Cluster Computing

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10586-021-03390-5 (0123456789().,-volV)(0123456789().
,- volV)

Efficient privacy-preserving anonymous authentication

scheme for human predictive online education system
Subramani Jegadeesan1 • Mohammad S. Obaidat2,3,4 • Pandi Vijayakumar5 • Maria Azees6 •

Marimuthu Karuppiah7

Received: 6 June 2021 / Revised: 27 July 2021 / Accepted: 9 August 2021

 The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2021

Abstract
In recent years, online education systems (OES) are improved tremendously with the development of information com-
munication technology. Also, OES provides the opportunity for the learners to predict and access the learning resources
using Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices and it provides learning flexibility through the various artificial intelligence and soft
computing approaches. The physical verification of the traditional education system is replaced with a secure authenti-
cation process for a human-centered predictive intelligence system. Many authentication schemes are available to provide
authentication in human predictive OES, but they are suffering from authentication delay, computation complexity,
communication cost, and user privacy. Hence, it is very difficult to provide data security using resource-limited IoT
devices. In this work, a secure and efficient anonymous authentication scheme is introduced to avoid the mischievous
learners and subject experts entering into OES. Also, the proposed scheme provides the essential security requirement of
user privacy to OES users until they behave properly. If any chance for dispute, the system discloses the privacy of
misbehaving users. The security and performance analysis section ensures that the proposed system provides a secure
infrastructure to support sustainable education using resource-limited IoT devices by consuming very little computation
and communication delay compared with other existing schemes.

Keywords Anonymous authentication  Conditional privacy  Soft computing  Artificial intelligence  Online education
system  IoT

3
King Abdullah II School of Information Technology,
& Marimuthu Karuppiah University of Jordan, Amman 11942, Jordan
marimuthume@gmail.com 4
School of Computer and Communication Engineering,
Subramani Jegadeesan University of Science and Technology, Beijing 100083,
jegadeesans@rediffmail.com China
Mohammad S. Obaidat 5
Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
msobaidat@gmail.com; m.s.obaidat@ieee.org University College of Engineering Tindivanam, Tindivanam,
Pandi Vijayakumar Tamil Nadu, India
vijibond2000@gmail.com; pvijayakumar@ieee.org 6
Department of Electronics and Communication, GMR
Maria Azees Institute of Technology, Srikakulam, Andhra Pradesh, India
azeesmm@gmail.com 7
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, SRM
Institute of Science and Technology, Delhi-NCR Campus,
1
Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh 201204, India
M. Kumarasamy College of Engineering, Karur,
Tamil Nadu 639113, India
2
College of Computing and Informatics University of Sharjah,
Sharjah 27272, UAE

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1 Introduction
Nowadays, the usage of information communication tech-
nology (ICT) tools in the teaching–learning process is
increased and it leads to e-learning. It allows the learners
(li ) especially those who are unable to learn in a traditional
education environment. By using this smart infrastructure,
the li can learn anywhere at any time by using advanced
devices such as laptops, smartphones, and other Internet-
of-Things (IoT) devices to provide sustainable education
[1].
The online learning system attracts several li in recent
years [2]. Therefore, online learning becomes more popular
than the traditional learning system [3]. Many educational
institutions take the advantage of online learning and
encourage their students to learn through e-learning to
increase learning habits. National Center for Education, US
published statistics on online learning in 2012: 925,495
learners enrolled in online courses, i.e., 35% of learners
enrolled only through online [4]. It ensures the develop-
ment and popularity of online learning among ordinary
people and almost all educational institutions follow the
online education system for the teaching–learning process.
But the online education system is affected by a lot of
security threats. Therefore, it is necessary to provide
security against various possible attacks. For example, it is
very difficult to identify the legitimacy of the li during the
assignment submission and assessment process via online
mode, and it is also very difficult to keep the content
secure. On the other hand, some intelligent system is
required to improve data security and privacy in resource-
limited IoT devices and also to improve the accuracy of
predictive intelligence in the education system. In an online
education system, with the help of an intelligent security
system and natural language processing system aimed to
predict the correct words or spelling and offer human-like
speech such as Alexa, Apple Siri, and Amazon.
In academics, one of the main security requirements is
data integrity. The term integrity assures six values, such as
morality, faith, justice, courage, respect, and responsibility
at all phases of academic practices. Academic integrity
extends to online education in order to investigate the
academic activities of institution/resource center (RC),
subject experts (SEi ) and li against the standard [5].
According to the Higher Education Opportunity Act
(2008), ‘Institutions offering online education should have
complete processes for registering students in a specific
course, distributing a structured curriculum, conducting an
examination, completing the course and receiving aca-
demic credit.’ As far as academic integrity is concerned,
the educational institutions should have a specific proce-
dure for verifying the authenticity of enrolled li . Therefore,
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the educational institutions need to follow, (1) create and
maintain an online learning environment only for regis-
tered li ; (2) monitor and track learning activities of enrolled
li ; (3) detect the academic integrity misbehavior, to avoid
fake while guaranteeing li uniqueness and morality.
In online education systems (OES), communication
between the entities is happening through a wireless
medium. Therefore, it is essential to provide the basic
security requirements such as data integrity, availability,
non-repudiation, confidentiality, user authentication, and
privacy in e-learning. Hence, to provide an efficient
anonymous authentication with less complexity and an
easy privacy withdrawal process, we have proposed a
smart, secure, and effective anonymous authentication with
a conditional privacy-preserving scheme for OES to pro-
vide sustainable education. The OES is developed to
address the following important security requirements: (1)
the RC offers conditional privacy to the li and SEi . (2) The
OES is developed based on the bilinear pairing [1]. (3) The
li and SEi generates anonymous certificates on their own
instead of storing them in the database to maintain user
privacy. (4) If any dispute, the RC can track and withdraw
the privacy of a misbehaving user and reveal its actual
identity.
1.1 Our research contributions
The main objectives of our proposed scheme are to address
the above-mentioned challenges:
To develop an anonymous authentication scheme with
less computational complexity for both li and SEi to
reduce the computational delay.
To ensure data integrity at the reduced signature and
certificate verification cost, this is essential for resource-
limited devices.
To reduce the data loss during the exchange of
information between SEi and li .
To ensure the privacy of the user by using the
conditional tracking system to remove the misbehaving
li or SEi from the OES with less computational
complexity.
The rest of this paper is summarized as follows.
Reviews of recent related works are discussed in Sect. 2.
The overview of the proposed system is presented in
Sect. 3. The proposed OES is described in Sect. 4. Security
and performance analysis of the proposed work is descri-
bed in Sects. 5 and 6. Finally, the conclusion of the pro-
posed work is presented in Sect. 7.
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2 Related works
In recent years, the online learning system attracts several li
due to the massive development of ICT. In OES, the
wireless medium is used for communication. Due to its
open nature, it is affected by a number of security issues
[35, 36]. In [6], the authors discussed and focused more on
the privacy of li and the basic security requirements of
OES. Also, other issues in the OES such as personal
information protection, anonymity, location privacy,
availability, and authentication are discussed. The OES
users are mainly concerned about the security of their
sensitive information. Therefore, technology solution pro-
viders need to find ways to store user data securely.
In OES, learning materials are accessible and unaffected
by all legal users when required. Since OES depends
entirely on the Internet, all components of the OES may be
attacked by intruders and may lead to illegal modification
and/or damage to learning materials or components [7].
Therefore, it is necessary to create a smart infrastructure
for OES by considering key security threats, such as
authentication, impersonation, and privacy, in order to
provide sustainable education. OES attracts cybercriminals
who thrive on their ability to attack and enter OES [8]. The
functions and features of the OES have become very
complex and are gradually exposed to security risks [9].
In [10], the authors mainly discussed issues of authen-
tication in the e-learning process. Policy, strategy, soft-
ware, and hardware requirements are discussed to provide
and ensure user authentication in e-learning. Security
issues within the OES, such as user identification,
authentication, and impersonation, are highlighted [11].
Many researchers have developed an algorithm to provide
minimum security requirements for OES such as authen-
ticity, confidentiality, anonymity, integrity without inter-
ference from third parties. In [12], the authors discussed a
profile-based authentication technique based on user
knowledge. User authentication depends on the personal
and academic details of the user. In [13], the authors pre-
sented a profile-based authentication scheme to provide
security for OES. The various security threats to the OES
are authentication, access control, availability, confiden-
tiality, non-repudiation, and integrity. In [14], the authors
also analyzed the different security threats in the e-learning
process. Some more research work has been done related to
artificial intelligence and information security in the
human-oriented online education system. Likewise, in [29],
the authors proposed an intelligent tutoring system target to
information security topics. The authors developed a
computer-based learning system to automate the education
process through intelligent techniques. Authors in [30]
have discussed implications for human development in the
twenty first century by the artificial intelligence, smart
classroom, and online education system. Moreover, in [31],
the paper explores the impact of artificial intelligence on
teaching and learning in the education system. The authors
have investigated the challenges for the higher educational
institutions. In [32], the authors have presented a case study
in the context of debate tutoring that uses prediction and
classification models to increase the transparency in the
decision-making process and provide a more accurate
classification for multimodal data.
From the detailed literature review referred to above, the
main security threats in the OES may be classified as,
Availability it ensures that legal users have access to the
data when required, which is available online. Issues in
the availability of data are classified as denial-of-service
attacks and the inability to process data. The function of
OES depends entirely on Internet connectivity. Acces-
sibility of learning materials and data at any time and any
location by the legal user is therefore very important. If
the OES failed to provide this basic requirement, it
would have a negative impact on OES users [14].
Data integrity to protect the unauthorized changes in the
content, the OES must allow only the legal users to alter
or modify the contents of the information. Data integrity
mainly depends on access control; therefore, the OES
must provide access control to the users.
Confidentiality to prevent unauthorized data access, the
OES must create a system to avoid unauthorized data
access.
Authentication authentication is used to validate the user
while accessing the OES.
Privacy personal information of OES users must be kept
out of adversaries in order to avoid the risk of privacy of
the user.
Although the schemes discussed above provide solutions
to security threats in OES, the work referred to above does
not focus on user authentication delays, message authen-
tication delays, and user privacy [15, 33, 34, 37–41]. The
proposed scheme is different from the existing schemes in
many aspects. During the authentication process, the pro-
posed system preserves the actual identity of OES users
from the other OES entities with very little computational
and communication delay. The proposed system also pre-
serves the integrity of information with less computational
complexity during the exchange of information between
OES users. Finally, the system provides conditional pri-
vacy for OES users with lower computational costs to
achieve sustainable education with the help of smart and
secure infrastructure.
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3 System overview
In this section, the system model, the attack models in
OES, and the preliminaries of bilinear pairing are
explained.
3.1 System model
The system model for the proposed authentication and
privacy-preserving method is shown in Fig. 1. It comprises
of three main modules, such as the Resource Centre (RC),
Subject Experts (SEi ), and Learners (li ).
Resource centre (RC) the heart of OES is RC. In OES,
RC is considered to be a trusted party, and it is
impossible for an opponent to compromise. The SEi
and li need to register with RC before the exchange of
information. In the proposed scheme, the OES is divided
into several domains based on the course content and
each domain has an RC. In Fig. 1, the function of a
single RC is demonstrated. Also, the RC generates and
issues the initial security parameters for all OES users
after the registration process.
Subject experts (SEi ) SEi must register under the specific
domain RC based on their field of interest. SEi is an
intermediate between the li and the RC. SEi is connected
to RC through a wired medium, and li is connected to SEi
through a wireless medium. In the proposed work, SEi is
Fig. 1 System model
Offline Registration
User Security Parameters
Subject
Expert
Subject Expert
to Learner
Communication
Learner
Learner
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considered a trusted party. If they reveal information to
an opponent and the particular SEi is found to be
compromised, the RC can identify it in a short time.
Learner (li ) li can establish the connection with OES by
using an online learning device (OLD). To make secure
and comfortable learning, the OLDs are used to
exchange information with other li and SEi . Also, the
OLD will store the secret keys for secure communication
with the other OES entities.
3.2 Security attack model in OES
In the proposed OES, the attackers are categorized as
internal and external attackers. External attackers are
considered to be powerful attackers than internal attackers.
The compromised li and SEi are considered as internal
attackers. The Internal attackers are part of the proposed
system; therefore, they have the power to use OES secret
keys. The proposed work is concentrated on an external
attacker. Because they can enter into OES by masquerade
attack and act as an authentic user such as SEi or li . Here,
the various possible circumstances of the attack in the OES
are discussed.
Fake message attack an adversary may transmit false
information to OES to perform the specific task. For
instance, an adversary may transmit fake information to
another li .
Resource Centre
Subject
Expert
Subject
Expert
Learner
Learner to
Learner
Communication Learner
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Impersonation attack in this attack, an adversary can
guess the identity of a li or SEi successfully and they may
enter into the OES as a genuine user.
SEi replication attack SEi is not provided with enough
protection against the malicious attack by considering
the large number of SEi and the cost, which leads to
compromise the SEi . If SEi is compromised, an adver-
sary can enter into the OES and they may launch any
mischievous attack.
Identity revealing attack this attack mainly relates to user
privacy. The focus of this attack is to collect personal/
sensitive information from the OES users illegally.
Certificate and key duplication attack to trace the li , an
opponent will try to confuse the RC. An adversary uses
the duplicate certificate and keys of other users as proof
of authentication.
Forgery attack An adversary copy the secret signature or
certificate of particular information and use the copied
signature or certificate for their personal use.
3.3 Bilinear pairing
Let G1 , G2 and GT are the multiplicative cyclic group with
large prime order q. Let g1 be the generator of G1 , g2 be the
generator of G2 , and w be an isomorphism from G2 to G1
such that wðg2 Þ ¼ g1 . e : G1  G2 ! GT is a bilinear map
and the properties of bilinear pairing are described as
follows,
Bilinear: eðga1 ; gb2 Þ ¼ eðg1 ; g2 Þab for all g1 2 G1 , g2 2 G2
and a; b 2 Z q .
Non-degeneracy: eðg1 ; g2 Þ 6¼ 1GT .
Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute the bilinear map e : G1  G2 ! GT .
4 Proposed scheme
In this section, the system initialization, learner authenti-
cation, and subject expert authentication process are
described. During communication among the li , retaining
the confidentiality of information is not required. Because
each authentic user in OES has the license or rights to
know the content of information. Each information is
appended by SEi and the OLDs digital signature before
communication starts. Therefore, the receiver can authen-
ticate the received information and check the integrity and
legitimacy of the information. The proposed system uses a
bilinear pairing method to check the integrity and legiti-
macy of the information received.
4.1 System initialization
The RC generates system parameters with the help of
bilinear parameters ðG1 ; G2 ; GT ; q; eÞ are as follows. First,
the RC chooses the random numbers x; y 2 Z q as the secret
keys and calculates X 1 ¼ ga1 and Y 1 ¼ gb1 . Then, it chooses
the secure cryptographic hash function H : f0; 1g ! Z q .
Finally, the RC broadcasts the OES parameters
param ¼ ðG1 ; G2 ; GT ; q; g1 ; g2 ; X 1 ; Y 1 ; H; eÞ.
4.2 Learner (l i Þ authentication
In the proposed scheme, the anonymous li authentication
process consists of user registration, key generation, cer-
tificate generation, signature generation, verification, and
conditional tracking.
User registration during the registration process, the ðli Þ
need to submit the necessary user data, such as
username, address, mail id, phone number, course code,
and course name, etc. to the RC. After the registration
process li is considered to be an OES user.
Key generation after completion of the li registration
process, the RC generates the required secret keys for the
li by using the key generation procedure. To generate the
secret keys, initially, the RC generates the li identity
ðLIDli Þ to each li . Next, the dummy identity ðDIDli Þ for
each li is generated by the RC. To generate the ðDIDli Þ,
the RC selects the r i as a random number, where r i 2 Z q
and calculates DIDli ¼ g1ri þx q. Likewise, the RC gener-
ates a dummy identity for SEi ðDIDSEi Þ. Then, RC maps
the actual identity with the dummy identity. The need to
create dummy identities for every user is to verify the
legitimacy of the source of information. Even if adver-
saries capture these identities, they cannot disclose the
privacy of OES users. Since they will get zero knowl-
edge about OES users. Finally, the RC chooses si 2 Z q as
1
a random number and calculates T i ¼ g1si þxþy . The RC
then keeps the values ðLIDli ; DIDli ; T bi Þ in its tracing
table and issues the authorization key K au ¼
ðDIDli ; T i ; Si Þ to the user as a smart card and it is kept
in a secure environment, where Si ¼ gr 1 q. Once the
i
registration process is completed, the li can connect to
the RC through SEi for the further process with the help
of their secret keys which are collected from the RC
during the registration process.
Generation of anonymous certificate the OES users need
to follow the following steps to generate the necessary
anonymous certificates.
Step 1 every user needs to choose the random
numbers a1 ; a2 ; :::; am 2 Z n ; where, m  n as the one-
time private key and calculate the corresponding one-
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time public key bk ¼ ga2k , where, k ¼ 1; 2; :::; m. bdu :bev2

Step 2 the OES user needs to calculate the anonymous d02 ¼
beu1 :bdv
one-time certificate Ck by using their one-time public
key bk as follows: Step 2 the receiver calculates CN 0 ¼ HðDIDli k Ai k
Initially, the OES user chooses k1 ; k2 ; a 2 Z q ran- Y 1 k Si k bk k bu k bv k d01 k d02 Þ and it checks for
domly and calculates bu ; bv ; d; d1 ; d2 : CN ¼ CN 0 . If true, the receiver will authenticate the li or
bu ¼ Y a1 the receiver will discard the message. The receiver also
checks the dummy identity of the li to authenticate the
bv ¼ T i :X a1 message source.
d ¼ ða þ am Þq Proof of correctness
Ai ¼ Si  DIDli
d1 ¼ baþk
u
1

¼ gr ri þx
1  g1
i

baþk1
d2 ¼ uaþk2 ¼ gx1
bv
¼ X1
After calculating the values of bu ; bv ; d; d1 ; d2 , the
user calculates the contender CN ¼ HðDIDli k X 1 k Y 1 k bdu
d01 ¼
Si k bu k bv k bk k d1 k d2 Þ and calculates the value e1 , beu1
e2 as follows,
bðaþa
u
mÞ

e1 ¼ ðam  k1 Þq ¼
buðam k1 Þ
e2 ¼ ðam  k2 Þq
¼ bðaþa
u
m am þk 1 Þ

Finally, the OES user generates Ck ¼

fbk k Si k DIDli k bu k bv k CN k e1 k e2 g as an anony- ¼ baþk
u
1

mous certificate. If the li needs to learn the new course e

bd :b 2
that comes under another RC, then the li required to send ¼ d1 .d02 ¼ bue1 :bvd
u v
the anonymous message AM ¼ ðmsg k sign k bk k C k Þ to
baþa
u
m
:bav m k2
the new RC. From the received anonymous message the ¼ am k1 aþam
new RC extracts the parameters Si and DIDli . After that, bu :bv
the new RC calculates Ai ¼ Si  DIDli , and this Ai must baþa m am þk1
u
be equal to X 1 of the registered RC. If true, the new ¼ m am þk2
baþa
v
domain RC accepts the li as an authenticated learner.
Generation of signature the OES user generates the one- baþk
u
1

1 ¼
time anonymous signature sign ¼ g1
ak þHðAMÞ
to authenticate baþk
v
2

and maintain the integrity of AM. Before broadcasts an ¼ d2

anonymous message AM ¼ ðmsg k sign k bk k C k Þ, the Step 3 after the contender verification, the integrity of
user appends the one-time anonymous signature. the received information is verified as follows.
Verification after receiving an anonymous message  
HðAMÞ
AM ¼ ðmsg k sign k bk k C k Þ from the sender, the recei- e sign; bk :g2 ¼ eðg1 ; g2 Þ
ver (RC and other registered li ) performs the following
verification procedure. If the above condition is satisfied, then the receiver will
allow the AM. Otherwise, it will be rejected.
Step 1 to check the legitimacy of the source of Proof of correctness
receiving information, the receiver calculates the  
HðAMÞ
following, e sign; bk :g2
 1

Ai ¼ Si  DIDli ¼ e g1
ak þHðAMÞ ak HðAMÞ
; g2 :g2
bdu  
d01 ¼ 1
beu1 ak þHðAMÞ
¼ e g1
ak þHðAMÞ
; g2

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certificate does not have any information about the actual

identity of SEi and it is considered as ‘‘anonymous’’.
1
:ak þHðAMÞ
¼ eðg1 ; g2 Þak þHðAMÞ Generation of signature the SEi generates a signature to
¼ eðg1 ; g2 Þ (Using bilinear property). validate and preserve the integrity of the information as
Conditional tracking if any dispute, RC can effectively follows.
trace the real identity of the li by looking up the value T bi Step 1 the SEi select the random numbers
in its tracking list with the help of an anonymous cer- m1 ; m2 ; :::; ml 2 Z n as the one-time private key and
tificate C k ¼ fbk k Si k DIDli k bu k bv k CN k e1 k e2 g. calculates the corresponding one-time public key as
m
The value of T bi is calculated as follows. SPj ¼ g2 j where, j ¼ 1; 2; :::; l.
Step 2 the SEi calculates the signature as signSE ¼
1
mj þHðLMÞ
bbv ðT i :X a1 Þb T bi :X ab T bi :gaab g1 by using the one-time private key mj and
¼ ¼ 1
¼ 1
¼ T bi broadcast message M SE ¼ ðLM k signSE k C SE k SPj Þ to
bau ðY a1 Þa Y aa
1 gbaa
1
all the registered li after appending the signature.
Verification after receiving M SE , the li can check the
After finding the actual identity of the misbehaving user, authenticity of SEi as follows.
the RC can withdraw the privacy and remove the mis- The li authenticates the SEi by performing the
chievous li from OES to avoid further damage. following steps.
x01 ¼ xa :xb
4.3 Subject expert (SE i Þ authentication
xb :xc
x02 ¼
The authenticated li must be registered with SEi to learn the xa
course under the specific domain RC, before starting the and calculate the contender CN 0SE ¼ HðX 1 k Y 1 k qu k
communication. The SEi will provide all the learning
qv k x01 k x02 Þ and it checks CN SE ¼ CN 0SE . If true, it will
materials (LM) to the li according to the registered course.
accept the received information or it will reject the
Registration it is essential to submit the important received information.
information of SEi such as qualification, a field of Proof of correctness
interest, and experience to the RC during the registration x01 ¼ xa :xb
process.
Key generation the RC need to choose Ri 2 Z q as a qx
¼ v
:ql2
qkv v
random number and calculate ST i ¼ Y R1 i . Next, the RC
assigns the identity for SEi and kept the values of qkþl 1
¼ v
:qlv 2
ðSEi ; ST bi Þ in its tracing table. qkv
Generation of certificate the RC chooses the values 1 þl2 k
¼ qkþl
k; l1 ; l2 2 Z q in a random manner and calculates v

qu ; qv ; x; x1 ; x2
¼ qlv 1 þl2 ¼ x1
l
qu ¼ X 1 1 :gk1 xb :xc
x02 ¼
qv ¼ ST i :X 1 2
l xa
qlv 2 :qlu 1 k
x ¼ ðk þ l1 Þq ¼ :qv
qx v
x1 ¼ qlv 1 þl2
qlv 2 :qlu 1
x2 ¼ qlu 1 :qlv 2 l1 ¼ kþl1
:qkv
qv

Then, the RC calculates the contender CN SE ¼ ðX 1 k ¼ qlv 2 kl1 þk :qlu 1

Y 1 k qu k qv k x1 k x2 Þ as well as xa , xb and xc . ¼ qlv 2 l1 :qlu 1 ¼ x2
qx
Where xa ¼ qvk , xb ¼ qlv 2 and xc ¼ qlu 1 . After the certificate verification, the li checks the
v

Next, the RC generates C SE ¼ integrity of LM by satisfying the following condition,

 
fqu k qv k CN SE k xa k xb k xc g as an anonymous cer- e signSE ; SPj  g2
HðLMÞ
¼ eðg1 ; g2 Þ
tificate for SEi and issues it to corresponding SEi . The

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If it holds, the li will accept the LM. Otherwise, it will be P believes fresh(X), P believes Q said X
rejected immediately. P believes Q believes X
Proof of correctness P believes Q believes X if P believes X is sent currently
 
HðLMÞ and Q has said X.
e signSE ; SPj  g2
Jurisdiction rule (Rule 3)
 1

mj þHðLMÞ mj HðLMÞ P believes Q controls X, P believes Q believes X
¼ e g1 ; g2  g2
P believes X
 1

mj þHðLMÞ mj þHðLMÞ P believes X if P believes Q has the jurisdiction for X
¼ e g1 ; g2
and P believes Q believes X.
Decomposition rule (Rule 4)
P sees (X, Y)
1
:m þHðLMÞ
mj þHðLMÞ j
(a)
¼ eðg1 ; g2 Þ P sees (X)
¼ eðg1 ; g2 Þ ðAs per bilinear propertyÞ P believes fresh (X)
(b)
P believes fresh (X, Y)
Conditional tracking if any dispute, the RC will collect
the certificate of a specific SEi , C SE ¼ P believes (X, Y)
(c)
fqu k qv k CN SE k xa k xb k xc g and computes the P believes (X)
following. Several postulates are used to decompose messages and
qbv
l
ðST i :X 1 2 Þb
bl
ST bi :X 1 2
bl
ST bi :X 1 2 verify their freshness. Informally, (a) If P observes
al ¼ ¼ ¼ ¼ ST bi everything, it will be able to detect X. (b) If one of the
Y1 2 ðgb1 Þal2 ðga1 Þbl2 X1 2
bl
components is fresh, then combination X; Y is fresh and (c)
The number of different message components implies
The RC can easily trace the actual identity of SEi by belief in them independently.
knowing the value of ST bi in the tracking list. After finding Proof of proposed anonymous authentication protocol
the actual identity of compromised SEi , the RC can with-
draw the privacy of a malicious SEi to avoid further harm 1. By applying Rule 1, the following can be derived.
to the OES. C SE
SEi believes SEi $ li ; SEi sees fM SE gCSE
SEi believes li said fM SE g

5 Security analysis 2. The following is obtained by using Rule 2.

SEi believes fresh ðCN SE Þ; SEi believes li said fM SE g
In this section, the security strength of the proposed SEi believes li believes fM SE g
scheme is evaluated formally using BAN logic and the
security properties such as data integrity, authentication, 3. Rule 3 is applied to derive the following.
and user privacy are analyzed informally.
SEi believesli controls fM SE g;SEi believesli believes fM SE g
SEi believes fM SE g
5.1 Formal security analysis
4. Based on the Rule 4, the following can be obtained.
The proposed scheme security strength is evaluated for-
mally by using Burrows, Abadi, and Needham (BAN) SEi believes SEi CSE li
$
logic. It is used to identify security flaws in the authenti-
cation protocol. The principles of BAN logic are mainly 5. Rule 1 is applied to obtain the following.
depending on the postulates and assumptions. Ck
li believes li $ SEi ; li sees fAMgCk
The postulates of the BAN logic are given as follows.
li believes SEi said fAMg
Message-meaning rule (Rule 1)
K 6. The following can be derived by using Rule 2.
P believes Q $ P, P seesfXgK
li believes fresh ðCNÞ; li believes SEi said fAMg
P believes Q said X
li believes SEi believes fAMg
P believes Q has said X if P believes the key K is the
shared key with Q and P sees X is encrypted by K. 7. By applying Rule 3, the following can be derived.
Nonce-verification rule (Rule 2)

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Cluster Computing
li believes SEi controls f AM g; li believes SEi believes f AM g
li believes f AM g
8. Rule 4 is used to derive the following.
li believes li Ck SEi
$
Ck
li believes SEi believesli $ SEi
Since li believes fresh ðCNÞ, so it is possible to
obtain li believes fresh ðCN þ 1Þ.
Hence, the following can be derived.
li believes fresh ðfCN þ 1gCSE Þ. Because
li believes CSE ; li sees fCN SE þ 1gCk .
10. The following can be derived based on the rule1.
li believes SEi said fCN SE þ 1gCSE
11. Rule 2 is used to obtain the following.
li believes SEi believes fCN SE þ 1gCSE
At last, the following can be derived.
li believes SEi believes li Ck SEi
$ h 1
Likewise, the following can be obtained.
SEi believes li believes li CSE SEi
$ r i is selected randomly for each user and hence DIDli is
5.2 Informal security analysis
In this section, the security properties of the proposed
schemes, such as data integrity, authentication, and user
privacy are analyzed informally. In the proposed system,
user-generated certificates and signatures are important
parameters for ensuring security against impersonating,
masquerade, and key duplication attacks. In this method,
the generation of valid certificates and signatures are not
possible for an outside attacker. Because K au is stored
securely. Therefore, it is very difficult for attackers to send
fake information to the OES and execute key duplication
attacks. The proposed system is secure against masquerade
attacks. Because, to execute a masquerade attack, the
opponent must find the one-time key of an authenticated
user and the key assigned by the RC. Also, it is difficult for
the opponent to find the details from the registration pro-
cedure since it is done offline in RC.
5.2.1 Resistance to an impersonation attack
To execute this attack, an attacker needs to find the secret
parameter T i and also need to identify bv by using the
generated anonymous certificate
C k ¼ fbk k Si k DIDli k bu k bv k CN k e1 k e2 g. The bv is
calculated as bv ¼ T i :X a1 , where a is selected randomly by
the li and hence bv is also at random. Furthermore, the bv is
calculated by using an elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem (ECDLP). Hence, finding T i from bv is very
h 1 i
complex. Computing T i from bv is o q2þoð1Þ loglogn ,
where n is defined as the number of li [16]. Also, finding a
from the set of k one-time public keys ð2k  1Þ is very
complex. Therefore, it is very difficult for attackers to
crake an anonymous certificate to execute an imperson-
ation attack by using T i and a within a particular period.
Therefore, the opponent cannot generate authentic
certificates.
5.2.2 Resistance to fake information attack
If an adversary K needs to transmit the fake information to
OES users, then he/she need to calculate two security
parameters Si and DIDli , such that Ai ¼ Si  DIDli ¼ X 1 .
Here, the Si ¼ gr1
i
and DIDli ¼ gr1i þx are calculated for
every user in the RC in offline mode. Hence, it is very
difficult for an K to calculate the r i and x from the Si and
DIDli due to the ECDLP problem. The computational
i
complexity in calculating x is o q2þoð1Þ loglogr . Here, the r
is considered as the number of users registered in RC. The
also random. Hence, it increases the complexity of calcu-
lating r i as o½2r  1. Therefore, to send fake information to
OES users, an K need to find the value of r i and x to
compromise Si  DIDli ¼ X 1 for transmitting fake infor-
 h 1 i 
mation to other users is o q2þoð1Þ loglogr :½2r  1 .
Hence, it is very difficult to send fake information to OES
users.
5.2.3 Resistance to the message modification attack
In the proposed system, the li sends an anonymous message
AM ¼ ðmsg k sign k bk k C k Þ and then SEi sends a mes-
sage M SE ¼ ðLM k signSE k C SE k SPj Þ to the other OES
entities. Here, the information is transferred through the
wireless environment. So, it increases the opportunity for
an opponent to modify the message msg and LM. To
maintain the integrity of the message from attackers, the
1
a þHðAMÞ
proposed system affixes the user signature sign ¼ g1k
on every message before communication. Here, ak is the
temporary private key. Therefore, this ak is only known to
the specific li . Hence, it is very difficult to generate the
same signature by an attacker. To generate the signature,
the attacker needs to find the value of ak . But the value of
ak will get changed from time to time. Even though, if
attackers found the value of ak , they cannot find the msg.
Because ak is used only one time and it is not used for
123

further communication. Similarly, SEi affix their signature
1
mj þHðLMÞ
signSE ¼ g1 on each LM before the transmission.
Here, the mj is only known to the specific SEi . Also, mj will
get changed from time to time. Therefore, it is very diffi-
cult for an attacker to generate the same signature.
Anonymous certificates of OES user are generated by using
K au and it is allotted by the RC during offline registration in
a secure manner. Therefore, an attacker cannot forge the
OES user signature and certificate without knowing the
value of the temporary private key and K au . Also, it is very
difficult for an attacker to modify the content of messages
without knowing the user’s signature and certificate.
5.2.4 Conditional privacy-preservation
In the proposed system, the li and SEi are using anonymous
signatures and certificates to protect their actual identities.
However, in this scheme RC can trace the actual identity of
li and SEi by using their anonymous certificate. For
instance, a li or a SEi sends fake information by attaching
their certificate to other OES entities, then the RC collects
the bogus information certificate and computes
bbv ðT i :X a1 Þb T bi :X ab T bi :gaab
¼ ¼ 1
¼ 1
¼ T bi
bau ðY a1 Þa Y aa
1 gbaa
1
(to find the real identities of li or SEi by mapping the
collected certificate with the track-list). So, the RC can
easily track the value of T bi of the user. Once the value T bi
is found, the privacy of the user is canceled by RC.
5.2.5 Privacy-preservation during user authentication
and data communication
In the proposed system, every message AM ¼ ðmsg k
sign k bk k C k Þ is attached with an anonymous signature
1
a þHðAMÞ
sign ¼ g1k and certificate
C k ¼ fbk k Si k DIDli k bu k bv k CN k e1 k e2 g. There-
fore, it is very difficult to find the real signature and cer-
tificate of the particular information. Therefore, an K
acquires zero knowledge about the real user of a specific
signature and certificate. Also, the value of the signature
and certificate consists of temporary private keys and
dummy identities. Even, if found the values of temporary
private keys and dummy identities to generate the signature
and certificate, an K cannot reveal the privacy of the li or
SEi . Because the computed value gives zero knowledge
about the li or SEi .
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Cluster Computing
5.2.6 Nonrepudiation
In the proposed system, the user (li or SEi ) cannot repudiate
after sending the data. Because, when the user receives the
information from the opponent, they can verify the
authenticity of the user by using the certificate C k and
ensure the integrity of the received information by using
the signature. If any dispute, the user can show the infor-
mation to the RC. From the received information, the RC
can find the actual identity of the user. Next, the RC will
reveal the privacy of the user and remove them from the
OES.
5.2.7 Unlinkability
In the proposed system, the certificate and signature are
calculated depends on the randomly chosen one-time pri-
vate key. Also, the value is changed from time to time.
Therefore, this one-time private key generates a new cer-
tificate and signature for each communication. Hence, it is
very difficult for an intruder to find the source of infor-
mation, except RC, during the data communication
between OES users.
6 Performance analysis
In this section, the performance of the proposed system is
analyzed, and it is compared with other existing systems in
terms of computational complexity, communication com-
plexity, and serving capability of SEi without any data loss.
6.1 Computational complexity
The amount of time required to verify the certificate and
the signature is considered to be the computational cost.
The computational cost of the proposed system is com-
pared with the existing systems such as D. Boneh et al.
scheme [15], Z. Gong et al. scheme [16], X. Lin et al.
scheme [17], R. Lu et al. scheme [18], and J. Shao et al.
scheme [19]. Let us consider that, the time needed to
perform the pairing operation is T p , the time needed to
perform the hash function is T h , the time required to per-
form the multiplication is T m and T ex is considered to be
the time spent to perform the exponential function. For the
proposed work, a pairing-based cryptography library is
used to perform T p , T h , T m and T ex . To calculate the
computational cost of this scheme, the proposed protocol is
implemented using a 2-GHz computer system with a
memory capacity of 4-GB, Cygwin 1.7.35–15 with the gcc
version 4.9.2 [20]. Every result is evaluated for 100 sim-
ulation runs and the average results are taken into account.
Cluster Computing

During the simulation, it is found that the time required to

perform the T p is 1.6 ms (milliseconds), T h is 2.7 ms, and
T m is 0.6 ms. Similarly, the exponential operation in G1
(T ex1 ) consumes 0.7 ms and G2 (T ex2 ) 0.6 ms.
For calculating the certificate verification time, consider
the certificate to be sent along with the signature. The
signature and the certificate verification delay of the pro-
posed scheme is reviewed with the existing D. Boneh et al.
scheme, Z. Gong et al. scheme, X. Lin et al. scheme, R. Lu
et al. scheme, and J. Shao et al. scheme in Table 1.
Table 1 ensures that the proposed scheme consumes
much lower computational costs for the verification of
signatures and certificates compared to other existing
schemes. To verify the single signature and certificate, the
proposed system consumes only 2T p , 4T ex1 and T ex2 .
That is, it takes only 6.6 ms to verify the single signature Fig. 2 Comparison of signature and certificate verification time of
and certificate. But the other existing schemes such as D. various schemes
Boneh et al. scheme consumes 11.8 ms, Z. Gong et al.
scheme takes 13.4 ms, X. Lin et al. scheme takes 11.1 ms, 6.2 Communication complexity
R. Lu et al. scheme consumes 12.9 ms, and J. Shao et al.
scheme takes 11.6 ms to verify the single signature and To analyze the communication cost in OES, it is assumed
certificate. The proposed scheme requires only two pairing that msg ¼ LM ¼ 160bits, the li and SE0 s certificate is
operations, while the other existing schemes require more C k ¼ C SE ¼ 160bits, the li and SE’s signature is
than two pairing operations. sign ¼ signSE ¼ 160bits, the li and the SE’s public key is
Hence, the proposed system takes much less computa- bk ¼ SPj ¼ 320bits [21]. In the proposed scheme, two
tional time than other existing systems such as D. Boneh pieces of information AM ¼ ðmsg k sign k bk k Ck Þ and
et al. scheme, Z. Gong et al. scheme, X. Lin et al. scheme, M SE ¼ ðLM k signSE k CSE k SPj Þ are communicated
R. Lu et al. scheme, and J. Shao et al. scheme. Figure 2 between the li and SEi . This two information consumes
illustrates the comparison of signature and certificate ver- AM ¼ ð160 þ 160 þ 320 þ 160Þ ¼ 800bits and
ification time of different schemes. It ensures that the M SE ¼ ð160 þ 160 þ 320 þ 160Þ ¼ 800bits.
proposed scheme takes very less computational cost com- The proposed scheme requires only 1600 bits as a
pared to other existing schemes when the number of communication cost per communication. Whereas D.
received messages (n) is large. To verify 100 signatures Boneh et al. scheme [15], Z. Gong et al. [16] scheme, and
and certificates, the proposed scheme consumes only X. Chen et al. [23] scheme exchange three messages, and it
224.4 ms, whereas other existing schemes consumes a consumes 3842 bits, 3532 bits, and 3040 bits as commu-
minimum of 537.6 ms to a maximum of 1181.6 ms for the nication cost.
same process. Al-Riyami et al. [22] and Zhang et al. [24]
scheme communicates two information, and it consumes
the communication cost as 1536 bits and 2112 bits
respectively. Table 2 and Fig. 3 describes that the proposed

Table 1 Computational cost of various schemes

Schemes For single signature and certificate verification For ‘n’ signature and certificate verification

[15] 4Tp þ 2Th ð2n þ 2ÞTp þ 2nTh

[16] 5Tp þ 2Th ð4n þ 1ÞTp þ 2nTh
[17] 3Tp þ 4Tex1 þ 5Tex2 3nTp þ 4nTex1 þ 5nTex2
[18] 4Tp þ 5Tex1 þ 5Tex2 ð3 þ nÞTp þ ð4 þ nÞTex1 þ 5nTex2
[19] 3Tp þ 2Tex1 þ 2Th ð2 þ nÞTp þ 2nTex1 þ 2nTh
Proposed scheme 2Tp þ 4Tex1 þ Tex2 ð1 þ nÞTp þ 4Tex1 þ nTex2

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scheme consumes the second minimum communication

cost compared with the other existing schemes.

6.3 Learners handling capability of SE i

If the li wants to learn the course under specific RC, then

he/she need to approach the specific SEi . Next, SEi need to
authenticate the li and vice versa. After completion of this
authentication process, the SEi will send LM to the li . Let p
be the message transmission probability of every SEi and N
be the number of li receives the 0 n0 LM without any loss
among the total (t) li . The N follows the binomial distri-
bution with p and t.
t
f ðn : t; pÞ ¼ PðN ¼ nÞ ¼ pn ð1  pÞtn
n
Fig. 3 Communication cost of various methods
For n = 0, 1, 2,…,t.

Where, nt ¼ n!ðtnÞ!
t!
is the binomial coefficient. pn Table 3 shows the security features of various schemes. In
0 0 Table 3, the symbol ‘’ shows that the system under con-
defines the n LM received by the li without loss. To
compute the li handling capability of SEi , it is required to sideration can withstand specific security attacks. The
calculate the signature and certificate generation time for n symbol 9 shows that the system under consideration can-
LM messages. Let SCt be the signature and certificate not withstand specific security attacks. The schemes
generation time for 0 n0 LM messages. In the proposed introduced in [25], and [26] cannot withstand against pri-
scheme SC t ¼ 6nT ex1 þ nT p þ 4nT m . For generating a vacy, anonymity attacks, and suffer from unlinkability
single signature and certificate, the proposed scheme con- problem. The system proposed in [27] cannot withstand
sumes SCt ¼ 6T ex1 þ T p þ 4T m . During the simulation, against confidentiality, nonrepudiation, and unlinkability
the signature and certificate generation time is calculated as attacks. The system introduced in [28] cannot withstand
around 7 ms. Here t is defined as the total number of li , p against confidentiality and unlinkability attacks. Whereas
be the message transmission probability of SEi , and SCt be the proposed scheme is resistant to all security attacks
the signature and certificate generation time for 0 n0 LM under consideration.
messages. Therefore the li handling capability of SEi
ðLHC SE Þ is defined as
p:SC t 7 Conclusion
LHC SE ¼
t
In this research work, an efficient privacy-preserving
The li handling capability of SEi is inversely propor- anonymous authentication scheme is introduced to support
tional to the number li . The li handling capability of SEi secure data communication in OES. In this scheme, the SEi
decreases with an increasing number of li . can efficiently authenticate the li in an anonymous way
before sending the LM to the li . Also, the li can effectively
6.4 Security comparisons authenticate the SEi before start to receive the LM. The
proposed scheme anonymously provides authentication
In this section, the security strength of the proposed with low signature and the certificate verification delay.
scheme is compared with the other conventional schemes. Also, it provides the user privacy by using the conditional

Table 2 Communication cost of

Method Number of messages Total communication cost (bits)
various schemes
[15] 03 3842
[16] 03 3532
[22] 02 1536
[23] 03 3040
[24] 02 2112
Proposed scheme 02 1600

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Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
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Subramani Jegadeesan received
the B.E. Degree in Electronics
and Communication Engineer-
ing from Periyar University,
Salem, India, in 2004, the M.E.
Degree in Communication Sys-
tems from the Anna University
of Technology, Coimbatore,
India, in 2009, and the Ph.D.
Degree from the Faculty of
Information and Communica-
tion Engineering, Anna Univer-
sity, Chennai, in 2016. He is
currently an Associate Professor
with the M. Kumarasamy Col-
lege of Engineering, Karur, India. His main thirst research areas
include energy management in wireless sensor networks and network
and information security.
Mohammad S. Obaidat (Fellow
of IEEE and Fellow of SCS)
received the Ph.D. Degree in
Computer Engineering with a
Minor in Computer Science
from The Ohio State University,
Columbus, OH, USA. Among
his previous positions are
Advisor to the President of the
Philadelphia University for
Research, Development and
Information Technology, the
President and the Chair of
Board of Directors, Society for
Molding and Simulation Inter-
national, SCS, the Senior Vice President of SCS, the Dean of the
College of Engineering, Prince Sultan University, the Chair and
Tenured Professor of the Department of Computer and Information
Science; the Director of the MS Graduate Program in Data Analytics,
Fordham University, the Chair and Tenured Professor of the
Department of Computer Science, the Director of the Graduate Pro-
gram, Monmouth University, the Tenured Full Professor of the King
Abdullah II School of Information Technology, University of Jordan,
The PR of China Ministry of Education Distinguished Overseas
Professor of the University of Science and Technology Beijing,
China, and an Honorary Distinguished Professor of the Amity
University: A Global University. He is currently the Founding Dean
and the Professor of the College of Computing and Informatics, The
University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. He is also an interna-
tionally known Academic/Researcher/Scientist/Scholar. He is also a
Fellow of SCS. He received many best paper awards for his papers,
including ones from IEEE ICC, IEEE Globecom, AICSA, CITS,
SPECTS, and DCNET international conferences. He also received
best paper awards from the IEEE Systems Journal in 2018 and in
2019 (two best paper awards). In 2020, he received the four best paper
awards from IEEE Systems Journal. In 2021, he also received and the
IEEE Systems best paper award. He also received many other
worldwide awards for his technical contributions, including the 2018
IEEE ComSocTechnical Committee on Communications Software
Technical Achievement Award for contribution to cybersecurity,
wireless networks computer networks and modeling and simulation,
the SCS prestigious McLeod Founder’s Award, the Presidential
Service Award, and the SCS Hall of Fame-Lifetime Achievement
Award for his technical contribution to modeling and simulation and
for his outstanding visionary leadership and dedication to increasing
the effectiveness and broadening the applications of modeling and
simulation worldwide. He also received the SCS Outstanding Service
Cluster Computing

Award. He was awarded the IEEE CITS Hall of Fame Distinguished India. He has already published the research articles in some of the
and Eminent Award. He has chaired numerous (over 175) interna- reputed journals, such as the IEEE Transactions on Intelligent
tional conferences and has given numerous (over 175) keynote Transportation Systems, Cluster Computing (Springer), and IET
speeches worldwide. He has served as the ABET/CSAB Evaluator intelligent transport systems. His research interests include security in
and on the IEEE CS Fellow Evaluation Committee. He has served as wireless sensor networks and VANETs.
the IEEE CS Distinguished Speaker/Lecturer and an ACM Distin-
guished Lecturer. Since 2004, has been serving as the SCS Distin- Marimuthu Karuppiah (Senior
guished Lecturer. He has received extensive research funding and Member, IEEE) received the
published to date about 1200 refereed technical articles—about half B.E. Degree in Computer Sci-
of them are journal articles, over 95 books, and over 70 book chapters. ence and Engineering from
He is also the Editor-in-Chief of three scholarly journals and an Editor Madurai Kamaraj University,
of many other international journals. He is also the Founding Editor- Madurai, India, in 2003, the
in Chief of Security and Privacy journal (Wiley). He is also the M.E. Degree in Computer Sci-
Founder or Co-Founder of five international conferences. ence and Engineering from
Anna University, Chennai,
Pandi Vijayakumar received the India, in 2005, and the Ph.D.
B.Eng. Degree from Madurai Degree in Computer Science
Kamarajar University in 2002, and Engineering from VIT
the M.Eng. Degree in Computer University, Vellore, India, in
Science and Engineering from 2015. He was an Associate
the Karunya Institute of Tech- Professor with VIT University,
nology in 2005, and the Ph.D. Vellore, India. He is currently a Professor with the Department of
Degree in Computer Science Computing Science and Engineering, SRM Institute of Science and
and Engineering from Anna Technology, Delhi-NCR Campus, India. He has published more than
University, Chennai, in 2013. 40 research articles in SCI indexed journals. Also, he has published
He was the Former Dean of more than 40 research articles in Scopus indexed journals and inter-
University College of Engi- national conferences. His current research interests include cryptog-
neering, Tindivanam and pre- raphy and wireless network security, in particular, authentication and
sently working as Assistant encryption schemes. He is a Life Member of the Cryptology Research
Professor in the Department of Society of India (CRSI) and the Computer Society of India (CSI), and
Computer Science and Engineering. He is guiding many Ph.D. a Member of ACM.
scholars in the field of network and cloud security. He has published
various quality papers in reputed journals like IEEE Transactions,
Elsevier, Springer, IET, Taylor and Francis, Wiley, etc. His main
thrust research areas are key management in network security and
multicasting in computer networks.

Maria Azees received the B.E.

Degree in Electronics and
Communication Engineering
and the M.E. Degree in Applied
Electronics from the St. Xavi-
er’s Catholic College of Engi-
neering, Nagercoil, India, which
is affiliated under Anna
University, Chennai, India, in
2011 and 2013, respectively,
and the Ph.D. Degree in the
Faculty of Information and
Communication Engineering
from Anna University, Chennai,
in 2017. He is currently a Senior
Assistant Professor with the GMR Institute of Technology, Rajam,

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