QUIMIGUING V.

ICAO
G. R. NO. 26795, 31 JULY 1970

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an
appeal from the orders of Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for support
and damages and request for amendment of complaint.

Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual
relations with her through force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant
despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed
for monthly support, damages and attorney’s fees.

The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to

allege the fact that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed
the case and subsequently denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no
amendment was allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant
despite failure to allege fact of birth in complaint

RULING:

Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was
carrying and an independent cause of action for damages.

This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the
unborn child, which includes its right to support from its progenitors, even it is only “en
ventre de sa mere.” Article 742 of the same Code holds that, just as a conceived child,
it may receive donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of Articles
40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further strengthen the
case for reversal of order.

Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for damage caused” per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision
supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages for victims of seduction,
abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
GELUZ V. CA
G. R. NO. L-16439, 20 JULY 1961

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva & Antonio Geluz met in 1948 through Nita’s aunt.

In 1950, she got pregnant. To conceal her pregnancy from her parents, she had an
abortion.

When they got married, she got pregnant again. Since she was an employee of
COMELEC and her pregnancy would be inconvenient to her, she had an abortion in
October 1953.

In 1955, she again became pregnant after 2 years and had an abortion for the third
and last time.

The last abortion constituted the plaintiff’s basis in filing an action for the award of
damages. CA and the trial court granted the award of damages.

ISSUE:

Whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same.

RULING:

The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a
person. It does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality
which the trial court and Court of Appeals predicated. Since an action for pecuniary
damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it
is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the
unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
deliberately accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue
on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since
no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality
under Article 40 of the Civil Code, which expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently alive. It is apparent that
he consented to the previous abortions. It made his action questionable for why he only
filed for damages on his wife’s third abortion. Also, SC held that the fetus wasn’t born
yet so it has no juridical personality. The award for the death of a person does not
cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality and incapable of
having rights and obligations.
JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO
G. R. NOS. L-5426-28, 29 MAY 1953

FACTS:

On 6 February 1945, during the battle of liberation in Manila, Joaquin Navarro, Sr., 70,
wife Angela Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion, and Natividad (23-25),
son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground
floor of German Club Building. Building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting
hitting the three daughters who fell. Sr. decided to leave building. His wife didn’t want
to leave so he left with his son, his son’s wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez. As they
came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground the rest lay flat on the ground to avoid
bullets. German Club collapsed trapping may people presumably including Angela
Joaquin. Sr., Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for
three days. Feb. 10, 1945: on their way to St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese
patrols, Sr. and Adela were hit and killed.

Trial Court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while Court of Appeals ruled that
son outlived his mother.

ISSUE:

Orders of death of Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr.

RULING:

Article 43 of the Civil Code provides: whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first
to die of the two or more persons who would inherit one from the other, the person
who alleges prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the
presumption shall be that they died at the same time and no transmission of rights from
one to the other shall take place.

In light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair inference can be arrived at that JN Jr died
before his mother. The presumption that AJ died before her son was based on
speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by
which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail.

Evidence of survivorship may be: (1) direct; (2) indirect; (3) circumstantial; or (4)
inferential. Article 43 speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called
to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in the absence
of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and there shall be no
transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules of Court, in cases of calamity,
there is a hierarchy of survivorship.
SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC
G. R. NO. 174689, 22 OCTOBER 2007

FACTS:

Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and
his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, for reason of his
sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but
thinks and acts like a female. The RTC ruled in his favour, saying that it is in
consonance with the principle of justice and equality.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, alleging that
there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether a change in the “name” and “sex” entries in birth certificates are allowed by
reason of sex reassignment.

RULING:

No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where
the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonour, or difficult to pronounce or write; a
nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis
of the change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he
thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name
does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth
certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The petition was denied.
REPUBLIC V. CAGANDAHAN
G. R. NO. 166676, 12 SEPTEMBER 2008

FACTS:

Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC.
She alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in
the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) – a
condition where persons afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She
alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has
become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such
that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from
Jennifer to Jeff.

Respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr.
Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondent’s condition is known as
CAH. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully
developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He
further testified that respondent’s condition is permanent and recommended the change
of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as
male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondent’s petition.

Hence, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of
the abovementioned ruling. The OSG contends, among others, that Rule 108 does not
allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent’s claimed medical
condition known as CAH does not make her a male.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC erred in granting the petition on the ground of her medical condition.

RULING:

No. The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and the court must look to the statutes. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is
not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code. The
acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include
even those that occur after birth.

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. It is one of the many conditions that involve
intersex anatomy. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both
male and female sexes.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations, which should not be subject to outright denial. The
current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either
as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when
nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis

for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on
medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than
female, then a change in the subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex
the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes
the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural
steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already
ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and
taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical mold
of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due
course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences,
much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male
tendency due to CAH. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and
of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to
take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of
evidence that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show
that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are
equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.

We respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male.

As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change
of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of
the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court’s grant of
respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name
to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name.
Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.

The Republic’s petition is denied.

NINAL V. BADAYOG
G. R. NO. 133778, 14 MARCH 2000

FACTS:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.

Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of
marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUES:

(a) Whether Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least five
years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.

(b) Whether plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal
is already dead.

RULING:

(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife
for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed
on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the
special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year
common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. The five-year period should be the years immediately before the day the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—
that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with
those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
REPUBLIC V. DAYOT
G. R. NOS. 175581 AND 179474, 28 MARCH 2008

FACTS:

On 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City through the
execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of
maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years. Then Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on 31
August 1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Then on 7
July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between
the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had
lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage
was secured through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for
the ground that the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that
his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for
the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 34 of the
New Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal condition
that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for
at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of
marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio?

RULING:

Yes, it is void ab initio for lacking the requirements of valid marriage in which the sworn
affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper because they started living
together five months before the celebration of their marriage. That according to the
five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 34 “No license shall be
necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediments to marry
each other… “ it means that a five years period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the
marriage, characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties.
REPUBLIC V. ALBIOS
G. R. NO. 198780, 16 OCTOBER 2013

FACTS:

Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on 22 October 2004, before the sala of Judge
Calo in Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (6 December 2006), Albios filed
with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According
to her, the marriage was a marriage in jest because she only wed the American to
acquire US citizenship and even arranged to pay him $2,000 in exchange for his
consent. Adding that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived
as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state and complying with their marital obligations. The court even sent
summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer.

Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab
initio for lack of consent because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means
to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.. However, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case
do not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties intentionally consented
to enter into a real and valid marriage. That the parties here intentionally consented to
enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to
acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

ISSUE:

Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in

consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

RULING:

NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.

Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter
into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given
and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires
that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent
must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the
vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. None of these are present in the case.

Therefore, their marriage remains valid.