on
Reliability Survey of Industrial Plants - Part III: Causes and Types of
Failures of Electrical Equipment, the Methods of Repair and the Urgency
of Repair, by IEEE Committee, Report on Reliability Survey of Industrial
Plants - Part IV: Additional Detailed Tabulation of Some Data Previously
Reported in the First Three Parts, by IEEE Committee, Report on
Reliability Survey of Industrial Plants - Part V: Plant Climate,
Atmosphere and Operating Schedule, the Average Age of Electrical
Equipment, Percent Production Lost, and the Method of Restoring Electrical
Service After a Failure, by IEEE Committee, and Report on Reliability
Survey of Industrial Plants - Part VI: Maintenance Quality of Electrical
Equipment, by IEEE Committee, were compiled by the Reliability Subcom-
mittee of the IEEE Industrial and Commercial Power Systems Committee.
Their application is primarily in the area of industrial power distribu­
tion systems. They provide considerable outage and repair data on indi­
vidual components and information on the impact of supply failure to
selected load types. In addition to components such as motors, genera­
tors, cables, switchgear bus the reports provide data on electric utility
power supply from single, double and triple circuits. Repair data in­
cluding information on the effect of urgency for transformers, circuit
breakers and other components is provided. Information is also provided
on maintenance quality and on the normal maintenance cycle used for
equipment classes studied. These reports provide a valuable source of
data for industrial distribution system applications.

IEEE Committee Report. Definition of Customer and Load Reliability Indices for
Evaluating Electric Power System Performance. IEEE Paper A 75 588-4.
This report was prepared by the Working Group on Performance Records for
Optimizing System Design of the IEEE Power Systems Engineering Committee.
It contains definitions of customer and load point reliability indices
commonly used for performance assessment of electric utility systems. A
primary objective of the paper is to illustrate clearly how each of these
indices was calculated. This is accomplished by using a simple numerical
example in which each index is illustrated and calculated.

C-l 5
IEEE Standard Definitions in Power Operations Terminology, 2. Terms for Reporting
and Analyzing Outages of Electrical Transmission and Distribution Facilities and
Interruptions to Customer Service. IEEE Standard 346-1973.
This IEEE Standard arose from the work done by the Joint Working Group on
Performance Records for Optimizing System Design of the Subcommittees on
Application of Probability Methods and System Planning of the IEEE Power
System Engineering Committee. The first publication of this information
was as Proposed Definitions of Terms for Reporting and Analyzing Outages
of Electrical Transmission and Distribution Facilities and Interruptions,
by IEEE Committee Report. This material plus the subsequent discussion
led to the present standard. Their basic purpose is to foster uniformity
and standardization of language among engineers engaged in reporting,
analyzing and predicting outages of transmission and distribution facili­
ties and interruptions to customers. The definitions do not provide
specific instructions for reporting outages and interruptions. The
standardization of basic terms should, however, enhance the exchange of
data between different utilities and data collection agencies.

Patton, A. D. Determination and Analysis of Data for Reliability Studies. IEEE

Transactions, PAS-87, No. 1, January 1968, pp. 84-100.
This is a fundamental paper in the area of data collection for trans­
mission and distribution studies. It details how the expected values
of component outage rates and outage durations required in reliability
studies can be estimated from field data. The paper also describes the
methods used to place confidence bounds on this data. A study of six
years of utility field records was conducted using the methods proposed,
and sample expected outage rates and outage durations are presented for
transmission lines, substation transformers and circuit breakers.

Saddock, H. G., M. P. Bhavaraju, R. Billinton, C. F. Desieno, J. Endrenyi, G. E.

Jorgensen, A. D. Patton, D. L. Piede, R. J. Ringlee, and J. A. Stratton. Common
Mode Forced Outages of Overhead Transmission Lines. IEEE Transactions, PAS-95,
1976, pp. 859-863.
This paper was prepared by a Task Force of the Application of Probability
Methods Subcommittee of the IEEE Power System Engineering Committee. It
focused attention on the definition and collection of data for common
mode outages of multiple transmission lines which are on the same right-
of-way for a measurable part of their length. The investigation showed
that common mode failures could be significant in transmission and dis­
tribution system reliability evaluation and that most of the present
data collection procedures are inadequate to collect data on these
events.

RELIABILITY ECONOMICS AND INDICES

Publications List

Allan, R. N., I. R. Homer, and E. N. Dialynas. Reliability Indices and Reliability

Worth in Distribution Systems. EPRI Conference on Power System Reliability Research
Needs and Priorities, Asilomar, California, March 1978, EPRI Publication WS-77-60,
pp. 6.21-6.28.

C-l 6
Arceri, J. A., and E. T. Parascos. Reliability Engineering and Underground
Equipment Failure, Cost and Manufacturer's Analysis. IEEE Conference Record 76
CHI 119-7-PWR, pp. 579-782.

Berk, L. H., and E. M. Mackay. Ontario Hydro Survey on Supply Reliability:

Viewpoint of Large Users. CEA Transactions, Vol. 16, Part 3, 1977.

Berrie, T. W. How to Work Out What Quality of Electricity Supply We Can Afford.
Electrical Review, Vol. 202, No. 3, January 20, 1978.

Billinton, R., and D. 0. Koval. Evaluation of Reliability Worth to Distribution

Systems. Proceedings, PSCC Conference VI, August 21-25, 1978, Darmstadt, Germany.

Billinton, R., D. 0. Koval, and M. S. Grover. Calculation of Reliability Worth.

CEA Transactions, Vol. 16, Part 3, 1977.

Canadian Electrical Association. Distribution System Reliability Engineering Guide.

CEA, Suite 580, 1 Westmount Square, Montreal, P.Q., H3Z 2P9, March 1976.

Chang, N. E. Cost Reliability Index of Underground Distribution System. IEEE

Conference Record No. 74 CH0832-6-PWR, pp. 414-422.

Dickinson, W. H. Economic Evaluation of Industrial Power System Reliability. AIEE

Transactions, 1957, pp. 264-277.

Dixon, G. F. L., and H. Hammersley. Reliability and Its Cost on Distribution

Systems. Transaction of the IEE Conference on Reliability of Power Supply Systems,
IEE Conference Publication No. 148, February 1977.

Gannon, P. E. Cost of Interruptions: Economic Evaluation of Reliability. IEEE

Industrial and Commercial Power Systems Technical Conference, Los Angeles,
California, May 10-13, 1976.

IEEE Committee. Report on Reliability Survey of Industrial Plants - Part II: Cost
of Power Outages, Plant Restart Time, Critical Service Loss Duration Time, and Type
of Loads Lost Versus Time of Power Outages. IEEE Transactions on Industry Applica­
tions, Vol. 1A-10, March/April 1974, pp. 236-241.

IEEE Committee Report. Cost of Electrical Interruptions in Commercial Buildings.

Conference Record 75-CH0947-1-1A, 1975 I&CP Technical Conference, pp. 123-130.

IEEE Committee Report. Reliability of Electric Utility Supplies to Industrial

Plants. Conference Record 75-CH0947-1-1A, 1975, I&CP Technical Conference, pp.
TTTT34.

Jackson, A. F., and B. Salvage. Costs of Electricity - Supply Interruptions to

Industrial Consumers. Proceedings IEE, Vol. 121, No. 12, December 1974, pp. 1575-
1576.

Mann, R. F., and J. J. Burke. An Availability Analysis and Economic Evaluation of

Direct Buried and Submersible Residential Distribution Systems. IEEE Conference
Record No. 71 C 42-PWR, pp. 277-285.

Sheppard, H. J. The Economics of Reliability of Supply Distribution (Great Britain).

IEE Conference on the Economics of the Reliability of Supply, Publication No. 34,
1967, Pt. 1, pp. 248-266.

C-l 7
Shula, W. E., and J. H. Easley. Cost and Reliability Evaluation of Four Underground
Primary Distribution Feeder Plans. IEEE Conference Record No. 74 CH.

Shipley, R. B., A. D. Patton, and J. S. Denison. Power Reliability Cost vs. Worth.
IEEE Transactions, PAS-91, No. 5, September/October 1972, pp. 2204-2212.

Skof, L. V. Customer Interruption Costs Vary Widely. Electrical World, July 15,
1977, pp. 64-65.

Swedish Committee Report. Costs of Interruptions in Electric Supply. Committee on

Supply Interruption Costs (English Edition), September 1969.

Abstracts

Berk, L. H., and E. M. Mackay. Ontario Hydro Survey on Supply Reliability:

Viewpoint of Large Users, CEA Transactions, Vol. 16, Part 3, 1977.
This paper represents the first attempt made by a Canadian utility to
determine reliability worth to its customers. It presents the viewpoints
of 172 large users of electricity in Ontario on various aspects of relia­
bility. This information was obtained from a survey of all customers
with demands of 5 MW or more. The results include the users estimates
of the cost and other effects of interruptions, the effects of voltage
variation on their operations and their ability to reduce load in an
emergency. Industry groups surveyed include the rubber products indus­
try, newsprint mills and petroleum and miscellaneous chemical products.
This paper is a summary of a more substantial report prepared by Ontario
Hydro.

Billinton, R., D. 0. Koval, and M. S. Grover. Calculation of Reliability Worth.

CEA Transactions, Vol. 16, Pt. 3, 1977.
This paper illustrates an extension to the application of standard tech­
niques for calculating reliability indices in substation and switching
station configurations and in radial distribution configuration to in­
corporate the customer cost associated with unreliability of supply.
The total cost to the consumer and to the utility is used as a design
factor in the selection of an alternate configuration or a design modifi­
cation to the circuit. The use of an overall cost index can provide a
consistant basis in comparing alternatives when it is not possible to
directly compare failure rate and outage duration indices.

Dickinson, W. H. Economic Evaluation of Industrial Power System Reliability. AIEE

Transactions, 1957, pp. 264-277.
This is a pioneering paper in the use of quantitative reliability indices
in the economic appraisal of alternate design configuration. Reliability
evaluation techniques have advanced considerably since this paper was
published. Some of the basic concepts proposed in the paper are, how­
ever, as pertinent today as they were at that time.

C-18
IEEE Committee. Report on Reliability Survey of Industrial Plants - Part II: Cost
of Power Outages, Riant Restart Time, Critical Service Loss Duration Time, and Ty'p¥
of Loads Lost Versus Time of Power Outages. IEEE Transactions on Industry Applica-
tions, Vol. 1A-10, March/April 1974, pp. 236-241.
This report was compiled by the Reliability Subcommittee of the IEEE
Industrial and Commercial Power System Reliability Committee. The re­
port was prepared following a survey of industrial plants in the United
States and Canada. Data from 30 companies covering 69 plants were used.

IEEE Committee Report. Cost of Electrical Interruption in Commercial Buildings.

Conference Record 75-CH0947-1-1A, 1975 I&CP Technical Conference, pp. 123-130.
This report was compiled by the Reliability Subcommittee of the IEEE
Industrial and Commercial Power System Reliability Committee based upon
a survey conducted with 48 companies involving 55 buildings in the
United States. The results are presented in terms of office buildings
and all commercial buildings. The results showed that there is con­
siderable spread in the assigned costs even within similar commercial
buildings.

Swedish Committee Report. Costs of Interruptions in Electric Supply. Committee on

Supply Interruption Costs (English Edition), September 1969.
This is a fundamental paper on attempts to establish the worth of supply
reliability by direct customer evaluation. The paper was the final re­
port of a joint committee set up in Sweden to study costs incurred by
consumers in the event of loss of supply. The investigation was con­
ducted with industrial, domestic, agricultural, general public services
and communications customer groups. Numerical data is provided in each
case. The investigations showed that the costs can vary considerably
between different consumers within one and the same consumer group during
the year and during the day. The costs presented are not applicable in
todays economic climate. The paper is significant, however, as it pre­
sents the first comprehensive study of consumer worth of reliability.

C-l 9
 Appendix D

SUPPLEMENTARY EXAMPLES

Examples contained in this appendix are intended to provide additional insight into
the application of predictive methods to different configurations. To simplify the
discussion and to highlight the affects of system structure on reliability, the
following assumptions are used.

• Unless otherwise stated, only first-order contingencies are con­

sidered; that is, overlapping outages and common-mode failures
are ignored.

• Exactly one crew is available to perform switching and repair

operations; thus, two switching operations cannot be performed
simultaneously.

• All protection devices are "perfect." This means that failures

of protection devices are ignored and that outages do not cas­
cade beyond the nearest protection device.

• All outages are due to short-circuit failures.

• Customers are restored by switching operations, if possible,

before repair/replacement of outaged equipment.

MODELING OPERATION OF A LOOPED SYSTEM

A simple looped system with manual switching is shown in Figure D-l. Failure rates
for corresponding components are tabulated in Table D-l. Note the inclusion of
failure statistics for the subtransmission supply. These numbers can be viewed as
equivalent load-point indices for the subtransmission system. In fact, they may
be calculated by applying the principles of Section 4 to the analysis of subtrans­
mission reliability. Thus, distribution reliability indices can be adjusted to
include the effects of failures in the bulk supply system.

Before attempting to apply formulae developed in Section 4, consider loop operation

during outage conditions. For example, any outage causes the feeder breaker to
interrupt the entire circuit. However, effects of an outage on segment A are dif­
ferent from those of an outage on segment B. Given an outage on A, restoration
involves two steps: (1) Restore customers on sections B and C by switching and

D-l
(2) make repairs on A. Given an outage on B, restoration involves three steps:
(1) Restore customers on section A by opening the switch between A and B and closing
the feeder breaker, (2) restore section C by switching, and (3) make repairs on B.
These effects are summarized in Table D-2.

Because the feeder breaker operates to clear outages on all sections, all load
points have the same interruption rate:

^eq ^eq^A ^eq^B ^eqV

= .10 + .01 + .45 + .10 + .15 + .60 + .25 + .35

= 2.01

Calculation of average annual downtimes is straightforward. Using the restora­

tion times tabulated in Table D-2, the average annual downtime for customers on
segment A is:

^U'eq^A= .10 (2.0) + .01 (12.0) + .45 (4.0) + .10 (.5) +

.15 (.5) + .60 (.5) + .25 (.5) + .35 (.5)

= 3.52 hrs/yr

Calculations of the remaining load-point indices (by feeder section) are summarized
in Table D-3. Corresponding system indices are tabulated below.

SAIFI = 2.01
SAIDI = 3.03
CAIDI =1.50
ASAI = .998370

The preceding example illustrates considerations involved with a manually-operated

loop. The next example illustrates application of formulae developed in Section 4
to the more complex loop arrangement depicted in Figure D-2.

Each substation transformer normally serves two feeders and operates at 50% of rat­
ing. Each is also supplied from a different subtransmission circuit. In instances
of transformer failure or loss of supply, the entire load of four feeders is served
through the one operating transformer.

D-2
 Figure D-l. Looped system

Table D-l

Outage data for feeder depicted in Figure D-l

failure rate restoration time

(f/yr) (hr/f) customers

substation supply .10 2.0 -

transformer .01 12.0 -

Section A .45 2.5 40

Section B .10 3.0 30

Section C .15 3.0 65

Section D .60 2.5 85

Section E .25 3.0 50

Section F .35 4.0 75

D-3
 Table D-2

Downtime Array

Outaged Feeder Section

I A B C D E F
j 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
L A ! .5 + 1 + 2.5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
0 B | .5 + 1 .5 + 1 + 3.0 .5 .5 .5 .5
a 1
d C | .5 + 1 .5 + 1 .5 + 3.0 .5 .5 .5
P i
.5 1.5 .5 + 1 + 2.5 ! .5 ! .5
o D -5
_____ ._i __ _ 1 . .
j E -5 .5 1 .5 i .5 + 1 ; .5 + 1 + 3.0 ^ .5
■ — -- .........■■)■■■—........... ..........!———• ■ - ......j............................................... ........■—-
1 F | .5
.5 ’ .5 ! .5 + 1 .5+1 .5 + 4.0

*Restoration steps:

Step 1 - Open switch nearer breaker and close breaker (.5 hr)

Step 2 - Open switch to isolate outage and close NO switch (1 hr)

Step 3 - Repair/replace outaged equipment (from Table D-l)

 Table D-3

Analysis of Looped System of Figure D-l

Segment A Segment B Segment C Segr mt D Segment E Segment F

r Xr r A.r r Xr r Jlr r Xr r Xr
Component f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr hrs/f hrs/yr hrs/f hrs/yr hrs/f hrs/yr hrs/f hrs/yr hrs/f hrs/yr

Supply .10 2.0 0.2 2.0 0.2 2.0 0.2 2.0 0.2 2.0 0.2 2.0 0.2

Transformer .01 12.0 0.12 12.0 0.12 12.0 0.12 12.0 0.12 12.0 0.12 12.0 0.12

Section A .45 4.0 1.80 1.5 0.675 1.5 0.675 0.5 0.225 0.5 0.225 0.5 0.225

Section B .10 0.5 0.05 4.5 0.45 1.5 0.15 0.5 0.05 0.5 0.05 0.5 0.05

Section C .15 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.075 3.5 0.525 0.5 0.075 0.5 0.075 0.5 0.075

Section D .60 0.5 0.30 0.5 0.30 0.5 0.30 4.0 2.4 1.5 0.90 1 .5 0.90

Section E .25 0.5 0.125 0.5 0.125 0.5 0.125 0.5 0.125 4.5 1 .125 1 .5 0.375

Section F .35 0.5 0.175 0.5 0.175 0.5 0.175 0.5 0.175 0.5 0.175 4.5 1 .575

Total Effect 2.01 1.75 3.52 1.05 2.12 1.13 2.27 1 .68 3.37 1.43 2.87 1 .75 3.52
The automatic sectionalizing scheme is designed so that the feeder breaker opens
for faults on Section A and the feeder recloser operates for outages on Section B.
Corresponding restoration procedures are summarized in Table D-4. For example,
given a fault on Section A, the feeder breaker will lock open. Due to the loss of
potential, the feeder recloser will also open to permit closing the tie switch.

Calculations of the load point indices (by feeder section) are summarized in Table
D-6. Note that in instances of loss of supply or transformer failure, restoration
time is much less than actual repair/replacement time. Note also that Section A
is without service while the repair crew switches Section B back into service and
then makes repairs on Section A. Outages on Section B do not affect service to
customers on Section A.

ANALYSIS OF SERVICE TO SPOT NETWORKS

Figure D-3 shows a simple spot-network arrangement. Basically, each secondary bus
has two redundant feeds; single contingencies do not result in interruption of ser­
vice.

Analysis of this configuration involves a combination of series-parallel reduc­

tions. Given the failure parameters of Table D-7, the equivalent failure rate for
service provided from substation A is

(JL ) = .12 + .8 (.30) + 2 (.05)

service from A

.46

Similarly,

^eq^ service from B = .25 + .6 (.30) + 2 (.05)

.53

D-6
 Figure D-2. Looped system with automatic
sectionalizing and manual ties.

Table D-4

Summary of operating practices for configuration

shown in Figure D-2

______ outage_______ restoration procedure

loss of supply or close tie breakers (feeder

transformerfailure breakers open), repair

Section A close tie switch (feeder

recloser open), repair

Section B repair

D-7
 Table D-5

Outage and switching data

manual
failure rate restoration time switching time
(f/yr) (hr/f) (hrs)

substation supply .10 2.0

transformer .01 12.0

Section A .35 2.0

Section B .55 4.0

feeder breaker .25

tie breaker .25

tie switch .50

Table D-6

Summary of reliability calculations

Section A Section B
X r Xr X r Xr
Cause f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr

loss of supply .10 .25 .025 .10 .25 .025

transformer .01 .25 .0025 .01 .25 .0025

Section A .35 2.50 .875 .35 .50 .175

Section B - - - .55 4.0 2.20

Total Effect .46 1.96 .9025 1.01 2.38 2.40

D-8
 AM AM

i
30MI- -.50 Ml .10 Ml

Figure D-3. Spot networks

Table D-7

Outage data for Figure D-3

failure rate restoration time

(f/yr) (hrs/f)

loss of supply at A .12 2.0

loss of supply at B .25 1.0

primary .30 (f/mi/yr) 4.0

transformer .05 10.0

D-9
Analysis of the series (in a reliability sense) service of each station is
summarized in Table D-8.

Table D-8

Analysis of series service of each substation

in Figure D

Supply A Supply B
X r Xr X r Xr
f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr

loss of supply .12 2.0 .24 .25 1 .0 .25

failures on primary .24 4.0 .96 .18 4.0 .72

transformer failures .10 10.0 1.00 .10 10.0 1.00

Total Effect .46 4.78 2.20 .53 3.72 1 .97

Each spot network is served by a parallel (redundant) combination of supplies A

and B; both spot networks have the same reliability:

^eq^service to spot network (.46) (. 53) ( 4,787603-'72 )

.0024 f/yr

(r ) (4.78)(3.72)
eq'service to spot network
v eq'servi
(4.78 + 3.72)
2.09 hrs/f
(u: (.00025)(2.09)
eq'service to spot network
.0005 hrs/yr

On the average, the spot networks are virtually free of interruptions due to
failures on the primary feeders. However, during transformer outages the proba­
bility of failure is much higher because both spot networks are reduced to a
single supply. This affect is commonly reduced by adding a disconnecting switch
on the primary side of the transformers.

D-l 0
ANALYSIS OF A SUBSTATION WITH THROWOVER SWITCHING

Substation configurations such as the one illustrated in Figure D-4 are used to
speed service restoration in cases of subtransmission or substation failures.
Although this arrangement is commonly set up for automatic throwover operation,
this analysis is based on manual switching operations.

A loss of potential on either of the subtransmission circuits results in the open­

ing of a high-voltage breaker. Service is restored by closing the high-voltage
tie breaker. Transformer failures result in the opening of both the high-voltage
and low-voltage breakers. Service is restored by closing the low-voltage tie
breaker.

Failure and switching characteristics are shown in Table D-9. Calculations are
summarized in Table D-10. Note that the chances of losing both supplies is very
smal1:

X 1.0 + 2.0 = 1 x 10"5 f/yr

= (.12)(.25) (
both supplies 8760

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This appendix is intended to illustrate application of predictive methods to

various configurations. As such, several assumptions and approximations are
made. Failure statistics are artificial and should not be extracted and blindly
applied to other similar configurations. For example, in these problems, all busses
are assumed to be completely reliable; this is, in fact, not a practical assumption.

Instead of presenting a set of detailed examples from which practical solutions

may be copied, the intention is to provide insight into reliability modeling
based on actual operating practices inherent in a given utility. This allows a
broader application of the principles of predictive reliability assessment and
demonstrates flexibility in their application to diverse problems.

D-ll
 SUPPLY A SUPPLY B

Figure D-4. Substation with manual throwover switching.

Table D-9

Outage data and switching times for Figure D-4

failure rate restoration time switching time

(f/yr) (hrs/f) (hrs)

Supply A .12 1.0 -

Supply B .25 2.0 -

transformer A .02 15.0 -

transformer B .05 10.0 -

tie breaker - _
1.0

D-l 2
 Table D-10

Analysis of the configuration of Figure D-4

Feeder A Feeder B
X r X r Xr
f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr f/yr hrs/f hrs/yr

Supply A .12 1 .0 .12 - “ -

Supply B - - - .25 1 .0 .25

transformer A .02 1 .0 .02 - - -

transformer B - - - .05 1.0 .05

Total Effect .14 1.0 .14 .30 1 .0 .30

D-13