1. LORENZO M. TAÑADA vs. HON. JUAN C.

TUVERA
ISSUE: Whether or not publication affects the validity of the Executive Issuances.
HELD: Yes. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code. Publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but
not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Thus, without publication, the people have no
means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees.

2. NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC. vs. MILITARY SHRINE

SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE
ISSUE: Whether or not the handwritten addendum of President Marcos had the force and effect of law though it was
not included in the publication.
HELD: No. This Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published.
Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.

3. VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON

PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE
AND ELECTORAL REFORMS
ISSUE: Whether or not the invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 support their claim of
valid publication through the internet.
HELD: No. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for
their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

4. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. QUE PO LAY

ISSUE: Whether or not Circular No. 20. need to be published in the Official Gazette for it to have force and effect.
HELD: No. Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November
1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its
penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after
November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time
he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EVANGELINE SITON et al

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code (anti-vagrancy) is vague.
HELD: No, it is not. Fair notice is inapplicable under our legal system because ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith. Offenders are being punished for their offensive conduct in public space as a valid
exercise of its police power.

6. TAYUG RURAL BANK vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

ISSUE: Whether or not the Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty on Appellee's past overdue loans
beginning July 4, 1965, by virtue of Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8 dated December 23, 1964.
HELD: No. While the Monetary Board possesses broad supervisory powers, nonetheless, the retroactive imposition
of administrative penalties cannot be taken as a measure supervisory in character.

7. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR.

ISSUE: Whether E.O. No. 80 has the effect of removing from the jurisdiction of the CSC the appeal of respondent
which was already pending before the CSC at the time the said law converted PNB into a private banking institution.
HELD: No. It is binding rule, conformably with Article 4 of the Civil Code, that, generally, laws shall have only a
prospective effect and must not be applied retroactively in such a way as to apply to pending disputes and cases.
This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward and not
backward.) The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive: the retroactive application of a law usually divests
rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and, hence, is
unconstitutional. Although the rule admits of certain well-defined exceptions such as, for instance, where the law
itself expressly provides for retroactivity, we find that not one of such exceptions that would otherwise lend
credence to petitioner’s argument obtains in this case. Hence, in other words, the fact that Section 6 of E.O. No. 80
states that PNB would be removed from the coverage of the CSC must be taken to govern acts committed by the
bank’s employees after privatization.

8. F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. vs. HR CONSTRUCTION CORP.

ISSUE: Whether or not FFCCI, on its failure to demand the joint measurement of HRCC’s completed works, had
waived its right to ask for the conduct of the same.
HELD: Yes. As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:

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 x x x the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word
‘waiver’ covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which
affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him
or to which he is legally entitled,
Here, it is undisputed that the joint measurement of HRCC’s completed works contemplated by the parties in the
Subcontract Agreement never materialized. Indeed, HRCC, on separate occasions, submitted its monthly progress
billings indicating the extent of the works it had completed sans prior joint measurement. FFCCI did not contest the
said progress billings submitted by HRCC despite the lack of a joint measurement of the latter’s completed works as
required under the Subcontract Agreement.

9. RUPERTO LUCERO, JR., et al vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF PASIG

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners may claim a vested right to the market stalls they were occupying.
HELD: No. The lease (and occupation) of a stall in a public market is not a right but a purely statutory privilege
governed by laws and ordinances. The city government, through its market administrator, is not duty-bound to grant
lease privileges to any applicant, least of all those who refuse to obey the new ordinance prescribing the rules and
regulations for the market stalls.

10. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO and BONIFACIO S.
TUMBOKON vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila
ISSUE: Whether or not in passing Ordinance No. 8119, the Sanggunian intended to repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
HELD: No. Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals the
intention of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. In enacting
Ordinance No. 8119, there was no indication of the legislative purpose to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. While it is
true that both ordinances relate to the same subject matter, i.e. classification of the land use of the area where
Pandacan oil depot is located, if there is no intent to repeal the earlier enactment, every effort at reasonable
construction must be made to reconcile the ordinances so that both can be given effect.

11. PAMBANSANG KOALISYON NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT MANGGAGAWA SA

NIYUGAN (PKSMMN), et al vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961, and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.
1468 are unconstitutional.
HELD: Yes. Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961, and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468
completely ignore the fact that coco-levy funds are public funds raised through taxation. And since taxes could be
exacted only for a public purpose, they cannot be declared private properties of individuals although such
individuals fall within a distinct group of persons.
But, since coco-levy funds are taxes, the provisions of P.D.s 755, 961 and 1468 as well as those of E.O.s 312 and
313 that remove such funds and the assets acquired through them from the jurisdiction of the COA violate Article
IX-D, Section 2(1)69 of the 1987 Constitution. Section 2(1) vests in the COA the power and authority to examine
uses of government money and property. The cited P.D.s and E.O.s also contravene Section 2 70 of P.D. 898
(Providing for the Restructuring of the Commission on Audit), which has the force of a statute.

12. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al

ISSUE: Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant petition
HELD: Yes. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution,
the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution." It is understandable why it should be so, the
Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
The "operative fact" doctrine protecting vested rights bars the grant of the writ of prohibition to the case at bar. It
should be remembered that petitioner was the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated and
implemented. He had the opportunity to question the SMDRP and the agreements on it, but he did not. The moment
to challenge the Project had passed.

13. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws is unconstitutional.
HELD: Yes. The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition
existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the
requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only.
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage
based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11 th Congress - as against all other
municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification
must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot
convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in
the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

14. ALBINO S. CO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

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ISSUE: Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 declaring the guarantee check will no longer be considered as a
valid defense be retroactively applied.
HELD: No. The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves
not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason why under Article 8 of the
New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system . . .'"

15. RUDY GLEO ARMIGOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal was beyond the reglementary period.
HELD: Yes. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In computing a period, the first day
shall be excluded, and the last day included.” The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a
Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday
or a legal holiday." In applying this rule, the Court considered the day as synonymous with the date and we find no
cogent reason to adopt a different view.
While it is true that rules of procedure are to be interpreted liberally so that the real matter in dispute may be
submitted to the judgment of the court, and that the trial court is vested with discretion to allow or admit an appeal
filed out of time, this discretion is not unconditional. There must be justifiable reason to warrant such action, since
the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional, and in the absence of any justifying circumstance, the court has no jurisdiction to approve or admit an
appeal filed out of time. In the instant case, the petitioner failed to prove, or even claim, that his failure to appeal on
time was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.

16. ERNESTINA BERNABE vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN
BERNABE
ISSUE: Whether Adrian’s right to an action for recognition had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family
Code.
HELD: Yes. A vested right is defined as "one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of
which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency x x x."
Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for recognition is procedural in nature and that "as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws."
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives
Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the
Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already
vested prior to its enactment.

17. LYNETTE G. GARVIDA vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is eligible to run.
HELD: No. The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of
his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks
of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each. The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over
21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a
fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not
equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the candidate be
less than 22 years on election day.

18. BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RICARDO J.
MARASIGAN
ISSUE: Whether or not there was abuse of right on the part of petitioner.
HELD: No. To find the existence of an abuse of right Article 19 the following elements must be present (1) There is
a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 
We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent suffered damages as a result of the
cancellation of his credit card. However, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the results of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences
must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does
not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. 

19. POLO S. PANTALEON vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent caused damage to the petitioner.
HELD: Yes. It should be emphasized that the reason why petitioner is entitled to damages is not simply because
respondent incurred delay, but because the delay, for which culpability lies under Article 1170, led to the particular
injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are remunerative. The somewhat unusual
attending circumstances to the purchase at Coster – that there was a deadline for the completion of that purchase by
petitioner before any delay would redound to the injury of his several traveling companions – gave rise to the moral

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shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation sustained by the petitioner, as
concluded by the RTC. Those circumstances are fairly unusual, and should not give rise to a general entitlement for
damages under a more mundane set of facts.

20. EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION vs. JOSE T. CALDERON

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for moral damages.
HELD: No. In law, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. And, certainly, respondent could
not have justifiably assumed that petitioner must have reinstated his card by reason alone of his having deposited
US$14,000.00 a day before he left for Hongkong. As issuer of the card, petitioner has the option to decide whether
to reinstate or altogether terminate a credit card previously suspended on considerations which the petitioner deemed
proper, not the least of which are the cardholder’s payment record, capacity to pay and compliance with any
additional requirements imposed by it.

21. BEATRIZ P. WASSMER vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant may be held liable.
HELD: Yes. It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage."
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.

22. TOMAS P. TAN, JR. vs. JOSE G. HOSANA

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose must return the consideration of the Deed of Sale.
HELD: Yes, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains sufficient evidence of the actual amount the
petitioner paid and the same amount which should be returned under the principle of unjust enrichment. Unjust
enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or
property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience." The prevention of
unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State and is based on Article 22 of the Civil Code.  The
principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he or Milagros received under the void contract which
presumably benefitted their conjugal partnership.

23. WILLEM BEUMER vs. AVELINA AMORES

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was unjustly enriched.
HELD: No. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for
money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is
proscribed by the Constitution.

24. IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER vs.
HELMUT MULLER
ISSUE: Whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo
property.
HELD: Respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition on foreign ownership.

25. ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL vs. EDERLINA P. CATITO

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner could recover the money used in purchasing the several properties
HELD: No. The sales of three parcels of land in favor of the petitioner who is a foreigner is illegal per se. The
transactions are void ab initio because they were entered into in violation of the Constitution. Thus, to allow the
petitioner to recover the properties or the money used in the purchase of the parcels of land would be subversive of
public policy. Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code. An action for recovery of what
has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as
in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine.

26. ANDRE T. ALMOCERA vs. JOHNNY ONG

ISSUE: Whether or not there was any delay, the same was incurred by respondent because he refused to pay the
balance of the contract price.
HELD: No. For failure of one party to assume and perform the obligation imposed on him, the other party does not
incur delay. It would simply be the height of inequity if we are to require respondent to pay the balance of the
contract price. To allow this would result in the unjust enrichment of petitioner and FBMC. The fundamental
doctrine of unjust enrichment is the transfer of value without just cause or consideration. The elements of this

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doctrine which are present in this case are: enrichment on the part of the defendant; impoverishment on the part of
the plaintiff; and lack of cause. The main objective is to prevent one to enrich himself at the expense of another. It is
commonly accepted that this doctrine simply means a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself
inequitably at another's expense. Hence, to allow petitioner and FBMC keep the down payment made by respondent
amounting to P1,060,000.00 would result in their unjust enrichment at the expense of the respondent. Thus, said
amount should be returned.

27. ARTURO SARTE FLORES vs. SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and EDNA C. LINDO
ISSUE: Whether or not Edna Lindo may unjustly enrich herself.
HELD: No. Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust enrichment, being a substantive
law, should prevail over the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals, in the assailed decision,
found that Edna admitted the loan, except that she claimed it only amounted to ₱340,000. Edna should not be
allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the
validity of the Deed. Moreover, Edna still has an opportunity to submit her defenses before the RTC, Branch 42 on
her claim as to the amount of her indebtedness.

28. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. ANTONIO B. BALMACEDA et al

ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of unjust enrichment is applicable.
HELD: No, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that another party
knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it
would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit. Ramos cannot be held liable to PCIB on account of unjust
enrichment simply because he received payments out of money secured by fraud from PCIB. To hold Ramos
accountable, it is necessary to prove that he received the money from Balmaceda, knowing that he (Ramos) was not
entitled to it.

29. ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, et al vs. ISMAEL VELOSO III

ISSUE: Whether or not the act imputed by petitioner violates Article 26 of the Civil Code.
HELD: Yes. Petitioners are also expected to respect respondent's "dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind"
under Article 26 of the Civil Code. Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages
are provided for violations of a person's dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.

30. JOSE S. CANCIO, JR., represented by ROBERTO L. CANCIO vs. EMERENCIANA ISIP
ISSUE: Whether or not the case is an independent civil action.
HELD: Yes. Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of
the civil and criminal actions. Independent civil actions may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even
without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a
waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. In the
case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed by petitioner show that his cause of action is based on culpa contractual,
an independent civil action.

31. ANG TIBAY, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the union is entitled to a new trial.
HELD: Yes. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice
would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his
motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the
Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is
not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should
be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove.

32. AYER PRODUCTIONS et al vs. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to privacy was violated.
HELD: No. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of
speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed
motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. There must, in other words, be no
knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution.
There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no
revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. The proposed motion picture should not enter into what Mme.
Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad referred to as "matters of essentially private concern." To the extent that "The
Four Day Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to
those events which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into

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private respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out
even without a license from private respondent.

33. RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

ISSUE: Whether or not civil action may be independently filed.
HELD: Yes. A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was predicated on
fraud. This was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that Consing and de la Cruz
had acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as security and later object of sale,
a property which they do not own, and foisting to the public a spurious title." As such, the action was one that could
proceed independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states as
follows: Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

34. MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, et al vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al

ISSUE: Whether or not Superguard and Safeguard commited can be civilly liable even if Benigno Torzuela is
already being prosecuted for homicide.
HELD: Yes. It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal
action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this
case. An action based on Article 33 may arise from both delict and quasi-delict.

35. CONTINENTAL STEEL vs. MONTANO

ISSUE: Whether or not the unborn child has juridical personality.
Whether or not the unborn child is a legitimate dependent.
HELD: Yes. We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and
capacity to act as a person are not in issue. Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.
Yes. It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and
his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child
legitimate upon her conception.

36. MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON ET AL VS. COMELEC

ISSUE: Whether or not Fernando Poe Jr. was a Filipino citizen.
HELD: Yes. Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until
the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required
to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino
citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. But while the totality of the evidence may
not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code.

37. ERNESTO C. DAWSON, et al vs. ROD - QC

ISSUE: Whether or not the property become part of the estate of Louis.
HELD: No, the said property did not become part of the estate of Louis P Dawson. Necessarily, partition is not the
remedy to determine ownership thereof and to consolidate title in herein petitioners. Hence, we agree with the
following assertion of the solicitor general: "Having stepped into the shoes of the deceased Louis P. Dawson upon
his death in June, 1971 with respect to the said contract, and being the ones who continued the installment payments
of the selling price from their own funds until its full payment in 1978, petitioners necessarily became the lawful
owners of the said lot in whose favor the deed of absolute sale should have been executed by vendor Siska
Development Corporation." 

38. ERNESTO S. MERCADO vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
ISSUE: Whether Manzano is disqualified to hold public elective office in the Philippines. 
HELD: No, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
39. LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, et al vs COMELEC

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ISSUE: Whether or not dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters.
HELD: Yes, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary,
R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the
same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A.
9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency
requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.

40. AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS
AND ALLIED WORKERS) vs. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG
ISSUE: Is RA9225 unconstitutional
HELD: No. To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-
executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No.
9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to
draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would
be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado had
already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the
parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual
citizenship.

41. EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TESSIE P.

VILLANUEVA
ISSUE: Whether or not the Lopez reacquired citizenship
HELD: No. For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of
law who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is
renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopez’s failure to renounce
his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission
to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of respondent to prove that he
abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this Commission holds him disqualified from running for an elective
position in the Philippines.

42. DJUMANTAN vs. HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO

ISSUE: Whether or not an alien married to a Filipino have the right of residency in the Philippines.
HELD: No. There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be
given permanent residency, in the Philippines. The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her
from the operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens. Under Section 9 of the
Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitor's visa. Once
admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the law, an alien allowed
to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and "may be admitted" as a permanent resident. Among those
considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration
Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of
right, even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.

43. ANTONIO BENGSON III vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
TEODORO C. CRUZ
ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: Yes. Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

44. WILLIAM CHIONGBIAN vs. ALFREDO DE LEON

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner William Chiongbian is a Filipino citizen
HELD: Yes, on the principle of transmissive essence of citizenship. When William’s father became a Filipino, he
also became one being a minor at that time.

45. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORA FE SAGUN

ISSUE: Whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law.
HELD: No. Respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only
documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of
allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by
the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondent’s oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a
reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as
required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was no

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satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil
registry.

46. CARAM vs. CLARO LAURETA

ISSUE: WN petitioner is a purchaser in good faith?
HELD: No. The agents of Caram purchased the property in bad faith. Caram, as principal, should also be deemed in
bad faith. Laureta was a possessor in good faith. Mata cannot now set up the defense that the deed of sale to Laureta
was procured by force. After the lapse of four years from the time the intimidation ceased, Mata lost both his rights
to file an action for annulment or to set up nullity of the contract as a defense in an action to enforce the same.

47. JUAN G. FRIVALDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE

ISSUE: Whether or not the repatriation of Frivaldo is legal.
HELD: Yes. Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship -- long
before May 8, 1995. His claim that he took his oath of allegiance to effect his repatriation under PD 725 was
undisputed.

48. ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

ISSUE: Whether or not the Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
HELD: To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his
domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the
settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere. The evidence Jalosjos presented is
sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
holding otherwise.

49. JAIME O. SEVILLA vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS

ISSUE: Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties prior to the
celebration of the marriage.
HELD: Yes, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792.
It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of
showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also
means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.

50. CYNTHIA S. BOLOS vs. DANILO T. BOLOS

ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions"
rather than to the word "marriages."
HELD: No. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. As the statute is
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis.

51. ISIDRO ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is a real party in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his
deceased brother.
HELD: Yes. Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949,
the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the
rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity
of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

52. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by Castro establishing non-issuance of
marriage license sufficient enough to grant a decree of nullity of marriage.
HELD: Yes. At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations
was the New Civil Code. The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her
petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her
testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage
was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as
a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show
that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.

53. MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO

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ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction and without the requisite
marriage license.
HELD: Yes. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur
therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. Respondent judge should also be faulted for
solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render
valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that
gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority
when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

54. SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.
HELD: No. It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. Neither
could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the
license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license,
having admitted to not reading all of its contents.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides
that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. Again, this marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.

55. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO
AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA vs. HEIRS OF
MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN
ISSUE: Whether or not Josefa and Guillermo contracted marriage.
HELD: Yes, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always
proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented
in support thereof. Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the
parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules
of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.

56. LUIS UY vs. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid marriage between Uy and Rosca.
HELD: No, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from his
own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage allegedly took place. Even
the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence that he was actually married to
Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to each
other.

57. ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI

ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO
ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.
HELD: Yes. The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never
invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and
Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was
the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the
marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No.
394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

58. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY

ISSUE: Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological incapacity.
HELD: No. Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality
of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines.

59. HERALD BLACK DACASIN vs. SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN

ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement on the
joint custody of the parties’ child.

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HELD: Yes and no. The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement
which is void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call
for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law
vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody,
belongs to this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.

60. ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the
Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD: Yes, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.   In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which  divorce
dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.

61. IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are
no longer husband and wife.
HELD: No, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed.
Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still
married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint. By German law, they were already
divorced.

62. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO

ISSUE: Whether a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad.
HELD: Yes. A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a
Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still
require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship
that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any
child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are
just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive
interpretation of the subject provision.

63. MARLYN MONTON NULLADA vs. THE HON. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA
ISSUE: Whether, under the same provision [Art. 26], a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine
law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse
who is capacitated to remarry.
HELD: Yes. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in
likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. To reiterate, the purpose of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.

64. FEDERICO C. SUNTAY vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY 

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents was void.
HELD: Yes, the court upheld the previous ruling of CFI Rizal as proper in holding the marriage null and void.
However, children begotten during the marriage and prior to the declaration of nullity are considered legitimate
children under the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code.

65. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not having a marriage license.
HELD: Yes. We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio
and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case,
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no
marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license
numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982.

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 66. ROLANDO D. CORTEZ vs. LUZ G. CORTEZ
ISSUE: Whether the either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with their essential marital
obligations which would result in the nullity of their marriage.
HELD: No, both parties undoubtedly comprehend the nature and importance of their spousal and parental duties.
Mere "difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the
spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness

67. CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and PATRICIO E. YAMBAO
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
HELD: No. This Court finds it impossible to believe that, there was nothing but heartache and strife in their over 35
years of marriage. To be sure, respondent, perhaps with a little more effort on his part, could have been more helpful
and could have made life that much easier for his wife. The fact that he did not, however, does not mean that he is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge his marital obligations, as to give the Court a reason to declare the
marriage null and void.

68. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR GALANG

ISSUE: Whether or not Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying with her
essential marital obligations.
HELD: No. These unfounded conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the
Family Code requires. To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to
change is another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.

69. LEOUEL SANTOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO
BEDIA-SANTOS
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.
HELD: No, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

70. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA
ISSUE: Whether or not the finding of psychological incapacity is proper.
HELD: No. There is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us
to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.
Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical)
illness.

71. CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI
ISSUE: Whether or not the refusal to have sexual communion is a psychological incapacity.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind
of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage'
within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

72. BRENDA B. MARCOS vs. WILSON G. MARCOS

ISSUE: Whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case was enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
HELD: No. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the
family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be
attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It
was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left
the family home.

73. JOCELYN M. SUAZO vs. ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
ISSUE: Whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD: There is no basis to nullify the marriage. Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn’s testimony to be insufficient.
Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito’s habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical

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beatings she received from him – all of which occurred after the marriage. This is a clear evidentiary gap that
materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must
exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

74. BENJAMIN G. TING vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING

ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin is suffering from psychological incapacity.
HELD: Respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were present at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink
and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological
defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.
75. RENATO REYES SO vs. LORNA VALERA
ISSUE: Whether or not Lorna is psychologically incapacitated.
HELD: No. Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case here of parties who have very
human faults and frailties; who have been together for some time; and who are now tired of each other. If in fact the
respondent does not want to provide the support expected of a wife, the cause is not necessarily a grave and
incurable psychological malady whose effects go as far as to affect her capacity to provide marital support promised
and expected when the marital knot was tied.

76. LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.

ISSUE: Whether or not a subsequent marriage can be conducted even without a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage.
HELD: No. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted
to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was
already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is
necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage
when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two
occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.

77. IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS

ISSUE: Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
HELD: No. In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per
current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can
marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its
nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal
backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second
marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot
be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.

78. OFELIA P. TY vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES

ISSUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered
into validly
HELD: No, we must note that private respondent’s first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979,
respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family
Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner
and of her children.

79. SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO

ISSUE: Whether or not the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is needed to claim her share.
HELD: Yes, the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio. It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to
respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first
be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains
that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
void ab initio.

80. GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL

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ISSUE: Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court
of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
HELD: No. An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry,
the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this
jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse, whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.

81. MYRNA P. ANTONE vs. LEO R. BERONILLA

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity of the first marriage after contracting the subsequent marriage is
immaterial in the crime of bigamy.
HELD: No. In a catena of cases, the Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible
and immoral. To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent
only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that
the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither
may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule
that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the
presentation of evidence.

82. CENON R. TEVES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DANILO R. BONGALON
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may be held guilty for the crime of Bigamy.
HELD: Yes. Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense,
and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing of the
criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for determining prescription. The crime of
bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The
finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made
to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.

83. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR

ISSUE: Whether or not Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry was dead.
HELD: No, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news that such
absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not
suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present
spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only
be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. These efforts,
however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence.

84. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REDANTE SANTOS

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty of qualified rape for being the stepfather of the victim.
HELD: No. The prosecution failed to establish the relationship of Danly as the stepdaughter of appellant since the
prosecution did not offer in evidence the marriage certificate between appellant and Danly’s mother. If appellant and
Danly’s mother were not legally married, a common-law relationship between appellant and Danly’s mother would
obviously exist. However, the Information did not allege a common-law relationship between appellant and Danly’s
mother but rather a legitimate relationship since the Information described Danly as appellant’s stepdaughter.
Because of the disparity between the facts alleged in the Information and the facts proven in court on the real
relationship between appellant and Danly, we cannot hold appellant liable for qualified rape but only for simple
rape.

85. CELERINA J. SANTOS vs. RICARDO T. SANTOS

ISSUE: Whether or not an action for annulment of judgment is proper because the declaration of presumptive death
is obtained fraudulently.
HELD: Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution
has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner."

86. VERONICA ALCAZAR VS. REY ALCAZAR

ISSUE: W/N Rey was psychologically incapacitated
HELD: No. Psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity does not encompass all psychoses, including narcissistic
personality disorder. For it to be a ground, it should refer to no other but a mental incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants.

87. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. JUDGE LYLIHA AQUINO

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ISSUE: W/N Judge Aquino did not comply with the procedures in conducting annulment cases
HELD: Yes. She admitted that she had proceeded with trial in the absence of a certification of non-collusion from
the Office of the Prosecutor claiming exercise of discretion. The Supreme Court said that this was a condition sine
qua none for the adjudication of annulment cases. She was given a fine and stern warning since her actions were not
tainted with malice, gross negligence, or bad faith.

88. MARGIE MACIAS VS. MARIANO MACIAS

ISSUE: W/N Judge Mariano was liable for immoral conduct
HELD: No. In administrative cases, proof must be established by the one alleging the same. This was not
sufficiently laid down by the complainant. Secondly, in administrative proceedings against judges charged with
grave offense, it takes on the characteristics of a criminal case because of its penal nature. Therefore, the plaintiff
must prove the alleged misconduct with evidence that is competent with direct knowledge. However, the Judge was
still charged with conduct unbecoming and ordered to pay a fine.

89. NAVARRO VS. ESCOBIDO

ISSUE: W/N Kargo Enterprises is the paraphernal property of Karen Go only
HELD: In suits to recover property, all co-owners are parties in interest. The registration of the business in her name
does not presuppose that it is hers alone. In this case this is considered as conjugal since either Karen or Glen acts
with authority to manage the conjugal properties. There is no need for one to obtain the consent of the other in order
to encumber or dispose these.

90. SUNGA CHAN VS. CA

ISSUE: WN the conjugal property of the Sps. Chan are solidarily liable for the debt to Chua
HELD: Yes. Sunga’s appropriation of the assets and property of Shellite even after the business was discontinued
may reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her husband’s benefit.

91. BUADO VS. CA

ISSUE: W/N the husband is a stranger to the suit and file a 3rd party claim
HELD: In this case, yes. The wife was being held liable to pay for damages for being convicted of slander. This
becomes a personal obligation. Under Art 122 of the Family Code, personal obligations incurred by either spouse
shall not be chargeable to the conjugal partnership except insofar as it has redounded to the benefit of the family.

92. ALINAS VS. ALINAS

ISSUE: W/N Onosefiro’s disposition of the conjugal property is valid
HELD: No. Under Art. 124 of the Family Code, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property without
the consent of the other spouse shall be void. The buyers were aware that they were buying the property without the
consent of Onosefiro’s wife. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his
guard and still claim he acted in good faith.

93. HAPITAN VS. LAGRADILLA

ISSUE: W/N Nolan’s waiver of the sale of their conjugal home to Sps. Terosa was valid
HELD: No. Such disposal or waiver of conjugal property is disallowed by Art. 124 of the Family Code which
requires the consent of the other spouse. Further, Art. 89 of the Family Code provides that no waiver of rights and
interests over their share of the conjugal partnership may be made except in a judicial separation of property.
Clearly, Esmeralda did not consent to this waiver since she objected to the Amicable Settlement agreed upon by
Nolan with the Lagradillas.

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