The Historical Formation of The Arab Nation A Study in Identity and Consciousness

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS:
THE ARAB NATION
THE HISTORICAL FORMATION O F

THE ARAB NATION
THE HISTORICAL FORMATION OF
THE ARAB NATION
A Study in Identity and Consciousness
A. A. DURI
Translated by
LAWRENCE I. CONRAD
Volume 1
R Routledge
Taylor &. Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published in 1987
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The
Historical
Formation
of the Arab
Nation
A Study in Identity and Consciousness
A.A. DURI
TRANSLATED BY
LAWRENCE I. CONRAD
CROOM HELM
London • New York • Sydney
© 1987 Centre for Arab Unity Studies
Croom Helm Ltd, Provident House, Burrell Row,
Beckenham, Kent, BR3 1AT
Croom Helm Australia, 44-50 Waterloo Road,
North Ryde, 2113, New South Wales
Published in the USA by

Croom Helm
in association with Methuen, Inc.
29 West 35th Street
New York, NY 10001
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Duri, 'Abd al-Aziz
The historical formation of the Arab
nation.
1. Arab countries — History
I. Title
909'.0974927 DS37.7
ISBN 0-7099-3471-8
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publkation Data

Dun, 'Abd al-'AzIz.
The historical formation of the Arab nation.
Translation of: al-Takwin al-tarikhi lil-ummah

al-'Arablyah.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Nationalism — Arab countries. 2. Arabism.
3. Arab countries — History — 1798- . I. Title.
DS63.6.D8713 1987 909'.0974927 87-17116
ISBN 0-7099-3471-8
Printed and bound in Great Britain by Mackays of Chatham Ltd, Kent

Contents
Preface
Introduction 1
1. The Arabs before Islam: Their Homeland,

Location and Origins 4
The Arab homeland 5
The position of the Arabs 13
The origins of the Arab nation 16
2. Islam and Arabic: The Formation of Arab-

Islamic Society 29
The caliphate of early Islam 30
The transformation and decline of the political
order 36
The formation of the Arab nation 41
Arab emigration and expansion 52
The Arabs and Islam in Egypt 60
Developments in the Maghrib 65
3. The Arab Nation and its Sense of Identity 84

The rise of Arab culture 84
The concept of the Arab nation in actuality 94
The concept of the Arab nation in thought 106
The concept of the Arab nation in literature 113
The concept of the Arab nation in the
popular consciousness 117
4. The Arabs in the Age of the Tanzimat 134

Economic developments 134
Modernisation 141
Socio-economic changes 146
Cultural revival 147
Beginnings of the modern consciousness 153
5. The Arab-Islamic Consciousness: Beginnings of

the Nationalist Awakening 183
Muhammad 'Abduh 186
Contents
Rashid Rida 186

Al-KawakibI 188
Al-Zahrawi 194
Rafiq al-'Azm 198
Shakib Arslan 204
6. The Development of Arab Consciousness from

1908 until the First World War 214
The Committee of Union and Progress 215
Arab activity in the societies 219
Intellectual features in periodical literature 226
The nationalist perspective 235
7. The Arab Movement 277

The reform movement 277
The First Arab Congress 288
From decentralisation to independence 294
The Arab national awakening 302
Conclusion 324
Bibliography 336
Index 354
Preface
The origins and rise of the modern Arab consciousness and sense
of identity as a people comprise both an important problem in the
study of the historical process of social formation and, of no less
interest, a topic of continuing scholarly debate. A.A. Dun's con-
tribution to the discussion represents the insight of an eminent Arab
historian whose research spans the period from the rise of Islam
to modern times, and ranges over historical studies in their political,
social, economic and intellectual dimensions. The original Arabic
work, Al-Takwin al-ta'rikhi li-l-umma at- 'arabiya: dirasafi l-huwiya wa-l-
dhat, published in Beirut by the Centre for Arab Unity Studies in
September 1984, has been received with great interest, and the
author has already presented an English summary of his views on
the medieval aspects of the subject in his 1981 Annual Distinguished
Lecture at Georgetown University's Center for Contemporary Arab
Studies.
Duri's study requires no additional introduction here, but a few
prefatory remarks concerning the translation would perhaps be in
order. The author's lucid Arabic style lends itself to translation, and
I have tried to stay as close to it as possible. Misprints in the Arabic
text have been corrected without comment; and similarly, technical
terminology has at times been rendered in a somewhat exegetical
fashion for the benefit of the uninitiated reader. At the same time,
however, it would seem important that the informed reader be
granted the means to determine whether a word in a book title or
item of technical vocabulary is, for example, amal (hope), or 'amal
(work), or whether an individual under discussion is someone named
'Amir or simply an individual bearing the title of Amir. To ignore
this problem at the least raises the possibility of unnecessary confu-
sion, and at worst implies that it does not matter whom or what
we are talking about. I have thus rendered all personal names and
book titles, as well as all but the most commonly known place names
(Damascus, Baghdad) and terms (ulema), in formal transliteration.
In some cases it has been necessary to introduce certain addi-
tions into the notes. Some of these are offered to clarify allusions
which, although clear enough to the Arabic reader for whom the
original work was intended, would not necessarily be so to one mak-
ing use of this translation. In other cases, where the author cites
Arabic translations of works originally written in European
Preface
languages, references to the original texts have been added. All such
additions are set off in square brackets. In cases where Duri quotes
from English-language works, I have, wherever possible, used the
text of the original English version (e.g. for renderings of Foreign
Office documents).
A particular problem arose in the case of poetry, which is in this
context cited not for its style or literary merit, but for the ideas it
conveys. I have thus tried to preserve something of the spirit and
essence of the verse quoted by Duri, but have not made an effort
to retain poetical form in cases where this seemed to require exces-
sive deviation from the literal sense of the text.
In conclusion it is my pleasant task to express a few words of
gratitude. I am most grateful to Professor A.A. Duri, who, in addi-
tion to reading the translation and offering useful suggestions for
improvements, gave freely of his advice on a number of procedural
questions and provided me with photocopies from certain Arabic
works unavailable in London. Also, my thanks to Dr Khair El-Din
Haseeb, Director General of the Centre for Arab Unity Studies,
who first suggested that I undertake the translation, and then
patiently tolerated several delays. The Centre has also arranged for
the preparation of the index. Finally, I am indebted to Vivien Wren,
who did superlative work in word-processing the English text, and
to the editorial staff of Croom Helm, for their care and skill in the
production of the book.
Lawrence I. Conrad
Introduction
Nations pass through periods in which they experience a feeling

of crisis and a pressing need to probe and study the issues of their
identity and essence as a people. This study represents an effort
to come to grips with the historical circumstances that gave rise to
the Arab nation and determined its sense of identity; it is an attempt
to scrutinise the Arabs' consciousness of their communal essence
and the development of this awareness up to modern times. Its aim
is to elucidate both the factors of continuity in this consciousness
and the particular pattern of its transformation.
Western authors have tended to judge every phenomenon and
development in terms of Western concepts and institutions, but by
now it has become clear that such a method is neither accurate nor
acceptable. Concepts and institutions do not take root and endure
in any milieu solely through a process of borrowing. Rather, there
must be formative elements and sources indigenous to that milieu,
and these may act and develop in conjunction with ideas from
elsewhere. Western nationalism emerged as the expression of the
thought and aspirations of the middle class and encouraged both
the formation of national states and colonial expansion. But this
does not necessarily apply to every nationalist movement, and
especially not to nationalist movements in Asia and Africa, for these
movements originated in different ways, emerged in different cir-
cumstances and had different objectives.
The Arabs live in medial regions of the world, and their role
in history has been characterised by a receptive attitude towards
the thought and civilisations of other peoples. In various historical
periods they experienced contact with the West, sometimes borrow-
ing from it and at others contributing to it, but at all times pro-
ceeding from a clear sense of cultural identity. There is nothing
strange in the fact that in the last two centuries they should con-
front the encroachment of the West in all spheres by attaching great
importance to the definition of this identity. This was natural for
a nation arising in history, bearing the message of Islam and playing
a central role in the formation of Arab-Islamic civilisation. The
cultural surroundings of the Arabs have been of great diversity; but
while mutual influences between cultures have been a common
phenomenon, this has involved neither the negation of diversity nor
the effacement of a sense of identity.
This study maintains that the Arab nation emerged in history
1
Introduction
after a long process of social and intellectual development, and that

its awareness of its identity and consciousness of its essence are
strongly bound up in this formative process. It also maintains that
the modern Arab consciousness in the nationalist perspective is not
an imitation of one form of nationalism or another; rather it expres-
ses the Arab sense of identity and comprises the historical exten-
sion of an Arab consciousness that has been influenced by modern
views in the modern age. This study considers that the modern Arab
consciousness in its various forms is connected with the beginnings
of the Arab awakening; that its objective was to achieve Arab revival
and to assert the unity of the Arab nation, the recovery of its
historical role and the rejection of any subordinate position; and
further, that it regards Arabism as closely linked to Islam — all
this in the face of external perils and a multitude of internal
challenges.
There have appeared a number of works discussing the origins
and development of the modern Arab consciousness. But the tribula-
tions and upheavals that the Arabs have faced in the last half-
century, and the extent to which these events have given rise to
questioning and doubts about the Arab consciousness and sense
of identity, necessitate a complete reappraisal. This means not a
broadening of the scope of investigation, but rather an effort to
re-examine some of the prevailing concepts and hypotheses, and
discussion of the subject in a more comprehensive fashion.
In this sense, the subject under investigation can be divided into
three periods. The first begins with Arab origins and then considers
the formation of Arab societies after the emergence of Islam, and
the historical formation of the Arab nation. The second period con-
cerns the beginning of the Arab awakening and the course of its
development in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the
first two decades of the twentieth. The third could consider
developments after the First World War. This study will discuss
the first two periods. As for the third, it can remain the subject for
another investigation.
Study of the first period necessitates an analysis of Arab history
before modern times, an assessment of the perspectives and factors
that shaped this history and an effort to comprehend the fundamen-
tal principles, circumstances and elements that led to the rise of
the Arab nation in both practical and intellectual terms. This enables
us to set forth a comprehensive view of this history, with a certain
concentration on the influence of Islam, socio-economic develop-
ments and the phenomenon of Arabisation.
2
Introduction
For the second period the study encompasses the modern Arab
consciousness in thought and the emergence of the nationalist
perspective. This requires that we follow the concepts of patriotism
and Arabism through the writings of numerous intellectuals, while
not neglecting to indicate general developments, though the greater
effort must of necessity focus on thought.
The present study encountered difficulty so far as access to cer-
tain primary sources and essential documents was concerned. This
was particularly true for the Arab Maghrib, although preliminary
investigation indicates that the lines of consciousness there may be
clearer than in the Arab East.
Nevertheless, this study comprises a preliminary and imperfect
effort. It attempts only to elucidate the main lines and general
features of Arab identity and consciousness; if it has achieved this
to some extent, it will have served its purpose.
3
1
The Arabs before Islam:
Their Homeland, Location and Origins
A nation's history cannot be fixed at a certain starting point, nor

can it be dated from a specific event. It rather comprises a con-
tinuum of events emanating from beginnings that may belong to
the remote past — as was the case for the Arab nation — although
the course of its history has not adhered to a single pattern. A nation
may emerge from several separate groupings or from the coalescence
of one large entity. It may produce a single political entity or find
itself divided among several. A nation may find its unifying bond
and sense of fraternity in the origins of its people. And it may
develop a single common language from which it proceeds to the
formation of its own culture, the character and essence of which
thus derive from that language.
There are widely divergent views on the concept of the nation.
Some envisage it in terms of unique human origins; others look
for a common will and a political entity; and yet others perceive
the nation in language and culture. There are those who associate
the nation with a single state; while others do not, and consider
the nation as one, regardless of whether it is politically unified or
divided. Such views may be justifiable intellectually, but their frame
of reference is the historical process of nation-building in the modern
age. This study does not seek to base itself upon any of the modern
theories of nation and state formation. Rather, it will attempt to
trace the historical development of the Arabs, so that in the pro-
cess we might discern the emergence and formative elements of the
Arab nation and the appearance and development of the idea of
Arabism.
Arab origins extend far back into antiquity, but the written
references to them date back only to a relatively late period (the
ninth century BC).1 As for the Arabic linguistic explanations of the
4
The Arabs before Islam
word larab, these are later restatements of meanings that were fixed
for the term during the first three centuries AH. 2
There are modern interpretations that attempt to ascribe the
word 'Arab' to ancient linguistic conjectures (Accadian, Assyrian
or Hebrew), taking it to mean 'people of the West', 'sons of the
South', 'people of the steppes' or 'people of the desert' (i.e.
bedouins). But such appellations refer only to the location of cer-
tain 'Arab' groupings relative to the inhabitants of the cultivated
areas, and especially so in Mesopotamia. They belong to a category
descriptive of location or condition; hence, it is nothing more than
sheer conjecture to cite them as ethnic evidence. 3 There are also
references mentioning the Semites, thereby raising the question of
whether the Semites were Arabs. Here it is appropriate that we recall
that among Western researchers the term 'Semites' (although of
Old Testament origin) does not refer to any ethnic aspect, but rather
to the similarities within a group of languages that supposedly can
be traced back to a single source or a single primary language.
T h e Arab homeland
The Arabian peninsula was the original home of these peoples, and
through its climate and geographical location it both fashioned their
natural environment and impressed a common stamp on their
civilisational beginnings. The influence of natural environment is
fundamental, especially in the initial stages of cultural formation.
These peoples created the first civilisations in the fertile lands to
the north. The languages of those who emigrated from the peninsula
and those who stayed there have some common roots and
similarities, 4 and this concept did not go unnoticed by classical
Arab thinkers. Al-Mas'udi (d. 345/956) pointed out the unity of
origins and language in asserting that one nation had inhabited Iraq,
Syria, the Jazira and the Arabian peninsula: the Assyrian, Babylo-
nian, Aramaean and Arabian peoples, he maintained," were off-
shoots from a single nation (the Chaldaean). This nation had one
tongue, and the languages that evolved from it could actually be
considered dialects of one language, Arabic being one of the closest
to the original tongue. 5
When considering the formation of the Arab nation in history,
one notices that most of the peoples that speak a 'Semitic' language
were Arabised; they naturally took part in the formation of that
nation and their civilisational heritage contributed to the formation
5
of Arab civilisation. In this sense, these peoples all became part

of the structure of the Arab nation, and this inclines us towards
referring to them as peoples of Arab character. Various names were
applied to these peoples once they had emigrated from the Arabian
peninsula. In ancient times it was not customary to refer to people
according to their place of origin; instead, places were usually called
after the people who lived there. This was a common and natural
trend, especially among bedouin groups.
The oldest written references to the Arabs mention bedouin or
semi-settled groups that, because of their presence astride the trade
routes or the danger they posed to the agrarian hinterlands, came
into conflict with the Assyrians in the Syrian Desert between the
Euphrates and al-'Aqaba and in the vicinity of Dumat al-Jandal
and Tayma'. It is worth noting that these inscriptions are Assyrian,
dating from the ninth century (853 BC) to the end of the seventh
BC. The groups in question are called by the names "Aribi',
" U r b l ' , ' 'Arabu' and ' 'Araba', and their territories are called the
'land of the Arabs' and "Arabaya'. These writings also refer to
Thamud and Saba' in the same region, speak of queens and kings
in the vicinity of Dumat al-Jandal and mention commercial or tribal
entities. The reason for the conflict with these groups was clearly
the Assyrian desire to control the trade route of western Arabia,
and that due to the role of these Arabs on the trade routes to the
Gulf, Yemen and Syria, especially the western route from southern
Arabia to the north. It appears that the relations of these Arabs
with the Assyrians were not based on submission or fear that their
lands would be invaded, but rather on their desire to protect their
commercial interests on the trade routes. The 'tribute' mentioned
in the inscriptions consisted of gifts to prevent trouble after the
Assyrians gained control of the termini of the route.
In the sixth century BC, writings of the Babylonian king Nabonid
(556-539) mention his capture of Tayma', which he made his capital
for ten years, and extension of his influence to include Daydan (al-
'Ula), Fadak, Khaybar and Yathrib, which were Arab towns. 6
These citations refer, in the first instance, to the bedouins. They
may in themselves comprise evidence of the commercial activity
of the northern Arabs, but what is of interest to us here is the
reference to the Arabs as a people and to the 'land of the Arabs'
as a home territory. 7 The word 'Arab' appears in the Iranian
cuneiform writings of the Achaemenids (from the sixth century BC)
to refer to the bedouins between the region of the Euphrates and
Egypt; likewise, the term ' 'Arabaya' appears in reference to the
6
'land of the Arabs', or to the home territories of certain Arab groups.

The oldest Greek reference is found in Aeschylus (fifth century BC),
who mentions the Arabian peninsula as a distant land from which
warriors come. In Greek and Roman works, beginning with
Herodotus, the expression 'Arabia' applies to the whole of the
Arabian peninsula and all of its inhabitants. Herodotus does not
limit the land of the Arabs to the Arabian peninsula, but applies
it also to the southern part of Syria, the Sinai peninsula and the
desert of eastern Egypt between the Nile and the Red Sea. After
the conquests of Alexander, the Greeks took greater interest in
discussion of the Arabian peninsula and concentrated more atten-
tion on it.8 The implication of all this is that the oldest extant
references to parts or all of the Arabian peninsula call it the land
of the Arabs, and that this name is connected to its people, the
Arabs.
In the south Arabian (Sabaean) inscriptions from the last cen-
turies BC and early centuries AD there are references to the Arabs
('Arab, 'Araban), and these describe the bedouins as enemies of
the state or as auxiliaries in the army. With the passage of time
the name appeared in the agnomens of the rulers: 'King of Saba',
Dhu Raydan, Hadramawt, Yamnat and the bedouins (al-a'rab) of
Tawd and the Tihama'. By the dawn of the fourth century AD,
when the bedouin population had become quite numerous, the term
'Arab' was in common use. 9
The first Arabic reference to the Arabs occurs in the Namara
inscription (328 AD) on the tomb of Imru' al-Qays. The inscrip-
tion is in Arabic, written in the Aramaean Nabataean script. It calls
Imru' al-Qays 'king of all the Arabs', and states that he subjected
to his authority the northern and southern tribes (Asadayn, Nizar,
Madhhij and Ma'add), and that his authority extended as far as
Najran.10 This indicates that the inscription considers 'Arabs' to
refer to the settled tribes as well as to the bedouins. There is also
an isolated reference to the Arabs by Qays ibn al-Hidadlya, a pre-
Islamic poet of the Khuza'a tribe. Glorifying Khuza'a on the
occasion of its war with Qays 'Aylan (fifth century AD), he says:
They are the protectors of the sanctuary and defenders

Of the sacred places from all the Arabs.11
The reference here is most probably comprehensive, including both

the bedouins and the settled Arabs.
It is evident that in Mecca at the rise of Islam, the word 'Arab'
7
was well known in its general sense. 12 In numerous verses of the

Qur'an the word * Arabic' occurs with reference to the Arabic
language, 13 and in others the word (arabl is juxtaposed to a'jaml
and refers to a native speaker of the language. 14 One also en-
counters references to the a {rab (bedouins), as opposed to the seden-
tary population. 15 In hadith mention is made of the (arab in
reference to town-dwellers. 16 And as the notion of (arabi was con-
nected in the Qur'an to the Arabic language, which was the lingua
franca of both bedouins and settled folk, this tongue was in the future
to continue to play a leading role in determining the Arab sense
of identity and to remain of fundamental importance in the form-
ation of the Arab nation.
Thus we see that the Arabian peninsula was the cradle for a group
of peoples that emerged in the same natural environment, started
out from the same linguistic origins and, in spite of their dispersal
and development, continued to bear the same linguistic heritage.
The Arabs were the last group to expand beyond the peninsula.
But the ethnic groups that emigrated obviously did not melt away
in either cultural or ethnic terms; rather, they established early
civilisations of their own. For their part, the Arabs drove away the
invading peoples, overthrew their authority and founded an Arab-
Islamic civilisation that embodied those that had preceded it. It was
at that point in history that the peoples who had previously
emigrated from the peninsula entered into the framework of the
Arab nation.
The history of the Arabian peninsula and the life of its people
were influenced by numerous factors, foremost of which was the
impact of geography and Arabia's location on the international trade
routes between the Far East and the Mediterranean world. The
climate and distribution of water resources in the peninsula had
far-reaching effects. There are areas along the northern frontiers,
and especially in the south-west, where rainfall is sufficient to allow
for sedentary life. The central and interior regions, however, are
arid zones marked by occasional wadis and springs, areas where
the tribes live or roam in the desert. In the arid fringe areas there
are also some oases, such as Dumat al-Jandal and Tayma', where
a semi-settled life developed. This meant that there were different
ways of life in the peninsula. The greater part of its population lived
in sedentary villages dependent upon agriculture, while in coastal
areas there were communities that earned their living from fishing.
In the steppe and desert areas, however, it was the nomadic or semi-
nomadic life of the herdsmen, the tenders of livestock and camels,
8
that prevailed. In addition, there were some who were active in

trade in certain towns and emporia.
The desert character of the peninsula rendered life there heavily
dependent upon water and pasturage, both of which were usually
in short supply. This factor, combined with the natural growth of
population in a salubrious desert milieu isolated from the pestilences
of the cities, posed a perpetual obstacle to subsistence, encouraged
expansion towards the agricultural regions to the north and put con-
tinuous pressure from the desert on the cultivated lands. Ancient
inscriptions and writings confirm that nomadic pressure was a con-
stant historical phenomenon. The presence of powerful states on
the neighbouring plains held the bedouins in check and only allowed
them entrance if they came peacefully; but whenever the states in
these areas became weak, the nomadic peoples poured into their
territories in what amounted to a flood of humanity. 17 Thus the
peninsula served as the great spring that poured out onto the
adjoining lands to the north and west, nourishing them with human
resources, preserving their Arab character and strengthening their
cultural roots. Such were the circumstances that caused some of
the Arab geographers to consider the Nile and the Mediterranean
as the western limit of the Arabian peninsula, and the Euphrates
(in the view of some) or the Tigris (according to others) the north-
east boundary. All included the upper Euphrates valley and made
it the northern frontier.
The great migrations from Arabia generally originated in its
desert and steppe regions, and usually moved from south to north.
This did not preclude the occurrence of migration in the opposite
direction, southwards, which was how the Sabaeans migrated.
There were also occasions of migrations from settled areas, such
as the Ma'rib region, as a result of the collapse of irrigation works
and trade.
The climatic stability of Arabia's deserts and steppes resulted
in a uniform way of life. Nomadism thus implies a similarity in
values and customs and adherence to similar ways of life, usually
based upon the grazing and tending of livestock and camels. It also
prevented the emergence of any social class structure worth men-
tioning, since such personal property as may accumulate in this
environment will rarely exceed a limited range of camels and
livestock. As for grazing lands, with rare exceptions these were the
collective property of the tribe, which could make such pastures
a himd — that is, restrict use of the land to members of the tribe.
Such an outlook could persist even when the tribe (or clan) moved
9
to agricultural lands, since the tribe's attitude towards the land in

its villages was based on the principle that such land was collective
property.
The desert environment cannot usually support large groups of
people. Indeed, based upon the resources of the environment it sets
a practical limit on the size of the group, this limit manifesting itself,
on the one hand, in the cohesion and capacity for collective move-
ment required of the group, and on the other, in the extent to which
water and pasturage are available to it. For this reason the largest
unit was the tribe, which was above all else a political unit, while
in the desert the natural cohesive unit was the clan. Natural cir-
cumstances (such as drought) or exceptional human developments
(e.g. a military campaign or personal ambition) could trigger the
formation of larger confederations of a number of groups or tribes.
Thus, Arabia was populated by tribal units constantly either
dividing or uniting in alliance with one another.
The tribes were based upon the notion of common descent, which
was the keystone of tribal cohesion and of its sense of solidarity.
As is revealed by the inter-tribal conflicts known as the ayydm al-
{
arab, this sense of common origins shared by the tribes was limited
by only one essential factor — the struggle for water and pasturage.
It is evident that the Arabs generally took an interest in genealogies:
among the northern Arabs the narratives about these genealogies
were handed down through oral transmission, their documentation
consisting primarily of poetry.18 There are no references to writ-
ten genealogies among the northern Arabs, other than some
accounts pertaining to genealogies of the rulers of al-Hira. The first
reports of tribal genealogical rosters go back only to the first cent-
ury AH, and poetry remained the 'register' (diwdn) of the Arabs.
Among the southern Arabs, however, there were apparently some
tribes, according to al-Hamdani, that had rosters (sijilldt) and writ-
ten records (zubur) of genealogies.19
It is not intended here to enter into a discussion of Arab
genealogies, and a few observations will suffice to give an idea of
the way the Arabs viewed their formation as a people. One would
expect the first stages to be ambiguous and to have undergone
development during Islamic times. The sources dealing with
genealogies come from the second century AH, with extant
antecedents somewhat earlier; but the fundamental lines of descent
were established before Islam. An accurate framework for these
genealogies, which had a major impact on the course of events,
especially in early Islamic times, has come down to us based
10
primarily on the genealogists of the tribes, tribal rosters and poetry.

According to the Arab view expressed in the genealogical works,
the Arabs are a race — not an isolated group speaking a single
language — and this race propagated itself in two lines of descent:
'Adnan and Qahtan, an issue of significance in its own right. The
genealogists' point of departure was that the primordial Arabs in
the Arabian peninsula — such tribes as 'Ad, Thamud, al-'Amaliqa,
Jurhum al-Ula , Tasm and Jadls — were tribes that disappeared
before the rise of Islam. The sources contain nothing on the identity
of these lost Arab tribes, although the inscriptions provide much
information on Thamud. 2 0 But the important point is that they
were Arab, and indeed, were primarily regarded as the primordial
Arabs. The Arab view concentrates on the two great ancestors of
the Arabs and on the two branches descended from them. The
descendants of Qahtan are called the 'pure' Arabs (al-lariba or al-
'arbd'), while the descendants of'Adnan are the 'assimilated' Arabs
(al-muta'arriba or al-musta'riba).21 The Qahtaniya are those Arabs
who trace their roots back to the south-western corner of Arabia
(Yemen), while the 'Adnaniya are the northern Arabs.
Saba' was considered the descendant of Qahtan and the father
of Himyar and Kahlan, the two main branches of the Yamaniya.
It is worth noting that the Sabaeans, Ma'inids and other peoples
of the ancient Yemenite kingdoms were regarded as descendants
of Himyar, and that the civilisation of their kingdoms was
characterised collectively as that of the Himyarites.
In Islamic times the primary role was played by such scions of
Kahlan as Tayyi', Hamdan, al-Azd and Madhhij. There was also
Quda'a, which played an important part in early Islam.
Genealogists differed as to whether it was part of Nizar or Himyar,
but South Arabian inscriptions mention it among the Yemenite
tribes. Tracing their descent from Quda'a are a number of tribes
— for example, Ball, Tanukh, Juhayna and Kalb — that headed
the Yamaniya during the Umayyad period.
The northern Arabs trace their descent back to Ma'add ibn
'Adnan or to his grandson Nizar. Mudar and Rabi'a, the two sons
of Nizar, became the starting points for the two main branches of
the northern Arabs, while the descendants of lyad died out during
the Islamic period. Qays 'Avian was considered one of the two main
branches of Mudar, and included such Mudarite tribes as Hawa-
zin, Sulaym, Thaqif, and 'Amir ibn Sa'sa'a. As for the other branch
of Mudar, it included Tamlm, Hudhayl and Kinana (and from
Kinana, Quraysh). From Rabi'a were traced the tribes of 'Abd
11
al-Qays, the Bakr ibn Wa'il grouping and Taghlib.

The division of the Arabs into northern and southern tribes does
not accurately correspond to the territories of these tribes in pre-
Islamic times. There is evidence indicating that the Sabaeans came
to Yemen from the north; and many Yemenite tribes (such as
Lakhm, Ghassan, Kinda, al-Aws and al-Khazraj) migrated to the
north in pre-Islamic times, in particular to Syria. The division
apparently goes back to the perception among the tribes of their
territories at some particular point in history. In any case, this
mobility of the tribes and the penetration of Yemen by many Arab
bedouin groups prior to Islam, in addition to other factors, served
to keep the tribal dialects in close linguistic proximity to one another
and to spread the Arabic of the northern tribes.
It is to be noted that most of the Yemenite tribes were sedentary
or semi-sedentary, and that the principalities founded in northern
Arabia (those of the Ghassanids and the Lakhmids) and in central
Arabia (that of Kinda) were Yemenite. Among the northern tribes,
on the other hand, nomadism prevailed. Here it is appropriate that
we draw attention to an important point: the tribes of the Qahtaniya
were regarded as 'pure' Arabs (cdriba)f while those of the 'Adnaniya
were considered to be 'assimilated' Arabs (musta'riba). This distinc-
tion was based on considerations of language and character and
had important implications for the historical formation and develop-
ment of the Arab nation in later times. 22
Let us further note, however, that tribal genealogy does not
necessarily imply that the tribes were isolated from one another,
each within its own genealogical framework. Indeed, groups or
individuals could, through alliance or clientage, gather under the
banner of a certain tribe and with the passage of time be included
in that tribe's genealogy. This is a phenomenon to which the
genealogical works refer and which continued for some time on into
the Islamic era. 23 It was more widespread in Yemen, where the
tribe was based on the land it owned. Groups from other tribes could
join it as allies or clients to help it cultivate its land, and in due
course enter into the framework of its genealogy. It can be deduced
from South Arabian inscriptions that in Yemen the term sha'b2*
was used as an equivalent to the northern Arab qabila ('tribe') or
'ashira ('clan'); but it is always linked to land owned by the tribe,
which was also the basis for the tribe's organisation.
12
T h e position of the Arabs
Arabia's geographical position between India and the Far East, on

the one hand, and the Mediterranean world and the West, on the
other, placed it astride the international trade routes. This had a
decisive influence on both the settled and nomadic societies of the
peninsula. It led to extensive commercial activity on the part of the
Arabs and to their domination of the transit trade for long periods
of time. This trade was a source of prosperity for some regions and
groups in the peninsula, but also comprised an incentive for out-
side attempts to gain control of the trade routes and to strike at
the Arab role in the commerce along them.
Ships carried goods from India (and the Far East) to the Gulf
or to Yemen. The merchandise was then transported in caravans
following the routes of the western part of the peninsula from
southern Arabia to Syria, or from the Arabian Gulf up the
Euphrates and across the desert to Syria, or across Wadi 1-Rumma
to Tayma' or Dumat al-Jandal and then on to Syria. The caravans
passed through the territories of the tribes along these routes; and
the tribes accordingly benefited from this traffic by providing
transportation, protection and guide services, for which they
charged duties and commissions. Arab commercial centres or
political entities arose along these routes. Most of them, such as
those that emerged along the southern, western and northern
peripheries of the peninsula (e.g. Daydan, Hatra, Petra, Palmyra,
Najran and finally Mecca), were dependent upon trade for their
prosperity. Whenever the trade routes were cut or diverted and
traffic along them was disrupted, the livelihood of the tribes was
affected and unrest and bedouin agitation prevailed.
The primary role in trade was played by the Arabs of the south,
whose activities had an impact throughout Arabia. Trade routes criss-
crossed the peninsula and served to link its various regions to each
other and to Mesopotamia and Syria, and the special role of Yemen is
highlighted when we add to the routes already mentioned the one
rising from Yemen to Wadi 1-Dawasir and across the Tuwayq Moun-
tains to al-Yamama and the Gulf. Trade also had its influence in
the emergence of commercial fairs. Yemen was one of the most fertile
regions of Arabia, and it witnessed the most advanced level of Arab
civilisation prior to Islam, as well as the highest degree of political
and social organisation. But while agriculture was an important factor
in the economy of the region, the prosperity and power of southern
Arabia (Yemen and Hadramawt) were based on trade.
13
It is to be noted that southern Arabia was not united, but rather

was a region in which were based four kingdoms: Ma*In (with its
capital at Qarnaw); Saba' (capital — Ma'rib); Qataban (capital
— Timna'); and Hadramawt (capital — Shabwa). Ma'Inid
civilisation was entirely dependent upon trade, and the kingdom
controlled emporia in other areas, such as Daydan in the northern
Hijaz. The kings of Ma'in ruled in co-operation with councils of
advisers, notables and other dignitaries. But the most important
of these kingdoms and the one of most far-reaching influence was
Saba', 25 which through its expansion, beginning with the efforts
of Yasir Yuhna'im and his sons in the late third century AD, was
able to bestow a kind of unity to southern Arabia over several
periods in its history. Saba' extended its hegemony over Ma*In,
then Qataban and subsequently annexed (in about 300 AD) the
two regions of Hadramawt and Yamnat under the rule of Shammar-
Yuhar'ish. The fall of Palmyra and the rivalry of local powers for
control of the trade routes in northern and central Arabia probably
led the southern Arabs to try to extend their authority north-
wards.26 Finally, in the early-fifth century AD, Saba* expanded
into central Arabia and an addition was made to the titulature of
their kings: 'King of Saba' . . . and the bedouins (al-a'rdb) of
Tawd and Tihama'. This political entity survived until the sixth
century.
Of the various aspects of Sabaean history, the most important
was their economic activity, which defined the role they were to
play both in Arabia and at the international level. Representative
of this activity was their irrigation system and their concern for
agriculture, especially for those products destined for foreign
markets, such as the frankincense tree. The Sabaeans supplied this
aromatic to all of the markets of the Near East and the Mediter-
ranean region. However, the prosperity of agriculture was linked
to their trading activity. And indeed, their geographical position
enabled them to become the pioneers of commerce between India
and East Africa on the one hand and the Mediterranean world on
the other. Relying on their knowledge of the monsoon winds and
ocean currents to India and East Africa, Sabaean maritime
supremacy lasted through the first millennium BC and led to the
growth of 'Adan and Qana to rank among the great emporia of
sea-borne commerce.
The Sabaeans also had to find suitable routes across Arabia, to
organise and protect the caravans, and to gain the co-operation of
the tribes along the western route of the peninsula. Ma'rib thus
14
became the focal point for a network of trade routes extending up

to it from the south-west and south-east, and then continuing on
north-east and north-west to northern Arabia. As one would expect,
regional powers attempted to gain control of the western route in
Arabia, or to reach India (as the Ptolemies did in the late second
century BC). Although such efforts may have proved successful for
a time, Saba' maintained its role until the Abyssinian invasion of
the area (520 AD). 27
The position of southern Arabia, between the sea to the south
and the deserts and mountains to the east and north, had the effect
of protecting it from foreign invasion and helped to preserve its
political entities for about a thousand years. Meanwhile, the
northern Arab polities collapsed as a result of Persian (Achaemenid)
and then Greek and Roman invasions. This, in turn, indicates the
continuity of the political entities of the peoples of Arabia. That
is, their disappearance in the north was countered by their persis-
tence in southern Arabia. And after the Abyssinians (then the
Persians) put an end to the Sabaean state, there came the rise of
Islam so that through Islam the Arabs repelled the invaders from
the north and west and restored the autonomy of the region.
Trade was the source of southern Arabia's prosperity and the
fundamental basis for its civilisation, which extended as far back
as the early first millennium BC. It was a civilisation notable for
its material achievements, although in intellectual and perhaps
spiritual terms it was not as sophisticated as that of the north. 28
Trade also made its influence felt in the formation of capital, in
the expansion of agricultural activity in Yemen and in the
emergence of large landholdings that required the services of out-
side tribal groups to exploit Yemeni lands as clients, dependants
and slaves. This pattern was influential in social development after
the rise of Islam.
Southern Arabia was the terminus of the southern sea route
coming from India to the West, while the Arabian Gulf was the
terminus of the shorter and more economical northern sea route
from India. But traffic along either of the two routes depended upon
stability and security at its terminus: that is, in the Gulf and
Mesopotamia on the one hand, and in Yemen on the other. This
factor highlights the genius of the Sabaeans and their organisational
ability in controlling the route to India. Goods arriving by sea had
always to be transported from southern Arabia northwards to the
Mediterranean along one of several routes: the one up western
Arabia to Syria, another via Wadi 1-Dawasir north-eastwards to
15
the Gulf and Mesopotamia, the route from the Gulf across Wadi
1-Rumma to Tayma' or Dumat al-Jandal and on to Syria, or up
the Euphrates and then westwards to Syria. The Ma'inids, then
the Sabaeans, demonstrated an outstanding proficiency at organis-
ing caravans and establishing trading posts along the route. It is
important to note that these trade caravans passed through the ter-
ritories of tribes that shared in the benefits by offering transport,
guides and protection, for which they charged duties and fees.
Grazing lands and water were important to the livelihood of the
tribes of central and northern Arabia, but the trade routes were
a lucrative source of income and profits for the tribes through whose
territories they passed, especially in western and northern Arabia.
Moreover, commercial emporia and entities dependent upon the
routes — Tayma', Dumat al-Jandal, Hatra, Petra and Palmyra,
for example — appeared in northern and western Arabia along these
routes, at oases or near wells, between the second century BC and
the third century AD. 2 9
The trading activities of Palmyra covered the entire area from
the Gulf to the Mediterranean, and its political authority extended
to Egypt and Asia Minor. It played a key role in the commercial
and military history of the pre-Islamic Arabs of the north. Hence
its fall was a decisive event in the history of the region and may
perhaps be regarded as the end of the First Jahiliya since it marks
the end of the period in which the powerful commercial caravan
cities emerged along the fringes of Arabia. 30 The fall of Palmyra
left a vacuum and led to unrest in northern Arabia; for this event
was followed by a remarkable upsurge of bedouin activity, the reper-
cussions of which gradually spread throughout the peninsula.
T h e origins of the Arab nation
This broadly sketched summary sheds some light on the deep-rooted

ethnic and cultural origins of the Arab nation, and indicates how
the Arabian peninsula was exposed to two conflicting sources of
influence. The first was the natural environment, which was
conducive to nomadism in central Arabia and to sedentary life along
the peripheries. By reason of the seas surrounding Arabia and the
deserts in the north, which hindered immigration into the penin-
sula, it also led to the semi-isolation of its people in ethnic terms.
The second was its location on the trade routes. This not only
encouraged contact with the outside world, but also led to the rise
16
of internal trade routes crisscrossing Arabia. These latter routes

served, on the one hand, to link the various regions of the penin-
sula, and on the other, to establish ties between the urban centres
and the bedouins. This situation, it seems, did not consign Arab
nomadism to a primitive level; rather, it had its own oral culture
and its own lifestyle, or, to use Ibn Khaldun's phrase, its own
thriving way of life ('umran).
From another viewpoint, it can be said that the salubrious desert
environment and the related factors of natural and continual
population growth and the ease with which its people could move
northwards and westwards, account for the constant bedouin
pressure on the agricultural lands. These factors, combined with
Arab nomadic culture, may to some extent explain how it was that
the waves of bedouin migration into Mesopotamia and Syria led
to the formation of the ancient civilisations there. At the same time,
the agrarian environment and geographical location of Yemen led
to the establishment of another deeply rooted civilisation. Influenced
to a certain degree by the civilisation of Mesopotamia, it then
extended its own influence as far as the northern part of the
peninsula.
The above discussion serves as a foundation necessary to our
understanding of the formation of the Arab nation, while the era
of the Second Jahiliya, approximately the three centuries prior to
Islam, provides us with an introduction for our comprehension of
the movement of the Arab nation. Three international powers —
Sasanian Persia, Byzantium and Himyar — arose in this era, vying
with one another to gain influence and sovereign power in the
region. The Sasanians controlled Iraq and the Byzantines were
masters in Syria, while Himyar embarked upon a remarkable
campaign of expansion in southern Arabia and to the north. These
states sought to extend their influence into Arabia and to restrict
the activities of the bedouin tribes. In order to create a buffer
between themselves and the bedouins, they sponsored the establish-
ment of Arab principalities that fought alongside them in their wars
and resisted the bedouins. After the demise of Palmyra the role of
guarding the Syrian Desert for the Romans and Persians fell to the
Lakhmids in the Hawran and eastern Jordan, in co-operation with
the tribe of Tanukh, which had controlled the desert lands west
of the Euphrates. After overrunning the Arabs of eastern and central
Arabia (about 325 AD), Shapur II granted authority over the tribes
and conquered territories to the Lakhmid prince, who was called
'King of the Arabs', a title recognised by both the Persians and
17
the Romans. After the death of Shapur II (380 AD), the Lakhmids
moved their capital to al-Hira and came under the suzerainty of
the Sasanians. To the west, the tribe of Quda'a rose to prominence
under the leadership of Sulayh; and in western Arabia, especially
in Mecca and Yathrib, political authority was vested in the hands
of a group from the tribe of al-Azd, perhaps through a mutual
understanding with southern Arabia. It would seem that Kinda,
led by the clan of Akil al-Murar and supported by the Himyarites,
had since the late fifth century controlled much of central and
northern Arabia.
Religion was a factor of fundamental importance in great-power
politics, and the fact that religious policies were linked to economic
interests served to intensify the struggle between them. The Byzan-
tines sought to present themselves as the champions of Christianity
and unsuccessfully tried to gain control of the trade route of western
Arabia. When Abyssinia converted to Christianity (in the fourth
century), Byzantium regarded it as an ally. And when Dhu Nuwas
rashly converted to Judaism and attacked the Christians in Najran,
whom he feared for their inclination to favour Byzantium, Abyssinia
invaded Yemen (525 AD) with Byzantine support and put an end
to the Himyarite state. This paralysed the trading activities of the
southern Arabs and ushered in a turbulent period in Yemen's
history. Abraha tried to attack Mecca in order to gain control of
the western trade route, 31 and his failure to do so aroused the
ambitions of Quraysh and stirred up a wave of Arab consciousness
in western Arabia.
The Sasanians aimed to control the trade of the Gulf. Likewise,
they sought to penetrate central and western Arabia and to extend
their influence to Yathrib (mid-fifth century) and supported
Qurayza and al-Nadir (which were Jewish tribes) against the Arab
tribes. They also occupied Yemen (about 575 AD) after a chieftain
from the tribe of Dhu Yazan sought their aid, and the area remained
under their control until the rise of Islam. Trade cannot be
disregarded as a factor underlying this expansion. 32
The dependent Arab principalities in turn did not survive these
events. They probably regarded themselves as allies more than
dependants of the great powers, and their actions were sometimes
influenced by this attitude. Bedouin activities, as well as the
tendency for al-Nu'man ibn al-Mundhir to connive with and seek
the support of the Arab tribes west of the Euphrates, 33 led to the
end of the Lakhmids (602 AD). In the same period, Ghassanid
relations with the Byzantines were thrown into confusion after the
18
latter embarked on a policy of relying upon their own forces and

garrisons to confront the bedouin tribes. Kinda did not long survive
the demise of the Himyarites, and fell in 528 AD.
The Arab tribes thus came into direct confrontation with the
Sasanians and the Byzantines in the north, and likewise confronted
their constant threat to seize control of the trade routes. It was in
this situation, surrounded by perils and challenges, that the activities
of Quraysh (in Mecca) gradually rose to prominence, assuming the
primary role in the caravan trade between southern Arabia and
Syria. Its trading activities expanded to include Iraq and Abyssinia,
in addition to its active role in the fairs. Quraysh had, at the same
time, firm relations with both the desert and the settled lands, and
its main advantage was that since the fall of the Himyarite state
it constituted an entity far from dependent on any other.
Quraysh adhered to a policy of cautious neutrality with regard
to the two great powers, and in spite of the expedition of Abraha
it did not come into conflict with the Abyssinians, even maintain-
ing a brisk trade with Yemen. An attempt by an ally of Quraysh
(and perhaps with its approval) to deal a blow to the trade of the
Persians along the route from al-Hira to Yemen was one reason
for the Harb al-Fijar, or * War of Sacrilege', which left the field
open to the caravans of Quraysh. The tribe also left no room for
'Uthman ibn al-Huwayrith, who had Byzantine connections, to gain
ascendancy.
In accordance with the spirit of that age, Quraysh associated its
commercial interests with religious affairs, striving to assert the
sanctity of its shrine and to encourage the tribes throughout Arabia
to come there on pilgrimage. Despite the presence of a plethora
of idols and images, Quraysh proclaimed the existence of an
omnipotent god to whom the idols were but intermediaries. The
sources attribute to Qusayy (second quarter of the fifth century AD)
an effort to revive the ancient Arab monotheism in Mecca's spiritual
life, which had been sullied by pagan practices. The Hums, of
Quraysh and other Arabian tribes, comprised a campaign to
advocate the sanctity of the sanctuary (the Ka'ba) and to defend
it. These tribes were based in various places: Thaqif to the south-
east of Mecca, Kinana to the south on the route to Yemen, 'Amir
ibn Sa'sa'a to the north-east of Mecca, Kalb to the north on the
route to Syria, and Yarbu' and Mazin on the route of al-Hira.
Quraysh was able to turn the sacred months into a period during
which fighting was to be suspended, in order to facilitate the
pilgrimage and to promote the trading and literary activities in its
19
fairs ('Ukaz, Majanna, and Dhu 1-Majaz). During the sixth century
Mecca gradually came to be assigned the distinctive status of a
sacred city, with Quraysh serving as the custodians of the Ka'ba
and assuming an important role in the spiritual life of Arabia.
Quraysh thus founded a sort of Pax Meccana into the framework
of which it gathered the settled folk and a group of bedouin tribes.
This was an accomplishment of some importance in Arab society
and a preliminary indicator signalling what was to come in Arabia
after the rise of Islam. The narratives about how the finest odes
(the mu'allaqdt) were hung up for display in the Ka'ba are probably
symbolic of this new order drawn up by Quraysh.
Quraysh adopted other measures to cement the bonds mentioned
above. These were the ilaf, or the agreements concluded with the
tribes along the trade routes to Syria, Yemen and eastern Arabia.
These accords guaranteed Quraysh safe passage for its caravans,
on the one hand, while, on the other, offering considerable material
benefits to the tribes by way of marketing opportunities for their
own goods, in addition to their fees for services rendered to the
caravans. All of this was done without alliance requirements and
on the basis of equality and parity.
Aside from these Arab activities, there emerged in the penin-
sula preliminary signs of consciousness and agitation not devoid
of implications for the future. The state of Kinda in central Arabia
had been a kind of great tribal alliance uniting Asad and Rabi'a
in a single political entity. It was the first effort of this kind and
it endured for about a century. Outside interference and tribal
partisanship led to its collapse, and Kinda returned to Hadramawt
in the late sixth century; nevertheless, the experiment indicated a
new trend in tribal coalition.
Bedouin raids on the agricultural hinterland of Iraq intensified
after the fall of the Lakhmids, and it was no longer within the power
of the Persian garrisons to contain these incursions. The battle of
Dhu Qar, in which Bakr ibn Wa'il triumphed over these garrison
forces along the middle Euphrates, was an indication of future
possibilities and a victory that aroused Arab emotions and
encouraged neighbouring tribes to continue such raids. But these
were limited and sporadic until the onset of the Islamic conquests.
Signs of change also appeared in the milieu of paganism. In
southern Arabia religion essentially amounted to the worship of the
stars and planets, with 'Athtar (the protector of the land and of
agriculture) at the head of the pantheon. In the tribe of 'Amir there
appeared a semi-monotheistic faith based on veneration of Dhu
20
Samawl ('Lord of Heaven'), a god with whom no other was

worshipped. In the fifth century (in the time of Abkarib As'ad),
a trend with monotheistic features emerged in the worship of Dhu
Samayan wa-Ardan ('Lord of the Heavens and the Earths'), which
became the official religion. It is not known whether or not this
was an offshoot of the worship of Dhu Samawl. And we must not
forget religion's ties to politics, the rivalry between Christianity and
Judaism (both of which entered the area in the latter half of the
fourth century), and the transformation of this rivalry into a political
struggle. Judaism may have been received favourably for a limited
period of time, but that was due to its lack of political associations.
After the Sasanian invasion, which introduced Zoroastrianism into
southern Arabia, it took on overtones that increasingly caused it
to be viewed with apprehension. The importance attached to the
worship of Dhu Samawl was probably an expression of self-
assertion. Other local calls in the north expressed dissatisfaction
with paganism and searched for a more sublime creed, as is evident
in the movement of the monotheistic hanifs in western Arabia (in
the Hijaz) and in the east (in al-Yamama). These were calls that
indicate a certain sense of anticipation and confusion.
Mention can here be made of the existence and activities of local
fairs, their proliferation along the peripheries of Arabia and their
convocation one after another at successive intervals through the
year. These fairs were forums for the exchange of goods and centres
of literary activity. They provided channels of contact, evinced a
sense of fraternity and established a medium for the formation of
shared ideas and a common literary language. It is to be noted that
in this same period, from the third to the fifth century, there was
an alleviation of the linguistic distinction between the Himyarites
and the Arabs of the north. Tribal movement and expansion —
the Himyarites towards the north and the bedouins towards the
south — served to draw the dialects close together, and this trend
was one that accelerated in the sixth century. Despite a certain
disparity in tribal vernacular expression, a literary dialect emerged
and spread, and it was according to its canons that the poets
composed their odes. 34
Poetry was particularly representative of the literary renaissance
that was taking place. Although there was an active interest in poetry
in central Arabia, its most distinguished representatives were the
poets from the Yemenite tribes and the tribe of Mudar. Arabic
poetry reached its peak in the ode form of the qasida, the develop-
ment of which must have required a span of time that could hardly
21
have been a short one. Its beginnings may have been among the
Arabs of the north, but this does not preclude the existence of
elementary poetical developments in southern Arabia. Poetical
activity in the sixth century was of the highest calibre among the
tribes under the suzerainty of the Lakhmids, whose court was a
hub of literary activity.35 And it is worth noting that the Lakhmids
were the first to adopt Arabic as an official language.
The sixth century marks the emergence of the Arabic script and
the beginning of its use in writing. 36 Previously, the Arabs had
used the Himyarite (musnad) and Aramaic scripts for writing pur-
poses. It is worth noting that writing had been common among the
northern Arabs since the second century BC. The inscriptions of
the Lihyanites (first-second century BC to the third-fourth century
AD), who were based primarily in the northern Hijaz near the
coast, with their capital at Daydan, are written in a form of the
Himyarite script. The Arabs of Thamud (second-third centuries
BC to the sixth century AD) also used a kind of Himyarite script.
They lived in northern Arabia, especially the northern Hijaz, and
their inscriptions have been found in various parts of the penin-
sula, particularly in the northern and central areas. The Safaites
(second century BC to the early sixth century AD), whose territory
was the Syrian Desert between Aleppo and Palmyra and whose base
was the eastern Hawran, wrote a form of Arabic in a script similar
to the Himyarite. As for the Nabataeans, they used the Aramaic
script. The Lakhmids used to write in the Aramaic Nabataean
script, and it was from this script that the Arabic script developed.
The Arabic script was of importance in both writing and the forma-
tion of culture and likewise was to play a role in later artistic
endeavours.
Mecca, with the trading activities of Quraysh and its widespread
contacts and influence in the peninsula, was a meeting ground for
the cultural and linguistic currents of Arabia. This was a factor of
some impact at the time of the rise of Islam.
But these first signs notwithstanding, it was along the northern
peripheries of the peninsula and in Yemen that the Arabs found
themselves in direct_confrontation with the Sasanian and Byzan-
tine Empires, and, moreover, with the spiritual challenge they posed
as well as their efforts to seize control of trade. All this, compounded
by the vacuum left by the demise of the Arab entities, led to the
rise of considerable unrest and directly confronted the Arabs with
challenges and dangers. It was in the midst of this turmoil and rising
awareness, in a period of increasing bedouin activity and in the
22
face of a variety of challenges, that Islam arose to change the course

of events and to point the way for future developments.
From the foregoing discussion it is obvious that the Arabs played
a manifest role in the process of civilisation in pre-Islamic times,
and occupied a position of widespread activity and pre-eminence
in international trade. They also established political entities and
states in various parts of Arabia between the first millennium BC
and the sixth century AD. The settled Arabs were clearly more
numerous and played a larger role in history, but the expanding
nomadism — and this was by no means primitive — was a source
of vitality and power. Some Arabs were bedouins, some semi-
sedentary and some settled folk. They were also scattered and
separated through Arabia. Yet among them we catch glimpses of
a vague sense of common origins, as manifested in their attitude
towards their genealogies, in the emergence of common traditions
and customs and in the rise of a literary language and exquisite
poetry.
The tribe — or, more precisely, the clan — was the socio-political
unit, especially in nomadic societies. It had its tribal council (majlis)
and a chieftain (shaykh) chosen to lead by the tribe. It had a sense
of tribal solidarity to bind it together, and was based on genealogical
foundations. It is to be expected that the tribe would undergo cer-
tain changes when it took up sedentary life on agricultural land or
in a commercial centre. Hence, in Yemen the tribe owned
agricultural lands upon which it depended and thus referred to itself
as a sha'b. Although genealogy remained a fundamental basis for
social relations in such societies, they were more flexible than the
bedouins. The Sabaeans had their mala\ or Council of Notables,
in which all of the noble clans were represented. In Mecca, trading
activities encouraged individualism and altered the pattern of tribal
relations, since the attainment of prestige required both nobility
and wealth. Quraysh too had its mala' of wealthy notables from
prestigious clans.
The advent of Islam effected a comprehensive transformation
of Arab life, for indeed, its emergence among them made them its
substance, the first bearers of its message and the founding fathers
of its thought and civilisation. In Islam, the magnanimous Arab
spirit found something that gave free rein to its potentials, pushed
it on to new horizons and raised it to extraordinary heights.
23
Notes
1. See EI2, vol. I, pp. 872 ff, qv 'Badw'.

2. See Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-'arab (Dar Sadir, Beirut, 1968), vol. I, pp.
586 ff, qv 'Al-'Arab'.
3. Georges Dossin, 'Les Bedouins dans les textes de Mari', in Francesco
Gabrieli (ed.), L'Antica societd beduina (Universita di Roma, Rome, 1959),
pp. 35 ff; Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History (Hutchinson, London, 1981),
pp. 10 ff.
4. Researchers have disagreed on the question of where these peoples
originally lived: Babylonia, the Caucasus, Africa, the Arabian peninsula
or some part thereof— Najd, Yemen or the north. But the prevailing view
is that the Arabs lived in and then spread out from the Arabian peninsula.
See Jawad 'All, Al-Mufassal fi ta'rikh al-'arab qabla l-Islam (Dar al-'ilm li-1-
malayin, Beirut, 1968-72), vol. I, pp. 226 ff; Sabatino Moscati, The Semites
in Ancient History: an Inquiry into the Settlement of the Beduin and Their Political
Establishment (University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1959); Harold A.
McClure, The Arabian Peninsula and Prehistoric Populations, ed. Henry Field
(Field Research Projects, Miami, 1971), pp. 51, 74 ff, 86 ff; Giorgio Levi
della Vida, Les Semites et leur role dans Vhistoire religieuse (Paul Geuthner, Paris,
1938), pp. 10 ff; Naslb Wuhayba al-Khazin, Min al-samiyin ila I- (arab: dirasa
'ammafi l-ta'rikh al-'arabi qabla l-Islam (Dar maktabat al-hayat, Beirut, 1962),
pp. 9 ff.
5. Al-Mas'udi, Al-Tanbih wa-l-ishraf ed. M.J. de Goeje (E.J. Brill,
Leiden, 1892), pp. 75-6.
6. The words for 'Arabian' and 'Arab' are used in the Old Testament
to refer to nomadism and bedouins. One also finds reference to the 'land
of the Arabs', which apparently means the Syrian Desert, the homeland
of the bedouins. See 'All, Mufassal, vol. I, pp. 18-19.
7. The first reference in Assyrian records comes from the reign of
Salmanassar III concerning the battle of Qarqar in 853 BC, in which he
defeated a confederacy that included 'Gindibu (Jundub) the Arab', who
had come with a thousand camels. There are then references from the reign
of Tiglath-pileser I: one in 738 BC to payment of tribute by the Arab queen
Zabibe and another in 732 BC to his defeat of the Arab queen Samsi. In
the inscriptions of Sargon II it is mentioned that in 716 BC he defeated
groups from Thamud, Ibadidi, Marsimani and 'Epha, the 'Arabs of dis-
tant abodes', and received tribute from the Arab queen Samsi and the
Sabaean Yitha'amar. An inscription of Sennacherib states that in 691 BC
he captured the brother of the queen Yatl'a, and that he attacked the camp
of the Arab queen Te'elkhunu and chased her into the desert. In the Annals
of Assarhaddon (676 BC) there are references to the Arabs and the impo-
sition of tribute upon Khaza'il in Dumat al-Jandal. In the inscriptions of
Ashurbanipal (649 BC), mention is made of his punishment of Birdada,
son of Yatl'a, and his defeat of the queen. The document also refers to
the Nabataeans and to his treaty with the Arabs of Qeydar.
Since the days of Tiglath-pileser and Sargon the Assyrians had tried
to incorporate some of the bedouins into their administration and armies
and assigned them to important locations in order to confront bedouin
24
advances towards agricultural lands. There are also indications of the Arab
penetration of western Babylonia in the second half of the seventh century
BC, since one finds villages and walled towns with Arabic names. There
are also references from the time of Nebuchadnezzar, who attacked the
Arabs in 599-598 BC and penetrated as far as Jordan, where many Arabs
lived at that time.
See 'Al-'Arab' and 'Badw' in EI2, vol. I, pp. 524 ff, 874 ff; T.W.
Rosmarin, 'Arabi und Arabien in den babylonisch-assyrischen Quellen',
Journal of the Society for Oriental Research, nos. 1-2 (January-April 1932), pp.
1 ff; Israel Eph'al, The Ancient Arabs (Magnes Press, Jerusalem, 1982), pp.
8 ff, 23 ff, 40 ff; Faysal al-Wa'ill, 'Ta'rikh al-'arab al-qadlm fi 1-nusus al-
ashuriya, 853-632 q.m.', in Shakir Mustafa (ed.) Kitab al-dhikrd wa-l-ta'rikh
(Kuwait, 1978), pp. 85 ff; Ridajawad al-Hashimi, 'Al-'Arab ff daw' al-
masadir al-mismariya', Majallat kulliyat al-adab (Baghdad), vol. 22 (1978),
pp.'639 ff.
8. Lutff 'Abd al-Wahhab Yahya, 'Al-Jazira al-'arabiya ff 1-masadir
al-klaslkiya', in Masadir ta 'rikh al-jazira al- 'arabiya (Matba' Jami'at al-Riyad,
Riyadh, 1979), vol. I, pp. 55 ff; 'All, Mufassal, vol.I, pp. 221, 271, 273;
Eph'al, The Ancient Arabs, pp. 192 ff.
9. See K.S. Al-Asali, 'South Arabia in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries
C.E., with Reference to Relations with Central Arabia', PhD dissertation,
University of St Andrews, 1968, pp. 16, 79, 96-110.
10. Irfan Shahid proposes that Imru' al-Qays undertook a campaign
against Najran and was victorious. Mahmud al-Ghul, on the other hand,
maintains that Imru' al-Qays was the agent ofShapur II (325 AD) after
the latter's conquests in eastern and central Arabia, that Imru' al-Qays
led an expedition to Hubasha, and, further, that Imru' al-Qays was a
Tanukhi, the original territory of the Tanukh tribe being in the Hawran.
See Irfan Shahid, ' Hamlat Imru' al-Qays 'ala Najran, in Masadir ta'rikh
al-jazira al-(arabiya, vol. I, pp. 72 ff. Al-Asali ('South Arabia', pp. 56 ff)
considers Imru' al-Qays an agent of Shapur II and is inclined to the view
that Shapur conquered northern Arabia, while Imru' al-Qays took part
in the conquest of central Arabia as far as Najran.
11. Qays ibn al-Hidadlya, Shi'r Qays ibn al-Hidddiya, comp. and ed.
Hatim Salih al-Damin in Al-Mawrid (Baghdad), vol. 8.2 (1979), p. 206.
12. See al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-ashraf, vol III, ed. 'Abd al-'AzIz al-Duri
(Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1978), p. 20, where Abujahl says to
al-'Abbas, 'We will write a writ to proclaim you the most mendacious of
the Arabs . . .'
13. Surat al-Shu'ara' (26), verse 195; Surat al-Nahl (16), verse 103;
Surat Taha (20), verse 113; Surat Fussilat (41), verse 3; Surat al-Ahqaf
(46), verse 12; Surat Yusuf (12), verse 2.
14. Surat Fussilat (41), verse 44; Surat al-Nahl (16), verse 103.
15. Suratal-fawba(9), verses 101, 120; Surat al-Ahzab (33), verse 10.
16. A.J. Wensinck et al., Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane,
ed. A.J. Wensinck (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1936-69), vol. IV, p. 174.
17. See Xavier de Planhol, Les Fondementsgeographiques deI'histoiredel'Islam
(Flammarion, Paris, 1968), pp. 14 ff; Jean-Robert Kupper, Les Nomades
en Mesopotamie au temps des rois de Mari (Societe d'edition des belles-lettres,
Paris, 1957); Karl W. Butzer, Quaternary, Stratigraphy and Climate in the Near
25
East (F. Dummlers Verlag, Bonn, 1958), pp. 12 ff.

18. Al-Shahrastani indicates that the pre-eminent Arab science in Jahillya
times was that of genealogy. See his Al-Milal wa-l-nihal, ed. Ahmad Fahmi
Muhammad (Maktabat al-Husayn al-tijariya, Cairo, 1948-9), vol. Ill,
p. 275.
19. See al-Tabari, Ta'rikh al-rusul wa-l-muluk, ed. M.J. de Goeje et al.
(E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1879-1901), vol. I, p. 770; al-Hamdanl, Al-Iklil, vol.
x, ed. Muhibb al-DIn al-Khatib (Muhibb al-DIn al-Khatib, Cairo, 1949),
pp. I l l , 119 ff.
20. On the territory of Thamud, see Ibn Sa'id al-Andalusi, Nashwat
al-tarabfi ta'rikh fahiliyat al-'arab, ed. Nasrat 'Abd al-Rahman (Maktabat
al-Aqsa, Amman, 1982), vol. I, pp. 50, 54, 69; Sa'id al-Andalusi, Tata^a/
al-umam (Najaf, 1967), p. 60; al-Khazin, Min al-sdmiyin ild l-'arab,
pp. 159 ff.
21. One view makes the Qahtaniya the pure Arabs (al-'driba), while
another considers the primordial Arabs of the lost tribes the pure type,
the Qahtaniya the 'Arabised' (al-muta'arriba), and the 'Adnaniya the
'assimilated' (al-musta'riba). See al-Mas'udi, Al-Tanbih wa-l-ishraf, pp. 79-80;
Ibn Khaldun, Al-Muqaddima, ed. Nasr al-Hurini (Bulaq, Cairo, AH 1274),
pp. 9, 46-7, 236; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat ansab al-'arab, ed. 'Abd al-Salam
Muhammad Harun (Dar al-ma'arif, Cairo, 1962), pp. 8-9.
22. See Ibn Hazm, Jamharat ansab al-'arab, pp. 7 ff; al-Mawardi, Al-
Ahkdm al-sultdniya (Matba'at al-watan, Cairo, 1880), pp. 204-5. Cf. also
'Al-'Arab', 'Djazlrat al-'arab', in EI2, vol. I, pp. 524 ff, 543 ff; Werner
Caskel, Gamharat an-nasab: das geneologische Werk des Hisdm ibn Muhammad
al-Kalbi (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1966).
23. See, for example, al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-ashraj\ vol. I, ed. Muham-
mad Hamldullah (Dar al-ma'arif, Cairo, 1959), pp. 15-16, 19-20, 25.
Ibn Khaldun (Muqaddima, p. 110) says: 'Know that a person of a certain
lineage may happen to fall within the genealogy of another group, whether
by reason of close physical proximity to them, alliance, clientage or due
to flight from his own people because of some crime he committed. He
thus comes to be included in the genealogy of this other group, and is
counted among them in matters where eschewing enemies, seeking
vengeance, bearing the cost of blood money and other such affairs resulting
from blood relationship are concerned . . . Then over a long span of time
his original genealogy could be forgotten; those who know it would have
passed away, and so it vanishes.'
24. Reference to the shu'ub occurs in the Qur'an. See Surat al-Hujurat
(49), verse 49.
25. It is to be noted that the Himyarite era was calculated from the
beginning of the Sabaean calendar (115 or 109 BC).
26. In the early years of the fourth century AD, the Arabs of eastern
Arabia began to raid parts of Persia across the Gulf. Was this done
with the support of the Arabs of the south? In AD 326 the Persians, led
by Shapur II, retaliated and launched a devastating attack on eastern,
central and northern Arabia, wiping out settled life, destroying wells
and water supplies, and forcing the tribes to flee. Shapur may also have
sent an expedition towards Najran. All this had its impact on southern
Arabia.
26
27. Irfan Shahid, 'Pre-Islamic Arabia', in P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lamb-
ton and Bernard Lewis (eds), The Cambridge History of Islam (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1970), vol. I, pp. 8 ff; M.P. Charlesworth,
Trade Routes and Commerce of the Roman Empire (Olms, Hildesheim, 1961),
pp. 57 ff; The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea: Travel and Trade in the Indian Ocean,
by a Merchant of the First Century, ed. and trans. G.W.B. Huntingford (Hakluyt
Society, London, 1980), pp. 32 ff.
28. While discussing how the northern Arabs boasted of their knowledge
of their language and their skill in composing poetry, Sa'id al-AndalusI
states, 'The kings of Himyar took no interest in observing the stars or
studying their movements, or any liking to any aspect of the philosophical
sciences. This was also true of the other Arab kings during the Jahillya.'
See Sa'id al-Andalusi, Tabaqdt al-umam, p. 55.
29. Petra fell to Trajan in AD 106, and Aurelian put an end to the entity
of Palmyra in 273.
30. See J. Starcky, Palmyre (L'Orient ancien illustre, Paris, 1952), pp.
27-85; Shahid, 'Pre-Islamic Arabia', p. 28.
31. The story of the desecration of Abraha's church (al-qullays) as a
motivating factor for his expedition is, irrespective of its historicity, indica-
tive of the strong connection between religion and economic affairs.
32. Al-Asali, 'South Arabia', pp. 231 ff; M.J. Kister, 'Al-HIra: Some
Notes on its Relations with Arabia', Arabica, vol. 15 (1968), pp. 143 ff.
33. Al-DInawari cites a problematic account that in essence nevertheless
clarifies the misfortune of al-Nu'man ibn al-Mundhir. This report quotes
Chosroes as saying, 'Al-Nu'man and his kinsmen were in collusion with
the Arabs and told them they were waiting for sovereignty to pass from
us to themselves'. See al-DInawari, Al-Akhbaral-tiwdl, ed. 'Abd al-Mun'im
'Amir (Dar al-ma'arif, Cairo, 1960), p. 110.
34. Shahid, 'Pre-Islamic Arabia', p. 13.
35. Sa'id al-Andalusi states, 'The knowledge of which (they i.e. the
Arabs) boasted, and in which they competed, comprised learning in their
language and its grammatical structures and the composition of poetry and
eloquent orations. This was also the origin of historical studies {'Urn al-
akhbdr) and the source for biographical and geographical information.' See
Sa'id a\-Anda\usi, Tabaqdt al-umam, p. 58; Ibn Sa'id al-Andalusi, Nashwat
al-tarab, vol. I, pp. 80-1.
36. The Arabic script was known in al-HIra and al-Anbar, and also
among the Nabataeans. It probably reached Mecca in the mid-sixth cen-
tury along the western trade route (between Yemen and Syria). There are
also references to certain individuals gaining a knowledge of this script from
al-HIra. See Suhayla Yasln al-Jaburi, Asl al-khatt al-(arabi wa-tatawwuruhu
hattdnihdyat al-'asr al-umawi (Jami'at Baghdad, Baghdad, 1977), pp. 63 ff;
Nabia Abbott, The Rise of the North Arabic Script and Its Kur'dnic Development
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1939), pp. 12 ff. In the course of
his discussion of Bishr ibn 'Abd al-Malik, the brother of Ukaydir (in Dumat
al-Jandal), Ibn al-Kalbl says, 'It was he whom the people of al-Anbar taught
to write a script, that called al-jazm, which was the Arabic script (kitdb al-
'arabiya). The first to write it was a branch of the Tayyi' tribe in Baqqa,
who taught it to the people of al-Anbar, who then taught it to al- Hlra.'
He states that Bishr learned it in al-HIra, then went on a trading journey
27
to Mecca and taught it to Abu Sufyan and Abu Qays ibn 'Abd Manaf.
Then he went to al-Ta'if and taught it to Ghaylan ibn Salama al-Thaqafi
and then came to Syria and taught them. See Ibn al-Kalbi, Kitdb al-nasab
al-kabir, Biblioteca de l'Escorial, MS Arabe no. 1698, p. 126.
28
2
Islam and Arabic:
The Formation of Arab-Islamic Society
Islam gave the Arabs a creed and imbued them with a sense of mis-
sion. It replaced diversity and fragmentation with unity of religious
belief; it rejected the divisive clannishness of the tribes and in its
place established the bond of the creed; it cast aside tribal customs
and upheld new values and standards, a common goal in life and
the fundamental principles of a comprehensive system of religious
law. It denounced the tribal raid and enjoined the jihad, the struggle
to uphold the faith and protect the umma. It advocated the idea of
the umma, the 'nation' or 'community', a concept based on the faith
and raised on the principles of equality, ranking according to one's
deeds, respect for the individual and emphasis on deliberative con-
sultation in public affairs.
The revelations of the Qur'an came in 'clear Arabic speech',
thus consolidating the position of the language, securing it a special
status and making it the basis for Arabism since Arab identity meant
that one was a speaker of Arabic. 1 All this had a most far-reaching
influence in the historical formation of the Arab nation.
Islam united the Arabs, for the first time in history, within the
framework of a single state. It included the Arabs of the north and
south, with their rich cultural heritage. It joined bedouins and settled
folk together in a single cause and a single movement, and in so
doing, it put an end (for a period of about two centuries) to the
state of confrontation and conflict between them.
It was basically the Arabs who carried the message of Islam
beyond Arabia; and although the bedouins comprised the youthful
fighting elements, it was the Arabs of the cities who provided the
constructive leadership and guidance. This is what distinguishes
the Arab-Islamic conquests from the bedouin incursions of earlier
times in terms of organisation, method and purpose. These conquests
29
restored autonomy to the Arab lands after incursions by powers

to the east and west, and, in conjunction with other factors, served
to demarcate the bounds of the Arab homeland in the ages to follow.
Islam adopted a negative attitude toward nomadism. It steered
the Arabs towards sedentary and urban life, advocated reading and
learning, and made these requirements of the faith. Both during
and after the time of the Prophet's mission, extensive efforts were
made to teach reading and writing, thus laying the first founda-
tions of cultural life. The Prophet enjoined the hijra to Medina at
first; then it was a policy of the caliphate also to encourage the hijra
from Arabia to the new garrison towns, 2 which led the Arabs,
especially in early Islamic times, to spread out over the land in a
constant stream of emigration from Arabia. This trend was a fac-
tor behind the founding of numerous new centres and cities in the
Islamic world, and was of considerable influence in the formation
of both the Arab nation and Arab-Islamic civilisation.
These were early trends that cast light on the Islamic movement
at its origin. Hence the study of the development of Arab society
and the rise of Arabic culture is essential for an understanding of
the formation of the Arab nation in history.
T h e caliphate of early Islam
The framework for a state was erected during the career of the Pro-
phet when he proclaimed the establishment of the umma, the Muslim
community, in Medina. This he accomplished by concluding a pact
between the muhdjirun (those who made the hijra with him from
Mecca), the ansdr (the early Medinan converts), and those who
followed and fought with them, and considering them as a com-
munity (umma) distinct from other people. Under the terms of this
pact, Muhammad provided that the internal security of the umma,
the waging of war and the conclusion of peace were common under-
takings to which all were bound, insofar as they pertained to the
welfare of the umma. He also stipulated that the Book of God (the
Qur'an) and the practice (sunna) of His Prophet should be the con-
stitution of the umma. Within the framework of the umma, the tribes
remained social units bearing such responsibilities as wergild and
ransom, but loyalty and legal accountability were tied to the umma.
Justice, security and public affairs all came to be the concern of
the umma and its head. At the same time, the umma was not demar-
cated by ethnic or territorial boundaries, but rather by the success
30
and spread of Islam. 3

After the death of the Prophet, the caliphate was established as
the practical political institution of the umma, drawing upon Islamic
concepts as well as upon elements of the Arab political heritage.
It is worthy of our notice that while the institution of the caliphate
was subjected to upheavals and fragmentation, the concept of the
umma continued intact through the ages, and remained, in historical
terms, the overall framework for the Muslim peoples. Throughout
the first century AH, there was continual expansion of the area of
land controlled by the caliphate.
It is to be noted that in the time of the Rashidun (11-40/632-61)
the caliphate was based on the elective principle. This was enacted
either directly, as in the cases of the first and fourth caliphs; by
nomination based on an awareness of the views of prominent
personalities from among the Companions, as occurred with the
second caliph; or by means of a nominating committee representing
the main Quraysh groupings in Medina, as in the deliberative com-
mittee appointed by 'Umar ibn al-Khattab. The concept of
deliberative consultation, or shura — the term may here recall the
notion of the mala' — was the basis for an open exchange of views
in the conduct of public affairs. Individual freedom and public
opinion also had distinct roles to play in the life of the Commun-
ity, and the oath of allegiance was representative of a covenant
between the umma and the caliph.
The ways in which the concept of shura was understood in Islamic
terms, however, did not find practical expression in specific public
institutions. This left them vulnerable to fluctuating circumstances,
which led to the opening of a gap between ideal views and prin-
ciples and what actually occurred in practice. The first elements
of this disparity emerged late in the era of the Rashidun, and they
became more pronounced with the passage of time. 4 But Medina
was able to maintain central authority so long as it remained the
centre from which warriors were dispatched and from which the
conquests were directed. The umma, too, played an active role in
this, since it comprised the manpower base for the army.
The internal strife (fitna) and the First Civil War in the days of
'Uthman and 'All (35-40/656-61) were manifestations of a crisis
that the general course of developments had provoked in the
caliphate and in Arab-Islamic society. The tribes had participated
in the conquests, and the warriors who had achieved them settled
in the new garrison towns. Here their numbers swelled through
migration, with the result that the balance of power shifted in their
31
favour. The tribes in the provincial garrison towns were aware of

their role and their power, and among them there arose common
interests and local loyalties. At the same time, however, they
developed no clear notion of the state and so were content neither
with the central authority of Medina nor with the hegemony of
Quraysh. The flood of wealth from the conquests opened a rift
between the tribes in the provinces and the Medinans, especially
those of Quraysh. The latter grew in wealth and riches and became
the owners of new landholdings, while the tribes in the provinces
had already exhausted the income they had gained from the spoils
of war. The resulting material disparity between the two sides gave
rise to a cause for grievance and complaint. This was further aggra-
vated by the fact that the military stipend system favoured the Com-
panions and the early participants in the conquests: these individuals
were allotted especially high stipends and were entrusted with the
positions of administrative and military leadership, leaving only
paltry stipends for the newcomers who emigrated to the provinces
after the battles of al-Qadisiya and al-Yarmuk. This provoked a
certain degree of unrest, especially once the newcomers (the rawa-
dij) had become the majority. If we consider the additional prob-
lems — that criticism of the caliphate even arose in Medina, where
neither the expansion of Umayyad authority in the days of 'Uthman
nor certain aspects of this caliph's policies (some of which were re-
quired by changing circumstances) were regarded with favour, and
that tribal concepts and views emerged in public affairs once the
wave of conquest had subsided — we can understand the cause of
the revolt against the third caliph and why it was that bands of
tribesmen violated the sanctity of Medina. The fourth caliph tried
to assert the principles of Islam in public life and to address the
causes of criticism and complaint, but the turmoil did not subside.
Indeed, Quraysh divided against itself, the tribal flood rose still
further and the crisis of the caliphate, which had no institutions
upon which it could rely for support, escalated into civil war. The
result of all this was the transfer of the centre of authority to the
provinces — Kufa, for example, then Syria — and the solution of
the problem of the caliphate by the sword, which comprised a serious
blow to the concept of deliberative consultation in public life.
Political authority passed to the Umayyads (41-132/661-750),
to be followed in the era of the Sufyanids (41-64/661-84) by the
introduction of the idea of the transfer of power through hereditary
succession. As one would expect, the notion did not meet with
32
acceptance, despite the inducements and threats used to prepare

the way for it and the efforts made to gain support for it. The idea
of hereditary succession comprised a fundamental contradiction of
the ideas of shurd, nor could it be reconciled with tribal principles,
which occasionally and to a limited extent accepted transfer of
authority from father to son but rejected the principle of hereditary
succession. It was therefore natural that the crisis of the caliphate
remained unsolved despite the events to follow. There were uprisings
proclaimed in the name of shurd and other Islamic concepts; a new
civil war broke out; political power passed to the Marwanids
(64-132/684-750), though it remained in Damascus; and for sup-
port the caliphate turned to the Syrian tribes, especially the Yama-
niya, who were the overwhelming majority and were tribes accus-
tomed to sedentary life and possessed of a long heritage of tradi-
tions of rulership.
The Marwanids sought to restore stability, to reorganise the state
and, in the reign of * Abd al-Malik (65-86/685-705), to Arabise its
institutions and coinage. They also launched the second wave of
conquests in the reigns of al-Walid and Sulayman (86-99/705-717),
pushing the territorial frontiers of the caliphate to Central Asia in
the east and Spain in the west. But the problem of the caliphate
remained an unsettled issue that represented the tangible expres-
sion of the conflict between the idea of hereditary succession, which
was not firmly established in Umayyad times, and the concepts of
Islam. These latter considered that political authority was God's
and called for deliberative consultation and election of the caliph,
whether from within the tribe of Quraysh, or in an unrestricted
fashion from the ranks of the Arabs or from among the Muslims
generally (this last was the Kharijite view). Other Islamic positions
advocated that the right to rule be acknowledged on the basis of
divinely guided designation (nass) and the principle of sacrosanct
legitimacy, and rejected the favouritism shown to the Syrians over
other tribesmen in the granting of stipends. Indeed, Islamic con-
cepts were even ensconced among the Umayyads themselves, as
is evident in the accession of 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz (r.
99-101/717-20) to the caliphate and his effort to implement reforms.
They are also manifest in a movement that marked the beginning
of the end for the Umayyads — the revolt of Yazid ibn al-Walid
ibn 'Abd al-Malik, in the cause of shurd and his accession to the
caliphate (126/744). The Umayyad period witnessed the ascendancy
of tribal concepts in public affairs, as contrasted to the permeation
of daily life by the principles of the faith, which were becoming
33
increasingly influential in the life of most Arabs. As one should

expect, the resulting discrepancy had an important impact on the
course of historical events. 5 Political developments were closely tied
to those on the socio-economic front, and the foregoing remarks
are only intended to enumerate some of the indicative elements.
It is clear that the principles of election, deliberative consulta-
tion and public opinion continued to find support during this period.
Likewise, the Arab tribes remained the backbone of the military
forces (the muqdtila), although they were supplemented by groups
of non-Arab clients (the mawdli). The leaders and notables of the
tribes, especially those of Syria, played a prominent role in public
life. Ibn Khaldun (d. 808/1406) characterised this as political
authority based on 'asabiya, the tribe's internal feeling of solidarity.
But this era gave rise to no institutions embodying political con-
cepts. It would appear that the reasons for this can be traced to
the lack of any firmly established concept of the state, and to
developments on the social front.
The Arabs, especially the town-dwellers and the notables of the
tribes, tended to gain possession of increasing amounts of land,
acquiring it through grants of estates by the caliphs (or amirs), as
well as by purchase, by restoring waste lands to cultivation and by
other means. But at the same time, the general run of tribesmen
lacked the expertise and the opportunities to acquire land. 6 This,
combined with the process of sedentarisation, gradually opened a
gap between the notables and the other members of the tribes and
placed their respective interests at cross-purposes. The notables were
inclined to co-operate with the regime in order to protect their
material interests and influence, while the common tribesmen were
prepared to join opposition parties and to participate in rebellions.
Trade in the international sphere was brisk during this period,
since the international trade routes between east and west had come
within the territorial domains of the caliphate just before the end
of the first century AH. In addition, there were lucrative oppor-
tunities for domestic trade in supplying the military forces and sell-
ing the spoils of war, not to mention transactions for disposal of
the state's surplus revenues in kind. Hence the early manifestations
of a mercantile class began to take shape. At first, Arab
entrepreneurs depended upon their non-Arab clients (mawdlt) and
slave-agents (called ma'dhuniin, or slaves empowered with certain
legal privileges) to conduct trade for them. But by the late first cen-
tury AH they were gradually increasing their own participation in
trade, since limitations on the number of warriors enrolled on
34
army rosters (the diwan al-jund) kept many Arabs off of the rolls
(and so left them without stipends). 7 Merchants usually favour
stability; but an aspiring group of them threw their financial sup-
port behind the clandestine movement of the 'Abbasids, probably
seeking to find a better role for themselves in public life.
The desire of the tribes to gain a share of political power, their
pride in their province and their claim that its revenues belonged
to them alone, and the emergence of common interests among the
tribesmen within each province — all of these factors were influen-
tial in creating a new kind of partisan solidarity emanating from
the material interests of the tribes and producing new tribal
alignments and coalitions ostensibly based on the lineages of these
tribes, northern and southern, but in reality representative of new
political and material interests. The tribal groupings were of Yaman,
Mudar and Rabl'a, but such a grouping did not hold to the same
attitude throughout the various provinces. Rather, the grouping
in each province maintained its own particular position, depending
on the demands of its own interests in the province. Indeed, inclu-
sion within the genealogical structure of a certain group sometimes
followed from common interest, not common descent. Such a situa-
tion undermined the idea of the state and gave this spirit of tribal
(actually political) partisanship a fragmenting power, especially in
the later Umayyad period, that comprised a prominent factor in
the destruction of the Umayyad regime.
The positions of high authority were in Arab hands, a natural
state of affairs in light of the circumstances in which the state had
come into being. Muslim ranks were gradually swelled by increas-
ing numbers of non-Arab (as well as Christian Arab) converts. The
Arabs employed many non-Arabs in administrative capacities, par-
ticularly in the financial administration. After the Arabisation of
the administrative departments (the diwdns), the bureaucrats
employed in them were Muslims, or non-Muslims with a good com-
mand of Arabic. There were some mawdli (especially those with
clientage ties to highly placed patrons) who held important
administrative and military positions, although their numbers were
relatively limited. 8 We shall return later to the issue of the mawdli.
Here it will suffice to note that the increasing numbers of mawdli,
the Islamic principle of equality and the emphasis placed on it by
the Arab opposition parties, and the activities of the mawdli in
economic life, especially trade, were factors behind the transform-
ation that with the advent of the 'Abbasids gained for the mawdli
a role in all dimensions of political power.
35
T h e transformation and decline of the political order
A century and a third after the hijra, Arab-Islamic society witnessed

the transfer of power to a new family of Quraysh, that of the
'Abbasids (132/749). This was in the wake of social, economic and
intellectual changes, and about thirty years of propaganda activity
in the name of Islamic principles. The success of the 'Abbasid move-
ment served notice of the breakdown of the tribal sense of partisan-
ship and of the ascendancy in public life of Islamic principles that
emphasised equality and rejected any element of favouritism.
Hence, the participation of non-Arab Muslims in power and the
abandonment of the concept of building the army on tribal founda-
tions (and the accompanying dissension caused by tribal 'asabiyd)
came about as the consequences naturally following upon earlier
developments and were part and parcel of the process of social
transformation.
This does not mean that the state had lost its Arab character.
In its institutions and culture the early 'Abbasid age was an exten-
sion of the Umayyad, and the foundation of power remained Arab
within an Arab-Islamic framework. Thus, the 'Abbasids shared
power with the Persians, especially their supporters in the 'Abbas-
id movement, their Khurasanian mawdll and those Persians resi-
dent in Iraq. They were able to steer clear of the influence of tribal
partisanship, and created a regular army from certain Arab tribes
and from Khurasanian units (both Persian and Arab). Many of
the Arab tribes enrolled on the army registers continued to receive
stipends, and likewise the 'Abbasids sought to strike a balance
among the various groups of which the army was composed.
The 'Abbasids entrusted administration of the provinces to per-
sonalities with fundamental ties to the caliph: members of the
'Abbasid family, propagandists from the campaign against the
Umayyads or proteges of the 'Abbasids. This appears to have been
far different from the Umayyad policy of relying upon the tribal
notables, as well as upon men from the tribe of Thaqif, with other
dependants of the regime playing only a limited role. Yet the
'Abbasid perspective was one that began from origins in the late
Umayyad period, in the days of Hisham ibn 'Abd al-Malik (r. 105-
25/724-43). It was then that the role of state secretaries began to ex-
pand, eventually comprising a class that was the foundation of the
administration. The Umayyads may have Arabised the governmental
departments and made Arabic the administrative language, but in
the 'Abbasid era certain of the secretaries were inclined to hark back
36
The Formation oj Arab-Islamic Society
to the Iranian heritage. As we shall see, this was a tendency that

contributed to intellectual and cultural controversy.
The 'Abbasids stressed the principle of hereditary succession and
linked this to divine will, which had chosen the family of the Pro-
phet {Al al-bayt) to rule. They provided no place for either
deliberative consultation or public opinion where the caliphate was
concerned. As a result of this trend, as also of the effects produced
by the traditions of authoritarian rule in the region (and these were
beginning to be felt during the Umayyad age), rulership under the
caliphate tended to be despotic. Adherence to hereditary succes-
sion within the family, restricted only by the idea of the ruler
nominating more than just his immediate successor, served to give
other contemporary forces an opportunity to interfere in the affairs
of the caliphate. These forces — the 'Abbasid family, the Arab and
Persian blocs associated with the palace, the army and the
bureaucracy — contributed to the outbreak of two civil wars in the
period between the beginning of the ' Abbasid era and the middle
of the third century AH. 9
If the concepts of election and deliberative consultation were of
minor significance in practice, they continued to be stressed in
thought. Justice was deemed the fundamental principle of govern-
ment and the community's right (in addition to its responsibility
before God) to criticise and to offer counsel was considered a
guarantee of sound government. 10 Hence, there was a widening
gap between the Islamic concepts of government and the character
of the political institution.
A few observations may help to clarify how this development
occurred. Upon their accession to power the * Abbasids asserted that
they were returning to the Qur'an and the sunna of the Prophet
and adhering to them in government, and in order to give prac-
tical expression to their adherence to the principle of justice, they
established a council to investigate abuses committed by govern-
ment officials and authorities. But they founded no institutions
representative of their Islamic perspective; rather, they actually
served to promote the trend towards despotism. Likewise, they tried
to create an Islamic institution by establishing the office of qddi
l-quddt, or chief judge, and by assuming direct control over the
appointment of judges. To a certain extent they were successful in
this, a beginning that helped in later periods to vindicate their rule.
In their tendency towards totalitarianism, they introduced the
innovation of interference in spiritual affairs when the caliph al-
Ma'mun (r. 198-218/813-33), followed by al-Mu'tasim (r. 218-
37
27/833-42) and al-Wathiq (r. 227-32/842-7), began to impose the

doctrines of the Mu'tazila by force. The issue was probably not
an entirely intellectual one. The expansion of the ranks of the com-
mon folk in Baghdad and their negative (if not hostile) attitude
towards al-Ma'mun, the promotion of antagonistic religious
perspectives (Manichaeanism, Isma'Ilism) by certain powerful
elements and the 'Abbasid fear of the threat such movements posed
to their authority — all of these factors probably shed light on the
' Abbasid tendency to favour the Mu'tazila. But of importance to
us here is the fact that this policy cast into disarray the Islamic foun-
dation that the 'Abbasids sought to establish.
The circumstances involved in the joint nomination of al-Amin
and al-Ma'mun for accession to the caliphate, and the ensuing civil
war between them (195-8/811-13), made it clear that the desired
co-operation and balance between the Arabs and Khurasanians
(Persians) had not been realised. A polarisation of the two groups
into opposing factions occurred, with the Khurasanian party emerg-
ing victorious. Irrespective of the true inclinations of both al-Amin
and al-Ma'mun, the people of Iraq at that time viewed the conflict
as one pitting the Arabs and the proponents of Arabism against
the Persians. This is clear from the odes lamenting the death of
al-Amin, the rebellion of the people of Baghdad against al- Hasan
ibn Sahl, al-Ma'mun's governor, and in the Arab uprisings that
occurred in Iraq at that time (the revolt of Nasr ibn Shabath in
the Jazira and that of Abu 1-Saraya in Kufa). Al-Ma'mun was
aware of this; so, motivated by an attitude not devoid of frustra-
tion with the Arabs, he began to eliminate groups of them from
the diwan.
These circumstances probably caused al-Ma'mun to favour Abu
Ishaq al-Mu'tasim and to name him, rather than his own son, as
his successor. As an amir Abu Ishaq was known for his favourable
attitude towards building up a military force consisting of Turks,
and as caliph he expanded this policy and favoured the Turkish
chieftains, which aroused the resentment of the Arab commanders
in the army and led some of them to conspire with al-'Abbas ibn
al-Ma'mun. When the plot was discovered, an example was made
of most of these officers, and al-Mu'tasim was strengthened in his
resolve to rely upon Turkish slave-troops and devoted considerable
effort to expanding their ranks. He even built a new capital
(Samarra') to serve as their base and cashiered every last Arab from
the army diwan.
These developments had far-reaching effects on the caliphate,
38
for the institution was weakened as a result of domination by the

Turkish slave-troops. In 232/847, when al-Wathiq died without
leaving an heir, a small group of Turks and the wazir decided to
throw their weight behind the candidacy of al-Mutawakkil
(r. 232-47/847-61). And when this caliph tried to limit the power
of the Turkish slave-troops, they conspired against him and killed
him. This ushered in a period in which the Turks elevated and
deposed caliphs at will. The caliphate regained some of its auth-
ority during the reigns of al-Mu'tadid (d. 289/902) and his son al-
Muktafi (d. 295/908). But under al-Muqtadir (d. 317/929) the army
again interfered with the affairs of the caliphate, and this trend was
aggravated during the period when the Chief Commander (the amir
al-umard}) held effective authority (327-34/936-45). n
The first steps in the fragmentation of the lands of the caliphate
had already occurred at the dawn of the 'Abbasid era, but the pro-
cess became manifest with the domination of the Turks and the
dissolution of the entity of the caliphate as a result of rebellions or
of separatist movements led by ambitious personalities. The third
century AH witnessed the emergence of numerous principalities
with only formal ties to the caliphate. It is clear that in some cases,
as in Iran (under Tahir ibn al-Husayn), Egypt (with Ahmad ibn
Tulun) and the Maghrib, the ambition of an individual met with
a favourable local response in the region where the principality
emerged. The third century had hardly ended by the time most
of the lands of the caliphate had passed beyond its actual control.
With the incursion of the Buwayhids (334/945), the caliphate
lost all real power. Authority passed into the hands of these foreign
masters, who stripped the caliphate of all power other than its con-
trol of the religious institution (judges, preachers and functionaries
in the mosques). 12 In the eyes of the umma the caliphate appeared
remote, since its domain was dependent upon intruding foreign
slave-troops, and consequently because it was subject to outside con-
trol. This weakness and state of fragmentation contributed to the
emergence of multiple caliphates in the fourth century AH: the
Umayyad caliphate in Spain, which arose as a consequence of the
collapse of the 'Abbasid caliphate, and that of the Fatimids, which
was the result of a socio-political movement. These developments
confronted the Islamic world with a new situation: the presence
within the umma of more than one supreme head.
This trend towards fragmentation and the weakness of the
caliphate in its powers and the scope of its authority was confronted
by another, particularly strong among scholars of jurisprudence
39
(the fuqahd'). Its proponents asserted that the caliphate was a source
of legitimacy and that petty princes had to obtain a mandate from
the caliph in order to legitimise their authority before the community
at large. This was a perspective that sought to preserve some kind
of unity in the Islamic world and viewed the caliphate as a symbol
of that unity.
Islamic principles — such concepts as election, the role of those
in positions of responsibility and influence (ahl al-hall wa-l- (aqd) and
deliberative consultation (shurd) — remained fundamental ones.
Likewise, justice and the comprehensive powers of the caliph con-
tinued to be stressed. But the jurists, striving for legitimacy yet fear-
ful of upheavals and unrest, sought from the second century AH
onwards to strike a compromise between the ideal and the reality
so inconsistent with it. What this meant in the end was the modifica-
tion of theory to accommodate the deviant reality. Theory tended
to emphasise the absolute powers of the caliph, then gradually
shifted to accept rulership by seizure (imdrat al-istild\ rule by such
princes as could defeat other contestants for power) in return for
formal recognition of the caliph (as in al-Mawardf's formulation),
and to accept the authority of the ruling (Buwayhid) prince over
the caliph by virtue of a (formal) mandate from the caliph. 13 They
also found a pretext for accepting the establishment of more than
one spiritual head (imam) of the community at the same time. 14
They then gradually came to accept the transfer of power to the
sultanate and the legitimacy of selection of the caliph by the
sultan, 15 and further, to regard the sultans as God's appointed
representatives on earth and to make their authority out to be
legitimate. 16 From the foregoing remarks it is obvious that the
' Abbasids, for their part, were unable to found political institutions
expressive of Islamic concepts, and consequently, that theory fol-
lowed behind practice.
It is clear from all this that Arab-Islamic political principles and
concepts assert several important points. The umma is the source
of authority, and justice is the fundamental principle of govern-
ment. The caliph is to be chosen by direct election or by those in
positions of responsibility and influence. Deliberative consultation
(shurd) is an indication of the umma's participation and supervision.
(These were views that continued to prevail among the jurists of
such non-Sunni groups as the Kharijites and the Mu'tazila.) But
the reality was that the caliphate tended to represent rule by the
despotic power of an individual, and was isolated from the com-
munity since the latter was not able to found the institutions that
40
would translate the ideal into a course of action and organisation

capable of expressing that ideal in practice. The gap between ideal
and reality therefore continued, and the umma continued to suffer
from it, as well as from the absence of political institutions.
The development of the institution of the caliphate was firmly
linked to the rise of Arab-Islamic society and to the stages of develop-
ment through which it passed. With the growth of Islam there
emerged a state, essentially Arab, to unify the umma. But the
domains of the caliphate were exposed to fragmentation at the same
time that the community was expanding. It therefore found in the
religious law of Islam and in Islamic culture a basis for unity when
its political unity had been lost. The new entities may have had
their own geographical and historical roots, but it is well worth bear-
ing in mind that the idea of the unified community {umma) remained
a practical and deeply rooted concept.
T h e formation of the Arab nation
We may now turn our attention to the question of the formation

of the Arab nation in terms of its basic elements, the principles upon
which it was founded and the entity that emerged in reality. The
historical formation of the Arab nation came about as the result
of a number of interrelated historical developments. These included
the influence of Islam, the diffusion of the Arabs, circumstances
conducive to the spread of Arabic and to the establishment of an
Arab-Islamic culture, and in addition, social and economic
developments.
Two currents arose from the Islamic movement: the expansion
of Islam and the spread of Arabic. These were at first inseparably
linked and continued to be so for no small span of time, although
later each came to follow its own course. The Islamic faith and the
Arabic language continued to exert their influence on the Arabs
in a clearly interrelated fashion; but in the final analysis it was
Arabic, in both linguistic and cultural terms, that delineated the
human and geographical bounds of the Arab nation. Arabism at
first bore ethnic connotations, but as it developed it found its basis
and meaning in the language and culture.
By the end of the Ridda wars the Arabs in the Arabian penin-
sula were united and the community was an Islamic one. Arabs
left for the campaigns of conquest voluntarily and at first in limited
numbers, the total of those who participated in the conquests
41
of Syria, Iraq and Egypt probably being under 60,000. They went
forth under the banner of the jihad declared by Medina. There may
have been some among them who were motivated by the prospect
of gain, but it is clear that Islam charged the Arabs with a mission
and rallied both bedouins and settled folk in a single cause.
In the year 20/641, after the conquest of Syria and Iraq, 'Umar
ibn al-Khattab instituted the diwan, which was to comprise a record
of the names of the warriors, their tribal affiliations and the stipends
they received. It was open to all Arabs, who could enrol by joining
the troops in the urban centres designated as their bases. 17 The
hijra, or emigration, to Medina may have been compulsory in the
days of the Prophet, up until the conquest of Mecca; but in later
times emigration was based on personal volition and on the jihad.
The jihad was the primary concern of the community in the days
of the Rashidun, hence the caliphate made it a firm policy to en-
courage emigration to and settlement in the new garrison towns.
This was based on the steadily increasing need for warriors to
broaden the battle fronts, on the one hand, and the desire to in-
duce the tribes to settle, on the other. And we should not forget
that Islam emerged in the mercantile society of Mecca, and that
it adopted a negative attitude towards nomadism and commended
settled life. Emigration to the provinces became a condition for shar-
ing in the revenues set aside for the community as a whole, since
stipends were limited to those who so emigrated. Those who
remained in Arabia received nothing, and returning to the desert
(or ta'arruh ba'da l-hijra, 'reverting to nomadic life after making the
hijra') was so repugnant that some deemed it tantamount to
apostasy. 18
The caliphate also adopted a firm policy concerning the lands
in the conquered provinces. It did not distribute such lands among
the warriors, as these latter wanted, in accordance with their tribal
point of view. Instead, the caliphate left them in the hands of their
cultivators in exchange for payment of a land-tax (the kharaj), and
considered these lands as the common property or endowment of
the Muslim community at large. The income from these lands was
spent on the stipends of the troops and on other expenses of the
state. 19 There were several reasons for this attitude on the part of
the caliphate, among them being the relatively small number of
troops, the necessity of sending them on the jihad and the fear that
they might scatter over the land, and the need to provide the state
with a permanent source of revenues. The point of view of the cali-
phate was essentially one emanating from the concept of the nation.
42
The troops were settled in the conquered provinces in specially

designated sites. Some were new cities (dur hijra, 'emigration
centres') founded for this purpose, such as Kufa and Basra in Iraq,
Fustat in Egypt and Qayrawan in Tunisia. In other cases the troops
were quartered in sites adjoining important cities (such as Hims
and Damascus), as was the case in the administrative districts (ajnad)
of Syria. The idea of having them camp in large groups in centres
specially reserved for them aimed at keeping them free for new con-
quests. Sites for these centres were chosen with the aim of meeting
the requirements of the troops with respect to climate, the provi-
sion of supplies, pasturage and communications. Hence, sites that
were given serious consideration offered pasturage nearby for
livestock and camels, occupied positions astride the lines of com-
munication to Arabia and enjoyed a climate similar to that of the
desert. Furthermore, most of these centres were close to the desert
lands that comprised the grazing grounds of the tribes. The desert
lands of Kufa and Basra, for example, were the traditional territories
of the tribes of Bakr ibn Wa'il and Tamim; hence these lands con-
stantly used to nourish the urban centres with new groups of
tribesmen. It was expected that in the spring the warriors would
go out into the adjoining countryside or desert lands to graze their
horses, camels and livestock; this was also in the interest of the
welfare and health of the tribesmen, and of the care of their camels
and livestock.20
The movement of conquest continued, with some lapses,
throughout the first century AH, and this required that the
administration and economy be directed in such a way as to
serve the objectives of the jihad. It was therefore not expected that
the warriors would take up trades or engage in agriculture, and
circumstances required that they remain gathered together in their
centres and keep to a minimum their intermingling with outsiders,
this to such an extent that they were not encouraged to live in the
surrounding countryside. In this way the warriors preserved their
identity and were able to develop their own way of life and social
and intellectual activities in accordance with their own inclinations
and interests. 21
In each centre lived groups from a number of tribes, since
the troops set out for the conquests voluntarily and in the form of
small groups. This was also true of the groups that emigrated to
the provinces after their conquest, although here we must note that
the newcomers (called the rawddif) came to join their relatives and
fellow clansmen. We therefore find groups from the same tribe in
43
Kufa, Basra and in many cases even in the administrative districts

of Syria. Similarly, the tribes in Khurasan usually came from the
tribes in Basra and Kufa. The settlement of the tribes contributed
to the creation of new interests and associations. The tribes in a
given province had contacts with each other, intermingled and
intermarried. Common interests between them also arose as a result
of their participation in the wars of conquest, and because the
revenues of lands conquered by the warriors of a particular pro-
vince accrued primarily to them. Their economic interests were
further entrenched by the formation of landholdings by tribesmen,
particularly the tribal notables, in the lands belonging to the pro-
vince. To these factors may be added the relations established by
intermarriage and the formation of a common dialect distinguished
by certain idiomatic expressions and distinctive items of
vocabulary. 22 It should therefore not be expected that the clans or
branches of a large tribe would have adopted the same attitude in
the various provinces where that tribe was present. Rather, the bond
between the clans and tribes in a given province, such as Kufa and
Damascus, transcended that of the tribe as a whole.
Each of these provinces was a gathering place for tribal groups
from both northern and southern clans, some nomadic, some semi-
sedentary and others settled. This led to the formation of unified
societies in each of the provinces and comprised a significant step
on the way towards the formation of the Arab nation, since,
although manifested on a regional basis in the provinces, it marked
an important stage in the process of comprehensive unification. And
here it should be noted that the focal points for cultural activities
in early Islamic times were in such Arab centres as Kufa, Basra
and Medina, not in the ancient cities. It was in these three centres,
then Fustat and Qayrawan, that Arab-Islamic studies began and
where the foundations of Arab culture were laid.
In these circumstances, the concept of tribal solidarity ('asabvya)
underwent a process of change. The settlement of different tribes
in a single centre and the formation of common interests between
them weakened the social dimension of tribal solidarity and
engendered a new form of solidarity that can be referred to as
political. This was based on the desire of the tribes in each pro-
vince to protect their common interests, being aggravated both by
the competition for power among the provinces and by the ambi-
tion of the tribes for a greater role in public life. There were a few
instances in which conflict arose between two or more tribal groups
in a given province (e.g. between al-Azd and Tamlm in Basra in
44
64/684), but these were limited in scope and were quickly settled.
None the less, the rivalry in public life — specifically, the competi-
tion for power between the northern and southern Arabs — did
gradually lead to political polarisation in some of the provinces. But
the importance or role of such polarisation should not be exag-
gerated, and it must be noted that neither of the two groups adopted
a unified position in the various lands of the caliphate, and that
the polarisation was neither general nor of long duration. It did
appear in Syria and the Jazira after the battle of Marj Rahit
(64/684), as Qays and Yaman became involved in a struggle for
power; but its grave consequences did not appear until the first
quarter of the second century AH, when they convulsed the
Umayyad polity. Such polarisation also emerged in about the same
period in Khurasan, between the tribes of al-Azd and Mudar. The
tribes in Khurasan were cognisant of a common enemy (the Turks)
along the eastern frontier and emphasised the bond of Islam in the
face of polytheism. But discord erupted as a result of a power dispute
during the governorship of Nasr ibn Sayyar and prepared the way
for the success of the 'Abbasid movement. Beyond this, however,
the issue does not lend itself to such simplification. The Yemenite
tribes were already present in Syria before the rise of Islam, they
were already familiar with the ways of settled life and to a certain
extent felt attached to the land, and they had developed an
understanding of the concept of the state. The Qaysite tribes, on
the other hand, came during and after the conquest and were
predominantly bedouins. In Khurasan, al-Azd was a tribe familiar
with maritime shipping, sedentary life and agriculture, whereas
Tamlm was a tribe of bedouin origins. Each group had a cultural
background by which its conceptions and perspective were influ-
enced. In any case, a development such as this represents a new
phase in the tribal point of view, for tribal coalitions or alliances
had taken the place of the clan or tribe in public life.
From this it is evident that in early Islamic times there arose
among the Arabs a feeling of a common destiny and of a distin-
guished historical role. They had set out on campaigns of conquest,
raised the banner of Islam and founded a state which they
themselves ruled. The Islamic community so created was at that
time essentially Arab, and its language was Arabic. This engendered
among them a sense of pride in their Arab descent and a feeling
of superiority over other peoples. The fact that at first they were
few in number, in comparison to the sum total of the other peoples
in the lands of the caliphate, may have been a factor reinforcing
45
their sense of fraternity and superiority.

The tribes were proud of their genealogies, devoted solicitous
attention to them, and regarded purity of descent as the standard
for gauging an individual's claim to be an Arab. This was an intro-
spective and conservative point of view and limited the extent to
which Arabism could broaden its horizons. Hence, there are many
references, especially in poetry, to descent traced within a tribe,
and even to Qahtan and 'Adnan, while reference to the Arabs in
general is limited. Aside from this, one finds occasional reference
to * Arabic' in a genealogical sense and in accordance with the con-
cept as expressed in the Qur'an. 23 But tribal quarters sought to
limit the influence of this aspect by insisting that eloquence and
correct expression arose from an innate Arab disposition for the
language and were not skills that could be learned. This was
representative of the continuing effort to exclude others from the
sphere of Arabism.
As a language (and later as a culture), Arabic tended to spread
and expand and transcended both tribal and regional considera-
tions. Qur'anic revelation secured a special sanctity for it, encour-
aged efforts to learn it and through Islam broadened its horizons.
The language came to be the foundation for Arab identity in
references made in the Qur'an, which regarded people as Arab or
non-Arab ('ajam) on the basis of their language. 24 At the same
time, Arabic had to pass beyond the limited tribal viewpoint before
it could create any broad cultural foundation. Islam, which was
in a state of continuous expansion, endowed Arabic with a more
extensive base and an ever-increasing vitality.
Entrance into the Islamic faith meant learning Arabic and, for
some, participating in Arabic culture, as many of the non-Arab
clients did. Some considered conversion to Islam as tantamount to
becoming Arab, and in early Islamic times other peoples viewed
Arabism as practically synonymous with Islam. Hence, when in
132/750 Abu Ja'far al-Mansur queried a non-Arab client of Hisham
ibn 'Abd al-Malik about his identity, the client replied, 'If Arab
means a language, we have come to speak it; if it means a religion,
we have embraced it.' 25
Islam spread voluntarily among the peoples of the caliphate, and
in this way was the vehicle for the spread of Arabic. This dissemina-
tion of the language was promoted by the system of clientage (waldy),
for in a society composed of tribal units and adhering to notions
deeply rooted in a genealogical tradition, the non-Arab converting
to Islam could only find a place for himself in society (especially
46
in the cities) by attaching himself through clientage to a person,

family or tribe. 26 The roots of clientage go back to pre-Islamic
Arabia, where clientage among the northern Arabs ensued from
manumission of a slave, establishment of an alliance or an agree-
ment for protection. Groups could by alliance attach themselves
to powerful tribes as 'clients of friendship' (mawdli l-muwdldh), and
with the passage of time could sometimes enter into the other tribe's
genealogy.27 Clientage was well known in Yemen, where it was
tied to cultivation and the land. Each tribe (or sha'b) had its land
and usually had to resort to outside groups in order to exploit it,
these groups attaching themselves to the tribe and working in return
for part of the harvest. A group of lower social standing might work
a tribe's land and enjoy its protection; eventually such groups of
outsiders might insinuate themselves into the genealogy of the tribe
for which they worked.28 With the advent of Islam, ties of this kind
may have been of even greater influence in the sedentary surround-
ings of the tribes. Such clientage-alliance involved reciprocal benefits
but did not necessarily imply equality in social status.
The concepts of clientage endured into early Islamic times. When
'Umar ibn al-Khattab founded the diwdn, the tribe and its clients
were entered in a single register and identical stipends were
stipulated for them. 29 In Basra, Persian units — the Hamra' from
Daylam and the Asawira — allied with clans from the tribe of
Tamim. The Indighan and the Sayabija did likewise; and when
the Banu l-'Amm migrated from al-Ahwaz to Basra, they too allied
with Tamim. 3 0
The first groups of mawdli were enslaved prisoners of war who,
when freed, attached themselves to their former masters. There were
large numbers of these clients in such provincial centres as Kufa,
but the ranks of the mawdli swelled even further with the spread
of Islam among the free persons who moved to the Arab centres.
It is to be noted that 'Umar ibn al-Khattab suspended the taking
of Arab prisoners, tried to prevent them from being enslaved and
freed those who had already been reduced to slavery. Hence the
term mawdli came to refer to non-Arab Muslims, while the word
hatif ('ally') was used in reference to Arabs. 31
These concepts of clientage continued in the era of the
Umayyads. It is reported in the sources that 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-
'Aziz classified the mawdli as mawdli 'aqd, or 'clients by contract',
mawdli 'atdqa, or 'clients by manumission', and mawdli rahimy or
'clients by kinship'. 32 One also finds reference to mawdli l-tabd'a,
indicating attachment to a governor or commander.
47
The mawdli learned Arabic and subsequently adopted it as their

own language. Some of them studied it in depth and acquired a
full mastery of it, especially those working in the various fields of
Islamic and Arabic studies. Al-Hajjaj (d. 95/714) even considered
mawdli Qur'an readers as Arabs. Of a client who spoke good Arabic
it was said that 'he became an Arab' (ta'arraba), and that 'he took
up Arab ways' (ista'raba); such mawdli were referred to as
'assimilated to the Arabs' (al-musta'riba) and 'Arabised' (al-
muta'arribun). This was used by the philologists as a technical term
for the Arab tribes resident in Syria before the conquest, and by
the genealogists to refer to the northern Arabs in general. 33
Clientage helped to promote both the spread of Arabic and the
expansion of Arabisation. It did not provide quite the same status
as genuine genealogical descent, but in certain cases it did lead to
assimilation into the Arab community. This is clear from the
disputes over whether certain persons were to be considered Arabs
or mawdli.3* Hence, within a certain limited range clientage helped
to broaden Arabism and to transcend the tribal genealogical
framework.
Clientage simultaneously implied both adherence to Islam and
knowledge of Arabic. So far as non-Arab non-Muslims were con-
cerned, one who embraced Islam became an Arab. 3 5 The Arab
spirit, in its most sublime aspects, found expression in Islam, which
made Arabic the identifying hallmark of the Arabs and deemed
genealogies a basis for mutual recognition as well as for the delinea-
tion of certain social responsibilities. 36 But tribalism emphasised
genealogy and made it a basis for distinguishing and separating
Arabs from non-Arabs, and even for distinguishing those of pure
Arab descent from the others. 37 This was one dimension of the
confrontation between tribal and Islamic concepts in early Islamic
times, one that played a major role in public life during that period.
It was to be expected that the Islamic concepts would gain ascen-
dancy and take root with the passage of time, and that their influ-
ence would broaden with the spread and permeation of Islam,
thereby undermining the influence of the tribal concepts.
Here a word must be said about mawdli-Arab relations in early
Islamic times. First of all, it should be noted that clientage did not
embrace all non-Arab Muslims, but rather was limited to those who
came to the cities and Arab centres and affiliated themselves with
the Arabs, either individually or in groups. As for the cultivators
in the villages, Islam did indeed spread among them during the
first century AH; but the majority of them, who remained in their
48
villages, usually did not establish ties of clientage. The fact of the
matter is that reports about the mawdli in early Islamic times con-
cern the non-Arab Muslims in the urban centres.
Furthermore, the mawdli did not comprise a single class or ethnic
group but rather came from different peoples in the domains of the
caliphate. Among them were merchants, tradesmen and farmers
(those who had migrated to the towns), employees in the govern-
ment departments, those who devoted themselves to the Arabic and
Islamic sciences and troops in the army. One would assume that
the attitude towards them would have been influenced by their voca-
tions, their financial resources and their social origins. The mawdli
who most rapidly mastered Arabic and assumed roles in public life,
in both cultural and administrative respects, were those whose client-
age linked them to a patron in some personal way, whether by
manumission or subordinate attachment (tabd (a). Most of those who
were Arabised and participated in Islamic studies were such mawd-
li as these or their descendants, although this did not preclude the
participation of certain other clients.38
There were reciprocal obligations between the tribes and their
clients. Among these was the responsibility of the mawdli to take
part in the raids and wars of the tribes. There were in addition such
other engagements as the patron's right to the estate of his client
if the latter left no legal heir, and the obligations of the mawdli to
help their Arab patrons in time of need, to give them financial
assistance and perhaps to fight on their behalf. The mawdli enjoyed
the protection of their patrons and other members of their clan,
and the clan paid the wergild (the 'aql or diya) for them. 39 These
obligations explain why so many mawdli took part in the uprisings
of the Iraqi tribes, such as the rebellion of Ibn al-Ash'ath
(80-2/699-701). Groups of mawdli joined the Islamic factions; but
even in such a situation as this, they were most likely to join forces
with their Arab patrons.40 At the same time, however, we find not
a single revolt raised by the mawdli during the Umayyad era, nor
does there emerge any faction specific to them. Indeed, the Arab
factions were the ones that called for certain social reforms affec-
ting the mawdli.
The feeling of superiority and concern for lines of descent among
the tribes led them to view with disfavour intermarriage with the
mawdli, and individual attitudes representative of this viewpoint are
attested in the sources. But this was inconsistent with the Arab spirit
as refined by Islam. Hence, references to intermarriage between
Arabs and mawdli are far more numerous; and indeed, this became
49
a customary practice by the final third of the first century AH. 4 1

This phenomenon became so widespread in Kufa, with its radical
tribal environment, as to cause the governor, 'Abd al-Hamid ibn
'Abd al-Rahman, to write to 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz for advice
on the matter. 'I have found mawali men taking Arab wives', he
said, 'and Arab men taking wives from among the mawali.'* The
caliph's reply is quite illustrative. 'I have looked into the issue you
raised', he said, 'and I find no Arab marrying a woman of the mawa-
li save the man of greedy disposition, and no client marrying an
Arab woman save the man of unbounded impertinence. But I can-
not proscribe the lawful any more than I can condone the unlawful.
Peace.' 42
Nevertheless, concepts of genealogical descent (and of social
fitness, or kifaya) remained strong in early Islamic times. Although
it was quite common for mawali to adopt the genealogy of the tribe
to which they had attached themselves, it remained customary in
those times to distinguish from others the individual of pure Arab
descent. Ibn Sa'd records the following about the well-known jurist
Sa'id ibn Jubayr (d. 95/714): Tbn 'Abbas asked me, "What is your
descent?" "From the tribe of Asad", I replied. "From their Arabs
or their mawali?", he asked. " N o " , I replied, "rather, from their
mawali." "In that case", Ibn 'Abbas said, "you should say: I am
one of those graced by God from the tribe of Asad." ' 4 3 But the
passage of time, combined with settlement, social interaction and
the influence of Islam, led to the broadening of the concept of
Arabism. 44
The policy of Arabisation adopted by the Umayyads had a far-
reaching influence on the spread of the Arabic language. This policy
was initiated by 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan and included Arabisa-
tion of the official registers and papyrus documents, as well as
Arabisation and reform of the coinage. Arabisation of the coinage
involved the elimination from coins of all pictorial representations
as well as Pahlavi and Greek inscriptions, replacing them with
Arabic inscriptions. The new form of coinage had the effect of
elevating the position of both Arabic and Islam. The changes did
not stop there, for 'Abd al-Malik reconsidered the weight of the
coinage as well. He set the weight of the gold dinar at twenty qirdts,
or 4.25 grams (instead of 4.50 grams), and that of the silver dirham
at 2.97 instead of 3.98 grams. The stabilisation of such a reform
as this required that the state possess great economic strength. The
new reform was successful and was an influential factor behind the
caliphate's economic independence and the rise in the status of the
50
Arab-Islamic coinage to such a point that it became an international

currency in commercial usage in both East and West. 45
Also of interest to us here is the Arabisation of the fiscal rosters
and departments. These had used Pahlavi in the East and Greek
(as well as Coptic) in Egypt and North Africa, all of which were
now replaced by Arabic. This meant the enrichment of the Arabic
language with new usages and terminology, and also posed an
incentive to cultured non-Arabs to master Arabic in order to gain
employment in government departments, which as a result meant
their integration into the course of Arabisation. In this way, Arabic
became the universal language of culture and administration for
everyone in the domains of the caliphate.
The cultural role of the secretaries began to emerge in the late
Umayyad period, and then became a prominent factor in cultural
and public life during the ' Abbasid era. It is to be noted that some
of these secretaries did not dissociate themselves from their cultural
roots. Rather, they diligently translated the Persian heritage from
Pahlavi into Arabic and strove to assert this heritage, instead of
the Islamic concepts, in their culture and values, and to pattern
the administration after it. Some of them even went so far as to
deprecate Arabic and Islamic studies and to attempt to raise the
status of the Persian heritage, but did not have much from which
they could contribute. It is well known that they did lend assistance
to Arabic culture by translating works from Persian; but by their
tendency to belittle the former they provoked an Arab-Islamic reac-
tion devoting special attention to Arabic-Islamic studies and the
Arabic heritage. This perspective found expression in the stress
placed upon the continuity of Arab culture through history, in the
composition of compilations of Arabic poetry beginning with that
of the pre-Islamic era (e.g. the various hamdsa anthologies and the
Mujaddaliydt of al-Dabbl), and in the expansion of studies in Arabic
philology. It even manifested itself in efforts to compose relatively
short encyclopedia-like works expounding on Arabic culture and
Islamic history (e.g. the Kitab al-ma'arif by Ibn Qutayba and al-
Ya'qubl's Ta'rlkh), the purpose of such works being the cultural
refinement of those who otherwise would find it difficult to gain
sufficient knowledge of these subjects. Arabic culture emerged from
this struggle more firmly established and broader in its horizons,
especially in that it embraced the best of the transmitted Persian
heritage after assimilating it and imparting an Arabic character to
it. 46
On the other hand, there developed a secretarial culture unique
51
in character. Typical of this culture was the concern that advan-

tage should be taken of the ancient sciences and translations from
Persian, as well as of the Arab-Islamic sciences. There were, in
addition, professional and technical dimensions that manifested
themselves in specialised works on the humane learning appropriate
to secretaries (for example, the Adab al-kuttab by al-Suli and the
Adab al-katib of Ibn Qutayba). The influence of this secretarial
culture was evident in the books they wrote, and all this helped to
broaden and enrich Arabic culture.
Hence, it is clear that the negative side of the activities of the
secretaries resulted in the confirmation of Arabism and the promo-
tion of the status of Arabic. The proponents of Arabic were not
limited to individuals of Arab descent only. Many of the most
prominent figures traced their ancestry back to other ethnic origins,
but had adopted Arabic and Arab customs. There is nothing
unusual in this trend, for as we shall see it occurred in a period
(the second and third centuries AH) in which the concept of Arab
identity had assumed a linguistic and cultural character.
Arab emigration and expansion
The expansion and continuous emigration of the Arabs from the

Arabian peninsula played a major role in the spread of Arabic, in
the process of Arabisation and then in the formation of the Arab
nation. The Arabs left Arabia as bearers of a message carried under
a single banner by both bedouins and settled folk, and the conquests
raised the barriers that had once obstructed the movement of the
tribes to the fertile plains to the north and west. The caliphate
encouraged movement to the provinces. This was a kind of emigra-
tion that castigated as reprehensible any later return to the desert
('no return to nomadism after making the hijra'), and so opened
new horizons to the Arabs. All this resulted in a continuous move-
ment of the tribes from Arabia to the new provinces.
In pre-Islamic times, the plains adjacent to Arabia had been sub-
ject to constant pressure from the tribes, which had spread to the
Jazira by the first millennium BC. Some of them remained nomadic,
living on the tending and raising of livestock, while others, especially
the tribes of Tanukh and Rabi'a, settled down in the villages. There
were other tribes, such as Iyad and Taghlib, that came to the central
and lower Euphrates regions, while the predominantly Yemenite
groupings of Tanukh, al-'Ibad and their allies settled in al-Hira. By
52
the seventh century AD, the lands along the central and lower
Euphrates and parts of the Jazira had been extensively Arabised.
In the spring, pastures were plentiful between Kufa and al-Anbar,
while bedouins were attracted to some of the springs and wells to
be found south of Kufa. Hence, large numbers of tribesmen from
Bakr ibn Wa'il and Tamim were to be found between al-Anbar
and the Gulf, and later participated in the conquests. 47
In pre-Islamic Syria, the Arab tribes, for the most part
Yemenites, spread more extensively and in greater numbers. They
spread out into the regions adjoining the Syrian Desert, in an arch-
shaped area extending from Ayla and southern Palestine toward
the east and north-east of the area. The tribe of Ghassan was located
in the vicinity of Damascus and the Hawran, Quda'a in al-Balqa'
and south-eastern Jordan, Tanukh, Tayyi' and Salih in the area
of Aleppo and Qinnisrin, and Lakhm and Judham in Palestine,
while Kalb was based in Tadmur and in the desert of south-eastern
Syria. 48
New tribal groups came during and after the conquests. In Iraq,
Kufa and Basra (in their capacity as diiral-hijra, 'emigration centres')
were the gateways of the desert to the Sawad. In Basra four large
tribal groups settled — Tamim, Bakr ibn Wa'il, 'Abd al-Qays and
Rabi'a — in addition to the ahl al-'aliya, a heterogeneous group
from various Hijazi tribes. When Kufa was founded it brought
together a diverse group of more than fifteen tribes and clans, and
with continuous immigration its basic tribes in the mid-first cen-
tury AH were the southern ones of Hamdan and Madhhij, and
the northern tribes of Tamim, Asad and Rabi'a. Noting the con-
tinuous immigration after the conquests explains how it was that
the numbers of warriors enrolled in the diwdn steadily increased
from 10,000 to 90,000 in Basra and from 20,000 to 60,000 in Kufa
(and each of these had his family) in the middle of the first century
AH. 4 9
Tribal groups from Tamim and Bakr, as well as Yemenite groups
(from Khawlan, Hamdan and al-Azd), settled in Mosul during the
caliphate of 'Umar. Other tribes came to Sinjar and Ra's al-'Ayn,
while groups from Qays, and likewise Asad, came to the Jazira.
Immigration into this latter region was continuous and resulted in
the expansion of the tribal territorial domains of Mudar and
Rabi'a. 5 0
New tribal groups, mostly Yemenite, also came to Syria during
and after the conquest. Syria was divided into administrative
districts called ajnad (four at first, becoming five during the reign
53
of Yazid ibn Mu'awiya, 60-4/680-3): those of Filastin (Palestine),

al-Urdunn (Jordan), Damascus and Hims, and later that of
Qinnisrin. These were administrative divisions based upon cir-
cumstances of the conquest campaigns and the distribution of the
tribes, in addition to the influence of geography and heritage. In
early Islamic times the Yemenite tribes were predominant in Syria,
while Qays comprised the majority tribe in the Jazira and Qinnisrin.
In most cases the tribes were distributed among two or more
districts, although it was possible for a given tribe to dominate a
single district. Examples of this were the predominance of Taghlib
in the outlying parts of Qinnisrin, of Qays in Qarqisiya, of
Quda'a in Damascus, of Kalb and Madhhij in Jordan, and Lakhm
and Judham in Palestine. The prevailing situation, however, was
for the tribes to be dispersed among the various ajnad.51
In Syria, the tribes were allotted lands near the administrative
centres of the ajnad (especially in the regions of Damascus and
Hims), in strategic locations in the north (along the Orontes River)
and in coastal areas. These lands were usually vacant or waste
(mawat) lands. In both Iraq and Syria, tribal notables and eminent
urban personalities (especially from the tribes of Quraysh and
Thaqif) were granted allotments of fertile land, some plots from
state-owned domains and others waste lands. New conditions pro-
vided opportunities for gain and enrichment that were turned to
good account by the men of the cities, led by Quraysh. Their activity
was in the field of trade (selling the spoils of war, provisioning the
armies and selling the excess proceeds from various taxes collected
in kind) and in the buying and selling of land. In Kufa and Syria,
the notables profited from their allotments, and also reaped benefits
by acquiring more land, not only through purchase but also by
draining swamps and bogs and restoring waste land to cultivation.
The demand for land led to the rise of a landed aristocracy and
to the emergence of large landholdings. The Umayyad princes were
in the vanguard of the class of new landowners, while the ordinary
tribesmen had neither the grasp of the situation nor the funds
necessary to acquire land.
The Arab landowners resided in the cities and employed agents
to administer their estates and to oversee their fields. It was the
responsibility of the agents to attract cultivators to till the land, and
to employ cultivators from neighbouring villages. This was
facilitated by the fact that the movement of the conquests had dealt
a serious blow to the ancient feudal system and made it easier for
peasants to move wherever there were opportunities for work. The
54
activities of the Arab landowners and their agents led to the

fragmentation of village societies and left them exposed to external
influences, in particular the spread of Arabic.52
The urban centres of the provinces — that is, the Arab centres
— were the principal markets for the villages and the adjoining
countryside, which meant that Arabic was the primary language
of commerce. The country folk came to these centres to sell their
products and crops and to purchase things they needed; and in so
doing they exposed themselves to Arabic and to Arabisation.
Similarly, in the atmosphere of coexistence that Islam established
between bedouins and cultivators, there arose relations between the
villages and the tribes of the desert lands adjoining the agricultural
plains that gradually and increasingly promoted the spread of Arabic
in the rural areas.53 Tradesmen and craftsmen, who were usually
non-Arabs, came to the Arab centres and offered their services; in
the initial stages they comprised, along with peasant immigrants,
the common folk of the cities, and it was natural that they should
learn Arabic, the language of the Arab warriors.
Those who came from Arabia to the provinces usually enrolled
in the army diwdn and lived in the Arab centres, where stipends
(payments in coin), provisions (arzaq, items provided in kind) and
other allocations were set aside for them. With the passage of time
it was predictable that the numbers of warriors in the various centres
should be restricted. Eventually, enrolment in the diwdn was limited
to eldest sons and to limited numbers of newcomers depending on
need and conditions prevailing in the empire.
This restriction began early in the days of the Marwanids. Con-
tinuing emigration from Arabia meant that increasing numbers of
Arabs were left out of the diwdn and without stipends, and so were
obliged to seek other means of earning a living, in commerce,
agriculture or in a trade.54 Some bedouins coming to such cities
as Basra even found themselves in the throng of paupers and in-
digents that lived on the outskirts of the city. The numbers of these
indigents steadily swelled with the addition of bedouins who immi-
grated during years of drought and villagers who came from the
countryside into the city as a result of the sometimes difficult con-
ditions in the villages. These groups mixed easily and freely with
non-Arabs, and so served to promote the expansion of
Arabisation.55
It should be noted that Islam steadily permeated into the Arab
tribes and increasingly affected their lives and attitudes, and likewise
spread among the peasant cultivators. Most of the peasants in Syria
55
and Iraq had roots going back to the Arabian peninsula, while the
Persians and Romans were there as ruling classes (and garrisons)
in the principal cities, most of them leaving during the conquests.
The term nabat, the word usually used for the local Aramaean
population, is one indicative of ethnic origins, and later came to
be associated with cultivation and irrigation. The Arabs held a
special attitude towards the peasants during and after the conquests.
They were not subject to captivity or other perils; as al-Mada'ini
(d. 225/840) states, 'Umar ibn al-Khattab 'banned their enslave-
ment . . . and made them tillers of the land'. 5 6 They were left on
the land to cultivate it, and were entitled to sell it, bequeath it and
use it as security. 57 They spoke Aramaic, which is cognate to
Arabic, and this probably explains the reference to them as 'uluj
as a term to distinguish them from the 'ajam, the other non-
Arabs. 58 They were considered free-born individuals in principle,
but their lot was much affected by the traditional concepts that
bound them to the land.
It would seem that Arabic gradually spread among the peasants
due to the proximity between their language and Arabic. Moreover,
passing references to the Arabic they spoke indicate that it could
be distinguished only by the way letters were sometimes pro-
nounced, and perhaps by a characteristically rural accent. 59 It
appears that most of the mawdli in Iraq were of Aramaean peasant
stock.60 Nevertheless, there is only occasional reference to the
Aramaean peasant mawdli as such, this apparently due to their ties
to the Arabs in both origins and culture. This provides a probable
explanation for an important phenomenon, and this is that Arabisa-
tion was entirely successful only in lands in which most of the people,
or at least a large proportion of them, spoke a language similar to
Arabic in its grammar and, to a certain extent, in its vocabulary.
But as we shall see, this Arabisation was only to achieve its culmina-
tion in a subsequent period, after the spread of the Arabs in the
countryside and the more broad-ranging propagation of Islam. 61
We have already referred to the inclination of some of the Arabs
towards trade and land. It is probable that at first most commer-
cial activity was in the hands of the mawdli. Towards the end of
the Umayyad age there appeared the first signs of the emergence
of a class of Arab and mawdli merchants, their activities stimulated
by the inclusion of the international trade routes within the domains
of the Islamic lands. Commercial activities led to the expansion of
contacts between the Arabs and other peoples, and to the further
spread of Arabic along the trade routes.
56
Moreover, these developments highlight the emergence in society

of new forces, represented by the fundamental development of the
transformation of the class of tribal notables into wealthy land-
owners, and of the emergence of large landholdings. Economic
activities increased, especially trade and, to a certain extent,
banking; although these were only in their initial stages, they bore
their own significance for the future. The Arab centres developed,
and did so in such a way as to transform them into centres of civilisa-
tion. Social and economic developments resulted in the dissolution
of tribal ties, the weakening of the fighting spirit among the tribes
and an increasing trend towards urban activities. Islam spread at
a steady pace, with the result that the mawali greatly increased in
both numbers and importance. This in turn necessitated a recon-
sideration of certain social discrepancies arising from the distance
between tribal attitudes and the exigencies of new circumstances.
The 'Abbasid revolution occurred as a result of these socio-
economic transformations — though without effecting a corres-
ponding change in public institutions — and served in turn to con-
firm the new developments. One must avoid the supposition that
the establishment of the 'Abbasid dynasty brought about a radical
transformation of society, fcr supreme power remained in Arab
hands. The trend exemplifying the natural outcome of development
was represented in the rejection of tribalism in public life and in the
endeavour to create an Islamic polity bringing Arabs and mawali
together on a basis of equality and shared participation in the
administration and the army. In reality, however, the 'Abbasids
relied upon their supporters and upon the Persian notables (most
of all the Khurasanians) who were their clients. Although some of
these were interested in the Persian heritage, they, in the first
instance, and their descendants especially, were entirely Arabised.
The 'Abbasids created a regular army with Arabs comprising
one of its ethnic elements, hence some Arab groups were drawn
to take up city life and to participate in economic activities. This
trend was reinforced when al-Ma'mun reduced the number of Arabs
enrolled in the army diwdn, and further when al-Mu'tasim dropped
the Arabs from the diwdn entirely. 62 The Arabs thereupon
reoriented themselves, on a tangible scale, towards settlement in
the villages and rural areas to cultivate the land and towards an
active participation in trade. The exclusion of the Arabs from the
diwdn led to renewed tension between the bedouins and the village
folk, to a resumption of bedouin raids on the agricultural plains
and to damaging effects on the agrarian economy.
57
As Arabs turned to economic ventures, trade and banking began

to flourish; merchants became the vanguard of economic activity,
and indeed, the representatives of Islamic civilisation. This
economic activity also extended to the exploitation of land. In
'Abbasid times there was an increasing interest in acquiring land
as a secure source of income. It was in this age, as a result of
expanding wealth and prosperity, that the phenomenon of large
landholdings emerged. Princes, military commanders and mer-
chants were among the great landowners. Allotments of both state-
owned and waste land, in addition to purchase, remained among
the various means of acquisition, while the ilja\ a protective measure
of registering lands in the name of a prince or other influential per-
son, also served to expand landholdings.63 Agricultural conditions
were cast into disarray, however, when the Turkish slave-troops
came to power, encroached on landholdings and estates and
impoverished the treasury. Although there were brief periods when
efforts were made to implement reforms or restore stability, this
marked the beginning of the disruption of the financial affairs of
the empire.
The Arabs began to play a prominent role in settlement in the
countryside. In Iraq the city of Wasit was founded in the last quarter
of the first century AH to serve as a centre for the troops of the
army, and also founded were other small towns like al-Nil or Qasr
Ibn Hubayra. But of primary importance for present purposes is
the spread of the Arabs in certain villages of the agrarian hinterland
of Iraq beginning in the late first century AH, which is indicated
by the presence of references to villages acquired by tribes or tribal
groups, some near Kufa and others in the countryside of Wasit.
Groups also came from desert lands adjoining the agrarian country-
side and settled in the latter.64 The spread of the tribes was not
limited to the rural countryside between the Tigris and the
Euphrates; rather, they spread across the lands east of the Tigris
and as far as the al-Jibal region of western Persia. The Arabs thus
spread throughout the agrarian hinterland of Iraq, in a process that
was completed in the third century AH. Al-Ya'qubl (d. 284/897)
even goes so far as to assert that Arabs were to be found in all of
the villages between Baghdad and Kufa.65
In the Jazlra region, tribal groups settled in the villages on a
large scale and worked as cultivators, while in regions of pastureland
some of them remained nomadic. There was a large aggregate of
Arab villages in the second century AH. Many of these Arabs began
to work in agriculture after their exclusion from the diwdn, and had
58
strong social ties with the rest of the population. 66

In Syria, the movement towards expansion into the countryside
and settlement in the villages became more widespread after the
fall of the Umayyads. Ibn 'Asakir (d. 571/1176) mentions a large
group of Arab villages, especially in the regions of Damascus and
Hims, the usual pattern being the population of a village by a single
tribe or tribal group. 67 The revolt of al-Mubarqa' al-Yamani
(227/842) reveals the extent to which the Arabs had spread in the
villages of Jordan and Palestine and how involved they were in
agriculture, as both landowners and cultivators. 68 The tribal con-
flicts in Syria basically arose between tribes living in the villages,
and some of these clashes were linked to agricultural problems. From
al-Ya'qubi, it is evident that Syria was already to a great extent
Arabised in the third century AH. 6 9
This Arab expansion was a source of influence on life in the
countryside, for it helped to make Arabic the language of the
agrarian hinterland and resulted in a comprehensive Arabisation.
It also led to an awareness of a common interest shared by all. This
explains the cases in which Arabs and non-Arabs participated in
the same uprisings and shared similar attitudes, as occurred in Egypt
in the late second and early third centuries AH, 7 0 and in the Jazira
in the second half of the second century AH.
The majority of the villages were probably inhabited by
Aramaean peasant cultivators. Islam spread extensively among
these people in the second and third centuries AH in Iraq, Syria,
Egypt and Ifriqiya, and the propagation of Islam was accompanied
by the learning of Arabic. The spread of Arab landholdings in the
villages, coupled with the steadily increasing contacts between the
countryside and the city, resulting from the expansion of cities and
their ever-increasing need for foodstuffs — all this promoted the
spread of Arabic among the villagers, who came to use the language
as a means of conversation while still preserving some of their tradi-
tional customs. It should be expected that the Arabic of the coun-
try folk would be weak and somewhat ungrammatical. Nevertheless,
al-Jahiz (d. 255/868) mentions that some of the country folk around
Kufa spoke correct Arabic with well-chosen expressions. 71
The spread of the Arabs in the countryside, as well as in the
cities, was an important factor in Arabisation of an ethnic kind.
Successive waves of immigration from Arabia brought large tribal
groups to the fertile lands north of the peninsula and in North
Africa. The tribes shifted from the nomadic to sedentary life, and
the garrison towns and other Arab centres evolved into setded social
59
entities. The expansion into the countryside was an extension of

the trend of sedentarisation, and a development fully consistent with
the orientation of the Arab-Islamic movement. It is obvious that
nomadism and the concepts upon which it is based were incom-
patible with the idea of the umma and, similarly, that gathering the
tribes under a single banner and within the framework of a single
great cause, such as the conquests, was in itself insufficient to
transform these tribes into a community or nation. There had to
be roots; likewise, there had to be changes leading to the efface-
ment of the divisive effects of tribal partisanship and producing a
sense of communal solidarity. The shift to sedentary life was an
important development that facilitated the adoption of a more clearly
conceived and more solidly based concept of the nation.
The conquests played the primary role in setting the territorial
bounds of the Arab empire and cleared the way for the Arabs to
spread out over the land. But it was not sufficient to delineate the
Arab land. This was dependent upon another trend: the movement
of Arabisation, which manifested itself in two perspectives. One
was ethnic, and involved the wide-ranging spread and settlement
of the Arabs in the new provinces. The other, the more comprehen-
sive of the two, was cultural. It involved the spread and ascendancy
of the Arabic language to become the language of culture, and then
the formation of Arabic culture as the embodiment of the spirit,
heritage and values of the Arabs.
Islam spread from the Atlantic to India and Central Asia, across
North Africa and Western Asia, and after that to other lands in
Asia, Africa and Europe. But the domains of the Arabs and the
Arab nation were defined by socio-cultural considerations based on
the dominance of Arabic and on the ascendancy of groups of Arab
descent and others who were Arabised. It is worthy of note that
this was clearly effected in regions settled by those ancestors of the
Arabs who had emigrated from Arabia, and where vestiges of their
culture were to be found.
T h e Arabs and Islam in Egypt
We have already discussed the eastern wing of the lands of the

caliphate, and now we would do well to turn our attention westward.
The relations between the Arabian peninsula and Egypt are ancient
ones, and the Sinai peninsula, inhabited by Arab tribes from remote
antiquity, was the natural bridge between them. The bedouin tribes
60
kept constant pressure on the eastern frontiers of Egypt, and for

that reason the Pharaohs erected a series of forts along the eastern
borders of the Nile Delta. When the state was strong it could stop
the bedouins or allow limited peaceful immigrations under their
own supervision. Hence it is mentioned, for example, that one of
the Pharaohs permitted the Edomite tribes to stay in the eastern
Delta. But weakness on the part of the state could lead to nomadic
incursions, as occurred in the late Middle Kingdom when the
Hyksos, a group of pastoralists, seized control of the land and
founded a state. The impact of migrations from Arabia and the rela-
tions between Egypt and the peninsula are demonstrated by the
fact that the ancient Egyptian language, which appears to have com-
bined Semitic, Hamitic and African elements, was clearly influenced
by the languages of Arabia.
From accounts in the classical sources, it would seem that the
eastern parts of the country, between the Nile and the Red Sea,
were penetrated by an Arab grouping perhaps from the fifth cen-
tury B C . 7 2 In addition, there were ancient commercial contacts
between the Sabaeans, then the Nabataeans, and Egypt. Just before
the Arab conquest, there were Arab groups in Alexandria, Tinnls
and the eastern region: Nabataeans, tribesmen from Ghassan and
Judham, and clans from Khuza'a. 7 3
About 12,000 warriors took part in the conquest of Egypt. There
were some small Qaysite groups, but most of the tribesmen were
Yemenite (e.g. from the tribes of Lakhm and Judham, Hadramawt,
Tujayb, Bali, al-Ma'afir, Himyar andKhawlan). 7 4 'Amr ibn al-'As
founded Fustat in 21/642 as a garrison town and base for these
troops, and its local quarters {khitat) were laid out on the basis of
tribal affiliation. 75 He also stationed a garrison in Alexandria and
another at Khirbita, west of Alexandria along the edge of the desert.
Continuous immigration after the conquest resulted in a sharp
rise in Arab numbers. About 20,000 warriors participated in the
campaign in North Africa during the caliphate of 'Uthman
(27/648). 7 6 The dramatic increase is clearly demonstrated by the
subsequent expansion of the local quarters of Fustat and by the set-
tlement of warriors on the west bank of the Nile. 7 7 The caliphate
encouraged emigration to Fustat and registered every newcomer
in the diwan. Bali, for example, part of which had participated in
the conquest, moved in its entirety to Egypt on the order of 'Umar
ibn al-Khattab. 7 8 This policy continued in the early Umayyad
period, with the result that in the reign of Mu'awiya (r. 4 1 - 6 0 /
661-80) the number of warriors enrolled in the diwan of Fustat
61
reached 40,000, and in Alexandria came to 12,000, later increas-

ing to 27,000. In the days of Marwan ibn al-Hakam (r. 64-5/684-5)
the number of warriors in Fustat rose to 50,000. 79
The flood of immigration into Egypt continued, and governors
sometimes brought new groups with them when they took up their
posts. Thus, in 100/719-20, Ayyub ibn Shurahbll enrolled 5,000
troops on the order of 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. 80 In 109/727*,
'Ubayd Allah ibn al-Habhab, the governor under Hisham ibn 'Abd
al-Malik, requested the latter's permission to transfer groups of
Qays tribesmen to Egypt. When this was granted, he brought in
1,500 families and settled them in Bilbays. This policy continued
during the governorship of al-Hawthara ibn Suhayl al-Bahili
(128/746), with the result that the Qaysites numbered 3,000 families
by the end of the Umayyad period. Their immigration continued
beyond that time, however, and by the year 153/770 their ranks
had swelled to 5,200 families.81 The plan in Egypt, based on con-
straints of security and the, jihad, was to concentrate the troops in
a limited number of centres. But from the beginning the administra-
tion enforced the policy of the irtiba', that is, the distribution of the
tribes into the rural districts during the spring for purposes of diver-
sion and for the benefit of their horses. This dispersal was aimed
primarily towards the region around Fustat and the eastern Hawf.
This policy was a preliminary step towards the intermingling of the
two peoples, and then to Arabisation. In fact, some of the tribes
later settled in the regions of their spring quarters.
The tribes apparently began to spread in the Egyptian coun-
tryside before the end of the first century AH, and some of them
were beginning to settle there from the dawn of the second century
AH. The most prominent step in the Arab trend towards involve-
ment in agriculture was probably that taken by 'Ubayd Allah ibn
al-Habhab when he asked the Qaysites whom he had brought to
Egypt to 'till the land'. Al-Maqrizi (d. 845/1442) considers this the
beginning in earnest of the spread of Islam into the countryside,
for, as he says, Tslam did not spread into the villages of Egypt until
after the first century AH, when 'Ubayd Allah ibn al-Habhab, a
client of Salul, settled Qaysite tribesmen in the eastern Hawf.
During the second century Muslims came to be very broadly
distributed in the villages and districts of Egypt.' 82
The Qaysite tribesmen were more involved in agriculture than
the Yemenites were, but this was to be expected, since the former
had poor relations with the 'Abbasids and were only registered in
the diwdn in limited numbers. The extent of Arab settlement in
62
the countryside is evident from the rebellions that occurred in the

al-Hawf region in the first half of the third century AH, especially
that of 216-17/831-2. Both Arabs and Copts participated in this
uprising, which indicates the extent to which the two peoples had
intermingled and come to share a sense of common interest. The
movement of Arab relocation and spreading across the countryside
expanded after al-Mu'tasim dropped the Arabs from the diwdn in
218/833. It is worth noting that this measure led to a limited revolt
by groups of tribesmen from Lakhm and Judham, not involving
more than 500 men, in Jumada I 219/May-June 834. 83 This serves
notice that the Arabs had turned to such economic activities as
landownership, agriculture and trade; the diwdn was no longer of
much interest to them.
It also bears notice that immigration into Egypt continued
uninterrupted into later times. The tribe of Tayyi', for example,
did not make its appearance in Egypt until the late second century.
The important migration of Rabi'a occurred in the time of the 'Ab-
basid caliph al-Mutawakkil (d. 247/861), when the tribe went to
the furthest parts of Upper Egypt because of the spread of other
Arab tribes in the country. 84 Groups from Kinana came from the
Hijaz in the mid-fourth century, and the Hilalian wave that rolled
across Egypt in the fifth century left many groups east of the Nile
between the Hawf and Upper Egypt. In this connection, we should
recall that the gradual spread of the Arabs usually passes unrecorded
in the sources. 85
The spread of the Arabs in Egypt was particularly extensive in
the second and third centuries between Alexandria and the furthest
reaches of Upper Egypt. Some of the tribes, such asjuhayna, even
went to the borders of Nubia and played a role in its conversion
to Islam. Rabi'a went to the remote parts of Upper Egypt, com-
bined with the tribe of al-Bajja, and took possession of the gold mines
of al-'Allaqi. Arab settlement and Arabisation were most likely con-
centrated in the eastern Delta region, the vicinity of Fustat and the
lands of Upper Egypt. 86 It would be difficult to formulate any
accurate idea of how large the groups entering Egypt were, and
it will suffice to state that the sum total of the clans that settled in
the province came to about ninety. 87
Turning our attention elsewhere, we find many references to the
mawdli of the tribes and especially to their important role in cultural
life. This is indicative of the wave of cultural Arabisation, which
became all-pervasive during the third century AH at a time of far-
reaching integration. Thus, Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam mentions that
63
the tribe of Judham, which settled in the eastern Hawf, 'no longer
exists'. 88 Al-Maqrizi says, 'Be advised that time has seen the
Arabs who witnessed the conquest of Egypt pass into oblivion. The
circumstances of most of their descendants are unknown, although
remnants of some groups did survive in the land of Egypt.' 89 Such
texts as these serve notice of the transformation of tribal groups into
settled social entities and of the restriction of tribal life to regions
more suited to it. They also imply that the Arabic language and
Arab culture had become sufficiently widespread to allow for a
comprehensive integration.
At first Islam spread slowly in Egypt, but the last quarter of the
first century witnessed a quickening of the pace of conversion. The
poll-tax was reimposed on new Muslims towards the end of the reign
of 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan, but the current of conversion
increased noticeably during the reign of 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz,
who declared that whoever converted to Islam would be exempt
from the poll-tax. This trend was assured after the advent of the
'Abbasids and promoted by the settlement of Arabs in the country-
side beginning in the second century. 90 By the dawn of the third
century Islam had spread on a wide scale in the countryside.
Al-Maqrizi is of the opinion that Islam became prevalent among
the village folk after the revolt of 217/832; in any case, it spread
very widely and became the religion of the majority of the popula-
tion in the fourth century AH. 9 1
It is worth noting that the regions in which the spread of the
Arabs was concentrated, such as the eastern Hawf and Upper Egypt,
were the ones where Islam spread rapidly and widely. Likewise,
it should be observed that the cultivators' revolts occurred in these
same areas, and that the largest of them, the revolt of 217/832,
brought together both Qaysite and Yemenite tribesmen, the other
Muslims and the Copts.
The Arabisation of Egypt was a comprehensive one and a con-
tributing factor in the development of culture. Although cultural
trends began to emerge relatively late in Fustat, by comparison to
Kufa and Basra, it was clearly playing a participating role by the
late second century AH. It passed through periods of cultural
efflorescence, as in the Fatimid period (fourth-fifth centuries AH),
and indeed, after the fall of Baghdad it became the focus of Arab-
Islamic culture.
64
Developments in the Maghrib
The general outlines for the spread of Arabic and the process of
Arabisation hold true for the Arab Maghrib as well, although there
are differences of some importance on points of detail. The ethnic
groups that traced their origins back to Arabia (leaving aside the
difficulty of verifying such claims) and came to North Africa were
relatively limited in number, and were essentially linked to the
activities of the Phoenicians and the movement of trade. Further-
more, the flow of immigration was at first not as brisk in the
Maghrib as it was in the Arab East. Similarly, the broad-ranging
expansion of Arabs into the countryside took until the fifth century
AH, with the westward migration of the tribes of Hilal and Sulaym,
to develop. By comparison, Christianity in the Maghrib was limited
to an urban presence. More important than that was the lack of
any indigenous culture or heritage; indeed, the language of the
church and of administration was Latin.
It is noteworthy that the propagation of Islam was both rapid
and complete, more so than in the East, and that the Arabisation
of the Maghrib preceded it in time and surpassed it in scope. Islam
was also quick to endow the people of the Maghrib with a sense
of mission when they took part in the conquest campaigns across
the Mediterranean and began to spread Islam among the nomads
in the desert regions and along the trade routes across the Sahara.
Similarly, Arabic was quick to put an end to Latin.
Some observations on the concept of Arabisation would probably
contribute to an understanding of its significance and the course
of its spread in the Maghrib, for the word may convey a meaning
not devoid of ambiguity and confusion. Before all else, Arabisa-
tion means the adoption of Arabic as a medium of conversation
and as a generally accepted language of culture. It also implies adop-
tion of the culture, the essence of which is expressed in Arabic; an
attitude that esteems the scientific and literary products of that
culture as its heritage; and the adoption of its masterpieces as
models. Arabisation also means a linguistic affiliation and a com-
plex of sensibilities, styles and intellectual conventions, but is in
no way connected to a sense of ethnic identity. 92 Lastly, it must
be borne in mind that in the Maghrib Arabisation was firmly linked
to Islam. Although Arabisation and Islam do not exactly corres-
pond here, since Islam was broader in scope, we do not find any
contradiction between them in the Maghrib. No cultural or social
movement opposed to Arabisation or Islam arose after the faith
65
spread into the region. A number of Kharijite or 'Alid movements

did arise in the Maghrib during the second and third centuries AH,
but these did so in the name of Islamic principles and played a role
in the promotion of Arabisation.
The first Arab groups came with the conquests. Traditions
related on the authority of the Prophet encouraged emigration to
North Africa and assigned an elevated status to the area and to the
warriors stationed there. 93 These convey some sense of the impor-
tance attached to the conquest and of the effort to encourage emigra-
tion to the region; indeed, they make North Africa a dar hijra. In
51/671, Qayrawan was founded on a site where it would be * secure
from Berber and Christian raids', and was adopted as a dar jihad,
a centre from which the Holy War could be pursued. 94 Garrisons
were later stationed in other centres, and a succession of expedi-
tions was sent forth from them through the course of the first century
and on into the middle of the second century AH. It is difficult to
follow these with any precision, but on some of them it is possible
to comment.
After the conquest of Egypt came that of Barqa, Zawila and
Fazzan, where some of the warriors settled. 95 After the death of
'Amr ibn al-'As, Mu'awiya assigned the governorship of Ifrlqiya
to Mu'awiya ibn Hudayj, who brought 10,000 Arabs with him. 96
'Uqba ibn Nafi' came to Ifrlqiya in 50/670, and was reinforced
by Mu'awiya with 10,000 troops. It was his policy to consolidate
the Arab position in the province to pursue the jihad and to prop-
agate Islam, hence the idea of founding Qayrawan. 97 In 55/675,
Abu 1-Muhajir ibn Dinar — the client of Maslama ibn Makhlad,
governor of Egypt — took over the governorship of Ifrlqiya and
brought in Syrian and Egyptian warriors. 98 Yazid ibn Mu'awiya
returned 'Uqba ibn Nafi' to power in 61/680-1, and he returned
accompanied by forces drawn primarily from Syria; 40,000 he led
on his campaign and 6,000 he left in Qayrawan. 99
When 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan assumed the caliphate, he sent
Zuhayr ibn Qays al-Balawi, then in command at Barqa, to Ifrl-
qiya to confront Kusayla, and then reinforced him 'with cavalry,
infantry and funds, and called up for him the assembled notables
of the Arabs . . . the armies then marched to Zuhayr.' 1 0 0 The
numbers involved here are not mentioned. After Zuhayr was killed
in battle against the Byzantines, 'Abd al-Malik chose for the
governorship of Ifrlqiya Hassan ibn al-Nu'man, who went there
in 78/697 with 40,000 troops. 101 After the battle of Wadl l-'Adha-
ra, in which Hassan suffered defeat, he wrote to 'Abd al-Malik,
66
who reinforced him, so that 'Arab horsemen and infantry thronged

to his side.' 1 0 2 Hassan concentrated the Arabs in Ifriqiya, con-
ceived the idea of building a naval base at Tunis and constructed
a shipyard, so that the jihad could be pursued by both land and
sea. In later times, Tunis was to grow and thrive to the point that
it rivalled Qayrawan. 1 0 3
In 122/740 came the revolt of Maysara al-Matghari, whose
assault upon the Arabs in the Expedition of the Notables so enraged
Hisham ibn 'Abd al-Malik that he said, 'By God, we shall wax
wroth against them with an Arab wrath, and shall send upon them
an army so vast that the vanguard will reach them while the
rearguard is yet with me!' In 123/741 he thus sent Kulthum ibn
Tyad at the head of 12,000 men; 1 0 4 the sum total of his forces
came to reach 40,000, and he was victorious in the battle of Qarn
al-Asnam. 1 0 5 In 144/761-2, Abu Ja'far al-Mansur awarded the
governorship of Ifriqiya to Muhammad ibn al-Ash'ath, who went
there with 40,000 men; 1 0 6 and in 155/772 Yazld ibn Hatim
became governor and came with 30,000 Khurasanians and another
60,000 Basrans, Kufans and Khurasanians. 1 0 7
These figures cannot convey any accurate impression of the
numbers sent on these expeditions, 1 0 8 due to the obvious gaps in
them. Also, they do not include the movement of tribes between
Egypt and the Maghrib, although relations between the two regions
were very close. Nevertheless, they do give a provisional idea of
the large numbers that came to the Maghrib.
The sources highlight the importance of the jihad in Ifriqiya and
the Maghrib, and demonstrate the interest taken in the propaga-
tion of Islam. This is what 'Uqba ibn Nafi' had in mind when he
said that Qayrawan would 'glorify Islam'. During his second tenure
as governor many Berbers embraced Islam; 109 and when 'Uqba
pushed on further into the Maghrib, he left behind 'some of
his companions to teach people the Qur'an and Islam . . . The
Masmuda Berbers knew no one but him, and it is said that due
to him most of them willingly converted to Islam.' 1 1 0
Hassan attached considerable importance to maintaining a
mutual understanding with the Berbers and diligently sought to
convert them to Islam. After his victory over al-Kahina in 82/701,
for example, a number of Berbers appealed to him for protection.
He agreed to this, however, only on condition that they provide
him with 12,000 of their tribesmen to fight alongside the Arabs;
so they accepted his terms and converted to Islam at his initiative.
Musa ibn Nusayr continued this trend. After his raid into the far
67
Maghrib region in 96/715, when they asked him for protection, 'he
ordered the Arabs to teach the Berbers the Qur'an and the legal
precepts of the faith, and left with the Masmuda seventeen Arabs
to teach them the Qur'an and the religious law of Islam'. 111 'Not
content with this, Hassan even sent the Berbers out with the Arabs
to fight the Byzantines and the unbelieving Berbers, and gave them
shares of the provincial income and of the conquered lands.' 112
The caliphates of both Sulayman ibn 'Abd al-Malik and 'Umar
ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz comprised a period of justice and rule according
to the law of the faith. Al-Raqiq al-Qayrawani reports that Sulay-
man ibn 'Abd al-Malik appointed as governor Muhammad ibn
Yazid, a client of Quraysh, who ruled 'in the finest and most just
manner, through the blessed power of Sulayman'. 'Umar ibn 'Abd
al-'Aziz strove to exempt from the poll-tax all who converted to
Islam, and placed particular emphasis on the propagation of the
faith. His governor, Isma'Il ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Abi 1-Muhajir,
adhered to this policy: 'He was the best governor and leader, con-
tinuously striving to summon the Berbers to Islam, so that at his
initiative the rest of them converted', 113 working together with ten
learned and eminent Successors sent by 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz
to teach Islam 'and to instruct the people of Ifriqiya in the law of
the faith'. 114
It should be noted here that pagan cults were predominant
among the Berber tribes at the time of the conquest and that their
resistance to the Muslims continued. Pagans did not have the rights
granted to Christians and Jews (the ahl al-kitdb, 'People of the
Book'), and this explains the many prisoners taken and the enor-
mous amount of booty seized. Conversion to Islam in sizeable
groups was common and natural among the tribes, but there is also
mention of a number of cases of wavering. 115 Hence, the founding
of a centre such as Qayrawan was essential to the propagation of
Islam.
Numerous other Successors came later on, and cultural ties
between the Maghrib and the East continued and broadened, with
students from the former travelling to the latter, and scholars from
the East coming to the Maghrib. 116 This activity was influential
in the spread of Islam and Arabic. Likewise, Qayrawan evolved
into an animated centre of culture that came to play its own role
in the dissemination of Arabic, both linguistically and culturally.
The propagation of Islam was also promoted by the propaganda
of the Sufriya and Ibadiya branches of the Kharijites. This propa-
ganda, which emanated from the East — especially Basra — began
68
in the late first century and was firmly established by the early
second century. It is reported that Abu 'Ubayda Muslim al-
Tamimi, the leader of the Ibadiya in Basra, sent five learned men
to North Africa to disseminate the group's propaganda. The call
of the Kharijites for absolute equality was highly effective: it led
many Arab and Berber groups to become dedicated followers of
the Kharijite movement and resulted in the appearance of Kharijite
principalities (such as that of the Rustamids in 160/777) in North
Africa. It is worthy of note that Kharijite polities emerged in
relatively remote parts of the Islamic world and in milieus dominated
by tribalism (e.g. 'Uman and North Africa). They represented a
return to earliest Islam and rejected social discrimination and
injustice, which were incompatible with the principles of Islam.
Hence, there exists no basis for accepting efforts to explain the Kha-
rijite movements in terms of regional or ethnic considerations. The
impact of Kharijite propaganda may be noted in the spread of Islam
between Nafusa (Mt Nafusa) and Mzata, and this holds true for
Sijilmasa as well.117
The Kharijite rebellions in North Africa were provoked by the
policy of 'Ubayd Allah ibn al-Habhab, who imposed excessive rates
of taxation and was arbitrary in his treatment of the Berbers. Acting
likewise were a number of his subordinates, especially the one in
charge at Tanja, who tried to impose the khums, or the * taking of
the fifth', on the Berbers. 'He claimed that they were the communal
property of the Muslims by right of conquest, something no gover-
nor before him had ever done. Governors used to impose the khums
on Berbers who had no guarantee of protection and who did not
submit to Islam.' Ibn Tdhari considers that this was the cause of
the unrest.118 An account in al-Tabari offers a vivid picture of the
Berber grievance against the policy of this governor. A delegation
of Berbers, headed by Maysara al-Matghari (the leader of the later
revolt of 122/740), went to Damascus during the caliphate of
Hisham ibn 'Abd al-Malik with a number of grievances against
injustices committed by his representatives. One of the things
Maysara said was: 'Furthermore, they force us to let them take
every beautiful one of our daughters. We say: We do not find this
prerogative in the Book or in the practice of the Prophet; and we
are Muslims.' When they found no one who would pay heed to
them, they returned to their country and the rebellion exploded
under the leadership of Maysara.119 The regime finally realised
how serious the situation was, but by then it was too late.
It appears that Islam became widespread in the Maghrib in the
69
mid-second century AH. As 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Habib wrote to

al-Mansur, 'Ifriqiya is now entirely Muslim, and captives are no
longer taken from it.' This passage, as well as al-Raqiq al-Qayrawa-
ni's statement that the governors used to impose the khums upon
any who did not embrace Islam, indicates the great numbers of
Berber captives before their conversion to Islam, as well as the ideal
and social effects of this on the spread of Islam and Arabic.
The propagation of Islam was accompanied by the teaching of
Arabic as requisite for the recitation of the Qur'an and an
understanding of the principles of the faith. It was also accompanied
by the expansion of urban life, especially since most of the war-
riors sent to North Africa were from the settled folk of the garrison
towns to the East. Hence, many of the warriors tended to acquire
land, and some became involved in trade. 120
Allotments of land were apparently assigned to the tribes or to
their notables. Hassan ibn al-Nu'man seems to have been quite
prominent in this respect, and even distributed lands to Berbers
along with the Arabs. 121 Noble Arab families and other groups also
settled in parts of the Maghrib and acquired lands there. It is
reported, for example, that Salih ibn Mansur al-Himyari chose
Nakur for himself during the caliphate of al-Walid ibn 'Abd al-
Malik (91/710), who allotted it to him. Reference is also made to
groups of Arabs distributed among the converted Berber tribes to
teach them the principles of Islam; some of the former then gained
positions of leadership and acquired lands. Mentioned in this con-
nection is Salih ibn Mansur, who, followed by his son, spread Islam
among the tribes of 'Amara and Sinhaja and directed their af-
fairs. 122 It may be inferred from accounts of the Kharijite revolt
under the leadership of Maysara in 122/740 that there were Arab
groups settled in various parts of the Maghrib. 1 2 3 The caliphate
was evidently aware of the importance of the spread and settlement
of Arab groups, for when Umayyad forces were beaten during the
above-mentioned Kharijite revolt, Hisham ibn 'Abd al-Malik swore
that he would send a large army, and added, 'I will not leave a
single Berber compound without pitching beside it a tent of a
tribesman from Qays or Tamim.' 1 2 4
The Arabs founded new urban centres that were of special
importance in the process of Arabisation. The first was Qayrawan,
followed by Tunis, construction of which was begun by Hassan ibn
Nu'man, who established a shipyard there. Tunis expanded in
the time of 'Ubayd Allah ibn al-Habhab; and in the latter half
of the second century AH it grew to such an extent, through
70
The Formation oj Arab-Islamic Society
immigration of numerous Arab elements, that it came to 'equal

Qayrawan in the magnitude of the Arab population and military
forces it contained', and also became a centre of opposition. 125 Idris
ibn 'Abd, Allah ibn al-Hasan founded Fez, and his son finished its
construction. It became an Arab centre and rapidly swelled with
Arab newcomers, especially from Qayrawan and Spain. 126
Such places, especially Qayrawan, evolved into centres of civilisa-
tion and became focal points for economic life and cultural activity,
as well as outposts for military expansion. With their expansion,
they required the services of extensive agricultural regions to pro-
vide them with foodstuffs; hence, they became primary markets for
the countryside. Furthermore, great numbers of workers and crafts-
men flocked to the cities to provide essential services. Migration
to the cities from the countryside was a familiar phenomenon, as
also was migration of bedouin groups, especially in years of drought.
All this led to the expansion of clientage and to the spread of
Arabisation. 127
It would seem that the essentially Arab political entities — for
example, the Idrisids, the Aghlabids, the Himyarite Banu Salih
and the Fatimids — were influential in encouraging Arabisation
by attracting Arab groups and by stimulating Arab-Islamic culture.
Furthermore, disturbances and political unrest in the East compelled
groups to emigrate to the Maghrib in search of security and
stability. 128
The commercial activity of the cities, especially the trans-Sahara
trade, was an impetus to the expansion of Islam and the spread
of Arabic along the trade routes. For its part, trade with the East
also helped to bring groups of Arabs from the East. Immigration
from there increased during periods of unrest and disorder. The
foundation of commercial cities during the second and third cen-
turies AH had its effect on areas where the bedouin tribes roamed,
since this encouraged some of them to shift to sedentary life, and
subsequently promoted the spread of Arabic. 129
A glance at al-Ya'qubl 130 gives some idea of the spread of the
Arabs and their settlement in the cities in the third century AH.
In the district of Alexandria, the tribe of Mudlij was located in the
desert and along the coast. In al-Rammada, in the district of Lu-
biya, there were, in addition to Arabs of Mudlij, others from the
tribes of Ball and Juhayna. In Barqa, and especially its outskirts,
was the army and a mixed population. On the two mountains near
Barqa were Arab tribes: al-Azd, Lakhm, Judham, al-Sadaf and
other Yemenites on the eastern mountain, and Ghassan and
71
people from Judham, al-Azd, Tujayb and others on the western

mountain. In Waddan, one of the districts of Barqa, was a group
claiming to be Yemenite. In Zawila, beyond Waddan, was a com-
bination of people from Khurasan, Basra and Kufa, while Fazzan
had a mixed population. In the region of Tripoli, in Qabis, a com-
bination of Arabs and non-Arabs were settled. 131
In the city of Qayrawan was an assortment of people from
Quraysh and other Arab tribes within the groupings of Mudar,
Rabi'a and Qahtan. At al-Jazira, one day's journey from
Qayrawan, were people from the clan of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab and
other Arab and non-Arab groups. At Satfura, two days' journey
from Qayrawan, were people from Quraysh and Quda'a. And three
days' journey from Qayrawan was Baja, in which there were people
from the forces of Banii Hashim, and beyond that was Majjana,
the people of which were from Diyar Rabi'a.
In the region of al-Zab, in its capital Tubna, was a combina-
tion of Quraysh, other Arabs, military forces and non-Arabs. There
was also the city of al-Zab, in which were tribes from the army and
non-Arabs from Khurasan; while in the city of Satif were residents
from the tribe of Asad ibn Khuzayma. At Bilizma the population
consisted of tribesmen and clients of Tamim. In the central Zab
was Maqqara, where the people were tribesmen of Dabba and non-
Arabs. In Ma'din were tribesmen of Tamim ibn Sa'd. Al-
Ya'qubi's information does not include all of the Maghrib: the Id-
risids, for example, in the far west, had Arab groups with them
and encouraged Arabs to come hither. 132
At this point it should be pointed out that Arabisation in the
Arab Maghrib was not fundamentally the result of extensive migra-
tions of such intensity as to change the demographic situation in
a vast land. Rather, it found expression in the Berber adoption of
the culture of the newcomers, and one of its most prominent
elements was Arabic. Having already driven Latin into extinction
in the cities, Arabic was the language of culture and administra-
tion, while Berber was a language of conversation appropriate to
a rural environment. The Arabisation of the administration, the
propagation of Islam and its connection with Arabic, in addition
to Arabic's position as the language of culture, were all factors
behind this Arabisation. In the cities the spread of Arabic was com-
plete, effected by the religious scholars and the military; and from
there it broadened out into the nearby rural areas.
The clientage/alliance system offered Berber individuals and
groups the opportunity to attach themselves to Arab tribes, which
72
could prove to be a first step towards integration or Arabisation,

and probably explains how Arab genealogies were given for Berber
tribes. It is also likely that the influence of the Arabs, esteem for
the language of the Qur'an and ambition all played roles in the
Arabisation of Berber groups. 133 This Arabisation took place
around the Arab centres through the influence of the Arabs in the
cities, and to a modest degree in the rural areas surrounding these
cities.
The Hilalian migration, which occurred in the fifth century AH,
had important effects on living conditions throughout North Africa
and on the demographic situation. It swept over Tunis and the
greater part of the province of Qustantina, extended to the plains
of south-eastern Algeria, and its western limit reached Wadl
1-Sahil south of the region of the tribes. The Hilalian migration
played a major role in spreading Arabic in the rural areas, especially
in the southern areas near the Sahara. 134
Arabic thus followed two paths in North Africa. The first was
a line inherited from the urban Arabs and can be traced back to
the period between the first and third centuries AH. The second
is the Arabic of the countryside and the steppes, and can be traced
back to the Arabic brought in by bedouin invaders (the Hilal and
Sulaym) in the fifth century AH. 1 3 5
The course of Arabisation reflects more than one pattern. In lands

in which groups from Arabia were found and where Aramaic was
predominant, Arabisation was complete and proceeded relatively
quickly, especially where Arab tribes had been present before the
conquest. 136 In Egypt the influx of the tribes was continuous after
the second century AH, and their diffusion in the countryside was
broad-ranging and rapid, with the result that Arabisation was just
about universal there in the third century AH. In North Africa,
successive groups of warriors came throughout the first and on in-
to the mid-second century. Islam spread and became pervasive in
the same period, and Berbers and Arabs even shared in the con-
quest of Spain. The tribal organisation of the Berbers was a factor
contributing to the spread of both Islam and Arabic. In the third
century, Arabisation was manifest fact in the mixed cities (Arabs
and Berbers), in the Arab centres, and in the adjoining rural areas.
Moreover, the expansion of urban life would imply the spread of
Arabisation since Arabic was the language of culture. The spread
of Arabisation in the countryside, however, lagged behind until the
Hilalian wave rolled over Ifriqiya and other parts of the Maghrib.
73
T h e Arabic language was the essential foundation of Arabisa-

tion. T h e n Arab-Islamic culture emerged to become the quintessen-
tial expression of the A r a b cultural awakening in Islam, a n d to lend
substance to Arabisation. T h i s was a point of the utmost impor-
tance in the formation of the Arab nation and in setting the historical
course it was to follow.
Notes
1. Surat al-Zukhruf (43), verse 3; Surat al-Shura (42), verse 7; Surat

al-Ra'd (13), verse 37. These verses stand in opposition to the tribal con-
ception stressing the importance of descent.
2. Al-Shaybani, Kitdb al-siyar al-kabir, ed., with commentary of al-
Sarakhsf by Salah al-DIn al-Munajjid (Matba'at Misr, Cairo, 1961), vol.
I, pp. 88, 94-5; al-Asali, 'South Arabia', pp. 90 ff.
3. Muhammad Hamidullah (comp.), Majmu 'at al-wathd'iq al-siydsiya
li-l-'ahdal-nabawl wa-l-khildfa al-rdshida (Lajnat al-ta'lif wa-1-tarjama wa-1-
nashr, Cairo, 1941), pp. 1 ff; Akram Diva' al-'Umari, Al-Mujtama' al-madani
ft ^^a/-/flM(Al-Jami'aal-Islam"iya, Medina, 1983), pp. 107 ff; R.B. Ser-
jeant, 'The Sunnajdmi'a, Pacts with the Yathrib Jews, and the Tahrim of
Yathrib: Analysis and Translation of the Documents Comprised in the So-
Called "Constitution of Medina'' ', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African
Studies, vol. 61 (1978), pp. 1-42.
4. See 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri, Al-Nuzum al-isldmiya: al-khildfa, al-
dard'ib, al-dawdwln, wa-l-wizdra (Matba'at Najib, Baghdad, 1950), pp. 25
ff; Samlr Hamdan, 'Al-Khilafa ff 'ahd al-rashidin', MA thesis, Univer-
sity of Jordan, 1975, especially Chs. II, III and V.
5. See H.A.R. Gibb ['The Evolution of Government in Early Islam',
in his Studies on the Civilization of Islam, ed. Stanford T. Shaw and William
R. Polk (Beacon Press, Boston, 1962), pp. 34 ff = ] 'Tatawwur al-hukuma
ff sadr al-Islam wa-'ahd al-umawiyin', in his Dirdsdt ft haddrat al-Isldm,
trans. Ihsan 'Abbas, Muhammad Yusuf Najm and Mahmud Zayid, 2nd
edn (Dar al-'ilm li-1-malayin, Beirut, 1984), pp. 45-60.
6. Al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-bulddn, ed. M.J. de Goeje (E.J. Brill, Leiden,
1866), pp. 293-4, 298-9, 382, 386; Ibn Sa'd, Kitdb al-tabaqat al-kabir, ed.
Eduard Sachau etal. (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1904-40), vol. VII.1, pp. 117-18;
Ibn 'Asakir, Ta'rikh madinat Dimashq, vol. I, ed. Salah al-DIn al-Munajjid
(Al-Majma' al-'ilmi al-'arabi, Damascus, 1951), pp. 587-8; al-Baladhuri,
Ansdb al-ashrdf, vol. IV. 1, ed. Ihsan 'Abbas (Franz Steiner Verlag,
Wiesbaden, 1979), p. 218; al-Tabari, Tarikh, vol. II, p. 376.
7. See Salih Ahmad al-'AH, Al-Tanzimat al-ijtima'iya wa-l-iqtisddiyaft
l-Basrafi l-qarn al-awwal al-hijri, 2nd ed (Dar al-talf'a, Beirut, 1969), pp.
254 "ff, 263 ff.
8. For example, Yazid ibn Abi Muslim, governor of Ifriqiya, 'Ubayd
Allah ibn al-Habhab, governor of Egypt and Ifriqiya, and Muqatil ibn
Hayyan, leader on the eastern front.
9. See al-Duri, Al-Nuzum al-islamiya, pp. 45 ff.
74
10. We find an expression of these notions in the early 'Abbasid period

in Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-kharaj (Al-Matba'a al-amfriya, Cairo, 1884), pp.
2-3, 6-7.
11. See H.A.R. Gibb, 'Government and Islam under the Early Ab-
basids', in L 'elaboration de I'Islam (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris,
1961), pp. 115 ff.
12. See 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri, Dirasatfi l-'usur al-'abbdsiya al-muta'akhkhira
(Sharikat al-rabita li-l-tab' wa-1-nashr, Baghdad, 1945), pp. 247 ff.
13. Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-sultaniya, pp. 19-20, 23; al-Duri, Al-Nuzum
al-islamiya, pp. 76 ff; H.A.R. Gibb ['Al-Mawardi's Theory of the Cali-
phate', in his Studies on the Civilization of Islam, pp. 151 ff = ] 'Nazariyat al-
Mawardi li-1-khilafa', in his Dirasat fi hadarat al-Islam, pp. 198 ff.
14. Al-Juwaynf, Al-Irshad ila qawati' al-adillafitawlal-i'tiqad, ed. Muham-
mad Yusuf Musa and 'All 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd al-Hamid (Matba'at al-
Khanji, Cairo, 1950), pp. 424-5.
15. Al-Ghazali, Al-Iqtisadfil-i'tiqad, ed. Mustafa al-Qabbani (Al-Matba'a
al-adablya, Cairo, n.d.), pp. 215-16; al-Ghazali, The Book of Counsel for
Kings, trans. F.R.C. Bagley (Oxford University Press, London, 1964), pp.
51 ff; Henri Laoust, La Politique de Gazali (Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1970),
pp. 177 ii.
16. Ibn Jama'a, 'Tahrir al-ahkam ff tadbir ahl al-Islam', ed. and trans.
Hans Kofler in Islamica, vol. 6 (1934), pp. 357 ff.
17. See Jamal Juda, Al- Arab wa-l-ardfi I- Traqfisadr al-Islam (Al-Sharika
al-'arabiya li-1-tiba'a wa-1-nashr, Amman, 1979), pp. 187 ff.
18. Ibid., pp. 228-30; also al-Tabarf, Tarikh, vol. I, p. 2860; Ibn
Manzur, Lisan al-larab, vol. I, p. 587, q.v. 'Al-'Arab'.
19. See al-Tabarf, Ta'rikh, vol. I, p. 2582; Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-kharaj,
pp. 81-2; Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Sirat lUmar ibn lAbd al-'Aziz, ed. Ahmad
'Ubayd (Al-Maktaba al-'arabiya, Damascus, 1927), pp. 72-4.
20. See, for example, Juda, Al-'Arab wa-l-ard, pp. 153 ff.
21. See al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-ashraf, Topkapi Sarayi Miizesi
Kutuphanesi (Istanbul), MSS Ahmet III nos 597-8, vol. II, pp. 751, 1235.
22. See al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. I, p. 2582; al-Mubarrad, Al-Kamil, ed.
Muhammad Abu 1-Fadl Ibrahim and al-Sayyid Shihata (Dar nahdat Misr,
Cairo, 1956), vol. I, p. 141; al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-buldan, pp. 177-8, 197-8;
Ibn 'Asakir, Ta'rikh madinat Dimashq, vol. I, p. 597.
23. Al-Hajjaj said to the people of Kufa, 'None but an Arab will lead
you in prayer.' So they went and prevented Yahya ibn Waththab, a client
and a Qur'an reader, from leading the prayers; whereupon al-Hajjaj up-
braided them, saying, 'Woe upon you. When I said Arab I meant an
Arabic-speaker.' See al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-ashraf (MS), vol. II, p. 1235.
24. It is to be noted that al-Shafi'i considered in detail the Arabic
character of the Qur'an and cited the Qur'anic verses that confirm this,
which indicates that this was a subject of dispute in his day. See al-Shafi'i,
Al-Risala, ed. Ahmad Muhammad Shakir (Maktabat Mustafa al-Babi al-
Halabi, Cairo, 1940), pp. 45-7, nos. 149-59. He further cites the verses
that juxtapose 'Arab' (carabi) and 'non-Arab' ('ajami): Surat al-Nahl (16),
verse 103, 'And how well We know that they say, "It is a mortal who teaches
him." But the speech of him to whom they refer is not Arab, while this
is clear Arabic speech'; Surat Fussilat (41), verse 44, 'Had we made it a
75
non-Arab Qur'an, they would have said, "Why are its signs not distin-
guished? What! Non-Arab and Arab?" ' In the Risala, p. 47, nos. 160-2,
al-Shafi'I considers that Islam necessitates the learning of Arabic in order
for its sources to be understood.
25. Al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-ashraf, vol. Ill, pp. 147-9. In al-Tabari
(Ta'rikh, vol. II, pp. 1505-6, under the year AH 110), it is said that Ashras
ibn 'Abd Allah al-Sulami, governor of Khurasan, promised exemption from
the poll-tax to those who converted to Islam. When large numbers of people
thereupon embraced the faith, the dihqans, who were responsible for the
collection of taxes, wrote to Ashras, 'From whom shall we collect the poll-
tax, now that all of the people have become Arabs.'
26. See, for example, al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-ashrqf, vol. I, pp. 192-3;
vol. IVB, ed. Max Schloessinger (Magnes Press, Jerusalem, 1938), pp.
107, 112.
27. Abu 'Ubayda, Naqa'idJarirwa-l-Farazdaq, ed. Anthony Ashley Bevan
(E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1905-12), vol. I, p. 424; al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-ashraf,
vol. I, pp. 157, 189, 192.
28. Jacques Ryckmans, L 'Institution monarchique en Arabie meridional avant
IIslam (Publications universitaires, Louvain, 1951), pp. 67, 71-2.
29. Al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-ashraf, vol. I, pp. 192-3, where it is men-
tioned that the Abyssinians registered in the roster of Khath'am and received
the same stipend.
30. Al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. I, pp. 2538, 2562; al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-
buldan, p. 280; al-Sarakhsi, Al-Mabsut (Matba'at al-sa'ada, Cairo, AH
1324-31), vol. VIII, p. 815.
31. Al-Ya'qubl, Ta'rikh, ed. M.Th. Houtsma(EJ. Brill, Leiden, 1883),
vol. II, p. 158; al-'AH, Al-Tanzimat al-ijtima(iya wa-l-iqtisidiyafi l-Basra, pp.
77 fjf. Al-Shirazi says of 'Abd Allah ibn Abi Ishaq that 'he was a client
of the Al al-Hadrami, who were allies (hulafd7) of the tribe of 'Abd Shams
ibn 'Abd Manaf; and according to the Arabs, an ally (halif) is a client
(mawla).' See al-Shlrazi's Tabaqat al-fuqaha', ed. Ihsan 'Abbas (Dar al-
ra'id al-'arabi, Beirut, 1970), p. 37; Abu 'Ubayda, Naqa'id Jarir wa-l-
Farazdaq, vol. I, p. 424; al-Murtada al-Zabidi, Taj al-'arus, q.v. wala'.
32. Al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-ashr'af (MS), vol. II, p. 147.
33. Ibid., vol. II, p. 750.
34. Abu 1-Faraj al-Isbahani, Kitab al-aghani (Dar al-kutub al-misriya,
Cairo, 1927-74), vol. XIII, p. 17, where the poet says, 'When already
a man, you became an Arab . . . ' In derision of al-Azd, another poet
says, 'They sought to make themselves Arabs, but in vain, for they are
non-Arabs.' SeeAghani, vol. XIV, p. 288; Ibnjinni, Al-Khasd'isfifalsa/at
al-lugha al-(arabiya, ed. Muhammad 'All al-Najjar (Dar al-kutub al-
misriya, Cairo, 1952-6), vol. I, pp. 239-40. In Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-'arab,
vol. I, p. 588, q.v. 'Al-'Arab', it is said, 'The assimilated Arabs (al-'arab
al-musta(riba) are those who came in later and took up Arab ways.' To this
Ibn Manzur adds, 'Al-Azhari said: In my view, the assimilated Arabs are
a non-Arab group that came in among the Arabs, spoke their language
and imitated their mannerisms, but are not of pure Arab descent.'
35. In a hadith it is said, 'Clientage comprises kinship like that of
genealogical descent.' See, for example, the dispute over the descent of
Ibrahim al-Nakha'I in Ibn Sa'd, vol. VI, p. 178; al-Mubarrad, Kdmil,
76
vol. Ill, p. 1184.

36. See al-Baladhuri, Ansdb al-ashraf (MS), vol. I, p. 599; al-Tabari,
Ta'rikh, vol. II, pp. 1505-6.
37. Al-Mubarrad mentions that one of them said:
Bedouins, that's what they call us,

But Arabs, that is our name;
While in them we find only chattels,
Hauling our food-sacks in shame.
What he means is that among us they are called the hamrd'. Al-Mukhtar
said to Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar at the battle of Khazar, 'Most of your army
consists of these hamrd', who flee before the ravages of war. So put the Arabs
on horseback and let the hamrd' walk before them.' See al-Mubarrad, Kdmil,
vol. II, pp. 61-2.
38. See Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Ta'rikh, ed. Suhayl Zakkar (Wizarat al-
thaqafa wa-1-siyaha wa-1-irshad al-qawml, Damascus, 1967), pp. 338, con-
cerning mawdli secretaries in the dtwdns during the reign of Hisham ibn
'Abd al-Malik. See also al-Baladhuri, Ansdb al-ashraf, vol. IVB, p. 123;
ibid. (MS), vol. II, pp. 750-1. Al-Mada'inI relates that the caliph Marwan
ibn Muhammad asked Muslim ibn Dhakwan, the client of Yazld ibn al-
Walid, 'Are you a client by manumission or by subordinate attachment?'
Muslim replied, 'A client by subordinate attachment', to which the caliph
responded, 'That's better, though both are good.' See al-Tabari, Ta'rikh,
vol. II, pp. 1852-3.
39. Ibn Sa'd, vol. VI, p. 156; al-Shaybanl, Kitdb al-dthar, ed. Abu
1-Wafa al-Afghani (Al-Majlis al-'ilmi, Karachi, 1965), pp. 100-1; Ibn
'Abd Rabbih, Al-'Iqd al-farid, ed. Ahmad Amln, Ahmad al-Zayn and
Ibrahim al-Ibyarl (Lajnat al-ta'llf wa-1-tarjama wa-1-nashr, Cairo, 1940-53),
vol. II, p. 125; Muhammad ibn Habib, Kitdb al-muhabbar, ed. Use
Lichtenstadter (Da'irat al-ma'arif al-'uthmanlya, Hyderabad, 1942),
pp. 342, 346.
40. During the revolt of al-Mukhtar ibn Abl 'Ubayd al-Thaqafi
(64-7/683-6), groups of mawdli joined forces with his movement against
their Arab patrons; but most of these were unfreed slaves. See al-Tabari,
Ta'rikh, vol. II, pp. 649-50.
41. To those who reproached him for giving his daughter in marriage
to Yahya ibn Abl Hafsa, the client of 'Uthman ibn 'Affan, Ibrahim ibn
al-Nu'man ibn Bishr al-Ansari replied:
Though indeed to a client my daughter I married,

T'was done for past custom and the dirhams he carried.
See al-Mubarrad, Kdmil, vol. II, p. 73; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, Al-'Iqdal-farid,
vol. II, p. 232.
42. Al-Baladhuri, Ansdb al-ashrdf (MS), vol. II, p. 157.
43. Ibn Sa'd, vol. VI, p. 198. See al-Mubarrad, Kdmil, vol. II, p. 96,
concerning a conversation al-Hajjaj had with Sa'Id ibn Jubayr, in which
the governor said to the latter, 'Did you not come to Kufa, where none
but Arabs lead the prayers, and where, despite that, I appointed you to
77
lead the people in prayer?' 'Of course', Sa'id replied. Al-Hajjaj continued,
'I appointed you over the judiciary, provoking an uproar among the Kufans,
who said that only an Arab is worthy of a judgeship.'
44. See Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddima, pp. 238-9, 245-6.
45. See 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Durf, Ta'rikh al-'Irdq al-iqtisddi fi l-qarn al-
rdbi' al-hijri, 2nd rev. ed (Dar al-mashriq, Beirut, 1974), pp. 202 ff.
46. Al-Jahiz, Fi dhamm akhldq al-kuttdb, ed. Joshua Finkel in his Three
Essays (Al-Matba'a al-salafiya, Cairo, 1926), pp. 42-3. See also Hamilton
Gibb [The Social Significance of the Shu'ubiya', in his Studies on the Civiliza-
tion of Islam, pp. 62 ff = ] 'Al-Ahammiya al-ijtima'iya li-1-shu'ubiya', in
his Dirdsdtfi haddrat al-Isldm, pp. 82 ff; Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies,
ed. S.M. Stern, trans. C.R. Barber and S.M. Stern (Allen and Unwin,
London, 1967-71), vol. I, pp. 164 ff; Encylopaedia Iranica, vol. I, pp. 438-9,
article 'Adab', the author of which (Dj. Khaleghi-Motlagh) explains that
those who carried the Sasanian literary tradition into Islamic culture were
the proponents of the Shu'ubiya, who harboured intense feelings of attach-
ment to Iranian culture and a superficial belief in Islam.
47. See al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. I, pp. 821-2, 827, 2505, 2849; al-
Baladhuri, Futuh al-buldan, pp. 177, 184, 248-9; Abu 'Ubayd al-Bakri,
Mu'jam ma 'sta'jam, ed. Mustafa al-Saqqa (Lajnat al-ta'lif wa-1-tarjama wa-
1-nashr, Cairo, 1945-51), vol. I, pp. 23-4, 52-3, 69-70, 85-6; Louise
Dillemann, Haute Mesopotamie orientate et pays adjacents (Paul Geuthner, Paris,
1962), pp. 34-6, 88-9.
48. Ibn 'Asakir, Tahdhib ta'rikh Dimashq al-kabir, abridged edn by 'Abd
al-Qadir Badran and Ahmad 'Ubayd (Matba'at al-Sham, Damascus, AH
1329-51), vol. I, p. 175; al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-bulddn, pp. 110, 145; Ibn
al-'Adim, Bughyat al-talab fi ta'rikh Halab, Topkapi Sarayi Miizesi
Kutuphanesi (Istanbul), MS Ahmet III no. 2925, vol. I, p. 126.
49. For Basra, see al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-ashraf(MS), vol. II, pp. 205-6;
vol. IVB, pp. 116, 122; al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. I, pp. 2804, 3455; vol.
II, p. 726; al-'AH, Al-Tanzimat al-ijtima'iya wa-l-iqtisadiyafi l-Basra, pp. 317
ff. For Kufa, see al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. I, pp. 2495, 3174, 3370-2; vol.
II, pp. 131, 433-4; al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-buldan, pp. 276-7, 350; idem,
Ansab al-ashraf, vol. IV. 1, p. 190; al-Jahiz, Al-Baydn wa-l-tabyin, ed. 'Abd
al-Salam Muhammad Harun, 2nd edn (Lajnat al-ta'lif wa-1-tarjama wa-1-
nashr, Cairo,' 1960-1), vol. I, p. 120.
50. Al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-buldan, pp. 177-8, 334; al-Azdi, Ta'rikh al-
Mawsil, ed. 'All Habiba (Lajnat ihya' al-turath al-islami, Cairo, 1967),
vol. II, pp. 183, 313-15, 332-3; Yaqut, Mu'jam al-buldan, ed. Ferdinand
Wustenfeld (F.A. Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1866-73), vol. IV, pp. 91-2; al-
Hamdani, Sifatjazirat al-'arab, ed. Muhammad ibn 'All al-Akwa' (Dar al-
yamama, Riyadh, 1974), pp. 275-6.
51. See 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri, 'Al-'Arab wa-l-ard fi Bilad al-Sham',
paper presented to the First International Conference for the History of
Bilad al-Sham, University of Jordan, 1974, and published in Ta'rikh Bilad
al-Sham min al-qarn al-sddis ild l-qarn al-sabi' 'ashar (Al-Dar al-muttahida li-1-
nashr, Beirut, 1974), pp. 25-7.
52. See A.A. Duri, 'Landlord and Peasant in Early Islam', Der Islam,
vol. 5 (1979), pp. 97 ff; Juda, Al-'Arab wa-l-ard, pp. 232 ff.
53. See, for example, al-Mubarrad, Kamil, vol. II, pp. 96-7.
78
54. Ibid., vol. II, pp. 73-4; al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-ashraf (MS), vol. II,
pp. 3, 16.
55. See al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-ashraf (MS), vol. II, p. 822; al-Tabari,
Ta'rikh, vol. II, pp. 1683-4; Ibn Sa'd, vol. VII. 1, p. 21.
56. See Abu Hilal al-'Askarf, Kitdb al-awd'il, ed. Muhammad al-Misri
and Walld Qassab (Wizarat al-thaqafa wa-1-irshad al-qawml, Damascus,
1975-6), vol. I, p. 136; al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-bulddn, p. 226; al-Tabari,
Ta'rikh, vol. I, p. 2370; Abu 'Ubayd, Al-Amwdl, ed. Muhammad Hamid
al-Fiqql (Matba'a hijazi, Cairo, 1953), p. 113.
57. Al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-bulddn, pp. 242-3; Abu 'Ubayd, Amwdl, pp.
82-3.
58. Al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. I, p. 2805; al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-bulddn,
p. 350.
59. WakI' mentions that Da'ud al-Ta'I spoke in front of al-Hajjaj, upon
which the latter said to him, 'The speech is that of an Arab, but the face
is that of an Aramaean', which attests to the difficulty of discerning the
identity of the speaker. See WakI', Akhbdr al-quddt, ed. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-
Maraghl (Al-Maktaba al-tijariya al-kubra, Cairo, 1947), vol. II, p. 179.
60. This is made clear by events of the rebellion of Ibn al-Ash'ath. Al-
Mubarrad states that al-Hajjaj 'noticed . . . that most of those jurists and
others who rebelled with 'Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Ash'ath weremawdli, and
therefore desired to expel them from the Abode of Eloquence and Precise
Expression (i.e. Kufa) and spread them among the village folk and rural
peasantry. "The mawdli are uncouth louts", he said; "they were brought
in from the villages, so their villages are the best places for them." ' So
al-Hajjaj expelled them from Kufa; and when they were allowed to come
back thirteen years later, 'they returned as pseudo-Aramaeans'. See al-
Mubarrad, Kdmil, vol. II, pp. 96-7.
61. A.N. Poliak, 'L'Arabisation de 1'Orient semitique', Revuedes etudes
islamiques, vol. 12 (1938), pp. 35-6.
62. See al-Kindi, Kitdb al-wuldt wa-kitdb al-quddt, ed. Rhuvon Guest (E.J.
Brill, Leiden, 1912, pp. 193-4.
63. See al-Jahshiyari, Al-Wuzard' wa-l-kuttdb, ed. Mustafa al-Saqqa,
Ibrahim al-Ibyari and 'Abd al-Hafiz ShalabI (Matba'at Mustafa al-Babi
al-Halabl, Cairo, 1938), p. 118; al-Tanukhl, Nishwdr al-muhadara wa-akhbdr
al-mudhdkaraawjdmi'al-tawdrikh, ed. 'Abbud al-ShaljI (Dar Sadir, Beirut,
1971-3), vol. VIII, p. 76; al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. Ill, pp. 1525, 1786, 1801;
al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-bulddn, pp. 323, 371; al-Azdi, Ta'rikh al-Mawsil, vol.
II, p. 158; al-Qalqashandl, Subh al-a'shdfi sind'at al-inshd' (Al-Matba'a al-
amlriya, Cairo, 1913-19), vol." XIII, pp. 123-31, 139-41.
64. See al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. II, pp. 977, 2648; al-Baladhuri, Ansab
al-ashraf (MS),' vol. II, p. 292.
65. See al-Ya'qubl, Kitdb al-bulddn, ed. M J . de Goeje (E.J. Brill, Leiden,
1892), p. 309.
66. See [pseudo-] Dionysius of Tellmahre, Chronique, Part IV, trans.
J.-B. Chabot (Librairie Emile Bouillon, Paris, 1895), pp. 47, 89, 114, 129,
194.
67. See Ibn 'Asakir, Tahdhib ta'rikh Dimashq al-kabir, vol. VI, pp.
395-401, 404-8.
68. Al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. II, pp. 1319-21, 1323; also the anonymous
79
Al-'Uyun wa-l-hadd'iq fi akhbdr al-haqd'iq, ed. M J . de Goeje (E.J. Brill,

Leiden, 1871),'vol. Ill, pp. 70-2!
69. Al-Ya'qubi, Kitab al-bulddn, pp. 324-9.
70. Al-Ya'qubi, Ta'rikh, vol. II, pp. 567, 569; al-MaqrizI, Al-Mawd'iz
wa-l-i'tibdr bi-dhikr al-khitat wa-l-dthdr (Dar al-tiba'a al-misriya, Bulaq, AH
1270), vol. I, pp. 80-1! '
71. Al-Jahiz, Al-Bayan wa-l-tabyin, vol. I, p. 66; vol. II, p. 71.
72. For example, Herodotus, who visited Egypt between 448 and 445
BC, Strabo, who wrote in the first century BC (66-24 BC), and Pliny,
who completed his Natural History in AD 77. See Jurji Zaydan, Al-'Arab
qabla l-Isldm, ed. Husayn Mu'nis (Dar al-hilal, Cairo, n.d.), p. 194; Yahya,
Al-'Arab ft' l-'usur al-qadima, pp. 153-4. See also George Mendenhall, 'The
Bronze-Age Roots of Pre-Islamic Arabia', paper presented at the Second
International Symposium on Studies in the History of Arabia (Riyadh,
1979), pp. 12 ff of the typescript.
73. Al-MaqrizI, Khitat, vol. I, p. 48; al-MaqrizI, Al-Bayan wa-l-i'rab 'ammd
bi-ard Misr min al-a'rdb, ed. 'Abd al-Majid 'Abidin ('Alam al-kutub, Cairo,
1961), pp. 82 ff; Alfred Joshua Butler [The Arab Conquest of Egypt, 2nd edn,
ed. by P.M. Fraser (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978), p. 43 = ] Fath al-
(
arab li-Misr, trans. Farid Abu Hadid (Dar al-kutub al-misriya, Cairo,
1933), p. 40.
74. Reports on the number of warriors vary between 8,000, 12,000 and
15,500. See al-'Askari, Kitab al-awd'il, pp. 312-13; al-Ya'qubl, Ta'rikh,
vol. II, pp. 168-9; Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Futuh Misr wa-akhbdruhd, ed. Charles
Cutler Torrey (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1922), pp. 56, 61; al-
Kindi, Kitab al-wuldt, pp. 8-9, 42, 46.
75. See Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Futuh Misr, pp. 48, 116-26.
76. Al-Kindi, Kitab al-wuldt, p. 12.
77. See Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Futuh Misr, pp. 116, 121, 123, 125-6,
128-9; al-Suyutf, Husn al-muhddarafi akhbdr Misr wa-l-Qahira, ed. Muham-
mad Abu 1-Fadl Ibrahim (Dar ihya' al-kutub al-'arabiya, Cairo, 1967),
vol. I, p. 136.'
78. Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Futuh Misr, p. 116; al-MaqrizI, Al-Bayan wa-l-
i'rdb, p. 29. '
79. Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Futuh Misr, pp. 102, 120; al-Kindi, Kitab al-
wuldt, p. 36; al-Maqrizi, Khitat, vol. I, p. 94; al-Suyuti, Husn al-muhddara,
vol. I, pp. 127-8, 163.
80. Al-Kindi, Kitab al-wuldt, p. 68.
81. Al-Azdi, Ta'rikh al-Mawsil, vol. II, pp. 30-1; al-Kindi, Kitab al-
wuldt, pp. 76-7; al-Maqrizi, Al-Bayan wa-l-i'rab, pp. 66-8.
82. See al-Azdi, Ta'rikh al-Mawsil, vol. II, pp. 30-1; al-Maqrizi, Khitat,
vol. I, p. 80; al-Maqrizi, Al-Bayan wa-l-i'rdb, pp. 101-2.
83. Al-Kindi, Kitab al-wuldt, pp. 190-2; al-Maqrizi, Khitat, vol. I, p. 94.
84. Al-Kindi, Kitab al-wuldt, p. 11; al-Maqrizi, Al-Bayan wa-l-i'rab, pp.
38, 41, 46.
85. 'Abd Allah al-Barri, Al-Qabd'il al-'arabiya fi Misr fi l-qurun al-
thdlitha al-ula li-l-hijra (Dar al-katib al-'arabi, Cairo, 1967), pp. 126-7,
281-2.
86. Judham settled in the district of al-Sharqlya, Lakhm in Alexandria,
and other groups from this tribe in Upper Egypt. Ball and Juhayna settled
80
in the land of al-Ushmunayn (in the central parts of Upper Egypt), and
groups of them spread into the eastern desert and reached the remotest
parts of Upper Egypt. Rabi'a settled in the eastern Hawf, then turned
towards the distant parts of Upper Egypt. See Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Futuh
Misr, pp. 142-3; al-Maqrizi, Al-Baydn wa-l-i'rdb, pp. 38, 101, 105; idem,
Khitat, vol. I, pp. 196-7; al-Kindi, Kitdb al-wuldt, pp. 112-13, 153; al-
Ya'qubi, Kitdb al-bulddn, p. 89; al-Barri, Al-Qabd'il al-'arabiya fi Misr,
pp. 72-3.
87. Al-Barri, Al-Qabd'il al-'arabiya fi Misr, p. 235; al-Kindi, Kitdb al-
wuldt, pp. 153, 162-3; al-Ya'qubl, Kitdb al-bulddn, p. 132.
88. Ibn Abd al-Hakam, Futuh Misr, pp. 141-3.
89. Al-Maqrizi, Al-Baydn wa-l-i'rdb, p. 3.
90. Al-Maqrizi, Khitat, vol. I, pp. 80, 82.
91. Ibid., vol. I, p. 80; I. Lapidus, 'The Conversion of Egypt to Islam',
Israel Oriental Studies, vol. 2 (1972), pp. 248 ff.
92. See William Marcais, 'Comment l'Afrique du Nord a ete arabisee',
in his Articles et conferences (Institut d'etudes orientales, Paris, 1961),
pp. 135-6.
93. Among these are the following. 'The Prophet — may the blessing
and peace of God be upon him — said: Whoever comes to Ifriqiya will
find good fortune and renown'; see Abu l-'Arab, Tabaqdt 'ulamd' Ifriqiya
wa-Tunis, ed. 'All al-Shabi and Nu'aym Hasan al-Yafi (Al-Dar al-tunis-
fya li-1-nashr, Tunis, 1968), p. 53. 'The jihad will cease in all of the pro-
vinces and remain nowhere except in a place in the Maghrib called Ifri-
qiya'; ibid., p. 51. 'Anyone stationed as a warrior in al-Munastir will enter
Paradise'; ibid., pp. 48, 50; al-Dabbagh, Ma'dlim al-imdn fi ma'rifat ahl
al-Qayrdwdn (Al-Matba'a al-'arabiya al-tunislya, Tunis, AH 1320-5), vol.
I, pp. 4-6.
94. Ibn 'Idhari states that 'Uqba ibn Nafi' proposed that a city be
founded for the glory of Islam. The warriors agreed to this, saying that
'its people will be frontier fighters', and that 'we will stay close to the sea
so that we may best carry out the tasks ofjihad and frontier fighting'. See
Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Baydn al-mughribfi akhbdral-Andalus wa-l-Maghrib, ed. G.S.
Colin and E. Levi-Provencal, 2nd edn (Dar al-thaqafa, Beirut, 1980), vol.
I p. 19; al-Dabbagh, Ma'dlim al-imdn, vol. I, p. 9.
95. Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Baydn al-mughrib, vol. I, pp. 1-2; Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam,
Futuh Misr, pp. 229-30.
96. Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Baydn al-mughrib, vol. I, p. 11; Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam,
Futuh Misr, p. 260; al-Maliki, Riydd al-nufus, ed. Husayn Mu'nis
(Imprimerie Misr, Cairo, 1951), vol. I, p. 18.
97. Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Baydn al-mughrib, vol. I, p. 19.
98. Al-Maliki, Riydd al-nufus, vol. I, p. 61; Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Baydn al-
mughrib, vol. I, pp. 16, 17.
99. See al-Raqiq al-Qayrawanl, Ta'rikh Ifriqiya wa-l-Maghrib, ed. al-Munjl
al-Ka'bi (Matba'at al-Saqatl, Tunis, 1968), p. 45. Al-M'slM (Riydd al-nufus,
vol. I, p. 22) reports that all of the warriors were from Syria.
100. Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Baydn al-mughrib, vol. I, p. 31; al-Qayrawanl, Ta'rikh
Ifriqiya, pp. 47 ff.
101. Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Baydn al-mughrib, vol. I, p. 34.
102. Ibid., vol. I, p. 37; al-Qayrawanl, Ta'rikh Ifriqiya, pp. 57-8.
81
103. Al-Qayrawani, Ta'rikh Ifriqiya, p. 66.

104. Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Bayan al-mughrib, vol. I, pp. 36-7, 54; al-Qayrawani,
Ta'rikh Ifriqiya, p. 112.
105. Al-Qayrawani, Ta'rikh Ifriqiya, p. 115; Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Bayan al-
mughrib, vol. I, pp. 62-3; Mustafa Abu Dayf Ahmad, Atharal-'arabfi ta'rikh
al-Maghrib (Mu'assasat shabab al-jami'a li-1-tiba'a wa-1-nashr wa-1-tawzi
', Alexandria; Matba'at dar al-nashr al-maghribiya, Casablanca, 1983),
pp. 36 ff.
106. Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Bayan al-mughrib, vol. I, p. 72.
107. Al-Qayrawani, Ta'rikh Ifriqiya, pp. 151-2, 159.
108. See Mohamed Talbi, L'Emirat Aghlabide, 184-206/800-909(Maison-
neuve, Paris, 1966), pp. 20 ff.
109. Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamilfi l-ta'rikh (Dar Sadir, Beirut, 1979), vol.
Ill, pp. 465-6; Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Bayan al-mughrib, vol. I, pp. 20-1, 23; al-
Dabbagh, Ma'alim al-iman, vol. I, pp. 7-8.
110. Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Bayan al-mughrib, vol. I, p. 42.
111. Ibid.; al-Qayrawani, Ta'rikh Ifriqiya, pp. 69-70.
112. Al-Dabbagh, Ma'alim al-iman, vol. I, p. 67.
113. Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Bayan al-mughrib, vol. I, p. 48; al-Qayrawani, Ta'rikh
Ifriqiya, pp. 93, 97.
114. Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Bayan al-mughrib, vol. I, p. 48; Abu l-'Arab, Tabaqat,
p. 84; Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Futuh Misr, p. 213.
115. It is said that when 'Uqba invaded Ifriqiya in 50/670, he had this
to say to his companions: 'When a commander enters Ifriqiya, its people
are sanctified in Islam. But if he leaves it, they revert to disbelief. In my
opinion, a city should be founded which we will make a military base and
garrison that will be a source of glory for Islam until the end of time.' See
al-Dabbagh, Ma'alim al-iman, vol. I, p. 8. This is probably a later state-
ment attributed to 'Uqba, but it does represent the attitude of some of the
Berber tribes.
116. Abu l-'Arab, Tabaqat, pp. 93 ff.
117. See 'Awad Muhammad Khulayfat, Nash'at al-haraka al-ibadiya (Dar
al-sha'b, Amman, 1978), pp. 33 ff; Talbi, L'Emirat aghlabide, pp. 37 ff.
118. Al-Qayrawani, Ta'rikh Ifriqiya, p. 105; Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Bayan al-
mughrib, vol. I, p. 52.
119. Al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. I, pp. 2815-16; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol.
Ill, p. 92; Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Bayan al-mughrib, vol. I, p. 52; al-Habib al-Jan-
hani, 'Harakat al-khawarij ff 1-Maghrib', Al-Fikr, vol. 23.4 (January 1978),
pp. 64 ff.
120. See Marcais, 'Comment l'Afrique du Nord a ete arabisee',
pp. 160-1.
121. In al-Dabbagh, Ma'alim al-iman, p. 63, it is reported that Hassan
ibn al-Nu'man gave the Berbers a share of the provincial income {fay*) and
land: 'He divided out the fay* and the lands among them (i.e. the Berbers),
and so secured their loyalty and won the allegiance of Ifriqiya.'
122. Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-'ibar (Dar Sadir, Beirut, 1971), vol. I, p. 212.
123. Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Futuh Misr, pp. 222-4.
124. Al-Qayrawani, Ta'rikh Ifriqiya, pp. 110-11.
125. Ahmad, Athar al-'arab fi ta'rikh al-Maghrib, pp. 36-7, 41; al-
Qayrawani, Ta'rikh Ifriqiya, pp. 63-4, 186.
82
126. Ahmad, Athar al-(arab fi ta'rikh al-Maghrib, pp. 42-3.

127. Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Futuh Misr, pp. 222-4.
128. See Ahmad, Athar al-'arabfi ta'rikh al-Maghrib, pp. 42 ff, 57 ff.
129. Al-Habib al-Janhani, Al-Maghrib al-islamiya (Al-Dar al-tunisiya li-
1-nashr, Tunis, 1978), pp. 37, 75.
130. Al-Ya'qubl, Kitab al-buldan, pp. 342 ff.
131. Ibid., pp. 342, 343, 345-7.
132. Ibid., pp. 348-9, 350-1.
133. Marcais, 'Comment l'Afrique du Nord a ete arabisee', pp. 189-92.
134. See Ahmad, Athar al-'arab fi ta'rikh al-Maghrib, pp. 57 ff.
135. Georges Marcais, La Berberie musulmane et I'Orient au moyen age
(Aubier, Editions Montaigne, Paris, 1946), p. 185.
136. See al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-buldan, p. 350; al-Mubarrad, Kdmil, vol.
II, pp. 439-40; al-Jahiz, Al-Baydn wa-l-tabyin, vol. I, p. 66; vol. II, p. 71.
See also Poliak, 'L'Arabisation de l'Orient semitique', pp. 35 ff.
83
3
The Arab Nation and its
Sense of Identity
The Arabs set out under the banner of Islam for regions of ancient
civilisation. But instead of melting away there, as had happened
to other peoples in similar circumstances, they created a culture
and laid the foundations of a civilisation. This ranks among the
unique phenomena of history and merits serious scholarly study.
Here it will suffice to mention that Islam in the first instance, and
then the Arabic language, played noteworthy roles in this.
Islam appeared in an Arab urban milieu and adopted a negative
attitude towards nomadism. It stressed the quest for knowledge,
and from this perspective the first scholarly studies arose. The
cultural interests of the Arabs — in their language, in the * battle
days' lore of the tribes (the ayydm al-'arab) and in poetry — were
influential in the founding of other studies as well. Thus were drawn
the primary lines of Arab-Islamic culture. Through the course of
Arab history, Islamic principles, on the one hand, and Arabic (both
as a language and as a culture), on the other, have been the two
essential foundations of the movement.
The rise of Arab culture
It bears notice that the formative period of Arab culture, especially

the first three centuries AH, closely approximates the period of
Arabisation.1 The cultural movement began among the Arabs and
developed briskly in the Arab centres: first in Medina and in the
garrison towns of Kufa and Basra, then in Fustat and Qayrawan.
This was expressive of their role in the cultural sphere. Such ancient
cultural centres as Alexandria, Antioch, Harran and Jundlshapur
played no part worth mentioning in the early Islamic period, nor
84
The Arab Nation and its Sense of Identity
do they seem to have been of any particular influence in the

'Abbasid age, when the movement of translation and transmission
began.
When cultural activities began in early Islamic times, they were
Arabic and Islamic in character; it was only later that the ancient
cultures were taken into account. During the formative period itself
the Arabs did turn to their advantage the administrative and fiscal
heritage of the ancients, which varied from one region to another.
They did so, however, within the framework of Islamic concepts,
so that this heritage would be Arabised, developed and remain in
harmony with these concepts, and in order to adhere to uniform
procedures in the lands of the caliphate. This much was realised
by late Umayyad times, and then theoretical bases were formulated
in order to make it part of the cultural entity of Arab-Islamic
civilisation.
Inspired by the spirit of the new faith and by their own cultural
roots, the Arabs in this period took on the task of laying down the
foundations of an Arabic-Islamic culture. Hence Islamic studies
emerged, represented by such subjects as the variant readings of
the Qur'an, its exegesis, hadith (the sayings and deeds of the
Prophet), maghazi (his biography) and jurisprudence. There also
appeared, in addition to poetry, Arabic-oriented studies in
philology, history and genealogy, all of which represented a con-
tinuation of interests in earlier times.2 Such cultural activities arose
among the Arabs, who were later joined in them by Arabised
mawdli. An examination of the names of individuals mentioned in
some of the biographical works for early Islam3 suggests that the
proportion of mawdli was modest, and that most of them were clients
of eminent Arabs.
Studies began as a result of the desire to understand Qur'anic
revelation and to follow the example (sunna) set by the Prophet. The
infant Community was also faced with such pressing needs and
problems as dealing with the peoples and lands of the conquered
regions, and the application of Islamic principles and concepts to
everday life in the provinces. And in addition there was the establish-
ment of the caliphate and all of the variation in legal opinion and
judgement that accompanied this.
The first Islamic studies were therefore related to the Qur'an,
and they were undertaken by the qurrd' ('reciters'), who performed
the task of teaching people the recitation of the Qur'an and
familiarising them with the concepts of the faith.4 The first qurrd'
in the garrison towns were Companions of the Prophet sent by
85
'Umar ibn al-Khattab to teach people the Qur'an and sunna. Ibn
Mas'ud (in Kufa), Abu 1-Darda' (in Syria) and Abu Musa
al-Ash'ari (at Basra) were such teachers, and around them formed
circles of other qurrd'.5 Such individuals embodied the spirit of the
Islamic movement, upheld the principles of the faith and of justice
and participated in public life and in the events of early Islamic
times. Their activities highlight the firm connection between cultural
activity and public life.
In the following generation, that of the Successors (the tdbi'uri),
there appeared among the qurrd' individuals who played an
important role in the development of jurisprudence: religious
scholars, authorities on jurisprudence and experts consulted for
formal legal opinions. While referring to the Qur'an and the sunna
of the Prophet, new problems and the desire to apply the concepts
of Islam in the various affairs of everyday life compelled these
scholars to resort also to their independent judgement. This principle
of independent personal reasoning, or ijtihad, appeared in the days
of the Companions, whose statements came to be regarded as part
of the old customary practice (dthdr).6 The forgery, for various
reasons, of hadith led to an interest in scrutinising it, and subse-
quently to the establishment of strict criteria for differentiating the
dubious from the reliable ones. There were those who argued for
restriction of the use of hadith, while others were inclined to rely
upon it as a primary source of law. Variations in regional circum-
stances and developments, and in the extent to which legal prac-
tice adopted independent reasoning or relied on hadith and old
established custom, resulted in two trends in jurisprudence, one
based on independent reasoning, and the other on traditional
practice. 7
Various fields of study developed along similar lines. First there
were transmitters of individual statements and narratives, then
masters who founded circles for study and taught students, some
of whom went on to add their own research to the learning of their
teachers. Scholarship was thus a progressive and cumulative under-
taking that led to the appearance of intellectual and legal schools
at the regional level. In the second century AH, the mutual exchange
of knowledge and influence among the regional schools or centres
led to the appearance of eminent scholars or masters in their re-
spective fields who laid down the lines for future development. This
manifested itself in various fields of study, including jurisprudence.
The collaborative efforts of legal authorities led to the establishment
of legal schools in the first decades of the second century AH,
86
followed by the appearance of legal masters, and then, by about

the dawn of the third century AH, to the evolution of formal legal
systems at the initiative of their students. In certain lands, the
regional heritage and established custom may have exerted their
influence through the infiltration of various > elements into
jurisprudence, but this occurred within the purview of the concepts
of Islam and was stamped by the spirit of the new movement. 8 It
is worthy of our notice that jurisprudence laid the legal foundations
for the Islamic community and its institutions, and established, for
the long term, the framework and unity of Islamic society, despite
the regional differences in environment and heritage.
The study of hadith began among the Companions and concen-
trated on the sayings and practices of the Prophet, and then ex-
panded to include the practices and usages of the Companions.
Political disputes, regional and tribal interests, and intellectual cur-
rents resulted in the forgery of hadith, which in turn led to greater
scrutiny and examination. This was at first directed at the matn (or
text of the hadith), then increasingly came to focus on the isndd (or
chain of transmitters). Hence there arose the science of al-jarh wa-
l-ta'dil, or 'Criticism and Vindication'.
The writing down and memorisation of hadith began in a
preliminary fashion in the days of the Companions and Successors,
followed by the first compilations or collections in the late first and
early second centuries AH. Then in the second quarter of the second
century AH came the stage of systematic compilation of hadith
arranged according to subjects, this for the benefit of those work-
ing in the field of jurisprudence. Concern for the isnad\ed, in the
late second century AH, to the preparation of collections of hadith
arranged according to the names of the Companions transmitting
them from the Prophet. Finally, there came the comprehensive col-
lection of scrutinised and verified hadith, as in the Sahih works, in
which the traditions were classified according to legal topic. 9 It is
noteworthy that the first collections of hadith appeared in the second
third of the second century AH, the same period in which the first
historical works (those of the narrative compilers, the akhbarryun)
were composed.
The interest in Qur'anic exegesis, or tqfsir, began with the recita-
tion of the Qur'an and consisted of linguistic explanations of
passages, using pre-Islamic poetry, traditions of the Prophet and
sayings of the Companions. As the subject of tafsir expanded, some
authorities took up the view that exegesis should proceed on the
basis of independent reasoning, while others concentrated on
87
reference to past authority. Certain elements of the Isra 'iliydt, the

'tales of the Israelites', also made their way into Qur'anic exegesis.
The first tafsir works were compiled in the late first and early second
centuries, and in the second century philological tafsir works
appeared. The Mu'tazila resorted to independent reasoning in their
exegesis, while the scholars of hadith placed primary emphasis on
past authority. Hence, there emerged two trends in exegesis: one
working on the basis of past authority and culminating in the Tafsir
of al-Tabari (d. 310/923), and the other proceeding by indepen-
dent reasoning and reaching a high point in the Kashshaf of al-
Zamakhsharl (d. 538/1143). 10
Poetry gained in vitality during early Islamic times, stimulated
by the new political and social conditions in the principal cities,
and by the concepts and values of Islam. Although basically a con-
tinuation of the pre-Islamic ode in form it set out in new directions,
introduced new themes and developed in modes of expression, while
bedouin poetry continued alongside it. A movement of renewal
developed in the 'Abbasid age, and the poetry it produced was more
refined, more firmly related to urban life and richer in its subject
matter. Nevertheless, the old poetry continued to be regarded with
high esteem. 11
Arabic, the language of the Qur'an, was a foundation of culture
and a life-giving force, whether in spreading the new message of
Islam, in assimilating the creative output of other civilisations
(Greek, Persian and Indian) or in the works of culture produced
by the Arabised peoples within the purview of Arabic-Islamic
culture. The tribes that set out from Arabia had their own particular
modes of dialectical expression. When they settled together in the
new garrison towns, this led to the emergence of a common spoken
Arabic in each of these centres. 12 But the Qur'an imparted to
Arabic a status of sanctity, provided the model for the writing of
Arabic and guaranteed its unity and continuity over the ages.
It was to be expected that in addition to impressive oratory, prose
would begin to manifest itself. Some early vestiges of prose, though
few in number, have indeed survived to modern times, this being
the smooth and direct prose we find in early historical and legal
writings and in some essays. The first indications of artistic prose
emerged in the late first century AH. It expanded in the second
century and needed more than a century longer to achieve its
efflorescence.
Philological studies originated at an early point, due to the
importance of philology to the correct recitation of the Qur'an.
88
Such studies were also necessitated by the use of Arabic on the part
of steadily increasing numbers of mawdlt, by the intermingling of
Arabs with other peoples in the garrison towns, by the influence
of captives in Arab households and by the consequent appearance
of solecisms. Such problems provoked a strong reaction in Arab
and Arabised circles to protect the language and preserve its
purity. 13
The beginnings of the study of grammar were also related to the
recitation of the Qur'an, and the pioneers in grammatical research
were qurra such as Yahya ibn Ya'mar (d. 89/707) and al-Kisa'I
(d. 189/805). An understanding of the Qur'an requires an excellent
knowledge of its language and its inflection, and in such topics the
commercial centre of Basra took the lead. Two perspectives
appeared among the grammarians. The first regarded language as
a matter of heritage, and so based its studies on the Arabic as orally
transmitted from the past on reliable authority. This was the
predominant perspective in Kufa, which was close to the desert and
a place where various Semitic languages intermingled. The second
perspective viewed language in terms of prevailing convention and
established usage, and prevailed in Basra, where the exposure of
Arabic to non-Semitic languages necessitated more strictly defined
linguistic rules.
Baghdad inherited both of these perspectives. The one favour-
ing oral transmission was the dominant one, however, and the ques-
tion of the variant readings of the Qur'an was probably influential
in this. Grammar was a field of study Arabic in its origins: there
is nothing to indicate that it borrowed from Greek or Syriac, though
this does not preclude benefit derived from the sciences transmitted
in translation. The principles and scope of grammatical studies were
established during the first two centuries AH. 1 4
Comprehension of the Qur'an and hadith, as well as the concern
for Arabic in the milieu of the various urban centres, necessitated
the undertaking of philological studies that turned to poetry and
the speech of eloquent bedouins in search of the pure Arabic. These
studies encompassed the poetry, historical narratives, battle-days'
tales and vocabulary of the bedouin Arabs, and they played a potent
role in the revitalisation of the Arabic humanities. They led to the
collection of items of vocabulary, randomly at first, then in com-
pendia pertaining to a particular topic or subject. This in turn led
to the compilation of dictionaries, beginning with al-Khalil ibn
Ahmad al-Farahidi (d. 175/795) and continuing to Ibn Manzur
(d. 711/1311-12), author of the Lisan al-'arab, although in matters
89
of theory the foundations were established during the first three cen-
turies AH. 1 5
The study of history arose first in Medina and concerned itself
with the biography (sira) of the Prophet, narratives on the Islamic
community and the history of the umma. This field of research was
in its first stages firmly linked to the study of hadith and so began
at an early point, in the first century AH. In Kufa, and then in
Basra, there appeared a perspective inclined towards the study of
tribal narratives and the affairs of the provinces, gradually shifting
to the history of the umma. There consequently emerged, especially
in the second century AH, two schools of history: the school in
Medina concerned with accounts of the Prophet's life and campaigns
(maghdzi) and the school of the compilers of tribal narrative, the
akhbariyun, in Kufa and Basra. The efforts of the two schools did
not take place in complete isolation from each other; rather, there
was reciprocal influence in style and historical concepts. In the third
century AH, this exchange and the development of historical writing
led to the emergence of the great historians — such as al-Ya'qubi
(d. 284/897), al-Baladhuri (d. 279/892) and al-Tabari (d. 310/923)
— exemplifying the stabilisation of styles, concepts and structures
in historical studies.
The study of history was a product of the Arab-Islamic milieu.
If the study of the Prophet's life and campaigns was at first an
extension of the study of hadith, then the activity of the akhbariyun
in its first stages represented a natural extension of the interest of
the tribes in the narratives of their past, in their battle-days lore
and in their genealogies.16 It is to be noted that historical studies
focused on the history of the Community and on biographical
accounts of individuals in more than one way. These studies perhaps
reveal two trends: the first tracing the course and role of the umma
in history, and the second considering the role of individuals and
eminent personalities in the various domains of public life in the
course of the Community's history. The first line of approach stems
from the principle of communal life as an expression of divine will,
while the second investigates numerous aspects of the activities of
mankind.
Furthermore, historical studies were to a certain extent influ-
enced, especially after the second century AH, by such ancient
sciences as geography, astronomy and philosophy. Secretaries,
authorities on jurisprudence and hadith scholars participated in the
study of history; but in these contributions, independent judgement
— in its critical and deductive sense — played no great role. This
90
was due, on the one hand, to fear of being suspected of personal

bias, and on the other, to the fact that the critical perspective found
its expression in the assessment of the reliability of transmitters and
of the chains of authorities (the isndds) in which these transmitters
appeared, with some accounts being accepted while others were set
aside.
Historical studies discussed the history of the Arabs both in pre-
Islamic times (with what accuracy is another matter) and after the
rise of Islam. Some historians were influential in emphasising the
role of the Arab nation and its historical mission in Islam, as al-
Baladhurl did (in his two works, the Ansdb al-ashraf and the Futuh
al-bulddn), or by giving substance to the concept of Arabism in its
cultural sense, as in the case of al-Mas'udl.
Contacts with other cultures were oral and limited in scope in
early Islamic times. They first began to appear in the late first cen-
tury A H and manifested themselves in the penetration of ancient
Persian religious views and semi-philosophical Hellenistic ideas, as
well as in a few translations from Greek and Persian. With the com-
ing of the 'Abbasids, the fundamental lines of Arab-Islamic culture
had already been established. Passing contact with other cultures
was replaced by a movement of both official and unofficial transla-
tion. Christian Arabs participated on a notable scale in this move-
ment, which was influential in enriching Arabic culture. Also, the
centre of cultural activity shifted to Baghdad.
There were two primary trends in this translation movement.
One was the official trend promoted by the caliphs, who lavished
funds on it and founded a bustling institute where translations were
prepared. These were in the fields of medicine, philosophy and the
sciences, and were made from works of Greek culture (at first from
an intermediate Syriac translation and then directly from the
Greek). The unofficial trend was fostered by the secretaries and
some literary figures and encouraged by some of the viziers. This
trend involved translation, primarily from Persian, of works deal-
ing for the most part with religious, literary and historical subjects.
With the exception of philosophy, which included concepts and
views sometimes in conflict with the concepts of Islam, the former
group, that of the translations from the Greek, did not represent
an alien corpus within Arab culture. Muslim intellectuals sought
to turn Greek logic to good advantage, and also tried to reconcile
Greek philosophy's view of the cosmos with that of Islam. The
translations in medicine and the sciences were important, since it
was known that their scope did not extend to value-structure. The
91
empirical perspective developed by the Muslims in the sciences and

in medicine was a factor of notable importance in cultural
development.
The popular translation movement, supported by the secretaries,
was undertaken in order to revive the Persian heritage and the con-
cepts related to it. It involved translations from Magian — first
Manichaean and Mazdakaean, and then Zoroastrian — religious
material, as well as transmission of literary pieces. These translations
played a passing role in stimulating certain religious movements,
such as Manichaeism, and in intensifying the cultural clash with
the Shu'ubiya.
One of the most important results of this conflict was a renewed
concern for the ancient Arab heritage, in both language and culture,
an assertion of the continuity of Arab culture through history, and
the confirmation of Arabic's role as the fundamental bond uniting
the Arabs. At the intellectual level, where speculative theologians
played a forceful and far-reaching role, the conflict also led to the
formulation of dialectical and rationalist arguments upholding
Islamic concepts in opposition to Manichaeism, and resulted in an
emphasis on the connection between Arabism and Islam. Both
Arabs and others of non-Arab descent were involved in the effort
to turn back the threat posed by the Shu'ubiya and Manichaeism,
and in the end the Arabic humanities emerged triumphant. And
this all points to another development: the expansion of the Arab
mission from one solely spiritual into one with a civilised cultural
dimension as well. This was an understandable development in the
wake of the spread of Islam and the enrichment of Arabic, by means
of the translation movement, to become the language of culture for
both Muslims and non-Muslims in the Islamic world.17
In the beginning, cultural activities were regional in character
and largely confined in scope to a particular city. This was followed,
in the second and third centuries AH, by a stage in which travels
in search of knowledge were undertaken, cultural interchanges
among the provinces occurred, hadith and historical materials were
collected, and studies undertaken in one region were then taken
up and pursued elsewhere. Such developments were actively sup-
ported by the trend towards setting this work down in writing, which
was facilitated by the introduction of paper-making in the late
second century AH. This made it possible to stabilise the lines of
Arab-Islamic culture and to preserve its heritage.
The second and third centuries were a period of extensive transla-
tion, accompanied and in certain respects followed by new advances
92
and discoveries in such ancient sciences as mathematics, medicine,

astronomy and alchemy, and by the development of algebra. The
fourth (then the fifth) century AH witnessed a period of new activity
and maturation in these sciences.18 Likewise, the Arabic and
Islamic sciences reached a stage of comprehensive stability, as
heralded by the agreement of the majority of Muslims that there
was no longer any need for independent personal reasoning in mat-
ters of jurisprudence.
It should be noted that during its periods of dynamism, society
adopted a receptive attitude towards other cultures, either through
translation or direct borrowing. In fact, it can be said that periods
of intellectual richness and brilliance were clearly associated with
such openness. In such eras the oudook was one of receptivity rather
than closed-mindedness even in situations of intellectual conflict,
for a common intellectual convention was to confront opposing
trends by borrowing from them and turning certain of their points
to the advantage of one's own view.
Education in Arab-Islamic society was essentially popular in
perspective and open to all. This helped to a great extent to endow
Arab-Islamic culture with a permanence and continuity, an
atmosphere of educational freedom, and a kind of unity despite the
prevailing state of political fragmentation. Beginning in the fourth
century AH the state began actively to concern itself with the con-
duct and organisation of higher education. This can be seen in the
founding of al-Azhar by the Fatimids in 359/970, matched in the
East by the establishment ofmadrasas, or colleges, beginning in the
days of Nizam al-Mulk (d. 485/1092). The madrasas did to some
extent render a service to the culture, but they were not foci for
any creative original thinking. The fact that they emerged in a
period of cultural stability and were subject to political influences
meant that their role concentrated on the collection and refinement
of what was already known. They did help, however, to shift the
centre of gravity in cultural activity from the secretaries of the
governmental departments to a class with roots deeply set in Arab-
Islamic studies.
These remarks will perhaps serve to elucidate the character of
the unity and continuity in Arab-Islamic culture. It was unity of
a general kind, embracing the variety and disparity that endowed
it with breadth and vitality, a cultural unity emanating from artistic
diversity. The formation of Arab culture lent substance to the Arabic
language and resulted in the delineation of the concept of the Arab
nation. It also developed the import of the Arab mission, so that,
93
with the involvement of other peoples as bearers of the banner of

Islam, it became a cultural mission.
T h e concept of the Arab nation i n actuality
It is worth asking ourselves about the extent to which the idea of

the nation was an ethnically based concept among the Arabs. That
is, did there arise among the Arabs a feeling that they comprised
a distinct ethnic group within the framework of the Islamic
Community?
As one studies the events and developments of early Islamic
times, one notes that there were two major currents in public life:
the Islamic current embodying the principles, concepts and perspec-
tives of the faith, and the tribal current giving expression to the
spirit of tribal partisanship ('asabiyd) and to certain tribal concepts
and perspectives in public life. This was an understandable state
of affairs. Islam involved a rebellion against the narrow spirit of
tribal partisanship, against fragmentation and against the view that
affiliation through common descent comprised the fundamental
social bond. It was to be expected, therefore, that the old and the
new would be in conflict with one another for a more or less substan-
tial period of time. We can see, however, that Islam emerged among
the Arabs and embodied the Arab spirit in its culture, and that
Arabic was associated with Islam, especially from the viewpoint of
the non-Muslim peoples.
It is clear that at first the feeling among the Arabs was that they
were an ethnic group bound together by a kind of affiliation with
a common origin. The Qur'an regarded Arabic as the fundamental
criterion for affiliation with the Arabs; and similarly, the Arabs were
the mainstay of the Islamic Community. Hence the statement of
'Umar ibn al-Khattab concerning the bedouins, 'They are the root
of the Arabs and the substance of Islam.' 19 For this reason, the
caliphate was at first an Arab ruling institution. As 'Umar ibn
al-Khattab addressed the Medinan Muslims during the discussions
immediately after the Prophet's death, 'By God, the Arabs will not
consent to grant you leadership when their Prophet comes from
some other people; but they will not oppose the granting of ruler-
ship to those among whom Prophecy had appeared.' Selection of
the caliph from the tribe of Quraysh remained a fixed principle
through the centuries to follow.20
The conquests engendered among the Arabs a feeling of pride
94
in the role they had played. Political power was in their hands during
the Umayyad period, and as they comprised the bulk of the war-
riors in the army, they were the foundation of the diwdn. Hence,
it was to be expected that they should feel that they were the
exponents of a mission and that they were superior to other peoples.
One accordingly finds in the sources many passages that juxtapose
Arabs to non-Arabs and refer to the feeling of a shared affiliation
and of the bond of an ethnically based Arabism. 21 Al-Mubarrad
says — and how often the Arabs cite the verse of Dhu 1-Rumma
(d. 117/735):
O house of Mayya, 'twas from your ranks we found our

support,
From the like of which, whether Arab or other, one hears
no report. 22
They came to consider that they had merits not possessed by other
peoples. Thus al-Ahnaf ibn Qays (d. c. 70/690) says, 'The Arabs
will continue to be Arabs so long as they wear turbans and gird
themselves with swords, and so long as they do not deem
forbearance a disgrace or modesty in their relations a humiliation.'
Similarly, Jarir (d. 110/728) criticises the tribe of al-'Anbar ibn
Tamim because they refused him the hospitality due a guest. He
even had to buy the usual guest-meal from them, and so said:
0 Malik ibn Tarif, to sell the guest the gift of his meal
Is to corrupt both your faith and the renown of your name.
They said, 'We shall give it in return for its price.'
1 said, 'Sell to mawali, but with Arabs have shame.' 23
The idea of the Islamic Community was strong and prevalent;

and similarly, there are recurrent references to the defence of
Islam and to the jihad in its cause in the works of poets, especially
in such frontier regions as Khurasan. 24 But the feeling for genea-
logical descent continued to be the dominant one among the tribes,
their primary social bond and a source of pride among them. It
is apparently this feeling that lies hidden behind the attitude of the
tribes, one incompatible with the Islamic viewpoint, towards the
mawali. Such reference back to considerations of descent explains
the repeated reference in poetry to boasting of descent in a certain
family, clan or tribe, or even from Mudar, 'Adnan and Qahtan,
the ultimate claims in genealogy, as compared to the few references
95
to the Arabs as a whole.

The implication here is that the conception of the Arabic
language as the primary bond was an unstable idea that had yet
to meet with unequivocal acceptance in tribal circles. Al-Tanukhl
(d. 384/994) cites an account the significance of which is clear,
though we may question its historical accuracy. The substance of
the report is that there was a certain Arab captured by the Byzan-
tines in the days of Mu'awiya and freed in the reign of 'Abd
al-Malik ibn Marwan. During his captivity he met a Greek patri-
cian who spoke such good Arabic that the Arab presumed that he
was of Arab origin. 'From what Arab tribe do you come?' he asked
him. The patrician laughed and said, 'I would reply to your
question, but I am not an Arab and do not have an answer for it.'
' And yet you speak such eloquent Arabic?' the Arab asked. To this
the patrician said, 'If knowledge of a language were to shift an indi-
vidual from his own kind to that of those whose language he has
learned, then you would be a Greek, for your eloquence in Greek
is no less than mine in Arabic. So according to your own analogy,
you must be a Greek and I must be an Arab.' T agreed', the Arab
says in finishing his tale, 'that he was right.' 25 This story, from the
early Umayyad period, stresses ethnic affiliation and does not con-
sider the language as a basis for membership in the umma. There
is also the example of al-Mughira ibn Habna' al-Tamimi, who
charged that al-Azd were not Arabs. Rejecting that one could
become an Arab by adopting their ways, he says:
Off they went to be circumcised,

Though their beards had turned to grey.
A deluded tribe of non-Arabs,
They adopt the Arab custom and way. 26
Nevertheless, the idea was not entirely lacking for supporters

who regarded the Arabic language as a foundation, for attributed
to the 'Abbasid Muhammad ibn 'AH is a statement that, although
we doubt that its ascription to him is accurate, will suffice for the
light it sheds on this perspective. Directed to Abu Muslim in
Khurasan in 128/746, it has Muhammad ibn 'All allegedly say-
ing, 'If it is possible for you to leave not a single Arabic-speaking
tongue in Khurasan, act accordingly. Kill any boy who has grown
to five spans of the hand in height and whom you suspect of being
a speaker of Arabic.' 27 This statement regards the speaking of
Arabic as the basis for association with the Arabs. Of similar
96
import is the reply of Rabah ibn Abi 'Umara, the client of Hisham
ibn 'Abd al-Malik, when Abu Ja'far al-Mansur (r. 136-58/754-75)
asked him, 'Are you an Arab or a mawldV He replied, 'If Arab
means a language we have come to speak it; if it means a religion,
we have embraced it.' 28
The idea of the Arabs as a distinct nation appeared in the late
Umayyad period when the empire was exposed to danger. We find,
for example, Nasr ibn Sayyar, governor of Khurasan, warning
al-Azd and Rabi'a (tribes which had rebelled against Mudar) of
the danger posed by the 'wearers of black' (al-musawwidd) in
Khurasan. Of these latter he says:
They are not of us Arabs,

That we might detect them;
Nor of the true mawdli
When they give their descent.
He reminds them that the religion of the revolutionaries is to 'kill

the Arabs', and points out that the fire of the revolt is close at hand
and that if it is not put out then it is 'farewell to Islam and to the
Arabs.' 29 In his essay lid l-kuttdb, 'Abd al-Hamid, the secretary of
Marwan ibn Muhammad (r. 127-32/744-50), referred to the
Umayyad empire as the Arab empire in saying, 'Do not let the
forelock of the Arab empire fall into the hands of the non-Arab
faction.' 30
This view of the Arabs as a genealogically based ethnic group,
or nation, continued in the early 'Abbasid period. Hence we find
the 'Abbasid Da'ud ibn 'AH delivering an address from the pulpit
of Kufa after the 'Abbasid victory and saying, 'The Arabs colluded
to deny our right . . . ' 31 And al-Mahdl (r. 158-69/775-85)
reportedly asked Bashshar ibn Burd, 'Among whom are you
counted, Bashshar?' The poet replied, 'My language and judge-
ment are Arab, but my origin is non-Arab ('ajami).'32
It would appear that power-sharing with the non-Arabs and the
competition for power both served to emphasise this attitude. Yazld
ibn Mizyad al-Shaybani, taking note of the manoeuvring, addressed
Hanin al-Rashid (r. 170-93/786-809) in these terms: 'These Arabs
are your swords and your military; but they have already been caught
up in intrigues, and the tongues of the Shu'ubiya have been wagging
about them . . . So beseech God for the safety of your people!'
When Yazld was killed, al-Walld ibn Muslim eulogised him, say-
ing, 'Through you, the Arabs followed the path to exalted status.' 33
97
Al-Ma'mun drew very close to the non-Arabs of Khurasan after

they gained him victory over al-Amln; and when he went to Syria
a man came to him and said, 'O Commander of the Faithful, look
upon the Arabs of Syria as you have looked upon the non-Arab
people of Khurasan.' 3 4 Nasr ibn Shabath al-Khuza'I rebelled in
the Jazira near the beginning of the reign of al-Ma'mun and
proclaimed, 'My inclination is with the 'Abbasids; but I have
waged war against them in defence of the Arabs, for they (i.e. al-
M a ' m u n and those around him) have given precedence over
them to the non-Arabs.' 3 5 When Tahir ibn al-Husayn boasted
in an ode of his glory and of killing al-Amin, M u h a m m a d ibn
Yazld al-Umawi replied to him in a harsh ode, saying, 'When
the ode reached me, I was annoyed at the affront to Arabdom
{al-carablya) and disgusted that a non-Arab should be boasting
over the Arabs: he killed one of their kings by the sword of his
brother, not with his own hand, and then boasts over them in this
way . . . ' 3 6
It seems that as the caliphate drew closer to the Turkish slave-
troops, beginning in the days of al-Mu'tasim, this made the Arab
sense of awareness more emphatic, especially when al-Mu'tasim
dropped the Arabs from the diwdn. There is an account explaining
how Ahmad ibn Abl Du'ad, chief judge (qadi l-qudat) for al-Ma'mun
and then al-Mu'tasim, was shocked when he heard that al-Mu'tasim
had given al-Afshin a free hand in dealing with the Arab commander
Abu Dulaf al-'Ijli. Ahmad ibn Abi D u ' a d rushed to intercede with
al-Afshin on the commander's behalf, and says that he told the
former, 'Al-Qasim ibn Tsa is the champion and ranking notable
of the Arabs, so retain him and bestow favour upon him. If you
do not consider him worthy of this, then spare his life as a gift to
all of the Arabs . . . You are now the best of the non-Arabs and
their ranking notable, and al-Qasim is the ranking notable of the
Arabs . . . ' The rest of the dialogue and the story of how Abu
Dulaf was saved indicates the Arab feeling of domination by non-
Arabs, the reaction of disdain on the part of the Arabs and the
intensification of feelings for Arabism. 3 7
Nevertheless, the struggle for influence and power in the early
'Abbasid period did not crystallise into an ethnic conflict between
those of Arab and non-Arab descent, for on the Arab side we find
such personalities of the mawdli as al-Rabi' ibn Yunus, al-Fadl ibn
al-Rabi' and Abu Ayyub al-Muryani. In this there is evidence of
something of a change in concepts; the institution of clientage was
coming to concentrate mawdli into personally oriented types of
98
clientage, as 'subordinates' {mawali l~taba"a) or 'proteges' (mawdti

l-istind"), and assuming a form more amenable to the interweav-
ing of lines of descent. 38 This feature manifests itself most clearly
in the works of litterateurs and historians. Before we take this up,
however, we must consider the social and general developments that
helped to bring about this transformation.
It has already been noted that the conquests made the Arabs
aware of a historical role. We have also discussed the spread of
Arabic to become the language of culture, the establishment of a
comprehensive Arab-Islamic culture, the rise of a broad-ranging
movement of Arabisation and the beginnings of an idea of an Arab
nation priding itself in its role and seeing in the Islamic movement
its own. But the problem of tribal (asabiya and the view that
genealogical descent comprised a basis for discrimination between
Arabs and other peoples made for inconsistency in this order. The
competition for power among Arabs and non-Arabs, and the
cultural conflict between the Arab-Islamic heritage and that of other
peoples (especially the Persians), exposed the Arabs to such new
challenges in the 'Abbasid age that concepts of Arabism and the
Arab nation had to be set on broader and firmer foundations.
The genealogically based view of Arabism was founded on a
society composed of tribal units and upheld by the warriors in the
army (the muqdtila) and the landowners. The clientage system led
to the introduction of only modest numbers of Arabised mawali into
the Arab framework. But the spread of Arabic swelled the ranks
of the Arabised, and in due time the Islamic concept that associated
Arabism with the language began to penetrate the structure of the
tribal perspective. This explains the tribal reaction of asserting that
knowledge of Arabic is gained by innate disposition for it (and not
through education) as another indication of Arabism.
Socio-political developments, however, dealt a mortal blow to
the tribal concepts. The expansion of urban life and the penetra-
tion of Islamic concepts led to the erosion of the idea of genealogical
descent and to a decrease in discrimination between Arabs and the
Arabised within the framework of Arabism. Social developments
proved to be of importance as tribal societies evolved into urban
ones, and as economic advancement led to the transformation of
society from an agrarian order dominated by landowning tribal
notables into a commercial society controlling the trade routes and
engaging in mercantile activities encompassing the ancient world
from the Far East to the Mediterranean basin. Banking institutions
(providing money-changing and credit-dealing facilities, called
99
sayrafa and jahbadha) in turn flourished, as a result of the commercial

activity on the one hand, and general economic developments on
the other. Agriculture witnessed a major expansion arising from
the way princes, governors, tribal notables and merchants focused
their efforts on exploitation of land. Some landowners began to live
on the land, so that residence in the countryside became
commonplace in the third century AH.
The second century AH saw the first stages in the emergence
of a commercial bourgeoisie, especially in Iraq, after the trade route
from India to the Arab Gulf became the primary commercial artery.
The appearance of a stable Arab coinage of a high standard helped
to stimulate economic life, and particularly trade. The coinage
remained stable and suffered from no fluctuations or changes worth
mentioning for a span of two centuries, which is indicative both
of its strength and of the strength of the economy in the domains
of the caliphate. Merchants met with encouragement from the
' Abbasids, although agriculture continued to be the most pervasive
form of economic activity.
In the third and fourth centuries AH the commercial bourgeoisie
became prominent in public affairs and played a major role in
economic life. Trade became the mainstay of economic activity and
at the same time helped to stimulate other aspects of the economy.
Hence, for example, greater capital and more human effort were
dedicated to agriculture, most particularly on the part of the owners
of the great landed estates. Similarly, the needs of the overcrowded
cities, the requirements of industry and the existence of large
markets led to an intensification of agriculture, as well as to greater
specialisation and diversity in the crops produced to meet the
demands of the market. Furthermore, the state encouraged, and
even enjoined, the cultivation of the most profitable crops.39 Crafts
and industry also expanded to meet the steadily increasing demands
of the cities and in response to the requirements of trade.
Economic activity shifted from agriculture towards trade, and
the economy evolved from one of subsistence into a thriving market
economy. These developments were accompanied by the expan-
sion of urban life, with such cities as Baghdad, Basra and Cairo
undergoing major increases in both population and area as a result
of the economic vigour and the opportunities for large profits. The
expansion of the cities was also promoted by widespread immigra-
tion from the countryside due to incidents of unrest and problems
of taxation, on the one hand, and owing to the abundant oppor-
tunities for gain in the cities, on the other. The role of the common
100
folk in the life of the cities clearly became prominent by the end
of the second century AH. They formed special organisations (the
asnaf, or guilds) for the professional trades, and there also appeared
among them other quasi-military confederations referred to in the
sources as the 'Ayyarun ('vagabonds'), Shuttar ('villains') and
Fityan ('young men'). The common folk in the cities were of various
ethnic backgrounds and had nothing to draw them together other
than the bonds of vocation and language.
All this was accompanied by a transformation in social relations,
from emphasis on genealogical descent to emphasis on material
resources. As a result, the formation of social groups and relations
came to be based on material considerations above all else. This
state of affairs led to the rise of movements calling for social justice
and the improvement of living conditions, although the demands
of such movements were based on Islamic concepts. 40 The role of
genealogical descent in public life was weakened, and this trend
was highlighted by the weakening of Arab political authority
beginning in the third century AH. It is to be noted that genealogical
works end their genealogies in the third century AH, after the Arabs
had been dropped from the diwan, although genealogy remained
a matter of some interest to particular individuals and families, and
so continued to be of some influence in social relations. Indeed,
affiliation with the Arabs continued to be a sign of distinction and
honour: 'Adud al-Dawla, the Buwayhid ruler of Baghdad (r. 367-
72/978-83), even forced Abu Ishaq al- Sabi, under the threat of
death, to forge an Arab genealogy for him.
Despite this, the 'Abbasid state continued to play a major role
in public affairs. On the other hand, the institutions of the state
did not develop in accord with the process of socio-economic
transformation. They failed to keep pace with these changes and
gradually deteriorated in confrontation with military elements, and
indeed, with even bedouin movements and depredations. This was
clear in the fourth century AH.
This brings us back to the problem of political power and its
consequences. In early Islamic times the Arabs founded a state
militarily based on the warriors of the tribes, with political power
in the hands of the Arabs, assisted by certain Arabised mawdli. The
arrogance and partisan spirit of the tribes, along with social
developments and the spread of Islam, led to tension within society
and reactions among Arabs and mawdli, in the name of Islam,
against the ruling authority. The confrontation between Arabs and
non-Arabs also emerged into view. The Arabs and the mawdli (the
101
Persians) shared power in the era of the 'Abbasids, who tried to

achieve a kind of equilibrium and co-operation between the Arabs
and the other peoples, although this effort was unsuccessful in
putting an end to the confrontation. Revolts broke out in Iran and
Transoxania throughout the early ' Abbasid period, and in general
these were rebellions against * Abbasid rule and what it represented.
They were the work of Iranian groups that would be difficult to
describe as Islamic since they proclaimed the message of neo-
Zoroastrianism and the Kurramiya (neo-Mazdakism), indicative
of an Iranian spiritual and political consciousness. These movements
had no sooner come to an end than the first of the semi-independent
Iranian principalities, that of the Tahirids, arose in the region
(205/821), to be followed by others. 41
The civil war between al-Amln and al-Ma'mun was a factor of
immediate importance in the failure of the effort to maintain
co-operation and equilibrium beiween the Arabs and the Persians,
for it was Khurasanian forces that sacked Baghdad and put al-Amin
to death (198/813). The Khurasanian forces that put an end to the
Umayyads may have been a combination of Arabs and Iranians,
but this time their forces were entirely Iranian, a fact that led to
a swift and violent reaction against the Khurasanians on the part
of the people of Baghdad (and Iraq). This situation was a factor
in the 'Abbasid shift towards the Turkish slave-troops, which in
turn marked the beginning of Turkish domination in the lands of
Islam.
The picture is brought into sharper focus if we consider the
development of the institution of the caliphate, which had shifted
from an irregular kind of deliberative consultation (shurd) to reli-
ance upon the notables of the tribes (especially those of Syria).
But this base was convulsed by the fractious partisan politics of
the tribes, while their martial spirit waned as they settled down
and were caught up in the process of social transformation.
Hence, the 'Abbasids had to rely upon a regular army of mixed
composition and on the bureaucracy of secretaries in the ad-
ministration. This was in keeping with the development of the
attitude of the 'Abbasids, who stressed that their authority derived
from God, with the result that their rule tended gradually to
become more and more authoritarian. Consequently, when the
'Abbasids came to rely on Turkish slave troops in the army,
the caliphate was cut off from the Community and came to
be at the mercy of the slave-troops and other elements of the
army.
102
This state of affairs led to the break-up of the domains of the

caliphate and the emergence of quasi-independent principalities,
and then of independent states, marking the end of the unitary state
for the Community and the beginning of the end for the role of
the Arabs in political authority. This was followed by the elaboration
of the Sunni theory of the caliphate through a series of compromises
aimed at keeping pace with practical reality. It conceded the
possibility of there being more than one head (imam) of the Com-
munity at the same time. It also carried the argument for the caliph's
delegation of political power to the point of acknowledging the
legitimacy of the sultanate, and even of accepting the proliferation
of political leaderships (sultans, kings etc.). But in the face of political
fragmentation, the unity of the Community and the authority of
the religious law of Islam (the sharVd) remained fundamental
concepts. 42
The principality of the Tahirids arose in the third century AH,
followed by those of the Saffarids (253/867) and the Samanids
(263/875). Under the auspices of these principalities there originated
prose and verse composed in the modern Persian language. This
development was the starting point for the split in Islamic culture
and for the revival of a sense of national identity. The use of a second
language other than Arabic in literature and culture was a grave
development in and of itself, for it brought about a split in the
culture, although, on the other hand, it did lead to the delineation
of the concept of Arabism in its cultural sense. 43 Here we should
note that the Shu'ublya movement, which began in the second and
extended beyond the third century AH, was confronted by the
insistence on the part of the proponents of Arabism and Islam that
Arabic, both as a language and as a culture, was the base and essen-
tial foundation of Arabism.
The Shu'ublya movement nurtured among certain peoples of
the caliphate, especially the Persians, the consciousness of their
ancient identity and heritage and its stance in opposition to Arab-
Islamic culture and Arab authority. 44 The Shu'ublya began at a
time when Islam and Arabism were practically identical, hence it
was sometimes associated with Manichaeism, which sought to attack
Islam from within and to destroy Islamic values.
The Shu'ublya may have had hidden roots in the Umayyad age,
but it emerged into open view in 'Abbasid times. It aimed attacks
at the Arab past and tried to sully it by charging that it was nomadic
and degraded. It raised doubts about the Arab entity by challenging
their genealogies and claiming they were a collection of incongruous
103
tribes, not a single nation, and disparaged the morals and character
traits of the Arabs. The movement set out to oppose the Arabic
language, to discredit Arabic culture and to cast doubt on its values,
while making a point of glorifying the cultures and heritage of the
non-Arabs. It sought to distort the history and historical role of the
Arabs so as to extol, by way of contrast, the grand and glorious
deeds of other peoples. It even went so far as to cast doubts on Islam,
because the Arabs were its advocates, and to try to destroy it from
within. 45
It may be noted that the Shu'ublya was most active in Iraq, the
heartland of the caliphate and the centre of Arab-Islamic culture.
Iraq was also the cradle of a deep-rooted civilisation created by
peoples from the Arabian peninsula, and the arena for conflict
between it and another culture that was Aryan. With the rise of
Islam and the manifestation of the Arab role in history, the region
became a field of conflict between Arabism and Persianism, between
Islam and the spiritual views of Mazdakism. This intellectual
conflict was one of far-reaching consequences, for it drew attention
to the fundamental elements of the Arab nation, and also to its
historical role, its culture and its values. In this way it aroused the
Arab consciousness and led to the clarification of the idea of the
Arab nation and, over the centuries, to affirmation of its essence
on broader foundations. It is particularly important to us here that
we understand how the Arabs responded to this challenge to the
elements that had shaped them, to the order they had established,
and to their role in history.
The attacks of the Shu'ublya on the Arab heritage led to the
formation of a more comprehensive view of this heritage among
the Arabs. They began by asserting that the Arab-Islamic fields
of study were the backbone of this culture, beginning with the study
of the Qur'an and its exegesis (tafsir), jurisprudence, and the
collection and transmission of the sayings and practices of the
Prophet, and also taking an interest in historical reports, language
studies and genealogy. The attacks on the Arab heritage prompted
a return to its poetry, proverbs and maxims, and to an interest in
collecting this and facilitating its comprehension, so that it would
become a constituent element in Arab culture. The view that sought
to divide Arab culture, disregarding anything pre-Islamic and
ignoring the ancient Arab heritage, faded into obscurity. This found
expression in a work like the Al-Bayan wa-l-tabyln of al-Jahiz
(d. 255/868), who offers a lively picture of the Arab cultural heritage
both before and after the rise of Islam. We also find it embodied
104
in such books as the hamdsa anthologies by Abu Tammam (d. 231/-

845) and al-Buhturi (d. 284/897, the Asma'iyat and in the Mufad-
daliyat of al-Dabbi (d. c. 168/784). These anthologies offered selec-
tions of verse and prose that expounded the splendour of poetry
and belles-lettres, and presented this material so that the young and
the cultured could familiarise themselves with it. Thus was estab-
lished, for the first time and in a clear manner, the idea of cultural
continuity in Arab life and of the cultural unity of the Arabs, or
in other words, of the cultural integration of Arab life both before
and after the rise of Islam. This in turn stressed that the Arabs had
deep cultural roots and that contrary to the claims of the Shu'ubiya,
they were heirs to an ancient heritage.
This perspective was not limited to litterateurs but manifested
itself among historians as well. In composing his Kitdb al-ma'arif,
Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889) devoted entire sections to the discussion
of the history and intellectual heritage of the Arabs both before and
after the rise of Islam. He made it an encyclopedia of historical,
literary and cultural knowledge encompassing both eras, and
intended it to be a cultural base furnishing the minimum amount
of such knowledge essential to the secretary and man of culture. 46
The concentrated attack on the Arabs of pre-Islamic times
resulted in an effort to clarify the concept of the Arab nation, to
defend the Arabs, even those of the era before Islam. The advocates
of this position expounded on the concepts of manly virtue upheld
by the Arabs, and attributed to them such qualities as magnan-
imity, forbearance, pride, courage and adherence to noble conduct
and deeds. They characterised them as men of'sound disposition,
perceptive thinking and keen understanding', of 'eloquence and
vast linguistic ability', 'all this despite their poverty and the bar-
renness of their lands'. 47 They referred back to the pre-Islamic
history of the Arabs in order to demonstrate that they had their
own wide-ranging and ancient tradition of monarchy and civilisa-
tion, that they were no upstart among empires and that they had
never tolerated any disgrace.
There are a number of notable works representative of this trend.
Al-Asma'I (d. 213/828) wrote a book on the history of the pre-
Islamic kings of the Arabs; and the pre-Islamic history of the Arabs
was discussed alongside the history of the ancient peoples by al-
Ya'qubi in his Ta'rikh, by al-Mas'udi in his Muruj al-dhahab and
also by al-Tabari. 48 Authors also set out to highlight the Arab role
in history. As an example of this we may mention al-Baladhuri,
author of the Futuh al-bulddn. He wrote this work in order to assert
105
the role of the Arabs in bearing the message of Islam, and in their
struggle — in the campaigns of conquest and in the founding of
new cities — to expand the domains of the faith and to bring its
empire into being, beginning from the time of the Prophet until
the third century AH. This same author composed the Ansab al-
ashraf. This was a work in which he discussed Arab history both
prior to and after the rise of Islam, paying particular attention to
the role of the tribal notables in politics, administration and culture,
and assigning them the fundamental role in the formation and
continuity of this history. Within this framework he also discussed
assimilated non-Arab personalities and indicated the part they
played in public affairs. This reveals an assertion of the unity of
the nation and the continuity of its course in history.
The Arabs were aware that certain of the Manichaeans and
proponents of the Shu'ublya opposed Islam for no other reason than
their hostility towards the Arabs and their distaste for Arab rule;
'for it was the Arabs who brought forth Islam', as al-Jahiz says,
' and they who comprised its founding fathers'. 49 This was natural,
if we recall that the Arabs continued to be conscious of their central
role in Islam and of the firm connection between Arabism and
Islam. 50
T h e concept of the Arab nation i n thought
The prevailing current of opinion among intellectual figures was

therefore that the Arabs comprised a single nation. Ibn Qutayba,
for example, speaks of the Arabs as a nation on the basis of ethnicity
and refers to them as such in pre-Islamic times, explaining that 'God
sent the Prophet from among them . . . unified them . . . granted
them dominion in the lands . . . and, at a time when there were
yet no non-Arabs ('ajam) among them, addressed them saying,
"You are the best nation ever brought forth to men". To the Arabs
goes the distinction of having been so addressed, while other nations
are newcomers sharing in this honour by virtue of having joined
the Arabs.' 51 Al-Tha'alibl (d. 429/1038) asserts that the Arabs
rank among the nations of mankind, 52 and al-Tawhidi (d. 414/
1024) declares that the Arabs comprise a nation possessed of special
qualities and virtues. 53
Inasmuch as the Arabs are one nation, the tribes, both northern
and southern, despite their differing genealogies, are but parts or
elements of the whole. Noting the divergence between the southern
106
Qahtaniya grouping and the northern one of the 'Adnaniya, and

also difference even among the northern tribes themselves, al-Jahiz
poses the question, 'How can their descendants all be Arabs when
there were such differences among their ancestors?' To this he
replies, 'When the Arabs were still one tribe, they shared the same
soil, the same language, qualities and aspirations, the same pride
and zeal and the same traits of character and disposition. They were
thus cast from a single pattern and produced from a single mould,
the parts being so similar and the components so much alike as to
produce a stronger bond of identity — this in both general and
particular aspects, as well as in terms of what they agree to or dispute
— than certain kinds of kinship. They have come to be judged
equally worthy and such connections have come to establish a
relationship tantamount to another birth.' 54 Al-Jahiz thus sees in
language, as well as in qualities of character and disposition, the
factors in the formation of the nation, replacing genealogical descent
and even comprising the bases for a new birth.
Before pursuing this question we should consider that of the
Arabic language, which was in turn exposed to criticism and an
effort to detract from its status. The Arabs took pride in Arabic
and boasted of their ability to express themselves eloquently and
clearly in it. Here, when confronted by criticism of it, they
responded by asserting its magnificence, based on its beauty, the
inflection of its speech, the richness and breadth of its vocabulary
and the honour accruing to it from the miraculous eloquence and
rhetorical elegance achieved in the Qur'an. Moreover, it was the
language of a vibrant culture and of that culture's splendid
literature. Hence, attacks on or objections to it could only arise from
ignorance of the language and from spite. The challenge thus led
the Arabs to expound on the virtues of Arabic and to assert that
it was the most beautiful, the purest and richest of all languages. 55
They went so far as to claim that it was blessed by divine solicitude,
for God had honoured it by choosing it for Revelation. Hence it
was associated with Islam as much as it was linked to the Arabs. 56
As al-Anbarl (d. 304/916) says, its critics are revilers of the Arabs
and innovators swerving from the path of truth. 57 Accordingly, as
al-Tha'alibi puts it, whoever loves the Arabs 'loves the Arabic
language in which the best of books was revealed'; and likewise,
'whomsoever God guides to Islam . . . believes that . . . Arabic
is the best of languages and that applying oneself to understanding
it is a religious duty'. 5 8
Furthermore, the Arabic language is the language of the Arab-
107
Islamic sciences and the vehicle for the articulation of all the various
branches of knowledge. In particular, discussion of most topics on
the principles and sources of jurisprudence depends upon its
inflection, while Qur'anic exegesis can only be understood through
recourse to the Arabic language. Astounded at the injustice of the
Shu'ubiya attacks on Arabic, al-Zamakhshari rejects these criticisms
and says, 'They could find not a single one of the Islamic sciences
— jurisprudence, speculative theology, Qur'anic exegesis or history
— that does not stand in clear and indisputable need of the Arabic
language . . . Discussions of most topics and questions on the
sources of jurisprudence are based on the study of inflection, and
works on Qur'anic exegesis are filled with citations from Sibawayh,
al-Akhfash, al-Kisa'I, al-Farra' and other grammarians . . . and
appeal to them for assistance by quoting their statements and
adhering to their exegesis and interpretation. It is in this tongue
that their learning is transmitted and their exegesis offered, and
in this tongue that their learned research, debates, teaching and
disputations transpire . . . ,59
The pride that the Arabs took in the Arabic language assumed
a social import and significance indicative of how deeply rooted the
Arab consciousness was. They viewed the Arabic language as the
symbol of their unity, the bond of their nation and the foundation
of their culture. The Arabs did, to be sure, boast of their lines of
descent: they wrote prolifically on these genealogies and strove to
preserve them (and to respond to the attacks of the Shu'ubiya),
and for a long period their actions were clearly based on the
significance of their genealogies. But this should not cause us to
neglect several points. The narrow tribal attitude towards
genealogies was a source of division and inflexibility, while the
habituation of the Arabs to settled life, social and economic
developments and the continuing process of Arabisation all restricted
the role genealogies could play. Similarly, the dropping of the Arabs
from the diwan was of profound influence on the role of genealogies.
The diwan had been the official register of Arab genealogies; once
this was no longer the case, interest was limited to individuals and
families. Hence we find that such genealogical works as have
survived to modern times stop at the end of the early 'Abbasid
period. This may also have been influenced by the receding
influence of genealogies in public life.
The foregoing remarks may serve to facilitate an understanding
of the emergent perspective that made the Arabic language the
fundamental bond among the Arabs, a trend that gradually
108
developed until the language was established as the basis of Arabism.

This perspective is clearly visible in the Arabic writings beginning
in the first half of the third century AH. In explaining that Ishmael
was an Arab, al-Jahiz states, 'They held Ishmael to be an Arab,
despite being the son of non-Arab parents; for God adapted his
uvula to the proper pronunciation of elegant Arabic without
instruction or practice, then endowed him with marvellous
eloquence with no gradual development or training, and stripped
his character of non-Arab traits . . . Then God gave him Arab
traits, bestowed upon him their characteristics and qualities and
endowed him with the highest degree of their disposition towards
magnanimity, pride and zeal . . . Hence, he had the most rightful
claim to being an Arab . . . ,60 Al-Jahiz thus considers the Arabic
language, in addition to qualities and traits of character and dis-
position, but not genealogical descent, as the basis for Ishmael's
Arabness. In light of this we can understand how al-Jahiz can
consider the mawali to be Arabs. As he says, 'If the client has been
shifted to join the Arabs in most respects, and regarded as one of
them for most purposes, this is no more remarkable than he who
counts the uncle as a father, a confederate as a blood relative and
a sister's son as a member of one's own clan.' He goes on to
elaborate this, saying, 'The client is similar to the Arabs in many
respects, since the mawali are Arabs for purposes of legal claims,
payment of the wergild and inheritance. Such is the import of the
Prophet's statements, "The client of the tribe is one of them", "The
client of the tribe is one of themselves", and "Clientage is a rela-
tionship like that of blood kinship." Similarly, the ally of the tribe
is one of them and is judged accordingly. And on the basis of this
genealogical connection it is forbidden to give alms to the clients
of Banu Hashim, for the Prophet assigned to them the same
blamelessness and purity he bestowed upon their patrons.' 61
Through this analysis, al-Jahiz thus makes Arabic the foremost bond
among the Arabs and the primary foundation of Arabism, and even
has it replacing the bond of genealogical descent in tribal concepts.
In this he gives expression to the general developments (social,
economic and political) that led to this change in view, a transform-
ation in which Arabisation and the spread of Arabic played the
primary role.
In speaking of the Arabs as a nation, Ibn al-Muqaffa' (d. c.
140/757) discusses their qualities and the influence of the environ-
ment on their character traits and concentrates on their language
and its distinguishing features. 62
109
Al-FarabI (d. 335/950) holds a similar attitude towards the

concept of the nation. He considers that human society reaches its
culmination in nations, and discusses the bonds holding a nation
together. He mentions that some regard genealogical descent as such
a bond, but notes that the passage of time dissolves it. He then cites
the other point of view, that the essential factors behind the
formation of a nation are a similarity in character, an identity in
qualities of disposition and a common language and mode of speech,
and that nations differ from one another to the extent that they differ
in these three respects.63 The natural traits — that is, character
and qualities of disposition — al-Farabi attributes to the influence
of the natural environment, geographical location (and astrological
situation) and the relevant distinctive qualities of the air, water and
types of plant and animal life. Language and mode of speech are
obviously manmade, while natural traits are relative. Further, al-
Farabi distinguishes between the umma (the nation in an ethnic
sense) and the milla (i.e. the adherents of a particular religion).64
Al-Mas'udi (d. 345/956) takes note of the importance of
geographical factors in history and comments that natural traits and
intellectual potentials are influenced by geographical circumstances
and climatic conditions.65 Discussing the principal nations in
history and the constituent elements that have formed them, he
states that they have been differentiated in three respects: their
qualities of disposition, their physical constitutions and their
languages. To the geographical environment he gives the primary
role in shaping the first two of these factors. When he discusses each
nation, he reports its home territory (i.e. its environment) and sets
forth the view that each nation comprised a single kingdom with
one language. Although political unity may end in fragmentation,
he notes, the nation remains one. This renders language the factor
of paramount status, despite his proposition that one language may
include dialects that differ from one another in minor features. He
too distinguishes between the umma (the nation in an ethnic sense)
and the milla (based on religion).66
Al-Mas'udi gives first importance to language when he discusses
the Arabs. He makes the statement that the Chaldaeans spoke a
single language (i.e. Syriac), 'which was the first language, that
of Adam, Noah and Abraham', and that Ishmael spoke Arabic
when he grew up among the 'Amaliq and Jurhum in Mecca.
Al-Mas'udi therefore states, 'Abraham was not an Arab, nor was
his son Isaac; his son Ishmael was the first to articulate and speak
in Arabic.' In this way he propounds the Arabness of Ishmael and
110
makes Arabic the basis for inclusion among the Arabs. It is to be

noted that al-Mas'udi considers the nation, in its ethnic sense, to
consist of people and tribes, a view in keeping with his historical
perspective. 67
We find a further historical characterisation of the Arabs when
Ibn Manzur(d. 711/1211-12) says, 'All those who dwell in Arabia
or other Arab lands, and who speak in the language of their people,
are Arabs, whether from the southern or northern tribes.' He then
adds that 'the Arabised Arabs are those who came to live among
them and took up Arab ways'. He includes 'both those who live
on the steppe and those who dwell in the towns' in his definition,
thus elaborating the comprehensive sense that came to prevail for
the term 'Arabs'. 6 8
Ibn Khaldun (d. 808/1406) offers a comprehensive historical
view. In his discussion of the Arabs, he considers them a nation
united by human bonds and distinguishes this nation from a milla,
which is held together by the bond of religion. 69 Ibn Khaldun's
viewpoint requires that one refer to more than a single factor in
order to determine the basis for the nation. Hence, he takes note
of the influence of the natural environment in determining the way
in which people live, their skin colourings and physical features,
and their habits and qualities of character. He even extends this
influence to affect their religious affairs.70
Ibn Khaldun begins with the usual concepts in tracing the course
of historical development. He regards the Arab nation as consisting
of peoples and tribes and points to its noble and ancient roots;
kingship had found expression among such Arab peoples of
antiquity as 'Ad, Thamud, the 'Amaliqa and the Himyarites, up
until Islamic times when authority over the empire was in the hands
of Mudar. As far as he is concerned, the collapse of the state does
not imply the extinction of the nation, but rather the fading of the
spirit of solidarity ('asabiya) in one people, to emerge in another
within the nation. States rise and fall, but the nation remains
intact. 71
Ibn Khaldun also provides a historical analysis of the role of
genealogy. For him, genealogical descent, the basis for 'asabiya, can
at a certain stage comprise the primary bond in the formation of
the nation, as it was in the case of the generation of the bedouin
Arabs. 72 But in his view, genealogical affiliation does not neces-
sarily mean direct descent from a single ancestral father; an
interweaving of genealogies may take place between tribes, he
believes, through a variety of means, such as alliance, clientage or
111
association. In all such cases, the individual or group acquires the

new genealogy and the responsibilities associated with it, yet the
genealogy itself remains a basic concept.73 But Ibn Khaldun does
not stop here. Rather, he considers that genealogical ties gradually
weaken and other new bonds emerge as the tribesmen take up
sedentary life and mix with non-Arabs. He notes the effects of Arab
settlement in the fertile regions and how this led to the mixing of
genealogical affiliations, and discusses their sedentarisation in the
provinces after the conquest and the accompanying development
in order to indicate the important role of interaction and home
territories. It is evident that he had a grasp of a more broad-ranging
level of development transcending that of the tribe, for he proposes
that in early Islamic times there emerged the idea of affiliation with
home territories (mawdtin), and that there arose common interests
serving, along with genealogical affiliation, to bind the tribes of a
region together.74 But to Ibn Khaldun this development only
represents an intermediate stage: through sedentarisation, social
interaction and changes accompanying these developments,
genealogical bonds gradually weaken to the point of complete
decay.75 Thus, Ibn Khaldun concedes to genealogical affiliation its
importance and role as a bond for the nation at certain specific stages
in Arab history, but considers that cultural development and social
interaction result in the evanescence of this role.
Ibn Khaldun assigns particular importance to language. He
begins by taking up the usual concepts, stating that the Arabs
include the 'lost' tribes (bd'ida), the 'pure' Arabs ('driba), the
'assimilated' Arabs (musta'riba) and the 'followers' of the Arabs
(tdbi'a), and explaining that these categories are to be considered
Arab because they all speak Arabic. To explain how the
'assimilated' Arabs became Arabs, he refers back to the formulation
of al-Jahiz. They are the descendants of Ishmael, who, although
born of non-Arab parents, adopted Arabic as his language. His
progeny grew up speaking it, and therefore are Arabs. In this way,
Ibn Khaldun expresses the opinion that the language is the funda-
mental basis for affiliation with Arabism.
He is not content, however, to end here. He makes a connection
between nomadism and the purity of the language; but, with the
historian's insight, he points.out the influence on Arabic by Islam
and the establishment of the empire. Arabic is the language of the
faith, and also of its sacred law; it is the tongue spoken by those
who established the empire, which facilitated its spread and enabled
it to gain a dominant position in the lands of the caliphate and
112
to obliterate the languages of other nations. As he states it, it has

come to pass that 'to this day, what is spoken in all of the provinces
of Islam, both east and west, is all Arabic'.
But the Arabic language was corrupted by intermingling with
non-Arabs, and there arose an urban language, different from that
of the bedouins, 'which was more deeply Arab in character'. 76 The
situation was further complicated by the shift of sovereignty to non-
Arabs in both the east and the west, especially after the Tatars and
Mongols (who were non-Muslims) seized power in the east, so that
Arabic was corrupted 'absolutely'. This was probably true of col-
loquial speech, but the point that Ibn Khaldun seeks to make is
that the Arabic language almost disappeared as a result of these
circumstances. 'The concern of Muslims for the Book and the
sunna", however, 'preserved the Arabic language and became a
factor in favour of its survival.' 77 The language thus remained the
fundamental basis of Arabism.
Ibn Khaldun thus bases his argument on a historial analysis.
He views the Arabs as a nation consisting of various peoples and
tribes; in considering the connection between the nation and the
state, he points out that while the state may be of limited duration
and then disappear, the nation endures. He begins by explaining
the importance of the natural environment in determining ways of
life and qualities of character and disposition. He considers that
genealogical affiliation, whether genuine or contrived, is important
among bedouins and cultivators — i.e. in the first stage of develop-
ment — but that its role fades into oblivion in civilised societies.
On the other hand, he assigns great importance to the language,
in view of its role as the fundamental bond of the nation, and takes
note of the influence of Islam and Arab rule in spreading Arabic
and Arabisation. But the language was subject to decline through
the effects of social interaction and the speaking of incorrect Arabic,
though classical Arabic survived through the influence of the Qur'an
and sunna. All this points to the conclusion that the language is the
fundamental bond in the nation, and likewise, that it is the nation
that comprises the enduring entity.
T h e concept of the Arab nation i n literature
With these points in mind, it should be expected that the develop-

ment evident in the concept of Arabism would find expression in
poetry and prose. In pre-Islamic poetry we find hardly a single
113
reference to the Arabs. 78 Reference is made to them in the

dialogue that reportedly transpired between al-Nu'man ibn al-
Mundhir and Chosroes, and they are also mentioned in the tradi-
tions of the Prophet, where they are so called on the basis of the
fact that they speak Arabic. 79 There are also references to the
Arabs in the days of the Rashidun caliphs, for example, the state-
ment of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, 'The bedouins are the root of the
Arabs and the substance of Islam.' 80 In the Umayyad age one does
find references to the Arabs in the genealogical sense of the term;
but the poets usually refer to specific tribes or to ' Adnan and Qahtan
and there are only a few references associating Arabism with the
language.
In the ' Abbasid era, especially in the late second and early third
centuries AH, reference is repeatedly made to the Arabs as oppos-
ed to the 'ajam, or non-Arabs, and to Arabism in a cultural sense
based on language. Ibn Qutayba, for example, articulates the role
of the language as follows: 'The proof that the Arabic language
originated in Yemen is that the Yemenites are called the " p u r e "
Arabs while the others are referred to as "Arabised", meaning that
these latter insinuated themselves among the Arabs and learned
Arab ways from them.' 81 When informed of how the abna1 (descen-
dants of the Persians) had killed the bedouin Arabs, the 'Abbasid
'Abd al-Malik ibn Salih said, 'What a disgrace, for the Arabs to
suffer such injustice in their own abodes and lands!' 82
Among the essays of Badi' al-Zaman al-Hamadhani (d.
398/1008) there is a dialogue about the Arabs and non-Arabs that
gives preference to the Arabs and stresses their qualities and
virtues. 8 3 Al-Zamakhshari stresses the connection between
Arabism and the Arabic language, and in defence of the latter says,
'I thank God for making me one of the scholars of the Arabic
language, and for creating me naturally disposed to protect the
Arabs and their solidarity.' He then adds, 'Those who denigrate
and belittle Arabic, those who seek to bring down its lamp after
God has raised it on high, probably do so because God brought
forth His best messenger and His best Book not among the non-
Arabs of His creation, but among the Arabs.' 8 4 Al-Biruni (d. 443/
1051), like al-Zamakhsharl, took note of the connection of Islam
with Arabism and how the former served to promote the status of
the latter. 'Our faith and the empire are both Arabic and in complete
harmony', he says, 'with the divine power glistening over the one,
and the heavenly hand over the other.' He then points out that
Arabic is the language of Islam and of the culture, saying, 'The
114
sciences from the corners of the earth were rendered into Arabic,
and so were adorned and enshrined in men's hearts . . . ' After
commenting that every nation exults in its own language, he com-
mends Arabic in saying, 'To be ridiculed in Arabic is for me
preferable to being praised in Persian. The truth of what I say will
be recognised by anyone who has perused a scientific work translated
into Persian and seen how its splendour has faded . . . and its utility
vanished . . . ,85
In ' Abbasid poetry one finds references to the Arabs and mention
of their virtues and glory. Al-Mutanabbi frequently sang of the
Arabs and celebrated them in verse. Comparing Arabism with 'ujma
in the Bawwan Valley (in Persia), he said:
But among their ranks the Arab still young

Is a stranger in face and hand and in tongue.
He also sings the praises of Arab courage:
They quake before Indian swords made of steel,

So how, faced by Nizarite Arabs, would they feel?
Irked by the domination of non-Arabs, he says:
People take after the kings on the throne,

And Arabs do not prosper under kings not their own.
And he lauds Sayf al-Dawla, since his victories reflect on the Arabs:
Through you raised the Arabs their tent-pole of glory

And turned mighty kingdoms into cauldrons of flames.
You they credit for their proud boastful story,
While to 'Adnan they refer for the source of their names.
With the Arabs in mind, Abu l-Faraj al-Babbagha' addresses Sayf

al-Dawla:
If Arabs do not thank their kings

For fine deeds done at such cost,
Soon the task of ruling them
To clamouring Persians will be lost.
Reference to the Arabs, praising them and their virtues, continues

to appear across the ages. Sibt ibn al-Ta'awidhi (d. 583/1118) says:
115
O daughter of the clan, how were the pledges you made me

neglected,
When their fulfilment, for Arabs, is as a matter of faith
respected.86
In praise of the vizier Ibn Hubayra (d. 560/1165), the amir Abu
1-Murhaf Nasr al-Numayri said:
My patron's heart blazed and seethed at full spate,

Until for the Arabs he founded a state.
When the vizier had recovered from an illness, Abu 1-Murhaf

addressed him:
Let thanks be raised on high to Grace

For restoring both Arab and Persian race.87
Saf! 1-Dln al- Hilll (d. 752/1351) says:
From high-raised spears a reply to your query

About our noble deeds you will gain.
And ask, if you will, the white-flashing swords:
Has hope placed in us e'er been in vain?88
Annoyed at having been treated unfairly, he says:
To you, O Apostle of God, I complain of the offences against

me
I am convinced, even certain, that

They will pass, however grave, with you to attest to them;
For I have seen the Arabs standing firm with their staffs,
Granting protection whenever a victim of wrong seeks it. 89
Moved by the Karbala' incident of 1842, Muhammad Salih al-

Kawwaz says:
Are Arab affairs to be governed by one of descent unknown,

In whose lineage no place for Nizar and Khindif is shown?
For the free none will do save the free-born man's son,
Who guards lest against them shameful injury be done.
116
T h e concept of the Arab nation in the

popular consciousness
This understanding of the nature and qualities of Arabism applied

to the popular domain as well, as is evident from such folklore as
the Sira (or Taghriba) of Banu Hilal and some tales of the Thousand
and One Nights. In the latter, for example, one finds glorification
of Arabism, exposition of the qualities and virtues of the Arabs and
acclaim for their conquests. 91 As one would expect, the connection
in popular culture between Islam and Arabism was and remained
a strong one.
The development of such views is representative both of chang-
ing conditions and shifting concepts. In early Islamic society,
typified primarily by the Arab centres combining both settled and
nomadic origins, the military forces (the muqatila) comprised the
backbone, and authority was in Arab hands. Within this society,
the tribal notables and the urban Arabs tended to become owners
of land. The clan was the basic social unit, and this was a factor
encouraging non-Arab Muslims to enter the cities and attach
themselves to Arab tribes within the framework of clientage. While
the Qur'anic sense considered the Arabic language to be the basis
for affiliation with the Arabs, that of the tribes regarded genealogical
descent as the basis for inclusion among the Arabs. At first the tribal
concept prevailed and emphasised the genealogical principle, but
this did not do away with the Qur'anic concept.
This milieu was gradually penetrated by some revealing and
significant developments. One of these was a continuously expand-
ing process of Arabisation in the cities, especially after the Arabisa-
tion of government departments, to include groups of mawati as
they took up Arabic and began to play a role in the culture. Another
was the tendency of increasing numbers of Arab groups, after
registration in the diwdn was restricted, to take up such professions
as trade and, to a certain extent, agriculture. There was also the
emergence of a class of great landowners, which had important
effects on the villages, the gradual shifting of the Arab centres to
a sedentary way of life, and their transformation into centres for
Arabic-Islamic studies that established the framework of Arabic
culture. And finally, there was the spread of Islam, which led on
the one hand to a steady increase in the numbers of mawali y and
on the other to the faith's permeation into Arab life.
These transformations necessitated changes in the general milieu.
The 'Abbasid revolution, for example, came to assert the partici-
117
pation of the mawali in political power and in the army on an Islamic

basis, the tribal principle of partisan solidarity being rejected. Arab
registration in the diwdn was further curtailed, leading them to turn
to trade, and more importantly, to spread out in the countryside,
which gradually became Arabised. The elimination of Arabs from
the diwdn served to intensify the Arab trend towards involvement
in agriculture, trade and the professions. This was followed by the
growth of the towns and by the linking of the countryside more
strongly to the city, its most important market. This was
accompanied by the economic transformation represented by the
establishment of the class of great landowners and the emergence
of the class of merchants to play a primary role in economic life.
These developments were matched by the expansion of the ranks
of common folk in the cities, introducing a new force into urban
life, and by social divisions based on material circumstances.
These were accompanied by other revealing developments:
increasing Arabisation in the cities, Arabisation of the countryside
through intermingling and the emergence of common interests, the
expansion and deepening of Arabic culture to embrace much from
the heritage of past civilisations, and the cultural-religious conflict
within society, a struggle that bound Islam up with Arabism and
drew attention to the Arabic cultural heritage. In addition, there
was renewed antagonism between the bedouins and the settled folk
(in the third century AH) and a reversion to the historical struggle
between them.
All this led to the formation of a clearer concept of Arabism that
was to prevail through the ages, one no longer based on genealogical
descent, but rather founded on the language, the culture and the
values associated with them. Thus circumscribed in cultural rather
than racial terms, the concept of Arabism gained a dynamism that
defied fragmentation, whether political or geographical. The
framework for Arabic culture was established in early Islamic times,
but the formative period of Arab-Islamic culture extended on past
the period of the political unity of the lands of the caliphate. This
means that in historical terms the formation of the Arab nation in
its linguistic and cultural dimension only in part corresponded to
the period of Arab political unity.
It is worth noting further that neither comprehensive Arabisa-
tion nor the extension of the scope of Arabism attained its full
natural extent until after the countryside had been Arabised. This
was not achieved through the spread of the Arabs alone. Islam and
the Arabic language were important, and the cultural (and especially
118
linguistic) heritage was also an influential factor.

There were, however, some lands of the caliphate, such as Iran,
the Punjab and Spain, where Islam spread and where groups of
Arabs were to be found, but yet where Arabisation was not
achieved. Here it must be borne in mind that the Arabs conquered
these lands under the banner of Islam and came into direct military
confrontation with their inhabitants (while where Iraq, Syria, Egypt
and much of North Africa were concerned, the confrontation was
with the Sasanian and Byzantine regimes). The Arabs put an end
to the existing states in these lands, but their people continued to
foster memories of the confrontation, such memories being rein-
forced by the presence of continuing cultural traditions and of
languages quite unlike Arabic. With the passage of time there
emerged from this a particular consciousness and an effort to assert
their heritage, whether through use of the national language or some
other means. It is further worth noting that in these regions the
Arab presence was limited to concentrations in widely spaced urban
centres; whether warriors, landowners or merchants, they remained
isolated groups in the midst of the sea of indigenous inhabitants.
And we must not forget another point, one raised by Ibn Khaldun.
The spread of Arabic was closely associated with Islam and Arab
rule, and the deterioration of this authority diminished the sphere
available to Arabic and limited Arabisation. Persian was used in
poetry and prose beginning in the late third century AH, and the
appearance of Turkish elements after the establishment of Seljuq
rule (in the fifth century AH) led to the emergence of another
language within the domains of Islam — Turkish (later the language
of the Ottoman Empire).
The bedouins may have played a role in certain times and places
in Arabising the countryside, as in North Africa. But it was the
Arabs of the cities who played a vital role in the process of Arabisa-
tion at the level of language and culture. It was the lot of secretaries,
intellectuals and historians to elaborate this cultural concept of
Arabism, while conceding to environment the effect of producing
a certain degree of variety within the purview of a more general
unity. When we consider developments in later times, this will prove
to be a point worth pondering and comprehending.
We would do well to pause here to consider the development
of the Arab consciousness. As points already considered
demonstrate, the first signs of the Arab consciousness — however
ambiguous — emerged late in pre-Islamic times and manifested
themselves in such spheres as language, literature, fairs and spiritual
119
unrest. Consciousness became more vigorous during the Islamic

movement and gradually its outlines took shape: politically united,
the Arabs founded a state, Arab in its rule and manpower, and
carried forth the message of Islam in the conquests. The faith was
for a long time the counterpart of Arabism, and the Arabic language
rose in status. An Arabism-oriented perspective among the Arabs
was evident in the movement of Arabisation, and then in the
formation of a comprehensive Arab-Islamic culture.
The primary role was that of the notables of the tribes and the
Arabs of the cities. Leadership positions were dominated by the
urban Arabs and the tribal notables, while most of the warriors were
tribesmen, these coming to make up the majority of the popula-
tion in the garrision towns. At first there were no class distinctions
among them, and likewise, Islam emphasised the principle of
equality; hence the early Arab-Islamic movement was a broadly
based popular one. But tribal arrogance and partisan solidarity
became factors of unrest in society after the spread of Islam and
the penetration of its creed. And the occurrence of broad-ranging
socio-economic developments, especially with the gradually in-
creasing tendency of the tribal notables and urban Arabs to acquire
land, led — along with other factors — to the emergence of large
landholdings, to the opening of a gap between the tribal notables
and the generality of tribesmen, and consequently, to the rise of
an Arab aristocracy based on genealogical descent and landowner-
ship. At the same time, this aristocracy was the mainstay of Arab
rule and the embodiment of the Arab consciousness in the eyes of
the common folk and of other peoples.
The 'Abbasids sought to assert Islamic principles and to involve
other peoples in the administration; but they were confronted by
the outbreak of a series of Iranian rebellions, by friction between
Arabs and Persians at the centre and by the appearance of the
Shu'ubiya movement. The early 'Abbasid period ended with
domination by the Turkish army, the weakening of the caliphate
and then political fragmentation.
But the Arab consciousness emerged clearer and more deeply
rooted than before. This consciousness may have been obfuscated
in early Islamic times by tribal arrogance and the concepts of
genealogical descent, but these concepts later faded away, so that
the Arab consciousness took on a linguistic and cultural meaning.
It should also be noted that the expansion of economic activity,
especially trade and agriculture, led to the emergence of a class of
wealthy landowners and merchants and resulted in a profound
120
social disparity between the rich wielders of authority and the com-
mon folk (regardless of their ethnic origins). Wealth came to play
a prominent role in social relations, and it was in this period that
a stable culturally based idea of Arabism developed.
This development endowed the Arab consciousness with a com-
prehensive character it had not previously had. This trend became
particularly prominent as Arab authority declined under the
domination of the Turkish army and suffered further blows with
the Buwayhid (334/946) and Seljuq (447/1055) invasions. This led
to the exclusion of the Arabs from power, which in turn broadened
their popular base. It was an important development, since con-
sciousness now expressed itself in popular movements aimed against
foreign despots and prevailing conditions in general.
The common folk played a prominent role in the large cities,
especially Baghdad, and their ranks were expanding from the late
second and third centuries onwards. They were usually unorgan-
ised, although there did emerge among them such quasi-military
organisations as the 'Ayyarun ('vagabonds'), Shuttar ('villains')
and Fityan ('young men'). From the little information about them
available for this period, it appears that they took the side of the
caliphs when the latter were exposed to foreign attack. The com-
mon folk and the 'Ayyarun in Baghdad, for example, volunteered
in large groups to defend the city and to assist the caliph al-Amin
against the besieging Khurasanian forces of Tahir ibn al-Husayn. 92
When al-Amin was killed and chaos prevailed in Baghdad in
201/817, groups of common folk took control of the situation and
preserved order and security in the city. 93 Defence of Baghdad by
organisations of the common folk was repeated in 251/865, when
the 'Ayyarun and Shuttar took the side of al-Musta'In against the
Turkish forces besieging the city. 94 When al-Muhtadi attempted
to restrict the power of the Turkish army in Samarra', and clashed
with them in 256/870, the common folk rushed to the caliph's
assistance. In the third and early fourth centuries AH their role
was limited and erratic, but it is well known that at this time the
caliph's authority still to a certain extent prevailed. Once the caliphs
lost their actual power to the Buwayhids, and then to the Seljuqs,
the organisations of the common folk and their bases of support
both expanded.
The common folk became increasingly active during the period
from the fourth to the sixth centuries AH. This is evident from the
movements of the 'Ayyarun and the Shuttar, which had among
their ranks craftsmen, tradesmen and peddlers, but also included
121
a certain number of former aristocrats who had lost their social posi-
tions and suffered a decline in their standard of living. The 'Ayya-
run and the Shuttar upheld such ethical principles as manly virtue
and compassion for the weak and poor, and also prided themselves
for their courage and generosity. Both movements tended to con-
front the representatives of the ruling power and to attack market-
places, merchants and eminent personalities. 95 Their lack of strict
organisation meant, as one would expect, that a certain degree of
chaos accompanied their actions, but their role in public life was
a significant one. Influenced by Sufism in both organisation and
principles, these organisations emphasised spiritual and ethical
values on the one hand, and heroic virtue on the other. Such groups
were most often referred to as brotherhoods of futuwa, or
'chivalry'. 96
The Arab consciousness manifested itself in the organisations
of the 'Ayyarun and the Fityan, which underwent great expansion
and a remarkable increase in their activity. 97 Their goals were to
oppose the injustice that arose as the infrastructure of government
disintegrated, to maintain security and to resist foreign domina-
tion; on occasions they went so far as to volunteer to fight the Byzan-
tines. 98 The ruling power, both in Buwayhid times and under the
Seljuqs, naturally adopted a hostile attitude towards the popular
organisations and tried to misrepresent their role. On the other
hand, ambitious power-seekers tried to gain their assistance against
the ruling power, as occurred in 334/945 and 363/973."
Futuwa organisations became very common in the eastern lands
of Islam, and in the mid-fourth century AH their counterparts in
Syria and the Jazlra emerged in the movement of the Ahdath
('youths'). This movement, which lasted until the sixth century,
was active in Damascus and Aleppo and also arose in other cities.
The Ahdath formed a popular force and adopted a hostile or
negative attitude towards foreigners and the ruling power. At times
they succeeded in imposing their own authority and taking over
leadership positions in the cities, as did the al-Sufi family in
Damascus and the Bad!' family in Aleppo. The Ahdath, like the
'Ayyarun, were organised along quasi-military lines, 100 but the
Ahdath showed no signs of the intellectual framework evident in
the movements of the 'Ayyarun and the Fityan.
The Arab consciousness was not limited to the futuwa organisa-
tions, which were semi-military, but rather found further expres-
sion in professional organisations of craftsmen and tradesmen: the
guilds. The goal of these organisations was to achieve solidarity
122
among those engaged in the profession, 101 to protect its members,

sometimes against transgressions by government officials, 102 to
maintain professional standards and to guarantee markets for their
products. It is to be noted that the professions were open to both
Muslims and non-Muslims, and that the bond of the profession (as
well as that of the language) comprised a common ground for the
tradesmen. Although these were professional organisations, they
participated in the movements of the common folk, especially in
times of insecurity or foreign attack. Moreover, the guilds par-
ticipated in their professional capacity in certain public occa-
sions, 1 0 3 and had their own internal organisation, grades of
membership and ceremonies.
The ruling power supervised the guilds by means of the muhtasib,
or 'market inspector', who was expected to ensure the accuracy of
weights and measures, to prevent fraudulent workmanship and to
make certain that craftsmen adhered to standards of public con-
duct. 104 Besides, the attitude towards the craftsmen and tradesmen
was not without a certain element of doubt, wariness and sometimes
suspicion. This was due either to their involvement in the general
activity in the city when security was disturbed or the town was
exposed to attack, or to the connection of some of them to Fatimid
propaganda. In cases such as the latter, punitive measures were
taken against them. 1 0 5
The attitude of the Buwayhids and the Seljuqs towards the
popular organisations was generally one of hostility. This was aggra-
vated by the fact that the expansion of the movements of the 'Ayya-
riin and Fityan led to the proliferation of blocs and factions within
them, as well as to disputes between them based on denominational
or other differences. 106
When the ' Abbasid caliphate revived in the late sixth/twelfth cen-
tury and put an end to the Seljuq nightmare, it realised the import-
ance of the popular organisations and the ways they could contribute
to public life. This resulted in an agreement between the caliphate
and the futuwa organisations, beginning with al-Nasir li-Din Allah.
This caliph apparently joined the futuwa in 578/1192-3 and ulti-
mately became its leader in 604/1207. Noting the differences among
the futuwa groups and their consistently belligerent attitude to-
wards government officials, he in 604/1207 issued a decree
announcing his decision to unify the futuwa organisations, make
them more cohesive and to improve their standards of conduct and
ethical principles. 107 Al-Nasir li-Din Allah presided over the futu-
wa movement and tried to spread its organisations in the Islamic
123
lands. In 607/1210 he sent his representatives to Muslim rulers,

including the Ayyubids in Syria and Egypt and the Rum Seljuqs
in Anatolia, that they might 'drink of the cup offutuwa' from his
hand. They acceded to his wishes, and al-Nasir became the cen-
tral authority to whom the futuwa organisations referred. He
recognised how important these groups were to the achievement
of a new revival, and so tried to turn them into chivalrous organisa-
tions dominated by lofty ethical values, as well as into a front for
confronting Turkish domination and the foreign threats posed by
the Crusaders and the Mongols. 108
The futuwa organisations and the ruling authority thus came to
follow a single policy. This trend of official sponsorship of the futu-
wa continued after al-Nasir li-Dln Allah, particularly in the time
of al-Mustansir, who issued decrees appointing kings and notables
as his regional representatives. Nur al-Din Zengi was among those
honoured by futuwa investiture in his time (634/1237), 109 in the
expectation that the futuwa would play a role in the struggle against
the Crusaders.
The Mongol invasion put an end to the 'Abbasid caliphate and
broke the unifying bond between the popular and official domains.
Indeed, the Mongols fought against the futuwa movement, which
thus reverted to its popular character and resumed its hostility to
the ruling power. The futuwa apparently endured into the time of
the Mamluks in Egypt and Syria, beginning with al-Malik al-Zahir
Baybars, who in 659/1261 joined the Nasiri futuwa. The movement
also spread to Anatolia in the days of the caliph al-Nasir. Ibn Battuta
(wr. 731/1331) refers to the Akhiya ('Brotherhood') and Fityan
organisations, most of whose members were craftsmen, and
mentions some of their concepts. From the late futuwa books it would
seem that the organisations of craftsmen and tradesmen were all
influenced by futuwa concepts. 110
The wave of the Mongol invasion did not wipe out the futuwa
organisations. Their activities continued, especially along the fron-
tiers, for it seems that futuwa and craftsmen's organisations in
Anatolia were transformed into military organisations with an
ethical charter that dedicated them to the jihad against the invaders
and made the fighting of tyrants and the spreading of security and
order their slogans. Research may reveal that the futuwa organisa-
tions and their values played a major role in the jihad against
the Crusaders. It has already been demonstrated that the Sufi-
influenced tradesmen's organisations played a role in the rise of
the Ottoman principality and its expansion in confrontation with
124
the Byzantines. 1 1 1
It should be noted that periods of foreign domination and cul-
tural stagation threw concepts of consciousness into confusion
a n d limited prospects for their reinvigoration. None the less, the
essential elements that h a d formed this consciousness persisted
in the cultural heritage, to reappear in the movement of national
awakening in m o d e r n times. T h e Arabic language remained the
foundation of Arabism; and the cultural heritage, e m b r a c i n g the
idea of the A r a b nation in a cultural sense and linking Arabism
with Islam, remained a fundamental c o m m o n ground. F r o m these
roots, and in the compass of internal challenges and foreign ideas,
the m o d e r n A r a b consciousness emerged to proceed from Arabism
in a socio-cultural sense to Arabism in a nationalist political sense.
Notes
1. See 'Abd al-'AzIz al-Duri, 'Nash'at al-thaqafa al-'arabiya al-islamiya:

nazra ila l-'Iraq', Majallat majma' al-lugha al- 'arabiya al-urdunni, vol. 1 (1978),
pp. 49 ff. [ = 'Arab (Islamic) Culture — An Approach Through Iraq',
Bulletin des etudes orientates, vol. 31 (1979), pp. 51 ff].
2. Al-Baladhuri reports that Hisham ibn 'Abd al-Malik asked one of
his uncles (of Banu Makhzum), 'Uncle, do you recite the Book of God?'
He replied, 'I recite from it only what I need to perform my prayer.' Hisham
then asked, 'Do you relate any of the traditions of the Prophet {athar)?'
'No', came the response. Hisham continued, 'Are you familiar with such
accounts of the Arab tribes, their poetry and their battle-days, as are known
among men of your standing?' The uncle again replied, 'No.' 'Well then',
Hisham asked, 'can you trace the genealogy of Quraysh and the rest of
the tribe of Nizar?' The uncle replied, 'I can do justice to no question in
genealogy.' With that Hisham remarked, 'Boy . . . no deference is due
this uncle of ours!' See al-Baladhuri, Ansdb al-ashrdf(M.S), vol. II, p. 240.
[As this report has it, Hisham was playing a game of chess when his uncle
suddenly entered the room. In deference to the sensitivities of the latter,
Hisham hurriedly concealed the chessboard. Now, however, after their con-
versation, he sees that his uncle deserves no such deference.] This implies
that Hisham ibn 'Abd al-Malik considered the foundations of culture to
be the Qur'an, the hadith, the accounts, poetry and 'battle-days' lore
of the Arab tribes, and the genealogies of Quraysh and the other northern
Arab tribes. See also al-Jahiz, Al-Bayan wa-l-tabyin, vol. II, p. 180.
3. See, for example, Ibn Sa'd, Kitdb al-tabaqdt al-kabir; WakI', Akhbdr
al-quddt; al-Anbari, Nuzhat al-alibbd'fi tabaqdt al-udabd' (Cairo, AH 1294);
al-ShlrazI, Tabaqdt al-fuqahd'; al-Dhahabf, Tadhkirat al-huffdz (Da'irat al-
ma' arif al-'uthmanlya, Hyderabad, 1955). The proportion oimawdli is in
the range of 25 to 30 per cent. See also Salih Ahmad al-'Ali, Tatawwur
al-haraka al-jikriya fi sadr al-Isldm (Mu'assasat al-risala, Beirut, 1983),
pp! 140 ff.
125
4. Al-Dhahabi, Ma'rifat al-qurra' al-kibdr 'aid l-tabaqdt wa-l-a'sdr,

ed. Muhammad Sayyid Jad al-Haqq (Dar al-kutub al-haditha, Cairo, 1967),
vol. I, pp. 46, 73-4; al-Shlrazi, Tabaqdt al-fuqahd\ pp. 43-4, 46.
5. Al-Baladhuri, Ansdb al-ashrdf(MS), vol. II, pp. 761,775; al-Dhahabi,
Ma'rifat al-qurrd', vol. I, pp. 34, 37-9.
6. Ibn Sa'd, vol. II.2, pp. 228-9; vol. VI, pp. 223-4; al-Dhahabi,
Ma'rifat al-qurm, vol. I, pp. 44-5, 52 ff.
7. See Joseph Schacht, Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Claren-
don Press, Oxford, 1950), pp. 25 ff; Muhammad Abu Zahra, Al-Madhdhib
al-fiqhlya (Dar al-fikr al-'arabl, Cairo, 1975), pp. 27 ff.
8. Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1964), pp. 16 ff.
9. See Fuat Sezgin [Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums, vol. I (E.J. Brill,
Leiden, 1967), pp. 53 ff = ] Ta'rikh al-turdth al-'arabi, trans. Fahml Abu
1-Fadl and Mahmud Fahmi HijazI (Jami'at al-Imam Muhammad ibn
Sa'ud, Riyadh,' 1983), vol. I, pp. 117 ff.
10. Ibid., [vol. I, pp. 9 ff = ] vol. I, pp. 19 ff; Ignaz Goldziher [Die
Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1920), pp. 76
ff = ] Al-Madhdhib al-isldmiya fi tafsir al-Qur'dn, part trans. 'All Hasan 'Abd
al-Qadir (Matba'at al-'ulum, Cairo, 1944), pp. 75 ff.
11. See Shawqi Dayf, Al-Tatawwur wa-l-tajdid fi l-shi'r al-umawi, 5th
edn. (Dar al-ma'arif, Cairo, 1973); Regis Blachere [Histoire de la litterature
arabe (Adrien-Maisonneuve, Paris, 1952-66), vol. I, pp. 156-60 = ] Ta'rikh
al-adab al-'arabi, part trans. Ibrahim al-Kaylani (Matba'at al-jami'a
al-suriya, Damascus, 1956), vol. I, pp. 191-3.
12. Al-Jahiz says, 'The people of the provinces speak the dialect of those
Arabs who came and settled among them. This is why you find such dif-
ferences of expression between the people of Kufa, Basra, Syria and Egypt.'
See his Al-Baydn wa-l-tabyin, vol. I, p. 19.
13. Al-SIrafi mentions that Abu 1-Aswad al-Du'ali said to Ziyad ibn
Ablhi, 'I have noticed the Arabs mingling with the non-Arabs, and now
their manner of speaking has changed.' See al-Sirafi, Akhbdr al-nahwiyin
al-basriyin, ed. Fritz Krenkow (Al-Matba'a al-kathuliklya, Beirut, 1936),
pp. 17-18. Abu 1-Tayyib says, 'The first aspect of the speech of the Arabs
to be corrupted, and the one most in need of instruction, was inflection,
because solecisms had emerged in the speech of the Arabised and others
not of pure Arab descent.' See Abu 1-Tayyib, Mardtib al-nahwiyin, ed.
Muhammad Abu 1-Fadl Ibrahim (Maktabat nahdat Misr, Cairo, 1955),
p. 5'.
14. See 'Abd al-'Al Salim Makram, Al-Qur'an al-karim wa-atharuhufi
l-dirdsdt al-nahwiya (Dar al-ma'arif, Cairo, 1968), pp. 48 ff; al-Zabldi,
Tabaqdt al-nahwiyin, ed. Muhammad Abu 1-Fadl Ibrahim (Matba'at al-
KhanjI, Cairo, 1954), pp. 13-14; al-Sirafi, Akhbdr al-nahwiyin al-basriyin,
pp. 21 ff, 33-4; Shawqi Dayf, Al-Maddris al-nahwiya (Dar al-ma'arif, Cairo,
1968), pp. 19, 157 ff.
15. John H. Haywood, Arabic Lexicography: Its History and Its Place in
the General History of Lexicography (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1960), pp. 24 ff, 65
ff; Abu 1-Tayyib, Mardtib al-nahwiyin, pp. 30-1, 39-40; al-Suyuti, Al-Muzhir
fi 'uliim al-lugha wa-anwd'ihd, ed. Muhammad Ahmad Jad al-Mawla et al.
(Dar ihya' al-kutub al-'arabiya, Cairo, 1958), vol. II, p. 401; al-Dhahabi,
126
Ma'rifat al-qurra', vol. I, pp. 83 ff.

16. See 'Abd al-'AzIz al-Duri, Bahthfi nash'at 'Urn al-ta'rikh 'inda l-'arab
(Al-Matba'a al-kathulikiya, Beirut, 1960), pp. 13 ff, 61 ff, 118 ff 131 ff
[ed. and trans. Lawrence I. Conrad as The Rise of Historical Writing Among
the Arabs (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983), pp. 12 ff, 76 ff,
136 ff, 152 fll; Sezgin [Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums, vol. I, pp. 237
ff = ] Ta'rikh al-turdth al-'arabi, vol. I, pp. 127 ff.
17. Gibb [Studies in the Civilization of Islam, pp. 71-2 = ] Dirdsdtfi hadd-
rat al-Isldm, pp. 94-5; 'Abd al-'Azfz al-Duri, Al-Judhur al-ta'rikhiya li-l-
shu'dbiya, 3rd edn (Dar al-tali'a, Beirut, 1981), pp. 59-60, 73 ff; Goldziher,
Muslim Studies, vol. I, pp. 137 ff.
18. Carlo Alfonso Nallino, 'Ilm al-falak: ta'rikhuhu (inda l-'arabfi l-qurun
al-wustd (Rome, 1911; reprinted Maktabat al-muthanna, Baghdad) pp. 141
ff; De Lacy O'Leary [Arabic Thought and Its Place in History, rev. edn (Kegan
Paul, London, 1939), pp. 104 ff = ] Al-Fikr al-carabi wa-makdnuhufi l-ta'rikh,
trans. Tammam Hassan (Wizarat al-thaqafa wa-1-irshad al-qawm"i, Cairo,
1961), pp. 120 ff.'
19. Al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. I, p. 2775; Ibn Sa'd, vol. III.l, p. 239.
20. Al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. II, pp. 1505-6. The potential selection of
any Muslim for the caliphate, without distinction, was advocated only by
the Kharijites; on only one occasion, in the second century AH, did they
choose a non-Arab leader.
21. See the anonymous (third century AH) Akhbdr al-dawla al- (abbdsiya,
ed. 'Abd al-'AzIz al-Duri and 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Muttalibi (Dar al tali"'a,
Beirut, 1971), pp. 2, 69. Here Ibn 'Abbas says to Mu'awiya, 'We pride
ourselves in the Prophet of God — may the blessing and peace of God
be upon him — over whatever you have come to take pride in over the
rest of Quraysh, over whatever Quraysh takes pride in over the Ansar,
over whatever the Ansar take pride in over the rest of the Arabs, and over
whatever the Arabs take pride in over the non-Arabs.'
22. Al-Mubarrad, Kdmil, vol. II, p. 41.
23. Ibid., vol. II, p. 59. Al-Mubarrad adds, 'The transmitters claim
that most of the mawdli deemed no verse worse than this one. When Jarir
says, "Sell to mawdli, but with Arabs have shame", he means to deprecate
the former, humiliate them and insult them with imputations of unbound-
ed disgrace'; ibid., vol. II, p. 64.
24. See Husayn 'Atwan, Al-Shi'ral-earabi bi-Khurdsdnfi I-lasral-umawi
(Dar al-jil, Beirut, 1974), pp. 114-15, 137, 139.
25. Al-Tanukhl, Al-Faraj ba(da l-shidda, ed. 'Abbud al-Shalji (Dar Sadir,
Beirut, 1978), vol. II, pp. 193-4. The account is related from Hamid,
secretary to Ibrahim ibn al-Mahdi, from Mukhallad al-Tabari, secretary
of the Department of Confidential Affairs {diwdn al-sirr) under the 'Abbasid
caliph al-Mahdf. It was handed down to him on the authority of Salim,
the mawld of Hisham ibn 'Abd al-Malik and his secretary in charge
of the Office of Correspondence {diwdn al-rasd'il). This last authority was
a minor secretary in the diwdn of 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan. See ibid.,
vol. II, p. 191.
26. Abu 1-Faraj al-Isfahanl, Kitdb al-aghdni, vol. XIV, p. 288. The poet
seeks to ridicule and abuse the tribe of al-Azd, but what concerns us here
is the significance of the verse.
127
27. In all probability this statement was forged by Umayyad propaganda

and put in the mouth of Muhammad ibn 'All in order to turn opinion
against him. See [al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. II, p. 1937; Al-Imama wa-l-siydsa,
ed. Sa'Id Salih, MA thesis, University of Jordan, 1978, vol. I, pp. 376-7.
Cf. also] Akhbdr al-dawla al-'abbdsiya, p. 285.
28. Al-Baladhuri, Ansdb al-ashrdf vol. Ill, pp. 148-9.
29. Ibid., vol. Ill, pp. 133, 308; Akhbdr al-dawla al-'abbasiya, p. 313;
al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. II, p. 1973.
30. 'Abd al-Hamid al-Katib, lid l-kuttdb, ed. Muhammad Kurd 'All
in his Rasd'il al-bulaghd\ 2nd edn (Dar al-kutub al-misriya, Cairo, 1913),
p. 221.
31. Al-Baladhuri, Ansdb al-ashrdf, vol. Ill, p. 141.
32. Al-Isfahani, Aghdni, vol. Ill, p. 139. In place of wa-l-ra'y, 'and judge-
ment', a better reading may be wa-l-ziyy, 'and attire'.
33. See 'Abd al-Jabbar Jumard, Ghurrat al-(arab min Shaybdn: Yazid ibn
Mizyad, al-qd'id al-a la li-dawlat Harun al-Rashid (Dar al-tall'a, Beirut, 1961),
p. 118.
34. Al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. Ill, p. 1142.
35. See 'Abd al-'AzIz al-Duri, Al-(Asr al-'Abbdsi al-awwal: dirdsafi'l-
ta'rikh al-siydsi wa-l-iddri wa-l-mdli (Matba'at al-tafayyud al-ahliya, Baghdad,
1945), p. 218.
36. See al-Tanukhi, Al-Faraj ba'da l-shidda, vol. I, pp. 124 ff.
37. Ibid., vol. II, pp. 66-75.
38. See al-Baladhuri, Ansdb al-ashrdf vol. Ill, pp. 212 ff, 242 ff; al-Jahiz,
Rasd'il al-Jahiz, ed. 'Abd al-Salam Muhammad Harun (Maktabat al-Khanji,
Cairo, 1964-79), vol. I, pp. 12-13.'
39. 'Abd al-'Az"iz al-Duri, Ta'rikh al-'Irdq al-iqtisddi, pp. 69 ff. Also see
Maurice Lombard [The Golden Age of Islam, trans. J. Spencer (North
Holland, Amsterdam, 1975), pp. 161 ff = 1 Al-Isldmfi 'azamatihi al-tild, trans.
Yasin al-Hafiz (Dar al-tall'a, Beirut, 1977), pp. 143 ff.
40. See 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri, Muqaddimafi l-ta 'rikh al-iqtisddi al- 'arabi,
4th edn (Dar al-tall'a, Beirut, 1982), pp. 67 ff; al-Duri, Ta'rikh al-'Irdq
al-iqtisddi, pp. 79 ff; Lombard [The Golden Age of Islam, pp. 118 ff = ] Al-
Isldmfi 'azamatihi al-uld, pp. 109 ff.
41. Gholam Hossein Sadighi, Les Mouvements religieux iraniens au 2eme
et au 3eme siecles de I'hegire (Les Presses modernes, Paris, 1938), pp. 82 ff,
107 ff, 111 ff.
42. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri, 'Al-DImuqratlya fi falsafat al-hukm al-'arabi',
Al-Mustaqbal al-'arabi, vol. 9 (September 1979), pp. 60 ff.
43. See Vasily Vladimirovich Barthold, [Turkestan Down to the Mongol
Invasion, 2nd edn (Luzac, London, 1928), pp. 266 ff = ] Turkistdn, trans.
Salah al-DIn 'Uthman Hashim (Al-Majlis al-watani li-1-thaqafa wa-1-funun
wa-1-adab, Kuwait, 1981), pp. 331 ff; Barthold, [Mussulman Culture, trans.
Shahid Suhrawardy (University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1934), pp. 80 ff = ]
Ta'rikh al-haddra al-isldmiya, trans. Hamza Tahir, 4th edn (Dar al-ma'arif,
Cairo, 1966), pp. 101 ff.
44. Al-Jahiz says that he has never seen 'any secretary who made the
Qur'an his companion or knowledge of it his concern, or any distinguished
by his devotion to studies of the faith, or dedicated to learning by heart
the words and deeds of the Prophet. . .' He goes on to say of any of them,
128
that 'once he could recite the proverbs of Buzurgmihr, the covenant of

Ardashir, the essays of 'Abd al-Hamid and the belles-lettres of Ibn al-
MuqafTa', and once he had made the book of Mazdak his mine of knowledge
and the tale of Kalila and Dimna his treasure-trove of wisdom', he con-
sidered this 'the ultimate pinnacle of achievement'. Here al-Jahiz is
obviously referring to the secretaries most zealously devoted to the Per-
sian heritage. See his 'Fi dhamm akhlaq al-kuttab', in Finkel's Three Essays,
pp. 42-3.
45. See al-Jahiz, Al-Bayan wa-l-tabyin, vol. Ill, p. 14; Ibn 'Abd Rab-
bih, Al-'Iqd al-farid, vol. Ill, pp. 405-12; Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi, Al-
Imtd' wa-l-mu'dnasa, ed. Ahmad Amln and Ahmad al-Zayn (Lajnat al-ta'llf
wa-1-tarjama wa-1-nashr, Cairo, 1939-44), vol. I, pp. 78-80, 89; Ibn
Qutayba, Kitdb al-'arab, in Rasd'il al-bulaghd\ pp. 345-6; Barthold
[Mussulman Culture, p. 11 = ] Ta'rikh al-haddra al-isldmiya, p. 51.
46. In his Kitdb al-ma 'drif Ibn Qutayba explains his method as follows:
'This is a book in which I have collected the knowledge of those things
incumbent upon one graced with noble status, separated from the ranks
of the vulgar by his cultured refinement and ranked above the common
folk by his eloquence, that he might dedicate himself to learning it and
committing it to memory; for he would find it indispensable when he sits
in the councils of kings, attends the assemblies of notables and deliberates
with the circles of the learned.' See the Kitdb al-ma'drif, ed. Tharwat 'Ukasha
(Dar al-ma'arif, Cairo, 1960), p. 1.
47. See al-Tawhidi, Al-Imtd' wa-l-mu'dnasa, vol. I, p. 82. Ibn Qutayba
says, 'And so it is with nations, that there should be among them such
an inherently noble-hearted one as that of the Arabs. For from pre-Islamic
times they have commended forbearance, diffidence and restraint,
reproached avarice, perfidy and impudence, eschewed vile and blameworthy
deeds, habituated themselves to intrepidy, patience and courage, and en-
joined the protection and preservation of the claims of those under one's
charge above those of all others.' See his Kitdb al-'arab, p. 282.
48. Al-Asmai, Ta'rikh al-'arab qabla l-Isldm, ed. Muhammad Husayn
Al Yasin (Matba'at al-ma'arif, Baghdad, 1959); al-Jahiz, Tria opuscula, ed.
Gerlof van Vloten (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1903), pp. 44-5. In refutation of
the Shu'ubl Ibn Gharsiya, Yahya ibn Mas'ada says, 'The pure Arab kings,
and those rising and setting stars of Thamud, 'Ad, Tasm, Jadis, Wabar
and Umaymima (perhaps al-asbahiya, 'Asbah', should be read here for al-
umaymlmlyd) — are these not sufficient to refute the way you describe them,?'
See Yazid's Risdla fi l-radd 'aid Ibn Gharsiya, in Nawddir al-
makhtutdt, ed. 'Abd al-Salam Muhammad Harun (Lajnat al-ta'llf wa-1-
tarjama wa-1-nashr, Cairo, 1951-6), vol. Ill, p. 286.
49. Al-Jahiz says, 'Most of those who question Islam have come to enter-
tain such doubts by virtue of their affiliation with the Shu'ublya. For when
they detest something they detest those who represent it; and if they detest
that language (i.e. Arabic), they detest that peninsula (i.e. Arabia) as well.
And thus they proceed in such cases, to the point that they even give up
Islam, for it was the Arabs who brought it forth and they who comprised
its founding fathers.' See al-Jahiz, Al-Bayan wa-l-tabyin, vol. Ill, p. 14.
50. Al-Tha'alibi says, 'One whom God guides to Islam . . . believes
that Muhammad was the best of prophets . . . and that the Arabs are the
129
best of nations . . . ' See al-Tha'alibi, Fiqh al-lugha wa-sirr al-'arabiya, ed.
Mustafa al-Saqqa, Ibrahim al-Ibyari and 'Abd al- Hafiz Shalabi (Matba'at
Mustafa al-Babl al-Halabi, Cairo, 1938) p. 1.
M. Ibn Qutayba, Kitdb al-'arab, pp. 282, 291.
52. Al-Tha'alibi, Fiqh al-lugha, p. 1.
53. Al-Tawhidi, Al-Imta' wa-l-mu'anasa, vol. I, p. 70.
54. Al-Jahiz, Rasa'il al-Jahiz, vol. I, p. 11.
55. Al-Tawhidi says, 'We find nowhere in these other languages the
brilliance one finds in Arabic . . . ' He also speaks of 'its breadth of
vocabulary, the inflection of its nouns, verbs and particles, its wide-ranging
etymology, the expressions it has borrowed and the unusual ones it has
produced by way of epitome, and its elegant metonymy in the juxtapositon
of expressions . . . ' See al-Tawhidi, Al-Imta' wa-l-mu'anasa, vol. I, pp. 76-7.
56. Al-Tha'alibi (Fiqh al-lugha, p. 2) says, 'When God — may His name
be exalted — honoured it, glorified it, raised it to momentous heights, en-
nobled it and used it to counsel the best of His creation . . . '
57. Al-Anbari, Kitdb al-addddft l-lugha (Wizarat al-irshad wa-1-anba',
Kuwait, 1960), p. 2.
58. Al-Tha'alibi, Fiqh al-lugha, p. 1.
59. Al-Zamakhshari, Al-mufassalfl sina'at al-i'rdb (Matba'at al-kawkab
al-sharql, Alexandria, 1873), p. 3.
60. Al-Jahiz, Rasa }il al-Jahiz, vol. I, p. 31.
61. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 12-13, 30-1, 34. See also al-Jahiz, Tria opuscula,
pp. 6-7.
62. Al-Tawhidi, Al-Imtd{ wa-l-mu'anasa, vol. I, pp. 70-96, viewing the
hierarchy of mankind as follows: nation (umma), religion or sect (ta'ifa),
tribe (qabila) and.family (bayt).
63. Al-Farabi says, 'Others consider that the communal bond arises
through similarity in character, an identity in qualities of disposition and
a common language and mode of speech, and that difference arises to the
extent that these differ. So it is with every nation . . . and hence nations
differ from one another in accordance with these three.' See his Ard' ahl
al-madtna al-jadila, ed. Albert Nasri Nadir (Dar al-mashriq, Beirut, 1968),
pp. 154-5, 157.
64. Al-Farabi, Al-Siydsa al-madaniya al-mulaqqab bi-mabddi' al-mawjuddt,
ed. Fawzl Mitri al-Najjar (Al-Matba'a al-kathulikiya, Beirut, 1964),
pp. 70-1; Naslf Nassar, Mafhum al-umma bayna l-dtn wa-l-ta'rikh: dirdsa
ft madlul al-umma ft l-turath al-(arabi wa-l-isldmt (Dar al-tall'a, Beirut, 1975),
pp. 42 ff.
65. Ahmad M.H. Shboul, Al-Masludt and His World: A Muslim
Humanist and His Interest in Non-Muslims (Ithaca Press, London, 1979), pp.
149-50.
66. Tarif Khalidi, Islamic Historiography: The Histories ofMas'udi (State
University of New York Press, Albany, 1975), p. 89.
67. See al-Mas'udi, Al-Tanbih wa-l-ishrdf pp. 75-8, 80.
68. See Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-'arab, vol. I, p. 587, q.v. (arab.
69. Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddima, vol. I, pp. 25, 317. This does not preclude
his use of the word umma in a limited number of cases (for example, vol.
I, p. 319) to refer to the Islamic Community.
70. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 69-74.
130
71. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 112-23.

72. Ibn Khaldun says (ibid., vol. I, p. 109), ' Purity of descent is found
among the barbarian Arabs and among those in a similar state of
development.'
73. Ibid., vol. I, p. 110.
74. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 101-2, 122-3.
75. Ibid., vol. I, p. 110.
76. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 317-18.
77. Ibid.
78. I have encountered a single reference. See Qays ibn al-Hidadlya,
Shi'r, p. 206 [cited on p. 7 above].
79. Wensinck, Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane, vol. IV, p.
174.
80. Al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. I, p. 2775. Addressing the Ansar during
the deliberations immediately after the Prophet's death, Abu Bakr said,
'Despite that, we are the most central of the Arab tribes where genealogies
are concerned, for there is not a single Arab tribe that does not have off-
spring related to Quraysh.' In his address to the Ansar, 'Umar said, 'By
God, the Arabs will not consent to grant you leadership when their Pro-
phet comes from some other people.' See Al-Imama wa-l-siyasa, vol. I, pp.
5, 7; al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. I, p. 1823.
81. Ibn Qutayba, Kitab al-'arab, pp. 278, 282.
82. Al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, vol. Ill, p. 873.
83. Bad!' al-Zaman al-Hamadhanl, Kashf al-ma'ani wa-l-bayan 'an rasd'il
Badi' al-Zaman, ed. Ibrahim al-Ahdab al-TarabulusI (Al-Matba'a al-
kathuliklya, Beirut, 1890), pp. 279 ff.
84. Al-Zamakhshari, Al-Mufassal fi sina'at al-ilr'ab, pp. 2-3.
85. Al-BIrunI, Kitab al-saydana, ed. al-Hakim Muhammad Sa'Id and
Rana Ihsan Alihi (Hamdard Academy, Karachi, 1973), p. 12. Al-BIrunI
pursues his point by criticising the efforts of those who seek to replace Arabic
with Persian, saying, 'How many the times that factions of underlings, most
prominent among them al-JIl and Daylam (referring to the Buwayhids),
have concentrated their efforts to dress the state in Persian robes! But they
will not succeed in their endeavour. So long as the call to prayer strikes
their ears five times every day, prayers are recited from the clear Arabic
Qur'an . . . and sermons summoning them to righteousness are addressed
to them in Arabic in the mosques, their efforts are of no avail: the cord
of Islam will not be split and the fortress of the faith will not be breached.'
86. 'Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, Kharidat al-qasr wa-jaridat al-'asr: qism
shu'ara', al-'Iraq, ed. Muhammad Bahjat al-Athari (Wizarat al-i'lam,
Baghdad, 1978, vol. II.3, p. 13.
87. Ibid., vol. II.3, pp. 460, 462.
88. Safi 1-DIn al- HUH, Diwan (Al-Matba'a al-wahblya, Najaf, AH
1283), p. 13.
89. Ibid., p. 49.
90. See Ibrahim al-Wa'ili, Al-Shi'r al-siyasi al- Iraqi fi l-qarn al-tasi* cashar
(Matba'at al-ma'arif, Baghdad, 1978), p. 224.
91. Ahmad Muhammad al-Shahhadh, Al-Maldmih al-siydsiyafi hikaydt
alf layla wa-layla (Wizarat al-i'lam, Baghdad, 1977), pp. 83, 243.
92. Concerning the siege of Baghdad in 197/812, al-Tabari says,
131
'The military forces behaved shamefully and failed to fight with convic-
tion, but not so the street peddlers, the half-naked poor, the prisoners, the
riffraff, rabble and rogues and the market folk.' See al-Tabari, Ta'rikh,
vol. Ill, p. 872.
93. Ibid., vol. Ill, pp. 1009-10.
94. Ibid., vol. Ill, pp. 1586 ff; also al-Mas'udi, Muruj al-dhahab, ed.
C. Barbier de Meynard and A. Pavet de Courteille (Societe asiatique, Paris,
1861-77), vol. VII, pp. 364-5.
95. See Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam fi ta'rikh al-muluk wa-l-umam (Da'irat
al-ma'arif al-'uthmanlya, Hyderabad, AH 1357-8), vol. VII, pp. 174, 220.
96. See Ibn al-Jawzi, Talbis Iblis, ed. Muhammad Munir al-Dimashqi,
2nd edn (Matba'at al-nahda, Cairo, 1928),' p. 392.
97. There are references in Ibn al-Athir and Ibn al-Jawzi (in his Al-
Muntazam) to their movements in the years 334, 361, 381, 421, 490, 493,
497, 512, 514, 515, 530, 538, 552 and 565 AH.
98. In 361/972 the common folk gathered to arms to fight the Byzan-
tines. They came out in such great numbers that this alarmed the Buwayhid
regime and led to a clash between them. See Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kdmilfi l-
ta'rikh, vol. VIII, p. 204; Ibn Miskawayh, Tajarib al-umam, ed. H.F.
Amedroz (Luzac, London, 1921-2), vol. II, p. 306.
99. In 334/945 Ibn Shirzad sought the assistance of the common folk
and the 'Ayyarun to fight the Buwayhid Mu'izz al-Dawla; see Ibn al-Athir,
Al-Kdmilfi l-ta'rikh, vol. VIII, p. 149. In 363/973 Sebuktegln sought the
aid of the common folk when he rebelled against the Buwayhid Bakhtiyar
ibn Mu'izz al-Dawla; see Ibn Miskawayh, Tajarib al-umam, vol. II, p. 324;
Ibn al-Jawzi, Muntazam, vol. VI, p. 86; al-Duri, Dirdsdtfi l-'usur al-'abbd-
siya al-muta'akhkhira, pp. 282 ff.
100. See Claude Cahen, Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain dans
VAsie musulmane du moyen age (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1959).
101. Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kdmilfi l-ta 'rikh, vol. VIII, p. 158; Ibn al-Jawzi,
Muntazam, vol. VIII, pp. 55-6, 62-3.
102. See Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kdmilfi l-ta'rikh, vol. VIII, p. 47; vol. IX,
p. 33; Ibn Miskawayh, Tajarib al-uman, vol. Ill, pp. 361-2.
103. For example, their participation in the celebration held for the
birth of al-Muqtadi in 480/1088 (see Ibn al-Jawzi, Muntazam, vol. IX, p.
38), and in 488/1095 when it was decided to build a wall around the private
quarters of the palace (ibid., vol. IX, p. 85).
104. See Ibn al-Jawzi, Muntazam, vol. VIII, p. 323; Ibrahim ibn Hilal
al- Sabi', Al-Mukhtdr min rasd'il al-Sdbi, ed. Shakib Arslan (Al-Maktab al-
tijari Ii-1-tiba'a wa-1-tawzi' wa-1-nashr, Beirut, n.d.), vol. I, pp. 141-2.
105. On the activities of Ibn al-Rasuli al-Khabbaz and 'Abd al-Qadir
al-Hashimi al-Bazzaz in 473/1080 and the connection of these activities
with the Fatimids, see Ibn al-Jawzi, Muntazam, vol. VIII, p. 326; Ibn al-
Mi'mar, Kitab al-futuwa, ed. Mustafa Jawad etal. (Maktabat al-muthanna,
Baghdad, 1958), pp. 38 ff.
106. See Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kdmilfi l-ta'rikh, vol. VIII, p. 220.
107. For the text of the decree, see Ibn al-Sa'i, Al-Jdmic al-mukhtasar
fi (unwdn al-tawdrikh wa-euyun al-siyar, ed. Mustafa Jawad (Al-Matba'a al-
suryanlya al-kathullkiya, Baghdad, 1934), vol. IX, pp. 223-5.
108. See Abdul Munim Rashad Mohamad, 'The 'Abbasid Caliphate,
132
575/1179-656/1258', PhD dissertation, University of London, London,

1963, pp. 113-14; 'Abd al-'AzIz al-Duri, 'Nushu' al-asnaf wa-1-hiraf f f
1-Islam', Majallat kulliyat al-dddb (Baghdad), vol. 1 (June 1959), pp. 24 ff.
109. Ibn al-Fuwatl, Al-Hawadith al-jami'a wa-l-tajdrib al-ndqi'afi l-mi'a
al-sdbi'a, ed. Mustafa Jawad (Al-Maktaba al-'arablya, Baghdad, 1945),
pp. 88-9.
110. See Ibn al-Mi'mar, Kitdb al-futuwa, especially the introduction,
pp. 5-99.
111. Mehmed Fuad Kopriilu [Les Origines de l}Empire Ottoman (E. de
Boccard, Paris, 1935), pp. 100 ff = ] Qiydm al-dawla al-'uthmdniya, trans.
Ahmad al-Sa'id Sulayman (Dar al-katib al-'arabl, Cairo, 1967), pp. 150
ff, where Koprulii explains the connection between the 'Ayyarun, the Fityan
and the Akhiya and shows that their organisations, as well as those of the
Runud (the 'rogues'), the frontier raiders and the craftsmen, were influenced
by futuwa views and Sufi values. At the consent and will of the local popula-
tion, they took over authority and preserved order during periods of unrest
in the cities and on the frontiers. The futuwa organisations were widespread
in Iraq, Syria and North Africa, in addition to the East and Anatolia, and
played a noteworthy role in the establishment of the Ottoman Empire.
133
4
The Arabs in the Age
of the Tanzimat
Economic developments
It is evident that in the 'Abbasid age the institutions of the caliphate

did not develop at a pace commensurate with social and economic
developments. It was in this era that the secretaries (kuttdb) of the
governmental departments rose to prominence, but these evolved
into a stagnant bureaucracy. The regular army established by the
'Abbasids also failed to become a stable institution. The outbreak
of strife between Arab and other factions within the army, the
disruptive effects of differences within the 'Abbasid house and the
inability of the caliphate to maintain cohesion or balance among
its supporters were all factors that led to dependence upon the
Turkish slave-troops, elements that were neither Arabised nor
representative of the cultural development of society. This resulted
in the disruption of the caliphate, the enfeeblement of its public
institutions, increased fragmentation and fiscal weakness.
With the coming of the Buwayhids (334/945) and their domina-
tion of the centre of the caliphate, military feudalism was introduced
into Iraq. The new regime had little understanding of the fiscal
organisation of the caliphate and, as a result, was not even able
to meet the expense of paying the army. At this point the admin-
istrative and fiscal institutions of the caliphate were in obvious
decline, and trading activity with India and the Far East shifted
from the region of Mesopotamia and the Gulf to that of Egypt and
Syria.
With the appearance of the Seljuqs in the fifth/eleventh century,
military feudalism spread to Iran and Syria. Trading activity con-
tinued, however, in Egypt and the Arab lands along the Mediter-
ranean coast in Fa timid times. Military feudalism then became
134
The Age of the Tanzimdt
common in Egypt and Syria in the days of the Ayyubids (the

sixth/twelfth century). It continued in Ilkanid times in Iraq and
under Mamluk rule in Syria and Egypt. Still, however, the flow
of trade between the Far East and the Mediterranean world brought
prosperity to certain Arab lands. But this vital artery was cut when
the West, beginning with the Portuguese, gained control of the
international trade routes. This was the most grievous blow to befall
the economy and prosperity of the Arab lands. The pathways of
foreign trade were thus blocked until the nineteenth century, when
the West did in fact open up some trading opportunities. But this
was for the benefit of its own production and capital, at the expense
of the Arab lands.
The Ottomans inherited the administrative system of the Seljuqs
and set aside military fiefs (the timdrs and ze 'dmes) for their feudal
cavalrymen, the sipdhis; in return, the sipdhi would provide a certain
number of troops for the army. This system prevailed primarily
in Anatolia and in parts of northern Iraq and Syria. The usual prac-
tice in the Arab provinces, however, was to grant estates to the com-
manders and governors in return for outright payments and the
annual remittance of taxes to the sultan. In the tribal areas in
southern Iraq and the mountainous parts of Syria it was not possible
to apply this system; in such areas collective landownership pre-
vailed, with local shaykhs exercising authority. In the eighteenth
century, with the weakening of central authority, that of the fief-
holders, the local rulers and shaykhs, and governors increased and
a semi-feudal system came to prevail. In Egypt in the latter half
of the century, the weakness of the state and the power of the
Mamliiks resulted in the transformation of the prevailing system
of tax-farming (the iltizdm) into one oimdlikdne, i.e. a lifetime grant
of tax-farming privileges, at times including the right to dispose
of or bequeath the land in question. 1
Some signs of local commercial activity do seem to have appeared
in Egypt beginning in the late eighteenth century. In this trade some
Mediterranean merchants participated. But this did not last long,
and it was displaced by the monopolistic trading practices of
Muhammad 'All (r. 1805-48).2 The use of steam-powered naviga-
tion in the 1830s, beginning with the British (1835), the French
(1837) and then the Austrians (1839), guaranteed strategic superi-
ority and commercial expansion to the Europeans. The concern of
the British was to sell their textiles (and to acquire precious metals),
while France was primarily interested in purchasing such raw
materials as dyes, textile fibres and oil-bearing plants in return for
135
The Age of the Tanzlmdt
its manufactures or payments in cash.

The West was not satisfied with the capitulation agreements.
Exploiting the difficult circumstances facing the sultan as a result
of his struggle with Muhammad 'AH, Britain imposed upon him
the Commercial Treaty of 1838. It was to apply to all Ottoman
domains, although it did not come into effect in Egypt until 1840;
and the other European states lost no time in adopting it for
themselves. Arab provincial markets were thus opened to the
products and manufactures of the West. The terms of the treaty
confirmed the capitulations, abolished the former duties and taxes
and all of the various monopolies in the Ottoman Empire (including
those in Egypt), and established reduced customs tariffs (3-5 per
cent on the imports of foreign merchants, and 12 per cent on
exports). While Ottoman merchants had to pay domestic taxes,
foreign merchants were exempt from these and paid only the
reduced customs fees.3
The proliferation of imports, at first from Britain and then from
elsewhere, made for the expansion of trade with Europe beginning
in the mid-nineteenth century. The trend was promoted by an
increase in the number of consumers, especially in the cities. This
invasion affected local industries, especially that of textiles, which
had done a brisk business in filling local needs. Now, however, it
began to lose ground to competing Western manufactures, which,
if less durable than the local products, were more skilfully produced
and cheaper in price. And this was in addition to other problems:
the subjection of local products to high domestic taxes, the exclu-
sion of local industry from any kind of protection, the lack of security
on the roads and the instability of the monetary system. All this
hindered the movement of local trade and at times brought it to
a standstill. At the same time, the commercial invasion of the West
led to the diversion of spun fibres and silk to European (especially
French) weavers, thus depriving Syrian craftsmen of one source
of raw materials and further exacerbating the crisis. 4
The European merchants employed local agents who knew
Western languages. These latter individuals flourished and came
to form a new middle class that began to imitate the Westerners
and to establish ties with them. They were usually Christians who
enjoyed the protection of the consuls, while the role of the class of
Muslim merchants in foreign trade drastically declined. The ones
who suffered were those whose fortunes were tied to local economic
interests, and these were generally Muslims. As soon became
evident, the interests of the agents of Western trade stood in
136
contradiction to those of the local craftsmen whom the Western com-

mercial invasion deprived of work and income. The decline of local
industry and trade was accompanied by the disintegration of the
professional craft organisations, a trend encouraged by the Ottoman
authorities in order to strip the trade guilds (the asnaf and niqdbdt)
of their influence over their members. These circumstances and the
economic crises that followed were of obvious influence in the
sectarian clashes that occurred in Aleppo in 1850 and in Damascus
on 9 July I860. 5
These commercial trends were further promoted by the establish-
ment of foreign banks from the mid-nineteenth century onwards
and by their role in the service of Western interests. Foreign capital
— both governmental and private — was invested in two direc-
tions. First, funds were used to support projects that facilitated trade
and were related to transportation, communications and the modern-
isation of port facilities (for example, the Suez Canal, the harbours
of Alexandria and Beirut, the railway systems in Egypt and Syria,
and the Lynch Company for river navigation in Iraq). Second,
capital was provided to encourage the production of crops for
Western markets (such as cotton and sugar cane in Egypt, silk in
Lebanon and dates and cereals in Iraq) in order to serve the
expanding Western economy. This marked the first stage in the
tying of the economy of the Arab lands to that of the West, and
in manipulating it to the service of Western interests. 6
The commercial expansion of the West had the effect of direct-
ing agriculture and land tenure towards the expansion of private
landholdings at the expense of state-controlled holdings (the khardj
and mm lands), as also towards expansion in the production of crops
needed to meet the demand of Western markets. All this was
reinforced by the Tanzimat, a trend towards modernisation in
administration and land tenure.
In Egypt, Muhammad 'AH began by abolishing the feudal
landholdings of the Mamluks and the tax-farming system of the
iltizdm. Between 1811 and 1814 he took control of all the land
formerly included in these systems, and in like manner took over
the lands of the pious foundations (waqf land) as well. He had
cadastral surveys taken, abolished the prevailing village system of
collective landownership, and gave the cultivator the right to dispose
of land. He also tried to form a landowning class from his proteges
and army officers by granting them large estates (the ib'adiydt)
formed from lands either abandoned or unregistered in the survey.
He then allowed the holders of such estates to sell them or transfer
137
their ownership. In this way the land grants of Muhammad 'All

began during his reign to develop into a trend towards the forma-
tion of large landholdings. This was further encouraged by the
practices of the 'uhda, in which villages that had fallen behind in
their taxes were assigned to the authority of supporters or proteges
of the regime in return for payment of the taxes owed. This was
another factor encouraging the formation of large rural landholdings.
The khedival legislation of Sa'Id (r. 1854-63), especially the Land
Law of 15 August 1858, also served to encourage private landowner-
ship. The cultivator's land was transferable to his heirs, and ib'adiya
and 'ushrlya (tithe) land was considered the property of its holder.
A cultivator oiathanya lands (land on which the kharaj, or land-tax,
was collected) was allowed to bequeath it, and became the owner
of the land after farming it for five years.
The legislation of Khedive Isma'il (r. 1863-79) confirmed this
trend, for the law of 30 August 1871 provided for ownership oikharaj
land by its cultivator in return for payment of a specified sum. In
the following year the payment of this fee was made mandatory,
and hence, most lands passed into private possession. Finally, it
was decided in 1871 to transform all remaining khardj land into
private property.
The expansion of irrigation projects, the trend towards the produc-
tion of commercial crops and the corresponding lack of any encour-
agement of industry (after the abandonment of Muhammad 'All's
projects) served to direct the attention of the wealthy to land.
Beginning in the days of Khedive Isma'il, financial need led to the
sale of vast tracts of land that were purchased by the wealthy. In addi-
tion, many cultivators fled oppressive taxation by selling their lands
to great landowning shaykhs. Similarly, the debts of the cultivators
led to the sale of lands to usurers and merchants, most of them
foreigners. 7 By the end of the nineteenth century, all agricultural
land in Egypt, with the exception of the waqflands, had passed into
private possession. Hence, there emerged a class of great landowners
consisting of members of the ruling family, important officials and
tribal shaykhs, and traders and other wealthy individuals. 8
A similar trend did in fact begin to manifest itself in the Ottoman
Empire, albeit slowly due to the complexity of prevailing circum-
stances, especially in tribal regions (such as central Iraq) and in
mountainous areas where feudal families held sway (as in Lebanon
and northern Iraq). Here, however, it had a fundamentally different
objective, in that it sought to assert the rights of the state where
land was concerned. The socio-economic system of the Ottomans
138
was based on the timdr, the feudal estate of the sipdhi, with the state
acting in a supervisory capacity and ensuring the quality and high
rate of productivity. But the decline of the sipdhis, especially after
the appearance of gunpowder, and the neglect of the timdrs led on
the one hand to the weakening of the economic base of the Empire,
and on the other, to an increasingly prominent role for local
notables, who became even more influential when the Empire began
to rely upon them for the collection of taxes. 9
After putting an end to the Janissaries (1826) and abolishing the
sipdhis along with them, Mahmud II ordered that timdr lands revert
to state control, a process achieved in stages by 1831. Most of these
lands were redistributed as concessions to tax-farmers or grants of
estates. The shortcomings of tax-farming (iltizdm) soon became
apparent, however, and the system was officially abolished by the
Khatt-i sherif of Gulkhane (the 'Noble Rescript of the Rose
Chamber') in 1839 and replaced by the principle of direct taxation.
On 7 February 1840 the sultan issued a decree reorganising the
taxation system. The canonical and customary imposts were abol-
ished in favour of limited agricultural taxes, and the task of tax
collection was undertaken by civilian tax collectors sent for that pur-
pose from Istanbul. Most cultivated lands were considered as legally
owned by the state, or rriiri, and 1846 saw the establishment of the
tdpii, or land registration system, under the terms of which the right
to exploit such land could be conferred on individuals. Financial
difficulties led to the return of tax-farming in 1842, only to be abol-
ished once and for all by the Khatt-i humdyiin (the 'Imperial Rescript')
of 1856, although it continued in practice for a while longer. 10
The Ottoman Land Law of 21 April 1858 was promulgated with
the aim of asserting the state's right to the land in the face of local
forces and the remnants of feudal interests. In fact, however, it
resulted in the broadening of the scope of private landownership
by individuals. Seeking to settle and subdue the tribes, the Empire
abolished the communal holdings of tribal lands in the expectation
that this would result in the development of small landholdings at
the expense of the shaykhs, and subsequently concentrate the power
of the state. But fear of taxation and military service led the
cultivators to register their lands in the names of their local leaders
or in the names of urban notables, which resulted in these latter
gaining ownership of the land while the small landowners were
transformed into sharecroppers or peasant cultivators. 11
As shaykhs and notables in Syria were allowed to register the com-
munal lands in their own names, the Land Law thus led to the rise
139
The Age of the Tanzimat
of a group of great landowners,12 which resulted in new changes

in the socio-economic situation. On the other hand, the peasant
revolts in Mount Lebanon (1858) and Jebel Druze (1886-7) were
of considerable influence in the abolition of feudalism in Lebanon,
in the consolidation of private property and in the rise of a group
of middle-class landowners interested in production suited to the
requirements of the foreign markets.
In Iraq the Ottomans abolished the former military feudal
holdings, while maintaining the waqf lands and certain private
holdings. This meant that in the view of the Ottomans, most of
the lands of Iraq reverted to state control as rriiri land, from which
the Empire could make grants of military allotments. In reality,
however, much of this land remained in the hands of local leaders
and Arab clans by virtue of their settlement on such land or their
dominant position in the area. Hence, communal clan property
prevailed as the landholding pattern in central and southern Iraq.
The government continued to claim ownership of the land on the
basis of the fact that it was mlri, but was unable to enforce its con-
trol or exercise its right of ownership.
The trend in Iraq was to assert the authority of the state and
to disrupt the clan system. It also encouraged private landowner-
ship and confirmed individual rights to land, both by taking over
ownership of the communal holdings of the tribes and by acquiring
tapii lands. The law made it possible to allocate state-owned mlri lands
to their actual cultivators. This meant that the right to dispose of
mlri lands passed to the small-scale cultivators and that the communal
clan holdings were abolished by being transformed into the private
property of individuals. Beginning in the time of Midhat Pasha
(1869-71), the Empire also took an interest in irrigation in the lowland
plains of southern Iraq. But the various measures that were taken
failed to achieve their objectives. Fear of military service and taxation,
along with the attitude of the tribes towards their territorial home-
lands, meant that few individuals were prepared to purchase the tapii
deeds to the lands in question. This left the field clear for the shaykhs
of the Arab and Kurdish tribes and the urban notables and men of
wealth. They were quick to register the tribal and tapii lands in their
own names, which led to the emergence of large landholdings.13
Thus, the trend embodied in the Ottoman Land Law, especially
after its application in Syria (beginning in 1864) and in Iraq
(beginning in 1869), primarily benefited such influential and
wealthy persons as the shaykhs, notables and merchants.
140
Modernisation
The movement of modernisation had its impact on the course of

events. This began with military matters, for the Ottoman Empire
was essentially based on the idea of the jihad against the Byzantines
and on confrontation with the West along its eastern frontier. Between
the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries the Empire posed a con-
stant threat to the West, while at the same time it successfully sought
to take part in the checking of the Western invasion of North Africa
in the sixteenth century, and tried in vain to oppose the West in the
Indian Ocean. Then in the sixteenth century the Empire expanded
into the Arab lands of both the Near East and the Maghrib (with
the exception of Morocco), which brought these lands into a single
political framework and opened them to the movement of domestic
trade and to socio-cultural relations. 14 The new state of affairs —
the fact that the centre of political power now lay outside the Arab
lands — led to reliance upon the administrative patterns already in
operation in the provinces and upon traditional local authority, with
the result that these lands received insufficient attention and failed
to develop. Arabic to a great extent remained the language of religious
studies, but it was no longer the language of administration (which
was now Turkish), and Arabic culture no longer enjoyed official
patronage. For Arabic culture, then, the Ottoman period was one
of stagnation. The Arab lands remained within the framework of
Ottoman authority, which as an Islamic regime raised the banner
of the faith against the West in particular. This had its effects on
relations with the West and on Arab consciousness, especially with
the emergence of danger from abroad.
The first signs of the stagnation and then weakness of the Ottoman
Empire in comparison with the West began to appear in the late
seventeenth century. The corruption and disarray of the Janissaries
had already demonstrated the need for reform, and the point was
further emphasised by various lessons of Western superiority over
the Empire, beginning with the Ottoman retreat from Vienna in
1683. 15 In the eighteenth century the urgency of reform was
highlighted as the Empire suffered a number of defeats, especially
after the disastrous war with Russia, ending with the Treaty of Kuciik
Qaynarje in 1774. Although some modest preliminary measures
came earlier, 16 reform essentially began with the efforts of Selim III
(r. 1789-1807) to modernise the army. In 1792-3 this sultan issued
a series of decrees, known collectively by the name Nizam-i jedid
(the 'New Order'), concerned with taxation and provincial admin-
141
istration. Selim also attached considerable importance to the foun-

ding of military and naval academies, and the most significant of
his measures was the initiative of establishing a modern army trained
by Western instructors. The old army, however, deposed him and
abolished his reforms.17
When Mahmud II (r. 1808-39) acceded to the throne he con-
tinued the process of reform. After one setback he massacred the
Janissaries in 1826, abolished the remaining military feudal estates
and refounded the new army. In 1827 he began to send groups of
students to Europe to be trained as teachers for the schools and
officers for the army. For purposes of officer-training, he decided
to revive and expand the advanced technical schools, and also
founded a new school of military sciences and a school of surgery
in 1832, as well as the Imperial Medical School in 1839. 18
Mahmud II also sought to reform the administration, beginning
with the organisation of the central administration and working,
with the assistance of the army, to enforce the authority of the central
government in the provinces. He subdued such regions as Kurdistan
and to a great extent crushed the local Valley-lords' (the derebeys)
of Asia Minor. He failed in Egypt, however, and prevailing circum-
stances also denied him success in Syria. He tried to regulate the
waqfs, or pious foundations, especially those of families. These were
placed under the authority of a central administrative department
and their revenues were diverted to the central government, these
measures serving to weaken the power of the ulema vis-a-vis the sultan.
Education was a fundamental pillar in the reform movement.
Selim III and Mahmud II founded advanced technical schools for
the training of military officers, engineers, physicians and admin-
istrators, and such institutions required students with a background
in a modern course of studies. Hence, in order to prepare students
for the military academies and to graduate civil servants for the
administration, Mahmud II in 1838 ordered the establishment of
modern preparatory (rushdtye) and secondary schools and of the
Mekteb-i ma'arif-i 'adliye, a school specifically designed to train
administrators for government service. This was the beginning of
the trend towards the creation of a kind of dualism in education
that expanded during the reign of his son 'Abdulmejid. In its report
of 1846, the Commission on Education recommended that a modern
educational system be established alongside the old. After the
Crimean War the system of modern schools (both civilian and
military) expanded and elementary schools for boys were founded,
the process of expansion reaching its peak under 'Abdulhamid II.
142
The dual educational system, including both the modern schools

and the traditional schools left unchanged, was a conspicuous
phenomenon in the lands of the Ottoman Empire and had a definite
impact on public affairs.19
The sultan 'Abdulmejid (r. 1839-61) pursued the programme
of reform, both because of the need for such reform and in order
to satisfy the Western states. On 3 November 1839 he thus issued
the Khatt-i shenjoi Giilkhane, the first of his reform decrees, which
was reinforced by the promulgation of the Khatt-i humdyun on 18
February 1856. These decrees continued until 1880 and are called
Al-Tanzimdt al-khayrlya, 'The Beneficent Reforms', or simply, the
'Tanzimat'. 20
The Tanzimat had as their goals the modernisation of the
administration, the imposition of central authority over the pro-
vinces and their placement under direct administration, the for-
mation of a society in which Muslims and non-Muslims would enjoy
equal rights before the law, and the improvement of social and
economic conditions. The Khatt-i sherif of Giilkhane, for example,
proclaimed such principles as the sanctity of life and property and
the abolition of the iltizam system, the imposition of a regular system
of military conscription, and the equitable application of these laws
to the peoples of various religions. The Khatt-i humayun confirmed
these principles and more strongly ordained the total equality of
the subjects of the Empire — equality of non-Muslims with Muslims
in military service, in the administration of justice, in taxation, in
admission to the schools and in treatment and conditions of
employment.21
Ottoman legal regulations and the sacred law of Islam were both
exposed to Western influences. The modernisation and reorganisa-
tion of Ottoman law began in 1840; although elements for modern-
isation were derived from several European legal systems, the model
followed was essentially that of French law. The revised Penal Code,
influenced by French practice but remaining within the framework
of Islamic law, was brought into effect in the same year and
amended in 1851. The first large-scale borrowing from Western
law came in the Commercial Code of 1850, which to a great extent
was taken from that of France, and then revised in 1861. The same
holds true for the Penal Code of 1858, which represented a second
wholesale borrowing of a Western law code. Also promulgated were
other codes all taken up from French law: the maritime trade law
of 1863 and the codes of judicial procedure, beginning with that
for commerce in 1861. The issuance of the new civil code, the
143
Mejelle (1869-76), was a major event in the programme of legal

reforms. Civil courts were created in 1869. These were ostensibly
parallel to the Islamic religious courts, but in fact they diminished
the range of the latter's jurisdiction.
The year 1840 saw the promulgation of 'Abdulmejid's decree
reorganising the administration and creating provinces with con-
sultative councils, after the example of French administrative
practice. In 1864 there was issued a new provincial law code
reorganising regional administration along lines that remained in
effect until the demise of the Empire. Such reforms were oriented
towards the centralisation of the administration.
The importance of education was emphasised by the Imperial
Rescript of 1845 and the formation of a commission to study educa-
tional affairs. In its report, submitted in 1846, it did not propose
the abolition of Islamic schools, but rather suggested the parallel
establishment of a modern educational system beginning at the
elementary level and extending through secondary to university
education. In August 1846 a law reforming the Empire's educa-
tional system was issued, its terms stipulating that the government,
rather than men of religion, would henceforth supervise education.
The Ministry of Education was established in 1866, and 1869
witnessed the passage of a comprehensive law reorganising the
government schools, with emphasis on Ottomanisation as well as
modernisation.22
The Tanzimat resulted in the creation of an elite — far removed
from the other classes of society — consisting of the officers and
officials graduating from the new schools. They comprised a refined
and ambitious group familiar with certain aspects of Western
civilisation. But the reforms had come about in circumstances not
devoid of pressure brought to bear by the Western states, sometimes
for their own advantage. The measures taken were in some instances
not understood and introduced innovations unacceptable to certain
elements of society. Likewise, they were sometimes not strictly
enforced, and provoked a kind of unrest in conservative circles.
In Egypt the drive towards modernisation was more vigorous,
with Muhammad * All embarking on the task of reorganising the
administration and seeking to establish a modern army and to
develop the economy needed to support it. He brought in foreign
experts and instructors and sent groups of students abroad to take
advantage of Western science and technology. He began to found
military and supporting schools, as well as the factories (especially
textile mills) essential to his forces. He also tried to develop
144
agriculture and to concentrate on profitable cash crops, followed

a semi-monopolistic policy in the marketing of products and took
over control of an important part of the import trade. His economic
system collapsed, however, after the Treaty of 1840.23
Nevertheless, the founding of modern schools continued and,
in general (until the days of Khedive Isma'il), so also did the sending
of students for study abroad. This was influential in the dissemina-
tion of modern culture. At the same time, the establishment of the
modern schools alongside the traditional ones led to a dualism in
education and in thought, which had its own far-reaching impact
on cultural development.
The era of Ibrahim Pasha in Syria (1831-40) was also influen-
tial, turning a new page in the course of modernisation and stabilisa-
tion. Firm measures were adopted to bring about changes in certain
aspects of traditional life. Local chieftains were stripped of their
autonomy and of their important functions, such as the collection
of taxes. Direct rule was imposed, and this required that steps be
taken to undermine the foundations of local power. Such measures
included the imposition of mandatory military service and the
disarming of the population in order to strip governors of their
military power. Ibrahim established local councils that embodied
the idea of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims by granting
to all a participatory role in these councils. He also introduced a
system of direct taxation to replace the semi-feudal system that had
comprised the source of the social and economic power of the local
notables. Hence, it should come as no surprise that the urban
notables played an active role in the revolts that broke out in many
Syrian towns. 24 In the literary sphere too, the era of Ibrahim
Pasha was one of noteworthy influence, for books were sent from
Egypt to Syria on a variety of subjects (especially for the schools),
including language and history.
The era of Ibrahim Pasha facilitated the course of the Tanzi-
mat in Syria, and it is worth noting that here the influence of the
TanzTmat was felt in the field of law before that of education. The
Al-Rushdiya school in Aleppo, opened in 1861, was probably the
first of the new schools in Syria. Schools were subsequently founded
in Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut and Jerusalem, but the movement
did not achieve its fullest expansion until the 1880s. The new law
for provinces was applied in Syria in 1865.
In Tunisia, the same trend towards reform was represented in
the effort to modernise the army, to set up factories to provide its
needs and to found modern schools (especially the Al-Sadiqiya).
145
This movement extended from the days of Ahmad Bey (r. 1837-55)
until the time of Muhammad al-Sadiq (r. 1859-81) and Khayr
al-Din al-Tunisi (d. 1890). 25
Socio-economic changes
The Arab lands witnessed socio-economic changes that affected their

structure. The upper classes in the Arab societies of the first half
of the nineteenth century consisted of families active in the religious
establishment that owned lands of their own or supervised those
of the pious foundations (the waqfs). There was also a group of
notables possessed of political or social influence, of positions in
the administration and of land. This state of affairs, however, was
affected by new factors, foremost among which were the modern-
isation of the administration, the Land Law and the development
of international trade.
The administrative aspects of the Tanzimat were influential in
that, by giving the ulema and the notables a major role in the
administration and in the local councils, they led in the first instance
to the concentration of civil leadership in the hands of these indi-
viduals. The judiciary and the administration of religious institu-
tions were also in the hands of the ulema. As for the notables, they
tried, with no small degree of success, to assert their interests and
expand their landholdings by taking advantage of their positions
in the administration and on the councils. They were prepared to
co-operate with the central government; but, with their more con-
servative elements, they were not pleased with certain aspects of
modernisation, such as equality before the law. Their influence
suffered a considerable setback in Syria after the sectarian distur-
bances of 1860. This strife ended by confirming the trend towards
modernisation, which then began in earnest. In other regions, such
as Iraq, however, this did not occur. 26
From another viewpoint, the economic expansion of the West
led to the domination of communications, banks and public debts
by European capital. The development of international trade led
to the emergence of a class of commercial agents and local mer-
chants for the most part from the religious minorities, and this class
was linked to the West by its activities and perspective. Some of
the activity in domestic trade remained in the hands of Muslim mer-
chants. Some of these turned to land as an opportunity for profitable
investment, and in this they were assisted by the application of the
146
Land Law of 1858.27

The trend towards centralisation and modernisation in the
administration led, on the one hand, to the shrinking of the role
of the religious families in the judiciary and in the administration
of the waqfs, and on the other, to the state's effort to form a class
more closely tied to the centre. This caused some of the religious
families and urban notables to try to obtain administrative and
military posts by first enrolling in the modern Ottoman schools.
It is worthy of note that in both cases the basis of economic power
took the form of land ownership on the one hand and domestic trade
on the other. The modern schools, especially in Istanbul, opened
opportunities to ambitious elements hoping to find the means to
gain government posts, and this became particularly easy for
members of wealthy families. The military academies, however,
where the students' expenses were paid by the state, were open to
enterprising individuals even from families of modest means. These
were the groups that were aspiring to a greater role in the new
circumstances. But, as was to be expected, the political and admin-
istrative perspectives of the Ottomans were not amenable to this,
since administrative centralisation of necessity meant that posts were
awarded with the aim of broadening the powers of the central
government and reinforcing the hegemony of its own elements (i.e.
Turkish ones) in the administration.
Cultural revival
A trend towards cultural revival began in the Arab lands. Egypt

played a pioneering role in the modernisation and enrichment of
the Arabic language, in the development of prose and composition
in a modern Arabic style and in the revival and regeneration of
ancient Arabic poetry, beginning with al-Barudi (d. 1904) and
extending on to the time of Shawqi (d. 1932). Egypt also played
a key role in the movement to rejuvenate linguistic studies and
writing in the Arabic sciences, as well as in the training of teachers
of Arabic, especially after the founding of the Dar al-'Ulum.
The beginnings of this were linked to the movement of modern-
isation in the days of Muhammad 'AH, the opening of the schools
necessary for the army, and then of schools for general education.
The sending of students for study abroad was another contributing
factor. Educational policy required that much be translated from
foreign books into Arabic, and that books also be composed in
147
Arabic. This produced a movement that reached its peak in the

1870s and 1880s. A certain number of cultured Syrians participated
in the translation activity at first, their work being checked by such
scholars of al-Azhar as Shaykh Nasr al-Hurlnl (d. 1874). The
pioneering roles in the movement were then taken up by Rifa'a
al-Tahtawi and the men of his school.
Al-Tahtawi (d. 1873) sought to rejuvenate writing on the prin-
ciples of Arabic grammar and submitted a proposal for a School
of Languages (opened in 1835) to train translators and teachers.
He called for an easier and simplified style of writing; as he states
in his Takhtis al-ibriz, he sought in his own works 'to adhere to a
practice of concise and simple expression so that its import can be
understood by all people.' 28 He also tried to take up the impor-
tant task of bringing the Arabic language into line with new ideas
and developments, and to establish or derive Arabic equivalents
to express newly emerging concepts, or to Arabise new items of
technical vocabulary that had to be expressed in Arabic. For use
in the schools he wrote an essay on Arabic grammar 'composed
in a new style that renders difficult points comprehensible to the
reader who wishes to learn'. 29 He regarded as particularly impor-
tant the editing and publication of the principal historical, literary
and legal works of the Arab heritage, and took up the task of
publishing such sources as the Muqaddima of Ibn Khaldun, the
Maqdmdt of al-Hariri, the Khizdnat al-adab of al-Baghdadl and the
Qur'an commentary of al-Fakhr al-Razi. He tried to rewrite Egyp-
tian and Islamic history according to modern methodological prin-
ciples, and in this he directed thinking towards the necessity of
rejuvenating historical writing. 30
All this was representative of the rejuvenating trends in language
and literature, and these were perspectives that after al-Tahtawi
continued and grew, especially in the latter half of the nineteenth
century. Making use of both Arabic sources and European works,
'All Mubarak (d. 1893) wrote his book Al-Khitat al-tawfiqiya, in
which he adapted the Arabic language as a vehicle for historical,
geographical and sociological writing. 'Abd Allah Fikrl (d. 1889)
wrote in defence of the language and rejected the view of those who
called for writing in colloquial Arabic. His argument was that the
language should be modified and that literary and artistic works
should be written in classical Arabic and made available to all
individuals in the umma. He also called upon decision-makers to
enact reforms improving and simplifying the educational process,
in order to facilitate the dissemination of scientific knowledge
148
while preserving the unity of the Arabic language. In this he saw

a way for the Arabs to preserve their literature and heritage and
to keep in contact with the history and values of the nation. 'In
the final analysis', he concluded, 'the classical Arabic language is
the means by which the Arabs will achieve progress in all of their
affairs.' 31 This was a perspective representative of a clear Arab
consciousness.
Muhammad 'Abduh (d. 1905) also played a role in the develop-
ment of the genre of the critical and reformist essay, and also in
the rejuvenation of the style for writing on religious topics. In some
of his essays he called for the creation of a new method for writing
books on the Arabic sciences, and for doing so in styles easier to
comprehend. In Al-cUrwa al-wuthqd his writings had the effect, on
the one hand, of broadening the scope of Arabic writing and opening
new horizons for the language as a vehicle for intellectual and
literary expression, and on the other, of developing the Arabic
writing style and endowing its methods with vitality and renewed
spirit. Considering that Arabic was in need of reform, and pointing
to how Western peoples (such as the French) had founded academies
to produce dictionaries and study the historical development of their
language, he called for the reform of Arabic writing styles in all
fields.32
The press played a prominent role in culture, and of particular
importance were the newspaper Wddi l-Nil, the oldest (1867)
political newspaper, and the journal Rawdat al-maddris, founded by
'Ali Mubarak in 1870, with contributions from a circle of eminent
Egyptian cultural and literary figures. Mubarak entrusted the
editorship to Rifa'a al-Tahtawi, and in his opening editorial in the
first issue the latter wrote that the journal was to be a tool to
disseminate the cultural message of the Egyptian Office of Educa-
tion: the diffusion of the sciences and the spread of the arts, so as
to reach all of the people of the nation. He also pointed out that
it would be written 'in an easy and clearly expressed style, in a
classical unvulgarised idiom, but foregoing the hardship of difficult
constructions . . . ' It was the policy of the journal to include new
works and to discuss various artistic and scientific topics, including
some translations, 'all this in an easy-flowing style of Arabic'. 33
This era also witnessed the founding of the societies, among them
the Society of Education (Jam'iyat al-ma'drif, founded in 1868), the
first learned society to appear in Egypt for the diffusion of culture
through writing and publishing. It undertook the task of printing
such classical works in history, language and literature as the
149
Taj al- 'arus of Murtada al-Zabidi, the Al-Baydn wa-l-tabyin of al-Jahiz

and the Muhddardt al-adab of al-Raghib al-Isfahani. There was thus
an increasing interest in publishing works of the medieval Arabic
heritage, especially in the days of Khedive Isma'il. This is obvious
from the great number of works published at Bulaq, these exceeding
2,000 by about the mid-nineteenth century.
Writing on language, literature, criticism and rhetoric continued
to develop. It is worth noting that certain aspects of the concern
for language and literature echoed a more general phenomenon:
the awakening of the Arab consciousness, the tendency to draw
attention to the fundamental elements that had shaped the Arab
nation and the assertion of its identity in the face of challenges. This
phenomenon found expression in the defence of Arabism and the
Arabic language in the writings of a group of scholars in Syria and
Lebanon, as well as in Egypt and Iraq.
Butrus al-Bustani (d. 1883) compiled his dictionary Muhit al-
muhit and wanted it to serve the homeland and its people, hoping
to see them progress in knowledge and civilisation in the service
of their noble language. 34
Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq (d. 1887) composed his Al-Jasus 'aid
l-qamus in 1866 and made it clear that his reason for doing so was
'the desire to inspire Arabic-speaking people to love their noble
language'. He refutes those who claim that Arabic is unsuited to
our time and considers that the deficiencies in its vocabulary had
arisen from the creation of new arts and vocations. This casts no
disgrace on Arabic; rather, disgrace lies in the borrowing of words
from foreign languages when we are capable of forming them from
our own language. Hence, there was a need 'for further elabora-
tion of the vocabulary and other constituent elements of our
language, and for distinguishing its fundamental principles from
its secondary elements . . . ' He calls for recourse to the coining
of new words in this sphere, and implores the scholars contributing
to Rawdat al-maddris to resort to this as a means for avoiding certain
foreign terms. He also praises the pioneering role of Egypt, saying,
'Egypt is the fountain-head and source of the Arabic sciences, and
the word of its scholars is adhered to in all of the provinces. When
they decide on a method for forming newly coined terms, all writers
and authors follow their example.' 35
Jabr Dumit (d. 1930) wrote articles discussing various aspects
of the history of the Arabic language, the philosophy of its
emergence and development and the means to improve it. He spoke
in great detail of the richness of the language and asserted that its
150
range was fully broad enough to meet the requirements of the

modern world. 3 6 Some authors applied modern methods in their
writing on language, literature and literary history. Among these
was Nasif al-Yaziji (d. 1871), whose Fasl al-khitab fi usul lughat al-i'rab
was written for young people. 3 7
Egypt was particularly attentive to linguistic studies, beginning
with Rifa'a al-Tahtawi in his Al-Tuhfa al-maktablyafi taqrlb al-lugha
al-(arabiya. Later, Hifni Nasif (d. 1919) produced his study
'Mumayyizat lughat al-'arab', 3 8 a study of the origins of the
Arabic dialects in light of the earliest immigrating tribes, as deter-
mined through examination of pronunciation. This was followed
by the articles of Muhammad 'Abduh on the reform of Arabic and
its writing style.
The Dar al-'Ulum school (founded in 1871) played a major role
in the teaching of Arabic in the schools; similarly, its scholars took
part in writing on grammar, inflection, literature and rhetoric.
Among these was Shaykh Husayn al-Marsafi (d. 1890), who
collected his Dar al-'Ulum lectures into a book entitled Al-Wasila
al-adabiya li-'ulum al-'arabiya.39 This was probably the first book
written in a modern method on the Arabic language, and it posed
important questions in the history of the Arabic language, its
literature and the development of the Arabic sciences. The book
reveals its author's knowledge of the Arabic heritage and appeals
for a return to the primary sources and for an open and critical
attitude in comprehending the views of earlier writers. Hamza
Fathullah (d. 1918), another scholar at the Dar al-'Ulum, wrote
a book entitled Al-Mawahib al-fathiya fi 'uliim al-lugha al-'arabiya.*0
Among the topics he discussed were the Arabic sciences, the special
features of the language, the correct means to decide a point of
language, grammar or inflection, and a summary of the most
important linguistic works then in circulation. Hifni Nasif was one
of the first graduates of the Dar al-'Ulum (1882). In his book Ta'rikh
al-dddb aw hayat al-lugha al- (arabiya*x he sought to elucidate various
aspects of the Arabic language, its applications and its stages of
development from the time it first emerged until the author's own
day. In his addresses at the Dar al-'Ulum Club he also showed an
interest in Arabisation and its origins in the Arabic language. 4 2
Syria was the scene of a cultural movement, especially in the
last quarter of the nineteenth century. Here it can be pointed out
that the Christian schools in Lebanon were playing an active role
in this before the arrival of the foreign Protestant and Catholic
missions. When the missions came, they at first did no more than
151
build up local bases of support with the help of the indigenous

population; even as late as the 1870s their presses played no role
in promoting the Arabic heritage, since these establishments until
the last quarter of the century limited themselves to the publica-
tion of religious and sectarian books. The output of these presses
only became of practical benefit when they began to print literary
or scholarly books. It was with this development that they began
to participate in the movement of cultural revival. 43
The American missionaries, through Arab writers upon whom
they relied for assistance, contributed to the development of an
Arabic style suited to school textbooks and newspaper reports. But
the first generation of these writers, including such men as al-
Shidyaq, al-Yaziji and al-Bustani, were not products of the
missionary schools. And it is well known that one of the effects of
missionary activity was to provoke a spirit of antagonism among
the religious communities and to intensify the feeling of antipathy
among the Muslims for the Europeans. Moreover, the allegiance
of the missionary schools was first to their own countries. This
atmosphere was probably a causal factor behind the founding of
modern indigenous Islamic schools. Here it is worth mentioning
the Islamic Beneficent Society (Al-Jamciya al-khayriya al-isldrriiya; also
called the Society of Beneficent Pursuits, Jam'lyat al-maqdsid
al-khayriya, or simply 'Al-Maqasid'), established with encourage-
ment from Midhat Pasha and essentially concerned with the opening
of schools in Damascus, Beirut and other cities. 44
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the Educational Law
of 1869 was more conspicuously applied, and modern government
schools — elementary, secondary (sultdriiye) and preparatory military
(rixshdiye) — were established in the main cities of Syria. The schools,
including the private ones, were subject to official supervision, the
reasons for this probably encompassing suspicion and fear of the
missionary schools as well as the Empire's need for civil servants.
It bears notice that the concern for the Arabic language was in the
indigenous schools, while it was certain of the foreign schools that
with the passage of time they gradually came to lose interest in it.
It is also worth noting that increasing numbers of Syrians and
Iraqis 45 who graduated from the sultariiye and riishdiye (military)
schools continued on to higher education, both civilian and military,
in Istanbul. Many of those who participated in the Arab movement,
especially graduates from the military academy, were educated in
this way.
152
Beginnings of the modern consciousness
There was a strong connection between the beginnings of the

modern Arab consciousness and circumstances prevailing in the
Arab lands. These beginnings were spontaneous, arising from the
awakening within the purview of Islam and from the revival of Arab
culture. The two lines of dynamism and development in Arab
history were within the sphere of Islam and the framework of the
Arabic language, and it was within these two perspectives that the
move towards reform or national awakening arose.
The first signs of the Arab consciousness began to appear within
the purview of Islam in the latter half of the eighteenth century,
and manifested themselves in a call for a return to early Islam and
in the rejection of deviations from it and of the consequences
precipitated by such departures. In this call one can see a response
to the domestic challenge posed by decline, criticism of the Islam
embodied in the rule of the Ottomans and a rejection of this
authority and what it stood for. In this connection it should be noted
that early Islam witnessed the close correlation of Islam with
Arabism, and that this was the era of the glorious achievements
of Arab Islam. The Arab-Islamic consciousness manifested itself
in Arab movements on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire:
Wahhabism in the Arabian peninsula, and then the Sanusiya move-
ment along the desert fringes of North Africa. The Wahhabi move-
ment obviously refused to recognise Ottoman authority and by
virtue of its own perspective considered that the caliphate should
be Arab. This trend was not limited to the frontier regions but
encompassed a broader sphere, as can be seen from the Salafiya
movement in Iraq and Egypt.
The first signs of an intellectual awakening began to appear in
Egypt in the late eighteenth century and were expressed in the
critical study of the traditions of the Prophet (hadith), in the atten-
tion devoted to the Arabic language and in historical writing. Early
in the period of Muhammad 'All the proponents of this activity
played their own role in the cultural revival. But the Western wave,
in the full sense of the word, competed against this first awakening
for influence on social and intellectual development. This resulted
in the introduction of new ideas, especially the ideas of the French
Revolution and the concepts of liberalism, and further raised the
danger of foreign domination and hegemony.
In the first half of the nineteenth century there was a conspicuous
feeling for the pre-eminence of Islam and its values, accompanied
153
by admiration of the Western superiority in science and industry.

This was the attitude of the early proponents of reform, men such
as al-Tahtawi, Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi and Hamdan Khuja
(d. 1839), who grew up in Islamic culture and were exposed to
Western culture. They upheld the exalted status of Islam and the
pre-eminence of its principles and values, but at the same time they
appealed for an open attitude prepared to benefit from the source
of the West's scientific and economic strength, and drew a connec-
tion between freedom and parliamentary rule and such Islamic
principles as deliberative consultation, election and exposure of the
evils of despotism. 46 In the second half of the nineteenth century,
however, the penetration and expansion of the Westerners gradually
led to a kind of restlessness and to an increasing awareness of the
danger to the state and the threat to the heritage. This feeling was
corroborated by the emergence of groups in certain countries, such
as those in Lebanon and Egypt, asserting the supremacy of the West
in everything and calling for the adoption and imitation of all that
was Western.
Hence, within the ranks of Islam there emerged those, such as
al-Afghani (d. 1897), who sought to sow the seed of political con-
sciousness in the Islamic community and to bring about co-operation
among Muslim rulers, in order to confront the Western invasion
and resist its materialistic and disintegrative effects on society. This
was followed by the emergence of the reformist perspective of
Muhammad ' Abduh and his followers, who upheld the fundamental
sources of Islamic law and the compatibility of Islam with modern
development. At the same time, they called for the reopening of
the 'door' to independent legal reasoning (ijtihad), the expansion
of its scope, the reinterpretation of certain Islamic concepts to meet
modern needs and the elaboration of the importance of modern
science and the need to borrow from it, all this to be accompanied
by an emphasis on the Arabic language and the living heritage.
It was to be expected that an Arab point of view should emerge
within the purview of the Islamic line, and that this should find
among its advocates those calling for the national awakening of the
Arabs, the upholders of the faith, and for an Arab caliphate that
would strengthen Islam. Some went further as they moved towards
acknowledgement of the patriotic and ethnic identity binding the
Arabs together. Such an orientation as this played its own role in
the formation of the Arab consciousness and in the promotion of
the nationalist perspective.
On the other hand, Western views, especially such ideas of the
154
French Revolution as freedom, equality and patriotism, began to

permeate into Ottoman lands from the first half of the nineteenth
century onwards. These concepts, which we find expressed in both
Turkish and Arabic, 47 were introduced through a variety of con-
tacts, but especially through the military schools and the groups
of students sent abroad to study. With the passage of time, these
produced an elite familiar with certain aspects of Western culture
and liberal thought. This group played a role in the modernisation
of institutions and legal codes and in the expansion of the modern
schools, trends that effectively opened the door to currents of liberal
thought. The enlightened elite held that the sanctity of life and
property and the equitable application of the law were part of the
foundations of liberty. Initially, however, such ideas as the realisa-
tion of justice and the obligation of both ruler and ruled to respect
the law were elaborated within the purview of Islam, especially when
it was noticed that the secular reforms of the Tanzimat had increased
rather than limited the powers of the sultan. Beginning in the 1870s
the issue had clearly gone beyond modernisation to deal with the
question of limiting the absolute power of the sultan. These con-
cerns were expressed by certain Turkish intellectuals, beginning
with men like Ibrahim Shinasi (d. 1871), Ziya Pasha (d. 1880) and
Mehmed Namiq Kemal (d. 1888), who were largely concerned with
adhering to Islam and applying the concepts of liberty and popular
sovereignty within the framework of such Islamic principles as
deliberative consultation (shiird) and the voluntary profferment of
the oath of allegiance (bay'a). Similar thinking emerged in such Arab
lands as Egypt and Syria in the second half of the nineteenth
century. 48
Patriotism
One idea that emerged was that of patriotism (watanlya), and the
sharing of common bonds, rights and responsibilities among the
sons of the nation. The idea of the watan, or * homeland', had roots
in the literature of the classical Arabic heritage, 49 but it now took
on a political significance due to the influence of the new ideas and
the need to respond to internal problems and to overcome sectarian
difficulties. In Egypt, for example, the favoured status of the
Circassian Turks with respect to the native Egyptians raised the
issue of the quest for equality by a people reduced to a status lower
than that of the foreign elements dominating their country. In
155
Damascus and Lebanon, there was sectarian strife in 1860.

The idea of patriotism first appeared with Rifa'a al-Tahtawi,
who spoke of the bond of the homeland and accorded it a special
status, referring to the Prophetic tradition 'Love of the homeland
is an article of faith' in composing a patriotic poem in which the
recurring refrain is 'Love of the homelands is an article of faith.' 50
He considered that bonds among the people of the homeland arise
from the facts that their language is one, that they are ruled by one
sovereign and that they submit to the guidance of one sacred law
and one system of government. This view is not devoid of influence
by the concept of the national state.
Al-Tahtawi regarded patriotism as a fundamental bond and a
motive for sacrifice, and linked citizenship to general rights. An
individual's affiliation with the homeland means 'that he enjoys the
rights of his land, the greatest of these rights being complete freedom
within the collective social entity (i.e. the society) in which he lives'.
It also means that the individual submits to the authority of the
law of the homeland and assists in its enforcement, 'hence, his
submission to the fundamental rules of his land requires that his
homeland guarantee to him the enjoyment of civil rights (al-huqiiq
al-madariiya) and the benefit of its own particular advantages'. When
he speaks of freedom he refers in particular to religious freedom,
'freedom of creed, opinion and denominational affiliation (madhhab),
provided that it does not depart from religion'. But patriotism does
not imply the guarantee of the individual's rights and no more; it
also requires that he honour the rightful claims that the homeland
has upon him, one of these being that he not violate the rights of
his brothers in the homeland, whatever their religious convictions
may be.
Al-Tahtawi considers that the brotherhood of patriotism is a
counterpart to the brotherhood of religion; just as the faith makes
requirements of the believer with respect to his fellow believer, the
brotherly bond of patriotism imposes all the same kinds of require-
ments when it enjoins the members of the homeland to honour their
mutual rights and obligations. It is the duty of the people of the
homeland to co-operate for the improvement of their condition and
the betterment of their institutions, and to do so in all that pertains
to the felicity, greatness and prosperity of the homeland. So far as
al-Tahtawi is concerned, the pivot of patriotism is Egypt, the noblest
of homelands and the one most loved by its people. 51 His
patriotism thus takes the form of an intense loyalty to the land in
which he was born and raised.
156
Al-Tahtawl elaborated a concept of patriotism that incorporated

both modern concepts on the one hand and ideas and images from
the heritage and history of classical Islam on the other, and his
formulation was clearly influential among later intellectuals.52 The
idea of patriotism had roots in the classical heritage, but the
articulation of it by al-Tahtawi was something new. It was deeply
embedded among the Egyptians through the course of the nine-
teenth century, with al-Tahtawi himself playing a role in this. 53
In his passing references, al-Afghani speaks in glowing terms
of the role of patriotism and its importance in the national awaken-
ing and in confronting colonialism.54
In his article 'Political Life' {Al-Haydt al-siydsiya), Muhammad
'Abduh analyses the idea of the homeland and expounds on its role
as the foundation of political life. Quoting the statements of political
thinkers, both ancient Greeks and some modern French authors,
he considers that 'the finest of the faces of unity is that of the
homeland, because on this disagreement and contention are
impossible'. He defines the homeland as 'the place to which your
descent is traced, where your rights are protected and your obliga-
tions known, and where your life, family and property are secure.
And as they (the political thinkers) have said of the homeland, there
can be no homeland without freedom.' That is, if there is no
freedom, then the absence of rights means that there is no homeland.
'Abduh thus ties the homeland to freedom and rights, and considers
that honour, felicity and prosperity can only be achieved through
the well-being of the homeland as a whole. He refers to the con-
nection between patriotism and personal honour, the latter requir-
ing one's fervent zeal for the homeland. In these views he recalls
the ideas of al-Tahtawi. Muhammad 'Abduh was thinking of Egypt
and discusses patriotism within that context.
He also indicates the reasons why one should love one's
homeland and show concern for it. First, the homeland is one's place
of residence and origin; second, it is the locus of the rights and
responsibilities that comprise the pivot of political life; third, it is
the basis for the identity that determines one's place in mankind.
In light of these considerations, 'it is incumbent upon the Egyp-
tian to love his homeland in all respects'. It bears mention that these
views occur within the fervently patriotic current that accompanied
the movement of 'Urabi. 5 5
Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi mentions the homeland on a number
of occasions and indicates the importance of inculcating a love of
the homeland in the souls of individuals. But for him the word
157
* homeland' (watan) means the Islamic lands in general, and not any
region in particular.56
In the writings of * Abd Allah al-Nadim (d. 1896), especially after
the movement of 'Urabi, we find an assertion of the idea of the
4
Bond of the Homeland' (al-jami'a al-wataniya). Appealing for a
brotherhood of patriotism among the various religious communities,
and especially between the Muslims and Copts, he says, 'Sons of
Egypt . . .let the Muslim among you turn to his fellow Muslim
to forge a spiritual solidarity, let the two of you then turn to the
Copt and the Israelite to consolidate the Bond of the Homeland,
and let all act as a single man pursuing a single goal: to keep Egypt
for the Egyptians.' Indeed, he declares that the Bond of the
Homeland originated in Egypt, and that the Muslims and Copts
are 'like the people of a household living together in co-operation,
sharing out amongst themselves the supervision of the various affairs
of the nation, and working hand in hand to protect the homeland
from the danger of sudden aggression.'57
Al-Nadim was involved in the founding in 1879 of the Islamic
Beneficent Society, which opened the doors of its schools to poor
students of both Muslim and Christian families. At the opening
of the first of the Society's schools, he said, 'It will teach the children
brotherhood in the homeland, keep them clear of religious or racial
fanaticism, and raise them to love the homeland and humanity.'58
Under the conditions of the British protectorate, he stressed the
unity of Egyptian Muslims, whether Arab or non-Arab, saying,
'We are sons of Egypt and do not differentiate between a Turk,
Arab and Circassian; for all of us are sons of the land.' He declares
that the Turks and Circassians are 'part of us. Our rights are theirs,
especially since the word of the faith has long drawn us together
. . . We all look to a single goal: to raise the land to prosperity,
to protect it from enemies and to hold back the hand of injustice
from ourselves and from it. Only by uniting can we achieve this
goal.' 59
Al-Nadim accords special importance to the Arabic language,
expressing, for example, the opinion that 'the man who protects
his language protects his homeland and himself. Appealing to the
Egyptians to protect Arabic in consideration of its role as an
indicator of identity, he says, 'If you do not know who you are,
the language is what you are.' He declares that the Arabic language
comprises the basis for agreement of opinion, for the unity of judge-
ment and culture and for the orderly structuring of society, and
that to neglect it is to neglect the essential character of the home-
158
land and the soundness of one's own self.60 Al-Nadlm here finds
in Arabic the primary bond among the people of the homeland.
The patriotic tendency emerged and grew in Egypt and also had
its impact on intellectuals elsewhere. In both cases, patriotism in
this period was firmly linked with the beginnings of the nationalist
consciousness.
A generation after al-Tahtawi, Butrus al-Bustanl proclaimed the
message of love of the homeland, which for him meant Syria. His
writings reveal his enthusiasm for the literary revival and for
patriotism, and his point of view became evident in the midst of
the sectarian strife of I860. 61 He preached love of the homeland
and reconciliation, and to promote these objectives he published
a newspaper (or periodical) entitled Nafir Siiriya, beginning on 29
September 1860. In it he called for accord among the religious
communities and reminded the people that they were joined together
by a single homeland, a single language and common customs and
interests. 62 He called for enlightenment through the schools and
libraries, and three years later, in 1863, he founded the National
School in Beirut 'in accordance with the principles of patriotism,
in order to preserve the language of the homeland, to appeal for
love of the homeland and to encourage patriotic relations among
its students'. 63
Al-Bustani set out to assert these concepts in his periodical
Al-Jindn (established in 1870), took 'Love of the homeland is an
article of faith' as its slogan, and sought to use it to disseminate
knowledge, to revitalise and refine the Arabic language, and to
encourage the people of the homeland to involve themselves in trade
and industry. 64 His dictionary Muhit al-muhit he compiled as a
service to the people of the homeland, hoping to see them progress
in knowledge and civilisation by means of their noble language. 65
This perspective culminated in the publication of a general encyclo-
pedia between 1876 and 1883. 66
Al-Bustani adhered to the legitimacy of Ottoman rule, pro-
claiming the idea of a Syrian homeland within the purview of the
Ottoman Empire. At the same time, he gave a prominent place
to the idea that the homeland community was bonded to Arabic,
since as both a language and a culture Arabic was a fundamental
common ground for the people of the homeland. 67
Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq dealt with the subject of patriotism and
considered that the true patriot is he who strives to promote the
welfare of his homeland, works in co-operation with the other men
of his homeland and shares their feelings. Al-Shidyaq may have
159
The Age of the Tanzlmat
been displeased with Turkish domination of the Arabs but he

remained staunchly Ottoman in his political viewpoint. He did,
however, consider that language and ethnicity determine those who
make up the nation, emphasising the Arabic language and rejecting
the stress that some placed on Turkish, the official language of the
Ottomans, at the expense of Arabic.68
The Arab consciousness also appears in the works of Adib
Ishaq (d. 1884). Influenced by the views of the French Revolution,
he called for liberty, justice and equality, and believed in the
establishment of a constitutional political system and in deliberative
consultation.69 His political loyalty was to the Ottomans, and
when he spoke of the homeland, or watan, he at first meant that
of the Ottomans.70 His thought probably underwent some change,
however, with his move to Egypt.71 He continued to tie the
homeland to the political entity, but tended to discuss this in
reference to Egypt.72 In his view, the homeland is the best of all
bases for unity, since, as Muhammad 'Abduh had said, 'on this
disagreement and contention are impossible'. In his definition of
the homeland (according to the political thinkers), he repeats
Muhammad * Abduh's definition73 and ranks the loyalty due to the
homeland above all other claims on one's loyalty. He then
enumerates the reasons why one should love one's homeland and
show one's fervent zeal for it, concluding that these imperatives
apply to Egypt and require that the Egyptian love his homeland
in all the ways he mentions. In this argument he reminds us of the
formulation of Muhammad * Abduh. 74 In his editorial in the
newspaper Misr, he regards Egypt as his homeland and finds in
land and language the bond uniting the people of a homeland. 75
The discussion set forth above may serve to indicate the influence
of Egyptian writings about patriotism on the thought of authors
in Syria. This takes on particular importance when we recall the
role of these ideas in the beginning stages of the Arab consciousness
in the nationalist perspective.
The idea of the homeland (watan) and of patriotism (watanlya)
thus appeared in the writings of a group of intellectuals, in partic-
ular in the second half of the nineteenth century, at first in Egypt,
then in Syria, in an effort to form a common ground transcending
internal and especially sectarian differences. The notion of
patriotism was accompanied by the feeling that ignorance and lack
of freedom (or lack of constitutional rule) were the primary causes
of backwardness. The call for the dissemination of knowledge and
the realisation of justice and equality — the concern for Arabic is
160
also to be noted here — was thus a general phenomenon. But for

some in particular, patriotism had become the common bond among
the people of the homeland.
Collective cultural activity in Syria
These perspectives were probably related to the first manifestations

of collective cultural activity in Syria. Here reference can be made
to the Society of Refinement (Jam'iyat al-tahdhiby founded in 1845-6),
the first Arab cultural society.76 It was a society that, rather than
limiting itself to topics of language and literature, involved itself
in discussions touching upon such subjects as patriotism and the
revival of past glories. The Oriental Society (Al-Jam'iya al-sharqlya)
was founded in 1850 with similar objectives in mind, but was a
Catholic organisation while the former was Protestant. Both societies
were therefore established within a sectarian framework.77 The
Syrian Society (Al-Jam'iya al-suriya, 1847-52) sought to become a
rallying point for members from the different confessional com-
munities, but at this stage it did not gain a generally representative
membership. The Literary Authority (Al-'Umda al-adabiya) was
established to disseminate Arabic literary works, and probably
transcended confessional lines. 78
The perspective of patriotism manifested itself in the founding
(after 1852, and lasting until 1868) of the Syrian Scientific Society
{Al-Jam'iya al-'ilmiya al-suriya) under the leadership of Amir
Muhammad Arslan (d. 1868). It included members from the
various confessional communities and sought to disseminate the
sciences and arts without taking up religious or political issues. It
appears that when the first Syrian provincial council (after the
application there of the law on provinces) recommended in 1867
that the government recognise the founding of a literary society in
Beirut, it was this society that was meant. During the governor-
ship of Rashid Pasha (1866-71) it was recognised as a branch of
the Ottoman Scientific Society (Jem'iyet-i 'ilmiye-i 'osmdniye), a
similar learned society in Istanbul. 79 Within the range of the lec-
tures and addresses delivered in the Society, some, while concen-
trating on the importance of culture and its dissemination, also
sought to expound on the great service the Arabs had lavished on
the sciences and the arts and their responsibility to regain their
former glory. And the meetings of the Society did not pass without
criticism of prevailing conditions.
161
Ibrahim al-Yaziji (d. 1906) was one of the members of the

Society, and in his poetry he sang of the past glory of the Arabs
and pointed to their pre-eminence in the sciences. In his view, the
Arabs had fallen behind when outsiders gained supremacy over
them and when the sciences fell into neglect and fanaticism replaced
religion. So far as he was concerned, the only way for the Arabs
to recover their former glory was through the reversal of these
trends. 80
Al-Yaziji called attention to the glories of the Arabs in several
of his odes, as, for example, in the one rhyming in rriim (m) and
beginning:
O Arab folk so noble: Hail!

O'er your abodes the clouds prevail. 81
It was also in this period that he circulated his ode rhyming in ha'
(b), which began:
Awaken, O Arabs, and leave slumber aside,

As danger's flood washes your knees in its tide! 82
The Society probably gave the impression of playing a role that

was more than ofjust cultural significance, for a report by the Greek
consul K.M. Basili in 1868 refers to literary meetings in Beirut at
which Arab glories were discussed, and to the fact that the pro-
ceedings also came to deal with Turkish domination and oppres-
sion. 83 Nevertheless, it is obvious that the general thrust of this
trend was cultural. There was no call for the formation of a political
entity, and the aspirations expressed were limited in scope to Syria.
Further, pro-Ottoman thought — whether conservative or revivalist
— continued to be the prevailing trend in this period. 84
This cultural awakening concealed behind it, or was itself an
indication of, a certain unrest in Syria. Various factors, all related
to socio-economic developments, were responsible for this unrest:
the break-up of the feudal system, the emergence of large individual
landholdings, the rise of groups of Christians tied to the commer-
cial and industrial interests of the West, and the reaction of Muslim
groups to the new order established by the Tanzimat, leading to
the restriction of the jurisdiction of the sacred law of Islam and to
the curbing of the traditional influence of the families of notables.
These were general phenomena, but they emerged in Syria in a
period earlier than, for example, their appearance in Iraq.
162
In the Ottoman view, society was made up of large units, i.e.

the confessional communities and such other social units as pro-
fessions and tribes, all of which had their own leaders, notables and
chiefs. The Tanzimat, however, threatened the prevailing struc-
ture of society in that they were oriented towards centralisation and
towards the formation of a government bureaucracy that would deal
with the subjects of the Empire as individuals rather than as groups.
This meant reducing the role of the traditional notables, who were
therefore opposed to reform.85 The measures that were taken,
however, promoted the influence of the notables, consolidated their
domination of the traditional educational system and enhanced their
religious status.
Here we can point out that the Christians of Syria felt that the
Ottoman order accorded them a lower status than others. The
Tanzimat introduced the idea of equality, but the attitude of the
Christians for the most part remained negative. Their children kept
their distance from the government schools, and they avoided
military service and were content to pay the bedel, or exemption
tax.86 Hence, we find among the Christians those inclined towards
separation from Ottoman rule and others favouring ties with the
West. At the same time, some of their intellectuals called for a
government embracing the principle of equality, finding in Arabic
— both as a language and as a culture — a common ground for
patriotic ties to the homeland.
It would seem that the call for equality between Arabs and Turks,
as well as the praise lavished on the role of the Arabs in Islam and
the memory of the Arab caliphate, were common notions among
Arab Muslims. Both their fear of the Western menace and their
Islamic point of view were factors behind the call for reform and
incentives for adherence to the Ottoman order, and provided room
for accommodation with the liberal Turks.
The campaign for reform culminated in Midhat Pasha's Con-
stitution of 1876, which placed emphasis on liberty and on the
curbing of despotism. In the imperial decree promulgating the Con-
stitution, it was conceded that decline was due more to domestic
administrative corruption than to external factors, and that proper
government would require the elimination of the errors and abuses
that had arisen from personal despotic rule, an emphasis on 'the
blessings of freedom, justice and equality', and the adoption of 'a
more broad-ranging system for the devolution of administrative
authority'.87 But the Constitution of Midhat Pasha was suspended
after the dissolution of the first Parliament (Mejlis-i meb'usan),
163
which had met from 19 March 1877 until 14 February 1878. This
was followed by a despotic personal rule that resulted in the paralysis
of the reform movement and obliged its proponents either to work
in secret or to emigrate abroad.
The suspension of the Constitution occurred during the Russo-
Turkish War of 1877-8. This was a total defeat for the Empire:
the Russian army occupied Edirne and marched on Istanbul, and
the Empire appeared to be on the brink of total collapse.88
Unrest in Syria and the movement of the notables
As was to be expected, this state of affairs gave rise to discontent

and unrest in Syria. The Ottoman Empire was in decline, despite
the reforms, and this was aggravated by the pressure brought to
bear by the Western states. The Muslim Arabs were anxious to
safeguard the integrity of the Empire in the face of the foreign
menace, but their awareness of its inability to protect its domains
was a cause for unrest and speculation over what the future would
bring.89
It seems that the Russian victory gave rise to alarm in certain
Syrian circles as a result not only of the Ottoman Empire's inability
to protect its domains, but also in fear of the possibility that other
Western states would seize their province.90 This situation led to
a movement among the notables of Syria: Jevdet Pasha was
appointed governor of Syria in mid-February 1878, and shortly after
his arrival the first signs of the movement appeared. Despite the
hardships that Syria had endured, nothing had happened during
the war to indicate the emergence of any serious anti-Ottoman
sentiment; similarly, relations between the Muslims and Christians
were normal. But in the final stage of the war, when the danger
became apparent, some agitation was aroused. A series of meetings
of Muslim notables from various parts of Syria was convened in
Sidon and Beirut, and culminated with a meeting in Damascus. 91
The movement decided that should the province find itself con-
fronted with the danger of occupation by a European state, Syria
was to be declared independent. If no such threat materialised, the
group proposed to move towards autonomy within the framework
of the Ottoman Empire. As a head for the new state, the move-
ment decided on Amir 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri (d. 1883), who
in principle accepted the programme of the notables, but advised
that the matter be deferred until it became clear how the Empire would
164
emerge from the war. Yusuf Karam (d. 1889), who was living in
Europe, exchanged letters with 'Abd al-Qadir about a political pro-
ject that seems to be consistent with that of the notables.92
It would thus seem that the movement of the notables was based
on patriotic rather than sectarian foundations, and that it was
stimulated by the idea of Arabism. There are some indications that
the views of the movement continued in the Islamic Beneficent
Society, founded in 1878 with the support of Midhat Pasha. 93
After the appointment of Jevdet Pasha, the sultan heard of the
secret meetings of the notables and ordered that certain of them
be arrested. In this he was probably influenced by other manifesta-
tions of the discontent. Two weeks after the end of the Congress
of Berlin on 13 July 1878, there appeared on the walls of the main
public buildings of Damascus two placards clearly seeking to incite
the people of Syria to revolt against Ottoman rule. The first, written
in Arabic, accused the Ottoman regime of responsibility for the
terrible crises that had befallen Syria, while the second, in Arabic
and Turkish, addressed itself directly to Jevdet Pasha, accused him
of corruption on a grand scale and listed his evil deeds. Both placards
fervently implored the people of Syria to rise and put an end to
the nightmare that so oppressed them. 94
The movement of the notables had posed two possibilities: first,
independence should the Ottoman Empire collapse, an issue
obviated by the Treaty of San Stefano (and then the Treaty of
Berlin), and second, autonomy or self-administration in case the
Empire survived. Their movement implicitly encouraged elements
disaffected with Ottoman rule and those eager for self-
administration, or for more than that. The placards launched attacks
on Ottoman maladministration and appealed for an end to the
Ottoman nightmare. It was difficult to draw a distinction between
the two, especially since the placards bore no explicit call for
secession.
The influence of the movement of the notables did not end during
Jevdet Pasha's tenure as governor but in fact continued on into
the era of Midhat Pasha, who was appointed governor of Syria on
22 November 1878 and held the post until 31 August 1881. It would
be unwise to consider the placards that appeared during the
governorship of Midhat Pasha (and after his recall) without relating
them to the placards that appeared during the governorship of
Jevdet Pasha.
The appointment of Midhat Pasha probably gave rise to a certain
degree of optimism, for he adhered to a policy more open than
165
that of his predecessors. He admitted many Arabs into the civil

service, including the posts of qd'im-maqdm (a district administrator)
and mutasarrif (lieutenant-governor), and gave the minorities broader
representation in the administration. He encouraged the develop-
ment of the press and the dissemination of new ideas to such an
extent that during his tenure the number of newspapers rose to more
than twelve. In order to facilitate the development of trade, he took
an interest in the construction of roads and in the maintenance of
security.
He also tried to involve the notables in the financing of such
development projects as the Tripoli tramway system, and en-
couraged the founding of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce. The
most prominent manifestation of such efforts appeared in his
campaign to expand education, when he urged the notables to
establish societies for this purpose, and himself funded branches
of the Islamic Beneficent Society (Al-Maqasid) in a number of cities,
such as Damascus, Beirut and Sidon. He apparently noticed that
education was still primarily in the hands of the schools run by the
foreign missionaries, who had their own objectives. He therefore
decided to offer modern education to young Muslims, for their own
benefit and in the interest of the Empire. In fact, the number of
schools increased to more than thirty, including a number of official
military preparatory (rushdiye) schools, most of them funded pri-
vately. He probably tried to co-operate with the enlightened, as
is indicated by his support for Shaykh Tahir al-Jaza'iri (d. 1920)
in the establishment in Damascus of a public library, which later
expanded into the famous Zahirlya Library. 95
In such an environment as this, it was to be expected that signs
of prevailing perspectives would continue to appear. One of these
was the idea of self-administration. A group of merchants and
businessmen met Sir Henry Layard, the British ambassador to
Istanbul, during his visit to Syria in 1879, and in the name of the
Arabs of Syria — without distinction of creed — disclosed to him
a desire for decentralised administration. Midhat Pasha was
apparently aware of the existence of discontent and aspirations
among the Syrians. In the consultation between him and Sir Henry
Layard, the latter indicated that reports had reached him concerning
an Arab or Islamic conspiracy based, it was said, in Medina or
Mecca, with one of its objectives being the establishment of an Arab
empire. Midhat Pasha replied that he had recently received infor-
mation confirming these reports. 96
Such information as this may be an exaggerated echo from the
166
movement of the notables. This much can be implicitly understood

from a report by the French consul Delaporte in Beirut on 9
November 1879, in which he discussed an Arab conspiracy, with
participants in Aleppo, Mosul, Baghdad, Mecca and Medina. The
aim of the conspiracy was to establish an Arab kingdom, and the
name of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri in Damascus was men-
tioned as a proposed ruler of this kingdom. He then stated that these
reports were only rumours, and that he could neither deny nor con-
firm their accuracy. 97
In his conversation with Midhat Pasha, Sir Henry Layard
referred to what he had heard from the British consul Henderson
and others about the existence of secret societies in Aleppo,
Damascus, Beirut and other cities. He added that Henderson had
assured him that in Syria there were secret societies, made up of
both Muslims and Christians, that sought to bring about a move-
ment to free the province of the sultan's misgovernment and to
establish some kind of autonomy. 98
Such information as this indicates that reports trickling in to one
consul or another had it that secret agitation among the Muslims
was aiming to establish self-rule, and that Christians were involved
in some of the secret committees. When placards appeared in the
days of Midhat Pasha, the French consul in Beirut wrote a dispatch
(2 June 1880) referring to their appearance in Beirut and Damascus
and stating that they called upon the people to demand self-rule.
He also made it clear that he was inclined to believe that the Russo-
Turkish War of 1877-8 had revived the hopes of the Syrians to gain
their independence. In this way he drew a connection between the
appearance of the placards and the general atmosphere produced
by the war. 99
The placards
These placards, about which much has been written, 100 appeared
in 1880. The first appeared in Beirut early in June, but was quickly
removed by the police and so passed unnoticed. 101 Several days
later a new placard appeared. Two or three placards were pasted
up on the streets of Beirut on 27 June, 1 0 2 and in July a placard
appeared in Damascus. 103 In December, as well as after the recall
of Midhat Pasha, other placards appeared in Sidon, Tripoli,
Damascus and Beirut. 104 We shall discuss the three surviving
placards in chronological order.
167
The first placard calls for the drawing of swords, addresses itself
to the 'sons of Syria', and speaks in the name of reform. Reviling
both the lethargy (literally, al-mawt, 'death') that led to their servile
bondage to the Turks and the discord that rendered the people of
the province of little account in European eyes, it appeals to them,
to march forth in the name of Arab dignity and Syrian zeal. 105
The second placard addresses itself to the 'sons of Syria' and
declares that there is no hope for reform on the part of the Turks.
Were this not the case, why, through the course of twenty years
(i.e. since 1860) of unfulfilled promises of reform, have they failed
to introduce such measures? It goes on to revile Turkish corrup-
tion and ignorance, asking, 'Among our men of reason, the sons
of our homeland and our men of ardour, are there not to be found
people capable of governing our affairs and guarding our honour
and the awakening of our homeland? After all, we are only two
million people in a single homeland.' The authors of the placard
say that they have pledged their lives and their possessions 'as a
sacrifice to redeem the homeland', and have vowed to awaken the
people from their slumber, whatever that may cost them.
The third placard addresses itself to the 'people of the homeland',
reviles the oppression of the Turks and declares that a group of them
have seized hold of the necks of the people of the homeland, reduc-
ed them to slavery and slammed the doors to development in their
faces. It accuses the Turks of 'obliterating your sacred law and
violating the sanctity of your books; they even enact statutes con-
demning your noble language to destruction'. It reminds the people
of the homeland that in the past they had been the ones in power
and authority, that the most learned and eminent individuals had
emerged from within their ranks, that by them the conquests had
been carried forth and that 'on the foundations of your language
were raised the fundaments of the caliphate, which the Turks have
pilfered from you'. The placard notes how the men of the province
are led off to war in time of adversity; but look at how they are
repaid, and how the funds from their pious foundations (awqdf) are
diverted to other purposes. It then declares that after consultation
'with our brothers' throughout the province, it had been decided
to make the following demands. If these demands were not met,
they would appeal to the sword for a solution. The demands were:
1. Autonomy (istiqldl) shared with our Lebanese brothers,

that the interests of the homeland might unite us;
2. that Arabic be an official language of the land, and
168
that those who speak it be entitled to complete freedom to

disseminate their thoughts and publish their works and
periodicals, in accordance with the imperatives of humanity
and the requirements of progress and civilisation;
3. that our military forces be limited to service of the home-
land and be rid of servile bondage to Turkish commanders.
The placard ends with five verses from the poem rhyming in
bd' (b) that begins:
Awaken, O Arabs, and leave slumber aside,

As danger's flood washes your knees in its tide.
It is worth noting that the style of the first two placards is weak
in comparison to that of the third. Similarly, the last placard
indicates that the secret society issuing it had cells in various parts
of the province, something we do not see in the first two placards.
And while both of these are directed to the 'sons of Syria', the third
provides for the inclusion of the Lebanese within the framework
of the homeland. At any rate, it is the bond of the homeland (Syria)
that is encountered in the placards, and an Arab spirit that
permeates them.
The first placard makes implicit reference to reform and to an
awakening and the elimination of discord, and the second proclaims
the futility of hoping for reform on the part of the Turks and calls
for self-administration. But the third is more comprehensive in its
criticism and contains a clear programme.
The complaint of oppression and despotism and the defence of
Arabic may have been issues relevant to the people of the homeland
as a whole. But discontent over such matters as the obliteration of
the sacred law of Islam, contempt for the sanctity of the Book (i.e.
the Our'an), the sending of Syrian forces to distant fronts and the
misappropriation of waqf funds — all these pertained to the Muslims
alone. Similarly, the way in which clear reference is made to the
fundaments of the caliphate being Arabic, and to how the Turks
pilfered them, are expressive of an Arab-Islamic aspiration in this
period, one that would recur in the days of Sultan 'Abdulhamid.
Turning to the demands, these focus on self-administration
within the context of a Syrian unity (including Lebanon), and on
recognition of Arabic as an official language, as well as freedom
of expression and of the press. These were general and commonly
shared demands, to which is added that of limiting military service
169
to the confines of the homeland. This conveys the impression that

the third placard did not originate from the same source that had
produced the first two. 106
In a dispatch dated 13 August 1880, the British consul in
Damascus referred to the appearance of revolutionary placards, one
of which he found posted on the door of his house. The placard
was obviously penned by one of the ulema, he said, since it was
to a certain extent influenced by the language of the Qur'an. Never-
theless, it was revolutionary since it called on the people to rise up
and rid themselves of the rule of those who despise the principles
of the Qur'an, behave like polytheists (mushrikiin; by this it was prob-
ably meant that they violate the sacred law of Islam) and bring
misery and ruin to the faithful Muslims in Syria. 107 This recalls
the third placard.
The consular reports refer to Midhat Pasha's connection with
these movements and to the fundamental role played by the Islamic
Beneficent Society (the Maqasid). On 17 January 1881, the British
acting consul108 in Beirut observed that the prevailing opinion was
that the placards had emanated from the Society, that resentment
of Turkish rule and demands for reform had long preceded the
appearance of the placards, and that some of the malcontents had
joined the Society at the time of its foundation. From another source
he learned that the revolutionary society was behind the founding
of the Maqasid Society and that Midhat Pasha had founded and
patronised the latter in order to promote the activities of the revolu-
tionary society.109 Likewise, the French consul in Beirut attributed
the placards to the Maqasid Society, which had included certain
Christians among its members so as to conceal its political aims.
He also stated that Hamdi Pasha (the successor of Midhat Pasha)
was suspicious of the Maqasid Society. 110 Government agents
writing secret reports (jurndldt) to Istanbul from Damascus also
linked the placards to Midhat Pasha, who was using them as a
means either to gain autonomy in Syria or, as even some of his
supporters believed, to apply pressure in order to gain broader
powers in the province. 111 Some attributed the third placard to the
Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Arab Community
(Jam 'lyat hifz huqiiq al-milla al- 'arabiya), which had cells in Damascus,
Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli, and called for the unification of Muslim
and Christian ranks. 112
Contemporary sources hint that Midhat Pasha did play a role
in the appearance of the placards, a reasonable conjecture in light
of the governor's connection with the Maqasid Society, or the
170
atmosphere of relative freedom that prevailed during his term of

office, and the fact that he failed to adopt any punitive measures.
The appearance of the placards in Damascus was one reason for
the despatch of a commission to investigate the situation in Syria.
This commission in the end recommended the recall of Midhat Pa-
sha from the governorship of the province, and he was accordingly
transferred to the governorship of Izmir. 113
The Ottoman authorities regarded the Maqasid Society as the
culprit primarily responsible for the placards, and therefore closed
its offices, prohibited it from engaging in educational work and
transferred its assets and functions to the official Board of Educa-
tion. A few years later, while he was in Beirut, Muhammad ' Abduh
sent to the Sheykh-ulTslam a memorandum, dated Jumada II 1304
(March 1887), in which he denied that the inhabitants of Syria
harboured any ambition to separate from the Empire of the
caliphate. He declared that this erroneous conjecture arose from
statements made by naive individuals of no particular consequence.
He also expressed the view that the charge that the Maqasid Society
had political goals was motivated by sectarian prejudices, and
rebuked the Ottoman authorities for suspending this society, which
rescued Muslim children from exposure to the influence of foreigners
on their thoughts. 114
The period between the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War and
the suspension of the Constitution thus proved to be one of unrest
and aspirations in Syria, as manifested in the movement of the
notables and then in the appearance of secret activity in the form
of revolutionary placards in Damascus in 1878. These ideas con-
tinued after the arrival of Midhat Pasha, with the newly founded
Maqasid Society apparently including in its membership a certain
representation from the movement. The atmosphere of relative
freedom that prevailed during Midhat Pasha's term of office enabled
the revolutionary trend to become more active, thus resulting in
the formation of non-sectarian secret societies, most of the members
of which were Muslims. Particular attention may be drawn to a
revolutionary reform society in Damascus, with cells elsewhere in
the province. This society was responsible for the third placard,
and may have had contact with members of the Maqasid Society.
It is worth noting that the third placard came to embody the essence
of the demands made by the Arabs in the Ottoman Empire until
early in the second decade of the twentieth century. 115
171
Notes
1. Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Land Regime, Social Structure and

Modernization in the Ottoman Empire', in William R. Polk and R.L.
Chambers (eds), The Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nine-
teenth Century (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968), pp. 41 ff.
2. Peter Gran, The Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, 1760-1840
(University of Texas Press, Austin, 1979), pp. 19 ff, 33 ff. See also Joseph
Hajjar [L 'Europe et les destinees du Proche-Orient (1815-1848) (Bloud et Gay,
Tournai, 1970), pp. 65-6, 69 ff = ] Urubba wa-masir al-sharq al- 'arabi, trans.
Butrus al-Hallaq and Majid Ni'ma (Al-Mu'assasa al-'arabiya li-1-dirasat
wa-1-nashr^ Beirut, 1976), pp. 13-14, 17 ff.
3. J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary
Record (Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1956), vol. I, pp. 110-11.
4. Moshe Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861: The
Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society (Clarendon Press, London, 1968),
pp. 176-9; Ma'oz, 'The Impact of Modernization on Syrian Politics and
Society', in Polk and Chambers (eds), Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle
East, pp. 346-7.
5. See Ilyas 'Abduh Qudsi, 'Nubdhata'rikhiyafi 1-hiraf al-dimashqiya',
in Actes du Sixieme Congres International des Orientalistes (E.J. Brill, Leiden,
1884-5), vol. II. 1, pp. 7 ff [trans. Yusuf Ibish in his 'Elias Qudsi's Sketch
of the Guilds of Damascus in the 19th Century', Middle East Economic Papers,
1967, pp. 41-62]; Dominique Chevallier, 'Western Development and
Eastern Crisis in the Mid-Nineteenth Century', in Polk and Chambers
(eds), Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, pp. 206-19.
6. Charles Issawi, 'The Economic Development of Egypt, 1800-1960',
in Charles Issawi (ed.), The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975), pp. 359 ff; John P. Spagnola,
France and Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1914 (Ithaca Press, London, 1977), pp.
16-17 (on the French recourse to Christian intermediaries in Beirut and
Lebanon), pp. 20 ff, 32 (on the role of Roman Catholic missionary activity
with the Maronites and the formation of a group of clergymen of modest
class origins). See also Helen Anne Rivlin [The Agricultural Policy of Muham-
mad 'All in Egypt (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961),
pp. 171 ff = ] Al-Iqtisad wa-l-idara ft Misrfi mustahall al-qarn al-tasV 'ashar,
trans. Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahim Mustafa and Mustafa al-Husayni (Dar al-
ma'arif, Cairo, 1968), pp.' 250 ff."
7. Foreigners took such interest in the purchase and exploitation of
land that by the end of the nineteenth century they owned ten per cent
of Egypt's arable land. See Gabriel Baer, Studies in the Social History of Modern
Egypt (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969), p. 70.
8. See Gabriel Baer, A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt,
1800-1950 (Oxford University Press, London, 1962), Chs. I and II; Rivlin
[The Agricultural Policy of Muhammad 'Alt, pp. 61 ff = ] Al-Iqtisad wa-l-iddra
fi Misr, pp. 91 ff.
9. Karpat, 'Land Regime', pp. 72 ff.
10. In Lebanon in 1858, peasants raised a rebellion to demand the
abolition of feudal privileges, a measure that proved to be an essential
172
provision of the administrative code promulgated for Lebanon on 9 June

1861. See Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman
Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1976-7), vol. II, p. 84.
11. See Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform, pp. 162-3; Baer, Studies in the Social
History of Modern Egypt, pp. 62-4.
12. Karpat, 'Land Regime', pp. 86-9.
13. Albertine Jwaideh, 'Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Lower
Iraq', St Antony's Papers, vol. 16 (1963), pp. 166 ff; Hanna Batatu, The Old
Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq s Old Landed
and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978), pp. 74 ff; Salih M. Haidar,
'Land Problems of Iraq', PhD dissertation, University of London, 1942.
14. See 'Abd al-Rahlm 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abd al-Rahlm, 'Al-'Alaqat
al-iqtisadlya wa-1-ijtima'iya bayna 1-wilayat al-'arablya ibbana l-'asr al-
'uthmani (1517-1798) min khilal watha'iq al-mahakim al-shar'Iya al-
misriya', AlMajalla al-ta'rikhiya al-maghriblya, vols 29-30 (1983), pp. 395 ff.
15. The failure of Ottoman forces at the siege of Vienna in 1683 was
the high-water mark of the Ottoman tide. The Austrians advanced and
defeated the Turks in 1687, and the war ended with the Treaty of Carlowitz
in 1699. In 1718, the Treaty of Passarowitz formalised the defeat of the
Ottomans by Austria and Russia. Then the Treaty of Kiicuk Qaynarje
in 1774 crowned the victory of the Russians over the Ottomans, whose
cession of the Crimea marked their first loss of Islamic territory. The year
1787 witnessed the outbreak of a new war with Russia, joined by Austria;
however, events in Europe (resulting from the French Revolution) limited
the Russian and Austrian advance. In 1791-2, the Treaty of Sistova was
signed with Austria and the Treaty of Jassy was concluded with Russia.
The terms of these treaties were relatively moderate, but the gravity of
the Ottoman situation was quite obvious.
16. KhalU Hamid Pasha, the Grand Vizier o f Abdulhamid I (r. 1774-
89), made an effort to modernise the artillery units with the assistance of
French experts, and the School of Military Engineers was founded shortly
thereafter. See Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963), p. 21.
17. Ibid., pp. 23-5. The army obtained afetva the substance of which
was that no sultan is fit to rule who introduces European methods and
practices and forces his subjects to adhere to them. See 'Abd al-Karim
Gharayiba, Suriyafi l-qarn al-tasi1 (ashar, 1840-1876 (League of Arab States,
Institute for Advanced Arab Studies, Cairo, 1962), p. 23; Yusuf al-Dibs,
Ta'rikh Suriya (Al-Matba'a al-kathulikiya, Beirut, 1893-1905), vol. VIII,
pp. 608-21.
18. He revived the military and naval engineering schools, founded
in 1773 and 1793 respectively, and opened the School of Military Sciences
in 1834. See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, London, 1961), pp. 78-83; Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire
and Modern Turkey, vol. II, pp. 41-5, 47-8.
19. Abdul-Latif Tibawi, A Modern History of Syria, Including Lebanon and
Palestine (Macmillan, London, 1969), p. 134; Shaw, History of the Ottoman
Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. II, pp. 106-9; Davison, Reform in the
173
Ottoman Empire, p. 32-3, 244-5.

20. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol. I, pp. 113, 149.
21. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, pp. 53 ff; Ma'oz, 'The Impact
of Modernization on Syrian Politics and Society', p. 335.
22. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. II, pp.
74, 96-8, 106 ff, 118-19; Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, pp. 44,
92-4, 253; Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 40-72; Ibrahim Khalil
Ahmad, Tatawwural-ta'lim al-watanifi l-'Iraq, 1869-1932 (Matba'at jami'at
al-Basra, Basra, 1982), pp. 30 ff.
23. See Hajjar [L 'Europe et les destinies du Proche-Orient, pp. 63 ff= ] Urubbd
wa-masir al-sharq al-'arabi, p. 11 ff; Issawi, Economic History of the Middle East,
pp. 35 ff.
24. Ma'oz, 'The Impact of Modernization on Syrian Politics and
Society', p. 334; Tibawi, Modern History of Syria, pp. 58-9.
25. Leon Carl Brown, The Surest Path: The Political Treatise of a Nineteenth-
Century Muslim Statesman (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
1967).
26. Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform, pp. 80 ff, 88-9; Batatu, Old Social Classes,
pp. 8 ff.
27. See Issawi, Economic History of the Middle East, pp. 505 ff; Philip
Shukri Khuri, Tabi'at al-sulta al-siyasiya wa-tawazzu'uha ff Dimashq,
1860-1908', paper presented at the Second International Conference for
the History of Bilad al-Sham, Damascus, 1978, and published in Al-
Mu'tamar al-duwali al-thani li-ta'rikh Bilad al-Sham (Jami'at Dimashq,
Damascus, 1980), vol. I, pp. 433 ff.
28. Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi, Al-A'malal-kdmila, ed. Muhammad 'Amara
(Al-Mu'assasaal-'arablyali-l-dirasat wa-1-nashr, Beirut, 1973-7), vol. II,
P. i i .
29. Muhammad Khalaf Allah Ahmad, Ma calim al-tatawwur al-hadith fi
l-lugha al-carablya wa-adabiha, I: Misrfi l-qarn al-tdsi' lashar (Dar ihya' al-
kutub al-'arablya, Cairo, 1961), pp. 2-3, 11, 20, 36.
30. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 32-3; Gilbert Delanoue, Moralistes et politiques
musulmans dans VEgypte du 19eme siecle (1798-1882) (Institut francais d'ar-
cheologie orientale, Cairo, 1982), vol. II, pp. 398 ff, 409, 412, 454.
31. Ahmad, Ma'alim al-tatawwur al-hadith, vol. I, pp. 28-9, 58-9.
32. Muhammad Rashid Rida, TaWikhMuhammad Abduh . . . wa-khula
sat sira . . . Jamal al- Din al-Afghani{Matba'at al-manar, Cairo, 1900-31),
vol. I, p. 926.
33. Ahmad, Ma'alim al-tatawwur al-hadith, vol. I, p. 11.
34. Butrus al-Bustanl, Muhit al-muhit (Beirut, 1870), vol. I, p. 2.
35. Ahmad, Ma'alim al-tatawwur al-hadith, vol. I, p. 119.
36. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 120-1.
37. Nasif al-YazijI, Fasl al-khitab fi usul lughat al-i'rab [first published
in Malta in 1836, with several revised printings appearing in Beirut through
the course of the nineteenth century].
38. The study was presented at the International Congress of Oriental-
ists in 1886 [Berichte des VII. Internationalen Orientalisten-Congresses gehalten in
Wien imjahre 1886 (Alfred Holder, Vienna, 1889), Semitische Section, pp.
69-105].
39. Husayn ibn Ahmad al-Marsafi, Al-Wasila al-adabiya li-l-'ulum
174
al-(arabiya ( M a t b a ' a t al-madaris al-maliklya bi-Misr, C a i r o , A H 1289-92).

40. H a m z a Fathullah, Al-Mawahib al-fathiya fi 'ulum al-lugha al-
'arabiya ( A l - M a t b a ' a al-amiriya, C a i r o , 1894-1908).
4 1 . Hifni Nasif, Ta'rikh al-adab aw hayat al-lugha al-'arabiya, a collec-
tion of the lectures he delivered at the Egyptian University ( A l - M a t b a ' a
al-jadlda, C a i r o , 1910).
42. A h m a d , Ma'dlim al-tatawwur al-hadith, vol. I, p p . 1 6 2 - 3 .
43. T i b a w i , Modern History of Syria, p p . 141-2; Spagnola, France
and Ottoman Lebanon, p p . 212 ff. It is worth noting that the schools
of the missionaries and local churches broadened the scope of education
a m o n g Christians but did not attract M u s l i m students. While the Chris-
tians were more receptive to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the Western perspec-
tive, the Muslims were more conservative and more sceptical of Western-
isation.
44. T i b a w i , Modern History of Syria, p p . 146, 156.
45. This was a particularly noteworthy trend in Iraq. Between 1872
and 1912, the total n u m b e r of Iraqi students who studied in Istanbul c a m e
to 1,400, of w h o m 1,200 were graduates of the military academies. See
W a m l d J a m a l ' U m a r N a z m i , Al-Judhur al-siyasiya wa-l-fikriya wa-l-
ijtima 'iya li-l-haraka al-qawmiya al- carabiya (al-istiqldliya)fi I- 'Iraq (Centre for
A r a b Unity Studies, Beirut, 1984), p. 74.
46. K h a y r al-DIn al-Tunisi says, ' T h e goal in discussing the m e a n s by
which the E u r o p e a n kingdoms achieved their present power and worldly
dominion, is to select from them that which is appropriate to our own situa-
tion and conducive and compatible to the terms of our sacred law, that
we might recover what was taken from our h a n d s and by using this put
an end to the wasteful difficulties that beset u s ' . See his Aqwam al-masdlik
fi ma'rifat ahwdlal-mamdlik, ed. M a ' n Ziyada ( D a r al-tali'a, Beirut, 1978),
p p . 108, 115. See also al-Tahtawi, Takhlis al-ibrlz, in his Al-A'mal al-
kdmila, vol. II, p. 11, where he says, ' O f course I would not approve of
a ruler {imam) who deviates from the literal sense of M u h a m m a d ' s sacred
law.'
47. J a m e s H e y w o r t h - D u n n e , ' R i f a ' a h Badawl Rafi' a t - T a h t a w i : T h e
Egyptian Revivalist', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol.
9 (1939), p p . 9 6 1 - 7 ; vol. 10 (1940), p p . 3 9 9 - 4 1 5 .
48. T h e first O t t o m a n effort at organized activity occurred in J u n e 1865,
when six m e n ( a m o n g them N a m i q K e m a l ) founded a secret society that
later e x p a n d e d and in 1867 came to be known by the n a m e of the ' Y o u n g
O t t o m a n s ' (Yeni (0smdnhlar). In 1868 they brought out the newspaper
Hurriyet ( F r e e d o m ) , and in the first issue they based their p r o g r a m m e on
the slogans 'Love of the h o m e l a n d is an article of faith' and 'Consult in
deliberation with them on the m a t t e r ' . [This latter slogan is taken from the
Q u r ' a n ; see Surat Al ' I m r a n (3), verse 159]. T h e y continued their activities
in both Istanbul and Paris until the dissolution of the first Parliament in
1878, when their activities terminated in Istanbul and began abroad u n d e r
the n a m e of 'Jeune T u r q u i e ' , later changed to ' U n i o n and Progress' {Ittihad
ve-teraqqi). Some A r a b s m a y have been influenced in such thinking by the
T u r k s , but the most conspicuous influence on the Arabs came through direct
contact with Western thought. See Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey,
p p . 1 3 0 - 1 ; Ra'If K h u r i , Al-Fikr al-(arabi al-hadith: athar al-thawra
175
al-faransiyafi tawjihihi al-siydsi wa-l-ijtima'i (Dar al-makshuf, Beirut, 1943),

pp. 83 ff, 113 ff [trans. Ihsan 'Abbas as Modern Arab Thought: Channels of
the French Revolution to the Arab East (Kingston Press, Princeton, 1983), pp.
14 ff, 37, 84].
49. Al-Jahiz wrote an essay entitled Al-Hanin ild l-awtdn; [see his Rasa'il
al-fdhiz, vol. II, pp. 379 ff]. See also the article watan in Ibn Manziir's
Lisdn al-(arab, al-Zabidi's Taj al-(arus and al-Bustani's Muhit; al-muhit al-
Tahtawl, Al-A'mal al-kdmila, vol. II, pp. 429-30; Wahib Tannus, Al-Watan
fl l-shi'r al-'arabi min al-jdhiliya ild nihdyat al-qarn al-thdni 'ashar al-milddi
(Aleppo, 1975-6); Louis 'Awad, Al-Mu'aththirdt al-ajnabiyafi l-adab al-'arabi
al-hadith, 2nd edn (League of Arab States, Institute for Advanced Arab
Studies, Cairo, 1966), vol. II, pp. 208, 228-9.
50. The poem begins:
Come, let us join together, O brothers,

By commitment and faith allied to each other,
Giving of ourselves, our devotion to show,
So rise, O heroes! To the battle now go . . .
Love of the homelands is an article of faith.
The last verse is repeated after every quatrain. See Mukhtdrdt min kutub Rijd'a
al-Tahtdwi, ed. Mahdi 'Allhm etal. (Wizarat al-tarbiya wa-1-ta'Hm, Cairo,
1958),' pp. 206-11.
51. See al-Tahtawi, Al-A'mal al-kamila, vol. II, pp. 430-4, 437; al-
Tahtawl, Mandhij al-albdb al-misriyafi mabdhij al-dddb al-'asriya (Dar al-tiba'a,
Cairo, AH 1286), pp. 7, 66-7; Mukhtdrdt min kutub Rifd'a al-Tahtdwi, pp.
55 ff, 61 ff, 206 ff. In one of his odes he writes:
The knowing man is disposed by nature

To love his Master, and then his homeland.
To the homeland each traces his descent,
And to it both mother and father are pledged.
They adhere to it as the sanctuary of their past,

Prepared to sacrifice both body and soul.
Our beloved homeland we gladly serve,
And in peace of mind we accept its rule.
The Egyptian's fortune, and likewise his blood,
Are offered up for the honour of the homeland.
See Mukhtdrdt min kutub Rifd'a al-Tahtdwi, p. 216. On the life of al-Tahtawi,
see Delanoue, Moralistes et politiques musulmans, vol. II, pp. 383 ff.
52. See Abdul-Latif Tibawi, 'From Islam to Arab Nationalism,
with Special Reference to Egypt and Syria', in his Arabic and Islamic
Themes: Historical, Educational and Literary Studies (Luzac, London, 1976),
p. 105.
53. Delanoue, Moralistes et politiques musulmans, vol. II, p. 452.
54. Muhammad al-Makhzumi, Khdtirat Jamdl al-Din al-Afghani al-
Husayni, 2nd edn (Dar al-haqiqa, Beirut, 1980), p. 143. Rashid Rida men-
tions that al-Afghani 'used to counsel his students, his followers and his
176
political party of the duty of the people in every Eastern land to unite in
co-operation on political and developmental tasks in the service of the
homeland'. See Rida, Ta'rikh, vol. I, pp. 289, 917.
55. See Rida, Ta'rikh, vol. II, pp. 194-5. He published his article on
28 November 1881. See also Muhammad 'Abduh, Al-A'mdlal-kdmila, ed.
Muhammad 'Amara (Al-Mu'assasa al-'arablya li-1-dirasat wa-1-nashr,
Beirut, 1972-4), vol. I, pp. 343-4; Salah 'Isa, Al-Thawra al-'urabiya (Al-
Mu'assasa al-'arablya li-1-dirasat wa-1-nashr, Beirut, 1972), pp. 199-200.
Rashid Rida states that Muhammad 'Abduh considered that patriotism,
which was a term for expressing the co-operation of all of the homeland's
people, in all their various religions, in everything conducive to its develop-
ment and the reform of its government, does not stand in opposition to
the Islamic religion. See Rida, Ta'rikh, vol. I, p. 917.
56. See al-Tunisi, Aqwam al-masalik, Introduction, p. 160. Khayr al-DIn
al-Tunisi was primarily concerned with internal problems: how the Islamic
state could be reformed while still preserving its character, and how to raise
it to the standard of Europe. He considered that there was no reason for the
gap between the Islamic lands and Europe other than the progress of the
Europeans in knowledge, which in turn was the product of political systems
based on justice and freedom. He therefore says, 'One of the most important
duties incumbent upon Muslim rulers, their ministers and scholars of the
sacred law, is to unite to organise reforms based on the pillars of justice
and consultation, executed so as to refine the subjects and ameliorate their
affairs in a way that will sow the seed of patriotism in their hearts.'
57. Al-Ustadh, vol. 4 (13 January 1892).
58. 'Isa, Al-Thawra al-'urabiya, p. 201.
59. Al-Sayyid Yasln, Tahiti madmun al-jikr al-qawmi al-'arabi: dirasa istitla-
'iya (Centre for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1980), p. 52.
60. He considered one of the reasons for the progress in the West and
the backwardness in the East to be the fact that Western rulers unified the
language in the kingdoms they created, while Eastern rulers made the
mistake of leaving the conquered lands to speak their own languages, this
despite the fact that the revival of any language can lead to agitation in
the souls of those who speak it and their secession whenever the oppor-
tunity presents itself. See Muhammad al-Sa'di Farhud, ' 'Abd Allah
al-Nadim: hayatuhu wa-atharuhu', MA thesis, League of Arab States,
Institute for Advanced Arab Studies, 1959, pp. 278 ff; 'AH al-Hadldl, 'Abd
Allah al-Nadim khatib al-wataniya (Maktabat Misr, Cairo, 1963), pp. 113,
120; 'Isa, Al-Thawra al-'urabiya, p. 221.
61. The civil war in Lebanon and the strife in Damascus in 1860.
62. Philippe de Tarrazi, Ta'rikh al-sahafa al-'arabiya (Al-Matba'a al-
adabiya, Beirut, 1913-33), vol. I, pp. 64, 89 ff. See also Tibawi, 'From
Islam to Arab Nationalism', p. 115.
63. Al-Jinan, vol. 1 (1870), pp. 70-1.
64. Ibid., pp. 302-3. Al-Tahtawi was the first to reiterate this saying,
which was also the slogan of the newspaper Hurriyet, issued by the Young
Ottomans beginning in 1868. This latter publication also carried another
slogan, 'And their affair is deliberative consultation among themselves.'
[This slogan is also Qur'anic; see Surat al-Shura (42), verse 38.]
65. Al-BustanI, Muhit al-muhit, vol. I, p. 2.
177
66. See Abdul-Latif T i b a w i , ' A l - M u ' a l l i m B u t r u s a l - B u s t a n i ' , in his

Arabic and Islamic Themes, p p . 2 2 8 - 5 2 .
67. As articulated in Al-Jindn, the idea of patriotism betrays a certain
degree of ambiguity. In Al-Jindn, vol. 1 (1870), p . 34, one reads, ' W h y
do we not unite in b r o t h e r h o o d , as we are all sons of one m o t h e r . . . that
being . . . the land of Syria . . . and one language a n d one set of customs
. . . u n d e r one sultan.' This recalls the ideas of al-Tahtawl. Salim al-Bustani
called for patriotic fervour in Syria, pointing out that 'having been Arabised
in customs, language and h o m e l a n d , we have b e c o m e a single patriotic
nation (umma wataniya) that has taken on the A r a b nationality (jinsiya)'.
See Al-Jindn, vol. 1 (1870), p . 647. This reveals a certain confusion between
patriotism a n d nationality.
68. Khuri, Al-Fikr al-'arabi al-hadlth, pp. 209-10 [ = Modern Arab Thought,
t r a n s . ' A b b a s , p p . 1 3 6 - 7 ] ; T m a d al-Sulh, AhmadFdris al-Shidydq: dthdruhu
wa-'asruhu ( D a r a l - n a h a r li-1-nashr, Beirut, 1980), p p . 235 ff; ' A w a d , Al-
Mu'aththirdt al-ajnabiya fi l-adab al-earabi al-hadith, vol. I I , p p . 247 ff.
69. See A d l b Ishaq, Al-Durar, ed. Najl 'Allush ( D a r M a r u n ' A b b u d ,
Beirut, 1975), p p . 102, 125.
70. In Al-Durar, p p . 7 3 - 4 , A d l b Ishaq speaks of the nation (umma), in
the usage of the political thinkers, as ' a collectivity participating in a single
national identity (jins) a n d s u b m i t t i n g to a single code of law, regardless
of the differences a m o n g its people with respect to origins a n d l a n g u a g e s ' .
T h e h o m e l a n d (watan) he then defines as ' t h e land where the greatest p a r t
of the nation (umma) lives a n d bears its c h i l d r e n ' .
7 1 . It should be noted that in his article ' A l - U m m a wa-1-watan' ( ' T h e
Nation a n d the H o m e l a n d ' ) , he does not go b e y o n d the literary sense of
the term watan.
72. Ishaq, Al-Durar, p . 67.
73. See Al-Durar, p . 66, where he says, ' T h e h o m e l a n d . . . according
to the political thinkers is the place to which y o u r descent is traced, w h e r e
y o u r rights are protected a n d y o u r responsibilities are k n o w n , a n d w h e r e
y o u r life, family a n d p r o p e r t y are secure. A n d as they say, there can be
n o h o m e l a n d without freedom.'
74. A d l b Ishaq states the reasons why one m u s t love his h o m e l a n d : ' I t
is the place where his family a n d children live, where there apply to h i m
the rights and responsibilities that comprise the pivot of political life, a n d
to which he traces his descent, from which m a n derives a feeling of eminence
a n d pride. If what we have said here holds t r u e , then it is i n c u m b e n t u p o n
the Egyptian to love his homeland in all these respects.' See Al-Durar, p . 67.
75. See the periodical Misr, 22 J a n u a r y 1880. In Al-Durar, p . 197, h e
says, ' W e are brothers in the h o m e l a n d , gathered together by the b o n d
of the t o n g u e . ' But on the other h a n d , in his article ' A l - U m m a wa-1-watan'
he does not make the language a bond of the nation. See Al-Durar, p p . 5 0 - 1 .
76. Both B u t r u s al-Bustani and Nasif al-Yaziji h a d a h a n d in the foun-
d i n g of this society, which lasted for five years.
77. See Tibawi, Modern History of Syria, p . 160; Zalman Isaakovich Levin
[Razvitie osnovnuikh techenii obshchestvenno-politicheskoi muisli v Sirii i Egipte
(Izdatel'stvo ' N a u k a ' , M o s c o w , 1972), p . 49 = ] Al-Fikr al-ijtimd'i wa-l-
siydsi al-hadithfi Lubndn — Suriya — Misr, t r a n s . Bashir al-Siba'I ( D a r I b n
K h a l d u n , Beirut, 1978), p . 6 1 .
178
78. The head of the Literary Authority was Khalid Bayhum, with al-
Bustani serving as administrative secretary. See Tibawi, Modern History of
Syria, pp. 165-6, 171; also Jurjl Zaydan, Ta'rikh addb al-lugha al-'arabiya,
ed. Shawqi Dayf (Dar al-hilal, Cairo, 1957-8), vol. IV, pp. 68-9.
79. See Max L. Gross, 'Ottoman Rule in the Province of Damascus,
1860-1909', PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 1979, p. 139. It
therefore included among its members some Damascenes and Egyptians,
as well as such statesmen as Kamil Pasha and Fu'ad Pasha. See also
Gharayiba, Suriyafi l-qarn al-tdsi' 'ashar, pp. 215-21; Zaydan, Ta'rikh addb
al-lugha al-'arabiya, vol. IV, pp. 69-70; Tibawi, Modern History of Syria, pp.
160-1.
80. See 'Isa Mikha'il Saba, Al-Shaykh Ibrahim al-Ydziji (Dar al-ma'a-
rif, Beirut, 1955), pp. 49-51, 71-4.
81. From the same poem come these lines:
The source of every eminence among us you will find,

And from our heritage has borrowed the whole of mankind.
Our exploits were the foremost in days of yore,
Though our glorious deeds the vile may abjure.
He goes on to say:
But it contents us not, just to straighten the tally,

Or on preserving the past our efforts to rally.
To noble goals of our own our struggle we aim,
'Till with honour and vigour our due we can claim.
See Louis Cheikho, Al-Addb al-'arabiyafi l-qarn al-tdsi1 'ashar, 2nd rev. and ex-
panded edn (Al-Matba'a al-kathulikiya, Beirut, 1924-6), vol. II, pp. 40-1.
82. In the same poem appear the lines:
Our goal let us seek by the edge of the sword,

For goals we pursue thus are surely secured.
The ode is in all probability the work of Ibrahim al-Yaziji. Cheikho (ibid.,
vol. II, p. 43) states that it was circulated anonymously. But some of al-
Yaziji's contemporaries, among them Salim Sarkis, attributed it to one
of the Muslim ulema. See Sami al-Kayyali, Al-Addb wa-l-qawmiyafi Suriya
(League of Arab States, Institute for Advanced Arab Studies, Cairo, 1969),
pp. 102-3.
83. See Levin [Razvitie osnovnuikh techenii obshchestvenno-politicheskoi muisli,
p. 64 =] Al-Fikr al-ijtima'i wa-l-siyasi al-hadith, p. 77.
84. C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins
of Arab Nationalism (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1973), p. 132.
85. See Gross, 'Ottoman Rule in the Province of Damascus', pp. 21-4.
86. Tibawi, 'From Islam to Arab Nationalism', pp. 103-4.
87. See the translation Al-khatt al-sharif al-sultdni wa-l-qdnun al-asdsi
(Matba'at al-jawa'ib, Istanbul, AH 1293).
88. The Russian army was victorious at Plevna, crossed the Balkan
Mountains and occupied Edirne on 20 January 1878, and marched towards
179
the capital. British intervention served to stop the advance of the Russians
and Sultan 'Abdulhamid submitted to Russian peace terms in the Treaty
of San Stefano (13 March 1878). This treaty was then amended — through
the intervention of the European powers at the Congress of Berlin — by
the Treaty of Berlin on 13 July 1878.
89. This probably developed under the influence of the outbreak of the
Crimean War in 1856. This is suggested by a report made in 1858 by the
British consul in Aleppo, who commented on the hatred the Arabs of nor-
thern Syria had for the Turks, explaining that they regarded the latter as
'degenerate' Muslims and added: 'The Mussulman population of Northern
Syria harbours hopes of a separation from the Ottoman Empire and the
formation of a new Arabian State under the sovereignty of the Shereefs
of Mecca.' See Abdul-Latif Tibawi, 'Nusus wa-haqa'iq lam tunshar 'an
asl al-nahda al-'arablya fi Suriya', Majallat majma1 al-lugha al-'arabiya bi-
Dimashq, vol. 42 (1967), p. 784. On the other hand, the reports of the Euro-
pean consuls must be regarded with caution; they were sometimes based
on rumours or on unconfirmed reports, and also were usually influenced
by the interests of the states concerned. See 'Adil al-Sulh, Sutur min al-risala:
ta'rikh haraka istiqlaliya qdmatfi l-mashriq al-'arabi sana 1877 (Beirut, 1966),
p. 128.'
90. See Tibawi, 'Nusus wa-haqa'iq', p. 781, where he draws atten-
tion to two secret reports clearly stating that prior to reaching an agree-
ment with the sultan for its occupation of Cyprus, Britain was considering
an occupation of Syria.
91. About thirty persons from Sidon, Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo, Hims,
Hamah, Latakia, the Hawran and the Jebel Druze, including Sunnis,
ShI'ites, Druzes and 'Alawites, participated in the meetings. Among them
were Ahmad Pasha al-Sulh (from Sidon), who had held high positions in
the Ottoman administration and was the leader of the movement; Sayyid
Muhammad Amln ibn 'All al-Husaynl, the Shl'ite mufti for the region of
Bishara (in the district of Tyre); 'All 'Usayran, one of the Shl'ite notables
of Sidon; Shablb Pasha al-As'ad al-Wa'ili, the leading Shl'ite notable of
the Bishara area; and Shaykh Ahmad 'Abbas al-Azhari, one of the ulema
of Beirut and a student of al-Afghani in Cairo until 1874. The resolutions
passed by the meetings found important supporters in such figures as Ibra-
him al-Jawhari, for years the head of the municipality of Sidon; Husayn
Efendl Bayhum, representative from Beirut in the first Parliament; and
Husayn TaqI 1-Din al-Husni, one of the Shl'ite notables of Damascus. See
Gross, 'Ottoman Rule in the Province of Damascus', pp. 248-9.
92. See al-Sulh, Sutur min al-risala, pp. 91-4, 100 ff. Here it is mentioned
(ibid., p. 104), that thirty notables conferred with Amir 'Abd al-Qadir and
visited Sidon, Jabal'Amil, Acre, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Baalbek and other places.
93. See ibid., p. 104; Fritz Steppat, 'Taghalghul al-mafahlm al-siya-
siya al-ijtima'iya fi Bilad al-Sham fi 1-qarn al-tasi' 'ashar', Al-Mu}tamar al-
duwali al-thani li-ta'rikh Bilad al-Sham, vol. II, pp. 611 ff.
94. See Gross, 'Ottoman Rule in the Province of Damascus', p. 252;
Great Britain (GB), Foreign Office (FO), 78/2848, Alieh: Eldrige to Layard,
no. 74, 21 August 1878, AAE 11; Damascus: Rousseau to Waddington,
no. 7, 30 July 1878.
95. Gross, 'Ottoman Rule in the Province of Damascus', pp. 270 ff,
180
315; Tibawi, Modern History of Syria, p. 156; Shimon Shamir, 'The Modern-
ization of Syria: Problems and Solutions in the Early Period of 'Abdulha-
mid', in Polk and Chambers (eds), Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle
East, pp. 356 ff, 376 ff; al-Sulh, Sutur min al-risala, pp. 135-8.
96. Tibawi, Modern History of Syria, p. 162.
97. Ibid., pp. 162-3.
98. Ibid.; also Tibawi's 'Nusus wa-haqa'iq', p. 786.
99. See Zeine N. Zeine [The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, with a
Background Study of Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near East (Khayat's, Beirut,
1966), p. 63 = ] Nushu' al-qawmiya al- 'arabiya, ma (a dirasa ta 'rikhiyafi I- (ala-
qat al-(arabiya al-turkiya, 2nd edn (Dar al-nahar li-1-nashr, Beirut, 1972),
p. 62.
100. See George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab Move-
ment (Hamilton, London, 1938), pp. 82-4; Zeine [The Emergence of Arab
Nationalism, pp. 62-7, 171-3 = ] Nushu' al-qawmiya al-'arabiya, pp. 61-6,
163-5; Tibawi, 'Nusus wa-haqa'iq,' pp. 787-9; Steppat, 'Taghalghul al-
mafahim', pp. 611 ff; Tibawi, Modern History of Syria, pp. 165-6; Shimon
Shamir, 'Midhat Pasha and the Anti-Turkish Agitation in Syria', Middle
Eastern Studies', vol. 10 (1974), pp. 115-41.
101. Photographs of the placards may be found in Zeine [The Emergence
of Arab Nationalism, pp. 171-3 =]Nushu' al-qawmiya al-'arabiya, pp. 163-5,
and the texts in Tibawi, 'Nusus wa-haqa'iq'. [For English renderings, see
Tibawi, Modern History of Syria, pp. 164-6; Tibawi, 'From Islam to Arab
Nationalism', pp. 117-19.] Also see GB, FO, 78/3130, Beirut: Dickson
to Layard, no. 44, 5 June 1880; Dickson to Goschen, no. 47, 3 July 1880.
102. The British consul sent a photograph of the second placard and
an original copy of the third.
103. GB, FO, 78/3130, Damascus: Jago to Goschen, no. 13, 3 August
1880.
104. GB, FO, 195/1368, Beirut: Dickson to St John, no. 2, 14 January
1881. In the dispatch was a copy of the placard posted in Beirut, with an
accompanying translation.
105. The placard begins with the verse:
By the sword each distant goal may be attained,

So with it seek if you be one whose aim will be gained.
106. It is clearly impossible to accept the view that the placards that
appeared in Beirut during the governorship of Midhat Pasha are to be
attributed to a secret society founded by five young Christians, this socie-
ty later expanding to include Muslims and Druzes. Similarly, it is by no
means possible to regard this society as the first organisation in the na-
tionalist movement. See Antonius, The Arab Awakening, pp. 79 ff; Tibawi,
Modern History of Syria, pp. 163 ff; Zeine [The Emergence of Arab Nationalism,
pp. 59 ff = ] Nushu' al-qawmiya al-'arabiya, pp. 59 ff.
107. GB, FO, 78/3130, Damascus: Jago to Goschen, no. 13, 3 August
1880.
108. The acting consul, John Dickson, made enquiries as to the source
of the placards but rejected the information provided to him by the con-
sular dragoman linking them to Midhat Pasha. He attributed them at first
181
to a Syrian secret society that had been active for the past five years and
had cells in Baghdad and Istanbul. See his dispatch [in GB, FO,
195/1368,Beirut: Dickson to Goschen, no. 47], 3 July 1880.
109. See Zeine [The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, pp. 62-6 = ] Nushu'
al-qawmiya al-'arabiya, pp. 62-5; Tibawi, Modern History of Syria, pp. 161,
166-7; GB, FO, 195/1368, Beirut: Dickson to Goschen, no. 3, 17 January
1881.
110. See Tibawi, 'Nusus wa-haqa'iq', pp. 782-3. Soon after a visit to
Damascus in 1887, Salim Sarkls attributed the placards to a secret society
of youths, formed in Damascus at the order of Midhat Pasha and instigated
by him to issue the placards within the context of his effort to gain the
autonomy of Syria. See Salim Sarkls, Sirr mamlakat Misr (Jaridat al-mushir,
Cairo, 1895), pp. 62 ff. This is apparently what he heard several years
after the posting of the placards in the days of Midhat Pasha.
111. See Shamir, 'Midhat Pasha and the Anti-Turkish Agitation in
Syria', pp. 118-20.
112. See Muhammad 'Izza Darwaza, Nash'at al-haraka al-'arabiya al-
haditha (Al-Maktaba al-'asriya, Beirut, 1971), pp. 94-5, 97; al-Kayyall,
A-Adab wa-l-qawmiya fi Suriya, p. 106. Neither of these authors cites his
source for this information. Zeine draws attention to a revolutionary leaflet
in Arabic that reached Baghdad, entreating the Arabs and 'the Christians
of Syria' to unite in order to liberate the Arab nation from the Turkish
aggressors. The title of the leaflet was Bayan min al-umma al- 'arabiya, 'Procla-
mation from the Arab Nation', issued by the Society for the Protection
of the Rights of the Arab Community and dated 17 Rabi' II 1298 (19 March
1881). See Zeine [The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, p. 65, n. 1 = ] Nushu'
al-qawmiya al-'arabiya, p. 198, n. 25.
113. See Gross, 'Ottoman Rule in the Province of Damascus', pp.
312-13.
114. See Rida, Ta'rikh, vol. II, pp. 523 ff; Tibawi, 'Nusus wa-haqa'iq',
p. 791.
115. See Issawi, Economic History of the Middle East, p. 506.
182
5
The Arab-Islamic Consciousness:
Beginnings of the Nationalist
Awakening
This was the era of Sultan 'Abdulhamid II. During this time the
Western invasion relentlessly intensified, making its influence felt
not only in the invasion of Western trade and capital, but also in
the subjection of some states to huge debts to the West. This became
so serious that bankruptcy was declared by the Ottoman Empire
in 1875, Egypt in 1876 and Tunisia in 1881. Such a state of affairs
became a source of agitation and fear among patriotic elements,
whose apprehensions were confirmed by other manifestations of the
Western incursion. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 had stripped
the Ottoman Empire of most of its European provinces; Britain
invaded Egypt in 1882 and imposed its protectorate upon it; and
in the same year France seized control of Tunisia. As the century
progressed the Western menace to the Empire (and, in the view
of some, to the heritage) increased, replacing such domestic
challenges as backwardness, maladministration and authoritarian
rule as the problem of primary concern to most groups. This
explains why most Arab thinkers accepted the Ottoman order in
the Arab East: the Empire was a power for confronting the Western
invasion, and speculation on ways to cope with the domestic
challenges long remained within this framework.
The Western invasion also made its influence on the trend
towards consciousness in the Arab lands felt in another way, in that
it led to a kind of fragmentation in attitudes. The trend of con-
sciousness would emerge, for example, in one country alone (such
as Egypt), or in a group of countries within the Ottoman framework
(in the Arab East), or outside this framework (in North Africa).
This led to a diversification in the movement towards political con-
sciousness, with some, as in Egypt and North Africa, confronting
183
Arab-Islamic Consciousness
the Western invasion by stressing Islam and then the Arabic

language, while others, as in the Arab East, emphasised an Arabism
tied to Islam or the classical Arabic heritage. On the whole, this
situation did not arise from disparity in the roots of the Arab con-
sciousness, but rather was the outcome of prevailing circumstances.
The period of' Abdulhamid II was a difficult one that witnessed
the separation of a number of provinces from the Empire, the danger
of partition as a result of foreign pressure, and fear of domestic
foment. * Abdulhamid sought to adopt a policy that would counter
these perils, and so struck at the constitutionalist movement and
the proponents of reform, ruled with absolute and direct authority,
and opposed all manifestations of the intellectual awakening. He
also tried to achieve a strong centralisation of the administration,
especially in Syria, where, in order to exercise greater control and
to suit local conditions, he reorganised the administration. In 1887
the southern and greater part of Palestine was made into a sanjaq,
with Jerusalem as its capital and ruled directly from Istanbul. In
the following year he established a new province including the
coastal areas of Syria from Tripoli to Acre with Beirut as its capital.
By 1890, then, Syria had been divided into three provinces: Aleppo,
Damascus and Beirut; and three special administrative districts:
the mutasarrifiyas of Lebanon, Jerusalem, and Dayr al-Zur.
'Abdulhamid emphasised the Ottoman caliphate and upheld it
with the pan-Islamic idea of the Islamic League (Al-Jami'a al-is-
lamiya). In this way he may have sought to buttress the Empire in
the face of the Western menace, and probably also saw in such ideas
a means for defending his rule against its liberal adversaries, oppos-
ing the aspirations for an Arab caliphate that were current in cer-
tain circles, and benefiting from the wave of Islamic awakening in
the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In 1888 he invited Jamal
al-Din al-Afghani, the proponent of the Islamic League, to Istanbul,
and maintained him there.1 He surrounded himself with throngs
of ulema, shaykhs and especially Sufis.2 He also endeavoured to
win over the favour and devotion of the Arabs by appointing some
of them to important military and civilian positions.3 And, by call-
ing for the building of a railway to the Hijaz with Islamic dona-
tions — a project he saw through to a successful conclusion — he
sought to gain the goodwill and loyalty of Muslims. 4 Moreover,
he used his agents and ministers — shaykhs, ulema and members
of Sufi orders — to maintain a broad network of contacts with the
Muslims throughout the Islamic world.5
At the same time, however, it should be noted that during his
184
reign the provisions of the Educational Law of 1869 were more

widely applied. The founding of government schools in Syria, for
example, included subyaniye (lower elementary) and sultaniye (second-
ary) schools in the main cities, as well as military preparatory
schools. Private schools were subjected to official supervision. The
reasons for this probably included suspicion and fear of the mis-
sionary schools, the need for civil servants and the increasing level
of Arab consciousness. These schools taught Turkish and some
French, but Arabic received only slight attention; it was in the
private schools, and for a time in some of the foreign schools, that
an interest was taken in Arabic. None the less, steadily increasing
numbers of Syrian and Iraqi students who completed their studies
at the sultaniye level went on to pursue their higher education —
whether civilian or military — in Istanbul. Many of those who were
active in the Arab movement after 1908 had been educated in this
way. In any case, the expansion of education was a factor in the
awakening and intensification of the nationalist consciousness.
Fear of the Western menace among Arab Muslims may have
caused the majority to discount any idea of wrecking the caliphate,
but this did not mean acquiescence in despotism and administrative
decline. Rather, demands for reform continued, especially after the
suspension of the Constitution of Midhat Pasha. 6 It was probably
the propaganda for the Islamic League, coupled with the policy of
oppression, intimidation and centralised rule, that led to the
paralysis of the reform movement. Dissenting voices, such as Rashid
Rida (d. 1935), al-Kawakibl (d. 1902) and al-ZahrawI (d. 1916)
were forced either to work in secret or to go abroad.
The Russo-Turkish War had demonstrated the weakness of the
Ottoman Empire; but while, on the one hand, it highlighted the
need for reform, it also, on the other, caused the majority to regard
the foreign menace as the main challenge and to advocate action
within the framework of the Ottoman order. The Arab con-
sciousness in the final quarter of the nineteenth century was thus
at first inclined to call for the improvement of conditions in the Arab
lands and for catching up with the march of civilisation — hence
the tendency to favour decentralised administration or autonomy.
When domestic and foreign challenges emerged, beginning in the
second decade of the twentieth century, they stimulated the perspec-
tive favouring independence in Arab Asia.
It is clear that the general current of Arab consciousness was
that which considered there to be a fundamental bond between
Arabism and Islam. The cultural revival may have had a role to
185
A rab-Islamic Consciousness
play in asserting Arabic and its heritage as a bond for transcending

sectarian differences, but it is no less true that the Islamic reform
movement played a role in the same direction.
M u h a m m a d 'Abduh
The movement of Muhammad 'Abduh was important for its basis

in reformist thinking. It asserted the importance to the national
awakening of the spread of education and placed emphasis on the
understanding of the classical heritage. It called for taking a stand,
with a clear insight, in the path of the Western wave that appeared
to be on the verge of sweeping away the classical heritage and
endangering the distinctively Arab-Islamic character. It warned of
the danger of dissolution and called for an assertion of the Arab iden-
tity. The aim of the movement was to emphasise Arabic and the Arab
revival. Muhammad 'Abduh was one of those who believed that
Arabic was a basic necessity to an understanding of the Qur'an, 7
and defended classical Arabic against both regional dialects and the
expansion of foreign languages at its expense. At the same time, he
called for the renewal of Arabic, a task in which he participated.
This emphasis on Arabic and on early Islam led the movement
to place particular stress on the role of the Arabs in Islamic history
and to call for a renewal of that role. This perspective is primarily
associated with the names of Rashid Rida and * Abd al-Rahman
al-Kawakibi.
Rashid Ricla
It should be noted that in all of the positions taken by Rashid Rida,

the concept of Arabism is a corollary to that of Islam. 8 For him,
then, the notion of returning to early Islam emphasised the necessity
of an Arab revival.
Rashid Rida called for opposition to the despotism of the sultan
on the basis of the Islamic concept of deliberative consultation
(shurd). That is, he sought to bring about reform through its promul-
gation by the sultan, acting in his capacity as caliph and in accord-
ance with the advice of a council of ulema. In 1905 he and RafTq
al-'Azm founded the Ottoman Shura Society {Jam'iyat al-shurd al-
l
uthmdniyd) to oppose despotism and to restore the Constitution.
When the Constitution was restored in 1908 he esteemed the day
186
this was announced as a day of celebration for the shura govern-

ment enjoined by Islam. Afterwards, he continued to attack despotic
government as contrary to the faith, and asserted the principle of
shura iili l-amr, deliberative consultation with ulema and leading
figures from the various sectors of society.9
Rashid Rida advocated the revival of Arabic studies. Spreading
the Arabic language is essential, he says. Indeed, learning it is
incumbent upon every Muslim: Arabic is the language of the faith,
and since the dissemination of Arabic is a means for achieving the
spread and understanding of Islam, to revive the former is to revive
the latter as well.10 He goes on to assert that the Arab revival is
the means to achieve the restoration of Islam, 11 for the greatest
glories of the Islamic conquests are attributable to the Arabs,
through whom the faith rose to dominion. On the other hand,
weakness befell Islamic rule with the disintegration of the Arab unity
upholding it and the insinuation of non-Arabs into the Islamic
dynasties. 12
He regarded his Islam as the counterpart to his Arabism, and
spoke of the two brotherhoods of religion and nationality, for which
he found support in verses of the Qur'an. He was a brother in
religion to both Arab and non-Arab Muslims, and a brother in
nationality to both Muslim and non-Muslim Arabs. But he gave
precedence to the obligations enjoined by the faith.13
His thought later developed to embrace the concept of the religious
caliphate proposed by al-Kawakibl, and when the Arab Revolt broke
out he staunchly supported it. He considered that the Islamic bond
and the Western menace forbade the Arabs to secede from the Otto-
man Empire. But after enumerating the instances of Turkish
mistreatment of the Arabs and their stand on Turkification, he
declares that by their own narrow partisan spirit and their persecution
of the Arabs, the Unionists have revived the partisan spirit of the
Arabs and have caused such a rift between the two sides that nothing
remains to forbid the Arabs from taking action. With this, he con-
cludes that Islam is compatible with Arab nationalism (his term is
jinsiya) and that the welfare of Islam is served by Arab independence.
Hence, he considers that the groundwork for Islamic independence
can be laid through the establishment of an Arab Islamic state with an
Arab caliph in 'the noblest of lands'. 14 Further, through the Arab
state the language of the Qur'an would be revived, which in turn
would revive the sacred law of Islam. 15 Rashid Rida thus advocated
the idea of Arab revival, making it the basis for a general Islamic re-
vival, and propounded the view that the Arabs were the best Muslims.
187
Al-Kawakibi
Al-Kawakibi set out to give the idea of Arab revival a political

content. 16 He wrote two books: Taba'i( al-istibdad, an impassioned
attack on authoritarian rule, and Umm al-qura, a study of the reasons
for the shortcomings and weakness in the situation of the Muslims,
and means for achieving their revival. The two works complement
each other in that they both diagnose the ills of Islamic society and
feel their way along the path to national awakening.
In his diagnosis of the ills, al-Kawakibi, like the reformers, sets
out on the one hand to attack despotism and on the other to assert
the pre-eminence of the Arabs and their special role in Islam,
pointing out that it is through the Arabs that the revival and the
unity of the faith can be achieved. 17 He considers that the basic
causes of the malaise are ignorance and a failure to adhere to pristine
Islam (al-din al-hariif), but holds that the neglect of religion springs
from despotism and that the foundations of well-being lie in political
freedom. Despotism is the root of all evil, for it rejects learning and
corrupts religion, morals and education. 18
Al-Kawakibi was influenced by Western views and concepts,
especially those concerning democracy and patriotism, 19 but
sought to apply these views to the problem of despotism in his own
land and time. 20 More importantly, he reflected upon the state of
Islamic society and Ottoman administration, and by returning to
early Islam found the sources that inspired his own views and form-
ulations. He boasts of the past greatness of Islam and of its pre-
eminence over the lifestyles of other peoples, and he considers that
although non-Muslims have gained the upper hand over the
Muslims in the sciences and arts, Islam remains the best religion.
Similarly, he rejects blind imitation of the West and strongly
criticises the new generation of Europeanised young people. 21
In the teachings of the Qur'an, al-Kawakibi finds an emphasis
on justice, equality, deliberative consultation and the fundamental
principles of political freedom; these he associates with monotheism
(tawhid), the antitheses of which are polytheism (shirk) and
despotism. These former concepts he finds manifested in early
Islam, the period in which the fundamental role was played by the
Arabs. It was then, in the era of the Prophet and the Rashidun
caliphs, that 'Islamic government was based on principles of
democratic administration, or popularism ('umumiya), and
aristocratic consultation, or deliberative consultation with the tribal
notables (shura l-ashraf).'22 He describes the government of the
188
Rashidun caliphs as 'representative socialist (niyabiya ishtiraklya),

which is to say, democratic', after which government became a
monarchy restricted by the fundamental principles of the sacred
law of Islam, 'since government was under the control of those in
power and authority (ahl al-hall wa-l-'aqdj: chieftains of Banu
Umayya during the Umayyad period, and leaders of Banu Hashim
during the 'Abbasid period. Supervision of the regime at first may
have been embodied in the assignment of the task of 'enjoining the
good and forbidding the evil' (al-amr bi-l-ma'ruf wa-l-nahy (an al-
munkar) to every Muslim man and woman, but this later came to
be the responsibility of those in power and authority. He considers
that the progress or decline of Islamic governments depends upon
the vigour or lassitude with which the individuals possessed of power
and authority exercise their supervisory role and involve themselves
in arrangements to consult the nation at large. 23
Al-Kawakibi thus associates democracy and deliberative consul-
tation with the era of Arab rule in Islamic history. He sees in the
seizure of power by non-Arab groups the beginning of the trend
towards despotism and ignorance and the fundamental factor behind
the enfeeblement of Islamic societies. On the one hand, dissension
arose over principles of law, and when 'the views of the intruders'
prevailed, this led to schism and to the fragmentation of opinion
into various mutually hostile sects. 'Hence, religion passed from
the nurturing embrace of its rightful proponents (i.e. the Arabs),
and the Community no longer spoke with a single voice.' 24 Super-
vision of the regime had been scrupulously upheld through 'enjoin-
ing the good and forbidding the evil'; but then 'there intruded into
our religion intrepid peoples that upheld worldly gain in place of
mindfulness of the duties of faith and limited their concerns to taxes
and the means to enforce their collection, which is to say, the army.
Mindfulness of the duties of faith, as well as enjoining the good
and forbidding the evil, thus fell in neglect', and as a result
despotism came to prevail. 25
At the same time, al-Kawakibi condemns the Ottoman Empire
and subjects the Turks to bitter criticism. The Ottoman Empire
— in his view — was in the glory of its youth of no benefit whatso-
ever to Islam; on the contrary, it did injury to the faith 'by wiping
out the universally approved 'Abbasid caliphate' and reducing to
ruins all that the Arabs had built. He holds that the Turks left the
umma without a caliph for four centuries and abandoned the faith
with nowhere to turn for protection from manipulation by heretical
trends; and he even accuses the Turks of throwing away parts of
189
the Islamic world. He is probably excessive in some of his allega-

tions, but his aim here was to assert the guilt of the Ottomans. 26
And as is well known, his Taba'i' al-istibdad was basically directed
against the political order of the Ottomans, and in particular against
the despotism of 'Abdulhamid.
Al-Kawakibi draws attention to an important point, the fact that
from the beginning the Turks have kept their distance from both
the Arabs and the Arabic language. This state of affairs he sees as
unique in Islamic history. All of the other non-Arab peoples who
established states in Islam quickly became Arabised and adopted
Arab manners and customs; only the Mongol Turks (i.e. the
Ottomans) have refused to do so. This he attributes to their disdain
and hatred for the Arabs, attitudes he substantiates with examples
from their language.27
Al-Kawakibi goes on to criticise Ottoman administration, which
he regards as one of the causes of the prevailing disarray. He
emphatically insists on the necessity of decentralised administration
in the Empire and attacks the rationale for centralised admin-
istration: the frontiers are far removed from the capital and
administrators responsible for governing the provinces are ignorant
of conditions there and of the special characteristics of the local
populations.28 The situation is further aggravated by the harmful
enforcement of uniform administrative and penal codes, despite the
differences among the local peoples in race and character, and by
the appointment of officials of ethnic backgrounds different from
those of the local populations. Thus noting how rulers and their
subjects differ in character, he cites the verse of al-Mutanabbi:
Like subjects, like King, the sages maintain.

Can Arabs then thrive o'er whom non-Arabs reign?29
He also believes that offices and positions should be allotted to

all the peoples of the Empire in accordance with their importance
and numbers, 'so that the bureaucracy typifies the nation as a
whole'. 30 Al-Kawakibi finds no excuse for the Ottomans in an
appeal to Islam; for in the case of most Ottoman rulers — in his
view — the respect shown for religious observances amounts to
'nothing more than superficial gestures'. It was not a feature of their
policy to give precedence to the concerns of the faith over the interest
of the sovereign; indeed, just the opposite was the rule.31
Al-Kawakibi's critique of Ottoman administration springs from
the attitude of the politically conscious Arabs of his time. Hence,
190
he calls for equality of the Arabs with the Turks and for decentralised
administration, and says that 'one of the most pressing of necessities
is that every people should gain a specific degree of autonomy
commensurate with their customs and the natural characteristics
of their land'. 32
Al-Kawakibi emphasised that the period of the Arab role in
history corresponded to that of the glory of Islam. For him, Arabism
and Islam are inseparable; decline and disarray only began with
the seizure of power by non-Arab peoples. We thus find him
adopting a manifestly Arab point of view and directing his appeal
for national awakening to them, 'because only the Arabs can lead
the way in this task'.33 He regards spiritual awakening as the goal
of the Umm al-Qura Society (Jam'iyat Umm al-Qura), for he holds
that the political order proceeds in accordance with religion, 'and
there can be no doubt that no people can match the Arabs in their
provision of spiritual guidance and their earnest solicitude for the
faith'.34
In his effort to assert the role of the Arabs, al-Kawakibi proceeds
to elaborate on the merits of Arabia, the cradle of the Arabs, and
on their special characteristics and virtues as a nation. He notes
that 'Arabia and its people possess a number of special traits and
qualities not found elsewhere.' Arabia is, for example, the place
where the light of Islam dawned, the heart of the Islamic world,
and the homeland of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. It is
the region most secure from intermingling, whether of nations or
of religions, and the place that most deserves to be the abode of
free men, this due to its far remove from the covetous and its natural
poverty.35
He also speaks at length in elaborating the qualities of the Arabs,
for the Arabs of Arabia were the founders of the Islamic League.
Islam arose among them and in their language. They are its
exponents, the Muslims most learned in the fundamental principles
of the faith and the most concerned to protect and uphold it; among
them, Islam continues to be a pristine religion free from complica-
tion and confusion. They led the Muslims in the beginning, so that
these others will not disdain to follow them now.
He then goes on to expound on their qualities, giving an account
of the position of the proponents of Arabic in the 'Abbasid era in
confrontation to the Shu'ublya. The Arabs are the most zealous
of nations in upholding their sense of pride by respecting covenants
and pledges, their humanity by honouring the duty of protection,
their noble-mindedness by upholding generosity and their manly
191
virtue by exerting themselves in praiseworthy endeavours. Further-

more, the Arabs are the most vigorous of nations in adhering to
the principles of equal rights and equal regard for the various classes
of society, and the nation most deeply rooted in the principles of
popular consultation. Of all the nations of Islam, theirs is the one
most zealous in upholding freedom and autonomy and in rejecting
injustice, this being obvious from their language, in which expres-
sions of submission and aggrandisement are both of rare occurrence.
Carried away by his Arab viewpoint, he declares that the Arabs
rarely mixed with others and so of all peoples have been most
successful in preserving their nationality (jinsiya) and customs. Here
he strikes a nationalist chord and singles out the Arabs as a nation
distinct from other Muslims. Theirs is the richest of Muslim
languages in culture, and in the Qur'an it possesses the best possible
guardian. 36 Then he adds other distinctions in which he is influ-
enced by the views of his era, stating that the Arab nation is the
one best guided in the principles of socialist life, and declaring that
Islam introduced socialism and that the Rashidun caliphs upheld
a socialism governed by the principle of equality. 37
Al-Kawakibi went to such remarkable lengths in analysing the
qualities and virtues of the Arabs, after highlighting their role in
Islam, in order to assert their role in the national awakening. This
leads to his call for placing the caliphate in Arab hands by installing
as caliph an Arab of Quraysh fulfilling all of the requirements of
Islamic jurisprudence, with his capital in Mecca. But he formulates
the nature of this caliphate with a view to the conditions of his own
time. The caliph is to be elected by a General Consultation Council
consisting of elected members from the various Islamic principalities
and sultanates. He would hold office for a fixed term of office, with
the electoral process being repeated every three years. Also, his rule
would be limited to the region of the Hijaz (where it would be linked
to a HijazI shiird); and through the General Consultation Council
he would have the right to supervise 'the general political and
religious affairs' of the Islamic lands. In this system of his al-
Kawakibi sees a solution to the problem of the caliphate and a means
to create an Islamic federation. 38
It is worth noting that al-Kawakibi considers that the administra-
tion of religion and kingship were only fully integrated in Islamic
history during the time of the Rashidun caliphs and the reign of
'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz (r. 100-2/717-20). There was a certain
degree of union in Umayyad times and under the early 'Abbasids,
but then caliphate separated from kingship. 39
192
Al-KawakibI thus restores the caliphate to the Arabs, but makes

it an elective office for a fixed term and restricted by shiira. And
to a certain extent he separates its political and administrative
authority, which is limited to the Hijaz, from its function of religious
supervision.
Al-KawakibI regards the Arabs as a nation comprising the people
of Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Egypt and North Africa, and holds that a
nation can be gathered together on the basis of descent, homeland,
language or religion.40 He considers the Arabic language to be the
primary bond among the Arabs 41 and in this reiterates the tradi-
tional concept of the Arab nation. But he is also influenced by the
modern concepts of patriotism and nationhood, which elsewhere
lead him to regard the nation as held together by bonds of nation-
ality, homeland and common rights.42 Hence, the Arabs are held
together by the bond of the homeland, and further, by that of
nationality; indeed, the Arabs are the nation that has best preserved
its nationality and customs.43
He implores his people, 'the native speakers of Arabic' (al-
ndtiqun bi-l-ddd), for national awakening; in the name of patriotism
he calls upon them to forget their animosities and to seek out the
means for achieving union. Other nations that have done this have
progressed in knowledge and have achieved 'deeply rooted bases
for a union that is patriotic rather than religious, a harmony that
is national rather than sectarian and a bonding that is political rather
than administrative'. He supports this appeal of his by referring
to the unity of language and to the idea of the homeland. And to
the non-Arabs and foreigners who would provoke enmity among
the Arabs he addresses these words: 'You there! Leave us to manage
our own affairs, to communicate among ourselves in eloquent
Arabic and to show respect and understanding for each other as
brothers . . . Leave us to lead our own earthly lives and to make
religions the arbiters in the hereafter only. Leave us to rally around
the same message. Long live the nation! Long live the homeland!
Let us live as the free and the strong!'44 He then goes on to stress
love of the homeland and the obligation of the young generation
to fulfil this duty.
Modern views on nationalism and patriotism were influential
in the thought of al-Kawakibi, but its roots are traditional since
he elaborates his views within an Islamic context. For him, Arabism
and Islam are inseparable: the past greatness of Islam was dependent
upon the Arabs, and so now also will be the national awakening.
Hence his call for an Arab caliphate and his exposition on the
193
historical and intellectual foundations for this. The Arabs are a

nation for which he seeks a unity transcending sectarianism and
expressed within the framework of the homeland. He also seeks a
national awakening that will restore to the Arab nation its role in
Islam; in fact, he considers that the awakening of the Arabs will
mark the beginning of the revival of Islam. 45
The writings of al-Kawakibi gained widespread acceptance and
encouraged both the rise of the Arab consciousness and the
emergence of the nationalist perspective. His views were particularly
influential since they were elaborated within an Islamic context.
Al-Zahrawi
Al-Zahrawi 46 followed a similar line of thought but was of a more

clearly nationalist orientation. He attacked despotism, but he also
criticised the political dimension of the idea of the Islamic League,
denying that there was any historical basis for it. He proclaimed
the idea of the homeland, defined the concept of the nation in
nationalist terms and stressed the role of the Arabs in history and
their aspirations for a better future.
Al-Zahrawi concedes that Ottomanism is a bond, but regards
it as somewhat of a fusion of disparate elements. Indeed, he makes
the statement that 'it splits up first on the basis of language and
second on that of religion'. 47 He declares that Muslims agree on
a single credo, 'that the Qur'an is the book of God, brought forth
by His messenger, Muhammad', but this has not kept them clear
of discord since the first century AH. 4 8 He therefore denies the
existence of the Islamic League promoted by Sultan 'Abdulhamld,
and even the possibility of establishing such a League, since Muslim
unity, whether political or spiritual, only occurred in Islamic history
for a short interval in the first century. In his view, political harmony
came to an end after the caliphate of 'Umar (r. 13-23/634-44), and
no religious accord remained after the middle of the first century.
'What kind of league', he asks himself, 'is that of a people that has
been quarrelling over political and religious issues for the past thir-
teen centuries, killing each other and calling for help against one
another to communities holding beliefs fundamentally opposed to
their own?' He goes on to raise the question, 'What sort of league
is this, that failed to close ranks to fight Hiilegu when he overran
their lands, though its people were strong enough to fight among
themselves? Where is this league, that failed to unite to drive out
194
the Crusaders when the latter attacked their lands?' In his view,
then, the call for the Islamic League only appeared in the second
half of the nineteenth century, 'Abdulhamid wishing to use it to
impress Europe. Also, the Western states have inflated its dangers
as a pretext for attacking the Ottoman Empire. It would be better
for the Muslims if, for their own good, they would put an end to
such appeals, since they are powerless to confront the West. 49
From this historical attitude, al-Zahrawi proceeds to the point
that despite its importance, religion cannot be a foundation for
political union: 'It is vain for us to hope that through religion we
will be able to break out of the universal pattern that has prevailed
from the caliphate of 'Umar up to our own time.' Then he goes
on to clarify his view: 'We say that we are Muslims, but we do
not want a union that fails to include the non-Muslim sons of our
homeland. And we are Ottomans, but we do not want a union that
fails to include all of the non-Turkish sons of our homeland.' Hence
he rejects both the Islamic League and pan-Turanianism, saying,
'The advantageous union is the one in which the Arab remains an
Arab and the Greek a Greek, and in which no one thinks badly
of anyone else when the latter seeks to render service to his language
and strives to promote the ideas of his people.' 50 In this way he
reveals his manifestly Arab perspective, desiring that the Arabs
should have their own entity within the Ottoman Empire and ample
scope for their national awakening.
Seeing in Arabic a fundamental bond among the Arabs, al-
Zahrawi says, 'Today the Arabs share a great common bond based
on a language raised to distinction by religion and society.' Arabic
is the language of fifty to sixty million people whose lands are all
contiguous and separated by no body of water other than the Suez
Canal. 'It is an ancient and venerable language, and the Arabs are
the speakers of this language, the life and progress of which are
known as far back as history is known.' 51
Al-Zahrawi turns to history to draw attention to the role played
by the Arabs both before and after the rise of Islam, and discusses
not only Islamic civilisation, but the civilisations created by the pre-
Islamic Arabs as well. When he takes up the latter, he draws upon
both Qur'anic verses and the results of modern research and says,
'One group of the Arabs founded a civilisation at Saba' in Yemen;
at some other time another group established a civilisation in Iraq;
and at yet another time another group produced an urban culture
along the Syrian littoral and subsequently along the coast of Africa
. . . And so they continued until there dawned from among them
195
that Greatest Light (i.e. Islam) that filled both East and West.' He
also recalls the glory of the Arabs, 'that greatest of peoples, whose
civilisations and learning extend across a continuum from many
centuries before the rise of Islam to many centuries after i t \ He
thus looks to history to assert the antiquity of the Arabs, to restore
Arab confidence and to emphasise the right of the Arabs to a better
life. For, in his view, the modern Arabs show something of that
same aptitude possessed by their ancestors; that is, they are 'en-
dowed with that same profound intellectual capacity, passed down
to them for over seven thousand years from ancestors acknowledg-
ed as the founders of civilisations and restorers of culture'. 52
Al-Zahrawi uses the word qawm, or 'a people 7 , in reference to
the Arabs, ascribes to them qawmiya, or 'nationalism', and considers
that this is one of the foremost bonds benefiting mankind in the
past and continuing to do so today. He applies the term umma, or
'nation', to both the Ottomans and the Syrians, but his primary
focus is the Arabs as a whole and their fundamental bond of
nationalism. As he himself puts it, 'But the nation (umma) of concern
to us here comprises those groups possessed of the spirit of nation-
alism (ruh al-qawmiya).' He lauds the blessings that this spirit bestows
on peoples, and sees it as their spring of honourable life and the
foundation for the formation of the nation. Hence, he advocates
nationalism and plainly states, 'Today the object of our search is
that spirit through which nations become nations. Once we succeed
in attaining it we shall in less than the wink of an eye become a
nation; and so long as that spirit eludes us we shall remain only
ghosts. . ,' 5 3 Al-Zahrawi concludes that nationalism is the
primary bond unifying the Arabs. They are a nation, 'and what
league is more precious or dearer than that of the nation?' 54
On the other hand, he considers that the homeland (watan) is
also a basis for unity, and in his discussion of this notion he goes
to great lengths in asserting the concepts of nationalism. 'The
homeland . . .' , he says, 'is a basis for unity whether we are drawn
together by the proximity of our homes, the affinity of our
languages, the accord of our consciences or the closeness of our
interests.' In this way he draws together factors of land, language,
consciousness and common interests. By watan he does not mean
one region in and of itself, but rather the Arab homeland, 'these
fair medial homelands in the territory along the Atlantic Ocean,
the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean'. 55 He speaks in glowing
terms of love for the homelands, which he defines in a way recalling
the definition of al-Tahtawi. Beseeching the Arabs in moving
196
terms to take care to protect their homelands, he says, 'Your

homelands, your homelands; the place where the holiest Revela-
tion descended, the cradle of the first civilisation, the dawning-place
of the lights of virtue, the spring pouring forth the greatest of
men!' 56
Al-Zahrawi emphasises the bond of attachment to the homeland
and connects it with tolerance. Islam upholds the freedom of
religion, he explains, and confirms that 'there has arisen no hostility
or strife between Muslims and Christians of the East, other than
that which occurs among neighbours even if they are of the same
religion'. He thus implores the Muslims to revive that praiseworthy
principle that 'gives to non-Muslims the same rights it gives to
Muslims and imposes on them the same responsibilities it imposes
on Muslims: both should be the same as ours'. In this connection
he notes that the hostility between the Muslims and the Christian
states of Europe has become more intense since the rise of Islam,
and that the wars between the Christian and the Islamic states have
been caused by factors that have nothing to do with religion. Such
is the case for the Crusades and the Western invasion of the East.
Religion, he declares, was a pretext adopted by the West to achieve
its aims. 'Just as protection of the Christians in the East was the
expedient excuse adopted by those Crusaders in their wars', he says,
'it has also become the excuse used by the Europeans of our own
time to realise their goals whenever fanaticism appears to be showing
its ugly face.' Addressing his plea to the Christians, he says, 'Among
the Christian sons of our blessed Eastern homeland, are there not
those who will rise to throw the appeal to such protection back in
the faces of the Europeans and tell them: " O u r survival in this
homeland for the past thirteen centuries demonstrates that our
forefathers were not in need of anyone to protect them"?' 5 7
The Western menace may have been one of the main reasons
leading al-Zahrawi to accept the bond of Ottomanism and advocate
the union of the peoples of the Empire within that context; but he
saw this as a federation of nationalisms, including that of the Arabs,
on the basis of justice, mutual respect and the sharing of common
political rights. He rejected the idea of union on the basis of arbitrary
domination by the Turks. It was impossible that the Arab should
renounce his Arabism for the sake of union; indeed, an Arab capable
of forgetting his nationalism could not be entrusted with custody
of the homeland. There is hence no justification for thinking ill
of one who seeks to serve his language and work for the advance-
ment of his people, for it is natural for a man to urge his people
197
'on to greater glory'. No one has the right to deny this. Further-
more, it is also natural to denounce discrimination on the basis of
language, when the government declines to employ those who do
not know the official language. 58
Al-Zahrawi adopts a clear Arab nationalist perspective and
proclaims the idea of an Arab nation drawn together by the bond
of the Arabic language, permeated by the nationalist spirit and
strengthened by the bond of the homeland. The idea of the Arabs
as a nation based on language may have been a concept inherited
from the past, but the emphasis on the nationalist and patriotic spirit
was something new. Al-Zahrawi thus provides us with a clear
example of the trend towards Arab nationalism within the Islamic
context.
Rafiq al-'Azm
Al-Zahrawi may have rejected the Islamic League in both theory

and practice and accordingly attacked the position taken by Sultan
'Abdulhamid and his followers, but Rafiq al-'Azm went a step
further when he asserted that the caliphate was a political institution
and a position of worldly leadership devoid of any spiritual dimen-
sion. From the days of his youth he adopted an Islamic reformist
attitude. In his view, the sacred law of Islam had brought with it
the fundamental virtues that would lead to the advancement of
Islamic society, 'most particularly those addressing the issue of
reason, which in turn encourages, among other things, work,
freedom and learning'. He considered that the cure for the malady
of backwardness and weakness from which the Muslims suffered
was to 'consist of instruction in the Islamic virtues, most important
of which are freedom of the intellect and will, and in speaking with
a single voice on the principles of the sacred law'. 59 He called for
the dissemination of knowledge and the sciences and emphasised
freedom and national receptivity to new ideas. 60 He supported
'beneficent reforms' at first, and urged rulers to implement such
reforms and to co-operate with the ulema to enlighten the common
folk in order to prevent them from opposing these measures. 61 '
It would seem that the state of the Ottoman sultanate (which
is to say, the question of the Ottoman caliphate) and his own
emphasis on freedom led him to discuss the idea of the caliphate.
No passage in the Qur'an mentions it, he explains, nor did the
Prophet make any reference to it; on the contrary, the issue was
198
left to the judgement of the Community. It is reason that should

decide on the matter, according to the interest of the Community.
'Had there been in religion any provision for deciding the succes-
sion, they would not have left it to reason', 62 which is what the
Companions did after the death of the Prophet. If it is argued that
the caliphate comprises succession to the Prophet, this point holds
true only for 'matters pertaining to the upholding of the pillars of
the faith'. And in any case, the caliphate in this sense did not endure
past the era of the Rashidun caliphs, after which time it became
nothing more than a worldly kingship.63 In earliest Islamic govern-
ment (in the time of the Rashidun), he sees a government so
democratic that it is hardly likely that seekers of freedom and justice
will find a better way to rule nations. 64
Al-'Azm proposes that politics intruded into religion when non-
Arabs embraced Islam after the conquests and after the first years
in the caliphate of 'Uthman (r. 23-35/644-56) had elapsed. 65
Hence, the discord over the caliphate in the First Civil War
(35-40/656-61) was a political question, 'in view of the fact that
the caliphate was a position of worldly leadership requiring the
exercise of reason to safeguard matters of worldly interest to the
people'. 66 Deviation from democracy occurred during the days of
the Umayyads, he considers, and resulted from intermingling with
Persians and Greeks. The Arabs were the champions of freedom,
but the Community's disunity in the lands of the caliphate after
the conquests led to rule being wrested away from them, and this
gave the caliphs a free hand to rule as despots. 67 He remarks that
once the seeds of contention were sown in the caliphate, leadership
eventually became despotic; that in turn brought on defeat and
decline. He cites two factors that account for this. Firstly, the
conditions of deliberative consultation and election were not fulfilled
before homage (the bay'a) was paid to an acceding ruler, which left
ample opportunity for the resort to force. Secondly, states have
assumed the tint of a religious character from the moment of their
foundation, which has made it a simple matter for ruling authorities
after the Rashidun caliphs to tyrannise their subjects in the name
of religion. 'They turned the nation's political life into a religious
life and left it no way . . . to pass through the stages of natural
development dictated by the conditions of every age, either politi-
cally or socially.' Hence, the Arabs failed to borrow from the
Romans the principles of representative government, which would
have guaranteed the continuation of the fundamental principle of
deliberative consultation enjoined by the Qur'an. That led to all
199
of the political and spiritual affairs of the state being entrusted to

the caliph, and so also led to authoritarian rule.68 The caliphate
was thus the cause of Muslim decline, since politics had been mixed
with religion. The first step towards the Muslim revival is therefore
to recognise the fundamental nature of the caliphate and to separate
politics (i.e. the caliphate) from religion, for without the former
Islam was already complete in its spiritual dimensions.
Rafiq al-'Azm adopts a nationalist position when he examines
the various partisan bonds that hold human societies together. He
mentions that of religion, but considers that it rarely emerges among
nations and is resorted to only in case of dire necessity. In his view,
'this bond has not for a single day drawn the Muslims together,
not even to co-operate in repelling the terrible catastrophes that
befell the lands of Islam when they were attacked by the Crusaders
and the Mongols'. 69 Al-'Azm considers that there exist natural
bonds or ties: these begin with the bond of the clan ('ashira), then
the bond of patriotism {wataniya), and finally the broader bond of
nationalism (jinsiya). He declares that the presence of the bonds of
nationalism and patriotism is ordained by human nature, and that
these ties disintegrate only with the dissolution of the people with
which they are associated.70 Such a nationalist bond prevails
among the Arabs, who in his view comprise an ancient nation, 'a
nation which five thousand years ago, in the reign of Hammurabi,
was the first to establish civil laws; a nation which sustained its
language, customs, nationalism and independence before Islam,
and which with the rise of Islam carried its religion, language,
authority and civilisation into all the lands from the Himalaya
Mountains of Asia in the east to the Pyrenees of Europe in the west'.
It is a nation that has never been subdued by force, one that has
repulsed any who have tried to conquer it. He further considers
that there remains no bond among the Arabs other than the Arabic
language.71 It is the bond of nationalism that has the potential of
uniting the Arabs, irrespective of their religions. He lays stress on
the idea that however much religions may differ, the homeland is
for all, and he advocates mutual assistance among the people of
the homeland, including non-Muslims. He proclaims, 'Recognise
their rights as your Prophet did in the past, as your sacred law
dictates and as the morals of your religion guide you to do.' He
points out that the world is moving towards democracy and that
this trend is separating the political life of nations from matters of
faith, 'so that doctrinal disparity within a single people will not
prevent the tightening of the bonds of nationalism'. He therefore
200
calls upon non-Muslims to co-operate with Muslims within the

context of nationalism and to strengthen the intimate bonds of
patriotic brotherhood so that democracy might be achieved. 72
Rafiq al-'Azm further considers that there is no contradiction
between Islam and nationalism; the two are complementary, and
in fact, the Islamic bond reinforces nationalism. And while he rejects
the Islamic League, seeing it as devoid of historical foundation and
as the invention of the politicians of his own time, he regards the
unanimity of Muslim opinion as 'the discharge of an obligation to
nationalism and a return to the preservation of the general bond
that could confront the bond of the Christian states that have
subdued most of the Islamic kingdoms'. 73
This facilitates our understanding of his attitude towards Otto-
manism and his adherence to it at that particular time. He believed
in an Arab nation drawn together by the Arabic language and held
fast by the natural bonds of nationalism and patriotism, and took
pride in the great role the Arabs had played in history. Even so,
however, the European menace posed a threat that neither the Arabs
nor the Turks were capable of confronting alone, hence the Ottoman
bond was important for the protection of all. And for this reason
he was fearful lest the partisan feelings of the various nationalisms
within the Empire should weaken this bond, and so 'provide a
tremendous opportunity for endless foreign interference in this
kingdom, which has already become a target for the arrows of the
covetous'. 74 Rafiq al-'Azm clearly was conscious of the presence
of the partisan spirit of nationalism and of its spread in the Islamic
lands since the beginning of the reign of 'Abdulhamld. Similarly,
he seems to have considered that this weakened the Islamic Com-
munity and thereby helped the Europeans to rend the Muslims
asunder and impose Western domination. 75 He therefore empha-
sised and sought to preserve the bond between the Arab nation and
the Turks.
Through those writings in which he analysed the development
of Turkish-Arab relations after the successful attempt by the
Unionists to gain power, it is possible to follow the attitude and
thinking of Rafiq al-'Azm to the point where he called for Arab
independence. He considers that prior to the promulgation of the
Constitution the injustice suffered was equally distributed in the
'Ottoman nation', and he alludes to the joy and celebrations in Syria
at the time the Constitution was announced. But the Unionists
adopted a negative attitude towards the Arabs. The idea of the Arab
caliphate was the first thing to arouse their suspicions, 76 and they
201
began to persecute the Arabs more than all other peoples and so
struck the first blow in the undermining of the foundations of
Ottoman unity. Hence the spirit of nationalism reawakened after
lying dormant for a time when the Constitution was first promul-
gated, and it was Unionist policy that aroused it. 77 He then
discusses the blunders of the Unionists in their dealings with the
Arabs, pointing out how the Ottoman peoples founded clubs and
societies once the light of freedom had dawned. The Arabs estab-
lished the Society for Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood (Jam 'iyat al-ikha'
al-'arabi al-(uthmarii) and opened a centre for their meetings; but
the Unionists, opposing no people except for the Arabs, dissolved
the Society and closed down its meeting house. This was the first
manifestation of their distrust of the Arabs. 78
He then proceeds to enumerate the Unionist measures that were
accompanied by steadily increasing levels of complaint among the
Arabs. A large number of Arabs were dismissed from government
positions in Istanbul; control of the Ministry of Pious Foundations
was taken away from them; Arab provincial governors and
lieutenant-governors were replaced by Turks; most Arab general
staff officers were recalled from their homelands to Istanbul; Arabs
were not admitted onto the Central Committee of the Party of Union
and Progress, nor were any Arab party-members allowed to par-
ticipate in its political deliberations; and the government showed
no concern for the spread of education among the Arabs. But the
gravest of all their deeds was the government's attack on the Arabic
language, even though the official religion of the Empire was Islam
and the language of this religion was Arabic. 'And this is to say
nothing of the government's disregard for this language in its
schools, even in those in Arab lands, and the replacement of it with
Turkish', although there remained for the Arabs no basis for unity
other than this language. For them, the last straw was the suppres-
sion of 'this language, which prodded and aroused the existing
partisan spirit of nationalism'. 79 Al-'Azm declares that what pro-
voked the misgivings and discontent of the Arabs after the promul-
gation of the Constitution was 'the Unionist Party's excessive love
of power and their entanglement in chauvinism, whether in their
dealings with the Arabs or with others'. This provoked a negative
reaction among the Arabs. He notes that the Constitution was not
promulgated with the aim of achieving democracy, but rather with
the goal of concentrating power in the hands of the Unionists and
confirming Turkish supremacy: 'they considered the Turkish
element as the ruling one and the Arabs and others as the ruled'. 80
202
He warns against the excesses of the Unionists in their policy,

especially since no taint had ever sullied the patriotism and sincere
devotion of the Arabs, and they had never contemplated separa-
tion from the body of the Empire.
Rafiq al-'Azm appeals to the record of the past in stating that
anyone who peruses the history of the Arab nation will learn that
it has never been ruled by force. It is a nation that preserved its
independence in ancient times, expanded in the conquests after the
rise of Islam, and was the first nation to establish laws. Indeed,
as the European scholars say, 'the Arabs are the teachers of the
world'. He concludes by restating his call for brotherhood; 'for we
are faced with a menace' that neither the Turks nor the Arabs are
able to confront, and the partisan spirit of nationalism may result
in the West's domination of them both. 81
Rafiq al-'Azm thus believed in the Arab nation and in its
historical role, defended its rights, called for its full participation
in power and attacked the racist policy of the Unionists. But he
advocated Ottomanism as a means for confronting the menace of
European colonialism. Noting the policy excesses of the Unionists
and the political consequences of these measures, he made concerted
efforts to win the Unionists over to an Arab-Turkish brotherhood.
This failed, however, and when it did, he played an active role in
the foundation of the Ottoman Administrative Decentralisation
Party ( Hizb al-lamarkaziya al-iddriya al- 'uthmarii). He was the presi-
dent of the Party and composed its first statement. Similarly, he
endorsed the reform movement in Syria and wrote in support of it.
Al-'Azm analyses the developments that preceded the calls for
decentralisation, pointing out the failure of the Empire and its
weakness after the Balkan War, the emergence of the ambitions
of the Western states to partition the Empire and the Syrians' fear
for the fate of their land and their speculation on the future. 'The
thinkers decided that the best guarantee of safety was agreement,
solidarity and the creation of a power for the homeland . . . based
on the unity of the homeland and popular solidarity.' This could
only be achieved through decentralised administration, 'which
allocates responsibility to the people in accordance with the rights
they request, and holds them directly accountable for any fortune
or misfortune that befalls the nation'. In his view, decentralisation
would lead to agreement, 'for the interest of the homeland is
undivided'; therefore, opinion came to favour decentralisation after
the pernicious effects of centralisation resulted in the loss of a third
of the Empire. Hence the Decentralisation Party emerged, and the
203
programme of reform was issued in Beirut, where the reform move-

ment had already found a favourable reception from the govern-
ment then in power (that of Kamil Pasha). Both groups were waiting
for the crisis of the Balkan War to pass so that they could address
themselves to the government. But the Unionists returned to power
and went to even greater lengths in their policy of nationalist
centralisation, which resulted in the loss of the provinces of
Macedonia and Albania. They sought to apply such policy to the
Arab lands in general, and especially to Syria; this was why they
promulgated the Law on Provinces, which gave absolute power to
the governors in the provinces and denied the people education in
their own language. The Unionist government also ordered the con-
fiscation of the roster of the Decentralisation Party and the obstruc-
tion of the Beirut Reform Committee, thus opening an unnecessary
gap between the two sides. Al-'Azm then defends the reform move-
ment and the role of its leaders in opposing despotism in the past,
praises them for their patriotism and rejects the allegation that they
worked in co-operation with foreign elements. He concludes by
warning against obstruction of the reform movement, for that
4
would divert it to a course which any conscientious Ottoman would
dislike it to take'. He thus warns that such action would result in
a separatist trend. He also warns against leaving matters as they
currently stand and calls for the achievement of decentralisation
* before there comes a day when the counsel of advisers and the
reproof of critics will be of no avail'. 82
He apparently lost hope after the executions ordered by Jemal
Pasha, and adopted a position favouring Arab independence. His
apprehensions of the West were subsequently confirmed by the
Sykes-Picot Agreement, after which he advocated the independence
of the Arab lands east of Suez. 83 The policy of the Unionists thus
caused the thinking — and this was of an Arab-Islamic character
— of Rafiq al-'Azm gradually to abandon Ottomanism and to assert
the viewpoint of Arab nationalism.
Shakib Arslan
A comparison of the thinking of Rafiq al-'Azm with that of Shakib

Arslan in this period may serve to shed light on another dimension
of Arab thought in the nationalist perspective. Arslan sets forth his
views in an essay he wrote in 1913. 84 In it, he stresses the bond
of Islam and rejects not only the idea of 'the partisan bond of
204
nationalism' {al-'asabiya al-jinsiya), but also the notion that the Arabs
have a special status in Islam. 'The call to Islam may have been
propounded by the most Arab of the Arabs, and its scripture may
have been revealed in the most eloquent dialect of Arabic', he says;
'but the faith is a path for all to follow, based on the principle of
absolute equality and far removed from nationalistic egoism.' 85
Quite naturally, then, he rejects the statements of those of his
contemporaries who assert the principle of Arabism and make it
the primary bond. 86 Indeed, so far as he is concerned, the partisan
spirit of nationalism is the creation of the proponents of discord who
are trying to provoke the Arabs against the Empire. In his estima-
tion, these elements want the bond of nationality to prevail over
that of religion, and seek to kindle the fire of strife between the two
peoples upon whom the Islamic empire is based. The factor that
prevented them from achieving this 'was neither Arab fondness for
the sight of Turks, nor their meek submission to Turkish authority,
for the Arabs are the nation least tolerant of abuse and quickest
to reach for their swords. Rather, what deterred them was their
concern for the survival of the Islamic caliphate and their fear that
foreigners would gain control of them.' 8 7
In his autobiography, however, Arslan later concedes that such
nationalism was already to be found among the Ottoman peoples
before the promulgation of the Constitution. After this, every nation
in the Empire began to attempt to secede, 'because when freedom
prevails, there is nothing to prevent the nationalist inclinations
hidden in the hearts of these nations' from appearing. 88 This holds
true for the Islamic peoples, including both the Arabs and the
Albanians in the Ottoman Empire. But he comes back to say that
maladministration within the Empire, on the one hand, and the
intrigues of foreigners from abroad, on the other, caused many
people, especially Arabs and Albanians, to favour separation from
the Empire despite the bond of religion. He then makes the state-
ment that the Arabs were complaining because of the special
privileges reserved for the Turks in the Empire, despite the fact
that the Arabs were more numerous, and says that this was a cause
of dispute aggravated by the weakness of the Empire. 'But the sole
factor preventing the explosion of the volcano of disaster between
the two factions was their fear for the territorial integrity of Islam,
nothing else.' 89 In the above-mentioned essay Arslan declares that
Europe was still waging a Crusader and commercial war against
the Ottoman Empire, and this was the greatest danger. He was
therefore anxious to preserve the bond between the Arabs and Turks
205
represented by the caliphate, and considered that the bond of

nationalism weakens that of Islam. 90
In his Sira, Arslan points out that difficulties arose in the
Parliament. The essential starting point for the Committee of Union
and Progress was * absolute centralisation, that is, concentration of
administration at the capital and basing all reforms on this found-
ation. It is self-evident that a principle such as this would give
supremacy to the Turkish element that occupied the foremost
position in power.' Hence, because it infringed upon their rights,
the Arabs and other peoples opposed this principle. 91
In his Bayan, however, he rejects the call for decentralisation and
vigorously attacks its proponents. He regards the decentralisation
movement as one of the schemes of the foreigners, and sees in decen-
tralisation the first step towards separation. Calling for this would
be followed by campaigns for such goals as the Arab caliphate,
national independence and liberation of the homeland. All this
would lead to civil war, 'which would be the death-blow to Arab
independence rather than its fundamental principle'. The decen-
tralisation movement would, in his estimation, lead to foreign
invasion; 92 hence, he viewed the supporters of the movement with
suspicion and considered them as part of the European plot against
the Muslims. 93 Despite this, he did acknowledge that some of the
proponents of reform were sincere, although in his view they were
wrong when they supposed that decentralisation would provide
protection from the danger of foreign occupation. 94 Some of the
others were not interested in reform as much as they were in
separating Syria from the Turks. 9 5
In this outburst, Arslan states in his Sira that before the World
War the English were able so to influence many young Arabs that
they supported the establishment of an Arab state, with the result
that there arose among the Arabs a party favourable to secession.
But in his opinion this view was not shared by the great majority
of the Arab nation: indeed, 'perceptive Arabs understand that if
a split occurs between the Arabs and the Turks, the Arab lands
will fall under European rule. Hence, they prefer to remain under
the rule of the Ottoman Empire . . . choosing the lesser of the two
evils.' 96
Shaklb Arslan thus opts for Ottomanism in order to confront
the West, and with 'the perceptive Arabs' regards Ottomanism as
the sole means to protect Islam and the Arab lands from Western
aggression. The Arabs have no choice but to accept Ottomanism
in order to confront the greater evil, the Western menace. But both
206
before and after this, Arslan regarded the Arabs as a nation and
extolled it for its qualities. The Arabs are 'a distinguished nation
endowed by God with such treasure-troves of virtue, noble pur-
suits, insights of genius, fountains of courage and lodes of
magnanimity as He has not bestowed upon the other nations of
the world'. 97 The Arabs are 'the nation least tolerant of abuse and
the quickest to reach for their swords'. 98 But he then expresses the
view, in tones reminiscent of Ibn Khaldun, that 'Arab accord is
inconceivable except on the basis of religious solidarity'. Despite
this, he is not opposed to the strengthening of the bond of Arab
nationalism, and says, 'By my life, there is no harm in strengthening
the Arab nationalist bond, reviving its moribund learning, renewing
the memory of its genealogies and filling the breasts of the Arabs
with the knowledge of their origins that would remind them of their
oneness.' But in the difficult circumstances then prevailing, he did
not want this to provoke a quarrel with the Turks or to stir up
emotions against the Empire. 99
Arslan upheld the bond of Arabic irrespective of considerations
of religion. All Christians who spoke Arabic were Arabs; for as he
himself stated it, 'It is our desire that the unity between us and
them should endure, that equality should be absolute among us all,
and that the Muslims should not be preferred over them through
any special rights.' He then goes back to the historical record to
demonstrate Arab unity irrespective of considerations of religion,
as occurred at the pre-Islamic battle of Dhu Qar, when the Chris-
tian and pagan Arabs united to fight the Persians. It is therefore
possible for the Arab Muslims and Christians to act as one 'in order
to defend homelands that belong to us all together'. He stipulated,
however, that this must not lead to an abandonment of the bond
of Islam, and 'that we must not pretend that we can replace the
Islamic bond with that of nationality'. 100 Arslan thus views Arabic
as a bond, but still, as an element in a more broadly based Ottoman
or Islamic bond. He therefore supports 'genuine reform' (al-isldh
al-sddiq), which he defines as 'equal rights among the nationalities,
and giving the provinces their share of the reforms on a uniform
basis'. 101
Hence, it can be seen that Shaklb Arslan believed in the existence
of an Arab nation, the primary bond of which, throughout its history
and regardless of religious differences, has been the Arabic language.
He sees no harm in the promotion of Arab nationalism, but in the
presence of the Western menace he emphasises the bond of Islam,
adheres to Ottomanism and considers that concentration on the
207
bond of nationalism will lead to confrontation between the Turks

and the Arabs and, consequently, to domination by the West. H e
had to wait until the victory of the Allies, their domination and
partition of the Arab lands and the demise of the caliphate before
taking up an unequivocally Arab unionist position and activity based
on language and culture, and also taking into account descent and
common interest. 102
It may be noticed that beginning with al-Kawakibi, the Arab-

Islamic viewpoint adopted an Arab nationalist attitude, seeing no
essential contradiction between Islam and Arab nationalism.
Embodied in this perspective is a reliance upon certain traditional
concepts, especially in defining the concept of the nation, as well
as an assimilation of such modern concepts as patriotism and the
transcending of sectarian differences by asserting equality among
Arabs within the framework of the homeland. This perspective
emphasises the Arab role in history, advocates their national
awakening, and favours decentralisation without secession in order
to confront the Western menace. The viewpoint of the proponents
of this perspective was represented in two complementary spheres:
Arabic, which was the immediate and natural bond, and the bond
of Islam or Ottomanism, which was more broadly based. In the
strength of the first lay the strength of the second; and similarly,
the second served to protect the first. It is to be noted that some,
in consideration of the Western menace, emphasised the second and
were fearful lest the first lead to fragmentation and hence to domina-
tion by the West.
Notes
1. In the same year, the Sharif Husayn ibn 'All and his family were
brought to Istanbul, where they remained as guests until 1908. Did the
sultan seek in this way to check what he regarded as an Arab claim on
the caliphate? See Tibawi, Modern History of Syria, p. 171.
2. Such as Shaykh Zafir (of the Shadhiliya Sufi order) from Mecca,
Fadl al-'AlawI from Hadramawt and Abu 1-Huda al-Sayyadl (a Rifa'I Sufi)
from Aleppo. It seems that 'Abdulhamld was initiated into the Shadhiliya
Sufi order by its shaykh before he acceded to the sultanate.
3. Such as 'Izzat Pasha al-'Abid, Second Secretary to 'Abdul-
hamld; the Syrian Na'um Pasha, Deputy Foreign Minister; and the
Lebanese Maronite Sallm Pasha Milhim, Minister of Mining, Forests and
Agriculture. The Ministry of Pious Foundations was reserved for an Arab,
and the Iraqi Mahmud Shakwat Pasha was Chief of Staff of the Third
208
Army in Salonika. See Ahmad 'Izzat al-A'zaml, Al-Qadiya al-'arabiya:

asbabuha, muqaddimatuha, tatawwurdtuhd, wa-nata'ijuha (Matba'at al-sha'b,
Baghdad, 1931-4), vol. Ill, pp. 80-2.
4. See Muhammad 'Arif ibn Ahmad al-Munayyir, The Hijaz Railway
and the Muslim Pilgrimage: A Case of the Ottoman Political Propaganda, trans.
with introduction by Jacob M. Landau (Wayne State University Press,
Detroit, 1971); Jeremy Salt, 'Christian Imperialism in Turkey', PhD
dissertation, University of Melbourne, 1979, pp. 246 ff. The ceremony
of dedication was held in Medina in September 1908.
5. See Muhammad Jamil Bayhum, Falsa/at al-ta'rikh al-'uthmani
(Sharikat Faraj Allah li-1-matbu'at, Beirut, 1954), vol. II, pp. 177-83; Salt,
'Christian Imperialism in Turkey', pp. 240-2.
6. The Parliament was convened on 19 March 1877, and on 14
February 1878 it was dissolved for an unspecified period and the Constitu-
tion was suspended.
7. Muhammad 'Abduh advocated a return to early Islam, based on
the Qur'an, and considered that the comprehension of the Qur'an required
an understanding of Arabic and of the customs and methods of argumen-
tation prevailing among the Arabs when the Qur'an was revealed. This
justified his insistence that religious revival required the decisive revival
of classical Arabic and of religious studies. See Rida, Ta'rikh, vol. II,
pp. 515-16.
8. Rashid Rida repeatedly emphasised pan-Ottomanism and pan-
Islamism. See Al-Manar, vol. 12(1909), p. 683; vol. 14(1911), pp. 772-3,
834; vol. 15 (1912), pp. 732 ff.
9. Rashid Rida mentions that only two Syrians joined the Ottoman
Shura Society. See Al-Manar, vol. 11 (1908), no. 6 and pp. 737 ff, 830;
vol. 12(1909), pp. 606 ff, 710 ff; vol. 14(1911), pp. 9 ff. Also see Muham-
mad Rashid Rida, Mukhtarat siyasiya min majallat al-Manar, ed. Wajlh
Kawtharanl (Dar al-tall'a, Beirut, 1980), pp. 130 ff, 137 ff.
10. Al-Manar, vol.' 1 (1898), p. 137; vol. 12 (1909), pp. 111-12, 906-8;
vol. 14 (1911), p. 422.
11. See Rida, Mukhtarat siyasiya, pp. 158-63, 231 ff.
12. Ibid., pp. 195, 230; Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, pp. 126-7.
13. Rida, Mukhtarat siyasiya, pp. 193-4.
14. Al-Manar, vol. 14 (1911), pp. 834 ff, 852; vol. 20 (1917), pp. 3-47.
See also Rashid Rida, 'The Arab Question', trans, in The Moslem World,
vol. 7 (1917), pp. 159-70; Mahmud Samra, 'Christian Missions and
Western Ideas in Syrian Muslim Writers, 1860-1914', PhD dissertation,
University of London, 1957, pp. 289-90. [The 'noblest of lands' is a
reference to the Hijaz.]
15. Rida, Mukhtarat siyasiya, p. 195.
16. See Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, pp. 137-8.
17. Samra, 'Christian Missions and Western Ideas', p. 184; Dawn,
From Ottomanism to Arabism, p. 140. Rashid Rida noted how the two
works of al-Kawakibl complemented each other when he said, 'I have
mentioned his merit in promoting religious and social reform in his
book Sijill jam'iyat umm al-qura and political reform in his book Tabd'i( al-
istibddd: See Rida's 'Al-Shura ff 1-Islam', Al-Manar, vol. 11 (1908),
pp. 727 ff.
209
18. 'Abd al-Rahman al-kawakibi, Tabd'i' al-istibddd, in his Al-A'mdl

al-kdmila, ed. Muhammad 'Amara (Al-Hay'a al-misriya al-'amma li-1-ta'fif
wa-1-nashr, Cairo, 1970), p. 356. References to the two books of al-
Kawakibi will be to this collection.
19. On the possibility that al-Kawakibi was influenced by Alfieri or
others (Rousseau, Montesquieu, Fourier), see Khaldun S. al-Husry, Three
Reformers: A Study in Modern Arab Political Thought (Khayat's, Beirut, 1966),
pp. 71 ff; Samra, 'Christian Missions and Western Ideas', pp. 226 ff; Sylvia
G. Haim, 'Alfieri and al-Kawakibi', Oriente moderno, vol. 34 (1954), pp.
321-34. See also Norbert Tapiero [Les Idees reformistes d'al-Kawakibi (Editions
arabes, Paris, 1956), pp. 13-14 = ] Al-Kawakibi': al-mufakkir al-thd'ir, trans.
'All Salama (Dar al-adab, Beirut, 1968), pp. 64-5. Muhammad Kurd 'All
recalls that the culture of al-Kawakibi was that of the traditional Arabic
subjects taught by the shaykhs, later mixed with Turkish culture, that he
gained much of his information from the Turkish language and from
meeting Turkish ulema, and that he made up for his ignorance of foreign
languages by reading Turkish translations of Western works. See Muham-
mad Kurd 'All, Al-Mu'dsirun, ed. Muhammad al-Misri (Majma' al-lugha
al-'arabiya bi-Dimashq, Damascus, 1980), pp. 281-2. Cf. also Kurd 'All,
Al-Mu'dsirun, p. 282, where he considers the writings of al-Kawakibi as
representative of his own independent thinking; Ahmad Amin, Zu'amd'
al-isldh fi l-(asr al-hadith (Maktabat al-nahda al-misriya, Cairo, 1949),
p. 254.
20. See al-Kawakibi, Tabd'i1 al-istibddd, pp. 346-7. Kurd 'AH (Al-
Mu'dsirun, p. 282) says, 'His book Tabd'i' al-istibddd is only a slight glimmer
of what his environment would have dictated, and his record bears eloquent
testimony to the prevailing oppression . . .'
21. See al-Kawakibi, Umm al-qurd, pp. 269 ff, where he says, 'As for
the rising generation of Europeanised youth, they are devoid of benefit
to themselves, not to mention how useless they are to their peoples and
their homelands.'
22. Al-Kawakibi, Tabd'i' al-istibddd, pp. 346-7.
23. Al-Kawakibi, Umm al-qurd, pp. 151-2, 180-1. In these views he
seems to have been influenced by those of Ibn Khaldun.
24. Ibid., pp. 152, 241, on the role of the non-Arab ulema.
25. Ibid., p. 157.
26. Ibid., pp. 306, 309-10. Al-Kawakibi accused the Turks of throwing
away Spain, India, the Islamic kingdoms of Central Asia and Muslim
Africa, but in historical terms it is difficult to accept these charges.
27. Ibid., pp. 258-60.
28. Ibid., pp. 257-8.
29. Ibid., pp. 253-4. He attacks the Turkish monopolisation of
advantages and sees evidence for this in the excessive discrimination between
Ottoman nationalities in the apportioning of benefits and liabilities. -
30. Al-Kawakibi, Tabd'i' al-istibddd, p. 472.
31. Al-Kawakibi, Umm al-qurd, pp. 258-60.
32. Ibid., p. 249.
33. Ibid., p. 328.
34. Ibid., p. 308. [Umm al-Qura, 'Mother of Towns', is an honorific
name for Mecca.]
210
35. Ibid., p. 300. It seems that al-Kawakibl made several journeys in

the Islamic lands. Muhammad Kurd 'All (Al-Mu'asirun, p. 283) mentions
that he travelled to the coasts of southern and eastern Africa, visited
Ethiopia, Harar, Somalia, Java and the coast of southern China, and
returned via Muscat and Arabia. See also De TarrazI, Ta'rikh al-sahafa
al- 'arabiya, vol. I, p. 223, who states that al-Kawakibl made a tour of Arabia
and visited eastern Africa and India.
36. Al-Kawakibl, Umm al-qura, pp. 139, 308; al-Kawakibl, Taba'i'al-
istibdad, p. 369.
37. Al-Kawakibl, Taba'i'al-istibdad, pp. 378-80.
38. Al-Kawakibl, Umm al-qura, pp. 313-15; al-Husry, Three Reformers,
pp. 85 ff, 92-4.
39. Al-Kawakibl, Umm al-qura, p. 309.
40. Al-Kawakibl, Taba'i' al-istibdad, p. 359; al-Kawakibl, Umm al-qura,
p. 308.
41. Al-Kawakibl, Taba'i' al-istibdad, p. 417.
42. Ibid., p. 426.
43. Al-Kawakibl, Umm al-qura, p. 308.
44. Al-Kawakibl, Taba'i' al-istibdad, pp. 417-18; al-Kawakibl, Umm
al-qura, p. 268.
45. Samra, 'Christian Missions and Western Ideas', pp. 287 ff.
46. He was born in 1855 in Hims, where he founded the newspaper
Al-Munir, one of the first Syrian Arabic newspapers to defy the despotism
of 'Abdulhamld. He emigrated to Egypt in 1900.
47. Al-Hadara, vol. 2, no. 56 (4 May 1911); 'Abd al-Hamid al-
Zahrawi, Al-Irth al-fikri li-l-muslih al-ijtima'i 'Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, ed.
Jawdat al-Rakkabl and Jamil Sultan (Al-Majlis al-aia li-ri'ayat al-funun
wa-1-adab wa-l-'ulum al-ijtima'Iya, Damascus, 1962), p. 30.
48. Al-Zahrawi says, 'By the time the first third of the first century
AH had passed, they were accusing each other of disbelief and exhausting
themselves in battles against one another . . . By the time the second third
of the century had passed, their summons to the faith and for the purifying
of souls had turned into a call for monarchy and self-aggrandisement . . .
By the time the final third had passed, the mischief-mongers had had their
day with religion and disparate creeds had arisen . . . Leave aside the
time of the first two caliphs, and tell me when there was ever a consensus
of opinion.' See his three-essay collection Al-Fiqh wa-l-tasawwuf(Al-Maktab
al-fanni li-1-nashr, Cairo, 1960), pp. 15-16.
49. Al-Jarida, 10 September 1907; Al-Mandr, vol. 10 (1907), pp. 586-7;
Samra, 'Christian Missions and Western Ideas', p. 291.
50. Al-Zahrawi, Al-Irth al-fikri, p. 17; Al-Hadara, vol. 2, no. 54 (20 April
1911).
51. Al-Zahrawi, Al-Irth al-fikri, pp. 63-4.
52. Ibid., pp. 63-4; Al-Hadara, vol. 2, no. 60 (1 June 1911).
53. Al-Mufid, 8 September 1913.
54. Al-Zahrawi, Al-Irth al-fikri, pp. 19-20, 371.
55. Ibid., p. 64. He also says that the Arabs are the people of Arabia,
along with the other provinces in Iraq, Syria and Africa; see Al-Hadara,
vol. 2, no. 57 (11 May 1911).
56. Al-Zahrawi, Al-Irth al-fikri, pp. 370-1.
211
57. Ibid., pp. 224-30; Al-Hadara, vol. 2, no. 84 (17 November 1911).
58. Al-Zahrawl, Al-Irth al-fikri, pp. 17, 30-1; Al-Hadara, vol. 2, nos.
53, 54, 56, 57 (13 and 20 April, 4 and 11 May 1911).'
59. Rafiq al-'Azm, Al-Durus al-hukmiya li-l-nashi'a al-islamiya, 2nd edn
(Al-Matba'a al-wataniya, Damascus, 1910), pp. 5, 17, 20 ff.
60. Rafiq al-'Azm, Al-Baydnfi l-tamaddun wa-asbdb al- 'umran, ed. 'Abd
al-Hadl Naja al-Ibyari (Al-Matba'a al-i'lamiya, Cairo, AH 1304), pp. 6,
16-17.
61. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
62. Rafiq al-'Azm, Majmu'at athar Rafiq Bey al-'Azm, ed. 'Uthman al-
'Azm (Matba'at al-manar, Cairo, AH 1344), pp. 14-15. He also says that
'every nation, whether drawn together by religion or on some other basis,
must have a leader to keep it unified, uphold the tenets of its law and direct
the policy of its realm'. See Rafiq al-'Azm, Ashhar mashahir al-Islamff l-
harb wa-l-siydsa (Matba'a hindlya, Cairo, 1909), vol. I, pp. 16-17.
63. Al-'Azm, Ashhar mashahir al-lslam, p. 17.
64. Ibid., p. 120.
65. Al-'Azm, Majmu'at athar Rafiq Bey al-'Azm, 'Al-Khutab', p. 15.
66. Al-'Azm, Ashhar mashahir al-Islam, vol. Ill, p. 633.
67. Ibid., vol. II, 302-3.
68. Ibid., vol. Ill, 677-8, 679-80.
69. Al-'Azm, Majmu'at athar Rafiq Bey al- 'Azm, 'Al-Jami'a al-islamiya',
pp. 49, 50-1.'
70. Ibid., pp. 48, 51.
71. Ibid., 'Al-Jami'a al-'uthmaniya', pp. 136, 140-1.
72. Ibid., 'Al-Jami'a al-islamiya', pp. 80-2.
73. Ibid., p. 52.
74. Ibid., 'Al-Jami'a al-'uthmaniya', pp. 140-1, 142.
75. Ibid., 'Al-Jami'a al-islamiya', p. 52. In the time of 'Abdulhamid
(about 1905), he wrote an essay entitled 'The Islamic League and Europe'
(Al-Jami'a al-islamiya wa-Urubba, in which he stressed two points: knowledge
and freedom (ibid., p. 77). He therefore regarded the oppression and egoism
of the rulers, and deviance from true Islam, as the causes for Muslim
discord, weakness and decline (ibid., pp. 55, 77-8). As for his essay 'The
Ottoman League' (Al-Jami'a al-'uthmaniya), it seems that he wrote this work
about 1910-11; in it his analysis of conditions proceeds in the nationalist
vein.
76. Rafiq al-'Azm makes the point that this idea was circulated by
certain young proponents of Ottomanism who took refuge in Egypt in 1896,
attempting to alarm 'Abdulhamid with the idea that he might possibly
restore the Constitution; but in their minds this figment of the imagina-
tion became a reality. See Majmu 'at athar Rafiq Bey al- 'Azm, 'Al-Jami'a al-
'uthmaniya', p. 112. He probably forgot, for example, the writings of al-
Kawakibi. On the subject of the Arab caliphate, see also Samra, 'Christian
Missions and Western Ideas', pp. 287 ff.
77. Al-'Azm, Majmu'at athar Rafiq Bey al-'Azm, pp. 118, 127, 129.
78. Ibid., pp. 129-30.
79. Ibid., p. 135.
80. Ibid., p. 137.
81. Ibid., pp. 135-42.
212
82. See the writings of al-'Azm in Al-Mufid, nos. 1258 and 1260, 22
and 24 April 1913.
83. Samra, 'Christian Missions and Western Ideas', pp. 292 ff.
84. Shaklb Arslan, Bayan li-l-umma al-'arabiya 'an hizb al-lamarkaziya
(Matba'at al-'adl, Cairo, 1913). He wrote this after the convening of the
First Arab Congress.
85. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
86. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
87. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
88. Shaklb Arslan, Sira dhdtiya (Dar al-tali'a, Beirut, 1969), pp. 66-7.
89. Ibid., pp. 68-9.
90. Arslan, Bayan, p. 33.
91. Arslan, Sira, p. 65.
92. Arslan, Bayan, pp. 21-5.
93. Ibid., pp. 26-7. He considered that the existence of the Ottoman
Empire was the only thing protecting Muslims in the entire world. Should
the Empire collapse, 'the colonialist states would at once remove the Qur'an
from the hands of the Muslims and force them to convert to Christianity'
(ibid., p. 42).
94. Ibid., p. 73.
95. Ibid., pp. 51-2.
96. Arslan, Sira, pp. 69-70. He emphasises this fear of the ambitions
of the West; ibid., pp. 81, 106-7.
97. Arslan, Bayan, p. 28.
98. Ibid., p. 13.
99. Ibid., pp. 47-8.
100. Ibid., pp. 42-3.
101. Ibid., p. 28.
102. See Shaklb Arslan, Al-Nahda al- 'arabiyafi I- 'asr al-hadir (Matba'at
dar al-nashr, Cairo, 1937); Ahmad al-Sharabasi, Shakib Arslan: da'iyat al-
(
uruba wa-l-lslam, 2nd edn (Dar al-jll, Beirut, 1978), pp. 68 ff; also Arslan's
article 'Al-'Uruba jami'a kulliya', in al-Sharabasi, Shakib Arslan, pp. 134 ff.
213
6
The Development of Arab
Consciousness from 1908 until the
First World War
In this period the Arab consciousness manifests itself in literary and

intellectual activity and in efforts to found Arab societies. It should
be noted that Istanbul, the capital of the Empire, witnessed more
extensive activity in the founding of Arab societies and that the
general Arab character was better represented there than anywhere
else. This was because it was Istanbul's centres of higher educa-
tion, both military and civilian, that were the goals of aspiring Arab
youths, and the capital that was the seat of the Parliament, where
the Arab deputies met. Furthermore, in Istanbul one can at first
hand view the perspectives of the new order, which can be examined
more clearly here than in the provinces. At the same time, however,
these societies were not pioneers in thought; rather, their pro-
grammes, whether public or secret, gave expression to perspectives
already under discussion.
At the dawn of the century there were two perspectives influen-
cing the Arabs. The first was that of the prevailing ideology,
Ottomanism, which was concerned with defence of the unity,
survival and modernisation of the Ottoman Empire; and the second
was the Arab perspective, which considered the Arabs as a nation
having its own role, distinguishing features and rights. The two
shared a common ground in affirming the necessity of national
awakening, progress and catching up with Europe, and in their
awareness of the Western menace and the importance of confront-
ing it.1 This probably explains a striking phenomenon, and that
is that the declared goal of the Arab societies did not go beyond
the demand for reforms that would guarantee Arab rights within
the Ottoman Empire. This is not to deny that some involved in
the movement went further than this and favoured independence;
but this trend was limited, and it was probably after the declaration
214
The Development of Arab Consciousness
of the First World War that it considerably expanded. The Arab

perspective gained momentum when the Turks, both before and
after promulgation of the Constitution, clearly displayed their
inability to stand up to Europe, and similarly, when the Unionists
introduced a grave provocation by opposing the Arabic language
and adopting a policy of Turkification. 2
The Young Turks were agreed on their primary goals — the
establishment of constitutional government and the protection and
strengthening of the Ottoman Empire — but differed on the
methods for achieving these aims. There were liberals, represented
by the attitude of Amir Sabah al-Din, who advocated a policy of
administrative decentralisation, recognition of the subject nation-
alities and use of the local languages. Others, however, represented
by the position of Ahmet Rida Bey, were Turkish nationalists who
called for centralised administration and later adopted a policy for
the Turkification of other peoples. These latter views were
manifested in the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihddve teraqqi
jem'iyet-i)?
T h e Committee of U n i o n and Progress
It should be noted that the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)

did not assume power after the promulgation of the Constitution;
rather, it left it to the existing government and assumed the role
of a supervisory body exercising its power and influence as need
arose. This was a situation that exposed the CUP to the accusation
of interference in government and of exercising power without
accountability, and this created an uneasy state of affairs. This is
in all probability attributable to the fact that the Young Turkey
Society was essentially a continuation of the Young Ottoman move-
ment. Like their predecessors, the Young Turks were concerned
with saving the Empire and considered — also like the Young
Ottomans — that this would be achieved by introducing constitu-
tional government, by means of which they would circumscribe the
power of the sultan and satisfy the aspirations of the minorities by
granting them equality before the law. At the same time, they felt
that the pace of modernisation would be accelerated by means of
a vigorous policy of centralisation. But while the Young Ottomans
were of relatively high class origins, the Young Turks were of a
more modest social background, this situation arising from the
broadening of the foundations of the reform movement in the
215
preceding period. 4 The Young Turkey Society arose from the

newly emerging professional classes: military officers, journalists,
lawyers and junior officials in the administration. They were the
product of the government schools and in all likelihood they were
of basically middle-class origin. The senior rank of officials was on
the whole hostile to the Young Turkey movement, while the lower
classes were indifferent. The movement thus found support among
junior officers in the army and navy, the middle and more humble
ranks of the civil service, professional men and some of the ulema. 5
This situation had its influence on CUP policy in the Arab lands
and on their relations with the Arabs.
In 1908 the CUP announced its political programme, which pro-
vided for equality of all citizens before the law in rights and respon-
sibilities without regard for religion or ethnic origin, freedom in
education and in the founding of societies, and administration of
the provinces according to principles of * devolution of responsibili-
ty' (tawsV al-ma'dhiiniya), provided that this did not result in the
weakening of the bond holding the Empire together. At the same
time, Turkish was to remain the official language and the language
of instruction in the schools.6
In the first elections for the Parliament (November-December
1908), the Unionists interfered in such a manner that it was difficult
to gain a seat without support from them. Many of their candidates
— landowners and members of the urban professional classes —
were elected, and the results were not gratifying to the Arabs. 7 The
only other party, the Liberal Party, was not successful in the
elections. 8 But conservative elements were opposed to the
Unionists because of their secularising measures, and the counter-
revolution of 13 April 1909 overthrew the Unionists and brought
the Liberals to power. Then came the movement of the army from
Salonica on 23-24 April 1909, and five days later 'Abdulhamid was
deposed and Muhammad Reshad was invested as sultan. The
failure of the politicians to maintain law and order led to a takeover
by the professional army, and the Liberals, as a party, collapsed. 9
It was in the third period, between early May and 27 August
1909, that most of the new legislation was enacted, the goals of these
laws being modernisation and assurance of the integrity of the
Empire. Through these measures the Unionists tried to achieve the
centralisation of power and to integrate the various subject nation-
alities in the name of Ottomanism, or to put it more precisely, to
Turkify them. The measures towards centralisation may have met
with some success (despite a certain degree of opposition to the
216
concentration of power in the hands of the Turks), but the policy

of Turkification, coupled with the growth of nationalism among
the peoples of the Empire, led to resistance and to emphasis on the
nationalist perspective. 10 In July 1909 the Unionists submitted to
the Parliament Article IV of the Law on Public Meetings, which
banned from the Ottoman Empire all societies having political goals
or nationalist names. This revealed the reaction of the Unionists
to the activity that was beginning to emerge among the peoples of
the Empire after the Constitution, and made its influence felt in
the trend towards secret organisations. 11
The CUP encountered a challenge from groups with less soli-
darity, consisting of Turkish politicians and military officers. These
groups favoured a more moderate method of change, and were more
lenient with the religious and ethnic communities of which the
Empire was composed. Between 1909 and 1911 more moderate and
conservative groups emerged, among them the Moderate Liberal
Party (Mu'tedil hurriyetperverdn firqasi), the Populist Party 12 {Ahdli
firqasi, most of the members of which had split from the CUP), and
the Ottoman Democratic Party ('Osmdn dimuqrdti firqasi). On 8
November 1911 the opposition groups finally united to form the
Freedom and Concord Party (Hurriyet ve i'tildf firqasi), which
brought together liberal, constitutional and conservative elements.
As stated in its manifesto, the Freedom and Concord Party saw
in the rule of the Unionists 'the transformation of the despotism
of the individual into that of the group'. It advocated considera-
tion for 'those national and confessional desires that are conceded
as a matter of course to any people or ethnic group', and emphasised
'the preservation of the freedom of the individual and the protec-
tion of the rights of the subject nationalities'. Its desire was that
every subject nationality in the Empire should be free, 'that is, not
pressured or constrained in those of its desires as are in the interest
of its people and involve no harm to Ottomanism. Let all of the
subject nationalities, despite their differences, live in harmony,
co-operation and mutual affection.'13 It advocated the devolution
of responsibility and the allocation of government posts, while still
maintaining the bond of Ottomanism, and leaving to the local
administration such local matters as education, public works, trade
and industry. The party was well received among Turkish opposi-
tion groups and also among other nationalities, including the Arabs
(some of whom were involved in its foundation). Its branches pro-
liferated in the Arab lands, clearly at the expense of the CUP,
including the Unionist clubs in Damascus, Beirut and Basra. 14
217
In the elections of April 1911, the Unionists exerted every effort,

legal and otherwise, to gain the selection of their own represen-
tatives. They succeeded, and a government of Unionist colouring
came to power. The Unionists then set out to amend the Constitu-
tion and to give greater power to the executive authority, although
this was incompatible with the point of view prevailing in 1908. 15
Italy declared war on the Empire on 18 September 1911 and
moved to occupy Tripoli. The war ended in Italian victory in
October 1912, and the loss of Tripoli provoked a great uproar in
the Arab lands. It served notice not only of the Empire's inability
to defend its domains but also of its negligence, especially since
forces had been withdrawn from Tripoli to put down the rebellion
in Yemen. 16
The war with Italy had no sooner ended than the Balkan War
began and the position of the Unionists began to totter. Kamil
Pasha, who was more inclined towards the views of the Freedom
and Concord activists, came to power as Grand Vizier on 9 October
1912. But the Unionists, aided by Turkish defeats in the war,
mounted a coup d'etat and overthrew the government of Kamil Pasha
on 23 January 1913. They were able to save Edirne, but almost
all of the European part of the Empire was lost to the Balkan states,
and this shifted the centre of gravity in the Empire to the Arab
lands.
Before the loss of the Balkans, and in the wake of the Islamic
policy of 'Abdulhamid, the Unionists set out to efface the Islamic
ideological factor and to implement a vigorous policy of centralisa-
tion in education, the army and the economy, in addition to
Turkification in order to integrate an empire of diverse subject
nationalities. But the new state of affairs after the Balkan War
necessitated a change in political and administrative ideology, since
it was desired that the one people of importance in the Empire,
aside from the Turks, should remain part of it. Hence the Arab
question jumped to a position of first priority.
The Unionists, however, were in no way prepared to grant the
Arabs autonomy or to respond to their demands. Instead, they were
content to promulgate two interim laws in March 1913. The first
(on 9 March) separated the regional budget from the general budget
by providing that revenues in the province would be collected by
a special administrative body which would then pay the expenses
for regional services, and by stipulating that the budget for each
province would be drawn up by its own council. The second law
(26 March) provided for the establishment of a provincial general
218
council elected in accordance with the Law of Deputies. Barred from

candidacy, however, were army personnel, notables, judges,
government employees, holders of government contracts and
members of Parliament; and the elections were conducted in a
manner that encouraged new elements at the expense of the tradi-
tional leaders of Arab society. Similarly, the governor was granted
wide-ranging powers enabling him arbitrarily to dictate when
sessions would be convened, what they would discuss and in what
way, so that the central government maintained its powers by means
of the governor and the Ministry of the Interior. Reactions to these
laws were therefore negative, especially on the part of the notables,
some of whom (such as Talib al-Naqib) announced that they would
resist them. With respect to the Arabic language, it was decided
to permit its use for education in the primary schools and in certain
departments of the government. But the persistence of demands
over the Arabic language reveals the inadequacy of both decision
and implementation: complaint continued in both Iraq and Syria
and manifested itself in the demands of the First Arab Congress. 17
And despite the Islamic tone in certain Turkish newspapers, as well
as in CUP discussions, with some calling for the broadening of local
administration, the Unionists did no more than adopt some simple
measures and were not shaken from their centralising policy, which
meant Turkish hegemony. 18
Arab activity in the societies
It was in these circumstances that the Arab movement grew, finding

expression in what was written and published, in certain attitudes
and in the founding of Arab societies. These societies produced no
new thought, but they were a vehicle for the expression of the
ambitions of the elite. Arab activity in the societies began in the
days of' Abdulhamid, when Arabs in Cairo established the Ottoman
Shura Society to confront his tyranny. 19 Others were involved in
a secret organisation that became a branch of the CUP in Damascus
in 1906.20
Here attention can be drawn to the circle of Shaykh Tahir al-
Jaza'iri in Damascus, a literary-cultural group that advocated not
only the study of the history and heritage of the Arabs and Arabic
belles-lettres, but also instruction in contemporary sciences and
reform. The members of the circle seem to have had some connec-
tion with the founding of the Islamic Beneficient Society, and the
219
group engendered an atmosphere of Arab consciousness. In this

atmosphere, a secret cultural (also political) circle was founded in
Damascus in 1903 by young men in the upper classes of Maktab
'Anbar, the government secondary school, and others of pro-Arab
attitudes influenced by the discussions in the circle of Shaykh Tahir
al-Jaza'iri. This circle was influential in the nationalist movement.
The Arab Awakening Society
The ostensible aim of the small Damascus circle was to study Arab
history and Arabic grammar and literature, and to disseminate
learning and knowledge. Its true goal, however, was to arouse con-
sciousness of Arabism. In their secret propaganda the members of
the circle limited themselves to demands that the Ottoman Empire
adopt a decentralised system guaranteeing the rights of the Arabs,
and make Arabic an official language in the government schools,
administrative offices and courts in the Arab provinces.21 In 1905
two members of the circle22 moved to Istanbul to study, and there,
in 1906, they joined two others23 in founding the Arab Awakening
Society (Jam'iyat al-nahda al-larabiyd). They subsequently admitted
members from Damascus, and in 1907 the Society's headquarters
was moved there.
It would seem that the Society adopted an Arab-Islamic posi-
tion. Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib states that its founders 'believed
that Arabdom was the noblest nationality in the Community, and
that God had chosen the Arabs to bear the beliefs of Islam in its
first days due to qualities and distinguishing characteristics found
in none but them . . . They also believed that the Arabs bore the
responsibility for carrying the message of Islam and for rejuvenating
the faith.' This is a historical message, since 'the first injury the
Muslims inflicted on themselves, more than a thousand years ago,
was to allow the hand of Arabdom to slip from the tiller guiding
Islam and its empire and directing its history towards its goals'.
The mischief reached its climax in two unprecedented blunders
perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire: the first was to dispense with
Arabic as an official language, and the second — and one of the
causes of Muslim backwardness — was to ignore the industrial and
organisational progress that was occurring in the West. 24 Aside
from this Islamic tone on the part of its president, the secretary
of the Society, Salah al-Din al-Qasimi, highlights the importance
of Arabic when he mentions that the four founders used to meet
220
every evening and study Arabic topics, 'the aim of this being to
revitalise themselves by revitalising the Arabic language, for they
realised that language ranks among the most decisive means of com-
munication among mankind and the greatest stimuli of revival and
progress in the life of nations'.25
Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib also mentions that the ambition of the
Society was 'to make educated young Arabs aware of their
Arabness, and to call upon them to co-operate in the reform of
Ottoman society, the well-being of which was a precondition to the
well-being of Arab society'.26 Al-Qasimi, on the other hand, places
stronger emphasis on the Arabs and says that the aim of the founders
was 'to promote the felicity of the Arab nation and to restore its
proud glory', and that the Society 'seeks to gather around itself the
sons of the entire Arab nation.'27 He then declares that the goal
announced in the Society's by-laws28 (Article XII) 'makes no
appeal for attaining strength, except that which is necessary for the
advancement of a subject nationality comprising more than half
of the population of the Empire'. As the Arabs progress in learn-
ing, 'they will come to realise the import of their rights and respon-
sibilities, and there will penetrate to the hearts of the nation's sons
the flame of that eternal light, knowledge. This would arouse their
determination and zeal from their present state of lethargy, and
at the same time we would to the same extent be uplifting the
Ottoman nation.' 29
Such statements clearly indicate that the Arab Awakening Society
was following an Arab nationalist line. It advocated the national
awakening of the Arabs; it emphasised Arabic as a fundamental
bond and a basis for the national awakening; it regarded the leading
role of the Arabs as essential to the revival of the Ottoman Empire;
and it was anxious to protect Arab rights within the framework of
the Empire. The members of both the circle of Tahir al-Jaza'iri
and the Arab Awakening Society played a tangible role in the Arab
movement after the promulgation of the Constitution.
Among the goals of the Revolution of 1908, which restored the
Constitution, were to guarantee equality among all Ottoman
subjects, to reinvigorate the Empire and to ward off the danger
posed by foreign ambitions. The Arabs looked forward to a new
era. Agitation for an Arab caliphate receded and thoughts of
secession disappeared. The Arabs hoped for reform, a share in the
administration of the Empire and recognition of Arabic, alongside
Turkish, in education and in official transactions and relations. In
addition, 'it stirred up the latent forces in the hearts of certain
221
individuals to strive for the revival of all that would serve to revive
the glory of the Arab nation'. 30 There was brisk activity in the
founding of newspapers and periodicals, especially in Syria and Iraq,
and earnest appeals were made for the opening of schools at various
levels.
Here it is worth drawing attention to the Arab involvement in
political parties. At first the Arabs rejoiced in the era of freedom,
and many of them joined the Society of Union and Progress,
'expecting from it all the best for the Empire and the Arab lands',
and opening C U P branches in Syria and Iraq. But when there
appeared the first signs of the CUP's intent to impose a Turkish
monopoly of power and to disregard Arab demands and rights, the
Arabs became actively involved in political parties, especially the
Freedom and Concord Party, that aimed for the participation of
non-Turks in the administration. 31
The Society for Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood
The first society32 to be established after the restoration of the Con-

stitution was the Society for Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood (Jam 'iyat
al-ikha'al-'arabi al-'uthmani). Founded on 9 August 1908, it was open
to 'all Ottoman Arabs, irrespective of their confessional and
sectarian differences'. 33 The first statement by its founders indi-
cates that since societies for other Ottoman nationalities had been
established, they decided to establish one for the Arabs. The Society
sought to promote the Arab cause within the Ottoman Empire.
Hence, although its charter affirmed the bond of Ottomanism, 34
the brotherhood of the subject nationalities of the Empire and the
preservation of the Constitution, it also declared that this was not
incompatible with a system in which each subject nationality would
see to the management of its own particular affairs. This was
especially true of the Arabs, 'the possessors of the noble language
of the Qur'an and a glorious and brilliant history.' The Society
thus 'seeks to enhance the status of the Arabs and Arabic within
the Ottoman community, and to see to it that the Arabs, irrespec-
tive of their religious differences, fulfil their right, conferred upon
them by Constitutional equality, to gain government positions, high
ranks and other legitimate concerns'. It also sought to spread the
lights of education among the Arabs by founding schools, printing
books and establishing newspapers, and urged them to form com-
panies concerned with the advancement of trade, industry and
222
agriculture. It was anxious to maintain the rights of the Arabs in

the Empire and worked to support them in their various concerns
and affairs. It advocated the importance of electing the best men
of the Arab nation to the Parliament and campaigned for the
opening of new branches of the Society.
The Society defined an Arab as 'anyone affiliated with the Arabs
by birth and homeland'. It would seem that it founded branches
in Syria, and that these campaigned against the Unionists in the
first elections. It also established a newspaper called The Ottoman
Brotherhood (Al-Ikha' al-'uthmdni). The Unionists were apparently
well aware of its aims, and so abolished the Society and closed its
branches and newspaper on 13 April 1909.35
The Literary Club
The idea of founding Arab organisations was clearly an enduring

one. The law of 7 July 1909 prohibited the establishment of societies
and parties with political goals or nationalist names, but such
organisations none the less arose in secret, while others not of this
description conducted their activities openly. Immediately after the
abolition of the Society for Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood, the Arab
youth of Istanbul founded the Literary Club (Al-Muntadd al-adabi)
and found support among leading Arab personalities in Istanbul
who adhered to the Arab position. 36 Members from various Arab
provinces involved themselves in the organisation, which they
intended to serve as a social and cultural centre for Arab youth. 37
The club apparently set out to establish a consensus of opinion
among the Arab students in Istanbul and to propagate the idea of
Arabism among them. Its nationalist aims manifested themselves
in the lectures, speeches and poems presented at its meetings and
in the articles published in its journal. 38 At a meeting held in
January 1911, 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil, president of the Literary
Club, delivered a speech 'in which he urged those in attendance
to unite, to co-operate and to speak with a single voice for the sake
of the awakening of their Arab nation'. He called upon each and
every one of them to pattern their lives after the hadith, 'Die in the
service of your nation, that both you and your nation might live.' 39
At a meeting of the Club in June 1911, 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil
presented a proposal in the name of the Club to the deputies and
others present. In this project he sought 'to unify indigenous
elementary education in the Arab lands, so that the upbringing of
223
the young people in all of our lands will adhere to a common course',
since he saw in education the best means to achieve unity. He also
called for the expansion of education and for the composition of
suitable books, 'so as to achieve a uniform programme of studies
conducive to the creation of a common feeling of awareness in the
souls of the students', 40 in this way seeking to stimulate the Arab
consciousness.
Bodies of the Club asserted that it was 'purely a forum for
learning, with no connections with matters of politics or religion'.
Such also was the position of al-Khalil, who affirmed the bond of
Ottomanism and made the point that appealing to the Arabs to unite
and to speak with a single voice was 'for the sake of the awakening
of their Arab nation, making it possible for it to be a member of
the Ottoman body working to protect its integrity'. He regarded
the unification of the Arab nation as, in the first instance, essential
in order to achieve its firm unification with the other elements in
the Empire. 41 This is a formulation frequently encountered in the
statements of activists in the Arab movement at that time.
It would seem that the perspective of the Club involved a reac-
tion to the Pan-Turanian movement and to the Turks' disregard
of Arab demands for reform, 42 which thus caused the Club to take
an interest in propagating nationalist thinking. In one of his
speeches, 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil stressed that the pillars of
nationalism were a unity of language, a unity of history, a unity
of homeland and a unity of interest, and that these bonds were to
be found in the Arab nation. This was a comprehensive and
developed definition of Arab nationalism. 43
The Literary Club was an Arab intellectual centre that played
a noteworthy role in the Arab movement and in the spread of
nationalist thinking. Some of its members and leaders probably
adopted a distinctively Arab position, but until the First World War
its point of view continued to be an Arab-Ottoman one. 44
The Qahtdnid Society
The Qahtanid Society {Al-Jam'iya al-qahtdniya) in Istanbul, the first

Arab secret society, was founded late in 1909 after the prohibition
of nationalist societies. Arab army officers and civilians were
involved in it, and its objective was to try to arouse the Arabs, to
unite them in a consensus of opinion and to demand their rights
to participation in the administration of the Empire. It apparently
224
gave expression to Arab complaints at the attitude of the Unionists.

It is well known that the Arabs complained about the committees
of disposition, which they saw as aiming primarily to exclude the
Arabs, and about the voices raised in the Turkish press (e.g. that
of Husayn Jahed in Taniri) rejecting the equality of the subject
nationalities and conceding to the Turks special rights and privileges
and the status of the ruling nation. Further causes for grievance
were the negative attitude towards the Arabic language and CUP
interference in the elections. 45 The publisher of Idahat conceded
that the goal of the Society was to disseminate the idea of Arab
progress, the improvement of their situation and their national
awakening. But he went on to raise accusations that the Society
(or more precisely, many of its members) sought the independence
of the Arab lands and the establishment of an Arab caliphate,
charges that in this period were devoid of foundation. 46
The Covenant Society
Reference may be made here to the Covenant Society (Jam'iyat

al-'ahd), a secret political society founded on 28 October 1913. The
idea of founding this organisation began with 'Aziz 'All al-Misri
after his experience in Tripoli in 1911, and its membership included
an elite group of Arab military officers, most of them Iraqis. To
judge from the thinking of its founder, it would seem that the
position advocated by the Society encompassed all of the subject
nationalities of the Ottoman Empire. Its aim was for autonomous
entities to be established for each subject nationality, and for the
language of each group to be the language used in its entity, with
Turkish remaining the universal Ottoman language. The Arab
nation, the society held, must prepare itself to act as a force standing
with the Turks against the West.
After the Balkan War and the departure of 'Aziz 'All al-Misri for
Egypt, the Society apparently came to focus its attention on the Arabs
and the Turks, advocating a system closer to federalism between the
two groups, while maintaining the integrity of the Empire and
accepting the Ottoman caliphate. 47 The programme of the Cove-
nant Society thus reveals Arab nationalist thinking, the Ottoman-
Islamic point of view and fear of the Western menace. After the
Ottoman Empire's entry into the First World War and the example
Jemal Pasha made of leading Arab personalities, the men of the
Society began to turn towards the idea of Arab independence. 48
225
The Young Arab Society
The idea behind the Young Arab Society (Al-Jam(iya al-'arabiya

al-fatai) emerged among young Arabs who, believing in the Arab
nation, noticed the Turkish nationalist perspective of the CUP. The
beginning was apparently in Istanbul in 1909, but it was after the
founders travelled to Paris to complete their studies that the Society
actually became active. 49
The first public statement by the Society referred to how the Arab
nation lagged behind other nations in social, political and economic
affairs, which required that perceptive leaders of the nation 'devote
their lives to ways of awakening the nation from this backwardness
and organise efforts leading to its advancement, so as to make people
aware of the meaning of life and to protect the natural rights of
the nation . . . ' The goal of the Society appears in Article I of
its by-laws: 'This society is called the Young Arab Society, and its
aim is to awaken the Arab nation and raise it to the level of energetic
nations.' 50
The Young Arabs extended their activity to include young men
from the Literary Club, as well as others from Syria and Iraq. 51
The Society played a leading role in the campaign for the First Arab
Congress in Paris and, with this purpose in particular in mind,
established contacts with the Decentralisation Party and the Beirut
Reform Society.52 It adhered to a nationalist point of view and made
membership conditional upon belief in Arab nationalism. 53 But
with the development of prevailing conditions, its Arab perspective
developed into one advocating decentralisation, and finally, after the
outbreak of the First World War, into one calling for independence.
Intellectual features i n periodical literature
We have observed the development of nationalist thinking among

the intellectuals and pointed out the perspective of the Arab societies.
We would now do well to turn our attention to manifestations of
the movement in some of the published articles and in the Arab
reform movement.
The predominant features of Arab perspectives after 1909 were
an emphasis on reform and equality among the subject nationalities
and advocacy for the Arabic language. 54 At first, there was also
a notable emphasis on the link between the Arabs and the Turks
within the Ottoman framework, or on the union of the Ottoman
226
peoples. 55 But the attitude of the Unionists and the measures they
took stirred up unrest.
Rashid Rida summarises the points of grievance at the beginning
of 1910, referring to the extreme excesses of the government in
dismissing Arabs from their government positions and in denying
them posts that were made available to non-Arabs. Another
grievance was the government's haste in undertaking actions that
served notice of its intention to weaken the Arabic language. For
example, it conducted legal proceedings in the courts of Arab
provinces in Turkish, although it knew that the people were for the
most part ignorant of this language, and did not accept petitions
of grievance written in Arabic, not even in the houses of Parliament.
Another source of complaint pertained to the Ministry of Educa-
tion, such as the decision to make Arabic in the preparatory schools
optional, like Armenian, although Arabic was one of the sources
of the official language, the language of the greatest number of
people in the Empire and the language of the Islamic faith. In
addition, the groups of students sent for study abroad included only
a tiny proportion of Arabs. Also problematic were matters con-
cerning the Ministry of War. Arab military officers, especially
members of the General Staff, were withdrawn from the Arab
provinces and dispersed in Turkish lands.
The Council of Notables also provoked complaint. It was
expected that its Arab membership would at least reflect the pro-
portion of Arab provinces, if not the proportion of Arab popula-
tion, yet this was not the case. And similarly, the Arabs complained
of their meagre representation in the Parliament, the most promi-
nent manifestation of the principles of equality and brotherhood.
Although he doubts that all these problems arose from Turkish
chauvinism, Rashid Rida does point out that among government
officials and Turkish journalists there were those who thought ill
of the Arabs and rejected their rights. He notes that such tension
was noticeable in Syria, although he visited the province and found
no signs of ethnic prejudice there. He noticed a steady increase in
tension and explains that at that time misunderstanding was limited
to two issues. The first was the arrogant attitude of the Turk towards
the Arab on the basis of his nationality, and his tendency to favour
himself over the Arab in government positions and offices. The
second was neglect of the dissemination of the Arabic language,
a problem for which Rida saw no excuse. Arabic was the language
of the Qur'an and of Prophetic tradition, which together comprised
the foundation of the Islamic faith. Likewise, the overwhelming
227
majority of the Empire's population were Muslims, who needed

Arabic in order to understand their religion. The sacred law of Islam
was the source of legal doctrines for both personal status and civil
law, and most of the authoritative texts on this law were written
in Arabic. Lastly, the Arab element was both the largest in the
Ottoman Empire and the one least familiar with its official language,
and it was essential that Arabic be used by civil servants in the Arab
lands. 56 He criticises the ethnic prejudice of the Turks and calls
for putting an end to it.
In early June 1911, Shukri al-'Asali raised numerous points of
criticism against the Unionists and expressed sharply worded
complaint at their policy. He criticised those who tyrannised and
scorned the subject nationalities, who resolved to deprive the Arabs
of official positions and to deny them participation in government,
those who controlled and wrote for the newspaper Tanin, and what
lay hidden behind their pens, and those who ingratiated themselves
to the lowest of the Arabs in order to get them to spy upon those
devoted to the Ottoman League and to accuse them of inclining
towards an Arab position and favouring an Arab caliphate. He
declares that the Arabs were upset at those who send to their pro-
vinces incompetent and inexperienced governors and ignorant,
oppressive and arrogant officials who did not even know the Arabic
language. The Arabs were also outraged to see the money they paid
for education and roads being spent in the province of Salonica and
elsewhere, and angry at those who loaded the nation with a burden
of millions in debts, only to use the funds to slaughter Albanians,
Arabs and other sons of the nation. The Arabs had such a dismal
view of what could be expected from the despots who tyrannised
the nation that they had begun to bless the days of 'Abdulhamld.
He then implies that the Unionists were in collusion with the
Zionists, saying that the Arabs and Syrians were angry at those
who facilitated the task of Zionist Jews trying to gain control of
Palestine, Syria and Iraq in order to establish a Jewish government.
He concludes by saying that most of such Arab complaints were
directed against the government, and were not grievances against
the illustrious Turkish people.57
The statements made by Rashid Rida and Shukri al-'Asali cover
all of the points of complaint and grievance, and may serve to pro-
mote our understanding of the development of the Arab position.
In the view of Al-Mufid, the Arabs were Ottomans, but at the
same time, a nation united 'in language, homeland and
customs'.58 Hence, the most important cause of dissension among
228
the subject nationalities of the Empire was 'the efforts and praises
repeatedly directed by the deluded to the idea of turning the subject
nationalities into one nationality'. The writer of the article con-
sidered that this was impossible so far as the Arabs were concerned,
and that the proper course of action was 'to leave each people free
to enjoy its own gifts . . . and to preserve its own unity'. In this
there was a response to the policy of Turkification and to Turkish
domination. 59
In 1911 Al-Mufid refers to a meeting in which Arab deputies
discussed the founding of an Arab party that would include all the
Arab members of the Ottoman parliament. The newspaper also
mentions that the points discussed by the conferees were as follows:
(1) requesting true equality with the other nationalities; (2) pursuing
elementary and secondary education in the Arabic language; (3)
protecting the rights of the betrayed citizens of the Arab provinces;
and (4) appointment of officials who know the language of the
land. 60 In its editorial of 1 April 1911 Al-Mufid expressed the view
that the time had come for action, and for the establishment of the
new party 'with its sublime goal, which is nothing other than to
uphold rights, to promote the language of the Qur'an, to raise the
status of the Arab among the peoples and to work towards placing
him on an equal footing with the Turk in personal and political
freedom, as well as to share in the governance of this Empire, of
which the Arabs comprise a large part and which can only be
vouchsafed through their strength and assistance'. 61
In an editorial for Al-Mufid about the latest meeting of the 'Arab
Party', al-'Urays! explains the reasons for the estrangement between
the Arabs and the Turks as the desire on the part of some fanatics
to make Turkish the language of elementary education, and the
ignorance by government officials of the language of the province
and the nature of its people. He stresses the decision of the con-
ferees that instruction in the elementary and riishdiye schools must
be in Arabic, while secondary education would continue in the
official Ottoman language. 62 In another article al-'Uraysi repeats
the fundamental Arab demands: the necessity that instruction be
in Arabic in the elementary schools, the sending to the Arab pro-
vinces of officials with a knowledge of Arabic and the spending
within the province itself of taxes and endowment (waqf) income
collected within the province. 63
The newspaper Tanin accused the Arabs in general, and the
Syrians in particular, of adopting a hostile attitude towards the bond
of Ottomanism. In his response to these charges, Shukri al-'Asall
229
reiterated his position that the Arabs are Ottomans, 'but they
absolutely refuse to be a dominated people deprived of the rights
of equality'. Likewise, the Arabs 'do not accept that anyone should
hold sovereignty over them, other than the house of the Ottoman
ruler . . . which occupies the seat of the great Islamic caliphate*.
Here he comes close to speaking of two parallel entities within the
framework of the state. Al-'Asali then enumerates the grievances
of the Syrians: elementary school teaching in Turkish and the need
to change this to Arabic, the fact that the government failed to
establish schools in accordance with Syrian wishes and even
oppressed the private schools, the Syrian demand for a fair repre-
sentation in the delegations of students sent to study abroad, the
need to send to Syria officials who knew Arabic and the require-
ment that a proportional share of waqf and education tax revenues
be set aside for the benefit of the people of the province.64 In this
he stresses points that had already been raised earlier.
Returning from a visit to Syria, Ahmet Sharif, the correspondent
for Tanin, mentions the complaints reiterated in the Syrian press.
'Why does the government not hire or appoint Arab officials, and
grant the Arabs their rights? Why are Arab officials, mutasarrifs and
governors not sent to the Arab provinces?'65
Al-Muqtabas discussed the unification of the subject nationalities
in the Empire and explained that the fundamental role of the
Tanzimat had aimed at blending all of the subject nationalities
together and preserving Ottoman unity. But this had not been
achieved; and since the subject nationalities differed in their histor-
ical backgrounds, religions, ways of thinking, cultures and aspira-
tions, it was impossible to mix them into one homogeneous
whole. 66 Al-Muqtabas viewed with favour the call for equality, and
in a second article it pointed out the example of Belgium and noted
how the two main peoples were on an equal footing in councils,
official bureaus and departments, and in the army, with both
languages enjoying official recognition. The journal called for a
similar system in the Ottoman Empire.67
In a third article, entitled 'The Distribution of Power' (TawzV
al-sulta), this issue was discussed and it was asserted that the
dissimilarities among the subject nationalities were based on natural
and geographical factors (race, language and locality) that could
not be changed. Hence, it was impractical to deal with them from
Istanbul. The Ottoman League could be preserved by linking the
Arab provinces together through a council drawing its members
from the people of the Arab provinces and taking Arabic as its
230
language, and by linking the Turkish provinces together through

a council drawing its members from the Turkish provinces and
adopting Turkish as its language. All would be linked together
through a supreme council using Turkish and drawing its members
from all of the Ottoman provinces. 68
The same topic was discussed in an article entitled 'Equality'
(Al-Musawah). This essay drew attention to the multiplicity of
backgrounds, races and religions among the subjects of the Empire,
and rejected the pursuit of a policy of oppression and suppression
in order to unite the subject nationalities. It advocated equality
among subjects of all backgrounds and maintained that equal rights
among 'people of all the races, religions and languages' was a
fundamental precondition for both the unification of the Ottoman
nationalities and their reconciliation among themselves and with
the government. There should be no discrimination, whether in
the administration of justice, in the law or in the selection of officials.
Civil servants and officials should be chosen for their competence,
merit and ability, without regard for nationality or religion.
Although Turkish is the official language, it is essential that the
affairs of the provinces be conducted in their own languages, in
Arabic in the Arab lands (with the provision that Turkish would
remain the official language), and that in selecting officials
preference be given to those who know Arabic as well as Turkish. 69
On 7 June 1911 Ahmad Mukhtar Bayhum summed up Arab
demands as follows: respect for the Arabic language, 'making
teaching in it mandatory in the elementary and rushdiye schools,
and regarding it as an assist to the official Turkish language'.
Furthermore, officials ignorant of Arabic should not be sent to the
Arab lands, concern should be shown for the spread of education
to the lowliest village and an ample representation should be given
to Arab students in the groups sent to Europe to pursue their
studies. 70
In all this one can thus see repeated emphasis on a core of basic
demands. Arabic should be recognised; it should be known by
government officials and made the language of instruction in schools
below the secondary level;71 there should be equality between the
Arabs and the Turks; and the Arabs should participate in the
administration. But the Unionists adhered firmly to a policy of
centralisation and Turkification, and encouraged the establishment
of Turkish nationalist organisations 72 while staunchly opposing
Arab organisations. This provoked broader opposition among the
Arabs and by some of the Turks, and in 1911 it led to the appear-
231
ance in the ranks of the opposition and among the Arabs of the
perspective favouring administrative decentralisation.
The nationalist reaction to the policy of the Unionists found
expression in some of what was published. Al-'Uraysi wrote, 'The
programme of the Unionists is self-serving and works in the interest
of only one nationality . . . I do not believe that anyone in the
Arab nation would relinquish his identity so as to melt away into
another nationality.' 73 In another article, written after the temp-
orary fall of the Unionists from power in 1912, he criticised their
policy and said, 'When the Unionists rose to power they harboured
in their hearts a desire to subjugate all of the nationalities to their
authority, hence they denied them their languages, their distinc-
tive qualities and their culture.' 74 He also responded to them in
a third article: 'Those Unionists whose souls incline them towards
the Turkification of the subject nationalities and suppression of
nationalist sentiments would do well to avoid this foolhardy policy
and to allow the peoples to keep promoting their national identities,
for this would be more conducive to strengthening the bond of
Ottomanism.' 7 5 The writer has thus shifted from criticism of the
Turkification trend to appealing for the awakening of the Arabs
and the promotion of their sense of identity.
It would seem that the call for decentralisation varied between
advocacy for participation in administration and appeals favouring
a kind of autonomous entity within the Empire. Haqql al-'Azm
published an article in which he called for the application of a
moderate system of administrative decentralisation including the
following provisions: (1) Teaching in the elementary, rushdiye and
official secondary schools should be done in the local language
(Arabic), while Turkish should be taught on a mandatory basis;
court cases and record keeping in the provincial courts and councils
should be in the local language, and laws should be published in
this language as well as in Turkish. (2) Governors should be
appointed who know the local language; qualified individuals from
the provinces should be hired for service in the upper levels of the
imperial administration; the domains of the jurisdiction of the
governor and general and administrative provincial councils should
be expanded; tax revenues collected for education should be spent
within the province itself. (3) The period of military service should
be lowered to two years, and in peacetime should be served within
the province. 76 This can be taken as a comprehensive summary of
decentralisation as it was understood at this time.
In Paris in the spring of 1912, 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi delivered
232
a lecture entitled 'The Intellectual Movement in Syria' (Al-Haraka

al-fikriyafi Siiriyd) in which he stated that 'this movement is a move-
ment of revival in thought, one that aims to focus power both in
particular and in general terms: in particular to focus the power
of the Syrians and in general to strengthen the Arabs within the
Ottoman League\ In his view, this movement has at its disposal
numerous means, most importantly the press. He then cites press
criticism of the prevailing conditions. Only half of the educational
tax revenues and about 6.5 per cent of public works taxes are spent
on the Syrians, whilst income from the pious foundations {awqdf)
is diverted for other purposes. Furthermore, most civil servants do
not know the language of the province, and the courts conduct their
proceedings in a language other than Arabic, which results in the
loss of rights. The Syrians pay money for education, but their
children do not study in the government schools because the teachers
are ignorant of Arabic, a problem that has compelled the people
to demand the right to study in Arabic. He concludes by saying,
'The press programme calling for reform in Syria is limited to
decentralisation in educational, public works and waqf affairs
only, and to consolidating the Syrian people, and consequently
the Arabs, through those natural rights granted to them by
God.' 7 7
On 23 January 1913, the government of Kamil Pasha fell and
that of Mahmud Shawkat Pasha came to power. After this, Zayn
al-Din al-'Amili 78 wrote to clarify those points of reform upon
which the decentralisation perspective was agreed. The points he
mentioned were these: (1) The Arabic language should be made
an official language in the Arab provinces. (2) Educational, public
works and awqdffunds should be spent in the same province in which
they had been obtained. (3) Military service should be within the
province in peacetime, and both the period of service and the cost
of the bedel should be reduced. (4) Members of the General Council
should be directly elected by the people, with representation pro-
portional to the populations of the various sects, and the powers
of the Council should be expanded to include responsibility for
appointing and dismissing officials. (5) Officials should be selected
from among candidates of competence and integrity, local candi-
dates should be favoured over outsiders and consideration should
be shown for the relative populations of the sects, in order to achieve
equality. 79 This probably expresses the prevailing perspectives on
reform based on decentralisation.
Wide-ranging discussion in the press and in published books
233
revolved around the topic of the importance of the Arabic language.

Arabic was the basis for the Arab sense of nationhood, the bond
and covenant, a language of science and literature, the universal
language of Islam and the foundation for the national awakening. 80
The issue of the Arabic language was a pivotal one with respect
to education, as well as in the attitude towards the foreign schools
and the steadily increasing criticism directed against them. 81
This was the intellectual framework within which the Arab
societies developed during the first two decades of the twentieth
century. Within this context one can notice two intermingling
intellectual perspectives. The first and more coherent of these was
the Arab-Islamic line, which, although exposed to modern views
in the concepts of patriotism and nationalism, emanated from Arab-
Islamic culture and had its roots, including concepts of the nation,
in the heritage of that culture. It emphasised the Arab identity,
stressed the idea of an Arab nation bound together by ties of
language and history (with perhaps the additional notion of shared
descent), and revealed a particularly sharp focus on the Arabic
language. This perspective drew a connection between Arabism and
Islam, emphasised the Arab national awakening and concern for
the Arabic language, and in the heritage found formative elements
upon which it could build. At the same time, it was cognizant of
the meaning of patriotism and saw in it a means to promote unity
and common interests among the various religious and ethnic
groups.
The second perspective was that of Arabism. It would seem that
at first it was influenced by the Western (especially French) idea
of patriotism, for it finds in the language a tie binding the people
of the region to each other in the face of both domestic and foreign
challenges. This view was expressed in the thought of Rifa'a
al-Tahtawi and among some thinkers in Egypt and Syria, and is
used on the one hand to confront sectarianism, and on the other
to work towards equality irrespective of creed or ethnic origins.
Within this framework there were a few voices that called for revolt
against the Turks. This perspective found a common ground in
Arabic, as both a language and a culture, and the emphasis on it
steadily increased and expanded, so that, as was apparent at the
dawn of the twentieth century, it became the fundamental bond
and thinking on its role as such spread from the regional level to
that of the Arabs generally.
It would seem that most of the thinkers who wrote extensively
about an Arab nation and a distinctly Arab role were representatives
234
of the first perspective. These thinkers 82 were firmly tied to the

classical heritage; indeed, some of them looked back to the historical
record for substantiation of their ideas. So far as they were con-
cerned, the foreign menace comprised the fundamental challenge,
hence their adherence to the bond of Ottomanism. When the pro-
mulgation of the Constitution failed to achieve the reform and
participation they had hoped for, or more importantly, when the
movement of Turkification began, they were confronted by a
domestic challenge of steadily increasing seriousness, while at the
same time the state was revealing its inability to deal with the danger
from abroad. Emphasis on Arabism thus increased, and manifested
itself in the trend towards administrative decentralisation and
autonomy.
T h e nationalist perspective
Alongside the nationalist thinking among intellectuals along Islamic

lines, there was a nationalist perspective among thinkers along
modern Arab lines. Here nationalist views appear more clearly,
while at the same time, these thinkers are dominated by the organic
connection between Arabism and Islam. The representatives of this
school of thought studied in modern schools without losing touch
with the classical Arab heritage.
Saldh al-Din al-Qasimi
Among them was Dr Salah al-Din al-Qasimi (d. 1916). In his view,
the language was the fundamental bond of the nation, and reform
of the language meant reform of the state of the nation. Similarly,
he regarded concern for the national language and its literature as
the measure of a nation's cohesiveness. 'The more nations protect
their languages and show concern for their literatures', he said, 'the
more firmly united they are', and the more certain they are of
political survival. 83 On the other hand, 'Nothing is more con-
ducive to crushing the life out of a nation . . . than the effort put
into the destruction of its language.'
Al-Qasimi therefore focused on the importance of the language
in both education and the national consciousness. In his view, the
first step in educational reform was to teach in Arabic, for it was
his firm belief that when a man gained his learning in a language
235
other than his own, it usually happened that nothing good for his
people could be hoped for from him. Language, he explains, 'is
a guaranteed means for setting aright the life of the nation'. When-
ever an individual studies in a foreign language, it becomes difficult
for him to spread the spirit of his learning among his people in their
own language. Hence, he considers that the forefathers' neglect 'is
what has led us to this deficiency in the balance of progress'.
Al-Qasimi is not content to proclaim that the Arabic language
and culture are fundamental to the formation of the nation (a view
that had its roots in the classical heritage). Instead, he goes on to
say that the language also instils in the souls of its people a love
for the homeland. In this way, taking the language as his point of
departure, he combines the idea of the Arab nation with that of
patriotism, although the former remains the fundamental basis. This
was an important step in his nationalist thinking.84
And Al-Qasimi did adopt a clearly nationalist position. He
addressed this issue in a lecture of his on 'Nationalism in Nations'
(Al-Qawmiyafi l-umam), and took note of the awareness of the idea
of nationalism, or a sense of nationhood, in the Ottoman lands.
Referring to the discussion over this issue, he described it as a debate
between those who, familiar with its sources, endorse nationalism
'as a lofty political principle or as one of the factors contributing
to awakening and progress, and those who, ignorant of the historical
facts and of the secret of the progress of nations, oppose it by
claiming that it encourages disunity'. In this way he criticises the
proponents of the call for the Islamic League. He goes on to say
that in days past, when nations found that it served their interest,
religious solidarity played a noteworthy role in the course of events.
But in his own era, in a further stage of development, 'nations have
found themselves compelled to rally around a different kind of
solidarity, by which we mean nationalism, since they view it as more
conducive to their survival and better suited to their development'.
Indeed, nations have found in nationalism a means simultaneously
to serve both the faith and humanity. Al-Qasimi wrote at a time
of nationalist activism in Europe, and in the circumstances of his
era viewed it as essential to survival and national awakening.
Nationalism did not contradict religion but rather was a means to
serve it.
Al-Qasimi proceeds to argue that although nationalism had only
recently emerged in the Ottoman lands, it was not an innovation
of the current generation, but the daughter of social imperatives.
It will continue to grow so long as there is dispute among the subject
236
nationalities, for it adheres to natural social laws 'that go back to

the fact that the nation requires that its life be protected by protec-
ting its language, customs and traditions', and does so in order to
oppose those who threaten it or try to dispossess it of the funda-
mental elements of its character. He considers that nationalism is
one of the greatest factors in national awakening, and that the
history of such revival movements 'demonstrates to us that the
advanced nations have only to come to enjoy their present state
of socio-political life when their hearts were filled with the idea of
nationalism and granted it the same status as a deep-seated article
of faith.' 85
Not content merely to point out the role of nationalism in the
unity of Germany, Italy, the United States and other nations,
al-Qasimi goes on to state that the Turks are aware of this role.
'They have begun to pride themselves for their own nationalism
and to sing the praises of their homeland's memory'; and once the
Constitution was restored, they began to take action to entrench
their nationalism by founding societies and publishing periodicals.
Concluding with a call for the idea of nationalism among the Arabs,
he says, 'This would perhaps be a profitable lesson to us, the Arabs,
prompting us to adopt the new and useful, and, in an age in which
the decision always falls on the side of power and national interest,
to cast aside the obsolete theories handed down from the past.' 86
The nationalism sought by al-Qasimi was not aggressive; rather,
it was constructive and aimed at the preservation of the Arab sense
of identity, and he even called for the preservation of the bond of
Ottomanism. This may serve to clarify his attitude towards the
relationship between the Turks and the Arabs. He wrote an article
entitled 'The Arab Question and its Rise' (Al-Mas'ala al-'arabiya
wa-nash'atuhaf1 in which he criticises the negative and contemp-
tuous attitude of the Turks towards the Arabs. The reason for this
attitude, he explains, is their fear 'that the idea of an Arab caliphate
will spread and permeate the souls of both young and old, causing
one part of the nation to rise against the other, and thereby lead
to the most overwhelming catastrophe'. He attributes this fear to
the machinations of traitors, and asserts the bond of Ottomanism.
Then he comes back to state that the Arabs are not all the same.
Some of them have taken up the Arab question to serve their own
individual aims, but others are motivated by zeal for their homeland
and its people. He views these latter with favour and considers that
they assert this perspective in order to take a firm stand 'against
all those who seek to plot against them, harbour ill-will against
237
their nationality or act to cause them injury by encroaching on their

rights'. This attitude is in his view an appropriate one. He has no
regard for labels; to him, what is important is to emphasise the Arab
bond. 'Let them say that they are Arabs first and Ottomans second',
for attachment to the principle of nationalisms has been manifest
in civilised lands among the most ancient of nations.
Beyond this, al-Qasimi holds that the very least benefit to be
derived from the principle of nationalisms is that it teaches people
the merit of self-reliance. The Constitution may have enjoined
equality among the subject nationalities, but that was not a suffi-
cient basis for national awakening, for there is no progress for a
people 'that does not make use of its own power'. He therefore con-
siders that 'the nationalist uproar is legitimate so long as the man
engaged in it, motivated by the driving force of genuine patriotism,
is trying to defend the rights of his nation'. This is a view indicative
of a certain degree of understanding of the difference between
various forms of nationalism, and reveals an appreciation for pure
nationalism. 88
It is thus that al-Qasimi discusses the concept of Arab nation-
alism. Although he does make incidental reference to the factor of
race, he regards language and literature as its fundamental bond.
And in a period of ascendant nationalism in Europe, he considers
it a factor behind the emergence of modern states and the basis for
progress and national awakening. He calls upon the Arabs to adopt
this idea, as the Turks have done: 'nationalism is both essential
and legitimate, for it aims to protect the rights of the Arab nation
and its national awakening'. It is also worth bearing in mind that
al-Qasimi grew up in a learned family and received a modern
education.
(
Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi
The nationalist perspective was also represented by 'Abd al-Ghani

al-'Uraysi (executed in 1916),89 who wrote articles in Al-Muftd on
the Arab role in history, the Arab nation and the elements that had
given rise to it, and Arab-Turkish relations. Al-'Uraysi studied in
indigenous Islamic schools, which took an interest in promoting
Arab consciousness and in the Islamic reformist perspective. His
Arab nationalist viewpoint thus took shape in his own land, 90
although his familiarity with Western thought, after his trip to Paris
in 1912-13, 91 probably made it possible for him to articulate his
238
nationalist ideas more clearly.

Al-'UraysI stressed the idea of the Arab nation and discussed
it in a number of articles in which he spoke in glowing terms of
its historical role and eminence. 92 Sufficient cause for taking pride
in it is provided by the fact 'that God produced from this nation
a man whose sacred law spread over the earth'. It was worthy of
such pride, since 'the Arabs are the nation of noblest stock and the
people of most outstanding nature'. This distinction he associates
with Islam: the noble Prophet came and brought them out of the
snare of delusions to the ethereal expanse of the truth, from the
worship of created beings to worship of the true God, from the bonds
of ignominy to the spacious domains of exalted renown, from the
confines of unquestioning adherence to tradition to absolute
freedom.93 He also takes up the historical role of the Arabs. It was
they who conquered and subjugated the regions of the earth, who
transmitted the sciences of the Greeks, which were borrowed by
the West from the Arabs. The Arabs are possessed of pre-eminent
skill in science and civilisation, and the Europeans were their pupils
and benefited from them in their own national awakening. God
endowed the Arabs with inexhaustible vitality, a vitality which
would make it possible for them in practically no time to restore
splendour and glory to the Islamic nation. 94 He goes on to state
that the Arab prophet of Quraysh confirmed this Arab eminence,
associated their glory with that of Islam, bid that they be held in
high regard, and warned against doing harm to them and to the
Arabic language. 'For I am an Arab', Muhammad had said, 'and
God has sent me as a prophet from among them . . . Grief and
destruction upon those who wrong them, and woe and suffering
upon those who cause harm to my language and sacred law.' 95
Al-'Uraysi points out that despite circumstances of invasion and
conquest the Arab nation had preserved its qualities and distinc-
tive features: many nations in such a situation have faded into
oblivion 'and lost their national qualities', but the Arab nation has
not. He takes notice of a unique point: 'that every conquered nation
has taken on the qualities of the conqueror, except in the case of
this nation, where the conquerors have taken on the qualities of
the conquered'. He explains this by the fact that the Arab nation,
whether in the role of conqueror or conquered, is possessed of con-
stitutive elements that preserve its essence and characteristics; hence,
the nation 'brings together among its people elements of civilisa-
tion and agreeable life'. 96
In discussing these formative elements of the nation and the
239
constituent aspects of Arab nationalism, al-'Uraysi refers back to

the classical heritage and also makes use of modern ideas. The
Arabic language is the foundation of Arabism, which is confirmed
by the fact that the Qur'an was revealed in Arabic. As al-'Uraysi
says, 'By Him who holds the soul of Muhammad in His hand, God
revealed His book as an Arabic Qur'an for no reason other than
to Arabise the peoples of the world.'97 In Al-Mufid there are a
number of articles, some of which were probably written by
al-'Uraysi (one of the newspaper's founders), that assert the import-
ance of the language, regarding it as 'a device for invigorating the
race and a means for achieving national awakening' and expressing
the view that 'the life of the Arabs depends upon the life of their
language'. Were the language to fade away, identity would disap-
pear and the nation would be wiped out. 98
Al-'Uraysi refers to the formative elements of the nation in his
discussion of the bond between Muslim and Christian Arabs,
declaring that they are tied to each other by the bond of nation-
ality, language and patriotism.99 In this article patriotism is meant
in a general sense and even includes the Turks, but the linkage of
nationality with the language encompasses only the Arabs as a
whole.
In Paris al-'Uraysi became familiar with Western views on
nationalism. This is apparent from his definition of the formative
elements of the nation in his speech at the First Arab Congress in
Paris on 20 June 1913. In this address he states that nations (jamd'at)
are only worthy of the name when they draw together: according
to the German scholars on the basis of language and race, in the
view of the Italians on the basis of history and customs, and
according to the doctrine of the French political thinkers on the basis
of political aspiration. If we look at the Arabs from these three
perspectives, we find that they draw together unity of language,
race, history, customs and political aspiration. 'This accordingly
demonstrates that the view of all political scientists, without excep-
tion, entitles the Arabs to claim the right of being a nation.' Here
al-'Uraysi obviously seeks to assert the Arabs' right to be regarded
as a nation; he therefore cites the European views on the subject
in order to say that they all confirm the Arabs' claim to this
right.100
After his return from Paris al-'Uraysi wrote an article101 in
which his own particular opinion on the formative elements of the
nation comes into view. By 'Arabs', he declares, he means 'all those
bonded to this nation by unity of language, common ancestry and
240
Arab inclinations'. This marks the addition of 'Arab inclinations'

(naz 'at al- 'arab) to the opinion he had expressed prior to his journey
to Paris, suggesting that he had been influenced by the French idea
of the role of the will in the formation of the nation. He explains
that his formulation on the sense of nationhood (here, jinsiya) is at
odds with that of the German and French scholars on the defini-
tion of the term. The Germans, in his view, require nothing more
than unity of language and ancestry to produce a true nation, while
the French stipulate no conditions other than inclination. 'But so
far as we are concerned', he adds 'an individual can only be
regarded as an Arab if all three conditions are deeply rooted in him.'
It would seem that he adopted this perspective in light of practical
considerations. He noted that some are drawn together by the bond
of language and common descent, but serve a people other than
their own and so stand 'outside this league'. And many politicians,
while lacking any connection with the Arabs by way of descent or
language, boast of their Arab inclinations. Such politicians,
however, are very quick to turn against this nation. He thus comes
to the conclusion that 'the Arab is the man tied to the other Arabs
by the bond of descent and unity of language, and whose inclina-
tions show zeal and concern for them'.
Al-'Uraysi emphasises the Arab identity in opposition to pan-
Turanianism, declaring that the Arabs were created Arabs and that
it is impossible for a man to cast off his identity. He corroborates
his idea when he declares that the spiritual, cultural and even
physiological character of the nation are all inherited. 'In ideational
terms', he says, 'all that finds a place in our souls, nature, morals
and customs represents the fruits of the tireless and unceasing effort
exerted by our forefathers'. He concludes that 'nationalist feelings
comprise a current of dynamism in peoples', and further, that the
Arab sense of nationhood (i.e. nationalism) took shape in the past
and is the Arab nation's expression of its sense of identity.
He therefore attacks the Unionists' policy of Turkification and
appeals to them to defer to nationalist sentiments. Such is the essence
of politics, he declares. As for secessionist movements, these are
but the result of the hostility shown towards nationalist inclinations
and the outcome of the effort to dominate peoples by force and
coercion. Such policy he goes on to characterise as a form of
colonialism, which he firmly rejects, saying, 'We Arabs are a living
nation that accepts colonialism in no form whatsoever.'102 This
bears an unambiguous warning to the Unionists.
On the other hand, it should be noted that al-'Uraysi devotes
241
only a few limited comments to patriotism and concentrates on Arab

nationalism, which is in itself a significant indication of the develop-
ment of the Arab consciousness. Al-'Uraysi emphasises patriotism
as a bond and states that 'the Islamic religion does not disallow
patriotism, for the faith is keen to preserve our brotherhood with
the non-Muslims of our homeland, protective of their equality and
amicable in its attitude towards their freedom. They enjoy all the
same rights that we do, and are held responsible for the same obliga-
tions.' He wishes to ensure the equality of the non-Muslims of the
homeland, and states that the union and awakening of the Muslims
will bring vigour and prosperity to the non-Muslims as well. That
is, he sees in patriotism not only elements of language and nation-
ality, but also a bond between the Muslim and Christian Arabs.103
By 'the homeland' he may have meant Syria; but in his article
'Neither Arabs nor Turks' (La 'arab wa-ld turk) he distinctly refers
to the Ottoman homeland as a bond. 104 In his introduction to the
Kitab al-banin he stresses that the people of the homeland must enjoy
the same freedom and rights,105 and advocates what he calls the
greatest virtue — love for the homeland — which he regards as
a fundamental duty incumbent upon every man, since the future
of the homeland depends upon its people. This having been said,
al-'Uraysi emphasises Ottomanism, reiterates his own sincere
allegiance to it, and accommodates it to his nationalist perspective
by calling for a moderate decentralisation in which Arab
characteristics and nationalist sentiments would be taken into
consideration.106
The many writings of al-'Uraysi on Arab-Turkish relations
provide a good indication of the development of these relations and
of the gradual rise of nationalist thought. In particular, we may
recall that much of what was written in the newspaper Al-Mufid
represented the attitude of the Young Arab Society,107 that al-
'Uraysi was a member of this society and that he played an active
and wide-ranging role in the nationalist movement. 108 This point
merits a detailed study that cannot be undertaken here, and for
present purposes a few observations will suffice.
First, it is worth noting that al-'Uraysi, like al-Qasimi, decided
not to raise the subject of the Arab caliphate. This issue had become
a means for provoking discord between the Arabs and the Turks.
It was taken up as a device for exploiting a situation for self-serving
purposes, and led to suspicion among the Turkish authorities.109
Secondly, it would seem that al-'Uraysi was anxious to preserve
ties with the Turks. On this question he made reference to two
242
fundamental bonds: the first, that of religion, a unity that would

survive even if all other bonds were broken, and the second, that
of patriotism, or living in a single homeland.110 Although he
stressed the compatibility between Islam and nationalism, al-'Uraysi
placed emphasis on Arabic because of its importance in Islam. And
in this connection he laid stress on Islam and the Islamic caliphate
in opposition to the proponents of pan-Turanianism, for whom the
topic of discussion was an Ottoman imperium dominated by the
Turks. Here he calls attention to the tremendous power the con-
cept of the caliphate had in times of crisis, and of the unrivalled
influence of Islam in the hearts of the people.111
Fear of Western expansion was also an important factor behind
al-'Uraysi's adherence to Ottomanism, despite the steadily worsen-
ing conflict between the Arabs and the Unionists. 112 He did,
however, associate his pro-Ottoman attitude with a demand for
Arab rights. He began by calling for freedoms and for equality
between the Arabs and the Turks;113 but as the dangers increased,
and especially after the Italian attack on Tripoli,114 he went further
than that in his demand for reforms. At the beginning of Al-
Mufid's fourth year (January 1912), he wrote that the newspaper
was 'an organ working in the interest of the Ottoman nation through
the national awakening of the Arab nation', and that by promoting
the welfare of the Arabs he sought to promote the welfare of the
others. After expounding on his reformist views, including support
for Arabic in the government schools and equality of the Arabs with
the other subject nationalities, he says, 'The platform of Al-Mufid
is an Arab-Ottoman one that parries all attempts to wrong the Arabs
and strives to uphold their rights.' But he goes on to say that it
adheres to the line of the Free Coalition Party (Mu'telif hurr-ifirqasi),
since it shares the same perspective, including such points as pre-
serving the identity of each nationality, allowing each province's
share of the educational tax burden to be spent within the province
and returning local waqf revenues to be spent on local education.115
In a second article he clarifies his position and attacks the Unionist
policy based on domination and Turkification. He describes it as
'a policy of robbery and extortion, a policy of coercion and subju-
gation', and supports the platform of the Freedom and Concord
Party, which 'is based on educating each subject nationality using
the income it generates, promoting the economic welfare of each
province with the taxes it pays, preserving the language of each
people from extinction, governing each province with administrators
who understand its inhabitants and maintaining an attitude of
243
brotherhood towards all peoples'. 116

The Balkan War revealed the weakness of the Empire. Al-'UraysI
began to criticise Western policies and their cupidity for Ottoman
lands, citing the public statements of Raymond Poincare concerning
French interests in Syria and Lebanon and also raising suspicions
of British ambitions. He demanded that the Empire hasten to
implement general reform in order to foil the ambitions of the
Powers and to stabilise the situation, and insisted on impartiality
among all the subject nationalities.
As the danger steadily increased, al-'Uraysi began to insist on
reform on the basis of decentralisation, and demanded that the
Arabs in the Empire share in government on the basis of equal
representation and equal involvement in the conduct of affairs, while
also insisting on 'protecting the life of the homeland and safe-
guarding the political survival of the nation.' 117 But the extremist
attitude and devious methods of the Unionists vis-a-vis the demand
for reform aroused the nationalists, and al-'Uraysi began to call
for Arab solidarity. Power, he said, is the fundamental considera-
tion, and there will never be genuine reform lest it be gained from
a position of power and self-reliance. We can perceive the orienta-
tion towards autonomy in his writing when he says, 'We regard
any reform not based upon our power as liable to be snatched away,
and any right not lying in the palms of our hands as open to doubt.'
He goes on to say, 'The day they rely upon someone other than
themselves for the reform of their affairs, then it is "Farewell
Arabs".' 118 In an article entitled 'The Arab Youth and his Public
Duty' {Fata l-'arab wa-wajibuhu al-'amm),119 he goes a step further
in declaring that it is the duty of every youth to ensure the survival
of his nation, and, even more than that, to ensure its advancement.
He expresses Arab displeasure at the attitudes of the Unionists and
calls upon 'our brothers, the Arab youth' to support the right of
the nation in the face of the authorities and to rely upon themselves;
however great the difficulties may be, the obstacles obstructing the
path to the nation's right will be demolished under the ardour of
the Arab youth.
Having said that his goals were those of the Freedom and Con-
cord Party, al-'Uraysi later began to insist that he and his group
belonged to no party. 'Rather, we are the party of our people', and
they would co-operate with anyone from the two parties —
Unionists or members of Freedom and Concord — who respected
Arab rights. He emphasises that 'our party unceasingly directs its
power to the goal of having its own unique identity'; hence, if the
244
two parties shunned it, 'in every land it could count on throbbing
hearts and sincere determined wills that would know how to sustain
their right and protect their people on the day the liars forsake
them.' 120 Was al-'Uraysi referring to the Young Arabs here?
Al-'Uraysi discusses the development of nations in history,
declaring that the final stage of development was the 'phase of
intellects' (tawr al-'uqiil), which upholds the right of the individual
and the freedom of his thoughts, morals and convictions, that he
might dedicate himself to a new and loftier ideal: 'the right to draw
together on the basis of a sense of nationhood', or nationalism, 'and
to declare that every people combining unity of origin and language
has the right to direct its own affairs'. Al-'Uraysi thus proceeded
step by step to a clear appeal for Arab autonomy based on nationalist
thought. 121 Of all the Ottoman peoples, he regards the Arabs as
the one best suited to autonomy and most worthy of it. In an article
of his on 'Ottoman Reforms and the Essential Role of the Arabs'
(Al-Islahat al-'uthmdriiya wa-makanat al-'arab al-dhdtiya),122 he de-
clares that the Ottoman reforms had come about only at the will
of one of the sultans or the desire of foreign powers. Of all the
peoples in the Empire, none but the Arabs had formulated a reform
programme, and none of the others had convened a conference like
that of the Arabs. 123 A people capable of achieving that 'is surely
a people of sincere will, bold resolve, free disposition and strong
men'. Upon the rights of such a people no one could encroach,
especially since the Arabs are, in addition, more discerning and
distinguished than any of the Ottoman peoples that preceded them
in demanding reform. He does, however, exercise caution and
warns the malcontents against recklessness, despite the fact that the
reforms implemented by the Empire have done little to benefit the
Arabs. And at the same time he calls upon the politicians in Istan-
bul to hasten to fulfil their promises, for the Arabs are the founda-
tion upon which the kingdom has been raised. In his speech at the
First Arab Congress in Paris, he proclaimed that connection with
the Empire would be in accordance with the extent to which Arab
rights were protected and guaranteed. 124
Al-'Uraysi concludes his intellectual message with his testament,
which he wrote after he was sentenced to death in absentia by the
martial law court in Aley in the summer of 1915, before which
Turkey had entered the war and Unionist extremism reached its
acme in the executions ordered by Jemal Pasha. In his testament
he describes the crimes of the Turks and the executions of Jemal
Pasha, as well as the oppression suffered by Syria as families were
245
starved and banished from their homes. The Turks, he says, 'tried
to kill our language, attempted to suffocate our nationalist feeling
and exerted efforts to Turkify us, all to no avail'. In the atrocities
of Jemal Pasha he saw an incentive for the nationalist movement
to take up the Holy War (jihad) against Turkification, and also an
expansion of the movement's scope: 'Syria', he added, 'will find
the men to preach the religion of Arab independence.' He appeals
in the name of nationalism for accord and union and denounces
any sectarian or regional division, concluding with a call for Arab
unity under the banner of nationalism. 125
We have discussed 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi in detail due to his
important role — both in thought and in practice — in the Arab
movement in the nationalist perspective, and because in his
nationalist thought he reached an advanced stage of comprehen-
siveness and clarity.
'Umar Hamad
'Umar Hamad (executed in 1916) took up the subject of the Arab

sense of nationhood (or nationalism) in two articles entitled 'How
Can We Promote the Arab Sense of Nationhood?' (Kayfa nu'azzizu
l-jinsiya al-'arabiya).126 It seems that he was one of the members of
the Young Arabs and that he was influenced by the development
of nationalisms in Europe. He refers to a great movement in the
world, that of nationalism, and acknowledges nationalism as a fun-
damental principle in reform.
'Umar Hamad begins with the question 'What is nationalism?'
His reply is, 'Nationalism is the bond shared by a society of people
on the basis of language, history, homeland, traditions, customs
and common interest.' Hence, he rejects the view of some127 to the
effect that language alone is sufficient to delineate a sense of nation-
hood. While he confirms the importance of language, even its role
as the primary formative element, he considers that 'speaking in
the language of a people does not make an individual one of them'.
It is essential, he insists, that all of these important conditions be
joined together: 'knowledge of the language, a common history,
kin relationship, residence in a single homeland, shared traditions
and customs, and finally, the bond of common interest'. Here he
adds common descent to his first definition, and generally adds the
idea of a common history, customs and traditions and a sense of
shared interest, to language, common descent and the homeland.
246
Hamad asks himself whether nationalism is one of the innovations

of modern times or of ancient origin. He rejects the view of some
who consider that it is a modern concept born in the nineteenth
century or the daughter of the movement of Napoleon. Nationalism,
he declares, is an ancient idea among mankind that 'has existed
whenever kingdoms have existed'. He then looks back to Arab
history to affirm that the idea of nationalism was to be found among
the Arabs 'in both their ancient and their modern history'. To
substantiate this view, he refers to the episode of al-Nu'man ibn
al-Mundhir, King of al-Hira, with Chosroes, and the Arab delega-
tion that went to see Chosroes at al-Nu'man's order 'in order to
acquaint him with Arab manners and customs, showing him that
the Arabs are the most eminent stock, the noblest in ancestry, the
purest in descent and the most immaculate in origin'. Raising the
subject of Islam, he says, 'The noble Arab prophet consolidated
this concept among the Arabs', and cites a Prophetic tradition
famous among Muslims: 'Love the Arabs for three reasons: I am
an Arab, the language of the people of Paradise is Arabic and the
Qur'an is Arabic', and another saying of Muhammad handed down
over the ages: T am an Arab, and there is no one more Arab than
I am.' In this he sees proof of the Prophet's pride in his race and
his noble ancestry, and he goes on to state, 'The researcher who
meticulously scrutinises the spirit of this hadith will recognise that
by this statement our Prophet sought to revive Arab sentiments and
to promote nationalist feeling among the Arabs.' He then praises
the Arabism of the Umayyads and declares that 'they were the
greatest influence in the revival of the Arab sense of nation-
hood'. 128
'Umar Hamad thus asserts that nationalist thinking is deep-
rooted among the ancient Arabs and therefore does not stand in
contradiction with Islam. On the contrary, Islam revived the idea
of Arabism and promoted the growth of nationalist feeling among
the Arabs.
Inasmuch as nationalist thinking is the fundamental principle
in the reform or awakening of nations, the Arabs, if they wish to
achieve a national awakening and attain a noble life, must under-
take 'the revival of the concept of Arabism and nationalist agita-
tion in the hearts of their people'. He emphasises that all dynamic
nations try to invigorate and promote their feeling of nationhood,
and that the Arabs must emulate their example. Or at least, they
must follow the example of their brothers, the Turks, who also pur-
sue such a policy. They have sent their sons to Europe and their
247
cleverest people to circulate within their country, and have founded

nationalist periodicals and newspapers, 'all this in an effort to
strengthen Turkish ethnic feeling'. This statement corroborates the
view of some Arabs that Turkish nationalism was a direct cause
in the growth of Arab nationalism.
'Umar Hamad is not content simply to define the feeling of
nationhood, adduce historical evidence for its antiquity and empha-
sise its importance in the national awakening. Rather, he goes on
to search for practical ways to promote Arab nationalism, and to
this end offers seven proposals: knowledge of Arab history should
be spread among the public, the memory of famous men should
be revived, nationalist songs should be circulated, indigenous
institutions should be more widespread, Arab celebrations and
mournings should be constituted, nationalism should be made a
fundamental principle for every individual, and finally, people
should make a point of wearing Arab dress on national holidays.
Hamad places Arab history at the forefront, viewing it as 'the
primary item on the agenda for the revival of this (nationalist) agita-
tion'. This is because 'history is a great mirror revealing images
of the forefathers to their descendants and bonding the people in
modern times to their ancestors'. History kindles determination and
sharpens zeal, and by paying heed to it 'Arab nationality will pro-
gress'. He therefore calls for the teaching of Arab history and for
the dissemination of the learning, literature, civilisation and
philosophy of the classical Arab heritage. In speaking of reviving
the memory of great and famous men, he proposes that statues be
erected, that places be named after them, and that celebrations in
their memory be held. 129
When he speaks of academic institutions, Hamad lays stress on
indigenous schools, which he regards as neglected, 'because it is
these schools that promote the growth of our language . . . spread
our principles and rejuvenate our moral standards. It is they only
that perpetuate the memory of our learned and famous per-
sonalities.' At the same time, it is impossible that the Arab should
ever 'learn love of the homeland from the foreigners' schools or
be inspired by any spirit of nationhood or feeling of nationalism
as a result of studying in them'. His opinion of the foreign mis-
sionary schools, which was shared by others, is clear. His is a con-
temporary rebuttal to those who attributed to these schools an
important role in promoting Arab consciousness.
'Umar Hamad concludes his writings by appealing that 'we
adopt Arabism and nationalist pride as our fundamental principle,
248
for every Arab must have a goal for which he can aim'. 130 It can
be seen that where the Arab nation was concerned, he made use
of concepts from the classical heritage. At the same time, however,
he was availing himself of modern concepts of nationalism when
he emphasised history and common interest, in addition to the
homeland, in defining the elements of nationalism. Likewise, he
referred back to Arab history, and in the manifestations of Arab
consciousness that he found there he saw proof of the originality
of Arab nationalism. He also took note of the organic connection
between Arabism and Arab thinking on the one hand, and Islam
on the other.
'Umar Fakhurl
'Umar Fakhurl (d. 1946)131 went further than 'Umar Hamad in

asserting the idea of nationalism, in trying to examine Arab history
and in making use of modern views on nationalism. But in arriving
at the opinions and observations he formulates, he has also applied
himself to observing the state of the Arab people and to thinking
of ways to rescue them from this condition. 132 His most outstand-
ing contribution was probably his historical analysis of the Arab
national awakening's connections with Islam and his regard for the
creed, 'the ultimate goal', as the basis for that awakening. From
this point of departure, he goes on to explain the decline of the Arabs
and to call, in the prevailing circumstances, for a political ideology
(i.e. nationalism) that can serve as a foundation for national
awakening. His was a first effort to undertake a comprehensive
historical analysis, though a limited and general one, as a basis for
advocating the idea of nationalism.
Fakhurl notes that the Arab nation has a past distinguished for
its political power and civilisation; yet, of all this nothing now
remains but some ruins and books. For six centuries it declined
into ignominy and ignorance; and some of its lands have been seized
by foreigners, while the rest remain threatened with the same fate.
This is a state of affairs that provokes anxiety and frustration; joining
with others in discussing the subject, he appeals to the Arabs to
reflect upon their present situation and their future. 133
Fakhurl asks himself, 'How can the Arabs achieve national
awakening?', meaning the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire. In the
usual replies — administrative decentralisation, the dissemination
of knowledge into all social levels of the nation, security from foreign
249
perils and so forth — he does not see the means to achieve such
an awakening. In his view, the answer lies in endowing the Arab
nation with an 'ultimate goal' or a 'universal ideology'. 134 'The
Arabs will only achieve a national awakening', he says, 'if Arabism
or the principle of Arabness becomes a matter of religious convic-
tion for them.' For him this is the principal idea, and he accord-
ingly calls upon the Arabs, irrespective of their religious beliefs,
to convert to a 'political sect'. The future belongs to such political
'sects', and this one is that of 'the Arab nationality' (al-'unsuriya
al-'arabiya).135 He uses this term, as well as the terms 'the Arab
feeling of nationhood' (al-jinsiya al-'arabiya), 'the Arab principle'
(al-mabda' al- (arabi) and ' Arabism' (al- earabiya), in the sense of Arab
nationalism.
Fakhuri sets forth his programme as follows in his essay How
Can the Arabs Achieve National Awakening?: 'I will study the reasons
for Arab greatness in ages past and the causes of their decline, and
also why it is that individuals and societies must have an absolute
or idealised goal. I will then direct my investigation to the intellec-
tual revolution which must be brought about in the nation in order
to generate a unity of sentiments, views and convictions, and which
leads to the establishment of a feeling of nationhood. I will then
proceed to an explanation of the duty consequently incumbent upon
Arab intellectuals as they travel along this proper path.' 1 3 6
In this study 'the idea' appears to be his goal. He considers that
the idea (or the principle) is the driving force in history. It is the
harbinger of an emergent civilisation, and can only be overpowered
by a more strongly entrenched idea. Hence, he seeks to make Arab
nationalism {al- (arablyd) a creed for the sake of which the individual
would sacrifice everything — his personal interests, his happiness,
even his life137 — and that because it is the basis for the national
awakening.
In discussing the connection between the Arab national awaken-
ing and Islam, 138 Fakhuri refers to the favourable time in which
they appeared and points out a number of qualities and abilities
common to the Arabs: sharpness of intellect, fervent zeal, military
skills, artistic propensity and a preliminary national awakening that
has prepared the way for the greater awakening. This provisional
awakening was not limited to literature and poetry, but rather
included a restive religious consciousness as well, hence the Arabs
were suited to receive the new creed of Islam. But in his estimation
the foundation for national awakening was the ultimate goal — i.e.
the creed of Islam — which brought the Arabs together and united
250
them after they had been scattered tribes cutting each other's
throats, and imbued the souls of its followers with such fervent zeal
that they thought little of dying for the sake of assisting it. 139
It is to be noted that Fakhuri speaks in glowing terms of Arab
qualities at the rise of Islam and points to an intellectual surge
among them at that time. This is a view that differs from the tradi-
tional view of that period. We also see him celebrating Arab qualities
in Islamic times, lauding their political genius, which found expres-
sion in their receptive attitude and religious tolerance. 140 He also
declares that they created an atmosphere of intellectual freedom that
was one of the reasons for their expansion in culture and civilisa-
tion, and that they established simple administrative structures (niza-
mai) appropriate to the needs of the overwhelming majority of the
conquered peoples.141 In explaining the rise of Arab civilisation he
stresses the influence of the new milieu to which the Arabs moved
with the emergence of Islam, and also the role of their innate
intelligence. But in his view the foundation for all this was the new
spirit or principle.
When Fakhuri discusses the causes of decline, he attributes this
to transformation in most of the factors of awakening. Thus, the
Arabs' martial traits were diverted to internal quarrels and disputes;
the sacred law eventually became unresponsive and inflexible;
political leadership turned into despotism. The first result of the
political system was fragmentation, while at the same time luxury
left a legacy of weakness, and mingling with the other peoples and
treating them with equality led to controversy over them. 142 It is
an astute analysis, but in it Fakhuri found confirmation of the
importance of the ultimate goal or the universal principle. 143
Our author then devotes his attention to the ultimate goal,
explaining that it must first be ingrained in the imaginations of
individuals and implanted in their minds; indeed, he makes this
the most important priority in the education of youth. And the
common belief among the individuals of the nation, even if it is
only a temporary faith, endows that nation with tremendous power.
As he goes on to say, 'The individuals of the Arab nation have no
ultimate goal higher or more sublime than the awakening of their
nation and the restoration of their glory.' 144 He considers that if
the new creed can capture the imagination of the nation, 'it would
become the source inspiring its institutional structures and all of
its arts, the foundation of its way of life and even the keystone of
all of its activities'; and should this creed be lost, the nation would
perish. Fakhuri concludes that the thinkers among the Arab people
251
now have no more deserving or loftier task than to make 'the Arab
principle' (al-mabda' al-'arabi) an ideology for the Arabs. 145
Fakhuri then discusses the way in which an ultimate goal can
be produced, and, pointing to revolutions, he declares that such
movements produce no results unless they have seeped down to the
depths of the emotions of the masses. Hence, sudden revolutions,
which for the most part are of a political nature, are the ones of
least value. It is the intellectual revolution that is the important one,
for it occurs gradually in the spirit of the nation — from its
sentiments and views to its customs and convictions — until it
engenders for it a new spirit. He explains that such a goal is essential
to the nation because it holds it together with a firmly binding unity,
and he considers it the means 'for establishing a new creed in the
soul of this nation'. At the same time, however, the intellectual
revolution must preserve the balance 'between the customs, senti-
ments, ideas and old established structures of the nation, and the
new principles and modern views it seeks to adopt', and must make
its way with deliberation and caution.
As the Arab nation was beginning to recover after six centuries
of lethargy, it was essential that it undergo a slow intellectual revolu-
tion that would do away with its obsolete and antiquated ideas and
corrupt traits and set its values aright. Hence, it was his desire that
the revolution should 'extend . . . to all that pertains to our family,
scientific and social life'. This should be in accordance with a goal
towards which every individual in the Arab nation would strive:
'the restoration of Arab glory, the rejuvenation of Arab civilisa-
tion and the creation of a genuine political entity for the Arabs'.146
He postulated that such a revolution would be based on a principle
or ultimate goal, that of an Arab feeling of nationhood (i.e.
nationalism).
Here Fakhuri turns his attention to the topic of Arab nationhood
or nationalism. After drawing attention to the explosion of nation-
alist movements,147 he declares that the future belongs to peoples
that cling to their nationalism, calling for Arab nationalism as a
new ideology for the Arabs. He appeals for the creation of a loftier
ideal for the Arab nation: Arab nationalism.
Fakhuri emphasises that the bond of nationality is the only one
that endures. He acknowledges that a number of factors — blood,
history, language and culture — help to create this bond, but insists
that the one that defines the feeling of nationhood is language. It
is language that shapes a man's world-view to conform to that of
his people; through it he becomes the son of his people and the heir
252
to their thinkers, men of letters and leaders, and through it he is

influenced by his people's literature and history, the things that
bring a people 'together in thought and deed'. In the end he
proclaims, 'Truly, language is man himself.'148 He is also aware
of the importance of history in exciting zeal. When a nation's history
is effaced, the nation forgets its distinctive character and is easy
to subjugate.
When he appeals for Arab nationalism, Fakhuri expresses the
opinion that thinkers should disseminate the idea by bringing the
new into proximity with the old, so that the former even appears
to be the inevitable conclusion of the latter. He adjures the Arab
teacher, author, poet and orator to make Arab nationalism an
ideology for the Arabs. He concludes by saying that the greatest
task that thinkers in the Arab nation can undertake, and indeed,
their first duty, is to bring about an intellectual revolution that
gradually serves to make Arab nationalism the new ideology of the
'sons of the dad' .m
'Umar Fakhuri thus regards the idea as the driving force in
history, considers that the Arab national awakening with the rise
of Islam was essentially brought about by the creed, and holds that
the awakening of the Arabs after centuries of lethargy would require
the adoption of an appropriate ideology, since the national awaken-
ing of peoples can only be achieved through the spread of an
ideology for them to believe in. He appealed for a political ideology,
Arab nationalism, because the nationalist idea was the basis for the
progress of peoples in the modern age, and called for rejuvenation
of the life of the nation in accordance with nationalist thinking. To
this end he implored Arab intellectuals to make their mission the
creation of an intellectual revolution that would entrench the idea
of Arab nationalism, with the provisions that this should be done
gradually, and that it should represent a continuation of the nation's
heritage and a rejuvenation of its way of life.
Najib 'Azuri
In the last years of the reign of 'Abdulhamid came the intellectual

output of Najib 'Azuri (d. 1916).15° He wrote in Paris in French,
which influenced his perspective and veiled his writing from the
Arab reader. Hence, our discussion of him has been postponed.
In his book Le Reveil de la nation arabe, 'Azuri appears to be concerned
with explaining the Arab awakening and its perspective as he saw
253
it, and with assessing Western policies and their implications for
the future of the Arabs. He also issued strong warnings against the
menace of Zionism.
'Azuri concentrated his attack on Turkish rule, which he
described as oppressive: the Arabs reaped nothing but injury from
it, it impeded the progress of the Arab lands and ' Abdulhamid was
the most pernicious of the sultans in his despotism and his network
of informants and spies. 151 He repeatedly draws attention to how
the Arabs (and others) hated the Turks, 152 and declares that the
Arab, unrivalled among nations in his enjoyment of a life of freedom
and proud of his noble descent and pure origin, absolutely refuses
to be enslaved. The Arabs, he says, repeatedly recite for the benefit
of Turkish ears: 'The Prophet was an Arab, the Qur'an is Arabic
and the language of Paradise is Arabic.' 153
'Azuri takes note 154 that a great quiet transformation is about
to occur, for the Arabs are becoming conscious of their national,
historical and ethnic oneness. They want to secede from the mangled
Ottoman Empire, so that they can become an independent state
within natural frontiers, extending from the Tigris and Euphrates
valley to the Suez Canal and from the Mediterranean Sea to the
Gulf of 'Uman. In defining this state, 'Azuri did not want to
encroach upon existing states or Western interests. Hence, and
apparently to satisfy Britain, he excludes Egypt from the 'Ligue
de la Patrie Arabe' on the pretext that the Egyptians are not
descended from Arab stock. This new state, he declares, will respect
self-rule in Lebanon and the independence of the amirates of
Yemen, Najd and Iraq. 155 And similarly, it would respect the
interests of Europe and all of the concessions and privileges thus
far granted to them by the Turks. 156 'Azuri goes on to say that the
Arab state (or empire) would be ruled by an Arab sultan ruling
a constitutional monarchy, 157 which he envisaged as a constitu-
tional sultanate based on complete religious freedom and equality
of all of the people of the homeland before the law. 158
'Azuri then calls for an Arab caliphate, expressing astonishment
at 'Abdulhamid's claim for the caliphate when he does not even
know Arabic. He considers that the caliph should be a sharif(i.e.
a descendant from the Prophet's family), that he should at the same
time be ruler of the Hijaz, which would give him a special status
in the Arab state, and that he should have spiritual authority over
all Muslims. In this he finds the solution for what to him is a major
problem, the separation of civil from spiritual authority. As he sees
it, one of the principal causes for the fall of the Arab empire was
254
the concentration of civil and spiritual authority in the hands of

a single man. 159 The caliphate would thus go to an Arab whose
civil power would be limited to the Hijaz, but whose spiritual
authority would extend to all Muslims.
Perhaps as a result of his work in Jerusalem, ' Azurl was one
of the first to warn of Zionist ambitions in Palestine. He quite
perceptively grasped that the Arab awakening and the Zionist move-
ment would inevitably collide, for he regarded them as 'two
phenomena similar in nature, yet diametrically opposed to each
other'. He follows up this penetrating analysis by saying, 'The
destiny of these two peoples is constant combat against each other,
until one triumphs over the other. And upon the final outcome of
this struggle between these two peoples, representing two contra-
dictory principles, hangs the destiny of all the world'. 160
It must be pointed out that ' Azuri took note of the dissension
among the Christian sects, especially in Jerusalem, and called for
the formation of an Arab Catholic church that would use the Arabic
language in its prayers and rites. But rather than point to the role
of the Western states and the missionary organisations in this
disagreement, he places the blame on the Turks. He wanted the
proposed Arab church to have its own special patriarch, and
postulated that it would absorb the other sects.161
The views of Najib 'Azuri seem to have stood outside the current
of Arab thought, and similarly, had no influence upon it, for he
wrote in a foreign language and directed his writings to a Western
audience. But this does not negate the fact that some of his views
were ones common in his time. The attack on the despotism of
'Abdulhamid, the call for an Arab caliphate and the restriction of
the caliph's political authority to the Hijaz, while extending his
religious authority to all Muslims, were the essence of the writings
of his contemporary al-Kawakibi, which were published before
'Azurl (who referred to him in passing) began to write. 162 'Azuri's
work is a muffled echo of the thinking of Umm al-qurd when he speaks
about the meeting of a society in Mecca (in 1903) to discuss the
establishment of an Arab caliphate based in Mecca, but he appears
to be ignorant of Islamic thought. 163
It should be noted that, as is evident from his analysis of the
policies of the Western states, 'Azuri viewed the future of the Arabs
within the framework of Western interests in the region, 164 fearing
only the expansionist policy of Russia. 165 He regarded British
policy as just and liberal, and praised British administration in
Egypt for its justice and competence. He justifies the British
255
presence in Egypt as guarding the freedom of the Mediterranean

and Asia, considers the Egyptians incapable of governing
themselves, adopts an attitude opposed to the perspective of
Egyptian patriotism represented by Mustafa Kamil, and absolves
Britain of any ambitions in Mesopotamia. 166
He speaks of France with enthusiasm and admiration: France
is the protector of the oppressed and the wretched, a nation of
chivalry and the torch of civilisation. He supports the French
invasion of Algeria, praises their missionary and cultural activities
in Syria and attributes to them the advance of Arab culture, the
reinvigoration of the Arabic language (as well as the emergence of
eminent personalities in the cultural and literary domains) and the
origination of the Arab nationalist awakening. He urges France to
increase its activities in Syria and Palestine.167 Faced with the
possibility that Europe would partition the Ottoman Empire, he
expresses the view that no country other than France has the right
to rule Syria and Palestine.168 He then calls upon Europe and the
United States to encourage the patriotic and secessionist movements
in the Empire, especially that of the Arabs. This, he declares, would
open up a wide range of opportunities for trade and capital
investment.169
The nationalist perspective in Iraq
In Iraq there was an Arab-Islamic perspective that found expression

in the praise of the Arabs and their past,170 an assertion of
Arabism171 and complaints of Turkish oppression and maladmin-
istration.172 There were, in addition, appeals to the Arabs for
national awakening173 and individual cries for rebellion against the
Turks for the liberation of Iraq.174 This perspective can be
observed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It may
be noted that it tended to base itself on the classical heritage, and
to represent a natural extension of the Arab consciousness in history
and an indicator of the nationalist perspective.
Arab-Islamic culture in Iraq was reinvigorated during the
Mamluk era, especially in the days of Da'ud Pasha (r. 1817-31),
and underwent a process of brisk cultural development in the Islamic
sciences, literature and philological studies. There emerged a
reformist attitude favouring independent reasoning and modernis-
ation, showing special concern for language and literature, and
inclining towards the borrowing of what was useful from modern
256
culture. It was in this perspective that an Arab consciousness arose

and a revival in poetry and prose appeared. In this milieu, in 1896,
Mahmud Shukri al-AlusI (d. 1924) wrote his book Bulugh al-arab
fi muhdwalat ma 'rifat ahwdl al- 'arab, in which he spoke of the historical
roots and merits of 'the nation of the Arabs'. In this discussion he
draws heavily from the classical texts, even citing and responding
to the arguments of the Shu'ubiya. And in his investigation of the
pre-Islamic history of the Arabs, a study distinguished in its
penetrating insight and comprehensive scope, he adopts a significant
approach in which he elucidates the general social, cultural and
civilisational conditions in which the Arabs lived and sets forth the
qualities of the Arab nation and its worthiness for bearing the
message of Islam. In addition, he stresses the eminence of Arabic
and its suitability for assimilating the modern sciences.175
Iraq had passed through a number of developments that had an
impact on the social situation. The Ottoman Land Law had the
effect of expanding the landholdings of the shaykhs and merchants,
and served to encourage the shift from collective to private owner-
ship. Iraq had also entered the international market, especially after
the opening of the Suez Canal and the introduction of steam
shipping into river-borne communications. Agriculture thus shifted
to meet the needs of the international market, the subsistence self-
sufficient economy collapsed and administration also tended to
become more centralised.
All these changes influenced the position of the notables, in
particular the ulema and the tribal chieftains. These personalities
gained their role and influence through management of the pious
foundations, monopolisation of teaching and occupation of govern-
ment positions; and their leadership of the Sufi orders gave them
further influence in the cities. Hence, they played a major role in
influencing public opinion. But from the mid-nineteenth century
onwards, the trend towards centralisation placed them in a posi-
tion of steadily increasing dependence upon service to the sultan.
Those who chose to maintain their independence found themselves
excluded from government positions and debarred from the pious
foundations. Similarly, their monopoly on education was broken
when, with the arrival of Midhat Pasha in 1869, the opening of
modern schools began. The leaders of the Sufi orders, however,
enjoyed patronage during the reign of 'Abdulhamid. 176
The modern schools, though few in number, consisted oirushdiye
military schools and the civil schools offering instruction up to the
secondary level. The graduates of the rushdiye military schools went
257
on to complete their studies in Istanbul at the state's expense, thus

producing a relatively large number of Iraqi officers, most of them
from the middle or lower class. A small minority of the most highly
qualified graduates of the modern schools went abroad to study.
The first institution of higher education, the Faculty of Law (Kulliyat
al-huquq), was opened in 1908 and played a role in stirring up Arab
consciousness. In Istanbul the Iraqi students were influenced by
the Arab activity in the societies, and among them the Arab
nationalist perspective asserted itself in opposition to inclinations
towards Turkish nationalism. The Iraqi officers in particular played
a noteworthy role in the Covenant Society, and many of them
participated in the Arab Revolt. 177 The ulema may have
represented local prestige and enjoyed an influence over the popula-
tion, but the graduates of the military (and civil) schools represented
the new ideas and the more modest sectors in society and harboured
clear Arab aspirations.
When the Revolution of 1908 occurred, it asserted central (i.e.
Turkish) control and adopted a negative attitude towards the
influential families. The Young Turks represented the victory of
the Turkish middle class, and it was to be expected that opposi-
tion, associated with the emphasis on Arab identity or Islamic
culture, would be encountered from the notables and tribal chief-
tains. 178 Unionist propaganda stressed ability rather than social
status as a pathway to power. Hence, attitudes towards the CUP
after the Revolution were divided between the educated, some of
the ulema and the minorities, who welcomed it, and the notables
and wealthy families, some of whom suffered loss of status and
influence, who remained aloof. When the Unionists opened a
branch in Baghdad and others in Mosul and Basra, most of the
membership of these branches consisted of army officers and civil
servants, and the majority of these were non-Arabs.179
The notables, most of them ulema and tribal chieftains, played
a leading role in the political agitation. Certain of the Shl'ite ulema
were in the vanguard of those calling for reform and rejuvenation;
it is worth noting that they stood opposed to the despotic and
sectarian policy of the sultan and that they likewise held a negative
view of the West. The attitude they adopted was therefore an Arab-
Islamic one. 180 The military men and some of the civilians who
had studied in the modern schools participated in the political move-
ment, and their perspective was opposed to the CUP.
The Arab perspective emerged strongly in Iraq, with its demands
stressing the expansion of education, granting the Arabs their
258
place in the new order and equality between the Turks and the
Arabs. In 1908 the notables from prominent Arab families set out
to form a committee under the name ' Consultation' (Al-Mashwar),
and joined together around the al-Naqib family. This movement
of theirs was apparently a spontaneous reaction to the establish-
ment of a branch of the CUP. Their aim was ostensibly to support
the Constitution, but in reality they favoured a return to the sacred
law of Islam. When the Moderate Liberal Party was founded, with
a platform calling for proportional representation of the various
nationalities in the Parliament, the government and public offices,
as well as for the use of the local languages in the provinces, branches
of the Party were established in Basra in August 1911 and in
Baghdad in September 1911. These Arabs demanded reform, in
particular the use of the Arabic language in the schools and the
appointment of a larger number of Arab officials in the Arab
provinces. The acceptance of such reforms as these would have
meant that the notables would have gained greater power and
broader influence, for they comprised the majority among the
educated and the influential.181 The role of the party was limited,
however. When the Freedom and Concord Party was founded
(October 1911), a branch of it was established in Baghdad (January
1912) and became active in opposing the local CUP branch and
expanding at its expense. A branch of the Freedom and Concord
Party was also established in Basra, more independent of the centre.
As expressed by its Commissioner, its programme was 'to see that
justice is done to the Arabs, to recover their rights and to demand
whatever is needed for the welfare of the Arab lands',182 and found
support among the Arab officers in Iraq. The branch in Basra was
apparently more clearly committed to the Arab movement and more
zealous. When after a time its position became stronger (1913), it
broadened its demands for Arab rights and inclined towards an
apparently secessionist position.183
The failure of CUP policy seems to have led to an emphasis on
the Arab demands for decentralisation and to the abandonment of
links with Turkish parties. This was reflected in the Patriotic Club
Society (Jam'iyat al-nadi al-watani), founded in Baghdad early in 1912
with a bold nationalist outlook, and in the Basra Reform Society
(Jam'iyat al-Basra al-isldhiya). It was assumed that the Patriotic Club
Society would be a literary society, but it became a centre for
political activity. Its membership consisted of educated persons who
had graduated from the Turkish high schools, students of the
Faculty of Law, some young men from the middle Euphrates
259
region, a large number of army officers, a certain number of

members of modest origin and some wealthy traders and land-
owners. It adopted a decentralisationist line, and published a
newspaper entitled 'The National Awakening' (Al-Nahda). The
Turks, however, were not unmindful of this society. They closed
down its newspaper shortly before the war and banished its
members. 1 8 4
It was thus in this manner that the Arab consciousness appeared
in Iraq. Its platform was an Arab-Islamic one with its roots in the
classical heritage. It may have found support among the notables,
but its most enthusiastic representatives were persons educated in
the modern schools, most particularly army officers. Although it
began by calling for equality and laying stress on Arabism, the policy
of the Unionists drove it to a position favouring decentralisation,
and later, to participation in the Arab movement.
Notes
1. Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, pp. 148-9.

2. Ibid., pp. 49 ff.
3. See, for example, the review of the situation in 1908-9 in Al-Manar,
vol. 11 (1908), pp. 760, 851 ff. See also the decree of the Sheykh-ul-Islam,
published in Al-Manar, vol. 12 (1909), pp. 594-601, which reveals an
emphasis on equality of rights and making appointments to government
positions on the basis of competence.
4. See Lewis, The Emergence ojModern Turkey, pp. 174-90.
5. Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee oj Union and Progress
in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969), p. 16-18.
6. See Tawfiq 'Ali Berro, Al-Arab wa-l-turk ft l-'ahd al-dusturi al-
c
uthmani, 1908-1914 (League of Arab States, Institute for Advanced Arab
Studies, Cairo, 1960), pp. 80-1.
7. The distribution of seats was as follows: Arabs, 60; Turks, 147;
Albanians, 27; Greeks, 26; and Armenians, 14. The proportion of Arabs,
in comparison to the size of their population, was thus a small one.
8. The Liberal Party ('Osmanli ahrar-ifirqasi) was established on 14
September 1908, that is, two months after the promulgation of the
Constitution. See Ahmad, The Young Turks, p. 28.
9. Ibid., p. 45.
10. Ibid., pp. 58, 60-2.
11. See Berro, Al-'Arab wa-l-turk, pp. 258-9.
12. The Populist Party, in which Arabs were involved, was founded
on 21 February 1910 and included in its platform such points as adminis-
trative decentralisation and the freedom to teach in the local language in
every province. On 21 November 1909, some of the deputies, among them
such Arabs as 'Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi and Rushdi al-Sham'a, met
260
and decided to found the Moderate Liberal Party. Among its goals were
'the elimination of all traces of despotic behaviour by any group and in
any form', and 'the exertion of effective efforts to preserve each one of
the subject nationalities, thereby making it possible to consolidate Ottoman
unity and leaving no scope for any nationality's subjugation and domina-
tion of another'. The Party regarded the magnanimous sacred law of Islam
as the law for all, and considered that any change in the Constitution would
require that reference be made back to this religious law. Its platform in-
cluded use of the local languages in the provinces, devolution of respon-
sibility and proportional representation of the subject nationalities in the
government and in the civil service. But it 'will fight against the idea of
decentralisation (in the sense of a federal union), and regards it as the
prelude to the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire'. See the article
'Khittat al-hizb al-hurr al-mu'tadil' in Al-Mufid, 23 April 1911; Berro, Al-
Arab wa-l-turk, pp. 261 ff. See also Shukri al-'Asali, ' Hizb al-ahrar al-
mu'tadilln', Al-Muqtabas, no. 711 (24June 1911), where al-'Asali, a member
of the Party, reviews its Constitution. This stipulates that the fundamental
aim of the Moderate Liberal Party is to preserve the Ottoman Empire with
all of its distinguished provinces . . . and to prepare the Ottomans —
irrespective of ethnic origin or religious convictions — to defend their
homeland (Article 1). The Party opposes administrative independence
(Article 2). Provinces should be administered according to the principles
of the extension of provincial jurisdiction permitted by the Constitution;
the scheduling of the ranks of government officials and procedures for
punishing them should be stipulated by law; routes and crossings should
be systematically maintained, the scope of trade, industry and agriculture
should be expanded, and education should be spread; and revenue from
educational and public works taxes should be left in the provinces to be
spent for their proper purposes, along with an additional amount from the
revenues of the General Treasury (Article 10). Care should be taken to
protect the languages, poetry and literary heritages of the subject nation-
alities (Article 11). The source of law should be the immaculate sacred law
of Islam, with consideration for the needs of the time and place, and
adopting such legal judgements as are useful (Article 6). Shukri al-'Asali
adds, Tt should be evident that the men of the Party have realised that
the survival of this Empire is conditional upon the unification of the subject
nationalities into a political union based on genuine equality and the concord
arising from mutual affection and friendship, and that they wish us to
understand that the domination of one nationality by another arises from
despotism and does harm to the interest of both nation and homeland.'
In another article in Al-Muqtabas, no. 742 (31 July 1911), it is said that
no sooner was the Constitution of the Moderate Liberal Party published
in Damascus 'than the people, with few exceptions, became Moderate
Liberals'. See also issue no. 741 (30 July 1911).
In Tzzat al-Jundi's article 'Al-Ahzab al-siyasiya fi 1-mamlaka al-
'uthmaniya' in Al-Muqtabas, no. 782 (16 September 1911), reference is made
to four parties: the Democrats, the Socialists (very few in number), the
Moderate Liberals and the Unionists. He then discusses the platform of
each party and states that the Democrats say, 'We wish to defend the
common folk and protect their rights, and we wish to ensure that domination
261
of the people by the wealthy, aghas, beys, and pashas does not come to prevail
in the land. For it is only in this way, by plucking out the roots of the
despotism that grew under the former regime, that our land can progress.'
As for the Moderate Liberals, they demand that the rights of all the sub-
ject nationalities be preserved on an equal basis, that justice prevail in the
land, that the principles of equality be applied and carried out in order
to achieve brotherhood in actuality, and that schools be constructed and
elementary and secondary teaching in the local languages be spread at all
grade levels. He states that although the Party of Union and Progress has
not published anything about its platform, he can deduce it from the Party's
actions. 'Our view', he says, 'is that it thinks ill of anyone who is not a
Turk. We consider that it monopolises all executive and administrative
tasks and reserves them for persons fanatical in their devotion to Turkism.
Further, in our opinion it suspects any man who speaks of the interests
and rights of his people, especially if he is an Arab writer or deputy, of
stirring up division and discord among the subject nationalities. We hold
that the single principle of its domestic policy is to subdue the subject
nationalities by force and to concentrate power in the hands of Turkish
fanatics . . . '
13. Al-Zahrawl, Al-Irth al-fikri, pp. 481, 482-6; Al-Haddra, vol. 2, no.
87 (5 December 1911).
14. See Ahmad, The Young Turks, pp. 69, 86-7; also the articles
'Al-Hizban wa-harakat al-intikhabat', in Al-Mufid, 19 March 1914; and
['Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi] 'Ayyuna ahaqqu an yuttaba'?', in Al-Mufid,
4 August 1914; Berro, Al-'Arab wa-l-turk, pp. 301 ff.
15. Ahmad, The Young Turks, p. 104.
16. Husayn Hilmi Pasha said to the British ambassador, 'Government
. . ., which is already being accused of being too Ottoman and too much
inclined to neglect the interests of the other races of the Empire, especially
the Arabs, could never agree to relinquish an Arab Province to a Christian
Power. It would mean the rising en masse of all the Arab Provinces of the
Empire against the Government.' See Ahmad, The Young Turks, p. 93.
17. See 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi, Mukhtarat al-Mufid, ed. Naji 'Allush
(Dar al-tali'a, Beirut, 1981), p. I l l ; Wajlh Kawtharani, Watha'iqal-mu'tamar
al-'arabi al-awwal, 1913 (Dar al-hadatha, Beirut, 1980), pp. 49, 51, 98 ff,
115-16.
18. Ahmad, The Young Turks, pp. 143 ff.
19. Among its founders were Rafiq al-'Azm and Rashid Rida. See
Al-Manar, vol. 12 (1911), p. 824.
20. The propaganda activity of the Young Turks in Damascus and
elsewhere had been noticed since 1896. Government measures taken against
their supporters in 1897 included some Arabs, such as Muhammad Pasha
al-'Azm and 'Abd al-Rahman Pasha al-Yusuf. See Gross, 'Ottoman Rule
in the Province of Damascus', pp. 446, 466. The first secret organisation
of the Young Turks was founded in Damascus in 1906, one of its members
being Mustafa Kamal. This organisation was then linked to the centre in
Salonica in 1907, and among its members were Rafiq al-'Azm and
Muhammad Kurd 'All. See Gross, 'Ottoman Rule in the Province of
Damascus', pp. 519-20, 527; Tibawi, Modern History of Syria, p. 199.
21. These were joined by young men of lesser age, such as Rafiq
262
al-'Azm, al-ZahrawI, Shukri al-'Asali, Muhammad Kurd 'All and Salim

al-Jaza'iri. See Mustafa al-Shihabl, Al-Qawmiya al-'arabiya: ta'rikhuha
wa-qawdmuhd wa-mardmlhd, 2nd edn (League of Arab States, Institute for
Advanced Arab Studies, Cairo, 1961), p. 51; 'Adnan al-Khatib, Al-Shaykh
Tahir al-Jazd 'in: ra 'id al-nahda al- 'ilmiyafi Bildd al-Shdm wa-a 'lam min khirriji
madrasatihi (League of Arab States, Institute for Advanced Arab Studies,
Cairo, 1971), p. 53. See also the account of Tahir al-Jaza'iri in Muhammad
Kurd 'All, Al-Mu'dsirun, pp. 268-78. Al-Jaza'iri joined the Maqasid Society
in 1294/1877 and founded the Zahiriya Library in 1296/1879. He sought
to borrow from modern civilisation while preserving Arab identity and
ethics. See Al-Muqtabas, no. 3 (18 December 1908).
22. Muhibb al-DIn al-Khatib and 'Arif al-Shihabl.
23. 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalll and Shukri al-Jundi. See the speech by
ZakI al-Khatib in Al-Muqtabas, no. 6 (22 December 1908), on the history
of the society, which he named the Syrian National Awakening Society
(Jam'iyat al-nahda al-suriya). See also Al-Muqtabas, no. 115 (3 May 1909)
on the society's internal structure and conditions for membership, which
included the provisions that the member's language must be Arabic and that
he must be committed to the principle of deliberative consultation (shurd).
24. Muhibb al-DIn al-Khatib, Saldh al-Din al-Qasimi (Al-Matba'a al-
salafiya, Cairo, 1959), p. jlm.
25. Ibid., p. ddl.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 4.
28. Approved 13 April 1909.
29. Ibid., p. 43; al-Khatib, Al-Shaykh Tahir al-Jaza'iri, pp. 45 ff.
30. See Muhammad Kurd 'All, Al-Mudhakkirdt (Matba'at al-taraqql,
Damascus, 1948-9), vol. Ill, p. 143; and Al-Muqtabas, no. 1 (17 December
1908), concerning the call for reform, a stress on Ottomanism and equality,
constitutional rule, patriotism and optimism for the new order.
31. See 'Anbara Salam al-KhalidI,y<au;/a/f l-dhikrayat bayna Lubndn wa-
Filastin (Dar al-nahar li-1-nashr, Beirut, 1978), pp. 60-1.
32. Cited in Ahmet Jemal Pasha, Idahat 'an al-masa'il al-siydsxya allati
jard tadqiquhd bi-Diwdn al-harb al-'urfi al-mutashakkil bi-'Alayh (Matba'at al-
tanin, Beirut, AH 1334), p. 7, quoting 'Abd al-Ghanl al-'Uraysf as saying,
'Arabist ideas were not created in a day and those who spread them were
members of the Arab secret societies.'
33. At first this society was made up of a group of Arab notables in
Istanbul, later joined by a group of Arab students fervently committed to
Arabist thinking. As a result, the society suffered from a certain disparity
in its membership. See Ahmad Qadri, Mudhakkirdti 'an al-thawra al- (arabiya
al-kubrd (Matabi' Ibn Zaydun, Damascus, 1956), pp. 8 ff. It is mentioned
in the Society's first public statement that Egyptians had attended the
foundation meeting, and that it was decided to include three of them on
the administrative committee on an honorary basis, 'since they were not
resident in the domains of the caliphate'.
34. It is stated in the Constitution of the Society that 'the Ottoman
imperial domains . . . all comprise a single body that admits of no
fragmentation or division, and every region of the Empire, however remote,
is a homeland for every single Ottoman'.
263
35. It is worth noting that the definition of an Arab is based on

the homeland (the Arab homeland in this case) and on birth (i.e. on
ethnic origins), while no mention is made of the Arabic language, this
fact probably having something to do with the make-up of the Society.
Ahmad Qadri states that most of those associated with the Society in
the Arab provinces were reactionaries who supported the counter-
revolution of 30 March 1909. See Qadri, Mudhakkirdti, p. 10. See
also the Constitution of the Society in 'Umar Fakhurf, Kay/a nahada al-
'arab, new edn, ed. 'Abd al-Latif Fakhuri (Dar al-afaq, Beirut, 1981), pp.
147-52; al-A'zaml, Al-Qadiya al-'arabiya, vol. II, pp. 98-108; Amln
Muhammad Sa'id, Al-Thawra al-'arabiya al-kubra: ta'rikh mufassal jami'
li-l-qadiya al-'arabiya ft rub' qarn (Matba'at Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi,
Cairo, 1934), vol. I, pp. 7-8; Berro, Al-'Arab wa-l-turk, pp. 94-5, 112;
Darwaza, Nash'at al-haraka al-'arabiya al-haditha, pp. 350-1; Jemal Pasha,
Iddhat, pp. 7-9; al-'Azm, Majmu'a, 'Al-Jami'a al-'uthmaniya', pp. 129-30.
Rashid Rida mentions that the pro-Ottoman Arabs whom he knew
viewed the founding of the Society with antipathy, and that it was
abolished because Arab public opinion did not support it. See Al-Manar,
vol. 13 (1910), p. 748. Al-Muqtabas expresses another view of the Society
for Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood, stating that the Society had mem-
bers who really were men of zeal, and that the fundamental concern
of the Society was to preserve the Constitution and to promote educa-
tion, trade and industry among the Arabs; 'that is, their fundamen-
tal concern was none other than to support the government'. See Al-
Muqtabas, no. 14 (31 December 1908). The newspaper Tanin, how-
ever, accused the Society for Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood in Damascus
of supporting the counter-revolution in April. See Al-Muqtabas, no. 139
(31 May 1909).
36. Such as 'Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, Shafiq al-Mu'ayyad, 'Aziz 'All
al-Misri and Rafiq al-'Azm.
37. The Literary Club was founded on 8 February 1909. See al-
Shihabi, Al-Qawmiya al-'arabiya, p. 71; Jemal Pasha, Iddhat, p. 10;
Berro, Al-'Arab wa-l-turk, pp. 309-19; Darwaza, Nash'at al-haraka al-
'arabiya al-haditha, p. 358; a\-Khalidi, Jawla ft' l-dhikrayat, p. 75. In Al-Mufid,
13 January 1911, it is stated that the founders were 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil
(Lebanon), Sayf al-Din al-Khatib (Syria), Yusuf Haydar (Baalbek) and
Jamil al-Husayni (Jerusalem). See also Al-Mandr, vol. 13 (1910), p. 469,
for a discussion of the prominent Arab students who founded the Club,
with reference to the assistance they received from many eminent
personalities
38. At the Club, Rafiq Rizq Sallum recited an ode that included these
lines:
They asked me, 'In what can the Arab take pride?'
'In all that of which man can boast', I replied.
Of forefathers' feats have they not taken heed,
Noting no exploit nor glorious deed?
O'er lands won by sword-edge was their banner unfurled,
While their learning and science illumined the world.
264
To bear witness to this all mankind they could call,

For their merit, like sunlight, shines forth on them all.
See Al-Muftd, 14 June 1912; al-Shihabi, Al-Qawmiya al-'arabiya, p. 71.

39. At a meeting at the Club on 8 February 1910, al-Rusafi recited
an ode containing this verse:
If Arab you be, with no lies in your story,

Then die now to revive the Arabs' past glory.
See Berro, Al-'Arab wa-l-turk, p. 324.

40. Al-Muftd, 13 June 1911. Al-Rusafi recited an ode beginning with
this verse:
The refinement of science and the science of refinement

Lead to honour of essence and the essence of honour.
See also al-A'zaml, Al-Qadiya al-'arabiya, III, 13-14.

41. Al-Mufid, 23 January 1911.
42. 'Anbara Salam al-Khalidi mentions that the Club was founded 'in
response to the increasingly forceful pace of pan-Turanianism that they
witnessed in the capital of the Empire'. She then explains that the members
of the Club 'used to meet to deliberate on the condition of their provinces,
the Ottoman Empire's neglect of all Arab lands that fell under their con-
trol, the restriction of important positions of responsibility to the Turks
and, likewise, the lack of interest in the education of Arab youth, their
exclusion from scholarships awarded for study abroad . . . and the
disparaging of all that was Arab, these issues all being factors compelling
the Arab youth to protect their nationality from attack by any available
means'. See al-Khalidi, J aw la fI l-dhikrayat, pp. 75-6.
43. Al-Mufid, 13 June 1911; al-A'zaml, Al-Qadiya al- 'arabiya, vol. Ill,
pp. 13-22.
44. See Jemal Pasha, Iddhdt, pp. 10-16; Darwaza, Nash'at al-haraka
al-'arabiya al-haditha, pp. 356-8; Sa'id, Al-Thawra al-'arabiya al-kubrd, vol.
I, pp. 10-11."
45. See al-'Azm, Majmu'a, 'Al-Jami'a al-'uthmariiya', pp. 132-3; Berro,
Al-cArab wa-l-turk, pp. 95-6; Thawrat al-'arab: muqaddimatuha, asbdbuhd,
wa-nata'ijuha (Matba'at al-muqattam, Cairo, 1916; an anonymous work
by 'one of the members of the Arab societies'), p. 53.
46. One of the factors behind the Unionists' suspicion was the report,
set into circulation in the reign of' Abdulhamid, to the effect that the Arabs
were calling for an Arab caliphate, when in fact this was a point espoused
by no more than a small minority. Fear of such agitation continued
into the Constitutional period, and the Turks adopted it as a pretext
for casting doubt on the loyalty of the Arabs. See Al-Mufid, 23 January
1911, 20 June 1911; Berro, Al-'Arab wa-l-turk, pp. 95-6, 98; Jemal
Pasha, Idahat, pp. 16-17; Darwaza, Nash'at al-haraka al-'arabiya al-haditha,
pp. 460-2; al-'Azm, Majmu'a, 'Al-Jami'a al-'uthmaniya', pp. 132-3; Sa'id,
Al-Thawra al-'arabiya al-kubrd, vol. I, 10-11; Al-Mandr, vol. 14 (1911),
pp. 55-6.
265
47. Ahmad Qadri mentions that 'Aziz 'All 'favoured a transforma-

tion in the administration of the Ottoman Empire, changing it into
a kind of federation of provinces with each province having its own
parliament and the Empire maintaining a federal parliament in Istanbul'.
See Qadri, Mudhakkirati, p. 54. Sulayman Faydi states that one of the
purposes of the Covenant Society founded by 'Aziz 'All was to seek
domestic autonomy for the Arab provinces, with the provision that they
would remain federated with the government in Istanbul, along the
lines of the Austro-Hungarian federation. See Sulayman Faydi, Ft
ghamrat al-nidal (Dar al-qalam, Beirut, 1970), p. 136; Berro, Al-lArab
wa-l-turk, pp. 557 ff. In an interview with 'Aziz 'All on 4 January 1918,
it is stated that he was hoping for an Arab-Turkish empire patterned
after the federation between Austria and Hungary. Later, however, he
rejected the idea of a federated empire and voiced his support for a
decentralised system. See Nazml, Judhur, p. 89; Majid Khadduri, 'Aziz
Ali al-Misri and the Arab Nationalist Movement', St Antony's Papers, vol.
17 (1956), pp. 140 ff.
48. See Darwaza, Nash'at al-haraka al-carabiya al-haditha, p. 471; Sa'id,
Al-Thawra al-carabiya al-kubra, pp. 46-8; Jemal Pasha, Idahat, pp. 20 ff; Berro,
Al-'Arab wa-l-turk, pp. 557 ff; al-A'zaml, Al-Qadiya al-'arabiya, vol. IV, 54
ff; Hasan Saab, The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire (Djambatan,
Amsterdam, 1956), pp. 141-2.
49. Ahmad Qadri mentions that the idea arose when certain young men
observed that the members of the Young Turks were fanatically devoted
to their Turkish nationalism and confined their policy to the strengthening
and promotion of this nationalism, at the expense of those of other peoples.
He also says that the first executive committee was organised in Paris in
1911. See Qadri, Mudhakkirati, p. 5.
50. Darwaza, Nash'at al-haraka al-'arabiya al-haditha, pp. 185-6.
Qadri states that their oath included 'sacrifice for the sake of enhanc-
ing the status of the Arab nation and ensuring that it joins the ranks of
the world's dynamic nations'. See Qadri, Mudhakkirati, p. 13. This
emphasises what the goal of the Society was. See also Berro, Al- 'Arab wa-l-
turk, p. 309.
51. Such as Sayf al-DIn al-Khatib, Rafiq Rizq Sallum and Yusuf
Mukhaybir (from the Literary Club), Amir 'Arif al-Shihabi,'Abd al-Ghani
al-'U ray si, Jamil Mardam, Muhammad al-Mahmasani and 'Umar Hamad
(from Syria) and Tawfiq al-Suwaydi (from Iraq).
52. Suhayla al-RImawI, 'Awraq Muhibb al-DIn al-Khatib', in Buhuth
ft l-ta'rikh muhdat ild l-duktur Ahmad 'Izzat cAbdal-Karim (Jami'at 'Ayn Shams,
Cairo, 1976), p. 117; Qadri, Mudhakkirati, p. 115.
53. Qadri, Mudhakkirati, p. 12.
54. This can be observed in the articles published in the newspaper
Al-Mufid. 'Anbara Salam al-Khalidi, after referring to the Arab aspir-
ation to raise their standing, says, 'Nevertheless, there was no explicit
call for severing the connection with the Ottoman Empire. On the
contrary, on every occasion when the Empire was exposed to mischief
or some parts of it were subjected to aggression, enthusiasm was shown
in the Arab lands for preserving it.' See al-Khalidi, Jawla ft l-dhikrayat,
p. 62.
266
55. See Al-Mufid, 23 January 1911, where it attacks those discussing

the Arab caliphate, regards such talk as a pretext used to take revenge on
Arab personalities and explains that for fifteen years the tongues of rumour-
mongers have been wagging about the caliphate, arousing the suspicions
of the authorities against the Arabs. See also 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi,
'La 'arab wa-la turk,' Al-Mufid, 8 May 1911, and the commentary in Al-
Mufid, 15 March 1911, on a statement by the Minister of the Interior in
which he declared that government policy aimed at the federation of the
Ottoman subject nationalities, not their unification into one, a goal which
the newspaper hopes will be achieved. See Al-Muqtabas, no. 20, 12 January
1909.
56. Muhammad Rashld Rida, 'Al-'Arab wa-l-turk', Al-Manar, vol. 12
(1910), p. 818 ff.; Al-Muqtabas, no. 18 (10 January 1909), where refer-
ence is made to contempt for Arab rights and to the Arab complaints at
this.
57. Al-Muqtabas, no. 712 (5 June 1911).
58. Al-Mufid, 8 February 1911.
59. 'Al-'Anasir al-'uthmanlya', Al-Mufid, 15 February 1911.
60. Al-Mufid', 22 March 1911.
61. 'Al-Hizb al-'arabi', Al-Mufid, 1 April 1911.
62. Al-Mufid, 5 April 1911.
63. Al-Mufid, 8 May 1911.
64. Al-Mufid, 17 May 1911.
66. Al-Muqtabas, no. 661 (26 April 1911).
67. Al-Muqtabas, no. 662 (27 April 1911).
68. 'Talkhls li-maqal Carnegie 'an al-hukm al-mahalfi wa-taTiq 'alayhi',
Al-Muqtabas, no. 699 (12 June 1911).
69. Al-Muqtabas, no. 702 (13 June 1911).
70. Al-Mufid, 7 June 1911.
71. See Al-Muqtabas, no. 81 (24 March 1909).
72. On 5 December 1909 the Turkish Club (Turk verenki) was founded
in order to stimulate the Turkish nationalist movement and to promote
interest in Turkish studies (history, literature, the Turkish heritage). An
important point to note is that it favoured a return to old Turkish vocabulary
and ridding it as much as possible of Persian and Arabic words. This attitude
of the Club was taken as a clear indication of enmity towards Arabic. On
31 March 1911 another society with literary-social interests, the Turkish
Homeland Society (Turkyurt-ijem'iyet-i), was organised. This society then
merged on 3 July 1911 with a similar society, the Turkish Hearth (Turk
ojagi), which aimed to bring about radical change by implementing
reforms on a Turkish basis and drawing the Turks together into a nationalist
league. See Berro, Al-'Arab wa-l-turk, pp. 323 ff; Al-Mufid, 13 November
1913.
73. Al-Mufid, 9 March 1911.
74. 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi, 'Al-Ta'rikh yusajjil', Al-Mufid, 15 July
1912.
75. Al-Mufid, 23 September 1912.
77. Al-Mufid, 16 April 1912. In this connection al-'Uraysi quotes an
267
estimate on the spread of education. He mentions that Beirut comes first

with 20,000 students out of 100,000 residents, a ratio unequalled — in his
opinion — except in Cairo. Damascus has a population of 200,000, 6,000
of them students, and Aleppo has 200,000 residents, 4,000 of whom are
students.
78. Zayn al-DIn al-'Amill published his article after the Beirut reform
programme had been drawn up (31 January 1913). It is likely that he had
seen it, although there are certain differences between his presentation and
the contents of the aforementioned programme.
79. Al-Mufid, 6 February 1913.
80. See Al-Mufid, 8, 15 and 28 February 1911; 11 August 1912;
29 September 1912; 6 and 23 November 1913.
81. See 'Abd al-Ghani al-'UraysI's article in Al-Mufid, 16 April 1911,
and that of Muhammad Jamil Bayhum on 15 April 1911. Muhammad
Kurd 'All also wrote on the subject of foreign schools. His view was that
at first, when they taught in Arabic, they adhered to an open admis-
sions policy and played a constructive role in the vitalisation of Arabic.
But then they gave up Arabic, began to limit admissions to one con-
fessional community and drifted towards an attitude of selfish mater-
ialism. Their emphasis was to teach English and the principles of commerce.
By relinquishing Arabic, the foreign schools became the means for
cultural alienation, derision of the Arab heritage and the dissemina-
tion of alien culture. They were partners with colonialism in exploitation
and in robbing students of their essence, for such schools stripped them
of patriotic sentiment, denigrated their heritage and took no interest in
the needs of their society. They thus caused students to repudiate their
country and lured them over to the West. See Samir Seikaly ['Damascene
Intellectual Life in the Opening Years of the 20th Century: Muhammad
Kurd 'All and Al-Muqtabas\ in Marwan Buheiry (ed.), Intellectual Life in
the Arab East, 1890-1939 (American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1981),
pp. 142-5; trans. 'Ata 'Abd al-Wahhab as] 'Al-Hayat al-fikriya al-dimash-
qiya fi mustahall al-qarn al-'ishrin: Muhammad Kurd 'All wa-majallat
Al-Muqtabas\ in Marwan Buheiry (ed.), Al-Hayat al-fikriya fi l-sharq
al-'arabi, 1890-1939 (Centre for Arab Unity'Studies, Beirut, 1983),
pp. 161-3.
82. This included 'Abd al-Ghanf al-'Uraysi and 'Umar Fakhuri.
83. Al-Khatib, Salah al-Din al-Qasimi, pp. 27-8. Dr Salah al-DIn al-
Qasimi was Secretary of the Arab National Awakening Society, founded
in 1906.
84. Ibid., pp. 44-6.
85. Ibid., p. 42.
86. Ibid., p. 43.
87. Salah al-DIn al-Qasimi, 'Al-Mas'ala al-'arablya wa-nash'atuha',
Al-Muqtabas,'no. 43 (8 February 1909).
88. Al-Khatib, Salah al-Din al-Qasimi, pp. 74-5.
89. Al-'UraysI studied in the Maqasid schools, then at the Ottoman
Islamic College founded by Shaykh 'Abbas al-Azhari in 1898. Having
already participated in nationalist activity and in the editing of Al-Mufid,
he travelled to Paris on 31 January 1912. He studied journalism and political
science, and then returned to Beirut on 10 August 1913. A member of
268
the Young Arabs, he was actively involved, during his stay in Paris, in
preparations for the First Arab Congress. See al-'Uraysi, Mukhtarat al-Mufid,
pp.10 ff.
90. On 16 April 1912 A l-Mufid carried the text of a lecture delivered
by 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi in Paris. In this address, entitled 'The
Intellectual Movement in Syria' (Al-Haraka al-fikriya fi Suriya), he says,
'Many foreign schools have been founded in Beirut, with others opening
in Lebanon, Haifa, Acre, Tripoli, Jaffa and Damascus; but they are of
benefit to the intellectual movement only where academic matters are
concerned. As for the government schools, they have proved beneficial from
an academic standpoint and they serve the government by graduating civil
servants for it without inculcating patriotic inclinations among them. It
is upon the indigenous schools that this intellectual movement relies
and depends, for they are the ones that have proved to be of benefit
from the academic standpoint, from the patriotic standpoint and from the
Ottoman standpoint.' See also the article by Ahmad Jamil Bayhum on the
Ottoman Islamic College in Al-Mujid, 15 April 1911. Here he inveighs
against the aims of the foreign missionaries and sees in this school 'an Islamic
college in Syria enabling the Muslims to dispense with the foreigners and
to ward off their hidden designs'.
91. On al-'Uraysi's journey to Paris, see Al-Mufid, 28 January 1912;
reprinted in al-'Uraysi, Mukhtarai al-Mufid, pp. 65-7.
92. See, for example, Al-Mufid, 12 March 1911, 8 May 1911,
22 September 1912; reprinted in al-'Uraysi, Mukhtarat al-Mufid, pp. 45,
49, 93 respectively.
93. See al-'Uraysi, 'Mawlid nablna 'alayhi al-salat wa-1-salam', Al-
Mufid, 12 March 1911; reprinted in al-'Uraysi, Mukhtarat al-Mufid,
pp. 45-6.
94. Al-Mufid, 9 June 1909, 11 January 1912; reprinted in Mukhtarat
al-Mufid, pp. 43, 62-4 respectively.
95. Al-Mufid, 12 March 1911. In Al-Mufid, vol. 4 (January 1914), it
is stated, 'Love the Arabs for three reasons: I am an Arab, the Qur'an
is Arabic and the speech of the people of Paradise is Arabic', also 'Love
of the Arabs is faith and hatred of them is hypocrisy', and 'If the Arabs
are disgraced, Islam is disgraced', etc.
96. Al-Mufid, 11 January 1912; reprinted in al-'Uraysi, Mukhtarat al-
Mufid, p. 63.
98. See Al-Mufid, 20 July 1909, 24 August 1909; reprinted in al-
'Uraysi, Mukhtarat al-Mufid, pp. 204, 215-16 respectively.
99. Al-Mufid, 18 May 1911; reprinted in al-'Uraysi, Mukhtarat al-
Mufid, p. 45.
100. KawtharanI, Watha'iq al-mu'tamar al-'arabi al-awwal, pp. 42-3.
101. 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi, 'Bism al-'arab nahya wa-bism al-'arab
namut', Fata l-'arab, 15 December 1913; reprinted in Mukhtarat al-Mufid,
pp. 118-21. Al-Mufid was closed down on more than one occasion, and
renewed publication in the name of Fata I- (arab and Lisan al- (arab. This article
was written after the First Arab Congress in Paris.
102. See al-'Uraysi, ibid., pp. 119-20, where he says, 'However much
the Unionist extremists may try to destroy our feeling of nationhood,
269
we are still Arab Ottomans, for this sentiment is a trust handed down to
us from our forefathers . . . a charge that the sons pass on from their
ancestors to their grandchildren. And woe upon the one who betrays this
trust.'
103. Al-Mufid, 20 June 1911; reprinted in al-'Uraysf, Mukhtarat al-Mufid,
pp. 53-4.
104. Al-Mufid, 8 May 1911; reprinted in Mukhtarat al-Mufid, pp. 47-9.
105. Paul Doumer, Kitdb al-banin [Livre de mes fils], trans. 'Abd
al-Ghani al-'Uraysi (Al-Matba'a al-ahllya, Beirut, 1911), pp. 23-4, where
he says, 'If our youth are anxious to preserve their own freedom and rights,
they must respect the freedom and rights of the other sons of their homeland'.
He calls for action on behalf of this nation and for deep affection for it, not
only for its times and glories past, but also in the calamities of its present,
for the Arab nation 'represents greatness and honour' (ibid., p. 25).
106. Al-Mufid, 23 September 1912; reprinted in al-'Uraysi, Mukhtarat
al-Mufid, p. 95. Rashid Rida points to the Turks' fear of the idea of the
Arab caliphate. See Al-Manhr, vol. 12 (1909), p. 958.
107. See al-'Uraysi, Mukhtarat al-Mufid, especially pp. 119, 122, 204.
108. See a\-Kha\idi, Jaw la ft l-dhikrayat, p. 99; Al-Mufid, 4 September
1912; Darwaza, Nash'at al-haraka al-'arabiya al-hadltha, p. 480.
110. Al-'Uraysi, 'La 'arab wa-la turk'.
111. Al-'Uraysi says, 'God be praised, that the concept of the Islamic
caliphate should prevail over the Ottoman imperium, and that it should
become evident to those in authority what awesome power this concept
will have if the crisis worsens . . . A first priority of our notables and
leaders should be to ensure that Jahed (the publisher of the newspaper
Tanin) understands that to call this realm an Ottoman imperium would
surely outrage Muslim sentiments and put an end to the strength of
the faithful.' See 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi, 'Allahu akbar', Al-Mufid, 20
June 1911.
112. See the article by Fu'ad Hantas in Al-Mufid, 14 May 1911; and
Rashid Rida in Al-Mufid, 23 November 1911.
113. Al-Mufid, 23 July 1911.
114. Al-'Uraysi attacked Italian colonialism, especially in his article
'Al-Mawt al-sharff, Al-Mufid, 1 October 1911; reprinted in Mukhtarat
al-Mufid, pp. 59-60. The occupation of Tripoli he regarded as the prelude
to the occupation of other places; and after the Italian bombardment of
Beirut he attacked Western ambitions and called for defiant resistance. See
Al-Mufid, 14 March 1912.
115. Al-Mufid, 11 January 1912; reprinted in al-'Uraysi", Mukhtarar
al-Mufid , pp. 62 ff.
116. 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi, 'Ayyuna ahaqqu an yuttaba'?', Al-
Mufid, 4 August 1912; reprinted in al-'Uraysi, Mukhtarat al-Mufid, p. 88 ff.
117. Al-Mufid, 7 January 1913; reprinted in al-'Uraysi, Mukhtarat
al-Mufid, pp. 102 ff.
118. 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi, 'Al-Haqq fi 1-siyasa', Al-Mufid, 28
August 1913; reprinted in al-'Uraysi, Mukhtarat al-Mufid, pp. 112 ff.
119. Fata I-'arab, 15 December 1913; reprinted in Mukhtarat al-Mufid,
pp. 118 ff.
270
120. Fata l-'arab, 16 December 1913.

121. Fata l-'arab, 18 January 1914; reprinted in al-'Uraysi, Mukhtarat
al-Mufid, p. 123.
122. Fata l-'arab, 3 May 1914; reprinted in al-'Uraysi", Mukhtarat
al-Mufid, pp. 127 ff.
123. Al-'Uraysi here refers to the Beirut reform programme and to the
First Arab Congress in Paris in June 1913.
124. KawtharanI, Watha'iq al-mu'tamar al-'arabi al-awwal, pp. 44-5.
125. See Thawrat al-'arab, pp. 241 ff.
126. See Al-Mufid, 6 and 13 November 1913.
127. Here 'Umar Hamad refers to the German Max Nordau, author
of a work entitled Al-Jinsiya wa-l-'amil al-kabir 'aid ihya' al-sahyuniyin, as he
calls it. See Al-Mufid, 6 November 1913. [This is probably Nordau's
'Sionisme et nationalisme', published in Paris in L 'Echo Sioniste, the second
number for 1903].
128. Ibid.
129. It is interesting to note that when he refers to statues of great men
he names 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibl and Mahmud Sami al-Barudi, thus
including contemporaries from Syria and Egypt.
130. Al-Mufid, 13 November 1913.
131. 'Umar Fakhuri graduated from the Ottoman Islamic College on
30 June 1913 and after a few months began to write articles for the
newspaper Al-Mufid. See, for example, the issues of Al-Mufid for 10 and
29 September, 3 and 4 November 1913. He then collected what he had
written, with an introduction, in his book Kayfa nahada al-'arab. I would
here like to thank Dr Mahmud Samra for graciously allowing me to examine
a copy of this printing in his possession.
132. 'Umar Fakhuri mentions that after giving the matter much
thought, he considered that 'the Arab people is not a stiff corpse. Rather,
it is feeble of movement and weak of pulse, an ailing people that can be
restored to health.' He then frankly and honestly declares that he has cited
'views which I quote from Western works that I do not claim to be flawless,
and ideas that came to my attention, which I compared and contrasted
to what I knew from my own experience. My essay is therefore a work
of collection and translation into Arabic more than it is a work of
composition and formulation' (ibid., p. 5). He derived particular benefit
from the studies of Gustave Lebon (La Civilisation des arabes, La Revolution
franchise et la psychologie des revolutions) and from Max Nordau (on
'solidaritarianism'). We shall see his own contribution — despite his youth
— in his analysis and conclusions.
133. Ibid., pp. 3-5.
134. Fakhuri mentions (ibid., pp. 6-7) that he asked himself, 'What
must be the common ultimate goal of the nation's thinkers?' After some
bewilderment, he found the answer in Gustave Lebon's analysis of the
French Revolution and his realisation that the secret of its success lay in
the fact that it 'established not a new regime, but a new religion'.
135. Ibid., p. 8.
136. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
137. See ibid., pp. 9-10, where he says, 'We seek to make Arab
nationalism (al- (arabiya) a faith and a religion for the sake of which each
271
one of us would sacrifice his personal interests and his happiness, and even
his life. It would bond the nation together with a moral unity that would
make its people like a solidly raised building and augment their material
power, for a principle such as this has always been the harbinger of an
emergent civilisation that will only be overpowered by a more strongly
entrenched principle.'
138. Here (ibid., pp. 11 ff) Fakhuri derived particular benefit from
Gustave Lebon's La Civilisation des arabes.
139. Ibid., p. 20.
140. 'Umar Fakhuri says, 'Briefly put, history has never seen indulgent
forbearance such as that of the Arabs, nor a religion equal to theirs in
mildness and tolerance' (ibid., p. 23).
141. Ibid., pp. 12-23.
142. Ibid., pp. 27-35.
143. See Al-Mufid, 29 September 1913.
144. Fakhuri, Kay/a nahada al-'arab, pp. 37, 41, 43.
145. Ibid., pp. 45-6; Al-Mufid, 19 September 1913.
146. Fakhuri, Kayfa nahada al-'arab, pp. 57-9.
147. Here Fakhuri refers to the views of Max Nordau on nationalism.
148. Ibid., pp. 61-6.
149. Ibid., pp. 74-5; Al-Mufid, 4 November 1913. [By 'sons of the dad1
Fakhuri means native speakers of Arabic, i.e. the only ones capable of cor-
rectly pronouncing the Arabic letter dad.]
150. Najib 'Azuri studied at the Imperial School in Istanbul, and then
in Paris, where he earned a diploma at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes. He
was appointed as an assistant to the Governor of Jerusalem in 1898, but
fell into conflict with the Governor and his dragoman and left for Egypt
in 1904. There he attacked the two in the newspaper Al-Ikhlas, and this
to such an extent as to provoke the Governor ofJerusalem to seek his extra-
dition. The authorities in Egypt, however, protected him. After a few months
he went to Paris, arriving at the end of 1904. In Paris he published his book
Le Reveilde la nation arabe and founded — or so he claims — the Parti National
Arabe, which spoke in the name of the Ligue de la Patrie Arabe. He then
began to publish the monthly L 'Independence arabe, of which 18 issues appeared
between April 1907 and September 1908. After the promulgation of the Con-
stitution in 1908 he returned to Jaffa, nominated himself as a candidate for
Parliament, and failed. See Najib 'Azuri, Yaqzat al-umma al-'arabiya, trans.
Ahmad Bu Milhim (Al-Mu'assasa al-'arabiya li-1-dirasat wa-1-nashr, Beirut,
1978), 'Al-Muqaddima', pp. 13 ff. See also Stefan Wild ['Negib Azoury
and His Book Le Reveil de la nation arabe', in Intellectual Life in the Arab East,
pp. 92 ff = ]'Najib 'Azuri wa-kitabuhu Yaqzat al-umma al-'arabiya', in
Al-Haydt al-fikriyafi l-sharq al- 'arabi, p. 108 ff; Elie Kedourie, Arabic Political
Memoirs and Other Studies (Cass, London, 1974), pp. 107 ff.
151. 'Azuri regards the Turkish government as a gang of greedy men
bent on robbery and working under the leadership of a wild sultan to ruin
the country of the Arabs. See 'Azuri [Reveilde la nation arabe, pp. 181ff = ]
Yaqzat al-umma al-'arabiya, pp. 181 ff.
152. 'Azuri called for dividing the Ottoman Empire into states corres-
ponding in number to the number of subject nationalities distinguishable
by their language, traditions and historical considerations, without regard
272
to confessional affiliation or religion. This was something no other Arab

thinker at the time was advocating. See [Reveil de la nation arabe, p. 241 = ]
Yaqzat al-umma al-'arabiya, pp. 216-17.
153. [Reveil de la nation arabe, p. 208 = ] Yaqzat al-umma al-'arabiya, p. 197.
154. In a proclamation which he claims the Parti National Arabe sent
to the great powers. See [Reveil de la nation arabe, p. i = ] Yaqzat al-umma
al-'arabiya, p. 37.
155. Iraq was neither an amirate nor independent. Did 'Azuri have
other considerations in mind?
156. [Reveil de la nation arabe, pp. ii, 245 = ] Yaqzat al-umma al-'arabiya,
pp. 37-8, 219.
157. Despite this, he says that the Ligue de la Patrie Arabe has offered
the throne of the Arab empire to a prince from the Khedivial family. See
[Reveil de la nation arabe, p. 245, =] Yaqzat al-umma al-'arabiya, p. 219.
158. He quotes this during his discussion of the programme of the Ligue
de la Patrie Arabe. See [Reveil de la nation arabe, pp. 245 ff = ] Yaqzat al-
umma al-'arabiya, pp. 219 ff.
159. [Reveil de la nation arabe, pp. i-ii, 246-7 = ] Yaqzat al-umma al- 'arabiya,
pp. 37, 220.
160. [Reveil de la nation arabe, p. v = ] Yaqzat al-umma al- 'arabiya, p. 41.
In speaking to the Westerners — his concern throughout his book — he
refers to the presence of consuls in Beirut and Jerusalem who support and
assist the Zionists because — in his view — they have been deceived by
the Jews and are unaware of the looming danger, when in fact their duty
is to oppose the action of Israel. See [Reveil de la nation arabe, pp. 46-7 = ]
Yaqzat al-umma al- 'arabiya, pp. 75-6. He does not explicitly mention which
state these consuls represent, although the consuls of Britain were in the
vanguard.
161. [Reveil de la nation arabe, p. 178 = ] Yaqzat al-umma al-'arabiya, pp.
176-7.
162. [Reveil de la nation arabe, p. 229 = ] Yaqzat al-umma al-'arabiya, pp.
208-9.
163. 'Azuri says that the society that met in Mecca decided that a Chris-
tian foreigner should assume the caliphate. This would be better than leaving
it to the loathsome 'Abdulhamid, since it is said in the holy scripture of
Islam that an infidel ruler is better than an unjust Muslim one! He even
says, 'There is a Qur'anic passage, which the Turks desire to strike out,
in which the angel Gabriel says: I travelled all over the world, from East
to West and West to East, and found no people prouder or nobler than
the Arabs!' See [Reveil de la nation arabe, pp. 208, 229 = ] Yaqzat al-umma
al-'arabiya, pp. 197, 209.
164. See Wild ['Negib Azoury', pp. 98 ff = ] 'Najib 'Azuri', pp. 114 fT.
165. [Reveil de la nation arabe, pp. 51 ff = ] Yaqzat al-umma al-'arabiya,
pp. 81 ff.
166. See [Reveil de la nation arabe, pp. 84, 87-9, 93 = ] Yaqzat al-umma
al-'arabiya, pp. 103, 106-7, 111. 'Azuri defends British colonialism and
desires for Syria an administrative system similar to that of Egypt.
167. See [Reveil de la nation arabe, pp. 101-2, 110-15 = ] Yaqzat al-umma
al-'arabiya, pp. 115, 122-5. 'Azuri goes so far as to glorify the Crusades,
saying, 'It was France that undertook the momentous Crusader expeditions,
273
the results of which have returned benefits to the entire world.' See [Reveil
de la nation arabe, p. 101 = ] Yaqzat al-umma al-'arabiya, p. 115.
168. [Reveil de la nation arabe, p. 128 = ] Yaqzat al-umma al-'arabiya,
p. 133.
169. [Reveil de la nation arabe, pp. ii-iii, 242, 244 = ] Yaqzat al-umma al-
'arabiya, pp. 37-8, 217, 219.
170. See Yusuf 'Izz al-DIn, Al-Shi'r al-'irdqt fi l-qarn al-tdsi( cashar (Al-
Dar al-qawmlya li-1-tiba'a wa-1-nashr, Cairo, 1965), pp. 27-8, 138-50.
'Abd al-Hamld Ahmad al-ShawI (d. 1896) says:
Over all mankind my striving people came to prevail,

Erecting great glories ruined not by time or travail,
How wretched the age that suits him deserving but scorn,
And in men of most glory discovers its foes fully sworn!
And in the verse of Salih al-Kawwaz (d. 1873) we read:
Are Arab affairs to be governed by one of descent unknown,

In whose lineage no place for Nizar or Khindif is shown?
For the free none will do save the free-born man's son,
Who guards lest against them shameful injury be done.
See al-Wa'ili, Al-Shi'r al-siyasi al-'iraqi, pp. 223-4, 246.

171. Al-Akhras (d. 1874) says (in 1848):
My life, now half spent, how sad it all seems,

With hopes all uncrowned by fulfilment's fine jewels.
Our thoughts as Arabs are the maids of our dreams,
Which the non-Arabs loathe as but hideous ghouls.
And from Sayyid Radi al-Qazwini (d. 1870) we hear:
Iraq's land of Zawra' is where our beloved we'll see;

But how long to wait for reunion, o'er such a distant land?
For the eloquent Arabic speaker, Tibriz is no place to be;
And compared to Iraqi Arabs, where can Turks hope to stand?
See Al-Wa'ili, Al-Shi'r al-siyasi al-'iraqi, p. 253.

172. Al-Akhras (in 1851) says (ibid., p. 251):
When will be lifted the gloom which I see,

And the veil be raised from morning's fair face?
After despair, a glimpse of desires,
And fulfilment of hope the false pledge will erase.
And Salih al-Qazwini (d. 1883) recites (ibid., p. 271):
Their kings often ravish what demands their respect,

For treachery, in Turks, is the trait to expect.
274
The following lines come from a poem by al-Zahawi in which he criticises

the Turks (in 1898) and describes the oppression that prevails in the Arab
lands (ibid., p. 272):
Effects of their oppression can be seen in every town,

The hallmarks of their presence and the source of their
renown.
Catastrophes redouble when they come into a land,
As if affliction sends them and directs them with its hand.
Throughout the land of Syria their tyranny prevails,
Heaping high upon its back a burden of travails.
Baghdad, that heart of learning, now has passed beneath
their rule,
Which dooms it to an incurable ill: the ignorance of the
fool.
Enquire with the Yemen for its view of the Turkish tide,
As it staggers 'neath the blows that befall it on every
side.
173. In addressing the expected mahdi, al-Kawwaz says (ibid., pp.

222-3):
To demand the right of the caliphate, stand.

Look! It's been snatched by the enemies' hand.
This is the flag of the Muslims, they claim,

As it waves o'er these men of most criminal shame.
And in 1849 'Abd al-Ghani Jamil said (ibid., p. 265):
Where are the high-ranking nobles of Hashim,

Whose enemies' bones will be crushed in the fight?
Where the staunch heroes to rise for the cause,
When battle's din blazes and spreads burning bright?
I cry out but find there are none who pay heed.
My words, to ring in deaf ears is their plight.
174. 'Abd al-Ghani Jamil says (ibid., p. 267):
When will my lance kiss the throats of the vile,

And in their necks swords find a thirst-quenching spring?
Around me stand warriors from Ma'add and Ya'rib,
Whose shining swords guarantee war unending.
War's fire blazes when they stir up its coals.
And flashing blades blood will soon be reddening.
And also (ibid., p. 268):
Are there no men whose zeal will claim the right of Arab
lands,
275
Awakening the sleeping dust 'neath hooves of charging

steeds?
Nizar's horsemen, and 'Amir's too, hold reins firm in their
hands.
Their dead honoured, each one of them the lesser fighter
heeds.
Ahmad al-ShawI (d. 1901) recites (ibid., p. 272):
Would that my knowledge was vain and my hopes deluded,

For the life that youth lives only leads to death.
But am I to be troubled by such misgivings,
When I have yet to avenge Islam on blasphemy?
I slake my thirst for their red-tinged beards,
And in my sword find my cure for the Turks.
175. See Muhammad Bahjat al-Athari, Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi wa-

ara'uhu al-lughawiya: muhadardt (League of Arab States, Institute for Advanced
Arab Studies, Cairo, 1958), pp. 8 ff; Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi, Bulugh al-
arabfi muhdwalat ma 'rifat ahwal al- carab (Matba'at Dar al-Salam, Baghdad,
1896).
176. Batatu, Old Social Classes, pp. 166 ff.
177. Nazmi, Judhur, p. 137; Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi, Al-misk al-adhkhar,
a biography of Abu 1-Thana' al-Alusi, ed. 'Abd Allah al-Jaburi (Dar al-
'ulum li-1-tiba'a wa-1-nashr, Riyadh, 1982), pp. 70 ff.
178. A group of ulema and notables organised the Consultation Party
in 1908 to serve as a centre for opposition to the CUP. It was a party Islamic
in its perspective and emphasised implementation of the sacred law of Islam.
See Ghassan R. al-Atiyah, Iraq, 1908-1912: A Socio-Political Study (Arab
Institute for Research and Publication, Beirut, 1973), p. 68.
179. On the Party's secret committee in Baghdad there were two
members of Turkish origin and one of Kurdish background; ibid.,
pp. 52-3.
180. Nazml, Judhur, pp. 74 ff.
181. Al-Atiyah, Iraq, pp. 54, 57, 68.
182. Faydl, Fi ghamrat al-nidal, p. 99.
183. Ibid., pp. 114-15, 121-3. Faydi says that its programme developed
after the expansion of its influence, and in 1913 passed beyond demands
for Arab rights within the Empire 'and began to call for their rights in their
entirety . . . and to advocate the liberation of Arab thinking from the yoke
of Turkish colonialism.' See also Al-Atiyah, Iraq, pp. 57-8, 69.
184. Al-Atiyah, Iraq, pp. 59-60; Nazml, Judhur, pp. 99 ff.
276
7
The Arab Movement
T h e reform movement
The reformist perspective favouring decentralisation and proposing

ways to achieve this began to manifest itself in 1911, and the
establishment of the Freedom and Concord Party served to pro-
mote this trend. The call for decentralisation then became more
urgent and broader in scope under the impact of a number of
important events that followed. The Italians attacked and occupied
Tripoli, Ottoman forces failed in the Balkan War and some of the
European powers hinted at their designs on certain Arab lands. Such
developments engendered alarm among the Arabs for their lands
and their fate, and it was to centralisation that they attributed the
weakness and the catastrophes. 1
The Decentralisation Party
The founding of the Ottoman Administrative Decentralisation Party

in Cairo (late 1912), by a group from the Syrian emigrant com-
munity, was the first openly active organisation in this perspec-
tive. 2 The party was Ottoman in its platform; but its officers and
members were Arabs (e.g. Syrians) and it voiced the prevailing Arab
position on reform in this period. The members differed in their
intellectual roots and political inclinations, but they were agreed
on the necessity of a decentralised administration under which the
Arabs would enjoy complete exercise of their rights within the
Ottoman Empire.
In its manifesto3 the Party explained the implications of decen-
tralisation, its advantages and why it was essential to the Ottoman
277
The Arab Movement
domains. First of all, it declares that the political and social existence
of a nation depends upon the form of its government: the more the
people participate in government, the more assured the nation is
of survival and progress. Experience has established 'that the best
form of government is the constitutional, and that the best form
of constitutional government is the decentralised, especially for
kingdoms consisting of multiple sects, religious denominations and
languages, and differing in customs, traditions and norms', since
it is impossible to establish a single legal system in such a kingdom
without taking these circumstances into consideration. Similarly,
the manifesto declares that decentralisation is the best method to
train the individuals of the nation to be self-reliant, 'which is the
best means for achieving the progress of nations'. It also asserts
that a people held accountable for nothing have no sense of respon-
sibility, while decentralisation distributes accountability among the
individuals of the nation to the same degree that it grants them
responsibility, and encourages self-reliance and a diligent sense of
purpose in life so that the goals of progress and development can
be quickly realised.
The manifesto states that centralisation has led to the decline
of education, a deficiency in or even absence of development and
the loss of the means to achieve progress, and likewise has obstructed
the movement towards reform. As an example of this it cites educa-
tion, for this takes place in a language not that of the people,
proceeds according to a uniform programme that fails to take into
consideration the needs of each province and the preparedness of
its people, and lacks the necessary funding. Hence, this policy limits
the scope of education and withholds it from the province. The
manifesto also notes that centralisation has rendered the govern-
ment incapable of defending most of the Ottoman domains if
attacked by an enemy (as had been obvious with the fall of Tripoli),
and impotent in the face of internal strife and rebellions. Conse-
quently, the whole Empire was exposed to danger because of
centralisation. And hence, centralisation not only provoked such
internal strife and political chaos as to deprive it of its fairest
provinces (in the Balkans), but was also incompatible with the
progress of the Ottoman nation and incapable of guaranteeing its
survival. And this was not to mention the malicious 'policy of
blending the subject nationalities, which is pursued by a band of
madmen so crazed by the thirst for domination that they would
bring catastrophes down upon the Empire . . . '
Hence, in order to ensure the political survival of the Ottoman
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The Arab Movement
nation in the future, to safeguard the Empire from the havoc of

internal strife and foreign perils, and to rally the subject nationalities
in devoted allegiance around the Ottoman throne, it was decided
to found the Decentralisation Party. This perspective would
'guarantee the integrity of the Empire, unite its peoples and focus
their resolve on those efforts most conducive to the development
and felicity of the province and the power and survival of the
Empire'.
It is not important that we consider the Party's platform in detail
here, and it will suffice to refer to some of the main points. The
platform of the Party stipulated that the Empire should have a
constitutional representative form of government and that its
provinces be united under the sultanate on the basis of adminis-
trative decentralisation. Each province would have a governor and
chief judge (qddi l-qudat) appointed by the sultan, 4 and a General
Council that would supervise all matters of provincial administra-
tion, such as the provincial budget, general security, education,
public works, the pious foundations and municipal affairs. Aspects
of provincial government pertaining to military affairs and foreign
policy the governor would refer to the central authority after
expressing his own opinion on the matter. All of the decisions by
the General Council would have the force of law, and the Council
would also supervise the government of the province. Each pro-
vince would have a Council of Administration that would fix the
budget of the province and nominate its civil servants, 5 a Council
of Provincial Education that would establish the curriculum, super-
vise educational affairs and fix a special budget to fund them, 6 and
a Council of Provincial Pious Foundations that would fix a special
budget for their revenues and supervise all of their affairs. These
councils would be elected, with the exception of the Council of
Administration, half of which would be elected while the other half
would consist of heads of administrative departments. 7 The
method of conducting elections for these councils, for the Parlia-
ment and for the municipal councils would be organised so as to
be free and representative of all elements of society.8
In each province there would be two official languages, Turkish
and the local language, and it was considered essential that in each
province instruction in the language of the people should be
expanded. 9 In peacetime the people in every province should
perform their military service within their own province, while in
wartime the deployment of military forces would be left to the
Ministry of War. 10 The governor would appoint provincial officials
279
The Arab Movement
from candidates nominated by the Council of Administration, and

similarly, the Chief Judge would appoint judges for the religious
courts. 11
The party was influential in encouraging the reform movement
in the Arab lands. Likewise, it played a role in the First Arab
Congress in Paris and afterwards.
The reform movement in Beirut
The Beirut Reform Society {Jam 'iyat Bayrut al-islahiya) was estab-
lished in the era of broadening calls for reform, 12 after the failure
of Ottoman forces in the Balkan War, the fall of the Unionist
government and the formation of the government of Kamil Pasha.
Salim 'All Salam, who was a prominent figure in the Society's
leadership, told the story of its foundation. 13
Beirut was a centre of wide-ranging commercial and intellectual
activity, and it appears that alongside the view that Lebanon should
be treated as a special political entity, there were a number of
perspectives on the conduct of its political affairs. Among the
Christians of Mount Lebanon there was a particularist tendency
favouring a Lebanese entity under the protection or sponsorship
of France. There was also an Arab nationalist perspective that was
particularly well represented among youths who had graduated from
the indigenous schools, especially from the Ottoman Islamic College
(Al-Kulliya al-'uthmdniya al-islamiya), which played a role in dissemin-
ating Arabist thinking. 14 As one would expect, the various perspec-
tives all found an open field in the issue of decentralisation.
Rafiq al-'Azm 15 discussed the reform movement, explaining
that the manifestation of weakening Ottoman power after the Balkan
War, along with signs of a shift in the European attitude towards
the Empire and talk about partitioning it, provoked alarm in Syria,
'because their province would be the first to be hauled onto the mat
for scrutiny', and the hearts of the people awakened to the danger
of what the politicians called 'the Syrian Question'. Hence, 'Syrian
men of discernment began to look for means of salvation and decided
to rely upon themselves, especially after they saw the fate that had
befallen Tripoli and the Ottoman provinces in Europe'. The
intellectuals among them considered 'that the most important
deterrent and the surest guarantee of security was a combination
of internal strength — that of the homeland — with general strength
— that of the Empire. The latter is necessarily inseparable from
280
The Arab Movement
the former: when the provinces are strong, the Empire will be
strong.' This strength can be achieved through solidarity and
patriotic unity, which in turn can only be realised through adminis-
trative decentralisation. This distributes accountability among the
people to an extent commensurate with the rights they seek, and
holds them directly responsible for any benefit that accrues to the
homeland or any injury that befalls it.
From the memoirs of Salim 'AH Salam (who played an impor-
tant role in the reform movement in Beirut), it can be seen that
the rout of the Ottoman army in the Balkan War and the rumour
that the French were going to send a fleet to Lebanon led to anxiety
in the Syrian provinces, especially in the province of Beirut, for
the future of these lands. 16 Some of the notables of Beirut sug-
gested to Salam that the province be annexed to Egypt under the
British protectorate, while others expressed the desire for a French
occupation. Being himself of Ottoman inclinations, Salim Salam
contacted the governor, Edhem Bey (who had been appointed by
the government of Kamil Pasha), informed him of the gravity of
the situation, including its secessionist dimensions, and advised him
that the way to deal with it was to initiate a broad programme of
reform in Beirut, and indeed, in all of the provinces. The governor
cabled to Kamil Pasha, informed him of the situation, and pro-
posed to him that a commission headed by Edhem be formed to
draft a programme of reforms. The reply was that the Parliament
was soon to meet, and that through the General Council the
governor could prepare such a programme and submit it to Parlia-
ment through the deputies of the province. In view of the gravity
of the situation, however, the governor decided to form a committee
under his own leadership to prepare a programme of reform pro-
posals and to submit it as soon as possible. However, this was not
agreeable to Salim Salam, who favoured the formation of a com-
mission representing the inhabitants of the province in order to for-
mulate a reform programme. Although he had already embarked
on his own undertaking, the governor raised no objections to this.
After a series of consultations between Salam and a group of
advocates for reform, they agreed on the founding of a National
Reform Commission representing the population at large and asked
local bodies — the local councils, the spiritual leaders of all the con-
fessional communities and journalists — to meet to select deputies
to represent them in the Reform Society.17
The account of Salim Salam seems to be accurate, with the
exception of his details concerning the attitude of the government.
281
The Arab Movement
As Rafiq al-'Azm wrote, Kamil Pasha was of the opinion that

reform based on decentralisation was essential, while the central
government 'intimated to the Syrian provinces, in the vanguard
of which was Beirut, that the people would be consulted on aspects
of the required reforms'. 'Hence', he continues, 'the heads of the
confessional communities, popular leaders and intellectuals met and
to this end founded a society with official permission from the
government'; and after negotiations on the subject between the
Society and the local government, the Society's reform programme
was drawn up. 1 8 This version of events is corroborated by Al-
Mufid, which reported that the government did more than simply
agree to the request from Beirut. In late December 1912 it requested
the governors of Damascus and Aleppo (on orders from the Ministry
of the Interior and in accordance with the decision of the Cabinet
of Ministers) to find out what the provinces considered their needs
to be. 19 In Damascus, however, the movement met with failure.
The governor, Kazem Pasha, called for a meeting of the General
Council in Damascus, and the mayor invited a number of leading
figures to attend, but the session ended without result. Some, such
as 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar, contested the point of whether
those present were representative of the peoples of the province,
and it was consequently proposed that the submission of a reform
programme to the General Council be left to anyone who wished
to do so. The dispute between the Concordists and the Unionists
also made its influence felt in the division. In any case, among the
proposed demands were that Arabic should be made the language
of judicial proceedings in the courts and be recognised in the Parlia-
ment, that civil servants be from the population of the province,
with the exception of certain high-level administrators to be
appointed from the government in Istanbul (provided that they
knew Arabic) and that broader powers be granted to the General
Councils. 20
In Beirut, the selection of the 86 members of the Reform Society
was complete by late December 1912.21 It met on 12 January 1913
(with 76 members present), affirmed the necessity of reform for the
province of Beirut, and proceeded to select a committee of 25
members to draft a programme of the required reforms. On 31
January the Society met again and, after passing some amendments,
it approved the programme of reforms set forth by the committee
and entrusted it with the task of implementing these reforms. 22
It seems that the governor, for his part, established and chaired
a special committee (with some of its members drawn from the
282
The Arab Movement
Reform Society) that drew up a reform programme which the

governor then presented to the General Council. There, however,
it encountered objections to some of its provisions. It was also
rejected by the Reform Society in a telegram to Hazem Bey, the
new governor sent by the Unionists. In this telegram it was stated
that the required reform was spelled out in the Society's programme:
'As for the programme proposed by the General Council', it
declared, 'even though it includes most of our demands, it fails to
meet all of the needs of the province covered in our programme,
as it deals with neither the expansion of the authority of the General
Council nor the question of foreign advisers . . . As for the
expansion of the jurisdiction of the governor, we regard this as an
undermining of the required reform and we categorically reject
it.' 23
Salim 'All Salam explains that the members of the Society agreed
to encourage support for the reform among the people so that the
latter would give up radical and secessionist tendencies. He also
indicates that one goal of the reform movement was to draw both
Arab nationalists and the particularist Christians into an organisa-
tion that could restrain the two sides. This accommodation can
clearly be seen in the names of the members of the committee that
proposed the reform programme. 24
From the programme itself it would seem that provincial adminis-
tration was to be divided into two categories. The first was that
comprehending the activities and basic functions of a sovereign state:
foreign and military questions, customs, the postal and telegraph
systems, enactment of laws and tax collection. This would be
entrusted to the central government. The second embraced the local
activities pertaining to the internal affairs of the province, control
of which would be entrusted to the General Council of the province
(Article 1). The governor would act in two legal capacities. In the
first, representing the central government, he would oversee the
activities included in the first category, subject to the decisions of
the central government. In his other capacity, representing the pro-
vincial government, he would supervise the performance of the
activities included in the second category, subject to the decisions
of the General Council. The governor would have the power to veto
decisions taken by the General Council, but if the measure were
to be revoted in the Council by a two-thirds majority, this would
override the governor's veto.
It is noteworthy that the General Council was to be elected in
such a way as to be representative of the confessional communities,
283
The Arab Movement
with half of its members Muslims and the other half consisting of
non-Muslims, and that the Council was to regulate all of the internal
activities of the province. Our attention is also drawn to the provi-
sion that the Council was to be empowered to negotiate loans so
long as their value did not exceed half of the revenues allocated
to the province; higher amounts required the backing of the central
government. The Council would also have the right to issue permits
for the establishment of Ottoman corporations working on public
works projects that would be beneficial to trade, industry,
agriculture and all other developmental matters within the province.
This was on condition that it should include no concessionary
privileges; if it did, then in such a case the approval of the central
government would be required (Article 3). This reveals that the
merchants and notables of Beirut felt that the central government
was obstructing their economic activities and impeding the pace
of the province's economic growth.
The programme stipulates that department heads were to be ap-
pointed by the central government, conditional upon their
knowledge of Arabic, and were to serve for a term of five years.
Other civil servants were to be chosen from the people of the
province. Candidates would be examined by a committee that would
select the best two, one of whom would be appointed by the governor
after approval of his choice by the General Council (Article 6).
Both interesting and indicative of the nature of the accommoda-
tion is the fact that the programme provided for the central govern-
ment's appointment of foreign advisers to the departments of the
gendarmerie, finance, post and telegraph, and customs, and of an
inspector-general to every district in the province, with the right
to inspect any department. Similarly, the General Council would
appoint foreign advisers — from states acceptable to the central
government — to the Provincial Council and to the departments
of justice, public works, education, municipal affairs and the police
(Article 7). The programme also provided for the formation of a
council of advisers entrusted with important domains of jurisdic-
tion. Among these were the interpretation of the articles of organisa-
tion set forth by the central government in accordance with this
programme, interpretation of the decisions and regulations passed
by the General Council, and investigation and judgement of cases
involving the possible dismissal of an official (Article 13). In
addition, the decision of the Council of Advisers would be binding
in any dispute with the General Council or any of its committees
or departments. Ayyiib Thabit, secretary of the Reform Society,
284
The Arab Movement
justified the need for foreigners 'in view of our ignorance of any
kind of administration and the failure of our ethical and
psychological upbringing to provide us with the training necessary
for the proper conduct of government'. 25 In the introduction of
advisers so empowered, some saw — and rightly so — a means
for elements friendly to France to serve that nation's interests, to
guarantee the supervision of the administration by the European
powers and to assert that there was scope for reform only with the
assistance of Europe. 26
Finally, the programme stipulated that Arabic would be con-
sidered the official language in all business conducted within the
province, and would be recognised as an official language — like
Turkish — in the Council of Deputies and the Council of Notables
(Article 14). It also provided that military service should be reduced
to two years and that in peacetime it should be served within the
province (Article 15).27
It is not important that we consider in detail here the events that
followed the drafting of the reform programme. It will suffice for
us to point out that through a plot the Unionists were able to regain
power and to appoint a new governor, Abu Bakr Hazem Bey.
Leaders of the reform movement met with him on 14 March 1913
to argue for their programme. On 17 March the governor sum-
moned Salim Salam and informed him that the government was
drawing up a new law on the provinces incorporating some of the
proposed reforms. He gave the reformers the choice of either waiting
for the promulgation of the new law or sending their proposals to
Istanbul. They chose the latter option, 28 but their programme was
rejected. On 8 April 1913 the governor announced that the Reform
Society was dissolved, that its meetings were prohibited and that
the Reform Club was closed.29 This was followed by a protest from
the Society on 12 April and the occurrence of strikes and other
protests. 30
Of importance to us here is the account Salim Salam gives of
how 'Abd al-Karlm al-Khalil, president of the Literary Club, came
to Beirut in March and visited the Reform Society. He explained
that he had been sent by the Ottoman Administrative Decentral-
isation Party for consultations on the possibility of the Society's in-
corporation into the Party, or of the merger of the two to form a
single front. Though no reasons were given, the proposal was
immediately rejected,31 a response that should be understood in
light of the composition of the Society, which included groups of
widely differing views and goals. From another point of view, the
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The Arab Movement
rejection of the reform programme and the abolition of the Society

were an indication of the attitude of the CUP, which was not devoid
of influence on the situation or on the widening of the gap between
the reformers and the CUP.
The Basra Reform Society
In this same period, some of the key leaders of the Freedom and
Concord Party in Basra, headed by Sayyid Talib al-Naqlb, decided
to dissolve the Party and to found a reform society patterned after
the one in Beirut. It would be linked to the Administrative Decen-
tralisation Party in Egypt, and would both act in accordance with
its programme and call for the realisation of its goals. This gives
some indication of how widespread the call for reform was in the
Arab movement. The local branch of the Freedom and Concord
Party agreed to the dissolution provided that the Unionists also
dissolved their society. This was actually achieved, and the Basra
Reform Society {Jam 'iyat al-Basra al-islahlyd) was formed and opened
on 28 February 1913. Most of the army officers of Basra, in addi-
tion to the members of the Freedom and Concord Party, joined
it. 32 The location of Basra, the fact that it was a commercial
centre, its expansion in the growing of dates for the foreign market
and the hegemony of the wealthy families in the town apparently
rendered it amenable to the reform movement. 33
It should be noted that the Basran reform programme stipulated
that the Ottoman Empire was 'an Islamic state under the authority
of the Caliph of the Muslims, the Supreme Sultan, and is not an
empire' (Article 3), in this way asserting the principle of equality
and rejecting the perspective of the Unionists. The programme
aimed to oppose foreign penetration and so provided that 'no con-
cessions will be awarded to foreigners in our land' and called for
'protecting it from foreign intrigues and blocking foreign influence
in it by any means possible' (Article 4).
This programme adopted a stronger position on decentralisa-
tion than that of the Beirut reform programme, for it gave the
General Council broad jurisdiction in decision-making apropos of
provincial affairs. The Council would have the power to promulgate
internal regulations, establish corporations for trade, industry,
agriculture and all other development enterprises, fix the wages of
civil servants, request the removal of the governor and supervise
economic affairs and education in the province (Article 7). The
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The Arab Movement
Council would be independent in all of its functions and have

authority over the governor and all other officials (Article 9). The
governor would be appointed from the capital, on condition that
he be an Iraqi, and the governor would in turn appoint heads of
departments in consultation with the General Council. Appoint-
ment at both of these levels would be conditional upon having a
perfect command of Arabic. As for other civil servants and judges,
these would be selected from the inhabitants of the province by
examination and with the approval of the General Council or its
committee (Article 14).
The programme stipulated that 'officers who know Arabic should
serve within their province' (Article 24), and that 'in peacetime
troops in the regular army should serve within their province', with
the government retaining the right to send them wherever it wished
in time of war (Article 23). The programme insists that Arabic be
the official language in all of the departments within the province
(Article 19), and that all the arts and sciences in the schools of the
province be studied in Arabic, while still paying due attention to
Turkish (Article 25). It also seeks to encourage agriculture,
exempting those engaged in agriculture from military service for
twenty years (Article 26). 34
In this programme one can perceive a clear Arab-Islamic perspec-
tive, an expansion of the principle of decentralisation, and a rejec-
tion of foreign influence and concessions (this last feature arising
from fear of the penetration of British influence in the province).
Its perspective is clearer than the Beirut programme as an expres-
sion of the nationalist viewpoint in the reform movement. Further-
more, like that of Beirut, the Basra programme pays attention to
aspects of economic activity in trade and agriculture and serves
notice of elite-group ambitions for a larger role in these fields.
Although there was as yet no middle class in the economic sense
of the term, there were preliminary indications that one was in the
first stages of development.
From the writings and programmes of the reformers, it is thus
clear that the nationalist movement favoured decentralisation,
including an expanded range of autonomous administration while
still preserving the Ottoman framework. The newspaper Al-Mufid
summed up this position with obvious ingenuity in its editorial of
9 May 1913. Here it advises the reader that the reform movement
is based on two fundamental premises. The first is the preserva-
tion of the surviving remnants of the Ottoman domains and the
protection of Ottoman independence. The second, which is the
287
The Arab Movement
most important factor upholding the first, is respect for the rights
of the Ottoman peoples and involving them in the administration
of the affairs of their provinces. 35
T h e First Arab Congress
The Arab movement manifested itself in the activities of individuals

and societies, both publicly and in secret. But the persistence of
the Unionists in centralisation and Turkification, and the expan-
sion of the Arab movement, led to an effort to gather together some
of its proponents in a conference convened outside the Ottoman
realm. Hence, the First Arab Congress met in Paris on 18-23 June
1913. 36 The organisational details are not of concern to us here,
and it will suffice for us to draw attention to the views and perspec-
tives that found expression in this conference.
It may be noted, first of all, that the idea of convening such a
conference and the lines along which it was organised emanated
from the Young Arab Society, which wanted the gathering to pro-
duce some sort of collective Arab action and to facilitate the realisa-
tion of its own goals.37 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi, a member of the
Young Arabs, wrote to Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, 'Our society is
the group that is organising the Congress, without informing any
of the delegates of this fact . . . We are arranging and directing
the Congress in accordance with the decisions made in our
meetings.' 38 The conference committee was organised in March
1913 at the initiative of Young Arab members assigned to the task
by the Society. This committee then contacted the Administrative
Decentralisation Party in Egypt in order to unite their efforts in
both practical and theoretical terms, and also in order to ask the
latter to send a delegate to chair the Congress. The committee also
contacted the Beirut Reform Society to seek its participation.
Care was taken to give Muslims and Christians equal represen-
tation on the conference committee. And although the organisers
of the Congress were Syrians, as also were most of the Congress
delegates (whether residents in the Syrian provinces or emigrants
from Syria), due to the prevailing circumstances, the invitation to
attend was issued in the name of the Arab emigrant community
in Paris and directed to 'the sons of the Arab nation'. In the view
of the organisers, the Congress should personify the Arab nation,
spread throughout the world. 39 In reality, however, it was limited
to Arabs in the Ottoman Empire (in addition to the emigrants),
288
The Arab Movement
which is understandable in light of its goals. It may also be noted

that the participants in the Congress were notables, merchants, press
figures and students, which is of significance with respect to the
scope of the Arab movement. 40
The motives and objectives behind the calling of the conference
are analogous to factors we have already seen at work in the reform
movement. Here they find expression in concern at the weakness
of the empire, and in the fear of European ambitions, as manifested
in debates in European newspapers, statements made by certain
politicians at public gatherings and a stream of international com-
munications on the topic of the Arab lands. These circumstances
were the result of the evil effects of centralised administration, and
now call for a convocation and a study of the steps necessary to
preserve the homeland from injury by foreigners, to deliver it from
the spectre of domination and despotism and to reform internal
affairs on the basis of decentralisation. Through such measures the
Arabs will become strong, the danger of dissolution and disintegra-
tion will vanish and despotism will disappear. It has therefore been
resolved to convene a conference personifying the Arab nation and
confirming 'the social and political solidarity of this nation'. This
Congress marks the point where the action of societies and indi-
viduals will be transformed into collective Arab action, and herein
lies the importance of the First Arab Congress. 41 From another
point of view, the Congress sought to demonstrate to the Europeans,
on the one hand, that the Arabs are 'a cohesive nation possessed
of a dynamic essence . . . august standing . . . and national
qualities that can never be taken away from them\ It also sought
to make it clear to the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, that
decentralisation is the fundamental basis for the well-being and
national awakening of the Arabs, 'and that the Arabs are partners
in this Empire, partners in the army, partners in the administra-
tion and partners in government'. 42
It is thus clear that the idea behind the Congress was to combine
the power of the reformist groups and to unite their efforts within
a collective framework that would better enable them to confront
the Unionists. The fundamental issues were rejection of centralisa-
tion, domination and (Unionist) despotism, reform on the basis of
decentralisation, and the insistence that the Arabs are partners in
the Empire. It can also be seen that the idea of making the Euro-
pean states understand that there did exist an Arab nation, an Arab
movement and Arab demands was in the minds of the Congress
organisers. In a statement before the Congress, al-Zahrawi
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The Arab Movement
expressed the view that one of its goals was 'to make our demands
heard and our opinion understood by Europe'. He also considered
that 'the presence of the Arab delegates in Paris will serve as a means
for dispelling illusions and great misunderstanding and will enable
us to lay the foundations for understanding between East and
West'. 4 3
From the statements and discussions, it seems that there was
disparity in the views expressed by the delegates, especially where
their attitude towards Europe was concerned. 44 Although they
admired Europe's learning and progress and its forms of govern-
ment, there were those who were suspicious of the attitude of the
European states, warned of their ambitions and considered that the
Congress should look into this matter, 45 while others did not hold
this view but rather hoped for support from the European powers,
especially France. 46 And the discussions were not free of mis-
givings on the question of European advisers in the administra-
tion. 47 This tension arose from the disparity in the perspectives of
the conferees, and was so serious that the subject was excluded from
the discussions in the Congress. It should be noted that the par-
ticipants ranged from nationalists to particularists, all drawn
together by the call for decentralisation and reform, although in
reality they disagreed as to whether or not these changes should
be sought within an Ottoman framework.
The speeches and deliberations of the Congress revolved around
the issues of Arab rights in the Empire, nationally oriented activity
in the Arab Ottoman provinces and reform on the basis of decen-
tralisation. The subjects of emigration from and immigration to
Syria, as well as Arab political education, were also raised, but by
extension from the topics just mentioned above. If the views
expressed in the Congress are compared to the writings of the Arab
thinkers in that period, we find nothing new in the former. Never-
theless, the importance of the Congress and the wide-ranging
reverberations from it are both subjects to which reference must
be made.
It should be noted that most of the speeches and discussions
tended to emphasise that the Arabs comprise a distinct nation with
its own rights, to assert the unity of Muslims and Christians within
the framework of the nation (or homeland) and to advocate reform
through decentralisation. Al-'UraysI spoke of the nation as a com-
munal or social entity drawn together by unity of language, unity
of ethnic origin, unity of history, unity of customs and unity of
political aspiration, in this way combining the views of German,
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The Arab Movement
Italian and French political scientists. The nationalism of the latter

countries arose in differing circumstances, to which the concepts
of their thinkers were linked. But al-'Uraysi, examining them after
his study and residence in Paris, was able to combine all these con-
cepts in a simple fashion. Considering them to be eminently
applicable to the Arabs, he concluded that according to the view
of all political scientists, the Arabs have the rights due a society
(jamd'a), people (sha'b) or nation (umma)^8 the first of these rights
being 'the right to a feeling of nationhood', or nationalism.
Elaborating on this point, he says, 'Before any other political
persuasion (i.e. before Ottomanism), we are Arabs, having pre-
served our special characteristics, qualities and sense of identity for
many centuries', this despite being subjected to efforts by the
government in Istanbul to obliterate their identity through such
means 'as political absorption, colonialist exploitation and ethnic
disintegration'. The reference to Turkification is encountered
elsewhere, but the description of Unionist tactics as 'colonialist
exploitation' (taskhir isti'mdri) is quite striking. 49 All these efforts,
he then declares, have led to nothing but a fervent desire 'for the
status worthy of a nation and for the revival of this noble and exalted
feeling, that of nationhood'. He has therefore resolved to oppose
everything that serves to weaken this nationalism and to devote
himself to everything that will lend vitality to Arab characteristics
and qualities. 50
Al-Zahrawi declares that the Arabs are an important subject
nationality distinguished by their unity of language, customs,
interests and disposition. This makes the Arabs a national entity
(qawmiya) with its own rights and its own particular demands. From
another viewpoint, al-ZahrawI explicitly states that the Congress
has no religious character to it, hence its numbers of Muslim and
Christian delegates are equal. Indeed, he repeatedly expresses his
view that the bond of religion has never been able to produce
political unity, and that for this reason he emphasises the nationalist
point of view.51
Nadra Mutran referred back to the historical record to account
for Syrian Arabism. He stresses the solidarity between Muslim and
Christian Arabs, and thus declares that since the conquest the bond
of national feeling between them has taken precedence over that
of religion. This national bond is an enduring one, and the events
of 1860 only occurred through the intrigues of 'All Pasha to strike
at the Christians and Muslims and impose centralised rule. He goes
on to declare that the Arabs are agreed in the views they express,
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The Arab Movement
despite the difference in their religious affiliations. He boasts that

the Arab nation, Muslim and non-Muslim, is united and bound
together in its interests, and that there has never been a nation more
profoundly moved by factors of national feeling than the Arab
nation. 52
The key issue of the Congress was reform through decentralisa-
tion. Al-Zahrawi makes it clear that the conferees were demanding
that the Arabs be involved in the public administration, and that
they would study how reform could be implemented on the basis
of decentralisation.53 In his speech entitled 'Our Political Educa-
tion' {Tarbiyatuna al-siyasiyd), he indicates the necessity of the nation's
supervision of the government, in default of which oppression and
impotence come to prevail. He rejects the Turkish domination of
politics to the exclusion of all others, and considers that both Arabs
and Turks should be involved in government and that this idea
should be the fundamental basis for political education. He also
regards decentralisation as the best way to bring about such col-
laboration outside the capital.54
'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi elaborated on the points summarised
by al-Zahrawi. He demanded that the Arabs be represented in the
Chamber of Notables in accordance with their population, that free
elections be held so that Arabs would be genuinely and accurately
represented in the Chamber of Deputies, that the Arabs be given
their rightful role in each ministry, thereby fulfilling their right to
participate in the governing of the Empire, and that they be actively
involved in administrative affairs. In addition, he demanded a con-
stitutional amendment making Arabic an official language in the
Arab provinces. Al-'UraysI summarised the rights of the Arabs in
the Empire by saying that they were partners within it: partners
in executive power, partners in legislative power and partners in
public administrative affairs. 'As for the internal affairs of our
provinces, we are our own partners in the educational revenues,
the public works revenues and the waqf revenues, and in the freedom
of assembly and of the press; this can only be achieved by expand-
ing the jurisdiction of the General Council.' 55
Iskandar 'Ammun spoke of reform on the basis of decentralisa-
tion. He considered that centralisation was the cause of the
backwardness of the provinces. The Ottoman nation was made up
of subject nationalities of divergent origins, languages, histories,
dispositions, needs and customs, and each group understood its own
special needs. Hence, it was impossible for one nationality to govern
them all well, and incorrect to apply a single legal code to them.
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The Arab Movement
Similarly, he considered centralisation to be incompatible with con-

stitutional government, which requires that the governing body
should derive its mandate to rule from the nation, not that one group
should claim a monopoly on sovereign power. He therefore calls
for the replacement of the existing ruling order by another that is
compatible with the needs of all of the subject nationalities, 'one
according to which the people of the province would have the last
word in managing its internal affairs, while the totality of the
Ottoman nation would have sovereign representative authority,
based on genuine proportionality, to manage general affairs'. He
then makes an appeal for an Ottoman government in which all
Ottomans would enjoy equal rights and responsibilities. 56
The resolutions passed by the Congress set forth a summary of
these views. They stressed that rapidly implemented reform was
essential and insisted that the Arabs be guaranteed the enjoyment
of their political rights through effective involvement in the central
administration of the Empire. They called for the establishment in
every Arab province of a decentralised administration that would
supervise the needs of that province, and advocated that the Arabic
language be recognised in the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies and
be an official language in the Arab provinces. Added to these points
was the generally expressed demand that military service should
be performed locally in the Arab provinces, except in circumstances
and situations calling for the most exceptional response.
Appended to the above was a resolution to the effect that the
resolutions of the Congress comprised a political programme for
the Ottoman Arabs, and that no candidate for election to a
legislative post could expect support unless he first pledged himself
to accept the resolutions of the Congress. 57 These resolutions did,
in fact, cover all of the reformers' demands.
Speakers in the Congress repeatedly stressed their devotion to
the bond of Ottomanism and their fervent desire to maintain the
integrity of the Empire, and emphasised that in the national
awakening of the Arabs lay a source of strength for the Empire.
Nevertheless, the speeches of the conferees were not free from hints
of other possibilities. Al-Zahrawl, for example, clearly stated that
if the government failed to pay heed to the demands for reform,
'our attitude towards it would then completely change'. 58 In his
speech, 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Urays! says that the issue of secession
will not arise so long as the rights of the Arabs are respected and
maintained, and adds, 'The extent to which we attach ourselves
to this Empire will fluctuate according to how well these rights are
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The Arab Movement
guaranteed: the greater the one, the greater the other; the lesser
the one, the lesser the other.' 59 This statement of his may seem to
be ahead of his time, but it is probably indicative of what was going
on in the minds of the Young Arabs.
From decentralisation to independence
The view that the trend towards administrative decentralisation was

a general perspective in the Arab movement, in both its public and
its secret halves, is corroborated by the placards of one of the secret
societies, the Young Arabs, under the name 'The Three Outcries'
(Al-Sarkhdt al-thaldth).60 It seems that the first of these was issued
after the Italian attack on Tripoli, and the third after the First Arab
Congress and the collapse of negotiations with the Turks.
The details of the contacts between the Unionists and the men
of the Congress do not concern us here. Generally speaking, Midhat
Shukri, Secretary of the C U P , was sent to Paris and agreement
was reached on some of the reforms. 61 But the Unionists tried to
split the reform movement by appointing some of the reformers to
official posts, and then reneged on implementation of the agree-
ment. All this widened the chasm between them and the Arab
movement, added to the nationalists' suspicions of the Unionists'
intentions and caused them to consider other possibilities. As one
might expect, the Outcries were more outspoken in their concept of
decentralisation and closer to the idea of autonomy.
The First Outcry, directed to 'those in authority in the capital',
emphasises how disposed the Arabs were to pride and dignity and
proclaims that they are prepared, as a united whole, to overlook
the injury the realm has suffered at the hands of those in authority
(the Turks), and to come to terms with them. It recalls that the
Arabs have established their presence in the Ottoman League by
struggling against a great European state (probably Italy) for fifteen
months, 'hence, we are entitled to demand that you grant us
whatever is necessary for the exercise of our rights, and to share
equally with you in governing those of the Empire's affairs that
specifically pertain to us'. The placard therefore calls for Arab
representation, especially in the Chamber of Notables, proportional
to Arab population and for new governments that are Ottoman
rather than Turkish.
Such were its observations on the general policy of the Empire.
Where domestic policy was concerned, the First Outcry notes that
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The Arab Movement
centralisation in the governing of peoples that differ in language

and natural disposition leads to the ruin of all. It calls for following
the example set by the Great Powers; the general administration
should be separated from the local, with each group directing its
own affairs, thereby generating insuperable material strength and
an interminable spirit of enthusiasm. As the placard views the
matter, the Arabs have opened their eyes to the meaning of life and
so demand that the Empire be governed in the same way as the
civilised states made up of different subject nationalities. It pro-
poses the formation of a central government (with two Chambers)
consisting of the Grand Vizierate (al-saddra), the office ofShaykh-
iilTslam (al-mashyakhd), and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War,
Justice, Finance, the Post, Commerce, Railways and Customs.
Other ministries would be decentralised: the Empire would be
divided into three regions — the Turkish, Arab and Armenian pro-
vinces — and each region (or subject nationality) would have its
own sub-government. The head of this government would be
appointed by the caliph from the inhabitants of the region, and the
government itself would consist of Ministries of Internal Affairs,
Education, Pious Foundations, Public Works, Agriculture, Police
and Public Relief, and a Chamber of Deputies elected by the people
and responsible for passing legislation pertaining to their affairs.
In short, 'All that pertains to the whole of the nation will be referred
to the Supreme Government, and all that comprises the specific
concerns of each region will be referred exclusively to the govern-
ment of that region.'
The First Outcry thus called for 'administrative autonomy' (al-
istiqldl al-idari), or a federal form of government, justifying its posi-
tion by declaring, 'Every nation has the right to pursue its well-
being by any means available, even if it means sacrificing two-thirds
of its people in order to protect the lives of the others'. The placard
makes reference to the strength of the Arabs and to 'the beautiful
bond among the Arab lands' that holds them together. It thus goes
further than the writings and publicly stated demands in its advocacy
for a kind of autonomy for the Arabs.
The Second Outcry was directed 'to the sons of the Arabs
everywhere'. 62 It seems to have appeared after the promulgation
of the Law on Provinces (1913), which was rejected by the reform
movement, but prior to the First Arab Congress; it is as if it were
preparing the way for the Congress. It argues in a fervently nation-
alist tone, strongly criticises the prevailing state of affairs and warns
against its continuation. It 'implores God to protect the Arabs
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The Arab Movement
from becoming grovelling slaves who, like the lowly and the weak,
acquiesce in being wronged', and issues a dire warning of the
mounting danger in the prevailing state of domestic oppression and
foreign peril: 'your revenues are being stolen, your language
annihilated and your lives taken, yet you cringe in degraded sub-
mission . . . as foreign horrors pour down upon you\ It summons
them to action, for they must choose to live either in a state of servile
misery tantamount to death, or in a state of pride that will place
them in the ranks of the nations. The glorious life demands of the
outstanding nation that it possess a sense of identity if it is to have
a sense of nationhood. The Second Outcry therefore makes an appeal
to all, that 'every Arab should stand tall — however humble his
standing may be — to protect his bond with the others, and bend
down — however august his station may be — in support of his
feeling of nationhood. How noble indeed is he whose every particle
quivers in response to calamities afflicting his nation.'
All this notwithstanding, the placard supports Ottomanism and
emphasises devotion to the Ottoman Empire. However, it justifies
its appeal by explaining that having seen the feeble performance
of the Empire in the battle for Tripoli and its dismal failure in the
Balkans, the Arabs in the Arabian regions realised that it had
become incapable of repulsing the attacks of its enemies. They were
thus compelled to advise the Empire 'that they rely on none but
themselves to ensure their survival', and hence it was necessary to
call for decentralisation.
The placard then calls out to the 'sons of Arabia' to add their
voices to those of the supporters of the reform movement in Syria.
This movement realises that religion is of God, it declares, but
religious convictions were being used by the capital as devices for
tearing Arab unity asunder. 'They therefore have agreed that
differences in confessional affiliations should not provoke differences
in sentiments for the homeland.' Members of all religions are to
be found in this movement within a nationalist framework. 'The
sense of nationhood brought them into being as a people before there
were any religions . . . They must therefore continue to press all
of their patriotic demands, protected by the heights of tolerance,
in the service of this Arab league.'
The 'movement of the Syrians', the document then declares, is
not enough by itself to protect the Arab lands, hence the call for
decentralisation. After expounding on the patterns of decentralisa-
tion in Germany and the United States and making reference to
such other decentralised countries as Switzerland and Austria-
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The Arab Movement
Hungary, it calls for decentralisation along the lines described in

the First Outcry. It accordingly rejects granting governors greater
jurisdiction, as this would lead to a situation worse than the present
one, and calls on the Arabs to consolidate their strength and to
reform the administration by themselves. The Second Outcry ends
on a clear note of warning: 'The Arabs will not forsake the Turks
so long as the latter treat them with justice; but if their faces are
soiled with dishonour and they reply with fine frills, then for every
situation there is an appropriate course of action, and no blame
can fall on the one who has given his warning.' It is worth noting
that many of the views and phrases found in this document and
in the one that preceded it are also found in the articles oiAl-Mufid
and in the speech of al-'Uraysi at the First Arab Congress.
The Third Outcry is directed to 'the sons of the nation'. 63 It
seems to have appeared following the First Arab Congress and after
the breakdown of the negotiations with the Unionists. It senses that
there is only faint hope for reform, bitterly attacks the ruling
authorities and hints at secession.
The document begins by exposing the perfidy of the rulers who
betrayed the reform movement. Some trusted them when they
announced their desire for reform, but all the rulers wanted was
to throw the ashes of deception in their eyes. Presuming that the
Arab national awakening was based on individuals, the rulers
entrusted them with official positions in the hope that this would
smother the movement. But the national awakening is deeply
engrained in the souls and entire being of the nation, not just in
specific individuals, and its strength is that of the nation, which
will never allow itself to be duped as the leaders were. It then attacks
the Empire (which it calls the 'Turkish Empire') for being in every
respect — land, economy and domestic and foreign affairs — so
dominated by Europe that it is 'an empire only in name, a bogus
facade that controls nothing even of itself. It goes on to say that
the regions that have seceded from the Empire (such as Greece,
Montenegro, Rumania and Serbia) have achieved their own
national awakening and have become more advanced than the
Turks. The condition of any province that has seceded has invari-
ably improved; since the Turks are the source of the misery, the
reverse also holds true, as is demonstrated by the condition of the
Arab lands, which were more advanced than the Balkan nations
when they began to call for their rights.
The Third Outcry goes on to state the new attitude of its authors.
It declares that they had been sincere in their demand for reform,
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The Arab Movement
but gained nothing: the outcome was patent treachery. Hence, they
proclaim to the Arabs that * their movement' will never come to
a stop, despite the intrigues of politicians. Indeed, it will advance
forcefully in confrontation of the Empire, * until the banner of the
Arabs waves over the inhabitants of the country'. 64 In the Third
Outcry there thus appears a more emphatic perspective on an Arab
political entity, although it stops short of calling for secession. In
the last sentence of the document mention is made of the colours
of the Arab banner, which are the colours adopted by the Young
Arabs. 65
The significance of the Three Outcries becomes clear in light of
the prevailing circumstances, especially after the convening of the
First Arab Congress. The pledges made immediately after the
Revolution of 1908, promising equality among all Ottoman sub-
jects without religious or ethnic discrimination, were not realised.
The goal of the C U P was to protect the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire from fragmentation and to strengthen it internally, and it
probably felt that this could be achieved by granting general political
freedoms (in accordance with the principles of the French Revolu-
tion) and through centralisation. In this period of emergent
nationalisms the other peoples may have welcomed the general
freedoms, but in centralisation they saw a vehicle for domination
by the centre (that is, by the Turks) and a factor weakening their
national character. The C U P , however, adopted a nationalist atti-
tude, encouraged the pan-Turanian movement and saw in Turkifi-
cation, along with centralisation, the means to achieve its goals.
In its view, Ottomanism came to be tantamount to Turkification. 66
In this attitude the Unionists did not distinguish between the Balkan
peoples and the Arabs. The former were inclined towards secession;
but the Arabs considered that in the face of the Western menace
there was a connection between their fate and that of the Turks,
and this is in addition to the bond of Islam between the two peoples,
as well as the fact that Arabic was the language of the Qur'an and
of the sacred law of Islam. When the Unionists tried, in particular
after the secession of the Balkan peoples, to turn to Islam as a bond,
this produced nothing but suspicions of their motives among Arab
Muslims, for the attitudes and previous actions of the C U P leaders
were incompatible with the Islamic perspective. 67
All this explains the steadily widening gap between the Arab
movement and the Unionists in particular, and similarly, the
Unionist espousal of pan-Turanianism was a factor in promoting
the nationalist perspective among the Arabs. For their part, the
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The Arab Movement
Unionists were suspicious of the Arab movement and saw in the

call for reform the prelude to secession. Hence, they did not take
the reformers seriously when they stressed their commitment to the
Ottoman framework.
As was to be expected, the CUP tried to prevent the convening
of the Arab Congress in Paris, or to throw it into confusion. When
it failed in this effort, it tried to reach some sort of mutual under-
standing with the conferees by sending CUP Secretary Midhat
Shukri to Paris. The details do not concern us here and it will suffice
for us to indicate that in mid-July the Unionists and the members
of the Congress arrived at a tentative agreement that gave a
favourable reception to the Arab demands. But the Unionists tried
to circumvent the agreement and weaken its provisions, and also
attempted to stir up criticism against the conferees, while at the
same time they began to appoint some of the Congress members
to official positions in accordance with one of the articles of the agree-
ment. Such actions raised differences of opinion among the pro-
ponents of reform over the nature of Arab-Turkish relations and
confirmed suspicions of Unionist intentions (as is apparent from
the Third Outcry).
Such thinking also finds expression in a declaration by the Decen-
tralisation Party on 9 October 1913. In this statement attention is
drawn to the Unionists' failure to fulfil their promises, and the ap-
pointment of al-Zahrawi to membership in the Chamber of Notables
is regarded as an attempt to split the ranks of the reformers. It
maintains that the Arab nation has suffered many blows of hard-
ship and calamity caused by the maladministration produced by
authoritarian rule. It had acquiesced in this oppression for the sake
of preserving the bond of Ottomanism and guarding against dissen-
sion, since such discord would lead to the destruction and parti-
tion of the Empire among the colonialist powers greedy for a piece
of it. But patience has its limits, and the way to guarantee the
survival of the Empire is to involve its people in the administra-
tion. After reviewing the failure of the Turks to implement the
agreement, the proclamation asserts that the way to achieve the
advancement of the nation and maintain its security is for them
to have the right to supervise the resources of their provinces, the
right to share in the direction of its interests and the right of educa-
tion in their own language. These goals can only be attained through
decentralised administration, and hence it has been agreed that an
effort should be made to achieve this by all possible means. On the
one hand, decentralised administration will guarantee autonomy
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The Arab Movement
to the Arabs, and on the other, preserve the political ties with the
Ottoman Empire. The proclamation therefore calls upon all the
Arabs, both societies and individuals, to unite in pursuit of this goal.
Were the Arab nation to gain satisfaction of its demands, it would
be devoted in its loyalty to the Empire; 'and if not, it will do all
that is within its power to attain its rights to reinvigorate its language
and way of life, to revive its land and to restore its enjoyment of
the blessings of its resources'. The proclamation ends with a clear
note of warning when it says, 'The man who seeks to live a natural
honourable life is not to be blamed; and when he strives for it . . .
he will attain it, peacefully or otherwise. When a nation sets its mind
on something, it does it; when it sets out towards a goal, it attains
it. Such is God's way with all nations.' 6 8
But the reaction through secret activity did not stop at this point.
A placard attributed to the Revolutionary Society (Al-Jam(iya al-
thawriya)69 addressed itself to the scions of Qahtan and the descen-
dants of 'Adnan (i.e. all the Arabs) and appealed to them to rise
and act, violently excoriating Unionist policy. It implores the Arabs,
'Are you sleeping?' Thanks to the Unionist tyrants, it first points
out, their land has been sold to the foreigners, their amenities (i.e.
their natural resources) have passed into the hands of England,
France and Germany, and they strive and toil so that the West can
loot the fruits of their exertions and leave them to starve to death.
The placard then cries out to the Arabs, 'For how much longer
will you fail to comprehend that you have become playthings in
the hands of those who possess no religion other than their devo-
tion to killing the Arabs and plundering their wealth? The country
is yours, and they say that it is ruled by the nation; but those who
bestow favours on you in the name of the Constitution do not con-
sider you part of the nation, but rather torment you with all sorts
of oppression and persecution.' The placard paints a dismal picture
of the Unionist attitude towards the Arabs. 'In their view you are
like a herd of livestock: they shear its wool, drink its milk and eat
its meat. And in their view your country is like a colonised estate
handed down to them by their forefathers, and its inhabitants their
grovelling slaves.' The Unionists have even conscripted the Arab
youth to kill their brothers — once in Yemen, once at al-Karak
and another time in the Hawran — which proves what their goals
are. And so also they now conscript armies 'to kill you, to kill your
freedom and to eradicate your noble feeling of Arab nationhood'.
The placard asks, 'For how much longer will you remain silent about
these outrages, as you watch your people being exterminated?'
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The Arab Movement
The placard warns the people of Yemen, 'Asir, Najd and Iraq
of the deceitful cunning of their enemies (i.e. the Turks), but it calls
upon the people of the Syrian and Iraqi provinces to act together
in harmony in the name of nationalism and patriotism, 70 saying,
'May the Muslims, Christians and Jews among you become a single
hand in acting in the interest of the nation and the country/ It
justifies this on the basis of the unity of language and land: 'You
inhabit one land and you speak one language, so also be one nation
and one hand.'
The placard goes to great lengths in warning against the incite-
ment of sectarian discord, and emphasises unity and solidarity.
Addressing the Muslim Arabs, it tells them that they would be
making a grave mistake 'if you suppose that this oppressive
tyrannical government is Islamic'. Any oppressive government is
an enemy and opponent of Islam, so what is one to conclude if it
reduces Islam to ruins, declares lawful the shedding of Muslim blood
and tries to suffocate the language of Islam in the name of the
government and caliphate of Islam? It adds, 'Is it not known to
all that they seek to suffocate the Arabic language? . . . Were the
Arabic language to perish, how would the Qur'an and sunna survive?
And were God's Book and the sunna to become unknown, what
would remain of Islam?' It also addresses the non-Muslim Arabs,
warning them against the allegations of those who say that the Arab
Muslims are fanatics and that the irreligious Turks are better.
The Arab Muslims are their brothers in patriotism, it reminds
them; calling upon them to act together in harmony as the sons
of their homeland and race, it points out that 'it would be difficult
for you to come to any understanding with the hooligans who, at
the same time, are both your enemies and the enemies of the Muslim
Arabs'.
Finally, the placard proclaims the establishment of a comman-
do society to kill anyone who fights against the Arabs and opposes
Arab reform. This announcement may be just so many words, but
the important point is the shift in the concept of Arab reform. This
is no longer based on the principle of decentralisation, which the
placard rejects and regards as the goal of 'the lackeys of the slave
boys of Istanbul', but rather 'on the principle of complete inde-
pendence and the founding of a decentralised Arab state that will
restore our former glory and rule the country through every district's
management of its own particular affairs'. 71
The placard seems to have appeared after the breakdown of the
negotiations with the Unionists and the frustration that accom-
301
The Arab Movement
panied it. It therefore stresses Turkish oppression, their abandon-

ment of rich Arab resources to the foreigners, their denial of Arab
rights and their contempt for Arabs, and their anti-Arab measures
and their attempt to divide Arab ranks by inciting discord. It regards
the Turks (i.e. the Unionists) as the enemies of the Arabs and con-
siders that there is no way to arrive at a mutual understanding with
such hooligan enemies. As they are furthermore the enemies of
Islam, the Islamic bond is henceforth devoid of meaning. Thus,
the Arabs must unite within the framework of nationalism and on
the basis of patriotism, and confront the Turks. There is no longer
any room for discussion of reform based on decentralisation; rather,
it must be based on independence and the establishment of an Arab
state adhering to the pattern of administrative decentralisation.
This placard was probably the first proclamation regarding the
Unionists as the enemies of Islam, and may have been the first
explicit call for Arab independence. But it offered nothing new by
way of ideas and was itself simply an expression of the tendency
of some in the Arab movement to favour independence. The Arab
movement had expanded, especially in the call for decentralisation,
but the position of the Unionists on centralisation and Turkifica-
tion underwent no change worth mentioning. This probably
strengthened the Arab movement's covert branch, which was con-
centrated in the Young Arab Society and the Covenant Society.
T h e Arab national a w a k e n i n g
Turkey's entry into the First World War on the side of Germany
confronted the Arab movement with new dangers. If the Russo-
Turkish War early in the last quarter of the nineteenth century had
given the Syrians cause to ponder the fate of the country at that
time, then it was natural that the Arabs should reflect on the fate
of the lands of the Arab East when confronted by the perils that
were now expected. 72 Turkey's decision was a factor of funda-
mental importance in promoting the trend favouring independence,
as was evident in the thinking of the Young Arabs and the Cove-
nant Society. The policy of terrorism, and then the executions
carried out by Jemal Pasha in Syria, served to consolidate this
perspective and prompted the Young Arabs and the men of the Arab
movement in Syria to contact Sharif Husayn in order to launch
an Arab independence movement. 73
We need not take up here the sequence of events in the Arab
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Revolt or devote our attention to any Arab agitation at that time;

our primary concern is to take note of Arab nationalist thought in
this period. It can be said that the thought that emerged during
the period of the Arab Revolt, or the Arab National Awakening
(al-nahda al-'arabiya), as it was called, represented a coalescence of
the Arab nationalist attitude in the lands of the Fertile Crescent,
especially the views of the Young Arab and Covenant Societies,
with the viewpoint of the shartfs, in particular, Sharif Husayn in
the Hijaz.
There were several important factors behind the movement of
Sharif Husayn. The Turks insisted on extending the Hijaz Railway
from Medina to Mecca, which affected the interests of the Arab
tribes that carried goods and offered other services along the
Medina-Mecca route. The Unionists also tended to violate the
traditional conventions of the Amirate of Mecca and to impinge
upon its special position. Furthermore, the CUP sought to apply
their policy of centralisation, as well as the trend towards Turkifica-
tion that accompanied this policy, to the Amirate of Mecca. Finally,
the outbreak of the World War served to aggravate the unrest and
provoke apprehensions about what the future would bring. 74 It was
against this background that the secret societies contacted Sharif
Husayn and called upon him to launch a rebellion. The latter's call
to arms was thus an appeal to the Arabs in general. 75
The dominant perspective during the Arab Revolt was an Arab-
Islamic one: Arabism was drawn into close association with Islam,
and it was argued that to take action for the national awakening
and independence of the Arabs was to serve Islam. A review of the
placards issued by Sharif Husayn and the articles published in the
newspaper Al-Qibla may give us a picture of the thinking and views
that accompanied the launching of the Arab Revolt. 76
Sharif Husayn issued the first proclamation of the Revolt on 26
June 1916, and in it announced his secession from the Unionists
and the independence of the country. A revised version of the pro-
clamation was then published in Egypt late in August 1916.77 The
emphasis in the modified version is evidently on the Islamic perspec-
tive, while the original version bears many references to the Arabs
and Arabism (al-'arabiya).7S The modified version of the proclam-
ation, in which an Islamic tone prevails, begins by pointing out
that the amirs of Mecca had been the first Muslim rulers to recognise
the Ottoman Empire, in the hope that they would unite the
Muslims. The Meccan amirs had taken this step because the
Ottoman sultans adhered to the Qur'an and sunna and ruled
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The Arab Movement
according to the sacred law of Islam, this being in line with the
elaboration of Sunni theory on rulership after the rise of the
Sultanate. Then the CUP seized power and turned away from the
faith and the true path of the sacred law: they deprived the Sultan
of the right to promulgate measures according to Islamic law,
violated the provisions of the caliphate and transgressed the sacred
law by breaking its rules in such matters as inheritance, fasting,
prayer and the confession of faith. In addition, they have squandered
the revenues of the Empire and through their negligence have lost
parts of the realm, and now they have brought it to the brink of
destruction by pushing it into a war that has led to starvation among
the people of the Holy Land. They have also desecrated the Ka'ba.
And in addition to spreading oppression, they have hanged 21 of
the most outstanding Muslims, exiled innocent families and con-
fiscated their property. Hence, it is impossible that 'we should
abandon our Arab and national entity for use as a plaything in the
hands of the Unionists'. God has prepared the way for the national
awakening of the Arab lands, so as to gain their complete
independence. The goal of this awakening is to promote the faith
of Islam and to raise the standing of the Muslims; its actions will
be based on the sacred law, and it stands ready to accept all that
conforms to the sources from which this law derives, and all aspects
of the arts of modern progress that are in harmony with its religious
sensitivities.
The original text for the programme, however, reflects a clearly
Arab perspective. It charges that the Unionists 'have torn the unity
of the Ottoman nation asunder by attempting to make all of its
peoples Turkish through recourse to brute force', in this way criticis-
ing the policy of Turkification that has estranged the other peoples
from the Turks. It attacks the Unionists, who 'have made a special
point of persecuting the Arabs and suppressing their language'. 79
This was 'the most heinous outrage they have committed against
both the faith and the state. They have tried to kill the Arabic
language in all of the Ottoman provinces by banishing it from the
schools and forbidding its use in government offices and the courts,
and on this issue they have expressed many views that have met
with strong objections from the Arab deputies in the Parliament.'
The proclamation then goes on to present this as a renunciation
of Islam itself, saying, 'As everyone knows, to kill the Arabic
language would be to kill Islam itself, for Islam is in truth an Arab
religion, not in the sense that it is particular to the Arabs but rather
in the sense that the Qur'an was revealed in the Arabic language,
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The Arab Movement
which was thus made the medium through which the pious Muslim
recites, ponders upon and understands his scripture. As God said
in Surat al-Ra'd: In such manner have we revealed it as an Arab
code {hukman 'arabiyan).'80
The proclamation states that after the declaration of war, the
Unionists found in the proclamation of martial law an opportunity
enabling them 'to achieve everything they wanted with respect to
the Arabs. So they began to kill and hang some of the greatest and
most eminent men of the Arab national awakening, masters of
education and thought, men of the pen and capable army officers,
all renowned for their vigilant concern for the nation and the
Empire.' The proclamation then draws attention to the Unionists'
most recent announcement that they had hanged 21 men in Syria
(the martyrs of the gallows of Jemal Pasha) at the same time. After
listing some of their names, the proclamation indicates that the
objective of these executions was 'to make sure that henceforth no
other Arab would be tempted to say that our language is the
language of Islam'. There have been, in addition, assassinations
among the Arabs and banishment of innocent Syrian families to
Anatolia, where their children would forget their language and
become Turks. The Unionists will probably bring in Turks to
replace the exiles and so facilitate the Turkification of the Syrian
lands. The proclamation then asks, 'What Muslim — nay, what
human being — could resign his people to such tyranny and
degradation as this? God Almighty has made the banishment of
a man from his homeland a matter comparable to forcing him to
forsake his religion, and legitimate grounds for the recourse to arms.
God Almighty said in justification of the jihad: It is permitted for
those to fight who are oppressed . . . '
The proclamation then turns to the past to elucidate the Arab
role in history. The most eminent empires of Islam were 'the Arab
empires of our forefathers', and the reader is reminded that the
caliphate was at first Arab, and that the Arabs had accepted the
Ottoman Empire, despite its abandonment of the Arabic language
and its usurpation of the caliphate, out of their earnest desire that
Islam should have a strong state to preserve its independence and
implement its sacred law. 81 But the Unionists have exposed the
independence of the Empire to extinction and have preserved neither
the fundaments of the sacred law nor the independence of the sultan.
Hence, there remains no reason to tolerate their oppression and
tyranny, which has even reached the sacred precincts of Mecca.
The proclamation then compares the degradation of the Arabs to
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degradation of Islam, substantiating this view by citing the hadith

of the Prophet, 'If the Arabs are degraded, Islam is degraded.'
With this, the proclamation arrives at 'the question of pro-
tecting the Hijaz from this outrage and aggression, upholding
the Islamic observances enjoined by God, and safeguarding the
Arabs and the Arab countries from the final result of the danger
to which the Ottoman Empire has been exposed by the malicious
conduct of this oppressive group, none of which can be set com-
pletely to rights by any means other than total independence
and the breaking of every contact with these bloodthirsty con-
querors'. The proclamation ends with a conclusion identical to that
in the version abridged from it, with the exception of one sig-
nificant point: legal equality of rights between Muslims and
non-Muslims. 82
It is worthy of note that in its original form the proclamation
encompasses the political lines of Arab nationalist thought.
Turkification and its role in provoking dissension are vehemently
rejected, emphasis is placed on Arabic, attention is drawn to the
Arab role in history and the interdependence between the standing
of the Arabs and that of Islam, and there is denunciation of the
persecution, butchery and banishments that have befallen the Arabs,
as well as criticism of how Turkey's entry into the war has exposed
the Arab lands to danger. The Arabs may have accepted the
Ottoman Empire and consented to its usurpation of the caliphate
— an Arab institution — for the sake of protecting Islam, but the
Unionists have gone beyond the pale of the faith, violated the sacred
law, robbed the sultan of his legitimate authority and rent asunder
the unity of the Ottoman nation. As there thus remains no place
for an Islamic bond with the Turks, the Arabs are obliged to come
to the aid of Islam and to protect the Arab lands. Further, the pro-
clamation emphasises the equality of rights between Muslims and
non-Muslims, a perspective frequently expressed in Arab thought
in this period.
This proclamation was the manifesto of the Arab Revolt,
explaining the circumstances in which it arose, sketching out its
position and giving expression to its concepts. Sharif Husayn issued
more than ten other proclamations, all but the first of which were
published in the newspaper Al-Qibla.83 The second explains the cir-
cumstances that justify the Revolt: the Ottoman Empire erred in
entering the war and, as a result, it is now exposed to danger and
the Arabs must try to escape from that danger. 84 As for the third
proclamation, it echoes the first (detailed) one and confirms that
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The Arab Movement
this version was the original. The proclamation addresses itself to

'the sons of our country, both elite and common folk . . . both
townsman and bedouin, on the true nature of the situation, to
demonstrate that the imperatives of religion, nationalism and
humanity all enjoin rebellion'. Here attention is once again drawn
to the wrongdoings of the Unionists: needless loss of lands, con-
tempt for religion and the perpetration of such crimes as hangings,
torture, confiscation of property, desecration of sacred places and
seizure of authority from its rightful holders. All of this enjoins
rebellion against the Turks, for rebellion against tyrants is
obligatory, based on the Prophet's saying, 'If the people see a tyrant
and fail to stay his hand, God's chastisement is but a moment from
overwhelming them.' The decree also cites another tradition of the
Prophet: 'The best of you is he who defends his clan.' Hence, once
the hostility of the Unionists towards the Arabic language and the
Arab feeling of nationhood (nationalism) became evident, the choice
of God fell to Husayn, 'that we might rise up with our nation to
stay the hands of the tyrants . . . and repel the evil from our Arab
clans and communities'. The proclamation here refers to the Arab
nation because Husayn, 'to his delight', recognises in it 'our nation,
devoted in its Islamic zeal and Arab fervour'. 85 Hence, the pro-
clamation considers that once the enmity of the Unionists had been
exposed, rebellion against their iniquity and injustices became an
obligatory duty enjoined by religion and nationalism. The Arab
Revolt thus sought to bring about the awakening of the Arab nation
and to repel evil from the Arabs of the Hijaz and from other Arab
societies. The fourth proclamation adds nothing new, but rather
concentrates on how the Turks violated the sanctity of the Prophet's
quarters in Medina and plundered their contents. 86
The attitude of these proclamations is an Arab-Islamic one, for
they set forth the interdependence between Arabism and Islam. In
the faith they see a source of strength for the Arab nation and sup-
port for Arab nationalism; similarly, in the Arab national awaken-
ing they see a source of power for Islam and a means for returning
to the sacred law.
At this point it is worth turning our attention to the thinking
embodied in the mouthpiece of the Revolt, the newspaper Al-Qibla,
which commenced publication on Monday, 15 Shawwal 1334/15
August 1916.87 In the first issues of the periodical one notes
criticism of Unionist despotism and of its divisive and damaging
policies, disparagement of the policy of Turkification and fusion/
unification, and rejection of pan-Turanianism, Turkish attacks on
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The Arab Movement
the Arabs and their historical role, and their contempt for
religion. 88 All of this echoes the Arabic writings.
Al-Qibla makes its mission the service of Islam and the Arabs. 89
As one reads in the editorial at the beginning of its third year, it
thus 'endeavours to serve Islam throughout the inhabited world,
devotes its earnest effort to the cause of Muslim advancement and
progress and strives to enhance the standing of the Arab nation'. 90
It would seem from sustained reading of Al-Qibla, however, that
the service of Islam is realised through the national awakening and
strength of the Arab nation. For example, the Arabs 'remain the
Islamic people best suited to undertake the leadership of Islam and
the restoration of its glory to mankind'. It is imperative that all
the Muslims be aware that no state established in any place or time
will endure or thrive unless the Arabs are its builders, the managers
of its affairs and the source of the spirit that permeates it; Islam
will never take pride in it and its guidance will never hold firm in
the midst of mankind except through the Arabs. 91 In an open
letter published as an editorial in Al-Qibla, it is stated that those
active in the Arab movement do not serve a person or a family:
'rather, we are Arabs who serve the Arabs, and Muslims who strive
for the Muslims . . . Our highest hope is that Arab strength should
return to the Arabs and pristine religion be restored to the
Muslims.' 92
Another editorial refers to the awakening of the Arabs in the lands
of the Fertile Crescent, and as the primary reason for this cites
Unionist injustices and atrocities, as well as their newspapers, books
and songs. It calls out to the Arabs that the time for national
awakening has come and that the time for unity has arrived. 'So
join your religion and your nation in their march to victory and
rally around the Arab banner raised in the wadi-beds of the Hijaz,
so that when the war is over you will be the mainstays of the world
and the upholders of religion, as your forefathers were throughout
the world.' 93
It is clear that on the one hand the Revolt was Arab in character
and in the ethnic composition of those involved in it, while on the
other, it was launched in the service of Islam after the Unionists
had adopted a pan-Turanian policy and deviated from Islam. It
was also a revolt for the national awakening of the Arabs and the
restoration of their leading role in Islam. Expressive of this idea
was a letter from Sharif Husayn (then the Hashimite king) to
Shaykh 'All al-Ghayati: 'Our intention in this national awakening
of ours is only to rally the Arabs to the service of Islam, as we are
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The Arab Movement
convinced of the pernicious designs the Unionists have for them

both. The direction of our movement and the inspiration for our
undertaking aim at nothing other than the welfare and embodiment
of the bond of our pure Arab lands, without distinction on the basis
of confessional affiliations. This is the ultimate goal, unrivalled by
any other.'
It was therefore natural that there should be a steadily increasing
emphasis on Arabism and on the nationalist perspective in Al-Qibla.
In its issues it published, for example, a multi-part essay entitled
'A Definitive Account of Arab Eminence' (Nayl al-arab fi fadl
al-'arab), 'in which he (the author) has collected whatever was to
be found in both Sunni and Shi'ite texts that demonstrates the
eminence of the Arabs and refutes the allegations of their
enemies'. 94 In Al-Qibla the Arabs are an ancient nation possessed
of a rich history and civilisation and distinguished by a special talent
for propagating the spirit of the sciences, arts and refinement in
other peoples. 95 One of its authors turned back to the Arab past
to elucidate their political and cultural role in history. He reviews
the empires and civilisations founded prior to Islam, beginning with
the Babylonian empire founded by Hammurabi, 'who was an Arab,
and whose empire was the first Arab empire', on through the Arab
states and their civilisation in Yemen, and including other empires
up until the rise of Islam. It was the Arabs, he declares, who created
the empire and civilisation of Islam; they spread science, and Europe
acquired it from them. In conclusion he says, 'The Arabs, just as
they dominated a great part of the earth through their power,
dominated the world through their civilisation, arts and
sciences.' 96
The Arabs are a nation of people innately proud and naturally
disposed to freedom, and such was their character in the earliest
days of pre-Islamic Arabia. They preserved their genealogies and
never lost the original seed of their independence, for invaders failed
to penetrate their peninsula, and over the ages they never bowed
in submission to a non-Arab ruler (they may have become the
subjects of the house of 'Osman, but this was the submission of
an ally to his partner). 97 The Arabs were the keenest of the peoples
in their attitude towards independence and the fastest to respond
to appeals for unity and accord. 'So is it now impossible for them
to become one nation agreed on its objectives, independent in its
lands and mighty in the domains of its homeland?* 98
Nationalism may now have become the basis for the formation
of nations and kingdoms, but the Arabs were the first nation to
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The Arab Movement
develop this spirit, a fact to which their history bears eloquent

testimony." This has been clear since the pre-Islamic age:
whenever languor seeped into their states, they pulled back to
Arabia, 'as anxious to preserve their feeling of nationhood (i.e. their
nationalism) as their origins, lines of descent and language'. Their
condition deteriorated just before the rise of Islam and they broke
up into various scattered tribes, but 'the Arab spirit and the
nationalist drive never quit these tribes'. This spirit exercised over
Arab hearts and sentiments an authority that prevailed over their
feelings of tribal solidarity, a phenomenon that finds tangible
expression in the gathering of the tribes in a fair regularly held at
the market centre of'Ukaz, which 'every year incessantly reminded
them of their unity of national feeling (i.e. nationalism) and of the
need to adhere to that bond of theirs which can never be broken'.
It was also their custom to overlook their mutual resentments and
to set aside quarrelling when performing their sacred duty — 'that
is, the duty of sustaining the language upon which their national
identity was based and tightening the bonds of Arab brotherhood
at a specified time every year. It is this that cemented the spirit
of unity and facilitated the uniting of the scattered parts in time
of need.' 100
The author of this essay thus holds the view that the nationalist
spirit has been deeply rooted among the Arabs since pre-Islamic
times, and that language is the basis for a sense of national identity.
The Arabic language, common lines of descent and, to a certain
extent, the homeland (the Arabian peninsula) were the primary
elements in the formation of the nation. There were also other views
on the bonds holding the nation together. The commander of the
Arab force at Rabigh, for example, gave a speech in which he
regarded the homeland, ethnic origin, language, religion and history
as the formative elements or bonds of the nation. 101 Ahmad Shakir
al-Karml called for the realisation of an Arab league, that is, for
the unification of a great nation with a glorious history. His justifica-
tion for this was the fact that 'the Arab nation can be traced back
to a single origin and speaks one language. This ranks among the
most important factors encouraging the coalescence of nations.' In
the disparity of religions and creeds he sees no impediment to the
cause of the league, since the incentive behind it springs from an
ethnic feeling of nationhood (i.e. from a form of nationalism). 102
Despite the assertion of the nationalist perspective in Al-
Qibla, it was to be expected that the newspaper would formulate
the nature of nationalism within the framework of the Arab-Islamic
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perspective. In one of its editorials it is stated that nations in the

modern age consider the bond of national feeling to be one of the
most potent factors behind the drawing together of nations, and
one of the strongest bonds in the unification of peoples. Hence,
nations have begun to take action to invigorate the bond of national
feeling and to awaken this sentiment among their people. But the
bond of national feeling is of two kinds. One neither contradicts
the spirit of religion nor violates its precepts. 'The objectives it seeks
to attain are the creation of harmony, unity and mutual feelings
of brotherhood, and the revival of the spirit of solidarity and co-
operation among the individuals of the nation, provided that this
does not go so far as to wrong or cause injury to anyone else.' This
is the kind that Al-Qibla advocates and strives to achieve, 'the
laudable kind upon which Arab empires were based in early Islamic
times'. As for the second type, 'the objectives it seeks to attain are
the revival of vain partisan fanaticisms, the creation of the spirit
of hateful egoism within the nation and the cultivation in the hearts
of its people of a love for wronging others'. Pristine Islam (al-din
al-hanij) set out to proscribe and condemn this kind. But this is the
type of nationalism espoused by the advocates of pan-Turanianism,
who imitate German excesses in calling for a bond on the basis
of race, a bond that seeks world dominion, control of all being
and the enslavement of every nation that fails to conform to their
designs:
Al-Qibla thus supports the kind of Arab nationalism that calls
for the unification and awakening of the nation without causing
injury to any other. This is a bond that is in harmony with Islam,
it maintains, and indeed, is one of great antiquity among the Arabs.
Their empires in early Islamic times came into being on the basis
of this bond and peoples of numerous different races and religions
were satisfied with it. Radical and aggressive forms of nationalism
like pan-Turanianism, however, ones that endeavour to enslave
other nations, are to be rejected on both religious and humanitarian
grounds. There are numerous articles and statements in Al-Qibla
that lend their support to this assessment. As the Hashimite king
(Sharif Husayn) said on 3 Muharram 1337/9 October 1918, 'The
intent of this movement is to please Almighty God and to render
unto Arab nationalism its due by helping to rescue its people and
protect its homelands. The readiness of the Arabs to adhere to their
nationalism is one of their most particular glories and most ancient
qualities. Throughout their history, they have been fervent devotees
of national independence.' 103
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Another editorial in Al-Qibla refers to 'the presence of the Arab

spirit, alive in the hearts of the people though time marches on and
tribulations buffet it one after another'. In this context it lauds the
throngs of Arab youth pouring in from all directions to volunteer
and bear arms in defence of the sanctity of the homeland and the
honour of the nation. 104
There are also many references to the glories of the Arabs in
history, to the fact that weakness befell the Muslims when the Arabs
became disunited and non-Arabs seized control of the empire, and
to the point that the Arab nation cannot live in servitude to a foreign
non-Arab regime. 105 Hence, the Arab movement has been
initiated by the Arabs, for the benefit of the Arabs, and in the
interest of the Arab lands. 106 Consequently, the appeal for the
Arab league aims to unite a great nation possessed of a glorious
history. 107 In one of its editorials Al-Qibla declares, 'All those who
read our newspaper know, from the time it first appeared, how great
our desire has been to unify the people of the Arab lands and how
intense our effort has been to restore their affairs to order.' 108 And
in declaring that the movement aims for the welfare of all Arabs
without distinction, it quotes Sharif Husayn as saying, 'We are
Arabs before we are Muslims.' 109 It also quotes the clarifications
of this point directed by Sharif Husayn to the Syrians: 'When I
speak of the "sons of Syria", I distinguish none of them from the
others on the basis of religious affiliation or any other consideration.
On the contrary, all of them are in my view equal, since the unity
of national feeling is a bond of mutual understanding and mutual
interests. How often I have said that the Arabs are Arabs before
they are Muslims, Christians or Jews . . . If there has been anyone
who has misunderstood or misinterpreted this fact, he wrongs . . .
the Arabs, whose history confirms that difference in religion cannot
be a reason for violating a right, disparaging someone's honour or
encroaching on anything else one requires to live happily in society.'
In conclusion he says that the country is the place where its people
should be able to enjoy all of their rights, without differentiating
between them in either rights or obligations.110 The articles written
for Al-Qibla refer to such equality and emphasise it. 111
It is worth mentioning here that Sharif Husayn received the bay 'a
(on 2 Muharram 1335/30 October 1916) as a king of the Arabs who
'will act in accordance with the Book of God and the customary
practice (sunna) of His messenger', and as their source of religious
guidance until such time as the Islamic world reaches a decision
on the question of the caliphate. 112 This recalls the thinking of
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The Arab Movement
al-Kawakibi, in which the caliphate is an Arab institution with

political authority limited to the Hijaz, but serving all Muslims as
a source of guidance in Islamic affairs, while political authority in
these other Islamic lands remains in the hands of Muslim rulers.
It must be noted here that Al-Qibla did not express the thinking
of any society or party. Its editor-in-chief was Muhibb al-Din
al-Khatlb, one of the Young Arabs, but in its pages there appeared
articles by authors not associated with any organised group,
individuals whose views expressed the current of Arab thought in
general. Still, Al-Qibla offers a general idea of this thought within
the context of the Arab movement at the time of the Revolt.
A study of the circumstances leading to the Arab Revolt reveals
a certain congruency between the early viewpoint of Sharif Husayn
and the goals of the Arab secret societies, especially the Young
Arabs. At first Husayn's complaint was that the Unionists were try-
ing to restrict the privileges and rights of the sharifo and to impose
a system of centralised administration, not to mention the accusa-
tions that they had little regard for religion. 113 Once the Arab
secret societies had contacted him, his Arab perspective broad-
ened to include the objective of independence for the Arab lands,
as stated in Sharif Husayn's letter of 14 July 1915 to Sir Henry
McMahon. 114
The general perspective at the time of the Arab Revolt was thus
an Arab-Islamic one that saw an organic interdependence between
Arabism and Islam and regarded Arab nationalism and Islam as
compatible. It was through Islam that the Arabs had played such
an important role in history, and through the Arabs that Islam had
risen to power and its civilisation and finest empires had been
established. In the age of nationalist movements the Arabs have
found in Arab nationalism a means to achieve their national
awakening and unity, especially since the Arabs prided themselves
on their language and had since ancient times made a point of
preserving their lines of descent. Hence the national awakening
defends Islam and promotes its standing, and through the nationalist
awakening and unity of the Arabs they can regain their pioneering
central role in the Islamic world. Furthermore, Arab nationalism
is constructive, liberal and humanitarian and rejects the wronging
or exploitation of others. For these reasons, Arab nationalism and
Islam are in harmony with one another.
Reasons for the Arab Revolt against the Unionists are also
advanced in accordance with the later Islamic thought of the Sunni
jurists. This thought upholds the sultanate as an institution
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delegated by the caliphate to exercise sovereign authority on its

behalf; empowered on this basis, the sultanate is legitimate so long
as it applies the sacred law and protects the territories of Islam.
In this lay the justification for acceptance of the Ottoman claim on
the caliphate, which was originally Arab. But the Unionists trans-
gressed the sacred law, rent the Muslims asunder, lost lands of Islam
through their negligence, and in addition, vilified Arabic, the
language of the Qur'an. All this made it an obligatory duty to rebel
against the Unionists in order to protect the sacred law of Islam,
bring about the national awakening of the Arabs and to protect their
lands.
The immediate practical objective of the Arab movement was
to draw the Arabs together, unify them and gain the independence
of the lands of the Arab East within limits drawn by the Young
Arabs. 115 In this it manifests the change it had undergone after the
outbreak of the First World War. Although allegiance had been
sworn to Sharif Husayn as a king over the Arabs, the door remained
open for a restoration of the caliphate to the Arabs, by decision
of the Muslims in general. This indicates that the idea of the Arab
caliphate was a prominent one in thought, although its proclama-
tion depended on the turn taken by relations between the Turks
and the Arabs.
In the circumstances of the Arab Revolt it was to be expected
that the proclamations and articles would focus on two concerns.
The first was to justify the Arab rebellion against the Ottoman
Empire (an Islamic regime) based on considerations that were, in
the first instance, Islamic, and then secondly, Arab. The second
point was to clarify the fact that Arab nationalism was compatible
with Islam, and indeed, that Arab nationalism's perspective aimed
at the national awakening of the Arabs' rendered service to Islam.
The outbreak of the First World War may have served to
encourage the Arab movement to declare the independence of the
Arab (Ottoman) lands in the East within the framework of a single
state, but the end of the war resulted in the partition of the Arab
lands among the Western states, the expansion of the Western wave
of influence in thought, economy and institutions, the realisation
of Zionist ambitions in Palestine, and the incitement of divergent
perspectives in the Arab countries. Similarly, there may have been
a perspective favouring the restoration of the caliphate to the Arabs
and aspirations to restore the central historical role of the Arabs
in the world of Islam. The hegemony of the West, however, struck
down this idea. This was followed by the abolition of the caliphate
314
The Arab Movement
(1926) by the Turks and an accompanying series of writings and

debates about the character of the caliphate, putting an end to the
historical role of this institution and to the intellectual and political
possibilities connected with it. The First World War thus marked
the end of one stage in the rise of Arab nationalism.
Notes
1. See the editorial in Al-Mufid, 11 January 1913, expressing apprehen-

sion at statements by the Prime Minister of France concerning his country's
rights and interests in Syria and its protection of the Catholic Church there,
all prerogatives acknowledged by Britain. See also Al-Mufid\ editorial on
12 January 1913 and the lecture by Fu'ad Hantas (co-owner and co-editor
of the newspaper with al-'UraysI, and his colleague in the Young Arabs),
entided 'Al-Harb al-balqaniya: mas'ala ta'rikhlya'. In this address he asserts
the necessity of decentralisation for survival and the responsibility of the
Syrians to defend their country. In this same issue, Al-Mufid emphasises
that 'the present administration is the leading cause of the decline and
disgrace that have befallen us'. In an Al-Mufideditorial on 14January 1913,
it is said that centralisation was the cause of revolts and fragmentation,
and that among the consequences of the Balkan War is the casting of
covetous eyes on Syria. This situation can be remedied through decentralisa-
tion, which is the essence of reform and an imperative for the preservation
of the country.
2. See Sa'Id, Al-Thawra al-'arabiya al-kubra, vol. I, pp. 14 ff; Darwaza,
Nash'at dl-haraka al-'arabiya al-haditha> pp. 360 ff; Berro, Al-'Arab wa-l-turk,
pp. 474 ff; Al-Manar, vol. 14(1913), pp. 226, 229, 231.
3. See Al-Mufid, 22 February 1913, in discussing 'the Decentralisation
Party established by eminent Syrians in Cairo', and then quoting the text
of the manifesto.
4. Article 1.
5. Article 7.
6. Article 8.
7. Article 10.
8. Article 11.
9. Articles 14 and 15.
10. Article 16.
11. Article 2.
12. In Jemal Pasha, Idahat, p. 34, it is said that at the beginning of
the Balkan War more pressing demands for reform began to appear in
newspaper columns and articles. 'The ambiguous (sic, al-mubhama) term
"reform" reverberated back and forth from the mouths of the learned and
the unlearned, the thoughtful and the thoughtless. The controversy
confronting the government intensified and tightened the strangling cord
around its neck, while the mounting excitement threw the people into a
state of tension and agitation'.
13. K.S. Salibi, 'Beirut Under the Young Turks: As Depicted in the
315
The Arab Movement
Political Memoirs of Salfm 'All Salam (1868-1938)', in Jacques Berque

and Dominique Chevallier (eds), Les Arabes par leurs archives (Centre National
de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, 1976), pp. 193-215. See also Salim
'All Salam, Mudhakkirat, ed. Hassan 'All Hallaq (Al-Dar al-jami'iya, Beirut,
1982).
14. See Marwan Buheiry ['Bulus Nujaym and the Grand Liban Ideal
1908-1919', in Buheiry (ed.), Intellectual Life in the Arab East, pp. 62 ff,
81-2 = ] 'Bulus Nujaym wa-Lubnan al-Kabir (1908-1919)', in Buheiry
(ed.), Al-Hayat al-fikriya ft l-sharq al-'arabi, pp. 79 ff, 96-7; Salam,
Mudhakkirat, p. 125. 'Anbara Salam al-Khalidi (Salim 'All Salam's daughter)
says of the Ottoman Islamic College, 'It was the first school to take an
interest in providing its students with an understanding of their history,
imbuing them with the nationalist spirit and impressing upon them the
necessity of restoring Arab glory. I believe that it was here that many of
the seeds of the revolt against Turkish oppression and despotism were sown.
I would not say that all of the calls for Arab rights were the outcome of
the teaching of this school, but I am absolutely certain that many of those
later executed on the gallows timbers of the bloodthirsty Turks were among
those who had obtained their early education at this school.' See al-
KhaMdi, Jaw la fi l-dhikrayat, p. 62. It is well known that at first there were
those prepared to adopt a favourable attitude towards the Young Turks'
appeal in the name of constitutional government, equality before the law
and restriction of the foreign influence in the Empire. See Spagnola, France
and Ottoman Lebanon, p. 245.
15. See Rafiq al-'Azm, 'Al-Haraka al-suriya: asbabuha wa-nata'ijuha',
Al-Mufid, 22 April 1913.
16. See Wajlh KawtharanI, Biladal-Sham, al-sukkdn, al-iqtisad wa-l-siyasa
al-faransiya fi matlac al-qarn al-cishrin: qira'afi l-watha'iq (Ma'had al-inma'
al-'arabi, Beirut, 1980), p. 165, on the report of the French Consul-General
in Beirut, dated 29 January 1912, about the rumours that were circulating
after the Turko-Italian War and the fear that the war was going to result in
the final break-up of the Ottoman Empire. In his memoirs (Mudhakkirati),
Ahmad Qadri mentions the repeated reference in European circles to the
idea of partitioning the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence following
the Balkan War, the fear this aroused among the Arabs and the call of
Beirut intellectuals in December 1912 for action to avert the danger posed
to their country.
17. Salam, Mudhakkirat, pp. 128-30.
18. Al-'Azm, 'Al-Haraka al-suriya'.
19. See Al-Mufid, 8 January 1913.
20. Al-Mufid, 15 January 1913. The newspaper commented on the
situation in these terms: 'The public interest is lost between the arrogance
of the notables and the vanity of the intellectuals', an observation of some
significance.
21. See Al-Mufid, 30 December 1912; Al-Manar, vol. 16 (1913), p. 275.
22. The Reform Committee considered the existence of political parties
to be detrimental to unity; it persuaded the Freedom and Concord club
to close down and to dissolve the Party, and then founded the Reform Club.
See the discussion by the Society's secretary, Ayyub Thabit, in Al-Mufid,
8 March 1913; also Al-Mufid, 21, 22 and 23 January 1913.
316
The Arab Movement
23. Al-Mufid, 24 February 1913; Salam, Mudhakkirat, pp. 130 ff, and
for the text of the programme prepared under the governor's supervision,
pp. 144 ff.
24. Al-Mufid, 11, 18 and 25 January 1913, 5 and 25 February 1913;
Salam, Mudhakkirat, pp. 129, 131; Salibi, 'Beirut Under the Young Turks',
pp. 204-5.
Among the most eminent members of the Committee were Sallm 'All
Salam, Ahmad Mukhtar Bayhum, Salim Tabbara, Kamil al-Sulh,
Muhammad Fakhuri, and also Khalll Zaynlya and Dr Ayyub Thabit from
the Lebanese Awakening (Al-Nahda al-lubnaniya), Petro Trad and Rizq Allah
Arqash. See also the letter of Couget, the French consul-general in Beirut,
to the French foreign minister concerning the memorandum presented by
Khalll Zaynlya on behalf of the Christian members of the Reform
Committee. In this document France is considered the protector of Ottoman
Christians and an adopted homeland for the Christians of Syria. It is
mentioned in the memorandum that the Christians of Beirut agreed to
co-operate with the Muslims for two reasons: firstly, to foil the Turkish
government ploy of inciting discord at will, before any reform plan could
be formulated; and secondly, to ensure that this programme includes the
principle of European supervision in all branches of the administration.
They considered, however, that even if it proved possible to implement
the reforms, this would still not satisfy the genuine aspirations of the
Christians of Syria. They declared that their greatest wish was for the
extension of a French protectorate over Syria. See the text of the memor-
andum in Kawtharani, Bildd al-Sham, pp. 269-73. Jemal Pasha (Idahat,
pp. 31-43, speaks of a memorandum — dated 12 March 1913, signed by
Ayyub Thabit, Khalll Zaynlya and Petro Trad, and presented to the French
consul — that outlines Christian demands and the reason for their partici-
pation in the Reform Society.
26. See al-A'zami, Al-Qadiya al-'arabiya, vol. IV, pp. 72-3, 81; Said,
Al-Thawra al-'arabiya al-kubra, vol. I, p. 14.
27. See Salam, Mudhakkirat, pp. 133 ff.
30. See Al-Mufid, 12 April 1913, giving the text of a long letter of protest
from the people of Beirut over the suppression of the Society and the closure
of the Reform Club. The protest was sent to the Grand Vizier and the
Ministry of the Interior, as also was the protest of the committee of the
Reform Society against the order of the governor. See Salam, Mudhakkirat,
pp. 158 ff.
31. For further details, see Salam, Mudhakkirati, pp. 152 ff; Qadri,
Mudhakkirati, p. 15.
32. Faydi, Fi ghamrat al-nidal, pp. 130-1.
33. See Nazml, Judhur, pp. 100 ff.
34. Al-Mufid, 17 March 1919; Faydi, Ft ghamrat al-nidal, pp. 130 ff; Said,
Al-Thawra al-'arabiya al-kubra, vol. I, p. 23; Jemal Pasha, Idahat, pp. 42-3.
In this last source it is said that the proclamation of the Basra Reform
Society attacked the Unionists and accused them of toying with the nation,
trading with the homeland, negligently losing provinces and the lands of
317
The Arab Movement
the Gulf, and granting concessions to the foreigners. At the same time,
the Society's proclamation emphasised the homeland, religion and the
honour of the nation. It is well known, however, that Jemal Pasha's work
offers the Unionist point of view.
35. Al-Mufid, 9 May 1913.
36. It was obviously necessary to convene the conference outside the
Ottoman domains, but the choice of Paris was cause for criticism, whether
impartial or tendentious. This was due to fear of French ambitions, and
there were also remarks made apropos of the alleged Francophile inclina-
tions of some of the conferees. See Kawtharani, Watha'iq al-mu'tamar al-'arabi
al-awwal, 'Muqaddima', pp. 48, 52-5, 61.
37. Ahmad Qadri says in his memoirs that the Young Arab Society
assigned 'our brothers' 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadl, Jamil Bey Mardam,
Muhammad al-Mahmasanl and 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Urays! to convene a
conference in Paris, the purpose of which was to realise the Society's goals.
Nadra Mutran, Shukri Ghanim, Charles Dabbas and Jamil Ma'luf were
then added so that the conference would include Muslims and Christians
on an equal basis. Dabbas, al-'Uraysi and Mardam were entrusted with
the Secretariat. See Qadri, Mudhakkirati, p. 14; also the Introduction by
Muhibb al-DIn al-Khatib in Kawtharani, Watha'iq, p. 4.
38. Al-Rlmawl, 'Awraq Muhibb al-DIn al-Khatib', p. 117.
39. Kawtharani, Watha'iq, pp. 6-7. It should be noted that the term
'Syrians' in the invitation to the Congress was used to include the people
of the land of Syria within its natural and historical boundaries.
40. Ibid., pp. 14-16. From this it would seem that the participants
consisted often urban notables, two merchants, seven newspaper owners
and six other educated individuals.
41. Ibid., pp. 6-7, 9.
42. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
43. Ibid., p. 19.
44. Tawfiq al-Suwaydl refers to three trends within the Congress:
(1) reformers — mostly Muslims, with some Christian Arabs — seeking
equality between the Turks and the Arabs; (2) those hostile to the Turks,
mostly Christian Arabs; (3) opportunists (wusHliywi). See Tawfiq al-Suwaydl,
Mudhakkirati: niffqarn min ta 'rikh al- 'Iraq wa-l-qadiya al- 'arabiya (Dar al-katib
al-'arabi, Beirut, 1969), p. 30. This analysis is confirmed by Shaklb Arslan;
see his Sira, pp. 109-11.
45. This is clear from the first subject mentioned in the announcement
of the organising committee: 'Patriotic Life and Resistance to Occupation'.
Nadra Mutran, however, limited his support to the first half of this title.
See al-Suwaydl, Mudhakkirati, p. 39. Al-Suwaydl felt that the convening
of the Congress in Paris was inappropriate and also that, given the circum-
stances of the Balkan War, its timing was inopportune.
46. See the speech of Nadra Mutran and especially the discussion that
followed, in Kawtharani, Watha'iq, p. 64; likewise the observations of
al-ZahrawI, p. 38; and Shukri Ghanim, p. 143.
47. See the statement of Charles Dabbas on the necessity of having
foreign advisors, and the comments that followed; ibid., pp. 104-6, and
his speech on p. 136. See also p. 114.
48. Al-'Uraysi said (ibid., pp. 42-3), 'In the view of the political
318
The Arab Movement
scientists, societies do not deserve this right unless they draw together:
according to the German scholars, based on unity of language and ethnic
background; according to the Italian scholars, based on unity of history
and customs; and according to the political school of the French, based
on unity of political aspirations. If we look at the Arabs from these three
viewpoints, we find that they combine unity of language, unity of ethnic
background, unity of history, unity of customs and unity of political aspira-
tions. Hence, the Arabs deserve . . . to have, in the view of all political
scientists, the right due to a society, the right due to a people and the right
due to a nation.'
49. Al-'UraysI repeats the reference to the Unionists when he says
(ibid., p. 44), 'We have sworn to ourselves that in this Empire we will
protect our status, our feeling of nationhood and our rights as equals. From
this day onwards no land will be colonised, no nation exploited; henceforth
we are the shepherds, not the sheep.'
50. Ibid., p. 44.
51. Ibid., pp. 17-18, 20.
52. Ibid., pp. 51-8, 61. Charles Dabbas said (ibid., p. 143), 'O Muslims
of Syria, you are our brothers in language and in national and patriotic
feeling.'
53. Ibid., pp. 18, 29.
54. Ibid., pp. 34, 37.
55. Ibid., pp. 44-9.
56. Ibid., pp. 100-4.
57. Ibid., pp. 113 ff. Added to this was another resolution (ibid., p.
119) in the Appendix stipulating that if the resolutions of the Congress were
not implemented, members of Arab reform committees would refuse to
accept any official post in the Ottoman government, except if they had
special approval from the societies to which they belonged.
58. Ibid., p. 20.
59. Ibid., p. 45.
60. See Darwaza, Nash'at al-haraka al-'arabiya al-haditha, pp. 382 ff. I
have obtained duplicate copies of the placards in order to check the reading
of the texts.
61. See the text of the agreement in Faydi, Fi ghamrat al-nidal, pp.
129-30.
62. See Darwaza, Nash'at al-haraka al-'arabiya al-haditha, pp. 395-6, with
a duplicate copy of the placard.
63. Ibid., pp. 384-5, with a duplicate copy of the placard.
64. It is said in the Outcry, 'Let the Arabs be informed that the course
of their movement will never be halted by political intrigues, and that they
will pound at the very foundations of this Empire until the banner of the
Arabs waves over the inhabitants in the country.'
65. The last sentence is, 'Peace be upon the nation: the peace of secure
land safeguarded in the dead [sawad, black] of the night, the peace of a
clear [bayad, white] conscience and the peace of the verdure [khudra, green]
of certain hope.'
66. In Salonica on 28 August 1910, Tal'at Pasha said, 'There can be
no question of equality until we have succeeded in our task of Ottomanising
the Empire.' See Zeine [Emergence of Arab Nationalism, p. 87 = ] Nushu'
319
The Arab Movement
al-qawmiya al-'arabiya, p. 84; Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, The Young Turks:

Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957),
pp. 90, 93.
67. Seton-Watson expresses the view that the background of the CUP
indicates that it was neither Turkish nor Islamic. From the time of its
foundation, not a single one of its leaders or heads was of pure Turkish
origin. He adds that 'the real brains of the movement were Jewish or
Judaeo-Moslem', and points out that financial support came from the
wealthy Dunmehs, the Jews of Salonica and international capitalists. See
Robert William Seton-Watson, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans
(Constable, London, 1917), pp. 134-5. Ramsaur {The Young Turks,
pp. 103 ff), however, argues against this view and against other writers
of similar bent, while conceding that Masons were members of the CUP
and had firm connections with Judaism.
68. The proclamation was issued in Cairo on 9 October 1913. See
al-A'zami, Al-Qadiya al-'arabiya, vol. IV, pp. 35-53.
69. The identity of this society, in terms of both its formation and its
programme, is uncertain. See Darwaza, Nash'at al-haraka al-'arabiya al-
haditha, p. 462.
70. The placard says, 'Come to accord in the Syrian and Iraqi provinces
with the sons of your nation and homeland.' The reference to Iraq and
Syria exemplifies the expansion of the front of the Arab movement in real
terms.
71. Al-A'zami, Al-Qadiya al-'arabiya, vol. IV, pp. 108-16; Darwaza,
Nash'at al-haraka al-'arabiya al-haditha, pp. 464-7; Jemal Pasha, Idahat.
72. See the view of Sharif Husayn in a telegram to Sultan Muhammad
Reshad, in which he warns against Turkey's entrance into the war, in 'Abd
Allah ibn al-Husayn (King of Jordan), Al-Athar al-kamila li-l-malik 'Abd Allah
ibn al-Husayn (Al-Dar al-muttahida li-1-nashr, Beirut, 1973), p. 109.
73. Ibid., pp. 16, 113.
74. Ibid., pp. I l l ff.
75. In the memoirs of King 'Abd Allah (ibid., p. 114) one reads that
when the Turks asked Sharif Husayn to declare the holy jihad and to send
fighters from the Hijaz for the Holy War, the latter replied that all this
would require that they first satisfy the yearning of Arab souls for the
attainment of their rights. A general pardon should be announced for all
those convicted of political offences, Syria — and likewise Iraq — should
be granted a decentralised administration, and the traditional prerogatives
of the sharffate of Mecca, agreed upon in the reign of Sultan Sulayman,
should be confirmed and recognised as hereditary.
76. See 'Abd Allah ibn al-Husayn, Mudhakkirat, concerning his role in
the Revolt. See also Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, pp. 69 ff.
77. See the text of the first proclamation in Sa'Id, Al-Thawra al- 'arabiya
al-kubra, vol. I, pp. 149-57; and the text in Muhammad Amin al-'Umari,
Ta'rikh muqaddarat al-'Iraq al-siyasiya (Al-Maktaba al-'asriya, Baghdad,
1924-5; published in the name of his brother, Muhammad Tahir al-
'Umari), vol. I, pp. 257-68, and the text of the abridged version on
pp. 269-75. The abridged version may also be found in Revue du monde
musulman, vol. 46 (1921), pp. 5 ff, with a French translation. Al-'Umari
{Ta'rikh, vol. I, p. 256) states that British officials suggested that the first
320
The Arab Movement
version be modified and abridged because of the content of certain passages.

78. 'All ibn al-Husayn issued an ultimatum to Jemal Pasha on
8 Sha'ban 1334/10 June 1916. In it he said, 'The Ottoman Empire has
rejected the Arab demands. In view of the fact that the army that has readied
itself for the jihad would never be called upon to make sacrifices for any
cause other than that of the Arabs and Islam, then if the conditions set
forth by the sharif of Mecca are not implemented immediately, it will not
be necessary to declare the breaking of any relationship between the Arab
nation and the Turkish nation, for 24 hours after the arrival of this letter
a state of war shall exist between them.' See 'Abd Allah ibn al-Husayn,
Al-Athdr al-kdmila, pp. 115-16. Here one should note the emphasis on
the Arab demands and the linking of the jihad to the Arab cause and to
Islam.
79. Al-'Umari, Ta'rikh muqaddardt al-'Iraq al-siydsiya, vol. I, pp. 257-8.
80. Ibid., vol. I, p. 261.
81. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 261-3. It is stated in the proclamation: 'We have
come to a state of danger the like of which has never before been encountered
in Islam. We had mighty empires, the most eminent of which were those
of our Arab forefathers, and these have been inherited by the Ottoman
Empire. We Arabs have been the ones most concerned for its survival,
despite the fact that it is this Empire — not the Turkish and Kurdish empires
that preceded it — that has forsaken the Arabic language and usurped for
itself the dignity of the caliphate . . . All this has been because we, and
all the Arabs, are earnestly desirous that Islam should have a strong state
to preserve its independence and implement its sacred law, if only in general
terms.' Ibid., pp. 264-5.
82. Ibid., pp. 267-8.
83. In the discussion in the Revue du monde musulman it is stated that
the original version is the concise one, that the detailed version was prepared
(at the request of the Sharif s representative in Cairo) by the owner of
Al-Mandr, and that no authority can be placed on this latter version. This
is the opposite of what Sa'Id says in Al-Thawra al-'arabiya al-kubrd, vol. I,
pp. 149-57, and of what al-'Umari tells us. In the fourth proclamation
reference is made to the desecration of the Prophet's quarters in a passage
that refers back to what we find on line 25 in the longer proclamation,
but which is nowhere to be found in the more abbreviated version. It may
be noted that the sermon by the owner of Al-Mandr in Mecca does contain
some remarks similar to some passages found in the longer version (with
respect to Arabic and the attitude of the amirs of Mecca), but the general
approaches are very different, the Arab viewpoint being clearer in the longer
version. See al-'Umari, Ta'rikh muqaddardt al-'Irdq al-siydsiya, vol. I,
pp. 327 ff.
84. See Revue du monde musulman, vol. 50 (1922), p. 74. The most
important proclamations of the Sharif are the first four (until 11 Jumada I
1335/5 March 1917).
85. Al-Qibla, no. 31 (4 Safar 1335/30 November 1916).
86. This proclamation was issued in Jumada I 1335/February-
March 1917. See al-'Umari, Ta'rikh muqaddardt al-'Irdq al-siydsiya, vol. I,
360-3; Al-Qibla, no. 58 (11 Jumada I 1335/5 March 1917).
87. The name of Muhibb al-DIn al-Khatib appears as a director
321
The Arab Movement
responsible for Al-Qibla in the second issue (Thursday, 18 Shawwal 1334/

18 August 1916). This was a newspaper published twice a week, on Monday
and Thursday.
88. See, for example, Al-Qibla, no. 1 (15 Shawwal 1334/15 August
1916), no. 2 (18 Shawwal 1334/18 August 1916), no. 4 (25 Shawwal 1334/
25 August 1916), no. 9 (14 Dhu 1-Qa'da 1334/12 September 1916), no. 11
(21 Dhu 1-Qa'da 1334/19 September 1916).
89. See, for example, Al-Qibla, no. 157 (10 Jumada I 1336/21 February
1918).
90. Al Qibla, no. 200 (17 Shawwal 1336/26 July 1918), on the second
anniversary of its first issue.
91. See the editorial 'Makanat al-'arab fi l-'alam al-islaml', Al Qibla,
no. 4 (25 Shawwal 1334/25 August 1916). Here we read: 'Let all Muslims
— wherever they may be, anywhere they are — know that any state founded
at any spot on earth, and at any time, must have the Arabs as the layers
of its foundations, the pillars of its structure, the columns of its towering
edifice, the orderers of its affairs, the directors of its activity, the hand acting
on its behalf, the power upon which it relies, the spirit that flows through
its joints and the aspiration from which new boughs and branches spread
and grow. Otherwise, it will be a state that will not endure; its condition
will not improve, its subjects will not find happiness, Islam will not take
pride in it, the faith's guidance and direction will not be demonstrated by
its example, and it will not rise to the task appointed to the Arabs by the
Lord of the Worlds, making them guides, advisors, prayer leaders bear-
ing the heritage and leaders who teach, advise and act justly.' Cf. 'Abd
Allah ibn al-Husayn, Mudhakkirat, pp. 14, 49, where he describes the Revolt
in these terms: 'It was a righteous rebellion to defend Islam, and then to
restore the Arabs to the status reserved to them by God, concerning which
He speaks in his glorious Book: You are the best nation sent forth to man,
enjoining the good and forbidding the evil.'
92. Al-Qibla, no. 6 (3 Dhu 1-Qa'da 1334/1 September 1916).
93. Al-Qibla, no. 52 (19 Rabi' I 1335/13 January 1917).
94. Jamil Bayhum wrote this essay using quotations from the Fadl
al- 'arab by al-Hafiz al-'Iraqi and the Kitdb al- 'arab by Ibn Qutayba. Among
its contents are such maxims as these: 'The continued survival of the Arabs
is the light of Islam', 'What disgraces the Arabs disgraces Islam', 'One
who deceives the Arabs will be denied intercession', 'The ruin of the Arabs
will be one of the portents of the Hour of Judgement.' See Al-Qibla, nos.
11, 12, 13, 14 and 16 (21,24 and 28 Dhu 1-Qa'da, 1 Dhu 1-Hijja 1334/19,
22, 26 and 29 September 1916).
95. Al-Qibla, no. 2 (18 Shawwal 1334/18 August 1916), no. 11 (21
Dhu 1-Qa'da 1334/19 September 1916).
96. 'Ayyuha l-'arab al-kiram halummu ila ta'rikhikum fa'rja'Ci ilayhi',
an editorial by 'a great Islamic historian' in Al-Qibla, no. 21 (29 Dhu 1-
Hijja 1334/27 October 1916).
97. Al-Qibla, no. 1 (15 Shawwal 1334/15 August 1916), no. 19 (22
Dhu 1-Hijja 1334/20 October 1916).
98.' Al-Qibla, no. 21 (29 Dhu 1-Hijja 1334/27 October 1916).
99. Al-Qibla, no. 1 (15 Shawwal' 1334/15 August 1916).
100. Al-Qibla, no. 37 (25 Safar 1335/21 December 1916). When he
322
The Arab Movement
speaks of religion, he refers to the tolerance of Islam and the protection

of the rights of the people of other provinces, and declares that Islam does
not differentiate between the Muslim and non-Muslim except in well-known
matters that have no effect whatsoever upon the Arab bond between them.
101. Al-Qibla, no. 157 (10 Jumada I 1336/21 February 1918).
102. Ahmad Shakir al-Karml, 'Qui: la yastawl al-khablth wa-1-tayyib',
Al-Qibla, no. 184 (17 Sha'ban 1336/28 May 1918).
103. Al-Qibla, no.232 (4 Muharram 1337/10 October 1918). On one
occasion, immediately after a sermon by Rashid Rida before him and the
pilgrims, Sharif Husayn had already said, 'This national awakening is an
Arab one that encompasses every Arab, whomsoever he may be, provided
that he be faithful to his homeland and true to his people.' See Al-Qibla,
no. 17 (15 Dhu 1-Hijja 1334/13 October 1916).
104. Al-Qibla, no. 26 (27 Muharram 1335/23 November 1916).
105. Al-Qibla, no. 17 (15 Dhu'l-Hijja 1334/13 October 1916), no. 37
(25 Safar 1335/21 December 1916) and the speech by Amir 'Abd Allah
in no. 28 (24 Muharram 1335/20 November 1916).
106. Al-Qibla, no. 3 (28 Dhu 1-Qa'da 1334/26 September 1916).
107. Al-Qibla, no. 157 (10 Jumada I 1336/21 February 1918).
108. Al-Qibla, no. 177 (21 Rajab 1336/2 May 1918).
109. Al-Qibla, no. 138 (2 Rabi' I 1336/16 December 1917).
110. Al-Qibla, no. 232 (4 Muharram 1337/10 October 1918).
111. See, for example, Al-Qibla, no. 138(2 Rabi' I 1336/16 December
1917), and no. 157 (10 Jumada I 1336/21 February 1918). Emphasis such
as this is given in order to dispel any impression that the movement aims
to benefit only Muslims.
112. Al-Qibla, no. 22 (3 Muharram 1335/30 October 1916).
113. See 'Abd Allah ibn al-Husayn's discussion with Kitchener on 5
February 1914 in Sulayman Musa, Al-Murasalat al-ta'rikhiya, 1914-1918:
al-thawra al-'arabiya al-kubra (Privately published, Amman, 1973), p. 12.
See also pp. 25-6, the letter of 'Abd Allah ibn al-Husayn to Storrs on
20 October 1914; and pp. 27-8, the letter of Storrs to Sharif 'Abd Allah
on 12 Dhu 1-Hijja 1332/1 November 1914.
114. Ibid.,'pp. 31-2.
115. See 'Abd Allah ibn al-Husayn, Al-Athar al-kdmila, p. 112.
323
Conclusion
The aim of this study has been to explore the origins of the Arab
consciousness and its historical development in order to elucidate
the circumstances of its growth, the course it followed and its rela-
tionship to the nationalist perspective in the modern age. In their
history the Arabs have witnessed periods of fragmentation, weakness
and foreign invasion, but they have also witnessed periods of unity,
strength and efflorescence. In order to come to an understanding
of the formation of the Arab nation in history and the forms in which
it manifested itself in ages past and in modern times, it is impor-
tant to become familiar with the factors of unity, cohesion and
dynamism through the course of this history, the nature of the bonds
and formative elements that held the Arabs together, and how these
ties developed and evolved in accordance with changing cir-
cumstances and conditions.
The Arabian peninsula, known throughout history as the * Penin-
sula of the Arabs' (jaztrat al-'arab), was the cradle of the Arabs. It
was also the home territory for other peoples who preceded the Arabs
in migrating to the north and west, some of whom founded civilisa-
tions in ancient times. These peoples spoke languages that shared
common origins with Arabic. While their languages developed once
they had left Arabia, however, Arabic remained in the land of its
birth and kept closer to the original language. Most of these peoples
later became Arabised and, in like manner, the greatest part of their
heritage also made its way into Arab-Islamic civilisation. All this
served to bring these peoples into a close harmonious relationship
with the Arabs, and eventually to assimilate them into the Arabs.
The life of the Arabs and their role in antiquity was dictated by
two key factors. The first was the climate and geographical character
of Arabia, a land of deserts, steppes and plains surrounded on three
sides by seas. This protected the heart of Arabia from foreign
invasion, preserved the purity of the Arabic language and resulted
in the rapid expansion of Arab population in the bedouin milieus
of Arabia. Such considerations enabled this environment to sup-
port settled societies and to spill out over the frontiers. Arabian
nomadism was thus a source of vitality and constant rejuvenation
for Arab societies.
The second factor was Arabia's central geographical location in
the ancient world and the passage of international trade routes across
its territory. Combined with the strategic situation of Arabia, this
324
Conclusion
enabled the Arabs, especially in South Arabia and the Gulf, to act
as intermediaries in international trade and to control for long
periods the routes followed by this trade. International trade was
an influential factor in Arab prosperity through the first millennium
BC and continued as such in later times. It became an even more
powerful factor after the rise of Islam and the incorporation of the
primary international routes within the domains of the Arab empire,
and remained so until the fifteenth century. Similarly, the internal
Arabian trade routes and the fairs associated with them helped to
promote communications among the Arab societies in the penin-
sula, served to strengthen social and cultural bonds and encouraged
the rise of a common literary language.
The Arabs had political entities and empires beginning in the
first millennium BC. Despite their exposure to pressure from the
great empires of the region and the efforts by these empires to gain
control over the peripheries of Arabia or over the trade routes, the
Arab states in the south of the peninsula continued until the fifth
century AD, while other Arab entities survived for a century longer.
The memory of these states, and of their freedom in the heart of
the peninsula, remained a source of pride to the Arabs and
nourished the independent spirit among them.
This was a period characterised by brisk nomadic activity, a
phenomenon expressed in internal fragmentation and strife,
especially over water and pasturage, but also involving certain heroic
norms and such shared values and ideals as muruwa, or 'manly vir-
tue'. Its motivating spirit was found in the tribe's feeling of par-
tisan solidarity, based on its common descent, although this did
not eclipse the feeling among the Arabs of their association with
the same origins and common ties of descent. And this period was
not devoid of manifestations of common features, among which were
the first efforts to achieve an accommodation between the nomadic
and settled elements of the population within a framework of parity
and co-operation, as can be seen in the accord reached in the ildf
and the sacred months. The tribe of Quraysh played a fundamen-
tal role in this, and also made an active and wide-ranging contribu-
tion to religious rapprochement by steering the people towards sanc-
tification of the Ka'ba and the institution of the pilgrimage. Men-
tion can also be made of the succession of fairs. These gatherings,
convened at different times and distributed through the various parts
of Arabia, were of great cultural and social influence. This period
also witnessed the adoption of Arabic as an official language
(especially in al-Hira), the appearance of the Arabic script, the
325
Conclusion
spread of literary Arabic to southern as well as northern Arabia

and the efflorescence of Arabic poetry, all of which created impor-
tant bonds among the Arabs.
In this period foreign powers — Sasanians, Byzantines and
Abyssinians — dominated the peripheries of Arabia, and it became
evident that the confrontation between them and the Arab tribes
was becoming a direct one. At the same time, the appearance of
the hantfs in various parts of the peninsula marked the emergence
of the first signs of a rejection of idolatry. In this restive atmosphere
Islam appeared among the Arabs as an all-embracing call, a great
movement and a message for mankind.
The Qur'an was revealed in 'clear Arabic speech', it was at first
the Arabs who carried the banner of Islam, its early glories were
associated with them and both the principles of the sacred law and
the foundations of Arab culture were laid down in Arabic. In Islam's
formative period, most of its scholars of religious learning and
thinkers were Arabs. In later times, Islamic movements were to
look back to the early Arab-Islamic period as an inspiring source
of guiding principles, ideals and legitimacy. All of this gave the
Arabs a central role in the course of Islam's history through the ages.
In Islam the Arabs were united in history, and through it they
created the first state encompassing all of the Arabs. This was the
empire of the caliphate, the only empire that gave political expres-
sion to the unity of Islam, and this for more than two centuries.
The institution then weakened, especially under the impact of the
domination by non-Arab elements (Turkish or Persian). But despite
political divisions, the caliphate remained a symbol of this unity
up until the fourth/tenth century, when multiple caliphates appeared
in the Islamic world. Politically the unity of Islam came to an end,
and even the idea of the caliphate receded, convulsed by the
emergence of sultanates and the proliferation of political entities.
Islam introduced the idea of the umma, the 'Community' of dif-
ferent peoples and tribes bound together by the creed, and the
Prophet laid down its foundations and its organisation. The idea
of the umma remained a deep-rooted concept and continued to be
the focus of thought and interrelationships within the Islamic world,
but the political unity of the Islamic Community was only realised
in the period when the Arabs were in power. Great Islamic empires
arose in later times, but once it had come to an end comprehensive
political unity was not restored. The caliphate for about three cen-
turies remained the symbol of Islamic unity; but it did not endure,
multiple caliphates emerged and the institution weakened, allowing
326
Conclusion
petty political regimes to emerge. The umma, however, survived

as the overall framework for unity.
The period of early Islam was not one of nomadism, but rather
one of sedentarisation, the development of settled life and cultural
formation. It was during this era that the principles of Arab-Islamic
studies were laid down, and then that the stage was set for the pro-
cess of administrative and cultural Arabisation. With the advent
of the 'Abbasid period, the basic principles of Arab-Islamic culture
were established and its general lines were elaborated, not only
through the growth of Arab-Islamic studies but also through
recourse to the ancient sciences via translations made in the course
of later centuries. The resulting culture, formed through the efforts
of Arabs and Arabised non-Arabs, was a culture Arabic in language
and hence comprised the heritage of the Arabic language.
In early Islamic times power was in Arab hands, a phenomenon
understandable in historical terms, since the Arabs raised the ban-
ner of Islam in the conquests and created a far-flung empire, thus
setting the stage for the subsequent gradual and peaceful spread
of Islam. At the same time, tribal concepts still had a role to play
in public affairs in the Umayyad age, with the Arab tribesmen har-
bouring feelings of superiority over other peoples and asserting the
idea of common descent as a bond among them, this latter to such
an extent that it obfuscated the concept of Arabism in public affairs.
The tribes viewed genealogy as the basis for Arabism and in their
general relations gave priority to tribal interests, this despite the
fact that the Qur'an based affiliation with the Arabs on language
and Islam itself made the concept of the umma the basis for public
affairs. The predictable friction between the two perspectives ended
with the triumph of the concept of Arabism based on language and
culture.
It was in this period that jurisprudence (fiqh) emerged and the
sacred law of Islam began to take shape, giving the Muslims —
irrespective of their cultural backgrounds — a unity of values, ideals
and attitude towards life. Indeed, Islam had embraced peoples and
tribes in its concept of a nation held together by the bond of the
creed, and the formation of Islamic law drew tight the bonds of
this nation and endowed it with a unity in history and heritage
transcending state entities and political fragmentation. Through
most of this era Arabisation was clearly linked to the spread of Islam,
but in its later years the emergence of new Persian to become a
language of literature and culture served notice of a development
that served to limit the dissemination of Arabic and to produce
327
Conclusion
linguistic and cultural diversity. It did not, however, limit the spread
of Islam; in any case, by this time the spread of the faith had already
begun to show differences from the spread of Arabic. All of these
factors, coupled with the open attitude nurtured by Islam, facilitated
the emergence of distinct human entities — nations — in the Islamic
world.
So far as the Arabs were concerned, however, Islam and Arabism
were inseparably linked and remained the basis for Arab identity.
This was the result of sweeping cultural development and the con-
flict between Islamic principles and tribal concepts in public affairs.
The outcome of this process was the transcending of the concepts
of common descent and ethnic origin and the adoption of Arabism
as a concept based on language and culture.
Here reference can be made to some of the trends in this pro-
cess of development. The tribal centres in the conquered provinces
evolved into settled Arab societies and centres of Arab-Islamic
culture. Conditions within these towns led to the formation of com-
mon interests and perspectives that transcended and undermined
tribalism and pushed back its influence in the life of these societies.
The Arabs did not remain isolated in their centres, but rather began
to intermingle, a trend promoted by the diffusion and settlement
of Arabs in the countryside after the first century AH. It was no
longer possible for all of them to aim for careers in the administra-
tion or army. Some instead took up agriculture and various pro-
fessions, especially trade. This trend proceeded at a more urgent
pace once the Arabs were reduced in numbers in the army rosters,
and finally, in the reign of al-Mu'tasim, dropped entirely from
them. All this led, on the one hand, to the spread of the Arabs and
increasing contacts with non-Arabs, and on the other, to the
dissemination of Arabic. And with time, Islam spread more widely
and began to exercise a more profound influence on the lives of
the common folk. This in turn meant a more broadly based spread
of Arabic and the weakening of the tribal concepts regarding
genealogy as the basis of Arabism, under the impact of the Islamic
concepts that regarded the language as the basis for association with
Arabism.
Other economic and social developments were also influential.
The Arabs' acquisition of land and their diffusion into the coun-
tryside served to tie them to the regions where they lived and to
weaken tribalism. There was also commercial activity, in which the
Arabs increasingly came to be involved after the second/eighth cen-
tury. This on the one hand expanded the scope for the spread of
328
Conclusion
Arabic, and on the other engendered new common interests and

ties that further weakened the influence of considerations of des-
cent. Urban expansion began after the second/eighth century,
turning the cities into the primary markets for the countryside, as
well as into an important factor in Arabisation. Such centres were
the meeting grounds for large groups of common folk who shared
no common bonds other than their professions and the Arabic
language, and the role of genealogy in public affairs receded, until
it was limited to the viewpoint of certain individuals and groups.
It was Arabic that became the fundamental bond, and this trend
was promoted by the emergence of Persian (and later Turkish) as
a language of letters and culture that was at first tied to a clear Ira-
nian consciousness.
The Arabs had from the beginning a general awareness of their
identity, and after the conquests they had a feeling for their role
in Islam, which among the tribes in the provinces was accompanied
by a kind of arrogance. In their lines of descent the tribesmen saw
the proof of their identity and so took an interest in genealogies
from an early point. This consciousness is most frequently evident
in Arab dealings with non-Arabs. It was, however, a feeling limited
by tribal concepts and interests and obfuscated by the mutual
boasting of lines of descent. But as a result of cultural and intellec-
tual development, the permeation of Islamic concepts and the reces-
sion of tribal ones in Arab societies, the spread of Arabisation, the
rise of currents opposed to the Arabs and the declining role of
genealogical lines of descent, tribalism receded in public affairs and
was replaced by the emergent concept of a culturally defined Arab
nation, one that viewed the Arabic language as the criterion for
affiliation with it, irrespective of ethnic origins.
It was thus a process of development in various intertwining fac-
tors that resulted in the emergence of that conceptualisation of the
Arab nation that emphasised the Arabic language as the funda-
mental bond among the Arabs. And if Arabic was the essential
criterion for being ranked among the Arabs, then it was Arab-
Islamic culture and its heritage that embodied the substance of this
membership.
This development is clear enough from a historical point of view;
hence, we should expect that it would find expression in the thought
of litterateurs, historians and other writers. This is indeed what we
see from the third/ninth century (al-Jahiz, Ibn Qutayba) until the
eighth/fourteenth century (Ibn Khaldun), with authors regarding
the Arabic language as the basis for affiliation with the Arabs.
329
Conclusion
Although they did assign a certain influence to environment and

granted descent a role in certain circumstances, the enduring bond
was that of the Arabic language. They viewed the Arabs as a nation,
and considered this nation as one. Some referred to Arab character
traits and qualities, these being in essence linked to the culture.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the formation of
the Arab nation was to a great extent dependent upon the process
of Arabisation, and that Arab identity was based on considerations
of culture rather than of ethnic origin. This outlook continued in
the Arab heritage and consciousness until the modern age.
It should be noted that the line of Arabisation did not corres-
pond to that of the spread of Islam, despite the great influence the
faith had in the spread and establishment of Arabic. Arabisation
was linked together with the dissemination of Arabic and the spread
of the Arabs into the countryside, and proceeded at a more rapid
pace in areas where the spread of Arabic had preceded the rise of
Islam, as in Syria and Iraq. It was also facilitated by the presence
of peoples whose languages shared common origins with Arabic (e.g.
Aramaic and Syriac). Arabisation was further promoted by the
establishment for long periods of time of Arab regimes (as in Egypt),
under which Arabic remained the language of the state. In some
cases, as in parts of Arab Africa, natural factors of geography and
ethnic circumstances limited the penetration of Arabic, both as a
language and as a culture, and curtailed the spread of the Arabs
beyond certain parts of the countryside, thus preventing Arabic from
encompassing the entire region. When this occurred, Arabisation,
though extensive, was not comprehensive in scope. When Arab
presence was limited to the cities and consisted only of troops, mer-
chants and townsfolk, Arabisation did not occur. This was par-
ticularly true in areas such as Iran, where the indigenous language
and heritage were far removed from Arabic. And in places like Iran
and India, the establishment of political entities with official
languages other than Arabic was a guarantee of the recession of
the latter. And it would be advisable to note here that the Arabs
never in their history attempted to impose their language or creed:
the spread of Islam and the course of Arabisation proceeded
peacefully and gradually. It was in this way, across the span of a
number of centuries, that the bounds of the Arab lands were
delineated.
The Arabs passed through long periods of regression and sub-
jugation. The states that arose in their lands were Islamic, and their
history remained within the general purview of Islam, but the
330
Conclusion
Arabs themselves neither held nor shared in power. It is true that

power remained in their hands in certain periods in one place or
another in the Arab world, and that when cultural activity stagnated
in one area it continued somewhere else. But the general dynamism
and creativity sank to an indifferent level. Flashes of Arab con-
sciousness survived in such local popular organisations and
movements as the futuwa, or in limited efforts to oppose foreign
invasion, as in the resistance to the Spanish in the sixteenth century.
The Ottomans brought under their control most of the Arab
lands, which thus came to be part of a great Islamic empire. It was
necessary for the Arabs to be exposed to the internal challenges of
backwardness and despotism and the foreign threats posed by
Western invasion (beginning with Portuguese naval incursions, and
then those of the British and the French) before the spirit of revolt
and opposition appeared and the modern Arab consciousness began
to emerge. This consciousness arose in the eighteenth century with
a call for a return to early Islam and a rejection of the impotence,
lethargy and corruption in Arab-Islamic society. It began along the
desert peripheries in the Wahhabi movement in Arabia, a move-
ment that sought to revive the role the Arabs had played at the dawn
of Islam, rejected the official Islam represented by the Ottomans
and evoked the memory of the Arab caliphate. The movement was
in essence an entirely Arab one and echoed widely through the Arab
lands. It was natural that this self-awareness should emerge within
an Islamic context, and as was to be expected, it encountered fierce
and continuous opposition from the Ottomans.
At the same time, cultural self-awareness found expression in
a concern for the study and criticism of hadith, in linguistic studies
(as in al-Zabldi's Taj al-'arus) and in some historical studies (al-
Muradl and al-Jabarti).
The arrival of the Western wave had a restricting influence on
this perspective, and the movement of modernisation began —
whether as a result of an awareness of Western power and an
attempt to imitate some aspects of that power, or as a result of an
early admiration for Western learning and institutions. In any case,
consciousness arose in this context in cultural terms, as expressed
in the effort to revive the intellectual heritage and in the concern
for the rejuvenation of Arabic. This was accompanied by the
penetration of certain Western views on the homeland, the state
and freedom. The pioneering and most important role in this was
played by Egypt, followed later and to a lesser extent by Syria.
Examination of the beginnings and development of the Arab
331
Conclusion
consciousness in the nineteenth century and the first two decades

of the twentieth leads one to reject the widespread views attributing
these origins to one part of Syria. Similarly, we must dismiss
opinions assigning a significant role in this regard to the missionary
schools, and set aside any theory presenting Arab consciousness
in terms of a sectarian movement proclaimed in the name of
Arabism. The idea of patriotism began in Egypt with Rifa'a Rafi'
al-Tahtawi and grew and spread there. It played a manifest role
in Egyptian life in the nineteenth century, reaching its practical
climax in the revolution of 'Urabi and attaining its intellectual peak
in the first two decades of the twentieth century. In Syria, especially
after the incidents of 1860, this idea was also influential. The con-
cept of the homeland was at first formulated by drawing together
the traditional sense and the modern political sense (in particular,
as elaborated in French thought), and ended with emphasis placed
on the latter.
Many may have found in the idea of the homeland and patriotism
a means to do away with sectarianism, especially in Egypt and in
Lebanon, but even then it was influenced by surrounding condi-
tions. In Egypt, for example, with its heritage of geographical and
political unity, the idea of patriotism was tied to Egypt itself and
to the concept of the unitary political entity, with some finding in
Arabic (both as a language and as a culture) a further cultural bond.
In Syria, however, with its geographical diversity and multiple
administrative systems, as well as sectarian differences, the idea of
patriotism was not limited to a single perspective. From one view-
point it looks at Lebanon (however defined) and almost adopts a
sectarian signification and an attitude even more restricted than
particularism. From another standpoint it looks at the natural
geographical entity of Syria, transcends the sectarian diversity and
sees its fundamental bond in Arabic, both as a language and as
a culture, and in recollections of the past. This bond may also be
asserted through recourse to genealogy and origins.
The tendency to favour Arabic, in both linguistic and cultural
terms, as a bond in patriotism has roots in the Arab heritage and
in the historical evolution of the Arab consciousness. It was also
a manifestation of the awakening of self-awareness after friction with
the West. As was to be expected, this perspective promoted the Arab
nationalist movement in the circumstances prevailing in the Arab
lands of Asia, while in Egypt (and North Africa), which faced dif-
ferent circumstances and primary challenges, it lagged behind until
a later period.
332
Conclusion
There was also the general Arab trend aiming for a nationalist
awakening. Although linked to the patriotic line of thinking, this
perspective was to a certain extent distinct from it, the more so since
it emerged, beginning with al-Kawakibi, within the context of the
Arab-Islamic line. Most of the representatives of this perspective
were the products of an Arab-Islamic education, and were subse-
quently exposed to Western ideas. Represented in this perspective
was an emphasis on the points that the Arabs comprised a nation
with its own distinct characteristics and that Arabic, both as a
language and as a culture, is the fundamental bond of this nation.
Historical memories also played a notable role in consolidating the
idea of Arabism. Writers drew attention to the strong connection
between Arabism and Islam. Some expressed the idea that it was
through the Arabs that Islam rose and flourished and that the means
to achieve the awakening of Islam was to restore the leading role
to the Arabs. Others held that the idea of Arab nationalism was
compatible with Islam since it aimed to serve the nation and har-
boured no aggressive designs. The Ottoman entity was thus
accepted in the name of Islam and as a force for protecting the Arab
lands from the West. In the age of nationalist movements it was
predictable that the nationalist perspective would be stressed for
its importance to the awakening of peoples and that we would find
those who point to ethnic origins or descent as a nationalist bond.
But these views did no more than strengthen the idea of Arabism
already embodied in the classical heritage.
In the Arab nationalist writings of this period we find certain
common features, such as discussion of the Arab nation, glowing
praise for the glories of the Arabs and their role in civilisation, and
emphasis on Arabic as a common bond. But nationalist thinking
had not yet proceeded beyond the formative stage. And although
there were references to the homeland (and to patriotism), the idea
of the greater Arab homeland found no clear expression. On the
other hand, it is not possible to say that any Western theory of na-
tionalism had a notable or general influence on the Arabic writings.
At a late point one does find references to one Western thinker or
another, but influences of this kind did not extend to the overall
concepts or framework of nationalist thought. The modern views
did, however, stimulate concepts already existing in the classical
heritage, such as the concept of the one nation, the Arabic language
and inherent Arab qualities. It also makes us aware of the fact that
the nationalist views found the material they needed in traditional
concepts and endowed these concepts with more sharply focused
333
Conclusion
modern meanings.
It is worth noting further that the emphasis on the idea of the
nation (which was a traditional idea) was not accompanied by any
advocacy for a single empire encompassing all of the Arab lands.
Rather, it limited itself to calling for the unity of the Arab lands
attached to the Ottoman Empire in Asia, lands which at that time
stood within a single political framework. And let us note that in
the classical heritage there is no connection drawn between the one
Arab nation and one Arab state.
In general terms, thought was oriented towards attacking
despotism, while at any more specific levels thinking divided
between those who called for deliberative consultation (shura), those
who laid stress upon the justice of the ruler and those who referred
to modern parliamentary systems. There were also references to
freedom and its importance. However, these points remained
ambiguous. There was also a call for absolute equality irrespective
of considerations of creed or confessional affiliation. This reflects
the influences of the modern age, although the nationalist authors
incessantly tried to find support for the idea in the classical heritage.
Further, it is not possible to regard all opposition to Ottoman
policy or to the CUP as part of the nationalist perspective. Motives
varied from the Arab-Islamic, to the sectarian, to the particularist;
some were thinking at the level of a particular group with its own
interests, while others adopted a patriotic or Arabist attitude. These
perspectives cannot always be distinguished one from the other, and
they would have to wait until the period following the First World
War for the situation to clear up and for each to adopt its own point
of view.
Syria played an active role in the Arab movement and in the
nationalist perspective in thought, while the viewpoint in Iraq was
an Arabist one fundamentally linked to the classical heritage. In
both cases the challenge of pan-Turanianism was an important fac-
tor in stimulating the nationalist perspective. In Egypt, under the
British protectorate, consciousness concentrated in an intensely
patriotic attitude. The emphasis on Arabism notwithstanding,
thought found in Islam a force with which it could confront British
domination. It thus adopted an attitude unlike the Arab viewpoint
in Asia, and it was not to be until after Egypt had rid itself of the
protectorate that it was to return to a more clearly Arabist trend
of thinking.
The First World War, the complete Western hegemony over the
Arab countries, the sweeping fragmentation of these lands, the
334
Conclusion
opening of the gates to liberalism, the imposition of Western systems

of government of one kind or another and the expansion of educa-
tion — all these factors brought about new developments that in
many cases seemed to comprise a regression from the preceding
period. But in reality they provided a proving ground for the various
Arab perspectives, nationalist and otherwise, and a new experience
along the course the Arabs were taking.
The period ended with views and concepts in the nationalist
perspective, but without producing any overall theory of Arab
nationalism. It ended with a call for the national awakening of the
Arabs and for the creation of a political entity for them in certain
of their lands, but without any earnest appeal for an Arab unity.
It also ended without determining which group or groups embodied
the Arabist idea, and consequently left the Arab movement without
any clear socio-economic standpoint. Nevertheless, this period was
of obvious importance in sketching out the perspective of Arab
nationalist thought.
335
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353
Index
In the alphabetic arrangement, the Arabic definite article (al-, 1-, AI-) is
ignored. Generally, early Arabic personal names will be found under the
first name, while more recent ones will be found under the last name.
al-'Abbas ibn al-Ma'mun 38 Abu 1-Faraj al-Babbagha' 115

'Abbasids 36-9, 40, 45, 57, 97, Abu Ishaq al-Sabl 101
102, 117-18, 120, 134, 189, Abu 1-Muhajir ibn Dinar 66
192 Abu 1-Murhaf Nasr al-Numayri
and state 36-7, 101-2 116
and trade 100 Abu Musa al-Ash'ari 86
end of 124 Abu Qays ibn 'Abd Manaf
origins, as movement 35, 36, 22n36
57 Abu 1-Saraya 38
Qaysites and 62 Abu Sufyan 22n36
revival 123 Abu Tammam 105
revolts against 102 Abu 1-Tayyib, 'Abd al-Wahid
'Abd Allah ibn al-Husayn ibn'AH 89nl3
313nll3 Abu 'Ubayda Muslim al-
'Abd al-Hamid ibn 'Abd al- Tamimi 69
Rahman 50 Abyssinians 15, 18, 19, 47n29,
'Abd al-Hamid al-Katib 97 326
'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan 33, Achaemenids 6, 15
50, 64, 66-7 'Ad 11
'Abd al-Malik ibn Salih 114 'Adan 14
'Abd al-Qadir al-Hashimi al- administration 35, 43, 53-4, 134,
Bazzaz 123nl05 135, 142, 144, 146-7, 184
'Abd al-Qays 11, 53 centralisation 206, 303 (see
'Abd al-Rahman ibn Habib 70 also decentralisation)
'Abduh, Muhammad 149, Administrative Decentralisation
151, 154, 157, 160, 171, 186 Party, Ottoman see
'Abdulhamid II 142, 164n88, Decentralisation Party
184-5, 190, 194-5, 228 'Adnan 11
deposition 216 'Adnaniya 11, 12, 107
Islamic policies 218 'Adud al-Dawla 101
opposition to 219, 254, 255 Aeschylus 7
'Abdulmejld 142, 143, 144 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din 154,
al-'Abid, 'Izzat Pasha 184n3 157, 184
Abraha 18, 19 Africa, East 14
Abraham 110 Africa, North see Maghrib
Abu 1-Aswad al-Du'all 89nl3 al-Afshin 98
Abu Ayyub al-Muryani 98 Aghlabids 71
Abu Bakr 114n80 agriculture 8-9, 13, 55-6, 100,
Abu 1-Darda' 86 138, 140
Abu Dulaf al-'ljll 98 and trade/cash crops 14,
354
Index
145, 257 Arab nationalism see under

Ahdath 122 nationalism
Ahmad ibn Abl Du'ad 98 Arab revival 187-208
Ahmad ibn Tulun 39 Arab Revolt 187, 258, 302-9,
al-Ahnaf ibn Qays 95 313-15; see also Al-Qibla
Akhiya 124, 125nlll Arab societies 214-15, 219-26,
al-Akhras 256nnl71, 172 234-5, 258, 313
al-'Alawi, Fadl 184n2 Arabia 7, 52, 191, 324-5, 326
Albanians 205, 228 emigration from 52-5
Alexandria 71, 84 Arabic (language) 12, 46, 51,
Alfieri, Vittorio 188nl9 52, 107-12, 117, 324, 325-6
Algeria 256 accents 56
'Ali 31 and Arab identity 46, 96-9,
'All, 'Aziz see al-Misri, 'Aziz 107-12, 117, 125, 150-1,
'All 158, 160-1, 186, 193, 195,
'All ibn al-Husayn 303n78 200, 208, 227, 240, 332
'Alid movements 66 and Islam 41, 45, 48,
allies 47 112-13, 228
al-Alusi, Mahmud Shukri 257 and Qur'an 29
al-'Amaliqa 11 as official or administrative
Americans 152; see also United language 22, 36, 51, 52,
States of America 141, 330
al-'Amili, Zayn al-DIn 233 correctness/purity 59, 89
al-Amln 38, 102, 121 importance 74, 84
'Amir 20-1 in education 227, 229, 231,
'Amir ibn Sa'sa'a 19 232, 233
amirs 303-4 learners 48, 49, 59, 96
al-'Amm 47 script 22
'Ammun, Iskandar 292-3 spread of 56
'Amr ibn al-'As 61, 66 status 219, 225
al-Anbar 22n36 study of 151 {see also
al-Anbari, Abu Bakr grammar and philology)
Muhammad ibn al-Qasim styles 152
107' teaching 151, 152, 185
ansar 30 Arabic culture see under culture
anthologies 105 Arabic studies 151, 187; see also
Antioch 84 Islamic studies
Arab Awakening Society 220-2 Arabisation 48, 50-2, 55, 58-74,
Arab Congress, First 226, 118-19, 327, 330
238n89, 240, 245, 288-94, definitions 65-6, 74
299 extent of success 56
outcries and 295, 298 Arabism 234-5, 332
Arab consciousness see under Arabs 1, 324-35
consciousness and Islam 29-31, 41-2, 45,
Arab movement 219-26, 260, 46, 48, 84, 94-9, 103,
288-315, 334; see also reform 106, 186-9, 191, 193-4,
movement 204-5, 208, 243, 250-1,
Arab National Awakening see 305-6, 307, 308, 313, 328
Arab Revolt Arab-Islamic line 234-5;
355
Index
see also religion and al-'Azm, Haqql 232

politics al-'Azm, Muhammad Pasha
and state 36 219n20
and Zionists 255 al-'Azm, Rafiq 186, 198-204,
as a nation see under nation 2l'9nnl9,20, 220n21,
'essence' 239, 241 223n36, 280, 282
identity 2, 94-9. 105-21, 125 'Azuri, Najlb 253-6
challenged 103-4; cultural
103, 105; see also Babylonians 5, 6
consciousness, Arab Badi' al-Zaman al-Hamadhani
meaning and origins of 114
word 4-5, 6-8 Baghdad 89, 91, 100, 102, 121
origins 4-10, 16-17, 23, al-Baghdadl 148
94 {see also genealogies Baja 72
and tribes) al-Bajja 63
Aramaean 7 Bakhtiyar ibn Mu'izz al-Dawla
Aramaeans 5, 56, 59 122n99
Aramaic 56 Bakr ibn Wa'il 12, 20, 43, 53
Aramaic script 22 al-Baladhuri, Abu 1-'Abbas
Armenian 227 Ahmad ibn Yahya 85n2, 90,
army, armies see military 9l", 105-6
Arqash, Rizq Allah 283n24 Bali 11, 61, 71
Arslan, Amir Muhammad 161 Balkan War 203, 204, 218, 244,
Arslan, Shakib 204-8 281
Aryans 104 banking 58, 99-100, 137, 146
Asad 20, 53 banning 217, 223, 285
al-'Asali, Shukri 217nl2, Barqa 66, 71-2
220n21, 228, 229-30 al-Barudi, Mahmud Sami 147,
Asawira 47 248nl29
Ashras ibn 'Abd Allah Bashshar ibn Burd 97
al-Sulami 46n25 Basili, K.M. 162
Ashurbanipal 6n7 Basra 43, 47, 53, 89, 100, 286
al-Asmai, Abu Said 'Abd as cultural centre 44
al-Malik ibn Qurayb 105 Kharijites from 68-9
assimilation 48, 112 " school of history in 90
Assyrians 5 tribes in 44-5, 47
'Athtar 20 Basra Reform Society 259,
Aurelian 16n29 286-8
Austria/ Austrians 135, 141, Basrans 67
296-7 Baybars, al-Malik al-Zahir 124
al-Aws 12 Bayhum, Ahmad Mukhtar 231,
'Ayyarun 121-2, 123, 125nlll 283n24
Ayyub ibn Shurahbil 62 Bayhum, Jamil 309n94
Ayyubids 124 Bayhum, Khalid 161n78
al-Azd 11, 18, 44-5, 71-2, 96, bedouins 6, 8, 9, 17, 29, 52-3
97 and Lakhmids 18, 20
al-Azhar 93 Arabic spoken by, as
al-Azhari, Shaykh Ahmad as 'substance of Islam' 94
'Abbas 164n91 'pure' 89
356
Index
197, 207, 242

raids by 57
and First Arab Congress
Beirut 280
288
Beirut Reform Society 226,
reform movement and 283
245nl23, 280-8 passim
Belgium 230 schools 151-2, 332
Berber (language) 72 sects 255
Berbers 67-73 passim societies 161
biography 85 status 163
Birdada 6n7 civil wars 31-2, 37, 38, 102,
al-BIruni, Abu 1-Rayhan 159n61, 199
clans 23, 140, 200; see also tribes
Muhammad ibn Ahmad
class, social and class structure
114-15
Bishr ibn 'Abd al-Malik 22n36 9, 58, 100-1, 120-2, 136,
Britain/British 135, 136, 144, 146-7
164nn88,90, 166, 167, 170, reform movement's
244, 287, 331 members' 215-16
and Egypt 158, 183, 255-6, Western 1
334 clients (mawali) and clientage
and Lebanon 281 15, 34, 35, 36, 46-50, 57,
'Azuri and 254, 255-6 + nl60 98-9
Salam and 281 and culture 85, 117
brotherhood 156 and power 101-2, 118
al-Buhturi 105 as Arabs 109
al-Bustani, Butrus 150, 152, in Egypt 63
159, 161nn76,78 in Maghrib 72-3
al-Bustani, Salim 159n67 peasant 56
Buwayhids 39, 40, 101, 121, coinage 50-1
122, 123, 134 colleges 93
Byzantine Empire 22 colonialism 291
Byzantines 17, 18-19, 122, 125, colours 298
326 Committee of Union and
Byzantium 17 Progress 215-16, 217, 219,
222, 225, 226, 258, 259,
Cairo 100 286, 294, 298, 299, 303
caliphate, caliphs 30-3 passim, opposition to 304, 334
36, 38-41, 94, 102-4, 121, power situation 215
134, 326-7 communications 136, 137, 146,
abolition of 314-15 166, 257
and military 42, 102 Companions of the Prophet
reform movement's views on 85-6, 87, 199
189, 192-4, 198-200, consciousness 102
205-6, 208, 221, 225, Arab 2, 18, 20, 119-21, 125,
242, 254-5, 313-14 149, 153-61, 185-208,
centralisation 206, 303; see also 214, 260, 331-2
political 166, 183-4, 185
decentralisation
(see also reform
Chaldaeans 5
movement)
Chosroes 18n33, 247
Constitution 163-4, 185, 186-7,
Christianity 18, 21, 65
201, 215, 218
Christians 35, 68, 136, 152,
357
Index
Society for Arab-Ottoman Dhu 1-Rumma 95

Brotherhood and 222 Dhu Samawl 20-1
Consultation Party 258nl78, Dhu Samayan wa-Ardan 21
259 Dhu Yazan 18
converts 30, 35, 46, 64, 67, 68 Dickson, John 170nl08
Coptic (language) 51 dictionaries 89-90, 150, 159
Copts 64 divine will 37, 40
Council of Notables 227 diwan 57, 58, 108
Council of Notables, Sabaean Diyar Rabl'a 72
23 Dumat al-Jandal 6, 8, 13, 16
countryside, settlement of Dumit, Jabr 150-1
58-60, 62-3, 119
Covenant Society 225, 258, economy, economics see finance
302, 303 Edhem Bey 281
Crimean War 164n89 education 93, 142-3, 144, 166,
Crusades 124, 195, 197, 256nl67 185, 257-8, 335
culture, Arabic 44, 51-2, 64, and culture 147-9
84-94, 104-8, 147-52, 159, finance 147, 230
161-2, 214, 326, 327 language of see under
and Western culture 154-5 language
challenged 104 state and 185
see also literary culture/ see also schools
activity Egypt 39, 42, 60-4, 67, 135,
CUP see Committee of Union 330, 331, 332
and Progress 'Azuri and 254
customs tariffs 136 bankruptcy 183
Britain and see under Britain
Dabbas, Charles 288n37, foreign land ownership in
290n47, 292n52 138
al-Dabbi 51, 105 literary culture 147-51
Damascus 33, 43, 44, 54 patriotism in 155-9, 160-1,
Dar al-'Ulum school 151 332
Da'ud ibn 'All 97 Tanzimat in 137-8, 144-5
Da'ud al-Ta'I 56n59 West and 135-6, 138
Daydan 13, 14, 22 Egyptian (language, ancient)
debt 146, 183, 228 61
decentralisation 206, 286, 287, election(s) 34, 37, 40, 192,
292-3, 296-7, 299-300 216, 218-19
Decentralisation Party, interference with 216, 218,
Ottoman Administrative 225
203-4, 226, 277-80, 285, emigration 288; see also
286, 288, 299 migration
demands see placards encyclopaedias 51, 105, 159
democracy 189, 199 English (language) 234n81
Democratic Party, Ottoman 217 English (people) see Britain/
Democrats 217nl2 British
dependants 15 environment 8, 10, 13, 16
Dhu Nuwas 18 ethics 122; see also ethical
Dhu Qar, battle of 20 teaching under Islam
358
Index
ethnic isolation 16 Freedom and Concord Party

ethnicity 160 217, 222, 243-5, 259, 277,
Europe see West 282n22, 286
executions 204, 245, 304 French language 253, 255
exports see trade French people see under France
French revolution 141nl5, 153,
Fadak 6 155, 160, 250nl34, 298
al-Fadl ibn al-Rabl' 98 Fu'ad Pasha 161n79
fairs 20, 21, 325 Fustat 43, 44, 61, 64
al-Fakhr al-Razi 148 Jutuwa organisations 122-5, 331
Fakhuri, Muhammad 283n24
Fakhuri, 'Umar 235n82, 249-53 genealogy/genealogies 10-12,
al-Farabi, Abu Nasr Muhammad 23, 46, 85, 90, 108, 111-12
ibn Muhammad 110 and Berbers 73
Fata l-'arab 240nl01 and clients/clientage 46, 48, 50
Fathullah, Hamza 151 challenged 103-4
Fatimids 39, 71, 93, 123 General Council 283-5, 286-7
Fazzan 66, 72 geography see environment
feudal estates 139 Germany/Germans 237, 241,
Fez 71 290-1, 296
Fikri, 'Abd Allah 148-9 Ghanim, Shukri 288n37
finance 50-1, 55, 99-100, 134, Ghassan 12, 53, 71-2
146, 183, 228, 257; see also Ghassanids 12, 18-19
banking Ghaylan ibn Salama
First Arab Congress see Arab al-Thaqafi 22n36
Congress, First Gindlbu 6n7
First Civil War 31-2, 199 government
First Jahiliya 16 necessity to supervise 292
First World War 245, 302, 303, Western systems 335
306, 314-15, 334-5 see also power and state
Fityan 121-4 passim, 125nlll grammar 89, 151
forgery 86, 87 Greek (language) 50, 51, 91
Fourier, F.M.C. 188nl9 Greeks 15, 239
France/French people 135-6, guilds 123
167, 170, 241, 244, 277nl, Giilkhane, Khatt-i sherif of 139,
281, 283n24, 285, 331 143
and Lebanon 280, 281
and Tunisia 183 al-Hadi, 'Awni 'Abd 288n37
Arab Congress in see Arab hadlth 85, 87
Congress, First forgery of 86, 87
Arab emigrants in 288 study of 87, 89, 90
'Azuri and 256 use of word 'arab' 8
political thinkers 188nl9, Hadramawt 13-14, 20, 61
240, 291, 332 al-Hajjaj 46n23, 48, 50n43, 56n59
see also French language and halijM
French revolution Hamad, 'Umar 226n51, 246-9
Free Coalition Party 243 Hamdan 11, 53
Freedom and Concord club Hamdi Pasha 170
282n22 Hamid, Khalil, Pasha 141nl6
359
Index
Hamra' 47 Ibadiya 68-9

Hantas, Fu'ad 243nll2, 277nl Ibn 'Abbas 95n21
Harb al-Fijar 19 Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Abu
al-Hariri 148 1-Qasim 'Abd al-Rahman
Harran 84 ibn 'AH 63-4
al-Hasan ibn Sahl 38 Ibn 'Asakir, Abu 1-Qasim 'All
Hashim 72 ibn al-Hasan 59
Hassan ibn al-Nu'man 66-8, 70 Ibn al-Ash'ath, 'Abd al-Rahman
Hatra 13, 16 49, 56n60
Hawran 17 Ibn Hubayra 116
al-Hawthara ibn Suhayl Ibn 'Idhari, Abu 'Abd Allah
al-Bahili 62 Muhammad 66n94, 69
Haydar, Yusuf 223n37 Ibn Khaldun, Abu Zayd 'Abd
Hazem Bey, Abu Bakr 283, 285 al-Rahman ibn Muhammad
hereditary succession 32-3, 37 12n23', 17, 34, 111-13, 119,
Herodotus 7, 61n72 189n23, 207, 329-30
Hijaz 14, 192, 193, 254-5, 306 modern publication of 148
Hijazi tribes 53 Ibn Manzur, Abu 1-Fadl
hijra 30, 52 Muhammad ibn Mukarram
Hilal 117 89, i l l
al-Hilli, Safi 1-DIn 116 Ibn Mas'ud 86
Hilmi, Husayn, Pasha 218nl6 Ibn al-Muqaffa' 109
Hims 43, 54 Ibn Qutayba, Abu Muhammad
Himyar 11, 17, 61 'Abd Allah ibn Muslim 51,
Himyarite 21 52, 105, 106, 114, 309n94,
script 22 329-30
Himyarites 11, 18, 19, 21, 71 Ibn Sa'd, Abu 'Abd Allah
al-HIra 22n36, 52 Muhammad 50
Hisham ibn 'Abd al-Malik 36, Ibn Shirzad 122n99
46, 62, 67, 69, 70, 85n2 Ibrahim ibn al-Nu'man ibn
history 4, 248, 253 Bishr al-Ansari 50n41
study of 51, 85, 90-1, 105-6, Ibrahim Pasha 145
148 identity, Arab see under Arabs
homeland 242; see also Idris ibn 'Abd Allah ibn
patriotism and placards al-Hasan 71
Hudhayl 11 Idrisids 71
Hums 19 Ifriqiya 66-7, 68, 70
al-Hurinl, Shaykh Nasr 148 Al-Ikha' al- 'uthmani
Hurriyet 155n48, 159n64 223
Husayn, Sharif 302 + n72, 303, imports 136
306-14 passim Imru' al-Qays 7
al-Husaynl, Jamil 223n37 India 13, 14
al-Husaynl, Sayyid Muhammad Indighan 47
Amln ibn 'AH 164n91 individualism 23
al-Husni, Husayn Taqi 1-DIn industry 100, 138, 144, 145
164n91 ' intellectual activity 214; see also
Hyksos 61 culture
Iran 39, 102, 119
al-'Ibad 52 Iranians 102
360
Index
Iraq 17, 42, 104, 134, 256-60, al-Jabarti 331

334 Jadis 11
clients in 56 Jahed, Husayn 225, 243nlll
land ownership in 138, 140 al-Jahiz, Abu 'Uthman 'Amr
peasants 56 ibn Bahr 59, 88nl2, 103n44,
Shu'ubiya in 104 104, 106, 107, 109, 112,
Tanzimat in 146 155n49, 329-30
al-'Iraqi, al-Hafiz 309n94 modern publication 150
Iraqi tribes, uprisings of 49 Jamil, 'Abd al-Ghani
irrigation 138, 140 256nnl73,174
Ishaq, Adlb 160 Janissaries 139, 141, 142
Ishmael 109, 110, 112 Jarir 95
Islam 153-4, 228, 305-6, 326-8 al-Jawhari, Ibrahim 164n91
and Arabian autonomy 15 al-Jaza'iri, Amir 'Abd al-Qadir
and Arabic language see under 164-5, 167
Arabic al-Jaza'iri, Salim 220n21
and Arabs see under Arabs al-Jaza'iri, Shaykh Tahir 166,
and patriotism 157 219-20, 221
and politics see under religion Jazira 45, 52, 53, 54
and socialism 189, 192 al-Jazira 72
converts to see converts Jemal Pasha 204, 245-6,
ethical teaching 40, 101, 283n24, 287n34, 302,
120, 188-9 303n78, 305
rise and spread of 22-3, 30, Jevdet Pasha 164, 165
48, 55-6, 57, 59-60, 64, Jews 68, 228, 298n67; see also
65-6, 112-13, 328, 330 Judaism and Zionism
and trade 71; see also Jewish tribes 18
Arabisation, converts jihad 29, 42, 43, 62, 66-7,
and Kharijites 124
sacred law 103, 143, 228, Al-Jindn 159
327 Jordan 54
Unionists and 218, 219, 298 journals 149, 159, 222; see also
see also Muslims press
Islamic Beneficent Society Judaism 21
(Maqasid Society) 152, 158, Judham 53, 54, 61, 63,
165, 166, 170-1, 219, 71-2
220n21 judiciary 37, 39, 50n43
Islamic League 184, 185, 194-5, Juhayna 11, 63, 71
201, 236 al-Jundi, Shukri 220n23
Islamic studies 85-94, 104-8, Jundishapur 84
153; see also Arabic studies Jundub 6n7
Isma'il, Khedive 138, 145 Jurhum al-Ula 11
Isma'il ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Abl jurisprudence 327
1-Muhajir 68 jurists 39-40, 313-14
Isma'ilism 38 justice, movements for 101; see
Istanbul 214, 223 also reform movement
Italy/Italians 218, 237, 243
political scientists 291 Ka'ba, the 19, 20, 304, 325
Iyad 11, 52 al-Kahina 67
361
Index
Kahlan 11 Kulthum 'Iyad 67

Kalb 11, 19, 53, 54 Kurd 'All, Muhammad 219n20,
Kamal, Mustafa 219n20 220n21, 234n81
Kamil, Mustafa 256 Kurramiya 102
Kamil Pasha' 161n79, 218, 233, Kusayla 66
281, 282 kuttdb see secretaries
Karam, Yusuf 165
al-Karml, Ahmad Shakir 310 Lakhm 12, 53, 54, 61, 63,
al-Kawakibl, 'Abd al-Rahman 71
185-94 passim, 201n76', 208, Lakhmids 12, 17-18, 22
248nl29, 255, 313, 333 land ownership 44, 54-5, 57,
al-Kawwaz, Muhammad Salih 70, 100
116, 256nnl70,173 as investment 58, 146-7
Kazem Pasha 282 communal 9-10, 12, 42, 44,
Kemal, Mehmed Namiq 155 140
al-Khalidi, 'Anbara Salam state and 137-40, 146-7
224n42, 280nl4 transfer rights 135
al-Khalil, 'Abd al-Karim land-taxes {kharaj) 42
220n23, 223-4 + n37, 285 language(s) 5, 22, 44, 159n60
al-Khalil ibn Ahmad al-Farahldi literary 21
89 of education 219, 227, 229,
kharaj see land-tax 231, 232, 233
Kharijites 33, 40, 66, 68-9, 70, official/administrative 22, 36,
94n20 51, 141, 225, 228, 279
Khath'am 47n29 tribal 12
al-Khatib, Muhibb al-DIn Latin 65
220 + n22, 221, 288, 307n87, law 143-4; see also judiciary,
313 jurists and under Islam
al-Khatib, Sayf al-DIn 223n37, (sacred law)
226n51 Law of Deputies 219
al-Khatib, Zaki 220n23 Layard, Henry 166, 167
Khatt-i humayun 139, 143 Lebanon 140, 159n61, 169,
Khatt-i sherifof Giilkhane 139, 280, 281, 332
143 administrative code 139nl0
Khawlan 61 Christian schools in 151-2
Khaybar 6 land ownership in 138
al-Khazraj 12 peasant revolts in 139nl0,
Khuja, Hamdan 154 140
Khurasan 44, 45, 95 Lebon, Gustave 249nl32,
Khurasanians 36, 38, 57, 67, 250nnl34,138
102, 121 Liberal Party 216
Kinana 11, 19 Liberal Party, Moderate see
Kinda 12, 18, 19, 20 Moderate Liberal Party
kingdoms 14, 17-18, 111 liberalism 215, 335
al-Kisa'I 89 libraries 159, 166, 220n21
Kufa 43, 44, 50, 53, 56n60, Ligue de la Patrie Arabe 254
89 Lihyanites 22
school of history in 90 Lisan al-(arab 240nl01
Kufans 67 Literary Authority, the 161
362
Index
Literary Club, The 223-4, 226, mawah see clients

285 al-Mawardi, Abu 1-Hasan 'Ali
literary culture/activity 19-20, ibn Muhammad 40
21, 105, 147-52, 159, 161-2, Maysara al-Matghari 67, 69, 70
214, 219-20 Mazdakism 92, 102, 104
as cover 220, 223 Mazin 19
literature 88, 103, 105, 113-17; Mecca 7-8, 19, 42, 191, 192,
see also poetry 255, 303, 305
Lynch Company 137 and trade 13
as early cultural centre 22
Ma'add ibn 'Adnan 11 development as sacred city
al-Ma'afir 61 20
al-Mada'ini 56 political authority in 18
Madhhij 11, 53, 54 social relations in 23
Maghrib, the 39, 65-73, 119 medicine 91-2, 142
access to sources on 3 Medina 30, 42, 191, 303
Magian religious material 92 as cultural centre 44
al-Mahdl 97 authority 32
al-Mahmasani, Muhammad school of history in 90
226n5i; 288n37 ' violation of 32
Mahmud II 139, 142 Mesopotamia, Mesopotamians
Ma'in 14 5, 13, 17
Ma'inids 11, 16 Midhat Pasha 152, 163-7
majlis 23 passim, 170-1, 185
mala' 23, 31 migration(s) 9, 17, 43, 52, 62,
Maiuf, Jamil 288n37 73
Mamluks 137 Milhim, Salim Pasha 184n3
al-Ma'mun 37-8, 57, 98, 102 military 34-5, 43, 62
Manichaeans, Manichaeism 38, and power 144
92, 103, 106 and state 101, 102, 142,
al-Mansur, Abu Ja'far 46, 67, 216
70, 97 factions in 134
manumission 47 membership 42, 55, 57, 135
Maqasid see Islamic Beneficent modernisation 141-2, 145
Society motivations 41-2
al-Maqrizi, Abu 1-'Abbas numbers 53, 67
Ahmad ibn 'Ali 62, 64 use of slave-troops 38-9, 102
Mardam, Jamil 226n51, 288n37 see also navies
Ma'rib 14-15 military feudalism 134-5
marriage 44, 49-50 military schools 142, 144, 147,
al-Marsafi, Shaykh Husayn 151 166, 257
Marwan ibn Muhammad military service 140, 163, 232
49n38 reform proposals for 285,
Marwanids 33 287
Masmuda 68 Misr 160
Masons 298n67 al-Misri, 'Aziz 'Ali 223n36, 225
Al-Mas'udi, Abu 1-Hasan 'Ali missions, Christian, and
ibn al-Husayn 5, 91, 105, missionaries 151-2, 255
110-11 schools 332
363
Index
Moderate Liberal Party al-Muradi 331

217 + nl2, 259 Murtada al-Zabidi 150, 331
money 50-1, 136; see also Musa ibn Nusayr 67-8
finance Muslim ibn Dhakwan 49n38
Mongols 124 Muslims
monotheism 19, 20-1 non-Arab 36, 48-9
Montesquieu, C.L. de S. see also Islam
188nl9 al-Musta'In 121
Mosul 53 al-Mustansir 124
Mu'awiya 66 al-Mu'tadid 39
Mu'awiya ibn Hudayj 66 al-Mutanabbi 115, 190
al-Mu'ayyad, Shafiq 223n36 al-Mu'tasim 37-8, 57, 63, 98
Mubarak, 'All 148, 149 al-Mutawakkil 39
al-Mubarqa' al-Yamani 59 Mu'tazila 38, 40, 88
al-Mubarrad, Abu 1-'Abbas Mutran, Nadra 228n37,
Muhammad ibn Yazld 290nn45, 46, 291-2
48n37, 95
Mudar/Mudarite tribes 11, 35, Nabataeans 22+n36, 61
45, 53, 72 Nabonid 6
Mudlij 71 al-Nadim, 'Abd Allah 158-9
Al-Mujld 226n54, 227n55, al-Nadir 18
228-9, 234nn80,81, Nafir Suriya 159
240 + nlOl, 242, 243, 277nl, Al-Nahda 260
282, 287-8 Najran 13
Outcries and 297 names 6
al-Mughira ibn Habna' al- al-Naqib, Talib 219, 286
Tamlmi 96 al-Naqlb family 259
muhajirun 30 Nasif, Hifni 151
Muhammad 30-1, 66, 198-9, al-Nasir 1-DIn Allah 123-4
239, 247 Nasr ibn Sayyar 45, 97
study of 85, 90 Nasr ibn Shabath 38
Muhammad 'All 135, 136, nation
1*37-8, 144-5 Arabs as 193-4, 198, 207-8,
Muhammad ibn 'All 96 214, 239, 241, 289
Muhammad ibn al-Ash'ath 67 formation of 41, 45, 84
Muhammad ibn Yazld 68 concept of 4, 94-9, 105-21,
Muhammad ibn Yazld 125, 160, 196, 200, 245,
al-UmawI 98 252
al-Muhtadi 121 see also umma
Mu'izz al-Dawla 122n99 National Reform Commission
Mukhaybir, Yusuf 226n51 281
al-Mukhtar ibn Abl 'Ubayd nationalism 1, 170nl06
al-Thaqafi 48n37, 49n40 Arab 187, 193-4, 196, 200-2,
al-Muktafi 39 204-8 passim, 224, 225,
Al-Munir 194n46 226, 235-60, 280, 303,
Muqatil ibn Hayyan 35n8 306, 309-13, 333-4, 335
muqatila 34; see also military (see also reform movement)
Al-Muqtabas 230-1 means of achieving goals
al-Muqtadir 39 250, 252
364
Index
Turkish 231 opposition to 165, 189-91,

Western 1, 240, 246, 247, 334 {see also reform
291, 332, 333 movement)
see also Pan-Turanianism and support for 159, 160, 162-3,
patriotism 183, 197, 201, 243
nationality 159n67; see also Outcries, The Three 294-9;
patriotism see also placards
Na'um Pasha 184n3
navies 67 pagans, paganism 20-1, 68, 207
Nebuchadnezzar 6n7 Pahlavi 50, 51
newspapers 149, 159, 166, Palestine 54, 184, 255
194n46, 222, 225 Palmyra 13, 16, 17
al-NIl 58 Pan-Turanianism 224, 241,
Nizar 11 243, 298, 307, 311
Nizar (tribe) 11 Paris
nomadism 30, 52, 60; see also Arab emigrants in 288
bedouins see also Arab Congress, First
Nordau, Max 246nl27, 249nl32 Parliament 214, 216
North Africa see Maghrib Arab representation in 227
notables, movement of the elections for 216, 218
164-5, 167 Parti National Arabe 254nl54
al-Nu'man ibn al-Mundhir 18, parties, political 216, 217, 244-5
247 Arab involvement in 222
Nur al-DIn ZengI 124 Party of Union and Progress
217nl2
organisations, popular 122-5 Patriotic Club Society 259-60
Oriental Society 161 patriotism (and homelands)
Ottoman Administrative 155-61, 193-4, 196-7, 200,
Decentralisation Party see 240, 243, 332, 333
Decentralisation Party and nationality 159n67
Ottoman Brotherhood, The 223 see also nationalism
Ottoman Democratic Party 217 Tax Meccana' 20
Ottoman Empire 124-5, 141-7 peasant revolts 140
bankruptcy 183 peasants 54-6
Basran Reform Society's periodicals see journals and
view of 286 newspapers
decline 164, 185 Persia/Persians 14n26, 17-18,
demands of Arabs in see 19, 36, 56, 57, 99, 101-2
reform movement Achaemenids 6, 15
land ownership in 138-40 religious views 91
Ottoman Islamic College see also Iran, Iranians,
238nn89,90, 280 Khurasanians and Pahlavi
Ottoman League 228, 233 Persian (language) 91-2, 103,
Ottoman Scientific Society 161 119, 327, 329
Ottoman Shura Society 186, Petra 13, 16
219 Pharaohs 61
Ottomans/Ottomanism 135, philology 51, 85, 88-9
153, 214, 216, 331 philosophy 91
ideology 163 pilgrimage 19, 325
365
Index
placards 164, 167-71, 300-2 Qana 14

Outcries 294-9 Qarnaw 14
place names 6 Qarqisiya 54
Pliny 61n72 al-Qasim ibn 'Isa 98
poetry 10, 20, 21-2, 51, 85, 88, al-Qasimi, Salah al-DIn
89, 113-16 220-1, 235-8', 242
quoted 95, 96, 97, 115-16, Qasr Ibn Hubayra 58
162, 274-6 Qataban 14
revival of 147 Qayrawan 43, 44, 66-72
study of 105 passim
Poincare, Raymond 244 Qays 45, 53, 54
political demands see placards Qays 'Aylan 11
and reform movement Qays ibn al-Hidadlya 7,
political organisation 10, 13, 23 114n78
political power see power Qay sites, Qaysite groups
political science 188nl9, 240, 45, 61, 62, 64
291, 332 al-Qazwmi, Salih 256nl72
politics and religion see under al-QazwIni, Sayyid Radi
religion 256nl71
poll-taxes 46n25, 64, 68 Al-Qibla 303, 306-13 passim
Populist Party 217 quasi-military organisations
Portugal/Portuguese 135, 331 121, 122; see also futuwa
power 17, 18, 34, 39-41, 147, Quda'a 11, 18, 53, 54, 72
155 Qinnisrin 54
and democracy 189 Qur'an 30, 240
and succession 32-3, 98 'Abbasids and 37
as problem 101-2 and Arabs/Arabic nation 29,
delegation 103 46, 94, 186
tribes and 35 language of placards
prayer(s) 46n23, 50n43 compared to 170
press 149, 166, 225; see also study of 85-6, 87-9, 108
publishing use of words 'Arab',
property 9; see also land 'Arabic' 8
ownership Quraysh 11, 18, 19-20, 22, 23,
Protection of the Rights of 54, 72, 325
the Arab Community, and caliphate 31, 33, 94,
Society for the 170 192
provincial general council and First Civil War 32
218-19 see also 'Abbasids
publishing 150, 152; see also Qurayza 18
press Qusayy 19
Punjab 119
Rabah ibn Abl 'Umara 97
Qabis 72 al-Rabi' ibn Yunus 98
Qadri, Ahmad 223n35, Rabi'a 11-12, 20, 35, 52, 53,
281nl6, 288n37 63, 72, 97
Qahtan 11, 72 race 16, 160
Qahtanid Society 224-5 racism 203, 228
Qahtaniya 11, 12, 107 al-Raghib al-Isfahani 150
366
Index
railways 137, 184, 303 al-Rusafi 223n39, 224n40

al-Rammada 71 Russia/Russians 141, 164, 255
al-Raqiq al-Qayrawanl 68, 70 Russo-Turkish War 164, 167,
Rashidun caliphs 31, 188-9. 183, 185, 302
192, 199 Rustamids 69
Rawdat al-maddris 149, 150
rebellions 59, 63, 64, 102, 140, Saba' 11, 14-15
145; see also Arab Revolt Sabah al-Din, Amir 215
Refinement, Society of 161 Sabaeans 7, 11, 12, 14-16, 23,
Reform Commission, National 61
281 sacred law see under Islam
reform movement 185-208, sacred months 19
226-35, 277-88 al-Sadaf 71
support for Ottomanism 203 Safaites 22
see also Arab movement, Saffarids 103
Arab societies and Safi 1-DIn al-Hilli 116
placards Sa'Id, Khedive 138
Reform Society, Basra see Basra Sa'id al-Andalus"i 15n28
Reform Society Sa'Id ibn Jubayr 50
Reform Society, Beirut see Salafiya movement 153
Beirut Reform Society Salam, Salim 'All 280, 281-2,
religion 18, 19, 20-1, 91, 92 283, 285
and politics 21, 37-8, 40-1, Salih 53, 71
195, 197, 199, 201, 207 Salih ibn Mansur al-Himyari 70
{see also Arabs and Islam Sallum, Rafiq Rizq 223n38,
under Arabs) 226n51
religious law see sacred law under Salmanassar III 6n7
Islam Samanids 103
Reshad, Muhammad 216 Samarra' 38
resources 8 Samra, Mahmud 249nl31
revival, cultural 147-52 Samsl 6n7
revival, literary 159 sanctuary see Ka'ba
Revolt, Arab see Arab Revolt Sanusiya movement 153
revolts see rebellions Sargon II 6n7
Revolution of 1908 186, 221, Sarkis, Salim 170nll0
258 Sasanians 17, 18, 19, 21, 22,
revolutionary reform society 326
171; see also placards literary tradition 51n46
Revolutionary Society 300 Satfura 72
revolutions 252 Sayabija 47
Rida, Rashid 185, 186-7, Sayf al-Dawla 115
188nl7, 219nl9, 223n35, al-Sayyadl, Abu 1-Huda 184n2
227-8, 242nl06, schools 86-7, 142-3, 145, 147,
243nll2, 311nl03 185
Rida Bey, Ahmet 215 and patriotism 159
roads 136, 166 finance 147, 230
Romans 15, 16n29, 17-18, 56 Hamad on 248
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 188nl9 Islamic Beneficent Society
Runud 125nlll and 152, 158
367
Index
language in see under language Shukri, Midhat 294, 299

missionary 332 shura 31, 33
private 185, 230 Shiira Society, Ottoman 186,
see also education and military 219
schools Shuttar 121-2
sciences 52, 91-2, 93, 142, 148, Shu'ubiya 51n46, 92, 103-8
239 passim, 120, 191, 257
scientific societies 161-2 Sibt ibn al-Ta'awidhi 116
scripts 22 sipahis 139
Sebuktegln 122n99 al-SIrafi, Abu Sa'Id al-Hasan
secret organisations and ibn 'Abd Allah 89nl*3
societies 166, 167, 217, 219, slaves 15, 34, 47
223, 224, 313; see also in military 38-9, 102
placards social class see class
secretaries 36-7, 51-2, 90-1, 92, social justice, movements for
134 101; see also reform movement
culture 103n44, 105 social organisation 13, 15, 23,
sectarian strife 156 101
security 136, 166 socialism 189, 192
Selim III 141-2 Socialists 217nl2
Seljuqs 121-4 passim, 134 societies, cultural 149-50; see
Semites 5 also Arab societies
Semitic languages 5, 89 Society for Arab-Ottoman
Sennacherib 6n7 Brotherhood 222-3
separatism 204 Society for the Protection of
Shabwa 14 the Rights of the Arab
al-Shafi'i, Abu 'Abd Allah Community 170
Muhammad ibn Idris Society of Refinement 161
46n24 Society of Union and Progress
al-Shahbandar, 'Abd al-Rahman 222
282 Spain, 71, 119, 331
Shakwat, Mahmud, Pasha state(s) 17, 36, 101, 134
184n3, 233 and nation 111
al-Sham'a, Rushdi 217nl2 see also kingdoms
Shammar-Yuhar'ish 14 Strabo 61n72
Shapur II 7nl0, 14n26, 17-18 students 258
sharecropping 139 succession 32-3, 37
sharVa see sacred law under Islam Successors 68, 86, 87
Sharif, Ahmet 230 Suez Canal 137
sharifs 254 Sufis, Sufism 122, 124-5, 184,
al-Shawi, 'Abd al-Hamid 257*
Ahmad 256nl70, 256nl74 Sufriya 68-9
shaykhs 23 Sufyanids 32
al-Shidyaq, Ahmad Faris 150, Sulayh 18
152, 159-60 Sulaym 65
al-Shihabl, Amir 'Arif 220n22 Sulayman ibn 'Abd al-Malik 68
226n51 al-Sulh, Ahmad Pasha 164n91
Shinasi, Ibrahim 155 al^Sulh, Kamil 283n24
shipping 45, 67, 135, 137, 257 al-Suli 52
368
Index
sultanate 40, 198, 216 taxes 42, 136, 139, 140; see also
sunna 30 poll-tax
Sunnis 103, 303-4, 313-14 tax-farming 135, 137, 139
al-Suwaydi, Tawfiq 226n51, Tayma' 6, 8, 13, 16
290n45 Tayyi' 22n36, 53, 63
Switzerland 296 Te'elkhunu 6n7
Sykes-Picot Agreement 204 al-Tha*alibi, Abu Mansur 'Abd
Syria 12, 13, 42, 164-71, 233, al-Malik ibn Muhammad
331, 332, 334 106 + n50, 107
administration 53-4, 184 Thabit, Ayyub 282n22,
Byzantines in 17 283n24, 284-5
cultural activity in 151-2, Thamud 11
161-2 Thaqif 19, 36, 54
land ownership in 139-40 Thousand and One Nights 117
patriotism in 159-61 Tiglath-pileser I 6n7
peasants in 55-6 timar lands 139
schools in 145, 152 Timna 14
settlement of 59 towns 6
Tanzlmat in 145, 146 Trad, Petro 283n24
tribes in 44, 45, 53-4 trade 9, 13-15, 18, 34, 56-8,
Syriac 91 100, 324-5
Syrian National Awakening agreements 20
Society 220n23 and individualism 23
Syrian Scientific Society 161-2 and spread of Islam 71
Syrians (ancient) 17 clients and 56
West and 135-7, 146
al-Tabari, Abu Ja'far trade routes 8, 13, 14-15, 325
Muhammad ibn Jarlr 69, and cultural development
88, 90, 105 16-17
Tabbara, Salim 283n24 and spread of Arabic 56
tafslr see Qur'an, study of West and 135
Taghlib 12, 52, 54 tradesmen's organisations 122,
Tahir ibn al-Husayn 39, 98, 124-5
121 Trajan 16n29
Tahirids 102, 103 translation(s) 91-3, 147-8
al-Tahtawi, Rifa'a 148, 149, Transoxania 102
151, 154, 156-7, 159nn64,67, transport 136, 137, 166, 184,
196, 234, 332 303
Tal'at Pasha 298n66 tribes 11-12, 43-5, 52-4, 62-4,
famim 11, 43, 44-5, 47, 53 71-3
Tanin 225, 228, 229, 230, and clients 49
243nlll and genealogy 48
Tanukh 7nl0, 11, 17, 52, 53 and power 35
al-Tanukhi 96 and property 9-10, 12
Tanzlmat, the 137-40, 143-7, as political unit 10, 23
155, 230 solidarity 44-5
reactions to 162, 163 see also clans
Tasm 11 Tripoli 72, 218, 243
al-Tawhldi 106, 107n55 Tujayb 61, 72
369
Index
Tunis 67, 70-1 policies 215, 217, 218-19,

al-TunisI, Khayr al-Din 154, 223, 231, 288, 302, 303
157-8 United States of America 237,
Tunisia 145-6, 183 256, 296
Turkifkation 216-17, 218, 231, missionaries from 152
232, 241, 243, 288, 291, uprisings see rebellions
298, 302, 303 'Uqba ibn Nafi' 66, 67, 68nll5
Turkish (language) 119, 141, 'Urabi 157, 158, 332
160, 225, 229, 231, 329 al-'UraysI, 'Abd al-Ghani
Turkish Club 231n72 226n51, 227n55, 229, 232-3,
Turkish Hearth 231n72 234n81, 235n82, 238-46,
Turkish Homeland Society 288 + n37, 290-1
231n72 at First Arab Congress 292,
Turkish nationalism 231 293-4, 297
Turks 38-9, 45, 102, 124 'Usayran, 'AH 164n91
Turks, Young see Young 'Uthman 31, 32
Turks 'Uthman ibn al-Huwayrith 19
'Ubayd Allah ibn al-Habhab Vienna, siege of 141

35n8, 62, 69, 70
'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'AzIz 33, Wadi 1-Dawasir 13
47, 50, 62, 64, 68, 192 Wadi l-Nil 149
'Umar ibn al-Khattab 42, 47, Wadi 1-Rumma 13
56, 61, 86, 9 4 , ' i l 4 Wahhabism 153, 331
clan of 72 al-Wa'ill, Shablb Pasha
Umayyads 32-7 passim, 45, 70, al-As'ad 164n91
96n27, 102, 189, 247 Waki', Muhammad ibn Khalaf
Arabisation policy 50-2 ibn Hayyan 56nn59, 60
clientage under 47 wala' see clientage
in Spain 39 al-Walid ibn 'Abd al-Malik 70
Umm al-Qura Society 191 al-Walld ibn Muslim 97-8
umma 29, 30-1, 40-1, 60, 90, War of Sacrilege 19
196, 326-7; see also nation wars see Balkan War, civil wars,
Union and Progress 155n48 First World War, Russo-
Union and Progress, Committee Turkish War and War of
of see Committee of Union Sacrilege
and Progress Wasit 58
Union and Progress, Society of water 8
222 al-Wathiq 38, 39
Unionist clubs 217 West/Western interests and
Unionist Party/Unionists 244, ideas 1, 135-7, 153-5, 255,
245, 258, 285, 298-9 290, 333, 334-5
coup d'etat 218 and finance 146, 183
criticisms of 201-4, 217, 225, and languages 159n60
227, 228, 232, 241, 243, as military instructors 142
244, 286, 289, 291, 300, as menace 164, 183-5, 188,
304, 307-8 197, 201, 205, 208,
interference in elections 216, 234n81, 244, 289, 290,
218 300, 331
370
Index
as 'superior' 141, 154, al-Yaziji, Nasif 151, 152,

_ 158n56, 159n60, 220 161n76
'Azuri's views on 254, Yemen 11-19 passim 23, 47,
255-6 114, 218
'borrowing' sciences from Yemenite tribes 12, 23, 45,
Arabs 239 52, 54, 61, 64, 71-2
First Arab Congress aimed Yitha'amar 6n7
at 289-90 Young Arab Society 226,
hegemony of 314, 334-5 238n89, 242, 245, 246, 288,
teachers training in 142 294, 302, 303, 314
views on Arabs 240, 241 andAl-Qibla 313
see also Christians, French colours 298
Revolution and under Young Ottomans 155n48,
nationalism 159n64, 215
World War I see First World Young Turks 215-16, 219n20,
War 258, 280nl4
writing (script) 22 al-Yusuf, 'Abd al-Rahman
Pasha 219n20
Yahya ibn Waththab 46n23
Yahya ibn Ya'mar 89 Zablbe 6n7
al-Yamama 13 Zafir, Shaykh 184n2
Yaman 35, 45 al-Zahawi 256nl72
Yamaniya 11, 33 Zahiriya Library 166, 220n21
al-Ya'qubl, Ahmad ibn Abl al-ZahrawI, 'Abd al-Hamid
Ya'qub 51,'58, 59, 71-2, 90, 185, 194-8, 217nl2,
105 220n21, 223n36, 289-90,
Yarbu' 19 299
Yasir Yuhna'im 14 at First Arab Congress 291,
Yathrib'6, 18 292, 293
Yazld ibn Abl Muslim al-Zamakhshari, Abu 1-Qasim
35n8 Mahmud ibn 'Umar 88,
Yazld ibn Hatim 67 108,' 114
Yazld ibn Mizyad al-Shaybani Zawlla 66, 72
97-8 Zayniya, Khalll 283n24
Yazld ibn Mu'awiya 66 Zionism/Zionists 228, 254, 255,
Yazld ibn al-Walid ibn 'Abd 314
al-Malik 33 Ziya Pasha 155
al-Yaziji, Ibrahim 162 Zoroastrianism 21, 92, 102
Zuhayr ibn Qays al-Balawi 66
371

The Historical Formation of The Arab Nation A Study in Identity and Consciousness

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The Historical Formation of The Arab Nation A Study in Identity and Consciousness

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ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS:

THE ARAB NATION

THE HISTORICAL FORMATION O F

LONDON AND NEW YORK

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered

ISBN: 978-0-415-62197-7 (Set)

Published in the USA by

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publkation Data

Translation of: al-Takwin al-tarikhi lil-ummah

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Mackays of Chatham Ltd, Kent

1. The Arabs before Islam: Their Homeland,

2. Islam and Arabic: The Formation of Arab-

3. The Arab Nation and its Sense of Identity 84

4. The Arabs in the Age of the Tanzimat 134

5. The Arab-Islamic Consciousness: Beginnings of

Rashid Rida 186

6. The Development of Arab Consciousness from

7. The Arab Movement 277

Nations pass through periods in which they experience a feeling

after a long process of social and intellectual development, and that

A nation's history cannot be fixed at a certain starting point, nor

of Arab civilisation. In this sense, these peoples all became part

'land of the Arabs', or to the home territories of certain Arab groups.

They are the protectors of the sanctuary and defenders

The reference here is most probably comprehensive, including both

was well known in its general sense. 12 In numerous verses of the

that prevailed. In addition, there were some who were active in

to agricultural lands, since the tribe's attitude towards the land in

primarily on the genealogists of the tribes, tribal rosters and poetry.

al-Qays, the Bakr ibn Wa'il grouping and Taghlib.

T h e position of the Arabs

Arabia's geographical position between India and the Far East, on

It is to be noted that southern Arabia was not united, but rather

became the focal point for a network of trade routes extending up

T h e origins of the Arab nation

This broadly sketched summary sheds some light on the deep-rooted

of internal trade routes crisscrossing Arabia. These latter routes

latter embarked on a policy of relying upon their own forces and

Samawl ('Lord of Heaven'), a god with whom no other was

face of a variety of challenges, that Islam arose to change the course

1. See EI2, vol. I, pp. 872 ff, qv 'Badw'.

East (F. Dummlers Verlag, Bonn, 1958), pp. 12 ff.

restored autonomy to the Arab lands after incursions by powers

T h e caliphate of early Islam

and spread of Islam. 3

favour. The tribes in the provincial garrison towns were aware of

acceptance, despite the inducements and threats used to prepare

increasingly influential in the life of most Arabs. As one should

T h e transformation and decline of the political order

A century and a third after the hijra, Arab-Islamic society witnessed

to the Iranian heritage. As we shall see, this was a tendency that

27/833-42) and al-Wathiq (r. 227-32/842-7), began to impose the

for the institution was weakened as a result of domination by the

would translate the ideal into a course of action and organisation

T h e formation of the Arab nation

We may now turn our attention to the question of the formation

The troops were settled in the conquered provinces in specially

Kufa, Basra and in many cases even in the administrative districts

their sense of fraternity and superiority.

in the cities) by attaching himself through clientage to a person,

The mawdli learned Arabic and subsequently adopted it as their

a customary practice by the final third of the first century AH. 4 1