Arms Race Instability and War

Arms Race Instability and War
THERESA CLAIR SMITH

Department of Pohtical Science
Rutgers University
Historically, half of the interstate wars identified by Singer and Small have been
preceded by arms racing; therefore, not all wars stem from weapons competition.
Similarly, there are arms races which end pacifically. Here, considering only arms race-
related conflicts, the author argues that war may be anticipated at the end of an arms race
on the basis of time-constrained mathematical stability characteristics of the involvement.
Simple linear models of arms racing are applied to a sample of historically founded
weapons competitions. Coefficients thus provided are used to determine the stability of
the arms races, using a time-restricted definition of interesting stability rather than
stability in the limit, to obtain a moderate rate of successful predictions. Stability analyses
with time constraints appear to provide a method for assessing part of the risk of a general
course of armament.
INTRODUCTION
Readers who in defiance of W. H. Auden have sat with statisticians

and committed social science are aware that asking the right questions is
an effort at least as important as producing the right answers.
Investigations of possible arms race/war connections have benefited

from several sets of probing questions (cf., Saaty, 1964, 1968; Gray,
1971, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976; Wohlstetter, 1974; Caspary, 1967;
Smoker, 1965; Lambelet, 1971, 1975). These range from fundamental
questions about the existence and nature of arms racing (Wohlstetter,
1974; Gray, 1971, 1973, 1974) to detailed conjectures about realistic
AUTHOR’S NOTE: The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the
Political Science Department and the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota for
a prior set of analyses, and the Political Science Department and Research Council of
Rutgers University for these. The author is considerably indebted to Brian L. Job and
Hector Sussman for comments on this and earlier drafts.
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol 24 No 2, June 1980 253-284

@ 1980 Sage Publications, Inc
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254
models and forecasts of political outcomes. Many of the basic questions

remain unanswered. Whether arms races lead to war is one of the more
compelling and unresolved issues.
In the literature of war origins, war causation is presumed to be a
complex process involving many often interrelated variables. Several
measures of military power are predominant among them, either as
hypothesized causal or secondary catalytic agents.Choucri and North

(1975), in a broad examination of the antecedents of World War I,
consider several interrelated processes stemming from national growth,
including alliance-formation and rising military expenditures. Assum-
ing a more direct relationship between capabilities and war, Singer et al.
(1972) correlate measures of preponderance of power (including
military power) with war to indicate that concentrated power is
associated with more war in the nineteenth century and less in the
twentieth. Wallace (1972) also makes this arms-war connection explicit
in arguing that tensions created by inconsistencies between achieved and
ascribed status are transmuted into war mainly through their impact on
arms accumulation. Holsti’s view (Holsti et al., 1968; Holsti, 1972) that
arms racing adversely affects decisions made in crises is coherent with
Wallace’s research findings. Other authors also point to possible
involvement of changing weapons levels in adverse crisis decision-
making (cf., inter alia McClelland, 1968; Hermann, 1972; Halper, 1971).
If these researchers are correct, there may be, for a variety of theoretical
reasons, consistent relationships among arms racing patterns and war or
peace. If such relationships do exist, Lambelet (1971) is probably not
correct in contending that arms racing and hot wars are largely
independent. However, in particular cases hot wars may still occur
sans arms race, and arms racing may stabilize or end without war.
(For example, the Korean war apparently began without an arms race,
if the author’s definition is used.)
On the basis of argument and accumulated research findings
(Caspary, 1967; Smoker, 1964, 1965, 1969; Milstein, 1972; Wallace,
1970, 1971, 1972, among others), we may then reject the most absolute
views-that racing always ends in war (there are also races which end
without war-cf., Table 1) and that arms rivalries and wars are totally
unrelated. This leaves us considerable middle ground. Military com-
1. Note that by definition catalysts may serve not only to initiate a reaction but also
to accelerate an ongoing process.

255
petition has been linked repeatedly to the outbreak of war in many

arguments and much historical and social science research (cf., Carr,
1939; Wright, 1942, Alcock, 1972, among others). If there are regu-
larities in this relationship between arming and war, there may exist
some class of arms races which is particularly war-prone. Distinguishing
such races from others would then become a matter of considerable
theoretical importance and practical utility. This article reports the
results of such an inquiry.
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
Any rigorous examination of this question must begin with a

definition. For the purpose of this study an arms race is understood as
the participation of two or more nation-states in apparently competitive
or interactive increases in quantity or quality of war material and/or
persons under arms. Though a race usually involves at least two

parties-independent states in this analysis-one may be far more
committed to racing than another. (One can imagine a state, racing in
isolation because of exaggerated fears of a potential opponent. It can
even be imagined that a state might race against a friendly nation just in
case the tide should turn, but presumably if racing posed a genuine or
publicly perceived threat to the erstwhile friend, the friendly nation

would eventually respond in kind.) The competition must last a
minimum of four years. An arms race then begins in a year for which
military spending rises and hostility toward some adversary nation-state
has been declared as government policy. (See appended comments.) A
race ends for a given participant when military spending falls for two
consecutive periods, the end point being the last year to show an
increase. (Some exceptions to these rules are made when it can be argued
that qualitative changes in arms probably account for spending
decreases, or when the construction of major new weapons systems
coincided with minor decreases in military spending.) In this definition a
race is also ended when war is declared between racing rivals. So the
units of analysis in this study are individual national records of military
spending while these are generally increasing, and while statements of
national officials indicate-if taken at face value-that increases are

256
made in response to or in anticipation of military moves of perceived or

potential adversaries. Thus a race is also ended when foreign policy is no
longer declared to be hostile between erstwhile rivals.
This choice of definition means, among other things, that not all
military spending constitutes arms racing, and not even all periods of
rising military outlays constitute arms racing, but only those coupled
with hostile or competitive foreign policy statements. A definition of
this kind is coherent with that of Colin Gray (1976: 3-4, 1971: 40) and
others except that it introduces some additional specifics. Gray writes
there should be two or more parties

perceiving themselves to be in an adversary
relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and
structuring their respective military postures with a general attention to the past,
current and anticipated military and political behavior of the other parties.
In contrast, Wallace (1979) advances a definition of an arms race

which is somewhat more specific than the one employed here. The
foreign policies of the proposed racers must be interdependent. Beyond
this Wallace confines racing to the great powers (by the Singer and
Small criteria), to their allies, and to intervals of abnormal military
expenditures marked at the outset by sharp acceleration to growth
rates of 10-25% (or more). Wallace’s definition varies from that used
here in that his acceleration criterion is explicit and the set of candidate
nations is that group of nations of roughly equal power, and again, their
allies in some cases. However, there is broad agreement with the present
study in that races are treated dyadically, and periods of abnormal
military spending and interactive foreign policies are singled out.
PAIRING OF RIVALS
The definition set forth above assumes that arms racing, to be of

interest, is at least bilateral but may be multilateral. However, in
researching several histories for this investigation, the author concluded
that most arms races had in fact been completely or largely bilateral in
that most of a racing nation’s arming had been directed against one
adversary at a time, again accepting foreign policy statements at face
value. (This is not to say that there are not contingency plans for altering
any nation’s course of armament.) There are some questions about this

257
assertion for the great powers before the world wars, but without
exception one link required for a complete multilateral race is missing.
For example, while Germany armed against both France and England
before World War I, France and England did not race against each
other. Usually where there is multinational involvement in racing, as in
the Arab-Israeli case, the ongoing competition is still essentially
bilateral, with a coalition of sorts forming one side.
For these reasons, in this inquiry I have grouped adversaries or sets of
adversaries by pairs. Perhaps the recent case most likely to argue for an
exception to this bilateral treatment is provided by the Chinese-Soviet
and Soviet-American but even here, the third part of the
involvements,
triangle, a U.S.-Chinese race, would be extremely difficult to sub-
stantiate. It is true that the U.S. ABM was once justified in this context
by then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, but this was largely in
response-apparently-to an objection that the ABM system as
envisioned would be an inadequate foil for Soviet attack. Since the
Chinese still have no missiles capable of reaching the United States (the
recent development of a longer-range ballistic missile in China indicate
this may not be so for long) this rationale appears flimsy. (Since the
ABM system is now dismantled, foreign policy generally seems less
antagonistic; and the United States is providing the PRC with a
surveillance satellite to observe Soviet Central Asia [cf., a number of
New York Times reports beginning with NYT, June 9, 1978, in which
US administration officials note an agreement to provide to the PRC
&dquo;airborne geological survey equipment using infrared scanning&dquo; which
would be denied to the USSR].) There seems to be at least as much
evidence for cooperation as for rivalry, especially since U.S. recognition
(January 1, 1979) and Chinese requests for increased U.S. military
presence in the western Pacific.
But this example does show that a country may race against more
than one opponent at a time; in this illustration consider that the USSR
apparently races with the United States and with the PRC simulta-
neously. When this occurs, the question of what proportion of the
military budget is directed toward each arms race naturally arises. Here
I have counted 100% of a multiple racer’s military spending against each
adversary in the multiple race. In doing so I probably exaggerate the
racing behavior of the multiple race participant by some unknown and
variable amount, but not to do so probably underestimates. The 100%
figure presumably does represent an accurate picture of worst case

258
military planning in opponents of multiple racers, since each opponent

could not afford not to contemplate the consequences of absorbing the
opposing multiple racer’s total military force, disregarding the dis-
tractions provided by other potential target nations. So this treatment
may nonetheless represent the way nations arm2, and is the tactic
adopted here. The mathematics of n-party races have been explored
(Richardson, 1960a; Smoker, 1965; Schrodt, 1978) and varying models
put forth. But their availability does not seem to be a sufficiently
compelling reason for their use unless a clear case for the additional
complexity can be made.
THE SAMPLE
There is exhaustive list of involvements which are generally

no
acknowledged constituted arms racing. This is so partially

to have
because the term has been used in a vague and overly generous manner,
and partially because an authoritative answer to the question &dquo;Where
are the arms races?&dquo; would require for its answer the services of several
dozen diplomatic historians and economists. However there are extant a
number of case studies (see e.g., Moll, 1968; Gray, 1975, 1976) and at
least one cautious selection of a small group of races (Huntington,
1958). As the author of the latter indicates, differences in definitions
result in disagreements among experts even on the relatively short list of
arms races which Huntington provides. Although some case studies and
Huntington’s suggestions can provide starting points for compiling a

sample of arms races, they do not go far enough to provide the substance
for a systematic general inquiry.
To attempt to provide a list of all recent arms races which could serve
as a sample of all arms races including future ones, the author obtained
military funding data extending back to about 1860. (There is nothing

magical about this date; it simply represents the point at which national
budgetary data become widely available. I do not argue that there were
2. Note that there is no practical method for obtaining more accurate estimates, since
even if these are matters of official record, which appears not generally to be the case, there
is some overlap in weapons, installations, and armed forces which could be employed with
approximately equal facility against either (or any) adversary. If this overlap exists, even if
"true" percentages of funds can be obtained, they should sum to more than 100.

259
no arms races before this time, simply that nothing can be said about
them in the quantitative terms I would like to use.) Banks Cross-
National Time Series figures were supplemented with early military
budget estimates from the Almanach de Gotha and the Staleman’s
Yearbook. Post-World War II figures are taken from the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute Arms Control and Disarmament
Yearbooks. A fairly complete and continuous record of military budgets
for most countries in the world at any given time in the 120 years from
1857 to 1977 was thus obtained. All increasing military appropriations
sequences of at least four years’ duration within this period were then
identified and investigated through historical sources. In the military
spending data there were well over 200 such sequences for individual
nations. When the foreign policies of the relevant countries were
researched, a list of thirty-two involvements which met the definitional
criteria was obtained. This list appears in Table 1. These involvements
clearly vary considerably in length, cost, commitment, and evident
intensity, but their differing among themselves in not, for example,
involving only rivalries inter pares does not alter their adherence to the
general definition proposed. (Readers may prefer an alternate or more
restrictive definition, or a reading of different historians. There is of
course reasonable scope for disagreement among area specialists,
quantitative historians and other writers on what &dquo;really&dquo; constitutes an

arms race.)
Here this list is accepted as a tolerable approximation of an arms race
inventory and is used as a basis for a quantitative inquiry into the racing
process.
WAR-PRONE RACES AND MECHANICAL STABILITY
It has been hypothesized that a class of war-prone races may exist;

there may be some type of race which, because of certain dynamics of the
spending patterns, tends to increase competition and result ultimately in
war.
Several ways to isolate war-prone races can be imagined, depending

on the speculations advanced on the relations between arms racing and
political events. It may be that some idiosyncratic factors affecting
individual decision-makers are crucial in some circumstances, so that

260
TABLE 1
Arms Races, 1860-1977

261
a. Military competition may be centered in only one part of the military, with a
particular service and/or weapons type receiving the most money and/or showing
rapid change in generations of weapons, transportation and delivery vehicles, or
sheer numbers of items deployed. If this appears to be so, the emphasized service
is noted under the &dquo;principal mode&dquo; heading. Development of nuclear weapons is
also noted here.
b. Cf., Hurewitz, 1969: 79; NYT, March 15, 1976. In the Times, a CIA official
addressing members of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics on
March 11, 1976 estimated Israel had 50 to 20 nuclear weapons &dquo;available for use.&dquo;
Then Director of CIA George Bush later accepted responsibility for the disclosure
of what was purportedly privileged information. Additionally, former U.S. Ambas-
sador to Morocco Robert E. Neuman has suggested to the author that Soviet war-
heads might have been transferred to Egypt for a brief period in the fall of 1973,
preceding the alert of U.S. forces. This is a rather durable rumor. (See SIPRI Year-
book, 1977 : 6.)
the most revealing work in this area would be that of the crisis decision-
making researchers. On the other hand it is possible that there are
certain large-scale deterministic factors which appear generally to be I
associated with the onset of war in the arms racing context, irrespective
of individuals in power. If so, some concepts which are helpful in
examining questions in the physical sciences may be applicable to this
problem, particularly the ideas of stability and instability in mechanical
systems. One way to examine arms races with a view to predicting their
outcomes could then be to consider them as mechanical systems which
may tend either toward a point of no further change, or to greater and
greater activity. (That is, consider arms races not as results of conscious
decisions but as physical systems working within certain bounds as a
result of some initial disturbance, as though arms racing were roughly
analogous to billiards.) One of the simplest ways to do this, if it is
assumed that a linear treatment is an adequate one for these purposes
and for the spending patterns under study, is to use the basic Richardson
models of arms races,3 shown later. If these models are accepted as
reasonable approximations of the arms racing process, the stability
coefficients which can be computed from them to determine their
mechanical stability may provide a useful indicator of the anticipated
outcome.
3. Presumably,someone has worked out the stability conditions for curvilinear
processes, but because this introduces the possibility of multiple points of equilibrium (?) it
seems excessively complex at this stage of the inquiry.

262
To consider why this may be so, the reader should note that in
Richardson’s view (1960a), unstable races which tend toward ever-
increasing armaments exacerbate international tensions and eventually
incite violence. (&dquo;Eventually&dquo; is not defined.) This suggests that
Richardson’s notion of stability, regardless of its intrinsic importance
or the theoretical validity of the basic linear model, may yield a useful
indicator of dangerous races; unstable races may be more risky than
others. But this is only an assumption in Richardson’s work. To see
whether or not Richardson’s stability conditions criteria allow war
prediction in some instances, I will use his stability conditions with the
alterations made necessary by use of discrete rather than continuous
data to identify stable and unstable races in the mechanical sense
employed here. The groups of races thus labeled stable or unstable-for
stability is a characteristic of the race itself, not of individual nations’
participation in it-will then be separated by outcome to see whether
their stability characteristics have given any guide to outcomes in the
,
past, and whether the hints they make about continuing races seem
persuasive.
To explain why the stability characteristics of the models given below
might provide a useful indicator of oncoming war, the definition of
stability as Richardson adopts the term from mechanics must be
elaborated. Stability in this sense refers to the existence within some
mechanical system of a point of equilibrium at which change in the
process under study ceases. If a given physical system, or, in this case, a
set of equations important in predicting arms racing for two countries, is
in equilibrium, its rate of change is zero. In the arms racing context, this
point is not necessarily a point of disarmament, but represents the point
at which change in the arming process ceases, regardless of the absolute
levels it may have attained. If, on displacement, the system returns to
equilibrium, even though this takes a long time, it is stable.4 If the arms
race tends to drift (or &dquo;run&dquo;) away from equilibrium either positively or
negatively (i.e., in an increasing or decreasing direction), then the racing

system is unstable. (In my definition arms funding which is negatively
displaced, even though it manifests instability, does not constitute
racing, and so negative displacement is not considered at any length
here.) To put this another way, there are arms races which tend, in some
terms, to converge to a common point, and there are those which tend to
4. Bounded oscillation about an equilibrium point is not included here in the

discussion of stability, though a case of oscillation which dies down appears in the results.

263
diverge. Those which tend to converge are considered likely to end

pacifically because they appear subject to some built-in limits. Those
which tend to diverge are expected to end in hostilities because of the
evidently unconstrained nature of the competition.
Thomas Brown ( 1971) gives a graphic description of stability in arms
racing which may be revealing at an intuitive level:
If arms racing for countries x and y is graphed on a coordinate plane with x and y
axes, the acceptable region for x is comprised of all points on or above the line
describing x’s current funding. The acceptable region for y is made up of all points
on or to the right of the line describing y’s current funding. If a race begins relatively
slowly there may be a large intersection of these areas within which the race may
proceed.
According to Brown, there are then two kinds of races-those which

display some mutually accepted regions of (positive) armament and
those which do not. Races which show these mutually accepted arming
regions tend toward rapid growth within this possibly large region and
are unstable. Stable races have no such intersecting acceptable regions,
and tend to be damped.
However, this does not mean that all arms races which show growth
are unstable. Growth only manifests instability if it continues away from
a point of equilibrium. There may be arms races which increase up to a
point of equilibrium; these would be stable, although conceivably at

high levels of armament. (Possibly SALT II-type agreements might
represent efforts to find such points, but only if the intent is for dx/ dt =
dy/ dt = 0 thereafter. This seems clearly counterfactual.) Similarly, it is
possible theoretically for an unstable race to be displaced negatively, so
that the tendency is for mutual rapid disarmament (akin, for example,
to the rapid divestiture of the trappings of high social positions in China
after the civil war). It is difficult to imagine a corresponding real life
situation, except perhaps competition in a munition which suddenly
became dangerous to store or deploy because of corrosion, chemical
instability or other complications.
Regardless of the illustrations we rely on, since we usually do not
observe arming nations at a point of zero change in armaments, it is more
accurate to say that there are some races which tend toward stability or
or instability in the long term. For convemence, these will be referred to
simply as stable or unstable races; that is, races whose every solution
remains bounded or approaches zero, and races whose solutions

264
explode. For a straightforward heuristic discussion of stability in the

Richardson models, see Zinnes (1976).
Note that this definition (which presumes the possible existence of
some point such that rates of change in arming are zero for both rivals) is
not the definition of stability used by deterrence theorists, crisis
decision-making researchers, or economists studying arming. It is
entirely possible for an arms competition to appear mechanically stable
at a point regarded by deterrence specialists as unstable in that the
character of some weapons system encourages preemptive attack. (For
other uses of the term, see McGuire, 1965.) This may help explain why
an occasional stable arms race will end in war or why, throughout some
unstable races, open conflict may be averted.
Let us consider what this means for the equations used here to
describe arms racing. In accepting the Richardson models for the
purposes of this initial investigation, we presume that an arms race looks
like:
in which the rate of change in arming for a given country x or y is an

additive linear function of perceptions (k, 1) of opponents’ weapons
minus the &dquo;fatigue and expense (a and /3) of keeping up the national
arsenal, plus grievances (g, h), which are assumed to be constant. (Signs
are allowed to vary.) If races may be so described, some simple
inequalities determine the stability or instability of the race. Richardson

(1960a) shows that for continuous functions instability results when the
product kl is greater than a/3; that is, when in the basic model the
product of the perceptual or &dquo;fear&dquo; factors is larger than the product of
the fatigue and expense coefficients. Stability is thus obtained when the
coefficients for the fear factors exceed those of the expense factors, as
might be expected if caution exceeds costs of military production in
some sense. Then arms build-ups tend to be depressed toward the origin.
So stability is a matter of coefficients in the continuous linear model and
can be expressed as a question of relative slopes. (See Richardson,
1960a; Zinnes, 1976; and Baumol, 1970, for a derivation and/ or a

265
treatment of the mathematics of stability.) The grievance terms may be

omitted from the determination of the stability coefficients because,
though they have a not inconsiderable impact in the real political world,
they serve in this model only to transpose the axes and do not affect the
coefficients themselves. That is, they set the starting points, the initial
levels of the competition, but not the shape of subsequent arms racing.
When discrete data are used, as in this case, stability conditions are
somewhat more complex than they appear in the Richardson example.
(All roots of the characteristic equation for the model must be less than
one in absolute value; see Baumol, 1970, esp. 213-227.) But here much
computational detail can be avoided because there are only two

independent variables, and borderline cases of neutral stability (cf., note
6) are omitted. Rearranging elements for convenience, we have two
equations describing an arms race as
in which signs are allowed to vary. To determine whether this system is

stable, the equations must be be rewritten in the form
from which
are derived. (The x and y variables are in the same sequence for both
racers for notational convenience.)
Assume, as an example, that accurate weights have been estimated as

follows:

266
Then the next step, writing the characteristic equation of the resulting
matrix5
gives
Solving the characteristic equation X2 + 3X - 6 = 0 via the quadratic

formula, we obtain
Two roots are now possible, depending on the sign on the second term in
the numerator above.6To approximate these lambdas
These values indicate stability directly when the borderline cases of

neutral or oscillatory stability have been excepted. If the solution of the
characteristic equation shows that one or both roots is greater than
unity in absolute value, then the equations describe an unstable arms
race. Calculations showing either one of the roots greater than 1 are
sufficient to show instability of the race. On the other hand, if the roots
are less than one in absolute value, then the equations describe a stable
race, one which tends to die down. (It is theoretically possible to obtain
borderline cases in which either one or both of the roots is exactly equal
5. The characteristic equation of any matrix [ cb

a ] is (a - λ) (d - λ) - bc = 0.
d
6. It is possible at this point to obtain imaginary numbers. In these cases complex
numbers a + bi emerge as roots. The interpretation of these results is not difficult (though
weird) since the same general observations about stability hold, and the absolute values of
a+b
| are obtained as 2
the roots |a + bi 2 (cf., Baumol, 1970: 210-212).

267
to I in absolute value. In these cases instability can occur, as can neutral,

oscillatory stability, so in such cases the determination of stability is
more involved. Since in the results presented here no such case (X = 1) is
obtained, no further discussion of these prospects is presented.)

In the above example, the first solution À1 = 1.37 suffices to show
instability. (To show stability, both lambdas would have had to be less
than one in absolute value.)
In the tables which follow the discussion of research strategy and
methods, coefficients estimated as per Ostrom (1978: 55-57), Malinvaud
(1966), Johnston (1972: 319-320), and others form matrices from which
the stability or instability of each adequately modeled arms race is
determined. For races which have ended, a comparison between
predicted and actual outcomes is made, and conjectures about con-
tinuing rivalries are advanced.
RESEARCH STRATEGY
To produce some results, the author took the list of arms races from
Table I and obtained estimates of military expenditures for as many
racers as possible, using the sources described in the section above titled
&dquo;the sample.&dquo; An attempt has been made in the SIPRI sources to include
disguised military expenditure from other budget headings, such as a
certain proportion of the All Union Science Budget to represent military
research and development spending in the USSR. Military aid is
included in the spending figures of the recipient nation. (Veterans’
benefits and payments on war debts are excluded.) These figures have
been converted to deflated U.S. dollars.
The research strategy then will involve fitting these data to the models
to estimate the stability coefficients, calculating the roots of the
characteristic equations from the matrices of coefficients to discover
whether stability or instability prevails for each race, and comparing
these expected results with the known outcomes of races which have
ended. Some speculations on outcomes of continuing races will
also be advanced. Readers who do not wish to be inconvenienced by a
discussion of statistical considerations may prefer to skip to the results
section.

268
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
If the Richardson models above are accepted as a reasonable if

simplified representation of arms racing between two states, stability of
the races thus represented may be determined by a statistical procedure
which estimates the coefficients reliably and allows the characteristic
equations to be solved. However, an ordinary least squares (OLS)
procedure is not necessarily appropriate. Determining the stability
coefficients in these models entails estimating an equation which
contains a lagged endogenous variable, and since arms racing is a time
series process, it probably exhibits autocorrelation in the error terms.
When serial correlation in the errors exists, the variances of the
coefficients are usually negatively biased, so that true standard errors
may be underestimated to some degree. The regression weights and their
significance tests may then attribute more importance to the lagged
variable than it actually merits, and less to any other regressors. Clearly
this could affect the stability comparisons crucially. The R2 and its
significance tests would also be exaggerated.
For these reasons, and the lagged endogenous variables pose an
especially serious estimation problem, OLS is no longer appropriate
because unbiased coefficients are not obtained. When lagged en-
dogenous variables and autocorrelation coexist in a model, the
estimates may be both biased and inconsistent (Hibbs, 1974: 290;
Malinvaud, 1966). This cannot be corrected by examining the OLS
residuals for error patterns, because these residuals do not in such cases
give an accurate picture of the disturbances. The usual tests will then
underestimate the actual degree of autocorrelation. Inclusion of one or
more exogenous variables will give an improved but not an entirely
accurate picture.
must then be determined through some other
Stability coefficients
method. Malinvaud suggests an instrumental variables technique to
compensate for the inconsistency obtaining in the presence of lagged
endogenous variables and possibly autocorrelated disturbances, but
notes a consequent loss of precision in the estimates (Malinvaud, 1966:
471; see also Johnston, 1972: 307). To provide estimates which are more
7. A relatively new test, Durbm’s h, has been developed precisely to fill the gap-to
estimate serial correlation when one or more lagged endogenous variables is present in a
regression. See Durbin ( 1970), Hopmann and Smith (1977), Ostrom ( 1978).

269
precise (Hibbs, 1974: 298) as well as consistent, the IV-pseudo GLS

procedure is adapted here (Ostrom, 1978: 557). According to Hibbs
(1974: 298) this technique allows more efficient estimates than either the
inappropriate OLS or the IV procedure alone.8
In these analyses no constraints were put on orsince it is argued cc
that they may be either positive or negative and practically any size.
These coefficients may, for example, be positive if arming is actually a
stimulus to the economy and hence to racing, and k and 1 may be
negative if the opposition appears overwhelming to the extent that
increments in weaponry are depressed. Of course, the coefficients may
also have the signs ordinarily given to them by Richardson.
RESULTS
As compared with the results of preliminary (regression) techniques

on the same data, these results show heightened contrast. The IV-GLS
procedure yielded results which fall into a distribution which is roughly

bimodal when racing is arrayed by R2, and which shows a strong
tendency toward high values of model fit for national participation in
arms racing (see Table 2). Most racing is very well fit; there are several
cases of extremely poor fit and relatively few intermediate cases.
Significance levels are correspondingly extreme. For twenty-two of

fifty-eight of these national military programs (38%), at least 80% of the
variance in national spending can be accounted for in relatively simple
linear models, though curvilinearity exists in some cases and may
provide useful diagnostic information in other analyses. (Part of this
curvilinearity is introduced by an apparent leap in racing immediately
8. The author notes that the small sample properties of this technique are evidently
unexplored. The assumptions underlying it include that the error structure approximates
AR (1). While this may not be the case, it is not a refutable assumption in these arms races
because the error structure cannot be determined empirically in small samples (in less than
30). Malinvaud (1966: 472) notes that because no methods exist for precise determination
of the form of serial correlation in the errors of brief time series, the choice of statistical
technique presents difficulties which are not encountered when only lagged endogenous
variables are involved (Malinvaud, 1966: 449). The Ostrom procedure seems to be one of
the few which takes some account of both of these issues. Since AR (2) and other more
complicated processes are relatively rare, a technique which makes the simplest possible
assumption in the absence of information should at a minimum provide a useful starting
point. There is apparently no known solution to the small sample bias problem.

270
TABLE 2
Fit for Models in Final Step of IV-OLS Procedure

271
Table 2 (Continued)
a.Though Japan was building a modern navy at a furious pace, hence the race,
construction was evidently funded partially through scrappmg and recychng of the
old fleet. There is no change in the official Japanese military budget during the race,
m this anomalous case.
prior to war, an observation which is substantiated in other data using

dyads [Wallace, 1979: 14-15].)
In interpreting these results, two qualifications should be noted. The
first and most obvious is that, given repeated lags in the statistical
techniques employed, the results of extremely short races are probably
not useful, though they are included in the discussion. Second, a
reasonable interpretation of these results rests on an appropriate
application of the stability concept. Since stability refers to tendencies as
time approaches infinity, discovering these long-term characteristics

272
may be less meaningful for policy than determining whether races are
stable or unstable within the time span of the competition (&dquo;interestingly
stable&dquo;). This kind of qualification may also be of interest theoretically
since Richardson probably would not have predicted peace for an arms
race which was not appreciably damped until the year became
arbitrarily large.
A breakdown of arms races by model fit is made in Table 3 on the
basis of the goodness of fit for the nation receiving the lower R2 of the
two competitors. For category I, the well-modeled races, the average R2
is .91. In category II, moderately modeled races, the mean R2 is .61. In
the category of poorly fit races, III, the average R is .76, because of the
inclusion of some races with extremely good fit for one rival. Since much
of the dynamics of racing is not captured by linear models for at least
one side in the involvements listed under category III, calculations of
stability for these races would be misleading. The convergence of the

system (or its lack) cannot be determined here without good fits for both
participants, so all races in category III have been eliminated from the
further discussion of stability.
The mechanical tendencies of the well- and moderately modeled arms
races are presented in Table 4. Overall for ended involvements the rate
of correct prediction (postdiction) on the basis of in-the-limit char-
acteristics of the systems is an unimpressive 45% (5/ 11of more
accurately modeled terminated races). Approximately the same ratio
obtains when the extremely short races (n~8) are eliminated; there are
then four ended well-fit races (#2, 6, 12, 13) for which half the outcomes
are correctly indicated.
However, in the (noninfinite) short term, in which most arms racing
has taken place, stable involvements may not be much different from
unstable ones which are not exploding at prodigious rates. Consider an
extreme example, race 12, the Russo-Japanese competition, whose
solution is not greatly damped for about ninety years. This sort of
stability has little meaning in the context of outcome prediction for brief
involvements. It may then be useful to sort out short-term stable races
from longer-term stable races on the basis of some arbitrary criterion.
For our purposes an interestingly stable race will be an involvement
represented by a matrix for whose roots x, y the size of the solution9 is
damped to no more than 1 / 10th its initial magnitude within the span of
9. Size is defined as the vector x2+y 2 for solutions x + y. (To the vector belong the
spoils.) The point at which size is reduced to 1/ 10th its initial magnitude is determined here
as t = log . 1/log m, where m is the largest of the roots of the characteristic
equation.

273
TABLE 3
Division of Arms Races by Accuracy of Linear Treatment
for the Poorer-Fit Nation of Each Pair
a. This average exceeds the average R2 in category II because of the coincidence of

extremely well-fit participation with extremely poorly-fit participation in the same
race. (See for example the second Indo-Pakistani race, R2 .205 for India, .939 for
=
Pakistan. This pair of results probably makes sense in view of the growing Chinese
military potential.)
the race. &dquo;Uninterestingly&dquo; stable races are indicated with an asterisk in

Table 4. If a peaceful outcome is only anticipated for cases of
interestingly stable arms racing, and &dquo;uninteresting&dquo; stability is con-
sidered not to differ significantly from instability within the span of the
race, correct predictions for ended races are obtained in approximately
82% (9/ 11) of these cases. When the extremely short races (n< 8) are
eliminated on methodological grounds, the rate of correct predictions is
5/7 or 71%.
Two ended races are incorrectly described regardless of the time
constraints on the stability concept. These are the Guatemalan-
Salvadorean race and the British-American one against Japan. These
erroneous predictions may be due in part to some anomalies in
Salvadorean military spending immediately prior to the 1885 war, in the
one case, and in the other perhaps to some confusion introduced by
treating the United States and the UK as a unitary actor, when there
were some interesting interactions between them during the period
under study.

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274

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275

276
Two of the three races continuing as of 1977, the Korean one and the
Eastern European one, have approximated or passed points of inter-
esting stability. In the Albanian case this seems plausible. Even though
Albania and the USSR still have no diplomatic, economic, or party
relations and periodically exchange perfunctory denunciations, the
involvement appears unlikely to end in war. The race seems to have had
essentially domestic driving forces in Albania and not to have exercised
a deciding effect on foreign military policy. Nor does Albania presently
seem physically capable of the sort of threat which would intrigue the
USSR sufficiently to overcome the considerable logistical and other
difficulties of a Soviet-Albanian war.
In Asia, the Korean case does not seem as clear. The volatility of the
Korean situation should not be underestimated, since the Koreas are
focal points of interest to the PRC as well as the United States and the
USSR, and since the region is one of the most heavily armed (per capita
or per square mile) in the entire world. However, it does appear that the
interested major powers have reached an implicit (if temporary)
agreement not to exacerbate Korean relations. Although there seems to
have been no overt settlement of the outstanding political issues in
Korea which would correspond to approaching the bounds of the arms
race, both the North and the South appear increasingly preoccupied
with domestic concerns: the North with the political future and the
health of Kim 11 Sung; and the South with dissent and most recently with
the assassination of Park Chung Hee, which occasioned a military alert.
According to these analyses, the U.S.-USSR competition has also
passed a point of interesting stability, about 1959-1960, which rep-
resents a period of intense foreign political contention and a prelude to
renewed active confrontation. This coincidence of damped solutions
and confrontation only serves to indicate that there are risk factors in
racing which are not encompassed at the level of abstraction of these
deterministic models. Although SALT II and other negotiations may
indicate a greater potential in the long term for real limits on weapons
competition between the superpowers, the military policies of each
appear inconsistent and unpredictable to the other, an impression
heightened by hardware and software failures (cf., the accidental US
NORAD nuclear alert on Nov. 9, 1979) and by &dquo;adventurism&dquo; abroad.
As perceived or actual advantages in preemption multiply, these
uncertainties may contribute to pressures for escalation in crises,

277
irrespective of the tendency of the Soviet-American race to be bounded.

Malfunction or unauthorized use of weapons systems may also create
crises. These risks are not assessed here, and neither is the probability of
deliberate war for anticipated gain.lo
The unobvious finding of interesting stability in the Soviet-American
race may also be a creature of the unit of analysis: it may be that this
involvement would show instability in some more specific terms, such as
the strategic weapons components of the budgets, and that it is this
surmise which influences expectations about the risks of the race.
In the whole sample of ended races there is a fairly substantial rate of
successful prediction (82%). When the extremely short races are
omitted, this rate falls to a moderate 71%. These results suggest that
where longer arms racing can be reasonably depicted in linear models,
political outcome may be moderately well predicted on the basis of time-
constrained stability characteristics of the involvement.
SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS ON RESULTS
Recently some broad similarities in definition of cases and in

predicted outcomes of arms races have become apparent in independent
research. Rattinger’s (1976) Middle East races (1956-1967, 1967-1973)
have essentially the same time span (1957-1966, 1968-1973) and
participants (Israel vs. Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Libya) as are
employed here except that in this treatment the war years 1956 and 1967
are omitted. (Wallace excludes these involvements entirely, evidently
because of the status of nations in the region or the cut-off in the Singer
and Small data.) In assessing reactivity patterns, Rattinger has not
directly addressed the war prediction question. But he does discover that
the naval race 1956-1967 between Israel and Syria, Egypt and other
Arab countries was a &dquo;runaway&dquo; race in that disarmament of 10-30%
would have been required on Israel’s part to force the Arab growth rate
to zero. This discovery in naval data is coherent with the exponential
character of this race in aggregate expenditure terms; however, this race
10. An incomplete record of nuclear weapons accidents and delivery system accidents
appears in the SIPRI Yearbook 1977 (pp. 52-82). To date these have evidently been little
or remediable ones. We may, nonetheless, anticipate the patter of little fates.

278
is necessarily poorly described in the linear models used in this study and
had to be removed from the present analyses, preventing a direct
comparison with Rattinger. (The first Middle East race, 1949-1955, is
uninterestingly stable in that its size is not appreciably diminished for
about 57 years.) For his second group of races Rattinger finds relatively
little reactivity, which is not entirely inconsistent with a race dying down
in 12 years, as calculated here.
From Wallace’s inventory of disputes (1979) it can be inferred that his
study and this one have identified a number of the same arms races and
some of the same results. The 1903-1904 Russo-Japanese war was
preceded by an arms race by both accounts: Wallace shows its index at

221.0 in 1904. Similarly the group of rivalries preceding World War I are
given high arms race index numbers: England and Germany in 1914,
133.0; France and Germany in 1914, 231.25. In 1939 the Russo-Japanese
race ended in war and is here shown to be uninterestingly stable, dying
down in 89 years. Wallace shows no dispute for Russia and Japan in that
year; however a prior calculation for 1938, a nonwar year, receives a low
index number, 14.96. The English and American involvement with
Japan ends here in war in 1940 and is stable, a disconfirming case. In the
Wallace study the U.S.-Japanese part of the involvement ends in 1941
with a large racing index of 314.58, and for the British-Japanese part in
1939, but no stability calculations were possible for that case. Wallace
shows disputes in 1936 and 1938 for these countries, neither of which
dispute has a high index number associated with it. The USSR and
Germany went to war in 1941 following a race by both accounts; the
racing index is 221.61 in 1941 and again, unfortunately, no stability
calculations have been made for this case. In one final case prior to
World War II, Wallace’s extremely large racing index (495.51) for
France and Germany in 1939 corresponds to a race which would not be
expected to die down until 1946.
There is a certain interlocking of Rattinger’s and Wallace’s results
with the ones presented in this analysis. Also, some consensus on the
historically available sample appears to be emerging in research on arms
racing, though this literature is not well reviewed here. Yet few specific
findings appear to be directly comparable. In general, various authors
have provided empirical support for the contention that arms racing is
risky, especially during periods of rapid acceleration or unusual
reactivity. These risks may arise through creation or escalation of crises,

279
technical accident, etc. (For a view of the war-preventing or postponing

functions of arms procurement in the Middle East, see Gray, 1975.)
CONCLUSIONS
There exists an overwhelming tendency for these discrete data

systems to be stable (i.e., bounded) in the long term even though there
has been a similarly powerful historical tendency for arms racing to end
in war relatively swiftly. If viewed somewhat simplistically, this
tendency toward stability in the limit leads directly to incorrect
predictions of short-term outcome. Prediction is considerably improved
by a consideration which takes into account the rate of convergence of
solutions over time. Then even the sparse and well-criticized Richardson
models produce nontrivial, if occasionally counterintuitive, results.
It is odd that there are no wildly explosive arms races here, as
indicated by roots in the neighborhood of 2 or larger. The absence of
rapidly exploding highly unstable races in these results may be due to the
omission of some of the more likely candidates such as Iran-Iraq, which
do not appear here because of poor fit to a linear model of arming for
one rival.
As Brown (1971) would have us expect, stable races in this group
apparently began with rapid rates of arming relative to the rates typical
of the unstable races; however, since the latter group comprises two
cases, this line of argument is conjectural. It may be that races initially
showing rapid acceleration in arming, which is generally alleged to be
destabilizing in the deterrence sense or with regard to likely immediate
foreign political repercussions, are actually mechanically stable, a
finding which would accentuate the importance of a time constraint in
the calculations. Races beginning more slowly might be unstable. This
may seem paradoxical; however, this development makes sense if
linearity is assumed to fail over the long term or for large x and y in arms
racing. Races showing tremendous early buildups may quickly approach
financial or political limits which cause them to level out, while in a
slower-growing race, the economy and political attitudes have a greater
opportunity to accomodate higher levels of military funding over time.
Stability as convergence to some set value is not synonymous with
stability in deterrence strategies. It may in fact be opposed to crisis

280
stability in foreign policy decision-making, if this discussion is correct,

since rapid arms buildups among possible opponents can increase the
incentives for precipitous actions.
Given the many simplifications and data problems encountered, the
substantial success rate for longer races here is encouraging. Addi-
tionally, if short-term stability is any guide, it may be possible to find
more and less risky ways to race, given that arms competition is a
persistent feature of the contemporary world, although this analysis

does not show exactly how this might be done. It would be interesting to
have a larger sample of peacefully ended races to investigate the
possibility that arming is good war prevention under some circum-
stances.
Generally, the problematic application to short time series of in-the-
limit characteristics of mathematical systems and the difficulty of
obtaining excellent fit to a linear model for both participants in all arms
races argue against the overconfident use of this particular strategy for
the future assessment of risk in any given rivalry. However, these results
do imply that interpretation of the stability of more complicated
systems&dquo; may prove useful for war forecasting, especially if more
realistic models are combined with a more precise examination of the
convergence of solutions within a time span relevant to particular arms
races.
APPENDIX:
FURTHER COMMENTS ON IDENTIFICATION OF CASES
To identify arms races, no exhaustive list of code words or phrases was

produced, as would be required for content analysis. Expressions of competi-
tiveness and hostility vary throughout the world by linguistic group, by culture,
and by time (e.g., &dquo;War Department&dquo; has lost cachet), though there may be some
undiscovered common core of such expressions in English. Instead the author
counted as hostile foreign policy statements any assertions of animosity or
rivalry-leaving these terms undefined-which identified both the speaker and
the target, and were linked to existing or projected military programs. Such
11. See, for example, the nonlinear (and discontinuous) treatments provided by
Wallace and Wilson, 1978.

281
assertions often appear in national budget legislation and statements preceding

such legislation, as well as in statements of national military policy. Historically,
Japan and other nations have been very forthcoming in publishing ranked lists
of national enemies, thus providing some identification of major rivals and a
date for the beginning of a competitive foreign policy. (Whether or not there are
such statements for more than one year, the beginning of the race is set where
and if such statements coincide with increases in military expenditure.) It was
not necessary that these statements be publicly announced to be counted,
though a number of them were issued publicly amid some acclaim.
Examples of statements which would be accepted as sufficient indication of a
hostile/competitive foreign policy:
-The drive to arm China after 1860 can be documented through the government’s
&dquo;self-strengthening movement&dquo; against the barbanans, and through demands for

regular reports on the progress of the army.
-&dquo;Peru pursued no other objective than... to erase Chile from the waters of the
&dquo;
Pacific.&dquo;
-&dquo;Japan intends to get rid of the menace of the USSR.&dquo;
Some key phrases where adversaries have been identified:
-&dquo;30% increase in readiness,&dquo;

-&dquo;outbuild Germany by 8/4,&dquo;
-&dquo;balance our naval power,&dquo;
-&dquo;maintaining supremacy.&dquo;
Statements such as these are not always so clear-cut, so that a different

reading will produce a different time span for some races. Short case studies of
the arms races analyzed here are available on request.
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Arms Race Instability and War

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Arms Race Instability and War

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Arms Race Instability and War

THERESA CLAIR SMITH

Readers who in defiance of W. H. Auden have sat with statisticians

Investigations of possible arms race/war connections have benefited

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol 24 No 2, June 1980 253-284

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models and forecasts of political outcomes. Many of the basic questions

hypothesized causal or secondary catalytic agents.Choucri and North

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petition has been linked repeatedly to the outbreak of war in many

Any rigorous examination of this question must begin with a

persons under arms. Though a race usually involves at least two

publicly perceived threat to the erstwhile friend, the friendly nation

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made in response to or in anticipation of military moves of perceived or

there should be two or more parties

In contrast, Wallace (1979) advances a definition of an arms race

The definition set forth above assumes that arms racing, to be of

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military planning in opponents of multiple racers, since each opponent

There is exhaustive list of involvements which are generally

acknowledged constituted arms racing. This is so partially

Huntington’s suggestions can provide starting points for compiling a

military funding data extending back to about 1860. (There is nothing

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quantitative historians and other writers on what &dquo;really&dquo; constitutes an

WAR-PRONE RACES AND MECHANICAL STABILITY

It has been hypothesized that a class of war-prone races may exist;

Several ways to isolate war-prone races can be imagined, depending

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3. Presumably,someone has worked out the stability conditions for curvilinear

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negatively (i.e., in an increasing or decreasing direction), then the racing

4. Bounded oscillation about an equilibrium point is not included here in the

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diverge. Those which tend to converge are considered likely to end

According to Brown, there are then two kinds of races-those which

point of equilibrium; these would be stable, although conceivably at

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explode. For a straightforward heuristic discussion of stability in the

in which the rate of change in arming for a given country x or y is an

inequalities determine the stability or instability of the race. Richardson

1960a; Zinnes, 1976; and Baumol, 1970, for a derivation and/ or a

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treatment of the mathematics of stability.) The grievance terms may be

computational detail can be avoided because there are only two

in which signs are allowed to vary. To determine whether this system is

Assume, as an example, that accurate weights have been estimated as

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Solving the characteristic equation X2 + 3X - 6 = 0 via the quadratic

These values indicate stability directly when the borderline cases of

5. The characteristic equation of any matrix [ cb

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to I in absolute value. In these cases instability can occur, as can neutral,

obtained, no further discussion of these prospects is presented.)

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If the Richardson models above are accepted as a reasonable if

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precise (Hibbs, 1974: 298) as well as consistent, the IV-pseudo GLS

As compared with the results of preliminary (regression) techniques

procedure yielded results which fall into a distribution which is roughly

Significance levels are correspondingly extreme. For twenty-two of