ALVAREZ YUSOP VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 138859-60 FEBRUARY 22, 2001

FACTS: The Office of Ombudsman, acting on an affidavit-complaint filed,

recommended the prosecution of Alvarez Yusop et. Al. for violation of of Section 3-a of
RA 3019 and Article 269 (unlawful arrest). Accordingly, two informations were filed
with the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, an arrest was issued but Yusop posted a bail bond
before RTC at the same time he filed a Motion To Remand Case To The Ombudsman -
Mindanao For Preliminary Investigation.

The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of petitioner for his alleged failure to submit
himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court. He then filed a Motion to Dismiss,
grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan resolved not
to take action on the Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted himself to its
jurisdiction.
On the scheduled arraignment, petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been
accorded preliminary investigation. In its two assailed Orders, the Sandiganbayan
rejected his claim and proceeded with the arraignment. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: 1. Whether Yusop is entitled to Preliminary Investigation
2. Whether Yusop waived his right to Preliminary Investigation?
3. Whether absence of preliminary investigation is jurisdictional that would entitle a
dismissal of the case?
RULING: 1. YES
The Rules of Court requires such investigation before an information for an offense
punishable by at least four years, two months and one day may be filed in court. The old
Rules, on the other hand, mandates preliminary investigation of an offense cognizable by
the regional trial court. Petitioner is charged in Criminal Case No. 24524 with violation
of Section 3-a of RA 3019. Such offense is punishable with, among other penalties,
imprisonment of six years and one month to fifteen years. Under the aforecited Rules,
whether in the old or the revised version, he is entitled to a preliminary investigation.

2. NO In Go v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that “the

right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it
before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.” Conversely, if the accused
does invoke it before arraignment, as the petitioner did in this case, the right is not
waived.

Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of petitioner’s right to
preliminary investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, “[a]n application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the
charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. x x x.”

We stress that the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely

formal or technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure
of his right to due process. Hence, preliminary investigation with regard to him
must he conducted.

3. NO
We disagree. In the first place, nowhere in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or
even the old Rules, is there any mention that this lack is a ground for a motion to quash.
Furthermore, it has been held that responsibility for the “absence of a preliminary
investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity
of the proceedings.” We reiterate the following ruling of the Court in People v. Gomez:
“If there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their
plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the
information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand
the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.”

G.R. No. 154438. September 5, 2007.*

ALICIA F. RICAFORTE, petitioner, vs. LEON L. JURADO, respondent.

FACTS: Jurado operates and manages a rice mill in Bulacan. Ruby Aguilar (Aguilar)
procured rice from him and in payment thereof she gave him two Far East Bank and
Trust Company (FEBTC) checks which were both issued by Alicia Ricaforte and when
presented for payment were dishonored. Thus, Jurado filed a complaint for estafa and
violation of B.P. 22 against Alicia. In her Counter-Affidavit, petitioner denied the
accusation. She alleged that Aguilar who had lost her Metrobank checkbook borrowed
her checks to pay off Aguilars obligations with Leon Jurado; that she willingly lent her
checks to Aguilar on condition that these checks will be replaced with Aguilars own
checks once her new checkbook is issued to her by Metrobank; that when Aguilar issued
the replacement checks, petitioner demanded from respondent the return of her checks
but respondent refused, thus she was constrained to request her bank to issue an order of
stop payment.

The Assistant Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for estaffa and B.P. 22 for
insufficiency of evidence. Subsequent Motion for reconsideration by Jurado was
denied. The prosecutor found that although the issuance of a worthless check
is malum prohibitum, B.P. Blg. 22 still requires that the checks should be issued with
consideration, which element was lacking in this case. Respondent appealed the dismissal
of his complaint to the Department of Justice. The Secretary of Justice issued a
Resolution modifying the Resolution of the City Prosecutor and directing him to file an
information against petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

ISSUE: Whether the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
finding that there is probable cause for the filing of information against petitioner for
violation of BP. Blg. 22.?
RULING: NO.
In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether
there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more
than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime
has been committed by the suspect. It does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. The
complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary
investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’
evidence. It is enough that in the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness,
credence is given to the finding and determination of probable cause by the
Secretary of Justice in a preliminary investigation.

G.R. No. 101837. February 11, 1992.*

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS; THE

HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial
Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M.; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS: Eldon Maguan (Maguan) was allegedly shot to death by accused Rolito Go due
to traffic altercation when petitioner’s car and victim’s car nearly bumped each other. The
Security of the “Cravings Bake Shop” saw the incident and point herein petitioner as the
gunman, which he positively identified when questioned by authorities. Thereafter, the
police launched a manhunt operation that caused petitioner present himself before San
Juan Police station to verify said issue. The police detained him then and filed a
complaint against him for frustrated homicide, which was later modified to murder, since
the victim Maguan died of his gunshot wound.
The counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate
release and proper preliminary investigation. This was granted and was accordingly filed
by Prosecutor with the RTC. The court grants the conduct of preliminary investigation.
However, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order: the granting of bail was
recalled, the conduct of preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled, and
petitioner’s omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation was
treated as a petition for bail.
When the court set the case for arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to restrain his
arraignment but was denied.
ISSUE: whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the
instant case considering that he was already arraigned
RULING: YES
The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to
invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. In the instant case,
petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his
arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of
Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary
investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail, petitioner
had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, we did hold that
appellants there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately
after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial “without previously claiming that
they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.” In the instant case, petitioner
Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one
omnibus motion.
Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the
part of petitioner.

G.R. No. 108251. January 31, 1996.*

CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and MANSUETO J. HONRADA, petitioners, vs.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Second Division; HONORABLE
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his official capacity as Special Prosecutor; HONORABLE
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, in his official capacity as Ombudsman; and TEOFILO
GELACIO, respondents.
FACTS: The case originated from a complaint of Teofilio Gelacio(Gelacio) against
Ceferino Paredes (Paredes). He alleged MCTC clerk of court Honrada in conspiracy with
Paredes and Atty Sanasaet certified as true a copy of arraignment in a criminal case when
in fact there was no arraignment held. Thereafter, a preliminary investigation was
conducted and before the resolution of Prosecutor Alaxan was submitted Atty Sansaet
retracted his statement to effect that Paredes had been arraigned. As a resultErdulfo
Querubin (Special Prosecutor) recommended the filing of information for falsification of
public document document against Paredes, Honrada and Atty Sansaet. They moved to
quash the information but was denied. Consequently, they move for a reinvestigation of
cases but was dismissed as grounds were same in their motion to quash. Accordingly, the
case was set for trial. Hence this present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction.

Among their contention was that the complaint shall be dismissed as the filling of charges
was politically motivated.

ISSUE: Whether the contention of Paredes was tenable

RULING:NO

We find the foregoing averments to be unpersuasive. xxx the filing of the charges is
politically motivated cannot justify the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is
otherwise evidence to support them. Here a preliminary investigation of the complaint
against petitioners was held during which petitioners were heard. Their evidence, as well
as that of private respondent Gelacio, was considered in great detail in the resolution of
GIO II Violan.

Indeed, this Court is loath to interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman unless such
discretion is clearly shown to have been abused.

There are instances, constituting exceptions to the general rule, when this Court will
intervene in the prosecution of cases. Some of these instances were enumerated in Brocka
v. Enrile, as follows:

a. Where injunction is justified by the necessity to afford protection to the

constitutional rights of the accused; (Hernandez vs. Albano, et. al. L-19272, January 25,
1967, 19 SCRA 95); b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or
to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (Dimayuga, et. al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil.
304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et. al. L-38383, May 27 1981, 104
SCRA 607); c.When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (De Leon vs,
Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202); d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority; Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil 62. (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil 62); e. Where the
prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil
556; Yu Co Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389); f. When double jeopardy is clearly
apparent; (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109 Phil 1140); g. Where the court has
no jurisdiction over the offense; (Lopez vs, City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18
SCRA 616).; h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (Rustia
vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960); i. Where the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J.
(1953), cited in Ranoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; cf
Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); jWhen there is
clearly no prima facie case against the accused and motion to quash on that ground has
been denied; (Salonga vs. Pano, et. al. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438); and
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners. (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1,
1953) (cited in Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPEDIUM, p. 188 1988 Ed).

But none of these instances is present here.

What petitioners raise are questions which go to the weight to be given to the
affidavits by Atty. Nueva and Judge Ariño. These are matters for the trial court's
appreciation. A preliminary investigation is not a trial. The function of the
government prosecutor during the preliminary investigation is merely to determine
the existence of probable cause. As we explained in Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan, this
function involves only the following:

Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-
founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a
thing is so. (Words and Phrases, Probable Cause v. 34, p. 12) The term does not mean
"actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. Thus a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that
it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the
charge.

G.R. Nos. 212140-41. January 21, 2015.*

SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Office of the Ombudsman,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD,
respondents.
FACTS: The Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy if complaint, among others,
that the criminal proceedings for Plunder. Estrada filed a counter affidavit. Thereafter he
filed a request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings. His request was made
pursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman). However, this was denied.
Accordingly, Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada. Hence, he file the
present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether Sen. Estrada has been denied of due process when he was denied to be
furnished of the counter-affidavit of his co-respondents during preliminary investigation

RULING: NO

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter affidavits of his
co-respondents violates his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada,
however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory
requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman
furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. . Neither
Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule
II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s
claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the
Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to
the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and
his witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching
thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent
to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this
point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what
Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the
affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents
are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion
can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order
which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.

It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt
and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a
part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full
exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to
establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation
are limited to those granted by procedural law. A preliminary investigation is defined as
an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should
be held for trial.

We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists
prima facie evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being
sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.

The constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him does not
apply in preliminary investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary
investigation be an infringement of his right to confront the witnesses against him. A
preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.

G.R. No. 161179. August 7, 2007.*

NACE SUE P. BUAN, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, respondent.

FACTS: Respondent Francisco Matugas (Matugas) was before a provincial governor.

Petitioner Nace Sue Buan (Buan) was a regular employee of provincial government of
Surigao del Norte. Matugas asked Buan to accompany him to Manila allegedly work-
related trip. In a hotel in Manila Matugas sexually harassed Buan. Buan reported the
incident to her mother but prevailed not to file any complaint yet since Matugas was at
that time was powerful and influential. Almost six years later, Buan filed a case for
attempted rape against MAtugas. The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of
probable cause. Buan appeal with the Department of Justice which in turn reversed the
findings of public prosecutor. Matugas filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. CA reversed and set aside the question resolutions of Secreatry ofJustice.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether CA was correct in reversing the findings of City Prosecutor, dismissing
complaint and directing the filing of information?
RULING: NO.
Admittedly, the CA has the original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari not only under
the Rules but also under the judicial power granted to courts by no less that the
Constitution. But, the question is, can the CA reverse and set aside a decision of the
Secretary of Justice and substitute its own judgment, as it did in this case? Definitely not.
The power to reverse and set aside partakes of an appellate jurisdiction which the CA
does not have over judgments of the Secretary of Justice exercising quasi-judicial
functions.
Certiorari power is limited to questions of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion only.
The CA, in reviewing and weighing/evaluating the evidence submitted, exercised
appellate jurisdiction and stepped down to the role of becoming a trier of facts which is
definitely uncalled for under the circumstances.
We may also be well reminded that the purpose of preliminary investigation is to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief as to
the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof—
it is exclusively within the ambit of the prosecutor’s power to determine whether
probable cause exists and which crime to prosecute for. Should it be determined later
on after a full-blown trial where a full account can be made of the incident, that not all
the elements of attempted rape exist, it is then for the trial court to acquit respondent or
convict him for a lesser crime necessarily included therein such as acts of lasciviousness
or unjust vexation. But the Secretary of Justice has the discretion to determine for which
crime he should prosecute for.

G.R. No. 171420. October 5, 2016.*

AURORA A. SALES, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN D. ADAPON, OFELIA C.

ADAPON and TEOFILO D. ADAPON, respondents.

FACTS: The case arose in an extra-judicial settlement of a parcel of land of the siblings
of Aurara A. Sales. Aurora Sales was a US immigrant. The respondent in the present case
caused the subdivision of the property. Petitioner filed a criminal case of use of falsified
document against respondent claiming that there she never sign the deed of extra-judicial
settlement because she was at that time in the United States and could not have appeared
before a notary public in Makati City. She authorized her son-in-law for the institution of
the said criminal complaint.
The Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it is
impossible for him to proceed with the preliminary investigation without the appearance
of private respondent who will be subjected to some clarificatory questions on certain
matters. They then filed an appeal before the Department of Justice. The Provincial
Prosecutor then ordered the filing of an information.
Thereafter the respondent filed certiorari before the CA which was granted by the latter
court. Hence , this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the complaint is proper because of the petitioner's
failure to appear at the clarificatory hearing set by the investigating prosecutor.

RULING:. NO
The investigating prosecutor gravely erred in dismissing the petitioner’s criminal
complaint for falsification simply because of her nonappearance at the clarificatory
hearing. To start with, her personal presence was excusable because of her advanced
age and the distance of her place of residence at the time (New York, United States of
America) from the Province of Batangas, the venue of the proceedings. Secondly, the
records already contained sufficient evidence upon which the investigating prosecutor
could make a finding of probable cause. Thirdly, she was represented in the proceedings
by her son-in-law Jerico B. Sales, whom she had constituted as her agent for purposes of
pursuing the criminal case against the respondents. Being her agent expressly authorized
for that special purpose, Jerico could competently respond to the investigating
prosecutor’s clarificatory questions in a manner legally binding on her. Fourthly, had the
investigating prosecutor sincerely considered her personal presence as absolutely
necessary in the determination of probable cause, he should have granted her request to
have her deposition taken instead. Such power was within his discretion as the
investigating prosecutor. And lastly, the investigating prosecutor’s requiring her personal
presence at the clarificatory hearing was probably unnecessary and superfluous in view of
his failure to specify the matters still needing to be clarified. As earlier mentioned, the
documents submitted by both parties in the proceedings were already sufficient for the
determination of whether or not probable cause existed against the respondents. If the
clarificatory hearing was geared towards the determination of the existence of
probable cause, the non-specification of the matters to be inquired into during the
clarificatory hearing indicated that no more matters needed to be clarified from the
petitioner herself.

The opinion of the CA was predicated on a very restrictive reading of the

term complainant as used in Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Such term is not of
the same import as the term plaintiff used in civil procedure to describe the party-in-
interest initiating the civil suit. In criminal proceedings, the real party-in-interest is
the State, and the complaint or information is always brought in the name of the
People of the Philippines, it being sufficient that the complainant is named in the
information or complaint as the offended party. Herein, the petitioner as the
complainant would be a mere witness for the Prosecution at the trial, subject to her right
to intervene by counsel in the criminal prosecution because the criminal action would
entail civil liability. Her participation in the criminal case as the complainant was similar
to that of the relator in other jurisdictions, the real party-in-interest in whose name a legal
action is brought by the State, or who relates the facts on which the action is based.

G.R. No. 188197. August 3, 2010.*

LEONARDO U. FLORES, petitioner, vs. HON. RAUL S. GONZALEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of Justice, and EUGENE LIM, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Leonardo Flores (Flores) filed a complaint-affidavit against private

respondent Eugene Lim (lim) for estafa before the City Prosecutor of Cebu City. The
case arose out of the true purchase price of CP. The City Prosecutor dismissed the
complaint for lack of probable cause. Having been denied of his motion for
reconsideration, Flores filed a petition for review with secretary of justice which
dismissed the petition. Flores moved for reconsideration which this time the Secretary of
Justice reversed his decision. Accordingly, City Prosecutor filed an information for the
crime of other deceits against Lim.
Lim thus filed a motion for reconsideration which the Secretary of Justice reconsidered
anew and issued a resolution reversing the filing of information. Accordingly, the City
Prosecutor filed with the MTCC a Motion to Withdraw Information. As a result, Flores
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA .
Meanwhile, the MTCC denied the Motion to Withdraw Information noting the flip-
flopping of public prosecutors. The Court has conformably to the doctrine laid down in
Crespo and other cases made its own independent assessment of the evidence thus far
submitted and is convinced that there exists probable cause to hold accused to trial where
the parties can better ventilate their respective claims and defense[s].
The CA finds no grave abuse of discretion o the part of Secretary of Justice. Flores filed a
motion for reconsideration and was denied. Hence, present petition.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution of MTC, denying Lim’s motion to withdraw information
and finding probable cause, rendered the disposition of petition before the CA moot and
academic.
RULING: YES. CA Ruling is already moot and academic because the MTC has already
denied the motion based on its power in Crespo vs Mugol.

Indeed, as Crespo declared

[O]nce a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of

the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the
trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny
the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment
of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
In this case, on a petition for review, the Secretary of Justice found probable cause for
Other Deceits against Lim; thus, the proper Information was filed in Court pursuant to the
directive of the Secretary of Justice. Upon filing of the Information, the MTCC acquired
jurisdiction over the case.

Lim filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 31, 2006 Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice. There was nothing procedurally infirm in this course of action inasmuch as there
is nothing in Crespo that bars the Secretary of Justice from reviewing resolutions of his
subordinates in an appeal or petition for review in criminal cases. The Secretary of
Justice was merely advised in Crespo that, as far as practicable, he should not take
cognizance of an appeal when the complaint or information is already filed in court.

G.R. No. 183270. February 13, 2009.*

RUFINA L. CALIWAN, petitioner, vs. MARIO OCAMPO, OFELIA OCAMPO

and RHODORA PASILONA, respondents
FACTS: The case arose from a heated incident between the parties herein in a birthday
party of Rufina Caliwan (Caliwan). Caliwan (Caliwan) filed a complaint for attempted
murder, multiple serious physical injuries, slander by deed, grave threats, and grave oral
defamation against respondents SPO4 Mario Ocampo (Spo4 Mario), Ofelia Ocampo
(Ofelia), and Rhodora Pasilona (Pasilona) before the Pasay City Prosecutors Office.
As counter charges, respondents filed complaints for grave threaths, oral defamation,
alarms and scandals, and physical injuries and oral defamation against petitioner.
The City Prosecutor of Pasay recommended the dismissal of complaint of Petitioner
Caliwan and recommended that she be charged with light threats and slight physical
injuries. Accordingly, an information was filed.
Petitioner Caliwan appealed to the DOJ which found probable cause for offense of light
threats against SPO4 Mario and for grave oral defamation and slight physical injuries
against Ofelia and Pasilona and consequently ordered the filing of corresponding
informations. The DOJ also ordered the dismissal of the rest of the charges, as well as
withdrawal of the Informations against Caliwan.
Consequently, a Motion for Withdrawal of Information was filed by Caliwan.
However, this was denied by the Metropolian Trial Court. Thereafter, she filed a
petition for certiorari before the RTC which granted the petition.
Respondents thus appealed to CA. The CA reversed the decision of RTC and denied the
MTWI. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but failed. Hence, present case.
ISSUE: 1. Whether the Motion to Withdraw the Information is an interlocutory order and
certiorari may be availed of?
RULING: YES. the MTWI is an interlocutory order and certiorari cannot be
availed of.
An interlocutory order is one that does not finally dispose of the case and does not
end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their
rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things
remain to be done by the Court. x x x Interlocutory orders merely rule on an incidental
issue and do not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they leave something to be
done before it is finally decided on the merits.

The June 6, 2006 Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court being interlocutory and
the case falling under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the Regional
Trial Court erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari despite the clear
prohibition in Section 19. Indeed, as held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Estoque, 346 SCRA 230
(2000), there can be no mistaking the clear command of Section 19 (e) of the 1991
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and judges have no option but to obey. When the
law is clear, there is no room for interpretation.

Once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case, i.e., its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion
of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
the criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The determination of the case is within the court’s exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which has the option to grant or deny
the same.

G.R. No. 189596. April 23, 2014.*

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. TEODULO NANO ALAON,

respondent.

FACTS: The provincial prosecution office of daet found probable cause to indict Alaon
for rape. On motion for reconsideration of Alaon, the Provincial prosecutor downgraded
the offense from rape to acts of lasciviousness. Consequently, an information was filed
against Alaon.
Thereafter, the Secretary of Justice directed the forwarding of records for automatic
review and to move for suspension of the proceedings against Alaon. This directive was
based on a letter of BBB, AAA’s mother (private respondent, narrating what happended
and telling that AAA is suffering from an intellectual disability. The Secretary of Justice
treated it as an appeal.
Thereafter the assistant provincial prosecutor sent letter to the Judge of RTC requesting
withdrawal of information in compliance wih the order of secretary mistakenly assuming
that Alaon filed a petition for review.
The criminal case proceeded until trial. Meanwhile, the propriety of the offense charged
was still at issue within the prosecution which the then undersecretary of DOJ issued a
resolution setting aside the downgrading of the offense charged. Alaon thus filed a
Certiorari with Court of Appeals alleging grave abused of disecretion. CA granted the
prtition. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari by Petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of the right to preliminary investigation and due
process.
RULING: the appellate court’s holding that Alaon was deprived of his right to
procedural due process, as he was not given an opportunity to be heard on the
letter-appeal of private complainant’s mother.

The conduct of preliminary investigation is subject to the requirements of both

substantive and procedural due process. Preliminary investigation is considered as a
judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature of
his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer.13Even at the stage of petition for review
before the Secretary of Justice, the requirements for substantive and procedural due
process do not abate.

The DOJ makes much of the fact that Alaon ostensibly knew of BBB’s appeal to the
Secretary of Justice.

This assertion of the DOJ cannot equate to compliance with procedural due process. x x x
Once the Secretary of Justice decided to treat the letter of BBB as an appeal, he should
have required Alaon to comment thereon. Even if the letter did not comply with the
requirements for an appeal under the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rules on
Appeal, indeed, precisely for such reason, the Secretary of Justice was duty-bound, as the
one hearing the case, to afford Alaon, respondent therein, an opportunity to be heard to
satisfy procedural due process. On this score, the DOJ abused its discretion when it rode
roughshod over Alaon’s rights as it accommodated private complainant.

READING SUPPLEMENT ON PI

G.R. No. 165596. November 17, 2005.*

ESMAEL ORQUINAZA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RTC

JUDGE OF BRANCH 35, CALAMBA CITY, MTC JUDGE OF CALAMBA CITY
and EDELYN ARIDA, respondents.

FACTS: Arida, an employee of Calamba Model Makers factory, together with her
witness Espinili, executed a sworn statement before the Calamba City Police Station
regarding the alleged act of Orquinaza, the general manager of the said factory, of kissing
her and touching her breasts while she was taking a nap inside a room of the factory. The
Calamba City Police designated the offense as sexual harrassment and referred the
case to the Office of the Prosecutor.

The assistant city prosecutor issued a subpoena ordering respondent Arida and Orquinaza
to appear for preliminary investigation. Orquinaza filed a motion to dismiss before the
Office of the City Prosecutor, arguing that the affidavits of Arida and Espinili do not
contain allegations to constitute the crime of sexual harassment.

Soon, the assistant city prosecutor issued a resolution finding that there was no
transgression of the anti-sexual harassment law, but petitioner's act of grabbing
complainant's breasts and kissing her constitute acts of lasciviousness. Thus, he filed
with the MTCC an information charging petitioner with acts of lasciviousness.

A warrant of arrest was issued against Orquinaza. Orquinaza filed an omnibus motion
praying that the warrant be recalled, the information be quashed, the arraignment be
invalidated and the case be dismissed. He also claims that he was deprived of his right to
due process since the information for acts of lasciviousness was void as the preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor was for sexual harassment and not for acts of
lasciviousness. The MTCC denied the motion.

Issues:

1. Is there a need for new preliminary investigation?

2. Should the case be dismissed on the ground of lack of preliminary investigation? Is

lack of preliminary investigation a ground for the quashal of the information?
RULING:
1. NO. The designation by the police officer of the offense as sexual harassment
when she referred the case to the Office of the Prosecutor is not conclusive as
it is within the competence of the prosecutor to assess the evidence submitted
and determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be charged. That is
precisely the purpose of the preliminary investigation. It is a means to allow the
parties to present their affidavits and counter-affidavits before the prosecutor to
enable the latter to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground to indict the
accused and to help him prepare the information to be filed in court.
After the Calamba City Police referred the case to the Office of the Prosecutor,
Assistant City Prosecutor Rodel Paderayon conducted a preliminary investigation
where he required petitioner and respondent to submit their respective affidavits
and supporting evidence. Based on the submissions of the parties, he concluded
 that the more proper charge should be acts of lasciviousness, and accordingly
filed the appropriate information.
2. NO. it is worthy to state that even if it were necessary to conduct another
preliminary investigation for the charge of acts of lasciviousness, the lack of
such preliminary investigation would still not be a ground to quash the
information against the accused. The Court has often held that the lack of
preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash or dismiss a complaint or
information. Much less does it affect the court's jurisdiction. The absence of a
preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case nor
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. The
remedy of the accused in such case is to call the attention of the court to the
lack of a preliminary investigation and demand, as a matter of right, that one
be conducted. The court, instead of dismissing the information, should merely
suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation.

G.R. No. 113930. March 5, 1996.*

PAUL G. ROBERTS, JR., RODOLFO C. SALAZAR, LUIS LORENZO, SR., LUIS

LORENZO, JR., AMAURY R. GUTIERREZ, BAYANI N. FABIC, JOSE YULO,
JR., ESTEBAN B. PALANNUAYAN, and WONG FONG FUI, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. MAXIMIANO ASUNCION, in his capacity as
the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104, HON.
APOLINARIO G. EXEVEA, HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, and HON. PHILIP
A. AGUINALDO, in their capacities as Members of the Department of Justice
“349” Committee, and the CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY,
respondents.

FACTS: Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board
of Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi “Number
Fever” promotion by handlers of the supposedly winning “349” Pepsi crowns. Of the four
cases filed against the petitioners, probable cause was found by the investigating
prosecutor only for the crime of estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses.

On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with the trial court without anything
accompanying it. A copy of the investigating prosecutor’s Joint Resolution was
forwarded to and received by the trial court only on 22 April 1993. However, no
affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found
in the records of the case as of 19 May 1993.

On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the
Department of Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor. They also moved for the suspension of the proceedings and the
holding in abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, the
public prosecutor also moved to defer the arraignment of the accused-appellants pending
the final disposition of the appeal to the Department of Justice.

On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1)
denying, on the basis of Crespovs. Mogul, the foregoing motions respectively filed by the
petitioners and the public prosecutor, and directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest
“after June 1993” and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993. In part, respondent judge
stated in his order that since the case is already pending in this Court for trial, following
whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the
independence and integrity his court. To justify his order, he quoted the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Crespo, which stated:

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the
Court.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent judge
had not the slightest basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the
issuance of warrants of arrest. After finding that a copy of the public prosecutor’s Joint
Resolution had in fact been forwarded to, and received by, the trial court on 22 April
1993, the CA denied petitioners’ application for writ of preliminary injunction. The CA
ruled that the Joint Resolution “was sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by
respondent Judge in convincing himself that probable cause indeed exists for the purpose
of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest” and that the “mere silence of the records
or the absence of any express declaration” in the questioned order as to the basis of such
finding does not give rise to an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his
favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty. Roberts, et al.
sought reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the finding of probable cause
by the investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition for mootness.

ISSUES

1. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the

basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the
issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review
filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved?

2. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the

issuance of warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary
investigation?
RULING: 1. Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the
basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance
the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for
review filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved.
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an
appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an
unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, “as far
as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of
the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court.”

Crespo could not have intended otherwise without doing violence to, or repealing, the last
paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which recognizes the authority of
the Secretary of Justice to reverse the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor upon petition by a proper party.

Whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is still a
matter of guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to
deny the motions to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following
grounds:

This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion
the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and
integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable of administering justice.

The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing
of the aforementioned motions [to suspend proceedings and issuance of warrants of arrest
and to defer arraignment] at that stage but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw
the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for review reversing the Joint
Resolution of the investigating prosecutor. Once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the
information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the
Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.

2. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance
of warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.

The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the
proposition that the investigating prosecutor’s certification in an information or his
resolution which is made the basis for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice
in the judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In Webb, this Court assumed that since the respondent Judges had before them not only
the 26-page resolution of the investigating panel but also the affidavits of the prosecution
witnesses and even the counter-affidavits of the respondents, they (judges) made personal
evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case.

In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12 April 1993
with the trial court. A copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, and received by, the
trial court only on 22 April 1993. And as revealed by the certification of respondent
judge’s clerk of court, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of
the proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the
course thereof were found in the records of this case as of 19 May 1993. Clearly, when
respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing, among
other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended
information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records or
evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he
made no specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants
of arrest “after June 21, 1993.” It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes
a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional requirement for
the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even
convincing logic.

G.R. No. 158543. July 21, 2004.*

ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALAN and RAINIER PUNZALAN,

petitioners, vs. DENCIO DELA PEÑA and ROBERT CAGARA, respondents
FACTS: Rainer Punzalan filed a criminal case against Michael Plata for attempted homicide
and against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm. In turn, Plata, Cagara and
Dela Peña filed several counter-charges for grave oral defamation,grave threats, robbery,
malicious mischief and slight physical injuries against thePunzalans, including one for
Attempted Murder filed by Dela Peña against Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen
others and one for Grave Threats filed by DelaPeña against Alex "Toto" Ofrin.

Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation,docketed
as, against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier, On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City dismissed the complaint for Grave Oral
Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan. The charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier,
Randall and 14 others was also dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor.

On March 23, 2000, then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution
modifying the July 28, 1998 J oint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor by ordering,
among others – (1) that the charge of Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan
be downgraded to Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the charge of Attempted Murder
against Rainier, Randall and 14 others be downgraded to Attempted Homicide; and
(3) that the charge of Grave Threats against Alex "Toto" Ofrin be downgraded to Other
Light Threats.On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the March 23, 2000
Resolutionand directed the withdrawal of the Informations against the movants..

ISSUES
(1)Whether or not the Secretary of Justice committed GAD? No.

G.R. No. 123504. December 14, 2000.*

P/INSP. RODOLFO SAMSON, PO3 JAMES BUSTINERA, PO2 PABLO

TOTANES, and PO1 ADRIANO CRUZ, petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR., as Secretary of Justice, Chief State Prosecutor ZENON DE
GUIA, and State Prosecutor PAULITA ACOSTA-VILLARANTE and Prosecuting
Attorney EMMANUEL VELASCO, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioners P/Insp. Rodolfo Samson et al., were charged of murder for killing
the son of a politician from Cotabato. The Prosecution Attorney filed the information but
Petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for judicial determination of existence of
probable cause with prayer to hold the issuance of warrant of arrest. The trial court
ordered the reinvestigation of the case through Chief Prosecutor. Before the DOJ could
conduct reinvestigation, Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the instant petition to
enjoin the Secretary of Justice from conducting reinvestigation of charges against them.

ISSUE: Whether Court may enjoin the Secretary of Justice from conducting a
reinvestigation of the charges against petitioners as ordered by the trial court for
determination of probable cause.

RULING: NO. Petitioners plea for injunction to restrain the reinvestigation of the
criminal case against them is not legally permissible.
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction preliminary
or final, to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution.[14] With more reason will injunction
not lie when the case is still at the stage of preliminary investigation or reinvestigation.

We find petitioners plea for a writ of injunction or temporary restraining order utterly
without merit. As a rule, we do not interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient
latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against an
offender.

G.R. Nos. 156399-400. June 27, 2008.*

VICTOR JOSE TAN UY, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL DIVISION),
CARLOS S. CAACBAY OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
ROMEO T. CAPULONG, LEONARD DE VERA, AND DENNIS B. FUNA,
respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner was alleged to be one of respondent in the
plunder case against former President Estrada. However, it appears
that he was mistakenly identified as Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy. Petitioner insist before the Ombudsman to
conduct a preliminary investigation but was denied. However, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the conduct of Premiliminary
Investigation. The Ombudsman required him to a clarificatory
hearing but he did not attend arguing that there is no need to
conduct clarificatory hearing as the evidence are clear that there is
no probable cause. As such, the Ombudsman held that there is a
probable cause against Petitioner. Hence, the present Petition for
Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether Petitioner was deprived of his right to preliminary investigation and due
process.

RULING: YES. At the core of the present controversy is the

regularity, in the context of accepted standards of due process, of
the Ombudsmans conduct of the Sandiganbayan-ordered
preliminary investigation. The petition must fail if the Ombudsman
complied with the basic requirements of due process and the
prevailing rules and jurisprudence on preliminary investigation.
The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound for trial and
before being exposed to the risk of incarceration and penalty is not a mere formal or
technical right—it is a substantive right; To deny the accused’s claim to a preliminary
investigation is to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.

As in a court proceeding, albeit with appropriate adjustments because it is essentially still

an administrative proceeding in which the prosecutor or investigating officer is a quasi-
judicial officer by the nature of his functions, a preliminary investigation is subject to the
requirements of both substantive and procedural due process; The level of scrutiny that
must be made in preliminary investigation is sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused
so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order
an acquittal.