Risk Assessment: - Safety Engineering Training - HDD ENSPD - 2021/2022

Risk Assessment
- Safety Engineering Training – HDD ENSPD - 2021/2022

Reminder : important terms & definitions
HAZARD
 Potential of a compound (e.g. toxic H2S) or working practice (working at elevated place) to cause
damage/loss to persons and/or environment (SEVESO II directive).
 In Oil and Gas industry, accumulated energy in systems is also a HAZARD.
RISK
 Refers to probability that this potential harm occurs
 Combination of the probability of a damage and its gravity (ISO/CEI 51)
 RISK = P___________ x G___________ = P x (I_____________ x V______________)
HAZARDS FIRST HAZARDOUS EVENT

INITIATING OR ESCALATION DAMAGES
EVENTS CENTRAL CRITICAL EVENT
Hazard :
Hydrocarbon gas
under pressure Hazardous
Event
Corrosion
Erosion Pressure Vessel Fire
Impact
Inspection Corrosion Detection Detection Plant Detection

Allowance Process ESD Separation and
Shutdown Deluge
PREVENTION MITIGATION
BARRIERS LEAK BARRIERS
2 - Safety Engineering Training – HDD ENSPD - 2021/2022
E&P related major incidents(1980 – 2008)
300+
H2S Release
Gaoqiao, China
Guadalajara
200 Sewer Hexane
explosion
Piper Alpha
Fatalities
A. Kielland
100
Colombia Ocensa
Ocean Ranger pipeline bombing
S China Sea
P-36
North Sea
Petrobras Venezuela
rig North Sea Mobil Nigeria expl.
Mumbai High
Total
1980 ‘85 ‘90 ‘95 ‘00 ‘05

E&P Technological risk management
Addressed . Not addressed
 
 Operation phase risks
 Occupational risks *
 Risk associated with the use or
processing of toxic , flammable or  Trips, slips, falls
explosive substances.  Driving
 Risk associated with accidental loss of  Routine lifting or transfer
containment  Short-term exposure to chemicals
 Risk associated with structural damage  Long term exposure to chemicals
or stability impairment  Construction risks
 Risk associated with natural hazards  Unless modifications required for
construction impact future ops.
 Unless construction crew exposed to
existing facilities risks.
* When Individual risk is the criterion considered some risks such as those
associated with travelling to/from the facilities should be taken into account.

Risk Management Framework
Risk Management
Risk Assessment Risk Treatment
Risk analysis Risk Evaluation Risk Reduction

(Identification) (Acceptability measures
(Estimation) criteria)
Acceptable Risk (ALARP)
ALARP
As Low As Reasonably Practicable Risk Communication

WHY PERFORMING TECHNOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT?
•TO MAKE ENGINEERING DECISIONS (TO BE UNDER CONTROL!)

•TO GET PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE
•TO COMPLY WITH REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS (when applicable)
TECHNOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT PERMITS TO:
ESTIMATING RISKS LEVELS AND ASSESSING THEIR SIGNIFICANCE (helps to decide where to reduce or not level of
risks).
IDENTIFYING THE MAIN CONTRIBUTORS (Suggests possible targets for Risk Reduction Measures).
CHECKING DESIGN ROBUSTNESS (Design based on Total specifications)
DEFINING DESIGN ACCIDENTS SCENARIOS (Provides design basis for fire protection, emergency evacuation,
emergency planning and training).
COMPARING DESIGN OPTIONS (inputs for the selection of design concepts).
EVALUATING RISK REDUCTION MEASURES (linked with Cost Benefit analysis to choose the most effective ways of
reducing risks)
IDENTIFYING SAFETY CRITICAL PROCEDURES AND EQUIPMENTS
IDENTIFYING ACCIDENT PRECURSORS (may be monitored during operation to provide warning of adverse trends in
accidents).
DEMONSTRATING RISK ACCEPTABILITY TO REGULATORS, PUBLIC AND WORKFORCE

Main elements

Main elements
1. Continuous process through

development cycle
2. Two parallel approaches
3. Risk acceptance criteria
4. «ALARP» demonstration
5. Major risk register & Action Plan

1. Continuous Process: repeated during life cycle
Life cycle/ Project phases
Sism. Prod./
Feasibility
Geolog. Pre- Basic Detail. Constr. Dev.pmt Operation Major
Geophy Concept. Aband.
Explo. project eng. eng. Install. Dri.ng Minor Modif.
Dril.ng Studies
Modif.
HAZID
1 1 U U S S U U 1
PRELIMINARY
RISK Ø or S Ø or S 1 or U S S U U 1
Activities
ASSESS.
QUANTIFIED
RISK Ø or S 1 or U U U U 1
ASSESS.
ALARP
DEMONSTR. Ø or S 1 or U U U U 1
ACTION
PLAN Ø or S 1 or U U S S U U 1
1 : First issue
Abandonment treated as new projects
U: Update
Major modifs treated as project update
S: Specific elements which potentially impact operational phase
2. Two approaches : Scenarios & QRA
Figure 3 Hazard Identification
Hazard Identification RECOMMENDED
• Permanently
Step 1 manned
Scenarios
Scenarios &
&
Hazardous
Hazardous Events
Events • Potential impact on
Critical Events
Critical Register
Events Register
public safety
• Novel technology &
Preliminary
Preliminary concept
Step 2 Risk
Risk Assessment
Assessment
Detailed Analysis Quantitative

Detailed Analysis
of Scenarios Risk Quantitative
Analysis (QRA)
Step 3 of Scenarios
Human, Environment
Risk Analysis (QRA) ! MANDATORY for
Individual
Safety:– RiskRisk
Individual
& Assets all developments
Scenario and existing
Scenario
Scenario Individual Risk
Based Risk RiskAssessment
Risk Evaluation
Assessment
Evaluation
of
Individual Risk
facilities
Assessment
Step 4
Iterations Risk Acceptability? Iterations
Risk Reduction Workshop, Cost Benefit Analysis
ALARP Demonstration QRA
Step 5 Risk Register Action Plan,

Action Plan
Risk Register
Scenario based method Common to both methods QRA method

3. E&P Risk Acceptance Criteria
Scenarios Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

 Matrices  Individual Risk per Annum (IRPA) levels
 Level 1 FIRST PRIORITY  LIMIT

 Level 2 ALARP  ALARP REGION
 Level 3 ACCEPTABLE  BROADLY ACCEPTABLE
Personnel
Public
-3-3
1010
LIMIT
Increasing Individual Risk Per Annum

10-4-4
10
LIMIT
TARGET
-5
Tolerable
10
10-5 If ALARP
3. Assets* Tolerable
If ALARP
2. Environment -6
10-6
10
1. Human Broadly Acceptable Level

Probability of occurrence of scenario
Occurrence
Probability DEFINITION /year
Likely Could occur several times during over plant lifetime > 10-2
Could occur once for every 10 to 20 similar plants over 20
Unlikely to 30 years of plant lifetime 10-2 - 10-3
One time per year for at least 1000 units.
One time for every 100 to 200 similar plants in the world
Very unlikely over 20 to 30 years of plant lifetime
Has already occurred in the company but corrective action 10-3 - 10-4
has been taken
Extremely Has already occurred in the industry but corrective action
unlikely has been taken 10-4 - 10-5
Event physically possible but has never or seldom occurred
Remote over a period of 20 to 30 years for a large amount of sites (> < 10-5
few thousands, ex: wagons, process drums,…)

3. Frequency Levels: Comparison with other risks
Source R2P2: REDUCING RISKS, PROTECTING PEOPLE
ANNUAL RISK OF DEATH FOR VARIOUS CAUSES AVERAGED OVER THE ENTIRE POPULATION
Cause of Death Annual Risk Risk per Year Basis of Risk and source
Cancer 1 in 387 2.58E-03 Annual Abstracts of Statistics (2001) UK
All forms of road accidents 1 in 16800 5.95E-05 Annual Abstracts of Statistics (2001) UK
Gas Incident (fire,

explosion, CO poisoning) : 1 in 1510 000 6.62E-07 HSE (2000)
domestic gas
Office of national statistics England and Wales

Lightning 1 in 18700000 5.35E-08
1995-99
All types of accidents and

1 in 4064 2.46E-04 Annual Abstracts of Statistics (2001) UK
all other external causes
Accidents at home 1 in 10000 1.00E-04 England and Wales 1984/ Henderson 1987
ANNUAL RISK OF DEATH FROM INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS
Industry Sector Annual Risk Risk per Year Basis of Risk and source
Mining 1 in 9200 1.09E-04 HSE book 2001 UK
Construction 1 in 17000 5.88E-05 HSE book 2001 UK
Manufacture of basic
metals and fabricated metal 1 in 34000 2.94E-05 HSE book 2001 UK
products
Agriculture, hunting, … 1 in 17200 5.81E-05 HSE book 2001 UK
Service Industry 1 in 333000 3.00E-06 HSE book 2001 UK
ALL locations, All personnels,

OGP Period 2002-2006 incl transport
(Onshore/Offshore)
FAR(/1E08 h) 4.44
IRPA(/y) 8.88E-05
Severity of potential consequences (DIRSEC08)
PHYSICAL INJURY
SEVERITY POLLUTION MATERIAL
On site or external
Moderate On site : No permanent effect

< 1 person (1p.) in IDLH zone
Spill or release of pollutant requiring a < 200 K€
(Immediately Dangerous to Life and
declaration to authorities, but without
Health = threshold for permanent
External : no effect environmental consequences
injuries)
Serious On site : permanent effects

On site: < 100 p. in IDLH zone Moderate pollution within site limits 200 K€ - 2 M€
External : non-permanent effects
On site: < 100 p. in LC1 % (1%

Major On site : one fatality and/or lethality) zone
Significant pollution external to the site
several permanent invalidities
2 M€ - 10 M€
On site + external :
Evacuation of persons
External : permanent effects
< 500 p. in SEI zone
Catastrophic On site : several fatalities
Important pollution with reversible
100 to 500 p. in LC1% zone (max. environmental consequences external 10 M€ - 100M€
External : one fatality
100 p. ext.) or 500 to 1000 p. in SEI to the site
many physical injuries
zone
Disastrous On site : many fatalities Major and sustained pollution external
> 500 persons in LC1% zone to the site and/or extensive loss of >100 M€
External : several fatalities aquatic life
> 1000 p. in IDLH zone

Human Severity Levels (GS-EP-SAF-041)
Severity Level Parameter Number of people exposed Additional Criteria
Onsite External (Number of people
Onsite + External)
Moderate SEI - -
Serious SEI 1 to 99 1 to 9
Major* SEI 100 to 499 10 to 99 Below 500

LC1% 1 to 99 1 to 9
Fatality 1 -
Catastrophic* SEI 500 to 999 100 to 999 Below 1000

LC1% 100 to 499 10 to 99 Below 500
Fatality 2 to 5 1
Disastrous* SEI Above 999 Above 999 Above 1000
LC1% Above 499 Above 99 Above 500

Fatality Above 5 Above 2 -
Note* Worst case combination should be considered for establishing the damage severity

Environment & Asset Severity Levels (GS-EP-SAF-041)
Severity level Pollution Event Intensity expressed as Material damage

spill volume event
Moderate Spill or release of pollutant requiring a < 0.1 bbl
notification to authorities, but without
environmental consequences.
< 200,000 €
Serious Moderate spill within site limits 0.1 -10 bbls
200,000 –
2,000,000 €
Major Significant pollution with external to the 10 – 200 bbls 2,000,000 –
site. Evacuation of persons.
10,000,000 €
Catastrophic Important pollution with reversible 200 – 2000 bbls
environmental consequences external 10,000,000 –
to the site. 100,000,000 €
Disastrous Major and sustained pollution external to > 2000 bbls
the site and/ or extensive loss of
aquatic life. > 100,000,000 €

4. As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)
demonstration
Likely
Unlikely
Very unlikely With mitigation

measure
Without mitigation
measure
Extremely unlikely
DM2 DM1
Remote DM2’
With mitigation
Moderate Serious Major Catastrophic Disastrous
measure

4. As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)
demonstration
Risk Tolerability
Criterion $
ALARP ?
Risk Cost
Intolerable ALARP Disproportionate

Design Options
The risk is only acceptable if risk reduction measures are impractical
or if their cost is grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained

ALARP Principle
Money Spent on Safety (T.Kletz 1985: safety and business economics-
Chem.Eng)
Money got back in return
Good
“Good Business
Business” & Bad Business Going out of
Bad Humanity Good Humanity Good Business
Humanity
Money spent on safety

5. Major Risk Register & Action Plan
Major Technological Risk Register

 Major scenarios
 Individual Risk Per Annum (QRA)
Action plan & schedule

 Elaborate an action plan and proposed schedule/priorities for the
implementation of the risk reduction measures.

What is a scenario?

A scenario is a sequence of events
Definition : Complete set of causes (failure/fault events) that may combine to cause
one Central Hazardous Event and result in the occurrence of one specific damage (see
blue outline on diagram).
DM1
IE1 OUT1
SE1 DM2
IE2 OUT2
CHE
OUT3
Legend:
SE2
IE: Initiating Event
SE: Secondary Event
OUT4
CHE: Central Hazardous Event
OUT: Outcome
DM: Damage
Estimation of damage frequency

Estimation of damage severity
Examples: Scenarios associated with
1 Blow out
2. Process release (small, medium, large)
3. Specific Process hazards (tank overfilling))
4. External impact (loss of HC containment)
5. External impact (Structural damage or stability
impairment)
6. Scenarios associated with Natural hazards
- Extreme environmental events
- Seismic events
- Geo-hazards
- Subsidence events

Example of Process release scenarios – Small release
leading to un-isolated jet fire
CORROSION
BLOWOUT
EROSION Successful Immediate Delayed Explosion on

Isolation? Ignition? ignition? delayed ignition?
OR GENERIC
VIBRATION FAILURE
EVENT OUTCOMES
MINOR
IMPACT
FITTINGS JET FIRE

LEAK
OR INTEGRITY VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION

OVER-
FAILURES
PRESSURE
UNDER-
PRESSURE FLASH FIRE or POOL FIRE
SPECIFIC Yes
OVER OR PROCESS LOSS OF
FILLING HAZARDS HYDROCARBON
OR
DISPERSION or SPILL
CONTAINMENT
VENTING SMALL RELEASE
TO ATM. No
(UNISOLATED) JETFIRE
SIS
FAILURE
VAPOUR CLOUD
EXPLOSION
MAJOR (UNISOLATED)
HUMAN
DROPPED FAILURES
OBJECTS FLASH FIRE/ POOL FIRE
MAJOR (UNISOLATED)
COLLISION OR EXTERNAL
IMPACTS
DISPERSION or SPILL
AIRCRAFT (UNISOLATED)
IMPACT
SNOW, ICE
HIGH WIND
NATARUAL
NATURAL
WAVE OR
HAZARDS
CURRENT
FLOODING Fault Tree Event Tree

ICE, SOIL
MOVEMENT

Example of major incident scenario
1 Blow out
2. Process release (small, medium, large)
3. Specific Process hazards
4.
External impact (loss of HC
containment)
5. External impact (Structural damage or stability
impairment)
6. Scenarios associated with Natural hazards
- Extreme environmental events
- Seismic events
- Geo-hazards
- Subsidence events
25
25 - -Safety
SafetyEngineering Training––Paris
EngineeringTraining HDD–ENSPD
France-–2021/2022
18th - 21st January 2010
Bombay High North Offshore Complex
Bombay
High

Bombay High Offshore North Platform (2005)
Date: 27 July 2005
On 27 July 2005, the vessel had come alongside MHN platform to transfer an
injured person to the platform via personnel basket.
The vessel was considerably large, and at the time was experiencing problems
with one of the azimuth thrusters - it was therefore under manual control during
the approach. At some stage the helideck of the vessel struck one or more of the
exposed unprotected risers of the platform.
The risers of the MHN platform (five 12" export gas lift at 1200 psi, and ten 14/16"
well fluid import) were situated outside the jacket, adjacent to the boat landing
stage at spider deck level.
Riser protection guards were fitted just above sea level, but these were only
designed for smaller offshore supply vessels.

27 July 2005
28 - -Safety
SafetyEngineering Training––Paris
EngineeringTraining HDD–ENSPD
France-–2021/2022
18th - 21st January 2010
What is the scenario here? Intermediate
Events
Barriers Barriers
Initiating Events
Hazards
Central Incident
Critical Event
Causes Consequences Esclation
Initiating Events Central critical event

 Close proximity vessel  Oil and gas release
operation.
Damages
Hazard outcome  Human: 22 fatalities, several injured
 Fire, explosion  Environment: Oil spill pollution
 Asset: Complete destruction of
platform.

…. after the fire.

Scenario Based Approach

General principles for Scenario Based Risk Assessment
B – Reducing hazard potential

IN
A – Identification of hazards (amount of dangerous material, alternate
processes,…)
§1 – Identification of hazards
C – Preliminary estimates of all risks
D – Plotting of potential accident §2 – Preliminary evaluation of risks

scenarios on the selection matrix
(Qualitative Risk Analysis)
E - Selection of scenarios to be
studied in detail

Preliminary Risk Assessment - Objectives
Identify all scenarios based on systematic hazard identification studies.
Conservatively estimate the damage (human, environment, asset)

associated with all scenario event outcomes (qualitatively or semi-
quantitatively).
Conservatively estimate the likelihood of damage associated with all

scenario event outcomes (qualitatively or semi-quantitatively).
Perform a screening based on the Screening matrix to establish the number

of scenarios to be studied in detail.

Screening matrix
Likely
Scenarios to be
10-2/yr
studied in Detail
Unlikely
Likely 10-3/yr
Scenarios to be
10-2/yr Very unlikely
Occurrence Unlikely studied in Detail
10-4/yr
Likely 10-3/yr Extremely

unlikely 10-5Scenarios Scenarios
to be with a generally
10-2/yr Very unlikely /yr
studied inacceptable
Detail risk level
-4
10 /yr Remote
Unlikely Asset
10-3/yr Extremely
Moderate
Scenarios with Serious
a generally Major Catastrophic Disastrous
unlikely 10-5/yr
Very unlikely acceptable risk level
Remote
10-4/yr
Environment
Extremely Moderate Serious Major Catastrophic Disastrous
unlikely 10-5/yr Scenarios with a generally
acceptable risk level
Remote
Human
Severity
Detailed Risk Analysis of Scenarios
Qualitative Quantitative
Second Priority First Priority
Risk Management Fault Tree – Event Tree

Sheets Likely
Analysis
Scenarios to be
10-2/yr
studied in Detail
Unlikely
Likely 10-3/yr
Scenarios to be
10-2/yr Very unlikely
studied in Detail
Unlikely 10-4/yr
Likely 10-3/yr Extremely

unlikely 10-5Scenarios Scenarios
to be with a generally
10-2/yr Very unlikely /yr
studied inacceptable
Detail risk level
10 -4/yr Remote
Unlikely Asset
10-3/yr Extremely
Very unlikely acceptable risk level
Remote
10-4/yr
Environment
Extremely Moderate Serious Major Catastrophic Disastrous
acceptable risk level
Remote
Human
General principles for risk analysis
B – Reducing hazard potential

IN
A – Identification of hazards (amount of dangerous material, alternate
processes,…)
§1 – Identification of hazards
C – Preliminary estimates of all risks
D – Plotting of potential accident §2 – Preliminary evaluation of risks

scenarios on the selection matrix (Qualitative Risk Analysis)
E - Selection of scenarios to be
studied in detail
§3 – Detailed and quantified analysis of risks
F – Quantification of risks (probability,
impacts, damages) and plotting of G – Detailed and iterative examination of risk
scenarios on the risk-ranking matrix reduction until the ALARP level
( As Low As Reasonably Practicable) is obtained

Risk Ranking Matrix
Probability of occurrence of the scenarios (frequency)

Likely
Level 1 risk
Unlikely (first priority)
Very unlikely
Level 2 risk
(tolerable if
ALARP)
Extremely unlikely Level 3 risk
(acceptable)
Remote

Severity of consequences
Quantification of Risks
Estimation of Damage Frequency : Event Tree Approach
Initiating event Secondary event

Delayed
ignition
Damage 1 Human impact
Deluge
Barriers Damage 2
failure Environmental
Operator error
Outcome 1 Damage 3 Asset
Detection
overpressure Yes Explosion
failure
Corrosion
Yes Damage 1 Human impact
Inst. Protection Scenario S1 Outcome 2 Damage 2 Environmental
Erosion System failure
Yes No Fire Damage 3 Asset
Central Outcome 3
No Limited fire
Hazardous Yes
Outcome 4 etc.
Explosion
Event Yes
Outcome 5 etc.
Loss of containment No Toxic dispersion
No
Large release
Outcome 6 etc.
No No impact
Fault Tree Event Tree Escalation

(Causes) (Consequences) (Damages)
Estimation of Damage Frequency
Estimation of Damage frequency involves
 Estimation of Central Hazardous Event frequency FCE
 Estimation of probability related to failure/success of conditional modifiers

 Probability of ignition
 Probability of atmospheric stability
 Probability of wind direction
 Probability of presence of personnel
 Estimation of probability related to failure/success of mitigation and protection measures

Estimation of Damage Frequency
Damage frequency is the combination of

 Central Hazardous Event frequency FCE
 Probability of conditional modifiers
 Probability of mitigation and protection measures
FDM = FCE x PA x PM x PP x PW x PH x PF
 PA = probability of ignition, where applicable (otherwise = 1).

 PM = probability related to failure/success of mitigation measures
 PP = probability related to failure/success of protection measures
 PW = probability related to weather conditions
 PH = probability related to human presence
 PF = probability related to release orientation
For PRA, simplified and conservative approach

Probability of conditional modifiers = 1

Detailed Risk Analysis
CHARAD Database (synthesis of databases such as DNV, FRED, Purple Book,

HSE, etc.)
 Frequency of Central Hazardous Event
 Pipe release
 Valve release
 Pump release
 Compressor release
 Probability of failure on demand

 ESD failure
 Gas detection
 Fire detection
 Probability
 Ignition
 Explosion

CHARAD Database
 Available on Intranet : "MAP > Group websites > Industrial Safety > Industrial Safety
department >Technological risks > Reference Documents"
 address : http://securite.corp.local/publish/templates/index.asp?rub_ident=383
 Work group
 Meeting every three months
 Version 6 available including data from OGP, ignition probabilities from UKOOA, a new splitting of leak
diameter for each equipment, etc…
 If any inconsistency or missing in the database, send a mail to

 XX


Critical Event Frequency
Central Hazardous Event Frequency

is based on historical Data.
Use Parts Count Sheets for Process

release (EP CHARAD).
Information required for Parts Count

are:
 Marked up isolatable section on P&ID
 Layout drawings (estimate length of pipe
work)

Isolatable Section and Generic Release Scenarios
Identify isolatable inventories based

on P&ID. BDV
 boundaries are defined by ESD valves, 2-phase Vapour
SDV
blow down valves, check valves SDV
(separating hazardous and non-

hazardous inventories), control valves
limiting the flow of hazardous fluids to
flare.
Establish equipment duty Liquid
assumptions (spare, standby, etc.) SDV
For each isolable section, equipment Isolatable Section
count is made based on fluid phase

(vapour, liquid or 2 phase) – Sections.

Estimation of Damage Central
Hazardous
Immediate
Detection ESD and
Blowdown Deluge Delayed
Deluge
effective
Outcome
Event successful isolation Event Tree Outcome frequency
Frequency Frequency
(/year)
Ignition
(fire or gas) successful
successful effective ignition upon delayed
ignition
(/year)
Event Tree Approach

0.1 Isolated, Blowdown and
Yes deluged Jet fire
1.58E-05
0.95
Typical branch No 0.95

0.9
0.5
Isolated and Blowdown
Jet fire
Isolated and deluged
1.43E-04
probabilities based on : 0.05

Jet fire
4.17E-06
 Ignition probabilities 0.975 0.5

Isolated Jet fire 4.17E-06
(immediate, delayed) 0.2 Unisolated and deluged

Jet fire
1.76E-06
0.15 0.05
 Fire and Gas detection 0.8
Unisolated Jet fire 7.02E-06
 Isolation probability 0.025

Unisolated Jet fire 4.50E-06
 Blowdown 0.01 Isolated, blowdown and

deluged Flash fire
8.98E-08
0.01
 Deluge effectiveness 0.95 0.99 Isolated, blowdown

8.89E-06
Flash fire
0.99 Isolated, blowdown
8.89E-04
Dispersion
0.95
1.20E-03 0.01 Isolated and deluged
4.72E-09
Different possible event 0.01
Flash fire
tree outcomes 0.05
0.99
0.99
Isolated Flash fire 4.68E-07

Isolated Dispersion 4.68E-05
Jet fire 0.975
 UVCE 0.01 Unisolated and deluged

UVCE
4.97E-09

0.01
Flash fire/Pool fire 0.05 0.99

Unisolated UVCE 4.92E-07
Dispersion/Spill 0.85 0.99
Unisolated Dispersion 4.92E-05
0.01 Undetected
2.55E-09
Unisolated UVCE
0.01
0.025 0.99 Undetected

2.52E-07
Unisolated UVCE
0.99
Undetected Dispersion 2.52E-05
Total 1.20E-03
Consequence of hydrocarbon release
Fire (Blowout) Jet fire
Pool fire Fire ball

Scope
Scope
definition
definition
QRA Approach Hazard Critical

Critical
Study
Study Data
Data Hazard
Team Identification
Identification Events
Events
Team knowledge
knowledge
Session
Session Register
Register
Review
Review of
of all
all
a. Hazard Identification hazardous
hazardous events
events
b. Review of Hazardous Events

Consequence
Consequence
CHARAD
CHARAD Frequency
Frequency Analysis
Analysis Analysis
Analysis
c. Detailed Risk Analysis
 Consequence Analysis
 Frequency Analysis
Aggregate
Aggregate Risk
Risk
 Risk Summation IRPA,
IRPA, PLL,
PLL,
LSIR
LSIR contours
contours
 Presentation of Risk
 Sensitivity Studies
Sensitivity
Sensitivity Studies
Studies
d. Risk Assessment & ALARP
Demonstration
Risk
Risk Mitigation
Mitigation
workshop
workshop
e. Validation & Priority based program
of actions.
Additional
Additional Risk
Risk
Analysis
Analysis
Cost
Benefits ALARP
ALARP
Demonstration
Demonstration
Input Validation
Validation && Major
Major
Input to
to
Emergency
Emergency Response,
Response, Summary
Summary Risk
Risk Register
Register
Asset
Asset Integrity
Integrity plans
plans Action
Action Plan
Plan
Comparison of Approaches
Scenario based approach QRA approach
Scenario based risk presentation (People, Global risk presentation (Individual risk per annum)
Environment, Asset)
Risk mitigation based on scenario by scenario. Risk mitigation based on global risk.
Excellent tool for risk communication and Not a very good tool for risk communication
identifying mitigation measures. compared to scenario based approach.

Risk Evaluation : Scenario Based Risk / QRA
Advantages of the QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessment) :

 Assessment of the global risks (sum of the frequencies for all scenarios)
 Possibility to reduce the damage zone by applying risk reduction measures on more
than one scenario
Difficulties :
 QRA
 Mathematical approach
 Complex, accuracy of data, time consuming
 BOTH
 Statistical database validity ?
 Human factor, asset integrity, construction, maintenance and inspection difficult
to account for

Recommendations
Perform Risk Assessment is to :

 Identify all major risks
 Classify those risks and the consequences
 Study risk-reducing measures (prevention or mitigation)
 Determine the top priorities for the investment
Main objectives :
Reduce our major risks

Risk Assessment: - Safety Engineering Training - HDD ENSPD - 2021/2022

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Risk Assessment: - Safety Engineering Training - HDD ENSPD - 2021/2022

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Risk Assessment

- Safety Engineering Training – HDD ENSPD - 2021/2022

HAZARDS FIRST HAZARDOUS EVENT

Inspection Corrosion Detection Detection Plant Detection

1980 ‘85 ‘90 ‘95 ‘00 ‘05

Addressed . Not addressed

4 - Safety Engineering Training – HDD ENSPD - 2021/2022

Risk Assessment Risk Treatment

Risk analysis Risk Evaluation Risk Reduction

Acceptable Risk (ALARP)

5 - Safety Engineering Training – HDD ENSPD - 2021/2022

•TO MAKE ENGINEERING DECISIONS (TO BE UNDER CONTROL!)

TECHNOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT PERMITS TO:

CHECKING DESIGN ROBUSTNESS (Design based on Total specifications)

COMPARING DESIGN OPTIONS (inputs for the selection of design concepts).

IDENTIFYING SAFETY CRITICAL PROCEDURES AND EQUIPMENTS

DEMONSTRATING RISK ACCEPTABILITY TO REGULATORS, PUBLIC AND WORKFORCE

6 - Safety Engineering Training – HDD ENSPD - 2021/2022

7 - Safety Engineering Training – HDD ENSPD - 2021/2022

1. Continuous process through

2. Two parallel approaches

3. Risk acceptance criteria

5. Major risk register & Action Plan

8 - Safety Engineering Training – HDD ENSPD - 2021/2022

Detailed Analysis Quantitative

ALARP Demonstration QRA

Step 5 Risk Register Action Plan,

Scenario based method Common to both methods QRA method

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Scenarios Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

 Level 1 FIRST PRIORITY  LIMIT

Increasing Individual Risk Per Annum

1. Human Broadly Acceptable Level

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Cancer 1 in 387 2.58E-03 Annual Abstracts of Statistics (2001) UK

Gas Incident (fire,

Office of national statistics England and Wales

All types of accidents and

ANNUAL RISK OF DEATH FROM INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS

Mining 1 in 9200 1.09E-04 HSE book 2001 UK

Construction 1 in 17000 5.88E-05 HSE book 2001 UK

Agriculture, hunting, … 1 in 17200 5.81E-05 HSE book 2001 UK

Service Industry 1 in 333000 3.00E-06 HSE book 2001 UK

ALL locations, All personnels,

Moderate On site : No permanent effect

Serious On site : permanent effects

On site: < 100 p. in LC1 % (1%

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Major* SEI 100 to 499 10 to 99 Below 500

Catastrophic* SEI 500 to 999 100 to 999 Below 1000

Disastrous* SEI Above 999 Above 999 Above 1000

LC1% Above 499 Above 99 Above 500

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Severity level Pollution Event Intensity expressed as Material damage

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Very unlikely With mitigation

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Intolerable ALARP Disproportionate

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Money got back in return

Money spent on safety

Major Technological Risk Register