Fmi 3-91 Division Operations (2006)

*FMI 3-91
Field Manual–Interim Headquarters

No. 3-91 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, (Draft–February 2006)
Division Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE ............................................................ iError! Bookmark not defined.
INTRODUCTION ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Chapter 1 DIVISION FUNDAMENTALS................................ Error! Bookmark not defined.
Fundamental Design Changes........................................................................ 1-1
Enabling concepts............................................................................................ 1-3
Role of the Division .......................................................................................... 1-6
Organization of the Division............................................................................ 1-7
Operational Framework ................................................................................. 1-18
Command and support Relationships ......................................................... 1-21
Chapter 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL AT DIVISION...................................................... 2-1
The Commander ............................................................................................... 2-1
Command Posts ............................................................................................... 2-1
Special Troops Battalion ............................................................................... 2-28
Staff Responsibilities ..................................................................................... 2-29
PART TWO – HOW THE DIVISION FIGHTS
Chapter 3 SCENARIO AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS .............................................. 3-1
Section I–Scenario .......................................................................................... 3-1
Road to War ................................................................................................ 3-1
Enemy Situation ......................................................................................... 3-2
Friendly Situation....................................................................................... 3-4
JTF Task Organization, Mission, Commander's Intent, Concept of
the Operation.............................................................................................. 3-4
C/JFLC Task Organization, Mission, Commander's Intent.................... 3-5
Environmental Considerations................................................................. 3-6
Section I–Division Concept of Operations .................................................... 3-9
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 i
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release as a draft document; distribution unlimited.
*This publication, when approved, will supersede FM 71-100.
FMI 3-91
Mission.......................................................................................................3-9
Commander's Intent .................................................................................3-9
Concept of Operations .............................................................................3-9
Chapter 4 DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS....................................................................4-1
Mission ........................................................................................................4-3
Commander's Intent...................................................................................4-3
Commander's Planning Guidance ............................................................4-3
1st Division Concept of Operations for Deployment..............................4-4
Division Command and Control................................................................4-6
Special Troops Battalion .........................................................................4-11
2nd HBCT, 5th HBCT, 10th HBCT and 87th IBCT..................................4-11
11th Combat Aviation Brigade ................................................................4-11
27th Sustainment and 44th Medical Brigades.......................................4-11
34th Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) ...................4-11
56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade .....................................................4-12
75th Fires Brigade ....................................................................................4-13
418th Civil Affairs Battalion.....................................................................4-14
Chapter 5 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ........................................................................5-1
Mission ........................................................................................................5-3
Concept of Operations...............................................................................5-4
Command and Control...............................................................................5-5
Special Troops Battalion ...........................................................................5-6
Chapter 6 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ........................................................................6-1
Scenario Continued....................................................................................6-1
Mission ........................................................................................................6-4
Concept of Operations...............................................................................6-4
Command and Control of Offense............................................................6-8
Special Troops Battalion .........................................................................6-10
BCTs in the Offense .................................................................................6-10
Supporting Brigades in the Offense.......................................................6-11
Chapter 7 STABILITY OPERATIONS ..........................................................................7-1
Mission ........................................................................................................7-1
Commander's Planning Guidance ............................................................7-3
1st Division Concept for Stability Operations .........................................7-5
Appendix A AIRBORNE OPERATIONS ...................................Error! Bookmark not defined.
Appendix B AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS .......................................................................... B-1
Appendix C COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN THE DIVISION .......................................... C-1
ii FMI 3-91 2/1/2006

Contents
Appendix D USAF PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE TO

DIVISION OPERATIONS ...................................................................................D-1
Appendix E NETWORK OPERATIONS ................................................................................ E-1
Appendix F ARMY AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL AT DIVISION ...................... F-1
Appendix G INTEGRATION OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES INTO THE DIVISION ...........G-1
Appendix H BRIGADE TASK ORGANIZATION ...................................................................H-1
Appendix I DIVISION STAFF TRAINING PLANS ................................................................ I-1
GLOSSARY ..........................................Glossary-Error! Bookmark not defined.
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 iii

(BLANK PAGE)
PREFACE
Doctrine provides a military organization with unit of effort and a common

philosophy, language, and purpose. Therefore, this manual discusses division
operations, which is designed to exercise command and control of up to six maneuver
brigades and supporting brigades and battalions. Division units will be rapidly
deployable, responsive, agile, and tailored for land force combat power.
PURPOSE
FMI 3-91 is intended to facilitate the operations and training requirements of

Army divisions as they complete the reorganization process, prepare for
operational deployment, and conduct combat operations. Its interim format will
evolve into an official field manual for division operations after lessons learned
from reorganization, training, and operational experiences are incorporated into
future Army doctrine.
SCOPE
FMI 3-91 has seven chapters and nine appendices organized in two parts. Part I
contains chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 1 discusses division fundamentals and what
has changed from the previous division design. Chapter 2 explains the command
and control system that the division relies on to synchronize the warfighting
functions, which replaced the battlefield operating systems, and details the
organization and functions of the staff elements and cells in the newly designed
division command posts. Part II of this FMI consists of five chapters which
discuss how the division will deploy and conduct full spectrum operations during
a major combat operation using a hypothetical vignette to explain. Chapter 3 sets
the scenario background for the examples and discussion in part II and explains
the division concept of operations. Chapter 4 walks the reader through an
example division deployment scenario. Chapter 5 describes how the division may
conduct defensive operations within the scenario described in chapter 3. Chapter
6 walks the reader through division offensive operations and chapter 7 describes
the division conducting stability operations.
APPLICABILITY
This publication applies to Army forces from Army Service Component

Commands to BCTs. It is most applicable to division commanders and their staff
officers.
DESCRIPTION OF FIELD MANUALS-INTERIM
An FMI is a Department of the Army publication that provides expedited delivery

of urgently needed doctrine the proponent has approved for use without placing it
through the standard development process. Unless an FMI is rescinded,
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) v

FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition)
information it disseminates is incorporated into a new or revised FM. FMIs

expire after two years, unless superseded or rescinded.
ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
Terms that have joint or Army definitions are identified in both the glossary and
the text. The glossary lists most terms used in FMI 3-91 that have joint or Army
definitions. Terms for which FMI 3-91 is the proponent manual (the authority)
are indicated with an asterisk in the glossary and printed in boldface in the text.
For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the
proponent manual follows the definition.
The glossary contains referents of acronyms and definitions of terms not defined
in JP 1-02 and FM 1-02. It does not list acronyms and abbreviations that are
included for clarity only and appear one time, nor those that appear only in a
figure and are listed in the legend for that figure. Some common abbreviations
and acronyms—for example, DOD and abbreviations for military publications—
are not spelled out (refer to the glossary). Since ARFOR is a defined term as well
as an acronym, it is not spelled out.
Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to
men.
Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, is the proponent for
this publication. The preparing agency is the Army Doctrine Proponency
Division, US Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and
recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and
Blank Forms) to Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort
Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-CD (FMI 3-91), 201 Reynolds Road, Fort
Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to web-cadd@leavenworth.army.mil; or
submitted on an electronic DA Form 2028.
vi FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Introduction
PURPOSE
This FMI is being published to meet the doctrinal requirements of the division
previously called the two-star UEx. This FMI applies to the transformational
force across the range of military operations: peacetime military engagement
(PME), small-scale contingencies (SSC), and major combat operations (MCO).
The doctrine contained in this FMI is approved for immediate use in training and
operations. Operational concepts described in this manual are based on decisions
by the Army Chief of Staff to reorganize the Army to a brigade-based force, and
to quickly implement “good enough” designs that will be refined over time. The
material provided in this FMI is considered “good enough” to satisfy the
requirements of the Army’s transforming organizations.
The intended audience for this publication is leaders and staff sections at the
division headquarters level within transforming units. This manual provides
guidance for division leaders and staffs for training and employment of the BCTs
and brigades to conduct full spectrum operations. This publication may also be
used by other Army organizations to assist in their planning for support to
divisions.
This FMI applies to the active component (AC), reserve component (RC), and
Army civilians. It builds on the collective knowledge and experience gained
through recent operations, numerous exercises, and the deliberate process of
informed reasoning. It is rooted in time-tested principles and fundamentals,
while accommodating new technologies and diverse threats to national security.
This FMI describes how the division, formerly known as the two-star UEx,
commands and controls the employment of up to six brigade combat teams and
five supporting brigades conducting full spectrum operations. The organization
and capabilities of the division headquarters and subordinate organizations will
be provided in the ensuing chapters.
FMI 3-92 will be published in mid-year 2006 and will address the Corps, formally
known as the three-star UEx. FMI 3-92 will contain many of the same concepts
discussed in FMI 3-91 but will focus on Corps level operations controlling one or
more divisions.
This FMI is published in conjunction with FMI 5-0.1 which establishes and
modifies many doctrinal terms. FMI 5-0.1 modifies Army doctrine for conducting
operations. The concepts in FMI 5-0.1 should be understood and applied by
readers of this FMI.
The reader should understand concepts detailed in FM 3-0, Operations, FM 3-90,
Tactics and FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces
and FMI 5-0.1, The Operations Process. Where applicable, the reader is referred
to those manuals.
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) vii

This FMI does not address the emerging concept of Homeland Security or Civil
Support Operations.
This FMI does introduce
the G-5 as the primary
staff officer responsible
CJCSM 3500.04B
for plans. This is a FM 7-15 BOS UJTL TACTICAL
change from the TASK AREA
previous use of the G-5
as the Civil Military ART 1.0-Intelligence BOS Deploy/Conduct Maneuver
Operations officer. This ART 2.0-Maneuver
manual also introduces ART 5.1-Mobility
ART 5.2-Countermobility
two new special purpose
attacks; Strike and ART 2.0-Maneuver BOS Develop Intelligence
ART 1.0-Intelligence
Mobile Strike. These will
ART 3.0-Fire Support BOS Employ Firepower
primarily be conducted ART 3.0-Fire Support
by the fires brigade and ART 4.0-Air Defense BOS PerformCSS & Sustainment
the combat aviation ART 6.0-Cbt Service Support
brigade and are ART 5.0-M/CM/S BOS Exercise C2
explained in detail in the ART 7.0-Command and Control
chapters. ART 6.0-CSS BOS Protect the Force
ART 4.0-Air Defense
This FMI does not ART 5.3-Survivability
address tasks in terms of ART 7.0-C2 BOS
the seven battlefield
operation systems (BOS)
systems. Because the
division staff is now Figure I-1. BOS – UJTL Functional Area Comparison
organized by functions,
this manual discusses staff operations by warfighting functions. The warfighting
functions are derived from the UJTL tactical task areas. Figure I-1 provides a
comparison of the BOS to the tactical task areas used to organize the staff by
function. The seven BOS were replaced by the warfighting functions in FMI 5-
0.1. FM 7-15, the Army Universal Task List, will continue to provide
commanders at all levels structured methods of considering tasks that their unit
might perform in any action. However, the new division staff is now organized by
function, consequently this FMI discusses staff operations by functions. Figure I-
1 illustrates the link between the old FM 7-15 (BOS) and the tactical task areas
from the UJTL used to organize the staff by warfighting function.
This FMI will expire after 2 years from its approved publication date.
Throughout its life, proponents should collect feedback to refine the emerging
doctrine that will be incorporated into new or revised field manuals.
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
Current published doctrine remains in effect, unless stated in this FMI that it has changed. The
overarching concepts in FM 3-0, FM 5-0, and FM 6-0 remain valid, for the most part. What
has changed as a result of modular transformation is explained in this FMI and FMI 5-0.1.
viii FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Introduction
NEW OR MODIFIED TERMS

This FMI, in conjunction with FMI 5-0.1, adds the following terms to Army doctrine:
z Changes the G-5/S-5 to Plans from Civil-Military Officer (CMO).
z Establishes the G-9/S-9 as the CMO.
z Establishes the G-8 as the Financial Management Officer.
z Establishes the term Unassigned Area (UA) – that portion of the area of operations
not assigned to subordinate units.
z Explains the phases of the operational ready cycle as part of Army Force
Generation as they pertain to a Brigade Combat Team (BCT).
ORGANIZATION CHANGES
This FMI—
z Eliminates—
Division rear CP and creates a second tactical CP.
Assistant division commanders and replaces them with deputy commanding
generals whose duties and responsibilities are set by the commander.
Deep Operations Cell at the main CP.
Division artillery and division support command.
z Establishes two identical tactical CPs and a mobile command group.
z Addresses—
Changes to the organization of division command posts and staff sections.
Changes to division staff as a result of the elimination of division troops (such as
changes to military intelligence, signal, and air defense battalion staffs).
Elimination of division headquarters company and establishment of division
special troops battalion (STB).
REASONS FOR CHANGE

Given that the Army is retaining the capability to generate three echelons of command above
brigade, one might ask why the Army is revising its existing division and brigade structure so
radically. There are five major reasons.
First–since 1999, the US military has undergone a sweeping evolution driven by operational
experience and new capabilities. In the past, the conduct of operations was divided into
loosely linked major land, sea, and air operations; often conducted with different objectives.
Today, joint operations form a coherent joint fabric and are increasingly integrated at the
tactical level. While this concept addresses the conduct of major land operations, the reader
must be cognizant of the degree of interdependence that has emerged among the joint
partners.
Second–the operational environment requires Army forces that are much more responsive and
tailorable to the needs of the combatant commanders. No single large formation is able to
meet the requirements of full spectrum operations. To meet the needs of the Regional
Combatant Commander (RCC) for land forces, the Army is constantly rearranging its current
force divisions and task organizing them into independent task forces, something for which
they weren’t designed. This is coupled with the need to employ land forces at the outset of the
campaign, in completely complementary fashion with other joint capabilities, translated into
the requirement for much more deployable Army forces.
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) ix

Third–the nature of modern land operations has changed in terms of geography and time. In
general, operations have become more distributed in space and more simultaneous in time. At
tactical and operational levels, subordinate units will operate in noncontiguous areas of
operations and conduct nonlinear operations as a matter of routine. This contrasts sharply with
the interlocked and hierarchical arrangement of land areas of operations prevalent in the past.
This change is the result of smaller and more agile forces, quantum improvements in
command and control capabilities, and joint integration.
Fourth–Army forces continue to increase their lethality, meaning that greater effects can be
generated with much smaller forces. This continues the historical impetus of the last 100
years. However, the integration of advanced information technologies multiplies the
effectiveness of the individual weapons systems by many times. The antithesis of this
development is the increasing dependence on unconventional means by our enemies. They are
simply unable to match the conventional military capabilities of the United States, and the
disparity is growing at an increasing rate. Thus, the likelihood of facing large, conventional
land forces decreases while the need for Army forces for full-spectrum operations increases
(when examined as a percentage of the total force engaged in campaigns).
Fifth–the newly designed brigade combat team incorporates the previous factors. It is a
combined arms formation capable of conducting independent full-spectrum operations. The
future force is designed around the maneuver brigade. The tactical maxims of the brigade are
to see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively. As these advanced units reach
operational status, the Army shifts from a division-based stance to a brigade-based posture.
The principal purpose of the Army shifts from generating and employing divisions in decisive
land operations to providing the joint commander the right mix of different brigades and C2
as part of a coherent joint operation. The shift makes it easier for the Army to tailor forces to
the combatant commanders’ requirements at the strategic level, and employ flexible, smaller
formations distributed across an expanded area of operations.
viii FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Chapter 1
Division Fundamentals
This chapter discusses the division design, enabling concepts, role and organization
of the division, and division operational framework. Together, these topics will show
how the division is structured to employ assigned forces that establish specific
military conditions within a specified area of operations (AO). The division conducts
full-spectrum tactical and operational-level operations and may serve as a Joint Task
Force (JTF) or Joint Force Land Component (JFLC) in a smaller-scale contingency.
When the division serves as a JTF or JFLC, it requires staff augmentation.
FUNDAMENTAL DESIGN CHANGES

1-1. The Army is transforming from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force with
brigades organized by function. The brigade building blocks of the division will make it a modular force
that is more easily tailorable to the needs of the assigned mission. While this new organization is designed
to be more flexible and deployable it is also more reliant on joint interdependence. Reductions in the
number of artillery units mean the division will increasingly rely on joint fires. The new design calls for
increased joint logistics support especially for intertheater and intratheater movements. Additionally the
division will rely on joint assets for protection, such as air and missile defense.
DIVISION REDESIGN
1-2. The division commander shapes the operation for subordinate brigades, resources them for their
assigned missions, coordinates, synchronizes and sequences their operations. The division focuses on the
conduct of major operations and leaves the details of executing battles and engagements to its assigned
brigade combat teams (BCTs) and supporting brigades. The division uses mission command and mission
orders (see FM 6-0 and FMI 5-0.1) as the preferred method of command and control (C2). In the previous
division design, the division commander sometimes fought battalions such as the attack helicopter
battalion. In this new design, the brigades are the primary headquarters responsible for fighting the
engagements and the best example of this is the combat aviation brigade is responsible for planning,
preparing, executing and assessing attack helicopter operations.
x During the Cold War, division commanders visualized operations in terms of battalions and issued
orders to brigades that were assigned to command those battalions. This was often referred to as thinking
two levels down. The new perspective of division operations is different, requiring the commander to
envision what were formerly corps-scale operations in terms of their scope. The commander now visualizes
operations in terms of brigades. This works well only if the division commander maintains perspective on
the overall division situation, and avoids being drawn into the conduct of subordinate unit engagements. It
also requires a greater degree of collaboration and initiative among the division’s BCTs and supporting
brigades. In a division with a mission command climate, BCT and supporting brigade commanders
anticipate each other’s support without constant reference to the division commander. BCTs and
supporting brigades accomplish missions based on the division commander’s intent.
KEY DIFFERENCES
1-3. A key design change for the division staff is elimination of the division’s reliance on major staff
augmentation from subordinate units. For example, previously under the Reorganized Objective Army
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 1-1

Chapter 1
Division (ROAD) and Army of Excellence (AOE) designs, when the division conducted training or
deployed, the division artillery (DIVARTY) would send officers to the division headquarters to create the
fire support element. Other subordinate units would also send augmentees to fill or form division staff
sections. The current modular division staff no longer requires augmentees from subordinate units to be
able to conduct operations. (There are a few exceptions to this statement, for example when the division
has OPCON a Civil Affairs battalion that battalion will send staff augmentation to the division
headquarters and the G-4 movement control element will often be augmented by a movement control
team.) The division headquarters is now a much more self-sufficient organization capable of conducting
operations and controlling up to six BCTs and a mix of supporting brigades.
1-4. The signal network supporting division operations is expanding as the size of the signal unit
supporting the division headquarters is reduced from a battalion to a company. The signal network
expansion has an eventual goal of being free of line of sight restrictions. However, over the life of this
FMI, divisions will be dependant on a mix of line of sight and non-line of sight systems to operate the
network. But in general terms, the network provides a high fidelity common operational picture (COP)
today. (See FM 1-02 for definition of COP) The latency of information contained in the COP will continue
to improve over time as more non-line of sight communications equipment is fielded.
1-5. The number and role of the command posts available to control operations is different. The new
division has a main CP, two tactical CPs and a mobile command group. These command and control nodes
are discussed in detail in Chapter Two but suffice it to say the commander has greater flexibility to control
operations and be on the battlefield where he thinks he needs to be.
1-6. The division now has two deputy commanding generals (DCG) instead of two assistant division
commanders (ADC). Previously, the ADCs had relatively set functional areas of concentration. One
concentrated on maneuver issues and the other on support. The modular division commander may
designate DCGs responsible for specific functions. The senior officer normally present at the TAC CPs is
one of the DCGs.
1-7. Collection management is also different in this new design. The division does not directly control
reconnaissance and surveillance assets. All assets are assigned to the brigades and the division determines
the information to be collected and sets priorities for the brigades to execute. The intelligence
synchronization plan is developed by the staff led by the G-2. The ISR plan is developed by the staff led
by the G-3 utilizing the intelligence synchronization plan, taskings from higher headquarters, requests for
information from subordinates and the commander’s guidance to answer the division commander’s CCIR
and information requirements. The G-3 provides the BCTs and other brigades with mission type orders to
fulfill information requirements associated with the ISR plan.
1-8. Another key difference is the division’s perspective of the deep fight in terms of time, space and
troops available. This division operates more like the traditional corps, taking a longer-term view of
operations in an expanded AO. The division concentrates on arranging and orchestrating major operations
and allows the BCTs to execute battles and engagements. The division also plans for and employs more
joint assets such as joint fires, ISR and logistics than before.
1-9. Finally, the commander’s role is different in this division. The commander’s intent, communication
of his vision of the end state and guidance are more important when using mission command type orders.
The division commander’s relationship to his subordinates can be compared with that of a JTF commander
and how he issues guidance to his component commanders. The division commander should maintain a
perspective of the overall division situation, assess how the current situation relates to future division
operations and avoid being drawn into the conduct of brigade current engagements. These differences are
discussed in greater detail through out this FMI.
1-10. The division’s BCTs and supporting brigades are different and have an expanded capability to
execute different operations simultaneously with organic troops. These brigades conduct full spectrum
operations—consisting of a mixture of offensive, defensive, stability operations or civil support. Their full-
spectrum operations may be nonlinear in nature and take place in non-contiguous AOs when required by
the situation. This next section discusses how these brigades have been changed.
1-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

BRIGADE REORGANIZATION
1-11. One of the greatest differences between the current division and the redesigned division is in the
organization of the maneuver brigades into BCTs. These BCTs are comprised of battalion-sized and
company-sized subunits. The BCTs are combined arms formations that include maneuver and sustainment
units and various arms of service. They resemble the former ad-hoc maneuver brigade formations,
however, each BCT has organic supporting arms and branches. BCTs are designed to be fully self-
contained so that they can easily integrate into any division or other C2 headquarters. (Paragraphs 1-41
through 1-43 discuss the role and organizational structure of BCTs.)
1-12. The division’s supporting brigades are organized as multifunctional units intended to support the
BCTs and carry out specific tasks in support of the division. Supporting brigades are organized as fires
brigades, combat aviation brigades (CAB), combat support brigades (maneuver enhancement) CSB(ME),
sustainment brigades, and battlefield surveillance brigades (BFSBs). Single branch brigades available from
the Army force pool include engineer, civil affairs, intelligence, air defense, and military police (MP).
FORSCOM or the division’s higher headquarters—corps or ASCC—tailor the division with combinations
of BCTs and supporting brigades based on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). These supporting brigades are key
to division operations because any brigade can be tasked with the decisive operation, depending on the
mission. These other supporting brigades add attack aviation and fires capabilities which complement the
BCTs in a combined arms way and make the division a more effective tactical fighting unit. (Paragraphs 1-
44 through 1-83 discuss the roles and organizational structure of the supporting brigades.)
ENABLING CONCEPTS
1-13. The enabling concepts for division operations are responsiveness via the modular force and force
tailoring, execution-focused operations, distributed operations, and operational readiness cycle. Most of
these concepts are not new ideas. What is new, however, is the way in which the modular division is
designed to capitalize on them.
RESPONSIVENESS
1-14. Responsiveness is achieved by meeting the geographic combatant commander’s (GCCs) requirement
for the right mix of forces at the right time. The division achieves responsiveness through the modular
force, force tailoring, and deployability.
The Modular Force

1-15. The modular force consists of units packaged into flexible configurations. Modular units are rapidly
deployable, responsive, agile, and can be tailored into discrete packages of land force combat power. In
marked contrast to the ROAD and AOE division, the modular division is not a fixed formation. A modular
division has no organic units assigned to it. It is a headquarters designed to exercise C2 for up to six BCTs
and any necessary number of supporting brigades.
1-16. The Army may assign training and readiness oversight of several BCTs and a CAB to each active
division. These units will most likely be stationed at the same installation as the division headquarters or a
nearby installation. This training and readiness oversight responsibility does not dictate the wartime or
deployed configuration of the modular division. The modular division may receive attached or operational
control (OPCON) of its BCTs and supporting brigades before, during, or after deployment. The
deployment timeline will typically dictate the integration and train-up requirements for the modular
division. The modular division is designed to rapidly attach and detach brigades throughout its conduct of
full-spectrum operations.
Force Tailoring
1-17. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix and sequence of units for a mission (FM
3-0). FORSCOM and the employing ASCC tailor the modular division with the right mix of brigades or
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 1-3

Chapter 1
battalions necessary to accomplish its assigned missions. This tailoring process results in a division team
consisting of units that may not be located on the same installations. This places a premium on the use of
doctrine, Army standardized standing operating procedures (SOPs) and early and continuous teamwork
once the Army staff determines the deployment or alert cycle for the force. (See FM 3-90.100-SOP for the
standardized SOP.) Such teamwork, emphasized by training (live, virtual, and constructive), builds the
cohesion in the new team that is essential for mission success.
1-18. Tailoring is a process that continues throughout all phases of the operation. Before deployment,
FORSCOM and the employing ASCC tailor the division and recommend a deployment sequence to
accomplish the joint force commander’s mission. After deployment, the division may continue to be
tailored by the ASCC based on changing missions. For example, if the mission changes from primarily
offense to primarily stability operations, the division may be tailored with additional civil affairs, engineer,
and MP units. One key component of force tailoring is force refinement (see Figure 1-1).
Figure 1-1. Force Tailoring and Refinement
Force Refinement
1-19. The division and its tailored forces are refined to account for the multiple constraints of the projected
operation. This refinement is a repetitive process. Force refinement involves METT-TC adjustments, force
sequencing, staff tailoring, and task organizing. Commanders analyze the deploying force using the factors
of METT-TC to identify any changes necessary for the planned operation. Commanders also refine the
force based on other factors, such as those in Figure 1-1.
z Force Sequencing. The ASCC next compares the situation in the JOA to the available lift,
determining the appropriate deployment sequence. The ASCC seeks a balance that provides
1-4 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

protection, efficient deployment, and a range of options for responding to possible conditions.
Lift availability is always constrained, so difficult trade-off decisions are routine.
z Staff Tailoring. The modular division staff is capable of accepting staff augmentees to provide
an expanded capability. If the division is expected to serve as a JFLC or JTF in a smaller-scale
contingency, then it must be augmented with other service military officers and
noncommissioned officers (NCOs).
z Task Organizing. Force tailoring is not synonymous with task organizing. While tailoring
matches force capabilities needed to accomplish a mission, task organizing temporarily creates
an organization from assigned, attached, or OPCON assets with specific command relationships
to accomplish the task at hand. The division continuously task organizes brigades throughout the
phases of an operation. Task organization is done to accomplish a specific tactical mission.
When task organizing, the division uses standard Army command and support relationships (see
paragraphs 1-107 through 1-128 and Figure 1-10).
Deployability
1-20. Deployability is directly related to the modular force and force tailoring. The division achieves
increased deployability and therefore strategic responsiveness, because it is composed of only those
essential C2 headquarters and subordinate elements that are needed by the GCC. The flow of forces into
the JOA will typically be determined by the time-phased forces deployment data requirements specified by
the GCC and the scheduling of available strategic lift assets.
EXECUTION-FOCUSED OPERATIONS
1-21. Execution-focused operations stress the role of the commander and the staff in decision making after
the order has been issued and the operation has begun. The conduct of execution-focused operations
balances the often competing demands of maintaining tempo and synchronizing combat power.
1-22. The Army’s operational concept requires the
division to maintain a tempo that the enemy cannot match Movement and Maneuver
by acting or reacting faster than the enemy can adapt, or
adapting to a changing situation before the situation Intelligence
deteriorates further. To accomplish this type of agility, the Fire Support
commander uses mission command (see FM 6-0 and FMI Sustainment
5-0.1) to focus his subordinate commanders’ initiative and Command and Control
staff supervision to maintain synchronization. While the
effect of subordinate commanders exercising initiative Protection
within the commander’s intent has a significant impact on
maintaining the unit’s tempo, division C2 nodes must stay Figure 1-2. The Warfighting Functions
abreast of the current situation and ensure minimum
synchronization of actions across the division.
1-23. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organization, information, and
processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training
objectives. (see figure 1-2) The warfighting functions, tied together by leadership, replace the battlefield
operating systems and elements of combat power. (See appendix A, FMI 5-0.1 for a detailed explanation of
the warfighting functions). The division command posts (CP) continuously strive to synchronize the
warfighting functions to achieve combat power integration in response to the changing situation on the
battlefield. See chapter 4, FMI 5-0.1 for an explanation of how units execute operations using the
warfighting functions as an organizational guide.
DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS
1-24. Distributed operations refer to how subordinate brigade elements typically conduct operations in
noncontiguous AOs (see FM 3-0). Distributed operations also refer to how the division CPs, their
subordinate cells, the BCTs, and other brigades interact with one another from dispersed locations. The
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range of line-of-sight communications systems will not limit locations for CPs and subordinate commands.
Distributed operations are enhanced by dedicated access to the global information grid through satellite
communication systems.
OPERATIONAL READINESS CYCLE

1-25. All BCTs will have an operational readiness cycle as part of the Army Force Generation
(ARFORGEN) process. The operational readiness cycle has three phases that indicate the unit’s
availability to deploy. These phases will vary in length of time based on the number of personnel changes
and amount of equipment upgrades. BCTs will have an operational readiness cycle of 36 months. The three
phases are:
z Reset/Train.
z Ready.
z Available.
1-26. Reset/Train Phase. Units redeploy from operations, recover, receive, and stabilize personnel,
receive new equipment, and conduct individual and collective training. This phase lasts approximately six
to nine months. The unit moves into the ready phase when the appropriate commander assesses the unit as
trained, equipped, and manned to meet force-level capabilities (as designated by the respective major
command (MACOM) commander).
1-27. Ready Phase. Units can conduct mission preparation and collective training with operational
headquarters, are eligible for sourcing, may be mobilized, and can be trained, equipped, resourced, and
committed to meet operational requirements. This phase last approximately 15 to 18 months. After the unit
is trained, equipped, and manned to execute mission-operational requirements (as designated by the
respective MACOM commander), the unit may move into the available phase.
1-28. Available Phase. Units are in their planned mission-time windows and are trained, equipped, and
resourced to meet operational requirements. This phase is 12 months long. Units may be scheduled to
deploy to a contingency and replace a unit already deployed or they may remain in an available status
without deploying until the end of the operational-readiness cycle. If a unit remains until the end of the
cycle, personnel depart, new personnel and equipment are assigned, and the operational-readiness cycle
begins again in the reset phase.
1-29. Division headquarters will not have a set operational readiness cycle but will move through
reset/train as soon as possible and train to staff proficiency at their authorized manning level as quickly as
possible. The goal is for division headquarters to be in the available phase as much of the time as possible.
ROLE OF THE DIVISION

1-30. The role of the division is to employ land forces as part of a joint, interagency, and multinational
force during full-spectrum operations. The division executes offensive, defensive, and either stability or
civil support operations (depending on whether or not it is operating in the United States or in a foreign
country) in an assigned AO to establish specific conditions. It combines tactical tasks and missions through
its battlefield organization of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to accomplish its assigned
mission. The division is the primary tactical warfighting headquarters for C2 of land force BCTs. The
division design is intended to further enhance the capabilities of the GCC by providing a strategically
relevant land force headquarters capable of conducting full-spectrum operations.
1-31. A JTF, JFLC, or intermediate tactical headquarters controls divisions. The division may serve as a
JTF or JFLC, with staff augmentation, in a smaller-scale contingency or as an ARFOR headquarters
(primarily for operational tasks) in smaller-scale contingencies without additional Army augmentation.
When serving as the ARFOR, JFLC, or JTF, the division is primarily concerned with operational tasks and
relies on the ASCC to provide most of the administrative control (ADCON) and Army support to forces
deployed in the joint operations area (JOA). Joint manning documents are being developed to determine
other Service officer and NCO augmentation the division staff requires to perform duties as a JTF or JFLC
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headquarters. When serving as a JTF, the division will organize and operate in accordance with joint
doctrine.
ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION

1-32. The division headquarters is organized with a special troops battalion (STB), three CPs, and a mobile
command group (MCG). The division will be assigned a mix of BCTs and supporting brigades, to conduct
operations, as needed. To conduct full-spectrum operations in a major combat operation, the division was
designed to have the appropriate mixture of the three types of BCTs and one of each of the five types of
supporting brigades.
SPECIAL TROOPS BATTALION

1-33. The STB is organized into three companies with distinct missions. They are a headquarters company,
a network support company, and a security company. If the division is assigned a band, it will fall under
the control of the STB (see Figure 1-3).
1-34. The division STB is not currently resourced with the security company. The security company is
required for the STB to conduct its assigned mission of providing CP security and must be resourced either
by task organizing a company from a BCT or by the preferred method of resourcing it from a non-
deploying BCT.
1-35. The STB task organizes its organic security, communications, life support, and transportation assets
S p e cia l T ro o p s B attal io n
He ad q u ar ters N ET W O R K S EC U RIT Y
SPT BA N D
C om p an y C om p an y
C om p an y
HQ & N ET
De t IN F Plt
C P Sp t
De t IN F Plt
N ET EXT
De t IN F Plt
to meet the requirements of the division’s deployed CPs. The MCG, less aviation assets, is assigned to the
STB and task organized with required security and communications assets when operating separate from
another CP.
Figure 1-3. Special Troops Battalion Organization
COMMAND POSTS
1-36. The modular division is organized with three distinct CPs and an MCG (see Figure 1-4). The
division organizes and distributes C2 assets according to the situation. For example, the commander may—
z Alternate the two tactical (TAC) CPs between planning and execution.
z Assign the TAC CPs to—
Geographically dispersed operations.
Different types of operations that are occurring simultaneously (for example, offensive and
stability operations).
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z Alternate the TAC CPs between phases within a major operation.

z Combine a TAC CP and the main CP or all the division headquarters CPs to increase the
division’s ability to C2 complex operations.
Figure 1-4. Modular Division CP Structure
Mobile Command Group

1-37. The MCG has organic ground C2 vehicles, communications (from the STB network support
company), and a small security force (from the STB security company). The size of the MCG security
force is determined by the overall size of the MCG and the enemy threat. It may be a squad-sized security
force in some instances or a platoon in others. The MCG does not have a staff. The commander selects
members of the staff to fill the required MCG positions based on the situation. The number of seats
available for staff members is limited by the physical number of seats in the organic ground and air
systems. If more staff members are required than seats available, then additional transportation assets must
be task organized to the MCG. When the commander requires more rapid movement through the air, the
aviation brigade provides dedicated UH-60 Army Airborne Command and Control System (A2C2S)
aircraft to move the commander and MCG staff. An A2C2S aircraft has five seats, each with a computer
workstation, one of which is manned by the system operator from the aviation unit. The other four
workstations are for the commander and the staff officers he chooses to accompany him. All workstations
are capable of accessing any of the battlefield functional area applications hosted on the aircraft. The
aviation brigade provides additional aircraft to move the security element on a mission basis. The
communications in both the ground and aerial platforms allow the commander to exercise battle command
on the move, remaining in contact with the TACs, the main CP, higher headquarters, and subordinate
brigades. In some instances, the commander will co-locate with a subordinate brigade CP, tying into the
network through that unit’s C2 systems and disguising the signature of the MCG. In other cases, the
commander will use the full capability of the MCG and move between positions and units continuously in
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order to sense the battle and exert personal influence with subordinates. The commander may also position
the MCG with TAC 1, TAC 2, or the main CP.
Figure 1-5. Main CP Organization
Main CP
1-38. The main CP includes the G-5 plans cell, the G-2 intelligence cell, and other selected division staff
sections and elements. Unless tactical conditions dictate otherwise, the main CP serves as the location for
special staff support to the division, including legal support, interagency coordination, and virtual links to
knowledge centers in the United States and overseas. The division chief of staff is normally the senior
officer in the main CP. The main CP has some organic transportation and signal support, but requires a
much longer setting-up and tearing-down time than the other CPs. The main CP is deployable but only 50-
percent mobile with organic transportation. Because of the longer time it requires for setup and its
connectivity, the main CP normally deploys to and sets up in a pre-established hard-wired site or secure
location in the division rear area. The main CP can operate from home station, an intermediate staging area
or from within the joint operational area (JOA), depending on METT-TC. The main CP may operate from
home station while the TACs or early entry command post are deploying or may move to an intermediate
staging area during deployment, as the division stages into the JOA. As communications capabilities
increase, the need to deploy the main CP into the JOA is reduced. This will reduce the size of the division
footprint and the logistical and security requirements within the JOA.
Figure 1-6. TAC CPs Organization
Tactical CP
1-39. The TAC CPs are designed to conduct C2 of all units assigned, attached, OPCON or TACON to the
division. The equipment in either TAC CP is almost identical. The TAC CPs are task-organized with signal
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support, security, and life support organic to the division headquarters’ STB. All equipment assigned to the
TAC CPs may be transported by C-130 or sling-loaded by CH-47 or UH-60.
Early Entry Command Post

1-40. During contingency operations the early entry command post (EECP) normally provides temporary
C2 until a fully functional TAC CP and or the main CP deploys into the AO. Normally austere, its specific
design is driven by METT-TC and may vary from deployment to deployment. The EECP controls all units
committed to the current operation, and conducts those critical C2 functions required to support the
division in tactical operations as it initially deploys into an unsecured area.
1-41. To be effective, the EECP is normally sequenced in the deployment to arrive as soon as possible
after the initial BCT or the airhead or beachhead is secure. It fights the current fight with division forces on
the ground, synchronizing the flow of follow-on units into the AO and phasing them into the fight. It also
begins initial planning for the conduct of future operations (branches and sequels). It serves as the division
C2 link early in the deployment between division forces on the ground, in the air, and at home station and
the higher headquarters. It continues this function until the remainder of the division C2 systems arrive.
Normal doctrinal functions will be transferred to a TAC or the main CP as they arrive and are prepared to
assume those functions.
1-42. The EECP is not a permanent or a fixed organization. Each situation or contingency mission may
demand different requirements, depending on the specific mission. However, each EECP is designed
around a basic functional structure of elements representing each of the warfighting functional cells as well
as elements capable of performing the integrating cell functions for plans, future operations and current
operations. It also contains a task organized package from the STB consisting of signal, security and life
support. One of the TAC CPs is often used as the base from which to build the EECP, with augmentees
from the rest of the division staff chosen to accomplish the specific short-duration mission. The EECP may
be larger or smaller than a normal TAC CP depending on the mission. The EECP is usually the first
division CP to deploy to a JOA and should contain a tailored staff focused on deployment into and
employment of forces in the JOA, to include reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
(RSO&I). The staff should be capable of performing the initial intelligence analysis, execution and
adjustment decision-making, and problem solving associated with deployment into the operational area and
RSO&I.
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

1-43. In major combat operations, BCTs maneuver against, close with, and destroy the enemy. BCTs
make permanent the otherwise temporary effects of other joint capabilities by seizing and occupying
decisive terrain, exerting constant pressure, and breaking the enemy’s will to fight. They will be the
principal ground-maneuver unit of the division. Three standard BCT designs make up the ground
maneuver power of the division: heavy, infantry, and Stryker. These BCTs have improved C2 capabilities
and organic combined arms capabilities, including battalion-sized maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, and
logistic subunits. Medical units and elements are also organic to each of these units. Maneuver within the
division capitalizes on integrated joint capabilities to expand mutual support across expanded AOs, and
enables BCTs to conduct operations within contiguous or noncontiguous AOs. The division will generate
tactical and operational effects through controlling the operations of the BCTs, supporting brigades and
joint assets under its control. Figure 1-7 shows an organizational overview of the three types of BCTs.
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Figure 1-7. Brigade Combat Teams
1-44. The division assigns a task organization, an AO, and missions to BCTs. The intent and concept of
operations allow the BCT to accomplish assigned tasks with minimum control from the division by use of
mission orders. The BCT has a staff that is designed to conduct full spectrum operations. That does not
mean that the BCT is ideally structured for full spectrum operations. It will normally be task organized as
required to include moving organic units to create task organized units for specific missions. The BCT may
require task organization changes, even for combat operations, because it does not have all the combat
multipliers that are often required. For example it does not have organic air and missile defense or bridging
assets.
1-45. In order to maintain continuous pressure on enemy forces, the division may design operations to
cycle the BCTs in and out of the fight to temporary bases where the BCT rests, refits, and receives large
quantities of supplies. This type of a sustaining operation is known as a mission staging operation (MSO).
The BCT moves to an area designated by the division where a sustainment brigade can conduct the
resupply portion of mission staging operations. While in mission staging, the BCT is not available for other
tactical tasks other than local security missions. Normally mission staging involves the sustainment
brigade, portions of the CSB(ME), and the BCT. In offensive operations, one BCT may replace another in
the attack, typically when one BCT has a follow-and-assume mission. The division commander can then
order a MSO for the relieved BCT. After mission staging, that BCT may resume the attack while the
second BCT refits, thus continuing a tactical cycle of mission staging without relinquishing the initiative.
SUPPORTING BRIGADES
1-46. The modular force features five types of supporting brigades that complement and reinforce the
BCTs. These supporting brigades are—combat aviation, battlefield surveillance, combat support
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(maneuver enhancement), fires, and sustainment. These supporting brigades are organized as combined
arms units that accomplish a broad function such as protection, in the case of the CSB(ME). Each modular-
supporting brigade includes a headquarters, brigade troops, and specialized battalions. A mix of other
specialized battalions is assigned, attached or OPCON to the brigade to match capabilities to requirements.
During operations, the division commander task organizes between the supporting brigades and BCTs.
Unlike the BCT, tailoring and task organization leads to considerable variation between modular-
supporting brigades of the same type. Figure 1-8 shows the various types of supporting brigades.
Figure 1-8. Types of Supporting Brigades
1-47. Normally these supporting brigades are assigned or attached to a division headquarters. However,
any of these brigades may be attached to a corps, an ASCC or theater-level command instead of the
division. These brigades also provide Army support to other services (ASOS) and may be OPCON to a
joint functional component commander (for example, the joint force air component commander) or to
another Service headquarters (for example, a Marine Expeditionary Force). When operating under the
control of the joint force commander (JFC) or another service, the ASCC commander exercises ADCON
over that supporting brigade.
1-48. The supporting brigades will conduct operations in the division’s unassigned area (that portion of
the area of operations not assigned to subordinate units). The BFSB will collect information, the fires
brigade will conduct strike missions and the aviation brigade will conduct mobile strikes in the unassigned
area.
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Fires Brigade
1-49. The fires brigade is a newly designed organization very different from the previous DIVARTY
design. The fires brigade’s primary task is to plan, prepare, execute, and assess strike operations within the
division AO, based on mission orders from the division. A second task is to provide support to the BCTs
and other supporting brigades in the division AO. A third task is to plan for and execute joint missions
separate from the division. The fires brigade conducts missions for the division in the unassigned areas to
include counterfire, attacks on specific targets, and other typical fire support missions.
1-50. Fires brigades are organized with organic assets that include an MLRS battalion and may be task
organized with additional MLRS and cannon battalions and counter fire or weapons locating radars. The
fires brigade may receive electronic warfare assets and offensive information operations assets.
1-51. The C2 capabilities of the fires brigade allow it to plan, prepare, execute, and assess strike operations
with OPCON of additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and offensive information
operations (IO) capabilities, or with the BFSB retaining control of ISR assets and providing the
information and desired effects to the fires brigade. The division will assign missions, usually in the form
of targets sets to be engaged, target priorities, and/or effects to be achieved. It will task organize the fires
brigade to accomplish assigned tasks. It may also allocate joint fires assets to be controlled by the fires
brigade.
1-52. The fires brigade may be OPCON to and conduct its full range of missions for the JFLC, JTF, or
other service or functional component commander.
1-53. Typical mission sets for the fires brigade assigned to a division are listed below:
z Conduct—
Army indirect fires, joint fires, and offensive IO in support of the division.
Counter battery fire missions.
z Provide army indirect fires, joint fires, and offensive IO in support of —
Suppression of enemy air defense fires to mobile strike operations.
BCTs in the close fight.
Other brigades in the division AO.
Battlefield Surveillance Brigade

1-54. The primary purpose of the BFSB is to collect information that answers the Division Commander’s
critical information requirements, specifically his priority information requirements, and other information
based on the priorities established by the division. The information it collects focuses on the enemy,
terrain and weather, and civil consideration aspects of METT-TC which feed the development and update
of the COP. The focus of the BFSB collection efforts is the division’s unassigned area. It receives its
taskings through mission orders from the division. The division commander describes the operation,
identifies his CCIR, and prioritizes other information requirements. The BFSB commander, not the
division staff, controls all assets whose primary role is collecting information on enemy, terrain and civil
considerations within the division’s unassigned areas. The BCTs retain control of their collection assets
and collect information inside their assigned AO.
1-55. The BFSB is normally assigned, attached or OPCON to a division. It is organized with a Military
Intelligence Battalion, a Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Battalion, and a Brigade Troops
Battalion. The MI Battalion provides a base of military intelligence collection capability that includes
unmanned aerial systems, signal intelligence, human intelligence, and counter-intelligence. The R&S
battalion provides manned reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities including mounted scout platoons
and mobile long range surveillance teams. The BTB provides the communications backbone for the BFSB
that allows it to communicate throughout the division AO and sustainment for the entire brigade. Based on
the factors of METT-TC the BFSB can be tailored for the mission and the AO. This may be in the form of
additional elements assigned to the BFSB from the division, or provided from ASCC and national-level
assets to reinforce the collection capabilities of the brigade. In stability operations, for instance, the BFSB
may be organized with additional human intelligence units. Aviation reconnaissance units and potentially
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additional ground reconnaissance units will be OPCON to the BFSB based on the situation. This includes
aviation reconnaissance assets and extended range unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) from the combat
aviation brigade on a mission basis.
1-56. The BFSB may control significant ground and air reconnaissance capability, however, the BFSB
does not conduct security operations for the division. When the division requires security operations–
screen, guard, cover, area security, and route security–it will assign the missions to BCTs, or in the case of
the latter two operations, it may assign them to a CSB(ME). In some operations, the threat will compel the
division to maneuver combat units to fight through for information and develop the situation. If so, the
division will assign the mission to a BCT or the aviation brigade.
1-57. The division focuses the BFSB collection efforts through two means: the assignment of brigade AOs
and the division ISR plan. The BCTs and the CSB(ME) are normally assigned an AO within the division
AO. The brigades are responsible for conducting reconnaissance and surveillance within their AOs. This
allows the BFSB to focus its resources in the division unassigned areas. The division ISR plan is a
collaborative effort within the division staff with the G-3 and G-2 as the leads. The ISR plan focuses the
BFSB by clearly defining CCIR and prioritizing other information requirements for collection. This
provides the BFSB commander greater flexibility to allocate, and when necessary reallocate, resources
within the division unassigned areas to answer the division information requirements. In some cases the
size of the unassigned areas will exceed the collection capability of the BFSB. In such cases the division
can either augment the BFSB capability or accept risk given the focus and priorities established by the
division.
1-58. The BFSB has the capability to augment the other brigades’ collection capability. The common
means of augmenting the other brigades is with CI/HUMINT teams from the MI battalion. The teams will
be attached or OPCON to individual brigades depending on the situation and the priorities established by
the division. The BFSB can also augment brigades with UASs, signal intelligence, mounted ground
reconnaissance, or mobile surveillance teams. For instance, the CSB(ME) has a large AO with several lines
of communication that must be monitored. The unassigned areas are well within the capability of the BFSB
to collect information so the division directs the BFSB to attach a mounted troop and several long range
surveillance teams to the CSB(ME) to assist in covering the lines of communication.
1-59. Information collected and developed by the BFSB will be assessed by the BFSB staff to ensure
tasked information requirements have been satisfied. All the information is passed to the division for full
assessment, fusion, and dissemination. The information is also posted to a distributed database that allows
access to commanders, shooters, and analysts. If the information is critical to a specific brigade it is also
reported directly to the brigade. An example is a brigade’s PIR that is sent to the division as an RFI. The
division adds the brigade’s PIR to its priority list for collection by the BFSB. Once the BFSB collects the
necessary information it reports it directly to the requesting brigade for action. The result of BFSB
collection activities will often cue other actions. As the BFSB collection effort identifies potential targets,
the brigade makes this information available to the division, fires brigade, aviation brigade and the BCTs.
Since the bulk of the intelligence analysis capability resides with the G-2 staff, the division develops target
handoff criteria in coordination with the other brigades in the division. For instance, the BFSB may locate
a high value target in the unassigned areas and pass the target off to the fires brigade or the CAB for the
execution of a strike operation. Alternatively, the BFSB may pass off an enemy unit to a BCT as it moves
into the BCT AO.
Combat Aviation Brigade

1-60. A combat aviation brigade supports the operations of the entire division with task organized aviation
capabilities. The bulk of the Army aviation’s combat power resides in the multi-functional aviation brigade
organized to support the division, the BCTs and other brigades. Based on priorities and missions, the
aviation brigade collaborates directly with supported brigades for operational details of the support
required.
1-61. The combat aviation brigade is expansible and tailorable to the mission, with various types of
organizations, containing both manned and unmanned systems, and can support multiple BCTs. The
aviation brigade is tailored to execute assigned tasks for the BCTs, division, ASCC, JFLC or JTF.
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However, it specializes in providing combat capabilities for decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations
within engagements and battles.
1-62. A combat aviation brigade assigned to a division typically conducts the following missions:
z Support BCTs by conducting close combat attack to close with and destroy the enemy in close
proximity to friendly forces.
z Mobile strike operations.
z Vertical maneuver for dismounted forces to a position of advantage.
z Screening operations.
z Aerial sustainment and critical resupply of maneuver forces to maintain operational momentum.
z MSR overflight to provide security for high value assets traveling the MSR.
z VIP transport and escort.
z Aerial medical evacuation.
1-63. The combat aviation brigade receives mission orders from the division, to conduct and support
reconnaissance, security, mobile strike, vertical maneuver, close combat attack in support of ground forces,
aerial sustainment, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and C2 operations. Based on METT-TC, the aviation
brigade commander task organizes available aviation resources into mission packages that are either
controlled by a supported brigade or the aviation brigade.
1-64. The combat aviation brigade has organic aerial medical evacuation assets. The air ambulance
company is assigned to the general support aviation battalion. Normally when the requirement for
MEDEVAC is anticipated, at least three MEDEVAC aircraft are assigned direct support to the BCTs while
the remaining aircraft provide general support to the division and receive their evacuation missions through
medical operations channels emanating from the medical brigade.
1-65. The aviation brigade can conduct mobile strike operations in support of the division scheme of
maneuver. Mobile strike operations may involve rapid task organization of assets across the division. For
conduct of mobile strike the aviation brigade will normally have OPCON or direct support (DS) of long-
range fires assets from the fires brigade and BFSB reconnaissance assets for planning and execution. The
aviation brigade will retain the DS relationship of the fires assets for the duration of the operation, but will
release control of the BFSB assets once its own reconnaissance capabilities are on station.
1-66. The aviation brigade executes close combat attack missions for the BCTs. These missions involve
conducting integrated air-ground operations to close with and destroy the enemy. These missions require a
high level of air to ground coordination and the CAB should attempt to develop a habitual relationship with
the supported BCT. Aviation support via this mission allows the ground commander to extend the tactical
reach of maneuver forces particularly in urban and other complex terrain. The aviation assets help control
the tempo of the fight by provided a force capable of rapid reaction to sudden changes. The attack
helicopters provide the BCT extended acquisition range and lethality.
1-67. The aviation brigade may also execute screening missions for the division. The aviation brigade may
receive ground maneuver and joint assets and capabilities to carry out these missions. It supports other
security operations with aviation forces; including BCTs assigned a screen, guard, or cover mission. For
screen, guard and cover missions, the aviation brigade may provide reconnaissance, attack, and lift assets
under the OPCON of maneuver BCTs. The aviation brigade can also support area security operations—
including route and convoy security operations—conducted by the CSB(ME) or BCTs.
Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement)

1-68. The CSB(ME) is designed to receive and control forces to provide protection and mobility to prevent
or mitigate the effects of hostile action against divisional forces. The CSB(ME) is responsible for security
within its assigned AO, which typically encompasses the division rear area and main supply routes. The
CSB(ME) is tailored with additional capabilities based on the factors of METT-TC for each operation. A
typical force mix will include engineers; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense;
civil affairs; MP; AMD and EOD assets. The brigade is also task organized with a tactical combat force
(TCF) when given an area security mission. The CSB(ME) does not supplant unit self-defense
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responsibilities. Units remain responsible for self-protection against Level I threats. The CSB(ME)
provides forces to respond to Level II threats and when task organized with the TCF can respond to Level
III threats. The CSB(ME) has some AO-wide protection responsibilities specifically in the areas of CBRN
response and AMD when given AMD assets for the division. When given AMD assets they will be
attached or OPCON.
1-69. Based on the scope of the operation, more than one CSB(ME) may be assigned to the division. These
CSBs(ME), in turn, may be made available to one of the components of the joint force.
1-70. The CSB(ME) is organized and trained to execute selected area security missions including route
and convoy security. It is not designed to do screen, guard, and cover operations at the division level. The
division assigns screen, guard, and cover missions to a BCT, or in the case of screening operations, to the
aviation brigade. The CSB(ME) employs (when assigned) a maneuver battalion as a TCF to conduct
combat operations in its assigned AO. When the situation requires, the CSB(ME) executes limited
offensive and defensive operations, employing response forces and the TCF against Level II or III threats
respectively. The TCF may include not only ground maneuver, but also aviation and fires assets. (A BCT
headquarters with a supporting slice should be employed when the situation requires a TCF of two or more
ground maneuver battalions.)
1-71. Typical missions sets for a CSB(ME) assigned to a division are listed below.
z Conduct CBRN Defense.
z Provide EOD support.
z Provide AO wide air and missile defense.
z Conduct area security, local security and LOC security operations.
z Construct, maintain and sustain lines of communications.
z Coordinate direct and indirect fires in support of CSB(ME) operations.
z Provide mobility to division assets while denying the enemy freedom of action.
z Conduct internment and resettlement operations.
z Conduct vertical, runway and road construction.
z Conduct limited offense and defense operations.
z Conduct some stability operations.
1-72. The CSB(ME) may be assigned an AO according to the situation. When assigned an AO, the
CSB(ME) controls and manages terrain and movement within the AO. However, the movement control of
sustainment operations within the division as a whole is the function of the division transportation officer.
The CSB(ME) provides security in areas designated by the division. Normally, the division will designate a
division rear area and assign this AO to the CSB(ME). The sustainment brigade positions many of its
assets within the CSB(ME) AO. The CSB(ME) is responsible for the area security operations within its
assigned AO, while elements of the sustainment brigade remain responsible for unit security and base
cluster defense.
1-73. The CSB(ME) secures, protects, and maintains ground LOC. When the division operates in
noncontiguous AOs, the division commander has two options. If the CSB(ME) can counter threats to
friendly forces using assigned, attached or OPCON troops, then the CSB(ME) controls the LOC and the
terrain surrounding it. The CSB(ME) coordinates convoy security along the LOC and secures the route
with static and mobile forces. When the threat to the LOC is persistent, and sustaining operations require
combined arms maneuver beyond the capabilities of the CSB(ME), the division will task organize and
assign a BCT to conduct LOC security.
1-74. The division provides the CSB(ME) with protection priorities and continuously updates estimates of
the threat. The CSB(ME) commander allocates assets to meet the division priorities, based on a careful
assessment of the self-protection capabilities of the units in the division. There will never be enough
capability to make the division invulnerable to conventional, unconventional, and environmental threats.
Therefore the commander tries to balance the needs of acceptable risk, self-defense, passive protection
measures, and proactive elimination of threats.
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1-75. In addition to the CSB(ME)s, the division’s higher HQ may allocate functional brigades to the
division to support the force as a whole or to carry out a particular task. The CSB(ME) may be required to
provide support to these additional functional brigades. For example, in addition to a CSB(ME), a division
might receive an MP brigade to control displaced civilians and handle detainees. In this case, the CSB(ME)
may provide support, such as general engineering, to the MP brigade.
1-76. The CSB(ME) has a combined arms staff and C2 capabilities that suit it for a variety of missions in
addition to protection. An additional capability is execution of some stability operations tasks within an
assigned AO. Many stability tasks have direct carryover to tasks normally assigned to the CSB(ME). As
long as the threat remains within the capabilities of the CSB(ME) to control the assigned AO, the
CSB(ME) may be assigned an AO as part of a stability operation. Another role for which the CSB(ME) is
suited is the provision of additional C2 for complex operations. For example, the division commander may
use the CSB(ME) as the crossing area headquarters for a major river crossing. This enables the BCTs to
focus on maneuver and close combat beyond the river crossing and allows the division TAC 1 and TAC 2
to concentrate on broader missions.
Sustainment Brigades
1-77. The sustainment brigades are assigned multifunctional combat sustainment support battalions
(CSSBs) and functional battalions tailored and task organized according to the factors of METT-TC.
Sustainment brigades provide distribution-based logistics to the BCTs and supporting brigades of the
modular division. This support includes, but is not limited to, the provision of supplies, field services, as
well as field and sustainment level maintenance.
1-78. One or more sustainment brigades provide support to the entire division and sustainment
replenishment operations and mission staging support to BCTs. The sustainment brigade must coordinate
the movement of sustainment convoys with the brigades owning the AOs through which the sustainment
convoys move. The sustainment brigade should be assigned a movement control battalion. The movement
control battalion coordinates with the G-4 division transportation officer element to plan and control
convoy movement division AO wide.
1-79. Normally the division will assign an AO to a CSB(ME) within which the sustainment brigade will
conduct sustaining operations. In the case of severe, prolonged threat to sustaining operations or when the
division does not have a CSB(ME), the division commander will assign an AO to a BCT for the protection
of sustaining operations. The division should plan for ground and aerial LOCs to link the sustainment
brigade area with the theater base.
OTHER SUPPORTING UNITS
USAF Air Support Operations Squadron

1-80. An Air Support Operations Squadron is normally aligned to provide support to a division. The Air
Support Operations Squadron is a variable sized organization of approximately 70 – 90 personnel that
provide air support planning and execution capabilities. The Air Support Operations Squadron provides
Air Liaison Officers (ALO) to the division headquarters and the BCTs. It also provides Tactical Air
Control Parties (TACP) to the division headquarters and the BCTs. The Air Support Operations Squadron
personnel are direct support to the division but remain under USAF command channels. Appendix D
expands the explanation of USAF planning considerations and support provided to the division.
Civil Affairs Battalion/Civil-Military Operations Center

1-81. A civil affairs battalion is normally attached to a division. The CA battalion is under division control
and typically assigns CA companies to a BCT or supporting brigade. This battalion establishes the
division's civil-military operations center (CMOC). The location for establishment of the CMOC is
METT-TC dependent with the goal being to establish it at the focus of civil activity within the division
AO. This could be at or near a civil governmental function, or population base that is considered, by the
division commander, to be the most significant location to positively influence the civil component of his
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AO and facilitate coordination of CMO. The battalion provides a CA planning team to the division G-9 to
assist in planning CMO. The division's CMOC plans, prepares, executes and assesses, with continuous
coordination with the G-9, all CMO within the division. The CA companies, attached to BCT or other
brigades, establish CMOCs for their supported brigade as determined by the brigade commander and with
the advice and recommendations of the G-9/S-9 and the CA company commander. The division's CMOC
and the CMOCs supporting individual brigades serve as the primary coordination interface for the U.S.
armed forces and indigenous populations and institutions, humanitarian organizations, international
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other governmental agencies.
1-82. The CMOC, in conjunction with the G-9, facilitates continuous coordination for CMO among the
key participants from local to international levels within a given AO. The CMOC and the G-9 also
develop, manage and analyze the civil inputs to the maneuver commander’s COP to facilitate situational
understanding of the civil component of METT-TC within the maneuver commander’s AO. The CMOC is
the operations and support element of the CA unit and a mechanism for the coordination of CMO. CA
elements at all levels recommend CMO priorities to the supported division and brigade commanders based
upon their analysis of the civil component of the AO using METT-TC. The civil considerations analysis
(the “C” in METT-TC) is expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE. See appendix C of FMI 5-0.1
Tactical PSYOP Company

1-83. The division will normally receive a tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) company to execute
offensive information operations. The PSYOP company coordinates its missions with the information
operations elements at the main CP and TAC CPs. The PSYOP company will normally locate at a TAC CP
and send tactical PSYOP detachments to the BCTs.
Other Special Operations Forces

1-84. The division may have special operations forces (SOF) under its control or operating in its AO.
When this is the case, the division may receive a special operations command and control element
(SOCCE) or a special forces liaison element (SFLE) to synchronize SOF activities with division
operations. This element should locate at the appropriate TAC CP. Refer to Initial Draft FM 3-05 for more
information.
OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
1-85. The division operates within a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. It integrates all
available forces to synchronize their effects. The division commander arranges forces and resources in
time, space, and purpose with respect to each other and the enemy or situation. The commander designs the
operational framework (AO, battlespace, and battlefield organization) to accomplish the mission. This
framework helps the commander visualize the use of forces to accomplish a missions and how to control
the tempo of an operation.
1-86. The division commander’s operational framework uses the purpose-based battlefield organization of
decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to unify elements of the organization and provide common
focus for their actions. The division commander organizes the division staff by function to integrate and
synchronize their results.
1-87. The division commander’s framework describes the context in which the division fights and aids in
the development of his intent. The division commander modifies his framework as needed, based on the
factors of METT-TC.
AREA OF OPERATIONS
1-88. The higher commander defines the division’s AO. The division AO should be large enough for the
commander to accomplish his mission and protect his forces. The division commander employs assigned,
attached, OPCON, and TACON units and supporting systems within his assigned AO. Within the division
AO, subordinate commanders synchronize their operations with the division’s plan.
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1-89. The division assigns AOs to brigades so they can accomplish their assigned tasks. Normally all
BCTs and a select few supporting brigades are assigned AOs. Any brigade may be assigned an AO
however, the owning brigade is responsible for terrain management, security, clearance of fires, civil-
military operations, movement control, Army airspace command and control and development and
maintenance of the common operational picture within their AO. Any brigade that is not staffed to
accomplish each of these functions should either be augmented or not be assigned an AO.
1-90. The CSB(ME) may be assigned an AO that includes the division rear area and other brigades such
as the sustainment brigade, BFSB, fires brigade and the combat aviation brigade may occupy terrain in the
CSB(ME)’s AO. The division may also position the main CP or a TAC CP in the CSB(ME)’s AO.
1-91. The combat aviation brigade and the fires brigade may be assigned an AO, instead of an engagement
area or kill box, to facilitate conducting a strike operation. This might be done to ensure unity of command
and facilitate control when the strike operation will occur over an extended period of time and several units
will participate.
1-92. Boundaries are used to describe the AO, assist in the synchronization of the operation and take full
advantage of the division’s capabilities. Commanders specify the necessary control measures to focus
combat power, delineate responsibilities, assign geographic responsibility, and support the operations.
(Basic graphic control measures are explained in FM 3-90 and FMI 5-0.1.) Generally, division
commanders use a mix of per-missive and restrictive control measures to ensure subordinate commanders
have the maximum flexibility to accomplish the mission. The concepts of battlespace, area of interest, and
area of influence are applicable when assigning AOs to brigades. (See FM 3-0 for details of the above
mentioned concepts.) The division will either assign contiguous or non-contiguous AOs (see Figure 1-10).
When assigning non-contiguous AOs, the division retains control of the unassigned area in the division
AO.
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Figure 1-9. Contiguous and Noncontiguous AOs
Contiguous AO
1-93. Contiguous AOs afford the division commander a better methodology for massing effects and
providing mutual support at critical times and places. Contiguous AOs also provide additional security for
maneuver units as well as C2 nodes, and the division rear area. Elements that might favor using contiguous
AOs include–
z Limited size of the AO in relation to number of friendly forces.
z Enemy forces concentrated.
z Reducing risk associated with being defeated in detail because of an incomplete operational
picture or because the division is significantly outnumbered.
z Decisive points in close proximity of each other.
z Limited availability of joint fires.
Noncontiguous AO
1-94. Assigning noncontiguous AOs to subordinate units allows the division to achieve effects in widely
separated areas and increase the effects of its combat power on a dispersed enemy. A commander’s
decision to use noncontiguous AOs, regardless of command echelon, is derived from a careful analysis of
the factors of METT-TC—particularly the enemy, and his ability to mass, and terrain. Overcoming this risk
places a premium on the division commander’s situational understanding (SU) and on the tactical mobility
of his forces. In order to reduce the risk, the division commander typically does not assign non-contiguous
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AOs to subordinate units unless they are within supporting distance of one another and the division is able
to rally sufficient combat power to prevent a threat from defeating a friendly unit in detail.
1-95. During combat operations, the division does not assign subordinate units AOs in areas were the
enemy does not pose a threat to the accomplishment of the division mission. The division retains these
unassigned areas as a division responsibility. It is the division commander’s responsibility to ensure enemy
forces do not operate in these unassigned areas in such a way as to become a threat in subsequent
operations or threaten to defeat in detail any friendly unit. If the enemy activity increases in the unassigned
areas, the division may chose to assign the area to a subordinate unit. Each noncontiguous AO must either
provide for its self-defense against any enemy capability or be in supporting distance of another divisional
unit or otherwise be able to mass fires (both Army and joint) to prevent defeat in detail. The commander
will typically establish noncontiguous AOs when—
z Comparative weakness of the enemy is known.
z Enemy forces are dispersed.
z Joint fires are available.
z The division has the ability to influence the division unassigned areas.
NOTE: FM 3-90, Chapter 2, and FM 3-0, Chapter 4, provides further details on establishing
contiguous and noncontiguous AOs.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
1-96. Division commanders designate decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations and may designate a
spatial relationship of deep, close, and rear areas if necessary. Designating these areas provides a tool for
analyzing spatial relationships between enemy and friendly combat forces. This technique is particularly
useful in contiguous offense and defense operations against an enemy force of similar capabilities. During
operations there will be a mix of offense, defense and stability operations that occur simetaneously
throughout the division AO.
1-97. The commander may designate simultaneous or sequential operations. In either case, the division
will always conduct a mix of offense, defense and stability simultaneously. In situations that dictate
sequential rather than simultaneous engagements, the decisive operation is often one of the subsequent
engagements. Initial shaping operations create conditions required for the commitment of the decisive
operation. Later shaping operations fix the defending enemy in position, block possible counterattacks
aimed at the decisive operation, or clear the enemy in the division’s AO as it moves forward. When the
division executes sequential operations, key initial shaping operations may be designated as the initial main
effort since their success directly affects the decisive operation. When the division executes simultaneous
operations, shaping operations prevent an enemy response by overwhelming his ability to identify the
decisive operation and concentrate his forces and effects.
1-98. When conducting sequential operations, the area where initial operations are conducted may quickly
transition from offense or defense into a stability operation. During the stability operation there may be
instances where units must quickly transition back to offense or defense.
1-99. The division must plan for transitioning from one type of operation, offense, defense or stability, to
the other. What starts out as predominately one type of operation will naturally transition into the others.
These transitions may occur rather quickly for subordinate units of the division and must be considered
when conducting the initial planning for an operation.
FACTORS OF METT-TC
1-100. The six factors of METT-TC are the situational information factors used by the division
commander and staff to conduct analysis throughout the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment
of operations. The commander considers these six factors for every type of operation. He uses this
information to adjust the resources, concept, or objectives of the plan, analyze risk, or acquire success in
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operations. Appendix B of FM 6-0 provides additional details on the components of the factors of METT-
TC and Appendix C of FMI 5-0.1 modifies the discussion of terrain and components of civil considerations
of METT-TC.
COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

1-101. The modular division uses Army command and support relationships to task organize for
missions. Command relationships are used by the division commander to subordinate one unit to another.
This changes the chain of command from the parent (losing) command to the gaining command. Support
relationships are used when subordination of one unit is not appropriate, for any of several reasons. When
the division places a unit in support of another element, it does not change the command relationship, but it
does allow the supported unit to task the supporting unit without referring to the division. Brigades and
battalions of the division use the same procedures to task organize within their organizations. Figure 1-10
shows the command and relationships and their inherent responsibilities.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
1-102. Army command relationships are organic, assigned, attached, operational control (OPCON),
tactical control (TACON), and administrative control (ADCON). Organic and assigned are used for
strategic organization of forces only, and not by the division. Administrative control is inherent in
attachment, subject to modification by the higher headquarters. Command relationships define superior and
subordinate relationships between units and their commanders. Through the use of a command
relationship, the division commander subordinates one unit to another. For operational matters, the chain of
command runs from the division through the gaining headquarters to the subordinate unit. Command
relationships unify a chain of command and in so doing, ensure unity of effort. Through a command
relationship, the higher (gaining) commander has both the authority and the flexibility to use subordinate
forces as circumstances dictate, without reference or dependence on the direction of a commander outside
the organization, other than the higher headquarters for an operation. This unifies the chain of command
and extends initiative on the part of the gaining commander.
1-103. Command relationships are used to subordinate a lower echelon unit such as a battalion, to a
different headquarters, normally a brigade, but occasionally directly to the division. In extraordinary
circumstances, the division commander may subordinate one brigade to another, but normally two brigades
will work through one of the tactical command posts. Typically, the division uses command relationships
to move battalions and companies between brigades.
1-104. The division attaches one unit to another headquarters when the duration of the mission and its
complexity requires the gaining commander to have complete flexibility over the attached unit. When the
duration of the operation extends beyond four days, and the division expects that the gaining commander
will frequently task organize the attached unit with other forces, attachment is the preferred command
relationship. Administrative control, including sustainment, transfers to the gaining headquarters, unless
modified by the division commander. Attachment works best when the duration of the subordination is for
a major operation or a phase of the campaign,
1-105. In contrast, OPCON units normally operate under their higher headquarters for a specific mission,
normally four days or less. Change of OPCON does not convey a change of administrative responsibilities,
therefore sustainment and other support remains with the parent brigade. Operational control allows the
division to subordinate the unit without imposing an undue logistical burden on the gaining command. It
works very well if the OPCON unit remains within supporting distance of the parent headquarters.
Aviation units subordinated to a brigade are normally OPCON, since their sustainment is intense and
specialized.
1-106. The division does not use TACON, unless subordinating a multinational or joint force for a very
short period to an Army brigade. Tactical control limits the gaining commander to operational direction
only, and prevents the gaining command from modifying the task organization using subordinate
formations of the TACON unit. However, when working with multinational formations TACON works
well, particularly if sustainment for the TACON force is provided from outside the division.
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Figure 1-10. Command and Support Relationships
SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
1-107. Support relationships are established when subordination of one unit to another would be
inappropriate. Reasons include tactical and technical ability to control different types of formations, the
echelon of the supporting unit, and the requirement for the supporting unit to answer many requests for
support from a variety of other units also needing additional capabilities (manage scarcity). A support
relationship depends upon mission command, allowing the supporting commander to function as the expert
manager of capabilities within the supporting unit and employing those capabilities to achieve results
required by supported commanders. Support relationships are graduated from an exclusive supported and
supporting relationship between two units, as in direct support, to a broad level of support extended to all
units under the control of the higher headquarters – general support. Support relationships do not alter
ADCON. Support relationships are used when task organizing the force. Army support relationships
include direct support (DS), reinforcing (R), general support reinforcing (GSR), and general support (GS).
Like the command relationships, support relationships are graduated from exclusive support (DS) to
inclusive support to the entire force (GS). Unless modified by task organization or tasks to subordinate
units, supporting brigades (fires, combat aviation, battlefield surveillance, sustainment, and combat
support) are in general support to the division.
1-108. Support relationships are rarely used between brigades. When one brigade requires the full support
of another brigade, the division order normally specifies support required within the concept of the
operation or tasks to subordinate units. The most common example is for one BCT to follow and support
another BCT. In unusual circumstances, the aviation and fires brigade may be in direct support of a BCT
or, in the case of strike operations, of the other.
1-109. If tactical circumstances dictate, the division commander may place one brigade in GSR to
another. This is a change for the modular division. The use of GSR as a support relationship between non-
artillery forces is new, but it provides the division commander the flexibility to assign supporting
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functions, tasks, or missions to one brigade in support of another and retain the remainder of the supporting
brigade’s capability to support the division. GSR supports the force as a whole and another subordinate
organization with specific forces, capabilities, tasks, and missions as limited by the common superior of
both forces. Used in the modular division, it focuses the supporting brigade commander on the needs and
requirements of the supported brigade without tying its resources completely to the supported brigade.
1-110. Because of the nature of the GSR relationship as compared to other support relationships, the
division commander normally specifies the purpose of the GSR relationship, the effect desired, and the
scope of the action to be taken. The order also may address—
x Limitations on forces and resources allocated to shaping operations
x The time, place, level, and duration of the support provided to the supported unit.
x The degree of authority over the support granted to the supported commander.
x The relative priority of the support provided in the division commander’s priorities.
x The authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort provided in
the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency.
1-111. Unless limited by the division commander when establishing GSR, the supported commander will
have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting unit. In general, the commander of the
supported force issues tasks, functions, or missions to the supporting commander and allows the supporting
commander to determine the details of accomplishment, including the resources to devote to the effort. The
supported commander may also designate priority of targets and objectives, timing and duration of
supporting actions, and other instructions necessary for coordination. All tasks, functions, and missions
given to the supporting force must contribute to the overall objective of the supported force and the
common higher headquarters. Within GSR, the supporting force may also be responsible to the parent unit
for accomplishing other tasks, missions, or responsibilities, and continues to conduct these while providing
required support to the supported force.
1-112. Battalions of one brigade are frequently placed in support of another brigade. Or example, the
cannon artillery battalion of the fires brigade reinforces the artillery of the BCT as the mission requires.
The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be
employed in providing this support. The supporting commander will advise and coordinate with the
supported commander on matters concerning the employment and limitations (for example, logistics) of
such support, assist in planning for the integration of such support into the supported commander's effort as
a whole, and ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated within the supporting
commander's organization.
1-113. Subordinate units of the brigades may be assigned the full range of the support relationships when
placed in direct support of another brigade. Depending on the authority to further assign support
relationships, the supported brigade may further assign these supporting forces a supporting relationship to
specific brigade units..
COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE DIVISION

1-114. All BCTs and supporting brigades are assigned, attached, or placed OPCON to a division. The
BCT’s may receive attachment or OPCON, of supporting battalions and companies from the other brigades
under the control of the division.
1-115. The division commander normally allocates the cannon battalions to reinforce BCTs, while
retaining the fires brigade in general support. For a particular mission, such as a mobile strike, the division
commander may place the fires brigade GSR to the combat aviation brigade. Fires battalions of the brigade
may also be attached, OPCON, or in DS to another brigade. Note, however, that since the BCT has
organic artillery, the fires battalion from the fires brigade is normally reinforcing. In some cases, the entire
fires brigade may support one BCT for a portion of the operation; the division will normally specify a
priority of support to that BCT, rather than using a support relationship.
1-116. Subordinate units of the BFSB may be attached or OPCON to a BCT; attached, OPCON, or GSR
to support fires brigade for detection of targets; and attached or OPCON to the CSB (ME) or sustainment
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brigade. During strike operations, the division may specify that the BFSB is GSR to either the combat
aviation or the fires brigade.
1-117. Typically, some battalions of the CSB (ME) are attached or OPCON to the BCTs. This may
include engineers, MPs, CBRN defense, or other units. The CSB(ME) battalions and companies also may
be attached or OPCON for area protection and CBRN support to the BFSB, fires, combat aviation, and
sustainment brigades.
1-118. The combat aviation brigade’s attack, reconnaissance, or lift assets may be OPCON or DS to a
BCT or CSB(ME). The aviation brigade may also have attack, reconnaissance, or lift assets OPCON, DS,
or GSR to the BFSB, fires, or sustainment brigade. The combat aviation brigade may be GSR to the fires
brigade for strike operations.
1-119. The sustainment brigade normally remains in general support to the division, with priority of
support specified in the division order. Based on the mission, the division may change the command or
support relationship of CSSB units to the BCTs or supporting brigades as these brigades are task organized
with additional battalions or companies. This is normally through assignment of a direct support
relationship, but may be through attachment or OPCON if the association is prolonged.
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Chapter 2
Command and Control at Division
The command and control (C2) system is the arrangement of personnel, information
management (IM), procedures, and equipment and facilities essential for the
commander to conduct operations (FM 6-0). There are two parts of the C2 system,
the commander and the control system. This chapter briefly discusses the role of the
commander in the division and then details the purpose, organization, and
characteristics of each of the command posts (CPs) that form the division’s control
system. The responsibilities and duties of staff officers are also explained in FM 6-0,
Appendix D. Unless specifically stated in the section on staff responsibilities at the
end of this chapter, these roles and responsibilities do not change in the modular
division.
THE COMMANDER
2-1. The commander combines the art of command and the science of control to exercise C2. Commanders
focus the science of control through applying the art of command – decision making and leading – to
support them and regulate forces. They create a positive climate that allows them to exercise C2 through
mission command. They accept legitimate risks and errors, foster trust and mutual understanding, inculcate
positive communications, build teamwork and establish and use values and examples.
2-2. The commander can not exercise C2 alone. The modular design of the division gives the commander
the flexible CP structure to tailor control to meet the commander’s requirements. Through use of the main
CP, the two nearly identical tactical (TAC) CPs and the mobile command group (MCG), the commander
has the flexibility to command from anywhere he desires. CP staffs support the commander by maintaining
the common operational picture (COP), providing better information to increase the speed and accuracy of
the commander’s decision making, and supporting preparation and communication of execution
information.
2-3. The role, duties and responsibilities of the commander are detailed in FM 6-0. However, the role of the
commander is slightly different in the modular division. The commander is more involved in describing to
the brigades their relationships and tasks and purpose to each other in terms of who supports who. The
commander weights each phase’s main effort and the decisive operation by establishing priorities and
support relationships and changing task organization. The commander thinks in terms of controlling BCTs
and brigades through the use of mission orders and graphic control measures. He normally no longer
directly controls battalions. The commander also must ensure the division staff supports the staff of the
BCT or brigade executing the division decisive operation.
COMMAND POSTS
2-4. A CP is a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities (FM 6-0). A CP is
the basic organization designed to assist the commander in controlling an operation. The staff is
functionally organized into G-staff sections, which are organized into functional and integrating cells and
their subordinate elements within CPs to facilitate coordination and promote efficiency. The CPs for the
division were designed to accomplish specific functions and organized by warfighting function. (See FMI
5-0.1 for detailed description of functional and integrating cells and the warfighting functions.) This
organizational design is meant to increase efficiency and ensure every division has the same capabilities for
C2.
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2-5. The commander determines the sequence of deployment, timing of moves, initial locations and task
organization for all CPs based on METT-TC and the commander’s visualization. The commander task
organizes functional capabilities and personnel across the CPs to fit his concept for C2 of the operation. He
may deploy CPs to separate locations or to a consolidated location based on METT-TC. The division is
resourced to field a MCG, two TAC CPs, and a main CP. METT-TC may dictate the co-location of two or
more CPs or the creation of a CP tailored from these assets, such as an early entry command post (EECP).
Each CP performs specific functions by design as well as additional tasks assigned by the commander. In
the division operations order C2 paragraph (paragraph 5), the commander details changes to the authority;
responsibilities; and task organization of the division CPs, from doctrinal responsibilities and designed
functions as well as any special instructions.
2-6. The fielding of an MCG and three fully functional CPs provides the division commander flexibility in
arranging CPs on the battlefield. This flexible CP structure allows the division commander to exert his
command presence on the battlefield where he desires.
MOBILE COMMAND GROUP
Purpose
2-7. The purpose of the MCG is to allow the commander to exercise personal leadership at a critical time
and place during the conduct of the operation. It allows the commander to decouple from the TAC CPs and
maintain continuous access to information. The MCG allows the commander to—
z Provide personal leadership, intent, and guidance at the critical place.
z Make a personal assessment of the situation.
z Maintain situational understanding (SU) while moving around the AO by allowing him to have
continuous access to updated information.
z Travel with key staff officers necessary to provide information relevant to the current operation.
Characteristics
2-8. The MCG serves at the commanding general’s personal CP. The MCG’s mobility allows the division
commander to move to the point of decision. He can position himself where he can assess the risks and
make adjustment decisions by seeing, hearing, and understanding what is occurring. What he learns and
sees helps him mentally visualize adjustments needed in current and future operations as he moves about
the AO and interacts with his subordinate commanders and different staffs. Thus the MCG allows him to
command from anywhere in the AO and not become tied to a TAC or the main CP. The MCG has both a
ground and an aerial component.
2-9. The MCG ground component consists of four armored HMMWVs, each with multifunctional display
units—Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS)—providing battle command on the move. The only
personnel permanently assigned to the MCG on the TOE are the four drivers of these vehicles. Two drivers
have a military occupational specialty (MOS) of 13F10, one is a signal support staff noncommissioned
officer (NCO) (MOS 25U40), and the other is a fire support NCO (MOS 13F40).
2-10. The air component of the MCG consists of Army Airborne Command and Control System (A2C2S)
equipped UH-60A/L helicopters assigned to an aviation brigade and are provided when required. The
A2C2S is a console capable of simultaneously receiving, processing and displaying tactical, JOA and
global broadcasts for use by the commander and his staff. Data links for connectivity to many ground and
airborne platforms provide the commander with the flexibility to operate in all tactical environments
without additional equipment.
2-11. Ground and air components each have the communications capability to monitor the command,
higher command, and the operations and intelligence nets. This communications capability is provided by
the signal company within the division special troops battalion (STB). Additionally, while the MCG takes
advantage of its small signature, speed, and mobility for security—and usually co-locates with subordinate
units headquarters, the MCG requires the presence of a tailored security force when its is moving and
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stationary. While the TOE of the division STB contains a security company, that company has not been
resourced and the division commander must task another subordinate unit to provide a local security forces
for the MCG.
2-12. The staff officers in the MCG are normally subordinate staff officers capable of operating the ABCS
multifunctional display units and they are not primary staff officers. The division commander chooses the
individual staff officers that staff the MCG. The personnel in the MCG are normally functional
representatives of those staff sections that can immediately effect current operations, such as maneuver,
fires, and intelligence in addition to his senior air liaison officer (ALO), and when needed, a joint terminal
attack controller (JTAC). The mission and staff available, however, dictate its makeup. For example,
during a deliberate breach, the division commander may choose to include an engineer staff officer. When
visiting a displaced civilian collection point, he may choose to replace the fires element staff officer and
ALO with a G-9/civil-military operations (CMO) translator, or medical officer.
TACTICAL CP
2-13. The division employs one or two TAC CPs to control the execution of operations. The TAC CPs
maintain continuous communication with subordinates, higher headquarters, the other CPs, and supporting
joint assets. When both TACs are set and controlling operations, they each have specific responsibilities as
designated in paragraph five of the operations order. When only one TAC CP is controlling operations, the
TAC CP not active in controlling operations may co-locate with the main CP and perform other functions
designated by the commander, such as planning and preparation for future operations. When both TAC
CPs are employed simultaneously, the commander must ensure unity of command by clearly identifying, in
paragraph five of the operations order, the roles and responsibilities assigned to each TAC, and the
reporting procedures for subordinate units.
2-14. One of the- two deputy commanding generals (DCG) controls operations from a TAC CP. The G-3
section is responsible for the operation of the TAC CPs. The division commander may command the
division from his deployed MCG, either TAC CP or the main CP, as dictated by METT-TC.
Purpose
2-15. The primary reason the division has two TACs is to cycle BCTs into the fight while maintaining
constant pressure on the enemy. One TAC controls a set of BCTs currently in the fight until it becomes
necessary to replace that set of BCTs with a set of fresh BCTs, which will be controlled by the second
TAC. This process may result in selected staff officers who are rotating from the TAC to give up control of
the operation to the TAC that is assuming control of the operation.
2-16. The TAC CPs normally control forces committed to the decisive operation and shaping operations,
however, they could also control particularly complex sustaining operations such as reception, staging,
onward movement, and integration (RSOI) involving multiple subordinate brigades. The division
commander may also use a TAC CP to control specific complex operations, such as air assaults, river
crossings, in-stride breaching operations, or passage of lines involving multiple subordinate units, or
provide a CP to form a special-purpose task force with subordinate units task organized under its control.
2-17. Maintaining unity of command requires that one TAC CP be in charge of synchronizing the
division’s overall operation. The TAC in charge maintains the COP for the division according to the
Command Information Management Plan (CIMP). The respective TAC CPs perform duties assigned in
paragraph five of the operations order that may include the following:
z Control units and activities conducting or supporting—
The decisive operation or shaping operations.
Strike and deception operations.
z Maintain the current operations estimate.
z Maintain and disseminate the COP throughout the division.
z Tailor the COP to meet the commander’s requirements.
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z Monitor sustaining operations.

z Provide—
A forward location for issuing orders and conducting rehearsals.
A forward short-term planning facility when the main CP must displace.
The majority of the personnel and equipment to form an EECP.
Personnel for the MCG.
Characteristics
2-18. Each TAC CP is designed to provide C2 for full-spectrum operations. One TAC CP is normally
designated to control current operations, which may include both the decisive operation and shaping
operations which are setting conditions. The TACs are designed and equipped to perform functions
essential to the control of current operations and immediate execution decision making. The main CP is
primarily designed and equipped to perform long-range planning, analysis, sustainment coordination, and
other supporting functions not directly essential to the immediate control of current operations.
2-19. The TAC CPs are organized as one multifunctional, integrating cell (see Figure 2-1). All warfighting
functions are represented in each of the TACs by staff elements capable of conducting 24-hour operations.
Figure 2-1. Organization of TAC CPs
2-20. The TAC CPs are 100-percent mobile, which means they are capable of displacing with organic
transportation assets in one lift. Although the two TAC CPs allow the division to plan the displacement of
these C2 nodes so that one is always set and controlling operations while the other is moving, this is not the
principal reason for providing the division with two, functionally redundant TAC CPs. Factors that
influence the movement of the TAC CPs include the flow of operations, the threat of enemy action, and the
desires of the commander. Elimination of the dependency on line of sight communications systems, with
their inherent range limitations, allows the TAC CPs to remain stationary longer and maintain C2 over
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units conducting operations over extended distances. However, the TAC CPs should remain close enough
to subordinate brigades for the staff to be cognizant of the operational environment in which the brigades
are operating.
2-21. Both TAC CPs may be employed simultaneously. When not actively employed for the C2 of
operations, the TAC CPs monitor all networked communications systems and the COP, prepared to
displace or assume control of operations, as required.
2-22. When notified to prepare for deployment, one of the two TAC CPs (the ready TAC) will maintain a
higher-readiness posture, configuring equipment and personnel into an EECP package to fit constrained
lift, with the other equipment and personnel prepared to follow. The other TAC CP supports joint and
Army training. A typical deployment sequence for a division might be as follows: Initially, a consolidated
CP (main and one or both TACs) provides C2 of pre-deployment preparation, mission rehearsals,
collaborative planning and virtual teaming with higher headquarters, and initial phases of unit deployment.
During the initial phases of deployment, the division may form an ad hoc EECP from the ready TAC with
additional staff augmentation and deploy the EECP early in the deployment sequence; the remainder of the
first TAC CP follows, linking up with the EECP in the division area of operation (AO) to form a fully
functional TAC CP. While the EECP and the remainder of the first TAC CP is deploying, the consolidated
division CP monitors deployment of subordinate units, controls the deployment of the remainder of the
division headquarters, and coordinates with the gaining ASCC, corps, or controlling joint headquarters.
The commander determines the initial locations and the sequence and timing of deployment and
displacement for all CPs. The commander deploys himself and elements of the command group forward
once a fully functional CP is established in the division AO.
2-23. There are a variety of TAC CP employment options, to include the following:
z The two TAC CPs may alternate between phases within a major operation. One TAC CP
controls current operations, while the other rehearses the upcoming operation. As the next phase
of the operation commences, one TAC CP replaces the other and the cycle repeats.
z The commander may distribute the two TAC CPs into separate areas (for example, on different
islands in an island group or into noncontiguous AOs during a stability operation).
z In a widespread offensive operation, the commander may designate one TAC CP to control the
operations of forces eliminating bypassed enemy forces within small cities along the line of
operations while the other TAC CP controls the decisive operation. In this example, one TAC is
acting as a subordinate task force of the division and would be subordinate to the controlling
TAC.
z The division commander may designate one TAC CP to control air assault operations conducted
by some elements of the division, while the other controls the continuing operations of the rest
of the division.
z The division commander may distribute control of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations
between CPs in complex operations. For example, the commander may designate TAC 2 to
control sustaining operations while TAC 1 controls the decisive and shaping operations.
Whichever CP is controlling the decisive operation should also control the shaping operations
that are setting the conditions. This ensures the controlling headquarters has visibility over both
and can effectively synchronize the entire operation.
z In protracted operations, the commander may combine the TAC CPs and the main CP into a
single consolidated CP in order to increase the capability to control particularly complex tasks
that may be performed in the AO.
z When one of the TACs is not employed, it could be used as a G-3 staff component to plan future
operations occurring in the next 24-96 hours, allowing current operations to focus on the next 24
hours and G-5 plans to focus beyond 96 hours, or use a similar time horizon determined by the
commander.
z The two TAC CPs can employ forces and deploy forces simultaneously. One TAC CP can be
dedicated to controlling the deployment of forces into the AO while the other TAC CP is in the
AO controlling initial operations.
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2-24. The TAC CPs receive a task-organized support element consisting of security (not resourced by
DA–should come from a non-deploying BCT), communications, and life support provided by the STB.
When the TAC CP and main CP are geographically dispersed, the STB commander, the security company
commander (if resourced), and the headquarters company commander from the STB each go to a different
CP and are responsible for supervising the STB slice providing life support, security, communications,
vehicle maintenance, field feeding, transportation, supply and medical support activities for the respective
CPs.
Functional and Integrating Cells

2-25. The staff at each TAC CP is organized into cells by warfighting function. The cell structure of the
two TAC CPs is almost identical in both function and personnel assigned. Each TAC CP is organized into
the following functional cells:
z Movement and maneuver.
z Fires Support.
z Intelligence.
z Protection.
z Sustainment.
z Command, control, communications, and computers (C4).
2-26. The TAC CP elements merge to form integrating cells as required. Essentially the TAC CP functions
as one large current operations integrating cell. TAC CP elements may be task organized by the G-3 to
form working groups or other temporary matrix organizations to resolve specific problems. For example,
when unanticipated opportunities or threats arise, the G-3 may form a future operations (FUOPS) working
group from the various functional elements in the TAC to develop branch plans and fragmentary orders
(FRAGOs) to address them. This FUOPS function is a natural extension of the current operations function
to an undetermined time in the near to mid-term planning/execution horizon, but within the scope of the
current division mission and OPORD. The G-3 may assign branch planning functions to ad hoc FUOPS
working groups in either of the TACs or in the current operations element at the main CP or, if sufficient
time is available, the G-3 may request that a given branch plan be assigned to G-5 plans in the main CP for
development and production of appropriate FRAGOs. If the situation requires a full MDMP analysis and
the issuance of a new OPORD, the planning task is ordinarily done by G-5 plans at the main CP. See FMI
5-0.1 for more information on FUOPS, integrating cells and working groups.
Movement and Maneuver Cell

2-27. The movement and maneuver cell is led by the G-3 current operations element and consists of the
following elements; G-2 operations, aviation, staff judge advocate (SJA), and when assigned, a United
States Marine Corps (USMC) operations element. Each of these elements are discussed in detail in the
following paragraphs.
2-28. G-3 Current Operations Element. This element coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes efforts of
all organic and supporting Army and joint assets conducting and supporting the current division operation.
The Current Operations Element—
z Serves as the staff coordinator for the maneuver.
z Synchronizes the actions of the staff for all other task areas within the TAC CPs.
z Allocates resources and establishes priorities in support of division operations.
z Synchronizes the current fight and recommends adjustments including commitment of the
reserve.
z Makes adjustment and execution decisions during the conduct of operations, when delegated
these decisions by the commander.
z Prepares and issues warning orders (WARNOs) and FRAGOs to support the current operation.
z Performs limited branch planning for short suspense branches off the current operation.
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z Passes the requirement to conduct branch planning to the other TAC or to G-5 (Plans) for
branches that are not short suspense or are sufficiently complex to require a full MDMP.
z Coordinates operations with higher headquarters and adjacent units.
z Coordinates with the G-5 (Plans) element in the main CP to synchronize future operations and
the transition from the current operation to a future operation without loss of momentum and
unit integrity.
z Manages the division's terrain.
z Maintains and displays the COP.
z Coordinates joint, interagency, and multinational efforts that support the division’s current
operations.
2-29. The division G-3 is normally the officer-in-charge (OIC) of one TAC and the deputy G-3 is normally
the OIC of the other TAC. A DCG is the senior officer at each TAC. The current operations cell performs
as the basis of the joint operations center when the division is designated as a JTF.
2-30. G-2 Operations Element. This element serves as the 24-hour intelligence element in current
operations. They integrate intelligence products and collection management into current operations.
2-31. Aviation Element. The aviation elements at the TACs coordinate all issues involving Army aviation
and the current operation. The aviation element—
z Coordinates and synchronizes the execution of operational and tactical aviation maneuver and
support for maneuver and sustainment operations.
z Coordinates and synchronizes close combat attack, mobile strike, vertical envelopment, air
assault, battle command on the move using aerial platforms, aerial MEDEVAC and key
personnel aerial transportation.
z Coordinates and synchronizes air movements and countermobility operations using Army
aviation assets.
z Provides Army aviation input and receives and distributes information from the joint air tasking
order (ATO).
z Provides aviation expertise to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); protection;
sustainment; and C4 meetings and working groups.
2-32. Army Airspace Command and Control Element. The A2C2 elements at the TACs are the division
headquarters’ only airspace control planning and synchronization elements. The main CP does not have an
A2C2 element. A2C2 planning support to the Main is provided by the TAC 1 A2C2 element. The TAC
A2C2 element—
z Plans and requests immediate airspace control measures (ACMs).
z Deconflicts airspace through the appropriate control authority.
z Controls airspace use in the division AO.
z Writes the A2C2 annex and maintains the A2C2 estimate.
z Supports the fire support element A2C2 requirements.
z Provides A2C2 staff support.
z Serves as A2C2 point-of-contact for subordinate units.
z Inputs future airspace control order (ACO)/ATO requirements.
z Coordinates sensor and tactical digital information link coverage with the Air and Missile
Defense (AMD) element.
2-33. Each TAC A2C2 element is the primary A2C2 POC for the subordinate BCTs and brigades under
their control. The controlling TAC A2C2 element oversees the subordinate TAC’s A2C2 element and is
responsible for managing the coordination, integration, and regulation of division airspace. When the
division is under the control of an ASCC, the controlling TAC’s A2C2 element will coordinate all planned
airspace requirements with the ASCC A2C2 element while keeping the subordinate TAC A2C2 element
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Chapter 2
informed. The controlling TAC A2C2 element is responsible for accumulating and submitting the division
input to the joint ACO.
2-34. SJA Element. This element provides 24-hour legal support and advice to the staff at the TAC CPs.
The SJA element provides legal advice in the following areas:
z Rules of engagement (ROE).
z Law of war.
z Lawfulness of targets and weapons.
z Reports of alleged violations of the law of war (war crimes).
z Treatment of detainees, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), noncombatants, and refugees.
z Relationships with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
2-35. CMO Element. The CMO element at the TAC is very lean with only one NCO assigned. It may be
augmented with CA personnel from the supporting CA battalion or with a civil affairs planning team
(CAPT) that normally would support a brigade. It coordinates CMO affecting division current operations
with the CAPTs supporting the BCTs and other brigades.
Fire Support Cell

2-36. The fire support cell is led by the personnel in the fires element and consists of the fires, information
operations (IO), Army airspace command and control (A2C2), and the ALO elements. The fire support cell
synchronizes the execution and makes adjustments to the division’s fire support plan for Army indirect
fires, offensive IO, close air support (CAS) and other joint fires. During planning with the main CP fires
element, it establishes target priorities, apportions available joint and multinational operational firepower
resources, develops high-payoff targets (HPTs), produces targeting decisions into a collection plan, and
when operating as a JTF establishes Joint Force Targeting Guidance. The fire support cell and other
members of the targeting team identify when major changes in the tactical situation warrant reevaluation of
the high-payoff target list (HPTL). The targeting team continually assesses the current situation with the
current operations cell. In coordination with the plans cell, it validates and refines the future fires needs of
the division. At the same time, the team reevaluates and updates the HPTL, battle damage assessment
(BDA) requirements, and target selection standards (TSSs) as needed. The TAC fire support cells —
z Participate in the division targeting process.
z Coordinate operational and tactical targeting.
z Request and coordinate CAS and air interdiction (AI).
z Synchronize Army indirect fires, offensive IO, and joint fires.
z Conduct fire support and assessment, and recommend reattack.
z Coordinate fire support operations with maneuver and A2C2 elements.
z Update the fire support estimate and annex.
z Provide input to FRAGOs.
z Nominates targets to be collected against to the G-2 for inclusion in the collection plan.
NOTE: Nonlethal fires are any fires that do not directly seek the physical destruction of the
intended target and are designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy
operational forces, function, and facilities. Psychological operation, electronic warfare
(jamming), and other C2 countermeasures are all nonlethal fire options. Nonlethal weapons are
weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or
materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to
property and the environment. (See FM 1-02.)
2-37. The fire support cell, in coordination with the tactical air control party (TACP) and other members of
the TAC, manages fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs). With the current operations cell, the fires
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element and TACP continuously evaluate current FSCMs and recommend the movement or cancellation of
measures. They will also recommend the immediate establishment of any new FSCMs. The current
operations cell, fire support cell and TACP review planned FSCMs, evaluate their validity, and recommend
changes as necessary.
2-38. The fire support cell contains two field artillery intelligence officers (FAIOs) who coordinate closely
with the G-2 target development element. These two warrant officers provide the fires expertise necessary
for the intelligence element to conduct quality targeting.
2-39. IO Element. The division G-7 leads the IO element at TAC 1 and an IO operations officer leads the
element at TAC 2. The IO element—
z Advises the commander and staff on operational and tactical IO.
z Integrates IO planning, operation, and targeting to achieve the commander’s intent.
z Synchronizes JFLC and ARFOR IO when required.
z Writes IO input to FRAGOs.
z Coordinates military deception operations.
z Coordinates operations security, computer network operations (NETOPS), and psychological
operations.
z If the division is serving as an ARFOR, JFLC or JTF, participates in joint IO planning and
coordination.
2-40. ALO Element. The ALO element is formed around a division TACP. USAF personnel at division
function primarily in a planning and execution role, providing USAF operational expertise for planning
and execution of Army operations. A seven member TACP will normally be located at each TAC CP to
assist in airpower planning and execution. Manning will include two ALOs, two intelligence personnel,
two JTACs, and one terminal air control coordination specialist. The air component planning and execution
element will normally be located in or adjacent to the fires element and will maintain close
communications with G-3 current operations, A2C2, and the analysis and control element (ACE). Specific
air component planning and execution roles include the following:
z Execute air and space power in accordance with C/JFACC guidance and division commander’s
priority, timing and desired effects within the Division AO.
z Provide expert liaison function to inform the commander and staff on the capabilities and
limitations of air and space power.
z Accomplish training and mission rehearsal under anticipated operational conditions with USAF
and other Service counterparts.
z Plan, prepare for, execute, and assess airpower (for example, CAS, air intelligence, and
suppression of enemy air defenses) operating within it’s the division AO out to the fire support
coordination line (FSCL).
z Prioritizes, coordinates and deconflicts air and space power executing missions in the division
AO, in accordance with the division commander’s priorities .
z Prevent fratricide through constant situational understanding of a multitude of friendly locations,
enemy positions, and FSCMs.
z Provide applicable updates to the COP for air assets tasked to support ground operations.
z Ensure all subordinate TACPs and JTACs know and understand JOA ROE.
z Deconflict both air and ground assets by monitoring the COP of both friendly and enemy forces
reported by intelligence and collaborative tools linked to other C2 units.
z Through the use of collaborative tools and secure communications, provide timely and efficient
processing of air support requests.
z Provide fast reaction to immediate air support requests, control kill box operations, and integrate
and coordinate air support missions (for example, ISR, EW, airlift) within the division
commander’s AO.
z Exercise OPCON or TACON of all JTACs operating in the division AO.
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Chapter 2
z Exercise OPCON of USAF TACPs operating in the division AO.

z Collect and report BDA and weapons effects in division AO.
Intelligence Cell
2-41. The deputy G-2 or an assistant G-2 leads the intelligence cell of the TAC CPs. This cell is
subdivided into several elements with specific ISR related functions.
2-42. G-2 Headquarters Element. This headquarters element serves as the requirements manager for
division organic and attached collection assets. Their primary function is to provide the commander and
staff with actionable intelligence.
2-43. Target Development Element. This element develops and nominates priority target sets. They
coordinate with the fire support cell and participate in the targeting meeting. They ensure targets are
prioritized and sequenced in current operations and future plans.
2-44. Fusion Element. This element provides commanders and staff with the COP and actionable
intelligence by performing the following functions:
z Conduct situation development.
z Prepare combat assessments.
z Develop and update the threat portion of the COP and the intelligence running estimate.
z Integrate and synchronize assets to optimize collection.
2-45. Communications Integration and Administration Element. This element establishes and
maintains internal and external communications and ensures communications security (COMSEC)
compliance.
2-46. Distributed Tactical Exploitation System (DTES) Element. This section receives, processes,
stores, displays and disseminates signal intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and
measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT). They provide advanced geospatial intelligence
analysis and products. These multi-source products are used to answer commander's critical information
requirements (CCIR).
2-47. Battlefield Weather Element. USAF battlefield weather personnel provide required weather
support to each division headquarters, normally through a force tailored combination of overwatch and in-
place liaisons. An element is located at each TAC CP and provides weather observation, forecast support,
and analysis of weather impact on the current operation.
Protection Cell
2-48. The protection cell consists of elements from the division provost marshal (PM); chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN); AMD; and engineer staff sections. The commander
designates the senior officer from the subordinate elements as the chief of protection Warfighting function.
These staff elements coordinate closely with the CSB(ME) and other protection related supporting units, as
well as the other functional cells throughout the division CPs. The protection cell develops and maintains
the commander’s critical defended asset list. The protection cell also coordinates explosive ordinance
disposal issues.
2-49. AMD Elements. The chief of AMD operations leads the TAC 1 AMD element and the deputy chief
of AMD operations leads the TAC 2 AMD element. The AMD element—
z Advises the commander and staff on all AMD-related issues.
z Monitors current enemy air and missile activities.
z Provides threat early warning.
z Battle-tracks friendly AMD operations including unit positioning, status, coverage fans, sensor
plans, changes in the ATO, priority target lists, ACMs, ROE, and number and type of missiles
available.
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z Coordinates current operations of subordinate AMD forces and passes critical AMD
information.
z Ensures the direction of beyond-line-of-sight/non-line-of-sight AMD fires complies with the
Joint Integrated Air Defense System.
z Assists with airspace coordination and execution, focusing on defense readiness conditions, air
defense warning and weapon control status.
z Provides and manages linkage to the joint Surveillance Integration Automation Project,
managing and developing the COP into SU.
z Synchronizes current operational protection of the third dimension.
z Coordinates division current operations with the Deputy Area Air Defense Commander
(DAADC).
z Supports C2 system integration of AMD functions with A2C2 and the fire support cell.
2-50. CBRN Operations Element. A single CBRN operations officer with a staff of NCOs leads this
element, which conducts the following actions:
z Advises the commander and staff on all CBRN issues.
z Coordinates immediate CBRN logistics functions.
z Provides CBRN response analysis.
z Writes immediate CBRN defense FRAGOS.
z Produces obscuration and flame estimates.
z Coordinates CBRN defense.
z Coordinates obscuration and flame operations.
z Recommends employment of chemical defense assets.
z Supports the CBRN warning and reporting system.
z Provides CBRN defense life support to the TAC CP.
2-51. PM Elements. The TACs’ PM elements are each led by a deputy PM. The PM elements—
z Advise the commander and staff on military police (MP) issues.
z Coordinate—
MP support for current operations.
Tactical MP requirements.
MP support to area security and protection operations.
Maneuver and mobility support operations.
Internment and resettlement operations.
Dislocated civilian resettlement.
Law and order operations.
Police intelligence operations.
z Synchronize MP operations between CPs.
z Write the MP annex to branches.
z Manage the DOD EPW and detainee program.
z Establish high-risk detainee operations.
z Provide populace and resource control.
z Assign protective services for high risk personnel.
2-52. Engineer Operations Element. Engineer operations officers lead this element at both TACs and are
supported by a staff of NCOs. This element—
z Advises the commander and staff on all assured mobility and sustainment engineer operations.
z When required, coordinates and synchronizes JFLCC and ARFOR engineer operations.
z Synchronizes engineer operations between CPs.
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z Coordinates tactical engineer support for battles and engagements.

z Assists in the intelligence collection and effect targeting process.
z Participates in reconnaissance and surveillance and targeting meetings.
z Writes engineer portion of FRAGOs.
z Synchronizes and coordinates mobility, countermobility, survivability and general engineering
operations.
z Provides reach back to the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) knowledge
centers.
z Maintains the engineer portion of the running estimate based on current operations.
z Coordinates explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) support.
Sustainment Cell
2-53. The sustainment cells at the TACs are lean organizations that rely on the main CP to conduct the
majority of sustainment functions. The cell consists of two G-4 logistics operations officers capable of
monitoring the current situation and coordinating issues with the robust staff at the main for planning,
preparation, and execution.
2-54. The surgeon element at the main CP is capable of sending a four person medical team to each TAC
CP for the purpose of planning and preparing the execution of all force health protection functions. The
commander decides whether to move this team forward to the TACs or to retain the team at the main CP.
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Cell

2-55. The division G-6 leads the C4 NETOPS cell at TAC 1 and the deputy G-6 leads the cell at TAC 2.
This cell—
z Advises the commander and staff on all matters concerning C4 operations.
z Conducts IM- and manages NETOPS.
z Coordinates with the G-3 to establish procedures for collecting, processing, storing, displaying
and disseminating relevant information (RI) and using information systems (INFOSYS) to
display the COP.
z Plans, prepares, executes and assesses the development of the COP within CPs.
z Coordinates with staff sections to ensure information quality criteria are maintained.
z Controls organic communications systems that interface with the global information grid.
z Incorporates and integrates network management, information dissemination management, and
information assurance (IA) functions.
z Coordinates with task organized section of the STB NETOPS company to ensure connectivity is
maintained between the TAC and all other CPs, joint supporting assets, and higher headquarters.
USAF Air Support Operations Center

2-56. The USAF Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) is the air component commander’s center to
effectively control CAS. An ASOC will normally be located at the division when the division is operating
on a separate line of operations and geographically separated from its higher headquarters or when the
division is the JFLC or JTF. Doctrinally, the ASOC is co-located with the senior Army echelon’s FSE (JP
3-09.3). Actual placement is guided by three principles:
z The ASOC is a C2 center and derives synergy and efficiency by the fact that a group of highly
trained airmen are working together, in concert. The ASOC will not be split up in order to co-
locate with multiple CPs, other than when it is displacing. While displacing there will be some
degradation in capability.
z The ASOC needs to be located in a relatively secure location. Due to the firepower the ASOC
can potentially bring to bear, its loss due to enemy action could have serious consequences for
the ground forces.
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z The need for a relatively secure location has to be balanced by the ASOC's primary limitation.
In order to control airpower, it needs to be able to communicate with the aircraft, which in most
cases remains restricted by UHF/VHF LOS. Optimistically, in a billiard-ball world, this could be
as much as 100nm with an aircraft at 10,000-feet or higher. However, factors such as radio
power, antenna size, and others have to be considered. Also, the distance is described as an arc
from the transmitter. In short, the furthest corner of the airspace the ASOC can control should
not be short of the FSCL or there is likelihood of creating a sanctuary from air attack for enemy
forces. In mountainous terrain, these distances may be considerably less, depending on the
elevation of the radio antennas in relation to the surrounding terrain. Radio relays, Joint STARS,
and airborne FACs are all means by which the ASOC may extend these distances on a limited
basis. In addition, future technologies may overcome this physical limitation.
2-57. If located at the division, normally, the ASOC will co-locate with the TAC CP that is controlling
operations; however the ASOC may locate at the main CP. The ASOC commander should recommend the
best location for positioning the ASOC to the division commander based on the factors of METT-TC. The
ASOC is normally a 54-person center that provides the following functions:
z Controls CAS assets within the division AO.
z Manages Air Interdiction assets within the division AO.
z Processes immediate and preplanned CAS requests.
z Deconflicts ACMs and aircraft.
z Allocates attack aircraft to TACP terminal attack controllers in accordance with the division
commander’s priorities.
z Manages the Joint Air Request Net and the Tactical Air Direction Net.
EARLY ENTRY COMMAND POST

2-58. The EECP is an ad hoc organization comprised of equipment and personnel from the staff of the
TAC CPs and the main CP. One of the TAC CPs provides the base from which staff officers are added or
subtracted based on mission requirements to form the EECP. The EECP should be staffed with a mix of
current operations personnel, planners, and logisticians to be able to coordinate the reception of the
division and plan its initial operations.
MAIN CP
2-59. The main CP primarily conducts future planning, analysis for current and future operations,
sustainment coordination and other staff functions. It is capable of controlling operations for a limited time
when a TAC CP is not available, however, the main CP requires augmentation from a TAC CP to C2
operations for a sustained time period. The division staff at the main CP, operate under the general
supervision of the division chief of staff (COS). The main CP serves as the primary planning CP and
coordination CP for logistics and sustainment to include human resources, legal, resource management,
PM operations, CMO, public affairs (PA), and inspector general (IG) support.
Purpose
2-60. The main CP performs the following functions:
z Serves as the primary plans, analysis and sustainment coordination CP.
z Monitors and assesses operations for impact on future operations.
z Conducts planning for major operations and battles.
z Writes OPLANs.
z Writes branch plans as requested by the G-3 at the TAC CP.
z Integrates intelligence activities into both current and future operations.
z Produces multi-source intelligence products.
z Produces terrain products.
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z Conducts IM.
z Coordinates and manages force structure to include request for forces and equipment.
z Participates in the targeting process.
z Coordinates CMO activities in the AO.
z Prepares and maintains division staff estimates, plans, and orders to support future operations.
z Plans and synchronizes all sustainment operations.
z Controls operations when a TAC CP is not available.
z Prepares all reports required by higher headquarters.
z Controls units and performs other C2 functions as designated in paragraph five (C2) of the
division operations order.
2-61. The main CP is much larger than either TAC CP and is functionally organized into a mix of
warfighting function and integrating cells to facilitate staff communications and interaction (see Figure 2-
2). Not all warfighting functions are organized into a pure warfighting function cell such as is the case in
the TAC CPs but all Warfighting functions are represented or available to serve temporarily in the current
operations and plans integrating cells. The arrangement of the main CP facilitates work and security,
smoothes traffic flow, and takes advantage of cover and concealment. The main CP does not have the
organic equipment to conduct C2 on the move so it must operate in a stationary mode. The main CP, as
currently resourced, is 50-percent mobile and requires two lifts to displace with organic transportation
assets. Detailed internal staff SOPs outline CP configurations and functions of individuals assigned.
Flexible configurations accommodate the use of different types of existing buildings found in the AO and
losses of equipment. Both temporary and long-term configurations should be planned.
2-62. The primary considerations in positioning the main CP are communications, survivability, and
accessibility. The commander determines the best location for the main CP based on the above
considerations and the C2 plan for use of the TAC CPs. When deployed to an AO, the main CP is normally
located in areas that reduce exposure to enemy surveillance and long-range indirect fires. The main CP
does not have CP platforms for work areas so the main CP could be established in built-up areas, using
maintenance facilities, warehouses, or other buildings large enough to accommodate all personnel and
equipment. Support assets task organized from the STB co-locate at the main CP. The organic tactical
vehicles and communications equipment are dispersed and camouflaged to reduce their electronic and
visual signature. When selecting a location for the main CP, considerations must be made for proximity to
a helicopter landing zone. See FM 6-0 for a detailed discussion of considerations for locating CPs.
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Figure 2-2. Organization of Main CP
2-63. The commander determines where to locate the main CP. A few options for locating the main CP
include:
z With either TAC CP. This is the preferred option when a fixed facility is available and the
situation does not require rapid displacement of both TAC CPs.
z With one of the brigades of the division. This usually is a CSB(ME) or a sustainment brigade
with its headquarters located in the division rear area.
z With the aviation brigade. This allows for dispersed division staff and commanders to reach the
main CP quicker.
z Within the ASCC or corps rear area, in close proximity to a fixed-wing air base. This facilitates
coordination and meetings between the main CP and other elements of the joint force, including
the ASCC or corps.
Main CP Cells and Elements

2-64. The main CP is organized by function into the following cells and elements:
z Headquarters element.
z Plans cell.
z Intelligence cell.
z Current operations cell.
z Coordinating and special staff cell.
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2-65. The main CP’s functional elements are organized into cells. The cells are scalable to accommodate
staff augmentation when required, such as when the division is assigned the mission to perform the duties
of an operational headquarters (JFLC or JTF) in a smaller scale contingency. The arrangement of
functional cells within the main CP supports the temporary movement of staff within the main CP.
Headquarters Element
2-66. The headquarters element provides administrative support for the division commander, serves as the
focal point for liaisons, and orchestrates a synchronized staff effort. The headquarters element consists of
the COS, the secretary of the general staff (SGS), organic liaison officers (LNOs), and supporting
personnel. The COS is the commander’s principal assistant for supervising, and training the staff except in
areas the commander reserves. The commander normally delegates authority to the COS to manage the
staff. The COS frees the commander from routine details and passes pertinent information and insight from
the staff to the commander and from the commander to the staff. (FM 6-0, Appendix D, details staff duties
and responsibilities of the COS, and Appendix E details LNO duties.)
2-67. The SGS assists the COS by planning and supervising special conferences and meetings, directing
preparation for, and monitoring execution of itineraries for distinguished visitors to the headquarters, and
acting as the informal point of contact for LNOs.
2-68. Receiving and dispatching liaison teams are critical functions of the headquarters element. LNOs
provide and disseminate RI and represent adjacent, attached, OPCON, supporting, and in some cases
supported units, at the main CP. (FM 6-0 discusses the duties and functions of LNOs.)
2-69. The division may also be augmented with LNOs from other governmental agencies (OGAs), NGOs,
international organizations, and joint or multinational headquarters. (JP 3-16, JP 3-8 and FM 41-10,
Appendix A, provide listings of prominent NGOs and international organizations.) These LNOs will be
located within CPs and cells, as necessary, to best facilitate operations.
Plans Cell
2-70. The plans cell is the heart of the main CP and is led by the G-5 (Plans and Policy), and is responsible
for planning all future operations (see Figure 2-3). The plans cell consists of a plans element and a
functional plans element. The plans element is led by the G-5 and contains several specialists including a
School of Advanced Military Studies qualified planner, an Operations Research & System Analysis officer,
a strategic plans officer, a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System officer, and two NCOs. The
functional plans element contains the functional area planners from the following specialties:
z Aviation.
z Fires.
z IO.
z Deception.
z Engineers.
z Military intelligence.
z Logistics.
2-71. The plans cell is responsible for planning operations for the mid- to long-range planning horizons. It
develops plans, orders, branches and sequels. They monitor the COP and stay abreast of the current
operation by coordinating with the current operations cell and plan for sequels accordingly. When
sufficient time is available before execution and at the request of a TAC CP, the plans cell may write
branches for the current operation. Plans cell members use the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)
for developing OPLANs and OPORDs. Each staff officer represents his functional area during the MDMP
from receipt of the mission to orders production. (FM 5-0 discusses the MDMP in detail.) The plans cell—
z Produces OPLANs, OPORDs, and WARNOs to transition to future operations.
z Closely coordinates with the current operations cell to transition from current to future
operations.
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z When requested, writes branch plans of the current operation for the G-3 at the TAC CP.
z Participates in the targeting process.
z Performs long-range assessment of an operation’s progress.
Figure 2-3. Plans Cell at Main CP
2-72. The plans cell normally plans operations to be conducted in the next phase of the operation which
normally occurs in the unit’s contingency or orientation planning horizon. (See FM 5-0 for planning
horizons.) However, they may be tasked by the commander to plan operations in the current phase or near-
term planning horizon. When this occurs, the division staff may be tailored and additional officers
temporarily assigned to the plans cell to conduct short-range commitment planning. These officers may
come for a TAC CP or the other staff elements at the main CP.
2-73. When planning requires functional area expertise that is not resident full time in the plans division,
an plans working group is convened and outside expertise resident at the main CP is temporarily called in
to support the planning effort. The other coordinating, special, and personal staff sections within the main
CP support the plans cell, as required, to include G-1, G-4, G-6, CMO, Provost Marshal Office, AMD,
space, surgeon, PA, CBRN, SJA, chaplain, and USAF planners. When the division is serving in a joint
environment and conducting operations with other services, the plans cell may be augmented with United
States Navy and USMC planners.
Intelligence Cell
2-74. The intelligence cell requests, receives, and analyzes information from all sources to produce and
distribute combat intelligence. The intelligence cell is built around what was previously the MI battalion
ACE and includes the USAF battlefield weather input (see Figure 2-4). It conducts continuous IPB to
support future operations planning and target development. The intelligence cell develops and tracks
critical targets, performs all-source analysis, manages collection, and produces and maintains IPB products.
The following paragraphs detail the elements that form the cell and provide a brief description of their
functions.
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2-75. Headquarters Element. This element contains the division G-2 and deputy G-2. They provide
intelligence for the current operation and future plans. They also manage requirements for organic and
attached collection assets. Their main purpose is to provide actionable intelligence to the command.
Figure 2-4. Intelligence Cell at the Main CP
2-76. Special Security Office Element. The Special Security Office Element exercises oversight of
sensitive compartmented information reception, transmission, and storage.
2-77. Target Development Element. This element develops and nominates priority targets for
engagement with nonlethal systems and lethal indirect fires. They participate in the targeting process with
the fire support cell to ensure targets are prioritized and sequenced into current operations and future plans.
This element receives two FAIO from the fire support cell to provide expertise in lethal-indirect fire
operations.
2-78. Collection Management Element. This element monitors collection assets and develops the
collection plan. They also integrate and synchronize assets to optimize collection.
2-79. Division Tactical Exploitation System (DTES) Element. This element receives, processes,
exploits, and disseminates SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT information and products. They provide
advanced geospatial intelligence analysis and products. These multi-source products are used to answer the
commander’s critical information requirements.
2-80. Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (CGS) Element. This element receives IMINT and
SIGINT from overhead collection platforms. They serve as the downlink from UASs, GUARDRAIL, and
JSTARS.
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2-81. Fusion Element. This element conducts situation development, prepares combat assessments,
develops, and updates the threat portion of the COP and maintains the intelligence running estimate. They
provide the commander and staff with actionable intelligence.
2-82. Communications Integration Element. This element establishes communications with outside
elements and maintains internal and external digital communications functions. They also exercise
COMSEC oversight.
2-83. SIGINT Element. This element conducts SIGINT analysis, electronic preparation of the battlefield ,
and tasking of division SIGINT systems. Their overall purpose is to provide single-source intelligence to
the G-2 Fusion element as part of the multi-disciplined intelligence picture.
2-84. G-2X Element. This element advises the senior intelligence officer and commander on employment
of counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT) assets and interfaces with OGA to
synchronize CI and HUMINT operations. Their main purpose is to synchronize all tactical and national CI
and HUMINT assets in the division’s AO.
2-85. Counter Intelligence Coordination Authority Element. This element provides technical control
and oversight for CI assets in the AO. They deconflict CI activities between other services and OGA.
2-86. Human Intelligence Operations Element. This element provides technical control for all HUMINT
assets in the AO. They deconflict HUMINT collection between military and OGA.
2-87. Language Coordination Element. The Language Coordination element is the focal point to obtain
and orchestrate employment of contract linguists within the division AOs. The division language
coordination element directs the integration of contract linguists into subordinate units. This element
conducts initial training on Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the United States Army and
operational security for all incoming linguists, and fulfills the following tasks:
z Determines all foreign languages (spoken and written) and dialects in which proficiency is
needed across the division to support mission accomplishment.
z Identifies linguist requirements to support intelligence operations and collections.
z Consolidates linguist requirements to eliminate redundancy.
z Recommends linguistic priorities of effort and support to maximize a limited resource.
z Contracts local-hire linguists with English-language abilities to facilitate operations within the
AO and enhance cultural awareness and SU to meet division language requirements.
z Coordinates security investigations of local-hire linguists to support operations security and
force protection.
2-88. Battlefield Weather Element. USAF BW personnel provide required weather support to the main
CP, normally through a force tailored combination of overwatch and in-place liaisons. In conjunction with
the ACE and geospatial information and services (GI&S) team, BW forces integrate weather information
into the IPB.
2-89. Geospatial Information and Services Element. The GI&S element, located in or near the main CP,
supports IPB by producing the combined obstacle and related terrain analysis overlays. It supports the
planning cell with analysis of traffic possibilities, routes, choke points, avenues of approach and obstacles.
The element supports the G-2 collection manager with visible area infiltration routes, landing zones and
drop zones, cover and concealment analysis for positioning intelligence collectors, and developing long-
range surveillance unit target folders. It supports targeting with line-of-sight, mobility, and cover and
concealment studies, and structural information on man-made targets. The element also provides terrain
products to subordinate units on request and is capable of sending a two person terrain visualization
support team to a TAC CP when required.
2-90. ISR Operations Element. This element serves as the intelligence element of the current operations
cell. They conduct interface between the G-2 and G-3 providing intelligence to the operations battle
captain and division COS for use in decision making.
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Current Operations Cell

2-91. The current operations cell provides information on the current status of the division to all staff
members at the main CP. Within the current operations cell, information is exchanged and the activities of
the entire staff are coordinated. From here, the COS provides guidance to the staff and supervises the
activities of all cells in the main CP. The current operations cell displays the COP and conducts shift
change and battle update briefings.
2-92. The current operations cell is multifunctional, composed of representation from maneuver, fires and
effects, the PM, engineers, AMD, aviation and space (see Figure 2-5). The current operations cell of the
main CP normally only monitors the current operation and updates the staff at the main. However, with
augmentation from a TAC it controls operations when a TAC CP is not available.
Figure 2-5. Current Operations Cell at Main CP
2-93. G-3, Operations Element. The G-3 operations element forms the nucleus of the current operations
cell. When required, all staff sections present at the main CP provide representatives to the current
operations cell. The G-3 operations officer has responsibility for the overall function of the current
operations element. The COS assigns tasks to other main CP cells and elements concerning requirements
for their inputs and contributions necessary for the current operations cell to accomplish its functions. The
G-3 operations element—
z Monitors the tactical situation to include the status of friendly forces.
z Maintains information about the current status of the division.
z Receives and assesses information about the tactical situation from the TAC CPs.
z Maintains communication with the TAC CPs, MCG, and subordinate, adjacent, and higher
headquarters.
z Provides current situation information to other CP cells, and to higher, lower, supporting,
supported, and adjacent units.
z Controls tactical operations when a TAC is not available.
z Receives and actions all incoming messages, orders, requests for information, and taskings from
higher headquarters, the TACs, adjacent and subordinate units.
z Provides updates to the Main CP staff reference the current situation during MDMP.
2-94. Fires Element. The fires element is located in the division main, plans the production of effects
resulting from the application of indirect lethal fires and offensive IO. This element synchronizes the
planning of fires and effects, Army indirect fires, joint fires and offensive IO to support the commander’s
intent through physical destruction, information and denial, enemy system collapse, and erosion of enemy
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will. The fires element translates the commander’s intent into tasks to subordinate units and parameters for
automated systems in support of division operations. The fires element conducts mission planning analysis,
COA development, coordinates production of staff estimates, produces the fire support plan, and produces
the fire and effects estimate and annex. The fires element and other members of the targeting team analyzes
enemy COAs and identifies basic high-value targets at the same time. As the staff wargames friendly
COAs, the targeting team develops initial proposals on HPTs and attack guidance. After the commander
selects the final COA and issues further guidance, the targeting team—
z Refines and prioritizes the HPTL.
z Develops the AGM.
z Submits these products to the commander for approval.
2-95. In coordination with the TAC 1 and TAC 2 FE fires elements, it establishes target priorities,
apportions joint and multinational fires, develops HPTs, and when acting as a JTF provides joint force
targeting guidance. In concert with the TAC 1 and TAC 2 fires elements and the ISR Target Development
Element, it produces a targeting collection plan. The fires element does not produce division OPLANs or
OPORDs. Rather, it provides input to the G-5 and its products are incorporated into the fully coordinated
OPLANs and OPORDs produced by G-5. Within the plans section, fires element representatives, and
TACP personnel develop and recommend FSCMs for the commander’s approval as part of the
OPLAN/OPORD development process. The recommendation includes the measures’ location,
establishment duration, movement, and cancellation. These FSCMs may include:
z The division’s recommendation for the FSCL, if used.
z Free fire areas.
z Kill boxes.
z Airspace coordination areas.
z No fire areas.
z Restrictive fire areas.
z Restrictive fire lines.
2-96. Air and Missile Defense Operations Element. Synchronizes and monitors theater and joint,
interagency, and multinational (JIM) AMD elements. This element is the principal AMD member for all
targeting boards and the principal liaison to JIM airspace control authority nodes through virtual networks.
It monitors the Single Integrated Air Picture and AMD defense design based on recommended AMD
priorities. It updates aerial IPB and recommends targets. It battle tracks AMD forces and recommends
changes of mission or support. When a TAC is not available, this element is responsible for current AMD
operations to support the division commander’s concept of the operation. The AMD element provides a
representative to plans, IO, and targeting meetings.
2-97. Engineer Element. This element monitors all mobility and sustainment engineer operations. It
participates in planning meetings and boards and provides reach back to USACE knowledge centers. It
maintains the engineer portion of the running estimate based on current operations. This engineer element
locates in the current operations cell and provides representatives to the other cells as required. The
engineer element provides a representative to plans, IO, and targeting meetings. When division is operating
as a JTF or ARFOR, it coordinates and synchronizes joint and ARFOR engineer operations and
coordinates administrative control and Army support to theater forces, as required.
2-98. Aviation Element. The aviation element monitors all aspects of current operations as pertaining to
the division’s aviation assets. This element maintains the aviation portion of the running estimate
containing the status of all aviation forces assigned to the division. It also provides aviation personnel to
temporary boards or working groups held at the main CP.
2-99. Provost Marshall Element. This element monitors all aspects of MP operations ongoing in the
division AO. It maintains the PM-portion of the running estimate and tracks status of all assigned MP
assets and other force protection assets. It provides personnel to temporary boards or working groups held
at the main CP.
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2-100. Space Support Element. The Space Support Element (SSE) plans and prepares all aspects of
space operations affecting the division, its AOs, and ensures the division an enhanced ability to access and
exploit all available space capabilities. The SSE provides space expertise and situational awareness to the
commander, staff, and subordinate BCTs. This includes the capabilities, limitations and vulnerabilities of
military, civil, commercial, threat and non-aligned space-based assets. The SSE provides a representative
to the plans element to conduct tactical and operational space planning, and in conjunction with the G-2
maintains the space portion of the IPB and order of battle. It prepares the space annex, maintains the space
portion of the running estimate, and provides space force enhancement products and support to the staffs of
the main and TAC CPs, and BCTs. The SSE provides personnel to the IO, targeting and temporary boards
or working groups held in the main CP. The SSE coordinates with SMDC/ARSTRAT for Army space
forces and monitors the status of and global missile warning systems. The SSE is also responsible for
synchronizing space operations and effects with the TACs and establishing a communication link with the
ASCC SSE. When the division operates as a JTF or ARFOR, the SSE establishes direct communication
with USSTRATCOM JFCC Space and Global Strike, the JFACC, NGA and other space related agencies.
Coordinating and Special Staff Cell

2-101. The Coordinating and Special Staff Cell is located in the main CP under the control of the COS
(see Figure 2-6). The staff provides the following functions:
z Advises the commander and other staff elements on all matters pertaining to their areas of
expertise.
z Assists the G-5 Plans in the preparation of plans and orders, and by preparing estimates in their
areas of expertise.
z Makes recommendations to assist in reaching decisions and establishing policies.
z Manages information within their area of expertise.
2-102. G-1, Human Resources Element. This element conducts the majority of human resources staff
planning and coordination actions. The division G-1 and deputy G-1 manage all personnel actions and
functions from this element at the main CP. The G-1 element—
z Integrates personnel service support within the division.
z Directs the military and civilian personnel systems.
z Prepares the personnel estimate.
z Tracks personnel combat power.
z Manages Soldier readiness programs.
z Directs other command programs to include Army substance abuse, equal opportunity, safety,
and morale, welfare, and recreation.
z Manages replacement, casualty, and postal operations.
z Coordinates band activities.
2-103. G-4, Logistics Element. This element conducts the majority of logistical staff planning and
coordination actions. The element is organized into several subsections consisting of a headquarters, a CSS
effects, maintenance, supply, services, and transportation. This element is the primary link between the
division staff and the sustainment brigade supporting the division. The G-4 logistics element —
z Develops the logistic estimate, in support of G-5 (Plans).
z Develops the movement annex and provides input to the service support annex, in support of G-
5 (Plans).
z Develops plans for casualty care, evacuation, medical logistics, and casualty prevention.
z Tracks critical Class VIII items and coordinate deliveries, as required.
z Oversees division tactical SOPs, plans, policies, and procedures for all CSS functions.
z When the division is serving as a JTF, JFLC or ARFOR develops concept of support plans and
policy covering all aspects of joint logistics.
z Accommodates the requirement for TAC 1 and TAC 2 reach back.
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z In coordination with the Army Field Support Brigade, oversees contracting management for the
division.
z Serves as the BCT contracting officers link to the Principal Assistant Responsible for
Contracting.
z Maintains asset and in-transit visibility.
Figure 2-6. Coordinating and Special Staff Cells at the Main CP
2-104. G-6, Net Plans Element. The G-6 element is responsible for all matters concerning Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, and Information Management (C4IM) operations. C4IM operations
include NETOPS and IM. NETOPS include network management, information dissemination
management, and IA. The G-6 may be assisted by a NETOPs officer, IA staff manager, IM coordinator,
and INFOSYS officer to assist in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing C4IM operations. The
C4IM operations element in the main CP—
z Prepares, maintains, and updates the C4IM operations estimates and the C4IM operation portion
of plans and orders in support of the G-5 (Plans).
z Recommends network priorities and locations for division CPs.
z Ensures that redundant communications means are planned and available to pass time-sensitive
critical information.
z Establishes automation systems administration procedures for all automation software and
hardware employed by the division.
z Plans, prepares, and executes all IA activities within the command.
z Plans, prepares, and executes the establishment of information network capabilities and services.
z Coordinates the availability of commercial INFOSYS and services for military use.
z Manages bandwidth, radio frequency allocations and assignments, and provides spectrum
management.
z Provides IA by—
Planning and executing information and system security functions.
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Chapter 2
Ensuring the appointment of an IA security officer in all elements of the force.

Planning, and executing COMSEC measures.
Providing IA direction and guidance to IA security coordinators.
z Develops the CIMP. Establishes procedures for collecting, processing, displaying, storing, and
disseminating data and information within the command.
z Facilitates the staff presentation of RI according to quality criteria of accuracy, timeliness,
usability, completeness, precision, and reliability to develop the COP.
2-105. Engineer Element. The engineer element in the main CP plans and coordinates all engineer
support within the unit’s AO, including mobility, countermobility, and survivability operations. The
engineer element locates in or adjacent to the current operations cell and supports the other cells as
required. This element monitors and makes recommendations on all engineering activities to include
engineering priorities, efforts, and support for current and future operations. Included are the following
functions:
z Integrates assured mobility.
z Integrates environmental considerations.
2-106. PM Element. This element consists of three personnel providing the following functions:
z Advises the division commander and CofS on all matters relating to MP operations.
z Coordinates MP operations with other division staff elements.
z Provides planning and coordination for MP functions and missions.
z Plans tactical and operational MP support for battles and campaigns.
z Plans long term confinement of US prisoners.
z Synchronizes MP operations between CPs.
z Provides guidance and plans for and prepares and executes internment and resettlement
operations.
z Plans detainee operations at the detainee holding area.
z Coordinates forensic lab support.
z Provides law enforcement and criminal investigation data management beyond the database
within the JOA.
z Provides links to joint/interagency/multinational organizations, knowledge centers, industry,
academia and centers of excellence.
z Coordinates transportation for detainees from the BCT initial detainee collection point to the
division detainee holding area to the higher echelon theater interment facility.
z Writes detailed MP annexes, plans, estimates and orders in support of the G-5.
z Provides guidance on nonlethal tactics, weapons, munitions, effects and systems.
z Coordinates MP specific training and material enhancements.
z Provides police intelligence and criminal intelligence analysis and coordination (when
augmented with Code 50 CID CW2).
2-107. G-8 Financial Management Element. This element consists of four personnel led by the division
G-8 and provides the following functions:
z Develops resource requirements.
z Prepares, justifies, reconciles, and manages budgets.
z Identifies, acquires, distributes, and controls funding.
z Tracks, analyzes, and reports budget execution.
z Maintains accounting records and capture costs.
z Establishes a management control process.
z Establishes and manages financial and resource management programs.
z Provides stewardship of resources.
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2-108. G-9/CMO Element. This element consists of personnel from the G-9 CA/CMO staff section
providing the following functions:
z Writes CMO annexes for plans and orders in support of the G-5.
z Reviews OPLANs and concept plans from higher headquarters.
z Directs and supervises the operations of the CA staff section assigned to the division
headquarters.
z Advises the commander and staff on the allocation and employment of CA units assigned or
supporting the division.
z Conducts detailed analysis of civil considerations in close coordination with other key staff
officers.
z Leads the staff in developing and recommending priority civil information requirements (PCIR).
z Synchronizes CMO activities with higher headquarters CMO efforts.
z Requests CA functional specialist augmentation, as required, to plan CMO in support of division
full spectrum operations.
z Establishes a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) to conduct interagency collaborative
planning and coordination accessible to both US Government and non-US Government
agencies.
z Advises the commander and staff on legal and moral obligations to the local population.
z Analyzes civilian impact on military operations and the impact of military operations on
civilians in the AO.
2-109. CBRN Element. The division chemical officer oversees the CBRN element within the main CP.
As the hub of CBRN operations for the division, this element prepares CBRN estimates that address CBRN
attacks as well as local toxic industrial material (TIM) facilities and their unique tactical impacts. The
CBRN element monitors CBRN equipment status and CBRN support to theater forces. The CBRN element
also disseminates contamination overlays and CBRN reports to all units and recommends how to allocate
resources and priorities for CBRN support. This element operates the unit’s CBRN warning and reporting
system and works closely with the fire support cell. The CBRN element locates in or adjacent to the current
operations cell and provides representatives to the plans, targeting, and IO meetings. The CBRN element—
z Prepares and maintains CBRN estimates and the CBRN-portion of plans and orders.
z Monitors and makes recommendations on all CBRN activities, as well as smoke and flame
operations.
z Receives and issues CBRN warnings and reports.
z Monitors the location and status of chemical units and assets within the AO.
z Conducts vulnerability assessments of friendly forces.
z Assists the G-2 in identifying CBRN intelligence requirements.
z Evaluates significant TIM facilities in the AO and estimates the effects of accidental or
purposeful TIM releases.
z In conjunction with the fire support cell, advises on employing nuclear weapons maintained by
the other services and the effects from employing those weapons.
z Coordinates and disseminates strike warnings with the fire support cell.
z Creates, if necessary, NBC-3 reports on friendly strikes against WMD facilities and on strikes
due to releases-other-than-attack.
z Supports planning for sensitive site exploitations.
2-110. Surgeon Element. The division surgeon plan, prepares, and oversees the execution of all medical
related activities from the main CP. This element’s functions include the following:
z Advises the commander on health status of the division.
z Provides the FHP estimate, patient estimates, and medical threat input for the commander’s
estimate.
z Prepares the FHP annex for all division plans. (For FHP planning factors, see FM 8-55.)
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z Provides reach back capability for the forward deployed surgeons in the TAC CPs.
z Reviews all OPLANS to identify potential medical hazards associated with geographical
locations and climatic conditions.
z Monitors and coordinates all FHP operations.
z Manages the division medical troop basis in conjunction with the G-1.
z Oversees all medical logistics operations for the division.
z Provides the G-4 (logistics element) a list of medical items that should be a part of the Battle
Command Sustainment and Support System commander’s tracked items list.
z Supervises the technical training of medical personnel and combat lifesavers in the division, as
required.
z Monitors and coordinates preventive medicine operations to identify potential medical threats.
z Monitors the health of the command and advises the commander of preventive medicine
measures to counter disease, nonbattle injuries, and other medical threats.
z Provides technical advice of occupational, environmental health, and medical surveillances,
sanitary inspection, and potential CBRN contamination.
z Ensures that clear and accurate patient records are maintained of all clinical encounters for
supported deployed personnel through the use of a DA Form 8007R or through the use of
electronic patient records.
z Determines procedures, techniques, and limitation in the conduct of routine medical care,
emergency medical treatment and advanced trauma management.
z Advises on the health effects of CBRN devices/weapons to include operational exposure
guidance.
2-111. PA Element. The PA element is normally located in the headquarters element of the main CP in
order to facilitate direct access to the commander. The PA element conducts and executes all PA core
processes—advising the commander/staff, and executing PA planning, information strategies, media
facilitation, PA training, and community relations. The PA element is augmented by a Mobile Public
Affairs Detachment (MPAD) to establish and operate media operations centers (MOCs), to include ad hoc
MOCs. The PA element is also augmented with a Public Affairs Detachment that allows the PAO to
establish PAO sections in TACs 1 and 2. The PA element requires the organic capability to communicate
within the division and with higher headquarters and subordinate units via secure and non-secure tactical
voice and data. The PAO also requires a 24/7 news feed, video conferencing, international commercial
voice and real-time COP organic capabilities. The PA element—
z Conducts future and current PA planning and analysis for the commander and staff.
z Monitors the Global Information Environment/Military Information Environment for pass-back
to higher headquarters and impact on division and subordinate units.
z Monitors/coordinates DOD media, media embeds, and national, international, and local
unilateral media requirements.
z Provides PA support to the division G-9 CMO, for the development and implementation of CA
programs.
z Provides PA coordination and support to the IO element.
z When augmented by a MPAD, establishes a MOC and controls MPAD operations.
z When augmented by a MPAD, establishes a PA element in TAC 1 and TAC 2; provides C2 of
MPAD.
z Coordinates and executes media, community relations, and command information requirements
and requests within division.
z Monitors TAC 1 and TAC 2 support of DOD, DA, higher headquarters PA guidance and
polices.
z Conducts press briefings and SME media training.
z Monitors and coordinates PA operations of attached and subordinate units.
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z Conducts security review of PA products.

z Plans and executes command information radio and TV requirements; provides limited
print/radio/TV production ability.
2-112. Division operations are subject to instant coverage by the media and close observation by the
American public and international audiences. External and internal PA strategies determine policy
decisions that profoundly influence external public support and impact the behavior of Soldiers and other
audiences within the division’s AO.
2-113. IG Element. The division IG operates from the main CP. This element conducts inspections,
provides assistance, and conducts investigations.
2-114. SJA Element. The division SJA and deputy SJA operate from the main CP. This element provides
the majority of SJA functions for the division to include the following:
z Legal advice to the command and staff on all aspects of operational law.
z Advise on all administrative actions and investigations.
z Advise on fiscal law, seizure, requisition, confiscation, purchase and lease of property.
z Support commander’s exercise of General Court-Martial Convening Authority by conducting
courts-martial and advising the commander on the disposition of criminal misconduct.
z Advise on the treatment of detainees, EPWs, noncombatants and refugees.
z Liaison with the International Red Cross.
z Conduct Article V tribunals as required by the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
z Provide advice on ROE, law of war, lawfulness of targets, and investigation and disposition of
alleged violations of the law of war.
z Execute foreign claims program for the command.
z Provide emergency legal assistance to deployed personnel.
z Advise on legal aspects of civil affairs (CA), CMO, interagency and multinational support, and
assists in liaison with NGOs, private voluntary organizations, and international organizations.
z Provide technical supervision of the brigade’s operational law teams.
2-115. Chaplain Element. The division chaplain and deputy chaplain operate from the main CP. The
chaplain element provides the following functions:
z Advice on all matters affected by religion and the impact on military operations.
z Advice to the commander, staff, fire support cell and plans team on impact of indigenous
religions on operations.
z Advice on ethics, moral, and morale as affected by religion.
z Plan, prepare, and oversee execution of religious support in the AO.
z Develop and maintain the religious support staff estimate.
z Write religious support annexes for plans and orders in support of the G-5.
z Synchronize religious support plans between CPs and with higher and subordinate religious
support teams.
z Provide liaison with indigenous religious leaders and religious affiliated NGOs and international
organizations.
z Provide personal delivery of religious support services, pastoral care, and counseling to the
headquarters and STB.
2-116. United States Air Force Elements. USAF TACPs are provided to Army maneuver unit
headquarters from battalion through Corps. TACPs advise the command and staff on the capabilities,
limitations, and employment of air power. The division ALO commands all USAF personnel within the
division and is the air component commander's direct liaison to the division commander. The TACPs are a
point-of-contact to coordinate preplanned and immediate air requests and to assist in coordinating air
support missions. The division main CP ALO and TACP are located in or adjacent to the fires element.
USAF personnel at the division main CP may include, four Master Attack Air Planners, an AI coordinator
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Chapter 2
(co-located with the ASOC), an ISR officer, an IO officer, and two Air Mobility Liaison Officers (AMLO).
The AMLO is the primary advisor on using airlift resources and is specifically designed and trained to
control airlift assets in support of ground troops and operate the airlift advance notification and
coordination net. All USAF personnel supporting the division have a direct support relationship to the
division and remain under USAF command. Many of these personnel will come from the Air Support
Operations Squadron aligned to support the division however; some of these personnel may come for other
USAF organizations and may not have previously conducted training with the division.

2-117. The STB task organizes support elements to each CP. The STB provides all administrative
support, life support, communications, transportation, and security for the division CPs and MCG. The
STB is commanded by a lieutenant colonel with a complete battalion staff. The STB is organized into three
companies with distinct missions: a headquarters company, a network support company and a security
company. When the division is assigned a band, it is assigned to the STB. (See Figure 2-7.)
2-118. The STB headquarters company contains the STB staff with an S-2/S-3 section, an S-1/S-4
section, a battalion maintenance section, and a chaplain. The headquarters company has a support platoon
with a field feeding section, a transportation section, a medical section, and a maintenance section. These
sections are subdivided to support the division’s main CP, TAC 1, and TAC 2 (see Figure 2-8).
Figure 2-7 Special Troops Battalion organization
2-119. The STB commander or his designated representative assists the COS with the daily functions of
the main CP. The STB commander will ensure the following functions are performed:
z Provide life support, security, vehicle maintenance, field feeding, transportation, supply, and
medical support.
z General maintenance and upkeep of facilities.
z C2 of the band.
z Special duties as assigned by the COS.
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Figure 2-8. Division STB Headquarters Company organization
STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES
2-120. FM 6-0, Appendix D, details staff responsibilities and remains valid with a few changes. The G-5
has changed from the CMO officer to the plans officer. The CMO officer is now the G-9. The G-8 is the
staff officer responsible for financial management. He replaces the finance staff officer position in the
previous division structure.
2-121. The coordinating staff officers G-1 (Personnel), G-2 (Intelligence), G-3 (Operations), G-4
(Logistics), G-6 (C4 Operations), and G-7 (IO) have not changed. Their responsibilities and duties remain
generally the same. What has changed is the focus of the division staff. The primary staff officers have the
responsibility to manage the manning, training, equipping and professional development of the Soldiers
and officers in their fields of expertise. With the removal of the military intelligence, signal, and air
defense battalions the G-2, G-6 and air defense officer are now the senior branch representatives. Their
role as the senior officer is greatly expanded in terms of their overall supervision, professional
development plan, slating and guidance for all Soldiers in their particular field of expertise. All staff
officers have the responsibility for knowledge management. The advanced digital C2 systems in use today
can increase staff proficiency but only if information is disseminated to those who need to know. Part of
the solution is following the CIMP which the G-6 has responsibility for technical execution but the plan
itself is the responsibility of the G-3 and COS.
2-122. Previously the division staff synchronized brigade operations for the purpose of fighting
engagements. The modular division design calls for the BCTs to fight the engagements and battles and for
the division staff to focus on synchronizing major operations at the operational and higher tactical levels.
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Chapter 2
2-123. The major change for the G-2 is that the division does not have a military intelligence battalion
organic as division troops. The G-2 relies on higher resources and the division’s brigades to collect
information. The G-2 sets priorities for collection and tells the brigades what information to collect inside
their AOs. He does not manage the brigade’s collection assets. The G-2 has a special relationship with the
BFSB commander who is responsible for collecting information in the division’s area unassigned. The
BFSB is the G-2’s principle resource for information in the division’s deep area. Another change is that the
G-2 now owns the analysis and control element to process all information into usable intelligence.
2-124. The division G-3 remains the principle staff officer for all matters concerning operations, training,
force development and modernization. The G-3 is no longer responsible for planning which has been
transferred to the G-5. The G-3 synchronizes the operations of the entire division. He coordinates closely
with the G-2, G-5, G-7 and G-9 to ensure synchronization. The G-3 also maintains coordinating staff
responsibility for several special staff officers listed below:
z AMD coordinator.
z Aviation officer.
z CBRN officer.
z Engineer coordinator.
z EOD officer.
z Fire support coordinator.
z LNOs.
z USMC liaison team commander.
z PM.
z Safety officer.
z Special operations coordinator.
z Space operations officer.
z AMLO.
z A2C2 officer.
z ALO.
2-125. The division G-3 normally operates at the TAC CP that is responsible for controlling current
operations and the deputy G-3 operates from the other TAC. If both TACs are employed and controlling
forces, one TAC CP is always in charge of synchronizing division wide operations and that is where the G-
3 operates. All staff officers must ensure their functional area specific operations are coordinated through
the G-3 to ensure synchronization with the division’s operations.
2-126. The division staff supports the division commander and supports the brigade commanders and
their staffs. When a brigade sends a request for information to the division and that request is a brigade
commander’s CCIR, then the division staff treats the request just like a division CCIR unless instructed
differently by the division commander.
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PART TWO
How the Division Fights

This part of the manual uses a fictional scenario as a discussion vehicle for
illustrating one of many ways that a division might conduct decisive, shaping, and
sustaining operations as part of its full-spectrum operations within a unified action
scenario. It is not intended to be prescriptive of how the division should conduct any
particular operation. The scenario focuses on potential challenges confronting the
division commander in accomplishing his mission using modular forces.
Chapter 3
Scenario and Concept of Operations
SECTION I – SCENARIO
3-1. The region used in this scenario has significant international importance in the year 2008. Its
emergence from its former status as an international backwater is primarily due to the discovery of
significant petroleum reserves in the BLUE Sea and the countries surrounding that body of water. The
newfound energy reserves have attracted extensive investment, primarily European, bringing with it the
trappings of western culture. With this influx of international investments, the ports and resources of the
region have extensively expanded to become major commercial centers for oil and other products moving
from Asia to Europe and vice versa.
ROAD TO WAR
3-2. GREENLAND is a multicultural federal republic recently formed from three largely ethnically based
states between the BLUE and WHITE seas. See Figure 3-1. The GREENLAND government, since its
founding, has sought foreign investments to develop its economic infrastructure and exploit the natural
resources of the area for the benefit of the GREENLAND people. The political leadership of
GREENLAND has largely accepted the western social mores and practices that accompany major western
financial investments.
3-3. REDLAND is a xenophobic theocracy bordering GREENLAND on the southeast. REDLAND
shares an ethnic minority, the Atropians, with GREENLAND and historically dominated that portion of
GREENLAND containing the majority of GREENLAND’s Atropians, until the entire region’s forcible
annexation into the then expansionist BROWNLAND in the late 1800s. (See the cross-hatched area of
GREENLAND on Figure 3-1.) After the breakup of BROWNLAND in the late 1900s, the Atropians had
their own country until the recent regional plebiscite authorized the founding of GREENLAND.
REDLAND’s senior religious leadership has redemptionist’s goals to incorporate all historical Atropian
lands into a greater REDLAND. The religious leadership’s analysis is that the economic benefits of
incorporating the Atropian region of GREENLAND will serve to jump start their economy currently
suffering from a large and growing underemployed class and economic isolation resulting from their
refusal to follow international trading norms. This will ensure that they are able to retain their hold on
power.
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Chapter 3
BROWNLAND
BLUE SEA
WHITE
SEA
GREENLAND
YELLOWLAND
REDLAND
Figure 3-1. General situation
ENEMY SITUATION
3-4. The REDLAND armed forces consist of five services: Army, Air Force (including national-level Air
Defense Forces), Navy, Strategic Forces, and Internal Security Forces. The Army totals two tank, one
mechanized infantry, six motorized infantry, and one infantry divisions. Prior to combat, these divisions
would normally be task organized into division tactical groups (DTGs) tailored for specific missions. In
this process, the original division headquarters may receive additional units allocated from echelons above
division or reallocated from other divisions. A similar process occurs in the task organization of some
brigades into brigade tactical groups (BTGs), although some brigades could fight in their original structure.
These divisions are supported by one separate mechanized infantry brigade, one separate motorized
infantry brigade, two combat helicopter brigades, five surface-to-surface missile (SSM) brigades, one
coastal defense, and two engineer brigades. The REDLAND Army also contains a special-purpose brigade
well suited for working with affiliated insurgents and terrorists. This brigade can also conduct
reconnaissance, sabotage, or other direct action missions. The infantry division and coastal defense brigade
at a minimum constitute REDLAND’s strategic reserve.
3-5. The REDLAND Air Force contains a mix of obsolete BROWNLAND- and Western-developed
fighter, bomber, transport, and command and control aircraft. The Air Force also includes national-level
Air Defense Forces, which supports a national strategic air defense system around population centers. The
Air Defense Forces consist of regional air defense centers, radars, and firing batteries with a mixes of
BROWNLAND and western systems.
3-6. The Navy has four corvettes, twenty-one missile craft, a hundred plus remote-controlled fast attack
craft. The Navy also has several hundred contact- and magnetically-fused moored and floating mines
available to defend REDLAND territory along the BLUE Sea.
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3-7. REDLAND’s Strategic Forces have 20 to 30 theater ballistic missiles organized into a strategic-level
SSM brigade. These are in addition to shorter-range SSMs that belong to the Army.
3-8. The REDLAND Internal Security Forces comprise a variety of police and paramilitary organizations
located throughout the country. They have the mission of backing up local police, providing emergency
services, border control, and riot control. Elite elements of the Internal Security Forces are responsible for
regime security and counterintelligence operations within the country. Units of the Internal Security Forces
can be allocated to a DTG or BTG to assist in controlling occupied territory. Alternatively they can operate
separately from military commands within REDLAND or on its land and sea borders. REDLAND also has
a militia consisting of platoon- and company-size forces in rural population areas backed up by battalion
and brigade size forces based in mid- and large-size cities. The level of training and equipment of these
forces vary widely from place to place. The militia can conduct internal security missions if Internal
Security Forces are not available but do not have the organic sustainment capability to operate far from
their garrison locations.
3-9. REDLAND is suspected of constituting a WMD capability as a wedge against U.S. action.
REDLAND leadership converted existing “dual use” facilities to permit the manufacture of fertilizers and
genetically enhanced agricultural products as well as chemical and biological agents. Its most dangerous
threat is a suspected stockpile of low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons derived from former BROWNLAND
stocks that they were able to acquire through criminal connections and the reprocessing of nuclear power
plant fuel. While these weapons have limited utility and reliability, they pose a significant threat against
population centers within or external to the region. They can be delivered by a variety of conventional air
and missile platforms or in an unconventional manner, such as being smuggled into a country within an
ISO container.
3-10. REDLAND is actively sponsoring an internal insurgency within GREENLAND. That insurgency
feeds off the concerns of a certain segment of the population concerned with GREENLAND’s current
social, religious, political, and economic direction. The insurgency has political and military wings, with
the military wing containing both local and main force elements. This insurgency is largely based in the
rural areas of GREENLAND.
3-11. Terrorist training camps are an additional factor in this region. International terrorist organizations,
driven from other portions of the globe, gravitated toward the GREENLAND-REDLAND border area
where they can establish training and operating bases under the covert sponsorship of REDLAND
theologians. These expanded training camps have become the number one area for groups preparing and
executing strikes against the U.S and Europe. Local tribal elders are willing to tolerate the presence of
terrorist groups who cultivate their relationships with those local leaders through intermarriage and
financial incentives.
3-12. REDLAND is currently actively threatening to use force to “unite” all ethnically Atropian territory
into a greater REDLAND. In the last month it has greatly increased the amount of support being provided
to both the GREENLAND insurgent movement and terrorist organizations operating along the border
region, and taken steps to increase the readiness of its armed forces to include the call-up of reservists,
conduct of large and small scale training exercises, and moving supplies to locations that could support
offensive action into GREENLAND.
3-13. During the above mentioned training exercises and preparations for operations in GREENLAND,
REDLAND appears to have task organized its armed forces into three operational-strategic commands
(OSCs) and a strategic reserve. The overall goal of REDLAND’s strategic campaign seems to be to occupy
the ethnic-Atropian part of GREENLAND and to secure the mountain passes near the GREENLAND
capital city THEB’SOL in order to prevent GREENLAND and/or coalition forces from maneuvering into
the occupied territory. OSC North (consisting of the 20th and 52nd Division Tactical Groups [DTGs], two
SSM brigades, one combat helicopter brigade, and one engineer brigade) has the mission to seize and then
defend the major mountain pass northeast of THEB’SOL. OSC South (consisting of the 10th, 26th, 51st, and
53rd DTGs, three SSM brigades, one combat helicopter brigade, and one engineer brigade) has the mission
to seize and then defend the major mountain pass southwest of THEB’SOL and controlling Highway 1
(including key road junctions and bridges near KILLEAN) and the mountainous area south of that highway
(including the LUSK RESERVOIR). OSC South’s mission also includes securing the key road junction
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Chapter 3
near THEB’SOL. OSC East (consisting of the 73rd and 77th DTGs, and the 98th Separate Motorized
Infantry Brigade Tactical Group, plus naval forces in the BLUE SEA) has the mission of controlling
occupied territory farther to the eat (including the cities of DIVKOVIC and KORNATI and the coastline).
Two other DTGs (90th and 54th) located within REDLAND may be REDLAND’s strategic reserve,
possibly with a mission of homeland defense.
FRIENDLY SITUATION
3-14. The United States has long had friendly relationships with the three countries that federated to form
GREENLAND and that relationship continues. The United States has an advisory group co-located with
the GREENLAND Ministry of Defense and a mix of uniformed military, DOD civilian, and contractor
personnel providing training and logistical support to the GREENLAND armed forces. Additionally, US
SOF regularly conduct training exercises with GREENLAND forces. US SOF on occasion, with the
permission of the GREENLAND political leadership, also conduct counterterrorism operations against
selected targets in GREENLAND as part of the Global War on Terrorism.
3-15. As part of flexible deterrent operations designed to deter REDLAND aggression against
GREENLAND, the secretary of defense authorized the EUCOM commander to deploy theater opening,
communications, and protection assets into GREENLAND. The Department of State participates in unified
action by assisting the EUCOM staff in obtaining necessary transit, overflight, and landing rights for US
forces to include the movement of maritime assets into the WHITE Sea.
3-16. Lastly, the situation in GREENLAND is not the only crisis situation facing the United States. The
Pacific region is also experiencing significant tensions that preclude the United States from strictly
focusing its military forces on GREENLAND. Much air and maritime combat power is being held in
reserve to respond to political and military developments in the Pacific.
JTF TASK ORGANIZATION, MISSION, COMMANDER’S INTENT,

AND CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION
3-17. This is a major operation so the EUCOM regional combatant commander (RCC) will be the joint
force commander. The RCC designates three of his service component commands, USAREUR, USAFE,
and USNAVEUR to act as functional commands (JFLC, JFAC, and JFMC respectively). MARFOREUR
continues to provide ADCON to Marine forces employed during this operation, but OPCON of those
forces belongs to the functional commands. SOCEUR has OPCON of the command’s special operations
forces.
EUCOM MISSION
3-18. The EUCOM mission is to deploy forces to the GREENLAND Theater of Operations and take
actions to deter and, on order, defend GREENLAND territory against a REDLAND attack; and, as
required, conduct offensive operations to restore the pre-conflict international borders.
EUCOM COMMANDER’S INTENT

3-19. We will deploy forces to support GREENLAND in the defense of their territory. As soon as
possible, our initial deployment will be followed by the positioning of United States’ ground combat forces
forward into GREENLAND with the capability to directly confront hostile actions by REDLAND to send
a clear signal of US resolve. End state has the REDLAND forces within GREENLAND destroyed,
captured or expelled, the international border restored, and EUCOM forces conducting post-conflict
stability operations within the JOA.
EUCOM CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

3-20. Priority for deployment is command and control, intelligence, counter-air, maritime forces to secure
sea lines of communication, and JRSOI capabilities that will facilitate a rapid build-up of forces in the
3-4 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

JOA. SOF forces will deploy to perform counterinsurgency training to GREENLAND armed forces. They
will also perform strategic reconnaissance in support of future EUCOM operations. Ground combat forces
will combine with friendly nation military forces to create a force with the capability to defeat any
REDLAND invasion. They will attack to drive the enemy from GREENLAND territory while
simultaneously rendering them incapable of continued offensive hostile action.
3-21. EUCOM and multinational forces will conduct operations in four phases: (1) deter REDLAND
aggression into GREENLAND, (2) deploy forces, (3) conduct decisive operations to defeat REDLAND
forces and restore the international border, and (4) conduct post-hostility and redeployment operations.
XXXX
C/JFLC
XX XX
XX
++ ++ ++ ++ ++
1 38 XX 21 TSC 5 32 46 MP
2
62 XX
X X X X
X X
2 X
67 4 SUST
X 48 108 11
92 MP
X
5 X GN X
27 SUST 49 X X
10 X X
146 SUST 50 93 MP
X 11 X 292 SUST
(I/R)
87 X 12 X X X
173 277 X
56 X 103 MP
X 66 MI
108
(CID)
2
X X
X
28 34 X 75 X X X
68 X
X 212 555 501 CA
5 102
Figure 3-2. C/JFLC initial task organization
C/JFLC TASK ORGANIZATION, MISSION, COMMANDER'S INTENT

3-22. The C/JFLC is organized around the 7th Army headquarters. The ground forces envisioned for
employment, once deployment is complete, include GREENLAND’s field forces—three traditional
divisions with support slice; a MEB; and seven US Army BCTs under the control of two US Army division
headquarters with appropriate slice elements. Figure 3-2 depicts the brigade and larger sized organizations
assigned or OPCON to the C/JFLC.
C/JFLC MISSION
3-23. When directed, the C/JFLC deploys forces into GREENLAND as part of flexible deterrent
operations. On order it defends GREENLAND territory to defeat any REDLAND attack. On order, it
conducts offensive operations to restore the pre-conflict international borders of GREENLAND and
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 3-5

Chapter 3
REDLAND and assists GREENLAND civil authorities in the alleviation of the conditions threatening the
continuance of a democratic and free GREENLAND federation.
C/JFLC COMMANDER’S INTENT

3-24. The purpose of the operation is to preserve or restore the territorial and political integrity of
GREENLAND. If REDLAND attacks, we will defend to retain as much territory as possible without
risking the destruction of defending land forces while retaining the use of available S/APODs. As soon as
possible, we will attack to restore GREENLAND’s control of its territory.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-25. A proper understanding of the operational environment in any region requires far more information
than is provided in this chapter. The only information contained in this section applies directly to the
conduct of the manual’s vignettes.
TERRAIN
3-26. The vast majority of the terrain within GREENLAND consists of two roughly parallel mountain
ridges. (Figure 3-3 depicts the major movement corridors from REDLAND and from friendly A/SPODs.)
These two parallel mountain ranges are split by the ALBA RIVER. The ALBA is a major river with few
fording sites except on its upper reaches near the GREENLAND capital city of THEB’SOL.
What does it mean?

- Terrain supports the defense
- Surprise will be difficult to achieve
- Movement is easy to detect
KRIZANIC
- Short rapid movements
- Long halts
GREENLAND
KACZMARCZYK
THEB’SOL
GAZI Hig DIVKOVIC

hw
CRITES ay KILLEAN Alba
1 Rive
r
Lusk
Reservoir KORNATI
Terrain Effects: ANHIER
Restrictive Terrain
Few Lines of Communication
Natural Obstacles - Rivers
Excellent Observation BIRYAN
Limited Cover/Concealment
Excellent Fields of Fire
REDLAND
Figure 3-3. Major movement corridors
3-6 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

3-27. The vegetation across the GREENLAND’s northern and southern valley slopes differ considerably,
but nature of ground above that, towards the snowline, is much the same and typically alpine. Northern
valley slopes and lower levels contain deciduous forests. Above 1500m forests become coniferous with
variable belts of mixed deciduous softwood trees. From 1800 to 2500m open alpine meadows are found.
On the southern side of the range, at the 1200-1500m altitude, great forests of beech can be found. The
area also includes mixed and coniferous forests of fir and aspen. High pastures for grazing animals lie
above these forests.
3-28. The WHITE Sea is GREENLAND’s window to the world as a whole since the BLUE Sea is totally
landlocked. YELLOWLAND AND BROWNLAND both have railroad connections to GREENLAND.
However, BROWNLAND’s railroad uses a non-standard broad gauge for its railroads which inhibits the
transfer of goods and services between the two countries.
3-29. Highway 1 takes advantage of the natural east-west movement corridor within GREENLAND to
bind the countries economic system together. Highway 1 exits the narrow mountain passes west of
THEB’SOL into the broad ALBA river valley. In recent years the GREENLAND government and the
federation’s previous governments have spent a great deal of money and other resources with the help of
GERMAN civil engineering firms to make it a hard surface, four-lane divided highway.
3-30. The LUSK RESERVOIR has three primary functions. It is the major source of hydroelectric power
for GREENLAND. The reservoir is the major source of water for use in irrigation for the agricultural
sector in the eastern half of the country. Lastly, it evens out the seasonal flow of water in the ALBA
RIVER to prevent the flooding of downstream communities.
WEATHER
3-31. The main peculiarities of the GREENLAND region are related to the altitude zoning and exposition
of the mountain systems to the prevailing western direction of winds. These winds reduce the utility of any
REDLAND chemical, biological, or radiological weapons because the agents will tend to be blown back
toward REDLAND forces.
3-32. Below 2000m winter lasts from December to February. Above that altitude it lasts from October to
April. Daytime temperatures on the lower slopes remain at about -2 degrees to -5 degrees C, and higher up,
-6 degrees to -16 degrees C; at night, -7 degrees to -10 degrees and -10 degrees to -21 degrees C,
respectively. Snowfall is abundant and snow storms are frequent in the high mountains. Trafficability of all
but cleared roads is limited and cross-country mobility is highly restricted. In winter snows may be up to 3-
meters deep in the valleys. Cloud cover marks half the winter season and severely restricts the utility of air
support.
3-33. Summers are cool and isolated fog banks frequently occur. These fog banks also restrict the utility of
air support. In valley areas summer lasts from May to September with temperatures of from 16 degrees to
20 degrees C. These high temperatures coupled with the altitude severely impact the carrying capability of
cargo helicopters. Nights are cold, sometimes with frost. Precipitation is mostly in the form of brief heavy
showers, sometimes with thunder storms.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
3-34. Military commanders take into account the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, peoples, and
events (ASCOPE) indigenous to their areas of operations. GREENLAND political leaders have mixed
support for the changes taking place within their country and the pace at which those changes are taking
place. However, they are fully supportive of coalition military efforts to expel REDLAND military units
from GREENLAND. The US and its coalition partners enjoy full domestic political support for the
coalition’s military actions largely because its actions are internally and internationally perceived as a just
response to unprovoked aggression by REDLAND. At this time most national and international media are
supportive of coalition goals and objectives. UN and European community support for military action is
uncertain because of the economic ties of individual countries to REDLAND. International
BROWNLAND political leaders see continued ethnic tensions in the GREENLAND and surrounding
countries as favoring its economic interests. YELLOWLAND civic leaders believe that the economic
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 3-7

Chapter 3
development of GREENLAND is in YELLOWLAND’s best long term interests. However,

YELLOWLAND has its own disgruntled ethnic minority which precludes it from having a military role in
developments in GREENLAND.
3-35. From the cultural perspective over the centuries many different ethnic groups invaded or migrated
into this area endowing GREENLAND with its unfathomable ethnic and linguistic complexity. Even today
more than 40 languages are still spoken by the ethnic groups within GREENLAND and its surrounding
countries. This diversity, and persistence, of languages is best explained by geography, but also by
societies whose loyalties are to clan and family as much as to nation. The dips and depressions of the
region’s mountain chains created near-isolated communities, with relatively little contact between them
even today. Most of these isolated societies have a high degree of ethnocentrism. Societal openness and
legal penalties for violations of cultural, legal, or religious norms almost varies inversely with the distance
of the each population hub from the major cities and major ground lines of communications. Western
culture has only been superficially adopted by the GREENLAND elites. Basic western concepts, such as
democracy, equality, and rule of law have not yet taken extensive hold in the minds of the civilian
population outside the major cities. Only minor adjustments to take into account local cultural variances
will need to be made by most mid-career NCOs and officers because of their prior experiences in similar
tribal cultures in IRAQ. Junior soldiers and officers on their initial deployments will need cultural
awareness training.
3-36. The religious structure of GREENLAND is heterogeneous as well. Most civilians are followers of
Islam. The Atropians in eastern GREENLAND are Shi’a Muslims. Christianity is represented
predominately by the different Orthodox Church sects with scattered Catholic and Protestant groups and is
largely confined to western GREENLAND. There are also small numbers of other religions traditions like
Judaism, Yezid, Krishnaism, and Bahaism scattered throughout the country. Most Suni Muslims within
GREENLAND are not inclined to impose their religious views on outsiders although scattered clerics are
more militant.
3-37. The internal economy of GREENLAND largely based of agriculture although its exports are
dominated by petroleum products. Its annual GDP is less than $50 billion. It is highly self-sufficient for
basic goods and services but is almost totally dependent on international imports in high-tech finished
goods, machine tools, and technical expertise. Its transportation infrastructure is overdeveloped for its
current needs because the basic infrastructure was developed in anticipation of significant future growth.
Second wave industrial development is responsible for less than 20% of the nation’s GDP. Many of
GREENLAND’s industrial sites contain significant quantities of toxic-industrial materials. Electrical
production capabilities exceeds the demand although electrical distribution systems are largely limited to
towns and cities and do not extend into rural areas. Telecommunications infrastructure between
GREENLAND towns and cities is a mixture of microwave and fiber-optic cable.
3-38. By international standards GREENLAND has a small population with less than 25,000,000 people.
Recently the rate of population growth has increase to a rate of almost 2% as western medical care
becomes more available. The general educational level of the GREENLAND population is poor with less
than 60% of its citizens receiving a high school or technical education. The life expectancy of
GREENLAND citizens is less 60 years. At the start of this scenario refugees fleeing REDLAND forces
have a significant impact on military operations by severely congesting the major east-west roads and
occupying potential tactical assembly areas. (This congestion gradually reduces throughout the scenario as
the refugees are placed into camps operated by the GREENLAND government and various international
and private volunteer organizations.)
3-39. Prior to its invasion by REDLAND, the GREENLAND military was very small and consisted of less
than 200,000 soldiers, airmen, and sailors. GREENLAND had only a limited armaments production
capacity largely limited to small arms and small-caliber munitions.
3-8 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

SECTION II – DIVISION CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
MISSION
3-40. 1st Division deploys, conducts RSOI, and defends its assigned AO to prevent further REDLAND
advances into GREENLAND with the no penetration line being PL DARLING. On order, it attacks to
destroy REDLAND forces and affiliated insurgents and terrorist groups within its AO out to the limit of
advance (PL HARRIS) to force the withdrawal of occupying enemy forces. Simultaneously the division
conducts stability operations designed to ensure civil security, alleviate human suffering, maintain or
restore GREENLAND civil control and essential services in order to create a viable civil society and
prevent insurgent or terrorist recruitment of the civilian population.
COMMANDER'S INTENT
3-41. The purpose of this operation is to return control of the land, people and resources in country to the
internationally recognized government of GREENLAND by destroying or forcing the withdrawal of
REDLAND’s occupying forces and affiliated insurgents and terrorist groups. The desired end state is a
secure and stable GREENLAND to include the restoration of essential services.
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
3-42. This operation will be conducted in four phases. Key tasks include:
z Rapid deployment of divisional forces and attachments sequenced first for defensive operations,
followed by the deployment of forces capable of offensive operations and a minimum level of
stability operations.
z Maximize the use of joint fires and limited attacks during the defense to reduce those portions of
the REDLAND 10th Tank and 51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Groups that are located
in our AO to less than 50-percent effectiveness before offensive operations begin.
z Conduct stability operations simultaneously with division offensive and defensive operations.
These stability operations encompass a myriad of subordinate tasks designed to enable the
GREENLAND government to provide civil security, establish civil control, and restore essential
services in order to reinstate a viable civil society within GREENLAND borders. These
subordinate tasks include, but are not limited to—providing humanitarian assistance to the
civilian population within the division’s AO, preventing the unnecessarily destruction of civilian
infrastructure, training and logistically supporting local GREENLAND security forces, and
restoring essential public services disrupted by combat operations. This will be the predominate
task after the division achieves its combat objective.
z Seize OBJECTIVE DIANA, the road junctions and bridges located north and east of KILLEAN
to isolate the REDLAND 20th Tank and 52nd Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Groups
currently trying to secure the major mountain pass northwest of THEB’SOL that leads into the
ALBA RIVER valley.
z Destroy those parts of the REDLAND 10th Tank, 51st Motorized Infantry, and 26th Mechanized
Infantry Division Tactical Groups located in our AO up to the limit of advance (PL HARRIS).
z Establish defensive positions along international boarder to prevent REDLAND forces from
invading or providing support to insurgents.
PHASE I – DEPLOYMENT (THIS PHASE IS CURRENTLY ONGOING AND ENDS APPROXIMATELY C+65 WHEN ALL
DIVISIONAL FORCES ARE SCHEDULED TO CLOSE THEIR TAAS.)
3-43. The main effort for this phase is the deployment of the 1st deployment package. This package
contains the necessary command and control and maneuver and logistical capabilities for the division to
conduct initial defensive operations and conduct shaping operations focused on setting conditions for civil
security and the restoration of essential public services within the division AO.
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Chapter 3
3-44. The division’s shaping operations, those actions with respect to the enemy that facilitate the division
deployment, will mostly be conducted by C/JFLC assets. This includes creating an integrated air defense
systems and developing the ISR pictures within the theater of operations. Insurgent or terrorist groups
encountered during deployment will be attrited within unit capabilities and their locations reported to the
joint security area coordinator for later resolution in accordance with the joint security area plans. The
division—in coordination with host nation authorities—will commit up to one battalion task force to
augment GREENLAND authorities conducting area security operations designed to secure civilian
population centers from insurgent and terrorist attacks. The division will assist GREENLAND authorities
to immediately restore disrupted essential public services
3-45. Sustaining operations are conducted by the home installations and later deploying units of the
division that conduct deployment related tasks to assist the first deployment package in rapidly moving
from fort-to-port and loading national transportation assets. The C/JFLC also conducts shaping operations
by providing assets to conduct the RSOI of incoming forces. Once the 27th Sustainment Brigade and 44th
Medical Brigade assets arrive in theater and complete their own RSOI, they assume control of the
division’s sustaining and FHP operations.
PHASE II – DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS (THIS PHASE BEGINS ON ARRIVAL AND RSOI OF DEPLOYMENT
PACKAGE 1 AND ENDS ON ORDER WHEN THE DIVISION ATTACKS.)
3-46. The main effort for this phase is preventing REDLAND forces from penetrating PL DARLING as a
result of a successful area defense of the division’s area of operations.
3-47. Division shaping operations during this phase are the actions of the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade,
56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, and 75th Fires Brigade to set the conditions that allow the 1st Division
to transition to the offense. This includes the identification of potential enemy attack forces. Determination,
if possible, of enemy intentions. The delay or disruption of enemy offensive operations to allow defending
BCTs more time to prepare their defenses. They also include the successful preparation for offensive action
by the 2nd and 5th HBCTs. Insurgent and terrorist groups encountered during the defense will be attrited
within unit capabilities and tracked for later destruction or capture as required. The division will conduct
area security operations designed to protect division forces and civilian population concentrations from
attack and mitigate the effects of these attacks. As appropriate other stability tasks, related to governance
and administration, infrastructure recovery, and humanitarian relief and assistance are initiated during this
phase. Synchronized by the G-7, division controlled assets conduct offensive IO to explain our presence in
GREENLAND to local civilians and international audiences. These operations will explain that we are here
at the request of their government to help them resist REDLAND, insurgent, and terrorists forces that have
committed numerous atrocities and violations of international law and will leave when GREENLAND is
secure and free from extralegal coercion.
3-48. Division sustainment operations encompass the completion of RSOI by all division elements and the
sustainment of divisional units in contact. They also include the efforts of the 34th CSB(ME) Brigade to
provide area security, ground lines of communications maintenance, and CBRNE reconnaissance within
the division sustainment area. (Area security includes both route and convoy security.)
PHASE III – OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS (THIS PHASE BEGINS ON ORDER AND ENDS WHEN ENEMY FORCES
ARE EXPELLED FROM GREENLAND.)
3-49. The main effort for this phase is the seizure of OBJECTIVE DIANA by the 2nd HBCT which, in
conjunction with the attack of the 2nd Division, seizes key terrain that isolates the majority of REDLAND
combat power in GREENLAND from their support and sustainment bases.
3-50. The 1st Division has three primary shaping operations during this phase. First is the 5th HBCT attack
along Highway 1 to destroy enemy forces and seize OBJECTIVE JOHN and OBJECTIVE BEM in order
to create the condition for the commitment of the 2nd HBCT. The second is the 87th IBCT attack to fix
enemy forces to deny them the ability to counterattack into the flank of division forces advancing along
Highway 1. Insurgent and terrorist groups encountered during the attack will be fixed until sufficient
combat power can be brought to bear to destroy them and capture or kill the personnel associated with
3-10 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

these groups. The third accomplishes tasks designed to maintain or return GREENLAND governmental
control, security, and essential public services over territory controlled by the division as it advances. This
third shaping operation contains five logical lines of operations—restoring security and control to
GREENLAND authorities, governance and administration, infrastructure recovery, perception
management, and humanitarian relief and assistance. The G-9 coordinates the division’s stability
operations with appropriate GREENLAND civil and military authorities. This becomes more important as
the division begins recovering previously occupied GREENLAND territory containing significant numbers
of civilians.
3-51. Division sustaining operations continue to provide logistics and personal support to the division’s
BCTs and supporting brigades. The 34th CSB (ME) remains responsible for ensuring that division MSRs
remain unobstructed for movement.
PHASE IV – STABILIZATION AND ENABLING CIVIL AUTHORITY (THIS PHASE BEGINS AFTER
REDLAND FORCES ARE EXPELLED FROM GREELAND AND ENDS WITH THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 1ST
DIVISION.)
3-52. Those stability activities along the five logical lines of operations initiated in the previous phase as a
shaping operation continue during this phase. The security and control line of operation is the division’s
decisive operation. GREENLAND civil authorities will never be able to meet the legitimate needs of their
civilian population without the existence of a secure environment in which to work. The division’s BCTs
have the responsibility for conducting counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations and providing
area security within their respective AOs. The 92nd MP Brigade has the mission of restoring the
GREENLAND police force throughout the division AO.
3-53. The other four lines of operation—governance and administration, infrastructure recovery,
perception management, and humanitarian relief and assistance are division shaping operations. The 555th
Engineer Brigade is responsible for coordinating the infrastructure recovery line of operation within
priorities and guidance established by the commander and the G-3. Likewise, the 418th Civil Affairs
Battalion is responsible for coordinating the governance and administration line of operation within those
same priorities and guidance. All the division’s brigades contribute to the accomplishment of these four
lines of operations.
3-54. The division’s sustainment operations throughout this phase continue to focus on the logistical and
personal support to the division’s BCTs and support brigades. The 27th Sustainment Brigade will have
numerous challenges during this phase supplying CLASS X and other supply items not normally required
by US forces.
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(BLANK PAGE)
Chapter 4
Deployment Operations
4-1. The 1st Division is a modular division stationed at Fort Riley, KS. The division has training and
readiness oversight responsibilities for a mix of brigade combat teams and support brigades including two
heavy BCTs (2nd HBCT, 5th HBCT) from Fort Riley, one heavy BCT from Fort Bliss, TX, (10th HBCT),
and one infantry BCT from Fort Knox, KY (87th IBCT). In addition to these four BCTs, FORSCOM has
assigned five support brigades to the division—the 11th Aviation Brigade (Medium), Fort Riley; 27th
Sustainment Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood, MO; 75th Fires Brigade, Fort Sill, OK; 56th Battlefield
Surveillance Brigade, Fort Huachuca, AZ; and the Mississippi Army National Guard 34th Combat Support
Brigade (ME). Appendix H contains the brigade internal task organization for units assigned to the 1st
Division. For the past sixteen months, these brigades and the 1st Division have been designated as a Ready
Expeditionary Force package, part of the ready force pool. This mix of brigades was assigned by
FORSCOM based on strategic requirements and force availability. Because 1st Division forces within the
Ready Expeditionary Force package did not have a specific contingency or overseas commitment while
they were in the ready force pool, they have trained with a full-spectrum METL that is oriented on
offensive operations, stability operations, and defensive operations (in that priority). Training included
collective training center rotations for the BCTs, exportable training center exercises, and one battle
command training seminar and warfighter exercise.
Active Component XX
1
Reserve Component
X X X X X X
SUST
2 56 75 11 34 27
X
MP CSSB
5 ATK SPT
SPT
X U
ASLT
10
ASB
X
87 GS
Figure 4-1. The 1st Division as configured as a ready

and contingency expeditionary force package
4-2. At the beginning of the fiscal year, FORSCOM moved the 1st Division and its assigned brigades into
the “available” force pool and designated them as a Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) package with
priority for planning toward Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Figure 4-1 illustrates the makeup of
the CEF package built around the 1st Division.
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Chapter 4
4-3. Because of its orientation to the Northeast Asia region, the 1st Division continued to focus its training
and preparation on conducting combat operations against North Korean forces. The division participated in
a virtual training exercise with the USARPAC Operational Command Post (OCP) and refined its part in
contingency plans for that region. G-5 planners from the division Main CP participated in PACOM
deployment planning conferences.
4-4. Five weeks into its CEF rotation, the crisis in GREENLAND prompts deployment of US forces to the
region. The 1st and 2nd Division CEF packages are alerted and begin planning for deployment to
GREENLAND. The 7th Army (ASCC) staff recommends that the 1st Division package be deployed as it
has trained, with the addition of the following forces—
z One unmanned aircraft system (UAS) battalion attached to the 11th Aviation Brigade.
z One EOD company attached to the 34th CSB (ME).
z One CBRNE battalion attached to the 34th CSB (ME).
z One additional ground reconnaissance squadron attached to the 56th BFSB.
z One additional combat service support battalion (CSSB) and 44th Medical Brigade attached to
the 27th Sustainment Brigade.
z One tailored engineer battalion attached to each BCT to provide necessary mobility (to include
gap crossing), countermobility, and survivability support. (See Appendix H.)
z FORSCOM and 7th Army coordinate with USACAPOC to attach a civil affairs battalion to the
division.
FORSCOM concurs and provides the necessary assets from the force pool. (Figure 4-2 depicts the results
of FORSCOM and 7th Army tailoring of the 1st Division. The internal organization of the BCTs and the
various battalions depicted can be found in Appendix H.)
Active Component XX
1
Reserve Component
X X X X X X
SUST
2 56 75 11 34 27
X
MP CSSB
5 ATK SPT
SPT
X U
ASLT
CSSB
10
ASB
x
X 48
II
87 GS
418 CA
I
EOD
Figure 4-2. The 1st Division as tailored by 7th Army and FORSCOM
4-5. Simultaneously the division directs its units to begin predeployment activities to include—
x Reviewing and updating database information regarding on-hand equipment and containers.
x Identifying equipment shortages and inventories of unit basic loads.
x Reviewing unit training status to include—
4-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Collective training status.

Individual and crew-serve weapons qualifications.
CBRNE training status.
Driver certification.
Rail, sea, and air loading team training and certification.
Identifying personnel shortfalls and prioritizing fills.
Conducting required theater training, such as ROE and cultural awareness.
x Conducting final individual preparations for overseas movement, such as updating inoculations,
DNA samples, wills, dental records, powers of attorney, etc.
x Identifying the unit rear detachment
4-6. The 1st Division depends on the installations where its units are stationed or mobilized to coordinate
the movement of those forces with the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to
seaports of embarkation (SPOE) and aerial ports of embarkation (APOE). The division staff coordinates
requirements with the installation management activity (IMA) of the installations supporting the division’s
deployment. The Home Station Operations Centers at each of the affected Army installations conduct 24-
hour operations. The division has limited control of the deployment because its units are deploying from
multiple installations, but should actively monitor and coordinate to set priorities and resolve conflicts.
4-7. In the JOA, the C/JFLC provides the majority of communications, intelligence, protection, and
sustainment support to the division’s deployed units until adequate division resources are deployed into the
JOA to provide these functions. Initially, this support is provided by the 292nd Sustainment Brigade
(organized to conduct the theater opening), the 5th Signal Command, and the 32nd AAMDC, which was
coordinated through the 21st TSC DCP and the 7th Army OCP.
4-8. REDLAND special purpose forces, terrorists, and GREENLAND insurgent elements will attempt to
interdict or disrupt the division’s deployment. Among other enemy means, the threat from MANPADS and
mines will delay the flow of forces into and throughout the theater deployment bases.
MISSION
4-9. 1st Division, on order, rapidly deploys to the assigned AOs and completes RSOI in preparation for
full-spectrum operations. Divisional elements will assume defensive positions as soon as possible, protect
the deployment process, and begin coordinating and preparing to conduct S&RO within their AO.
COMMANDER'S INTENT
4-10. The purpose of this operation is to return control of the land, people, and resources to the
internationally recognized government by destroying or forcing the withdrawal of occupying forces,
reestablishing the international border, and restoring a stable environment for the nation of GREENLAND.
The key tasks in the deployment phase of this operation are:
z Rapidly deploy all divisional forces and attachments to the AO.
z Monitor the status of the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of all
division forces moving into theater.
z Prepare for defensive operations immediately upon arrival within the theater.
z Begin working with existing GREENLAND and interagency assets to prepare to restore a stable
environment in those areas occupied or affected by REDLAND, insurgent, or terrorist forces.
COMMANDER'S PLANNING GUIDANCE

4-11. Organize the division into deployment packages that provides the correct mix of forces that match
the anticipated missions. Sustainment units deploy early to receive combat units and expedite the buildup
of capabilities in preparation for defensive and offensive operations. Division C2 nodes deploy early to
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 4-3

Chapter 4
conduct required coordination and planning with the 7th Army OCP and the 21st TSC DCP conducting
RSOI. The division coordinates with and uses C/JFLC C2 nodes, force protection assets, intelligence
capabilities, and CSS assets that are in theater before the division’s arrival to expedite the division’s
deployment process. Units will focus first on protection during deployment, then preparation for defensive
operations, and then begin planning for the S&RO actions that can be immediately implemented.
1ST DIVISION CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT

4-12. The division uses the force-sequencing information developed in conjunction with the C/JFLC
headquarters and organizes units into deployment packages that match available USTRANSCOM assets
according to time-phased force deployment data. These deployment packages match the request for forces
packages submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval. (See FM 3-35.4 for deployment procedures.)
All units prepare personnel and equipment to meet the deployment timeline established in deployment
directives and orders.
4-13. The decisions on the composition of the deployment packages are made by analyzing the required
capabilities in the AO using the factors of METT-TC. The deployment package compositions used in this
scenario are just one of many possible ways of organizing the division’s forces for deployment.
4-14. The concept of Phase I (Deployment) is to deploy the EECP by air, followed by—
z Deployment package one, consisting of—
The remaining assets of TAC 1 augmented by sufficient individual CA personnel and
equipment from the 418th CA Battalion to establish a bare-base CMOC.
MCG.
10th HBCT.
87th IBCT.
56th BFSB to include the attached ground reconnaissance squadron.
11th Combat Aviation Brigade headquarters with one attack/reconnaissance squadron, an
assault battalion, the MP battalion from the 34th CSB (ME), two CSSBs from the 27th
Sustainment Brigade reinforced with medical assets, and the 418th CA Battalion.
z Deployment package two, consisting of—
TAC 2.
5th HBCT.
75th Fires Brigade headquarters with two missile battalions.
Aviation support battalion.
UAS battalion.
34th Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) headquarters.
27th Sustainment Brigade headquarters with the two remaining CSSBs and the rest of the
44th Medical Brigade.
z Deployment package three, delivers the remainder of the division to include the Main CP.
4-15. This sequencing of forces allows the division to accomplish the commander’s intent by placing
critical capabilities required in the AO first and increasing the division’s capabilities over time. The
division must rely on theater-level assets to provide those warfighting functions not included in its initial
force package. This requires there to be a degree of trust between the ASCC/JFLC commander and the
division commander that the necessary intelligence, command and control, sustainment, and protection
assets will be available to support the division during its RSOI. Figure 4-3 on page 4-5 depicts the
division’s illustrative deployment packages used in this scenario. (During the deployment, the division is
expected to perform offense, defense, and stability missions in proportion to the box in the lower right-
hand corner of Figure 4-3.)
4-4 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Figure 4-3. 1st Division deployment packages
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4-16. The division plans for convoy security with local police agencies and other available agencies
responsible for security, such as port and railroad security authorities, during their movement from their
garrison location to the point of embarkation. The division coordinates with the various installations and
monitors the movement of forces not assigned to the same installation as the division headquarters. The
C/JFLC headquarters arranges for operational protection over and above the division’s local security
efforts throughout the division’s conduct of RSOI within the theater. This operational protection is in
addition to the self protection measures accomplished by individual deploying units.
DIVISION COMMAND AND CONTROL

4-17. Once the division is alerted for deployment the entire staff contributes to the MDMP process to put
together the plans necessary to alert all assigned or attached division units, mobilize those reserve
component units, conduct necessary individual and collective training, accomplish necessary activities to
prepare the division’s equipment for deployment and then deploy division personnel and equipment into
the theater of operations. The staff will also develop a base plan and various branches and sequels to guide
its actions once it initiates operations. The entire staff will also be involved in the dispatch of LNOs to
appropriate headquarters. Intelligence, engineer, and CMO staff collect information about the JOA.
C4 CMO
Long Haul
Communications
HELP
DESK
OGA
ALO DTO/AMLO
AMD
FS SUSTAINMENT
A2C2 IO
CUR JAG EN CBRN PROTECTION

OPS
CHOPS CoS PMO
CUR
OPS ISR
SWO
SOF
CG/
DCG
Life Support and Security

Figure 4-4. Division EECP as tailored for this scenario
EARLY ENTRY COMMAND POST

4-18. As introduced in Chapter 1 the division’s EECP provides temporary C2 until one of the division’s
TAC CPs is able to close within the area of operations. The EECP is mission tailored to reflect the
prevailing factors of METT-TC. For this scenario the equipment forming the EECP was built largely from
the TAC 1 base and will eventually revert back to their parent CPs once those CPs close into the division
area of operations. However, the individuals assigned to the EECP are individually selected by the division
chief of staff based on their competence and the expertise required by the factors of METT-TC. The EECP
has a designated acting chief of staff to facilitate continuous and efficient staff support to operations. This
scenario uses the EECP depicted in figure 4-4. For scenario purposes the 1st Division EECP deployed with
14 HMMWVs–including 1 USAF HMMWV, 13 SICPS shelters, 2 SSET shelters, 65 Army personnel, 8
4-6 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

USAF personnel, 2 SOCEUR personnel, and 3 individuals from other governmental agencies (OGA) in
order to perform critical C2 functions on a continuous basis for 7 to 14 days. These totals do not include
the commander or the division mobile command group with its associated equipment. The three non-
military individuals have at least secret security clearances so their presence does not disrupt ongoing
EECP command and control activities. This EECP configuration is approximately 75% mobile with its
vehicles. The HMMWVs contain all communications and computer equipment that can be used either in
the HMMWV, remoted to the SICP shelter, or in a combination of both. The HMMWVs have associated
trailers for additional cargo capability and generator support. A brief description of the roles and functions
of each area follows along with illustrative personnel and equipment layouts.
4-19. For this scenario the EECP requires a CMO element consisting of four Soldiers with one HMMWV,
with three OGA liaison officers—one each from the Department of State, Department of Agriculture, and
Department of Justice. Most of the CMO element’s communications equipment is dismounted from the
vehicle so that CMO personnel can use that vehicle to drive to the offices of GREENLAND authorities and
other necessary locations. The presence of these other governmental agencies allows for the early
coordination of stability activities with interested agencies.
COMMAND GROUP SUPPORT CELL

4-20. The command group support cell provides a private workplace for the CG or DCG. The command
group support cell in this scenario consists of one HMMWV and four Soldiers—the EECP chief of staff, a
driver, and two clerks. The EECP chief of staff alternates with the EECP chief of operations from the
current operations cell to provide continuous supervision of EECP activities. The two clerks provide
continuous records management support to the entire CP in addition to supporting the CG or DCG’s needs.
This includes physically preparing fragmentary orders issued by the EECP. It contains ABCS equipment
sufficient to display the COP updated in almost real time with friendly and enemy unit locations depicted
to the commander’s desired scale and selected other information, such as future plans, force flow
information, and national and international media feeds. The CIC is located next to the current operations
cell within the EECP configuration to facilitate the flow of information with the other staff elements.
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER CELL

4-21. The movement and maneuver cell controls all deployed division units. It is the information hub of
the EECP. It is the focal point into which all EECP cells provide information to enable the commander to
see his area of operations and answer his CCIR. For this scenario it is comprised primarily of TAC 1
personnel with two HMMWVs and nine personnel. Two additional SOF liaison officers from SOCEUR are
located in the movement and maneuver cell. It is the net control station for the EECP and receives, logs,
and posts information received from tactical and situation reports, and personal recovery. Assisted by the
clerks from the command group support element, it issues warning orders and fragmentary orders to
control current operations. It maintains the combat capability status of all committed forces two levels
down.
4-22. Two additional SJA officers are located in the cell to inform the commander on legal ramifications
of operations and courses of action. These officers are knowledgeable of the GREENLAND legal system,
procedures, and laws. The SJA function is a critical element in the EECP during the early stages of the
deployment. These two individuals also participate in targeting meetings.
4-23. The four-man A2C2 element coordinates and deconflicts the use of airspace with the C/JFLC and
controls airspace users within the division’s airspace. This continues until TAC 1 is fully operational
within the AO. This element maintains control of airspace to facilitate attack helicopter, joint fires, and
unmanned aerial system operations as well as Air Force transport flights into and out of division airfield(s).
The A2C2 element works closely with the AMD element.
INTELLLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE CELL

4-24. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) element in the assault CP performs those
functions primarily associated with a TAC CP ISR operations element. It consists of one HMMWV and
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four personnel. These personnel are augmented by USAF weather personnel. The ISR cell is primarily
manned by ISR personnel from TAC 1. They receive, post, and analyze intelligence data and reports
received from committed units and provide them to the command center and higher headquarters. They
also receive intelligence information from higher intelligence assets and pass it down to maneuver brigade
combat teams, supporting brigades, and independent battalion S2s for their use. They maintain that
information from intelligence assets that support the CCIR to see current and future enemy and civil
capabilities and courses of action and assess friendly intelligence asset capabilities.
FIRE SUPPORT CELL

4-25. The Army fire support, joint fires, and offensive information operations functions of TAC 1 are
performed by this cell until TAC 1 can close within the division’s AO. It consists of one HMMWV and
four personnel. These personnel are augmented by a USAF TACP. The fire support cell coordinates and
synchronizes all fire support assets committed to current operations. Until the arrival of the 75th Fires
Brigade headquarters, this cell within the EECP may perform some of that brigade’s targeting functions,
depending on the situation. The fire support cell synchronizes fire support and tactical air support for units
committed to combat operations. It also monitors the arrival and progress of additional division and joint
fire support assets through the RSO&I process. It maintains information to support the commander’s
critical fire support information requirements and assesses the combat capability of committed units.
SUSTAINMENT CELL
4-26. The sustainment cell consists of two HMMWVs and six personnel augmented by two USAF AMLO
personnel. The G-1 element maintains contact with subordinate unit S-1s to have an accurate picture of the
personnel strength of division units arriving in the theater, divisional units undergoing RSO&I, and
committed units. It advises the commander and G-3 on the arrival of individual personnel and replacements
into the AO. The G-1 receives and maintains reports that support the personnel information requirements.
4-27. The G-4 element within the sustainment cell of the EECP has two primary functions. The first is to
monitor the division’s flow into the AO, influencing the process where and when possible to support the
commander’s concept of operations. This function is primarily the responsibility of the DTO assisted by
the USAF AMLO. These two elements perform any necessary coordination associated with incoming
flights and their reception with USTRANSCOM, 7th Army/CFLC, and 21st TSC agencies. They also input
the division commander’s desires regarding the disposition of personnel and cargo offloading into the
RSOI system and keep the rest of the EECP and division CPs aware of the division’s current deployment
status. They maintain contact with aircraft on the ground, inbound to the AO, and at the departure airfield.
They advise the commander on the status of deployment and arrival of division units. The DTO is also
involved in the onward movement of divisional units after they finish reception and staging. The DTO and
AMLO use automated systems, such as GCCS-A and TC-ACCIS, to assist them in this process. The
second primary function of the G-4 is the status of committed unit class I, III, and V. The G-4 maintains an
accurate status of the quantity and location of critical logistics supplies as they arrive in the AO and
recommends their allocation to the G-3, the chief of staff, and the commander.
4-28. The sustainment cell will also be the home base for a contingency contracting team from the Field
Army Support Brigade. The team will initially be responsible for contracting goods and services in support
of division operations until sufficient contracting resources can flow into theater to establish a more formal
competitive bidding process. This contracting team is not depicted in figure 4-4 since they will normally be
absent from the EECP’s location, but will receive direction as far as what goods and services are needed by
the division and life support from the EECP.
PROTECTION CELL
4-29. The protection cell is responsible for coordinating the division’s operations process as it applies to
CBRNE threats, air and missile defense, counterterrorism/force protection measures, security to operational
forces. It consists of one HMMWV and eight personnel. In coordination with the fire support cell and C4
cell it also is responsible for coordinating the division’s defensive information operations. The senior MP
4-8 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

officer within this cell is initially responsible for division detainee operations until the division PMO is
able to assume those responsibilities.
4-30. The four-man AMD element within the EECP maintains positive control of any AD assets attached
or OPCON to the division. This element works closely with the A2C2 element to proactively prevent
fratricide. The AMD element also coordinates its activities within the protection cell of the EECP to assist
in accomplishing all aspects of the area AMD protection function. This element maintains their airspace
SA via their ABCS systems and provides that information as appropriate to the other cells within the
EECP.
C4 CELL
4-31. This cell is responsible for establishing internal and external communications nets for the EECP. It
consists of two HMMWVs and eight personnel. This includes the command post’s intranet, long-haul
communications, and internet connections. It provides the webmaster for the EECP and provides
troubleshooting support to EECP elements as necessary.
SECURITY AND LIFE SUPPORT ELEMENT

4-32. This element from the STB TAC support platoon is responsible for local security of the EECP and
providing minimal life support. It consists of two HMMWVs and eight personnel. This element has a
burner unit capable of heating MREs and providing hot water for beverages. One of the Soldiers assigned
is a medic. The NCOIC of this element is responsible for overseeing the field sanitation of the EECP. This
element provides the minimum force necessary for continuous security. Upon the detection of a threat to
the EECP, this element will notify the EECP chief of staff or CHOPS of the threat and receive the
necessary additional manpower to conduct a static defense of the EECP.
MAIN COMMAND POST

4-33. The primary role of the Main CP during deployment operations is to coordinate with the
installations providing the deployment platforms for the division’s brigade combat teams, supporting
brigades, and other divisional elements. This includes the conduct of individual and collective training in
preparation for the deployment or projected future missions. It also must coordinate through FORSCOM
with USTRANSCOM and its major subordinate commands for movement from unit locations, to
mobilization sites (for the division’s reserve component units), to air and sea ports of embarkation as
required. The Main CP will make extensive use of liaison officers to various organizations throughout the
deployment process. Until the Main CP deploys, it remains a fully functioning CP working at home station,
conducting planning and analysis, and tracking the deployment and in—theater status of divisional units
throughout the RSO&I process. FM 100-17 outlines the mobilization process. FM 3-35.4 describes the
deployment process.
4-34. The Main CP continues to collect information from home station. The information is provided
forward initially to the EECP and the deployed brigades and then to TAC 1 when that organization is
functioning within the AO. The Main CP’s equipment is deployed in deployment package three and the
personnel continue to perform their mission from the division headquarters until the TACs are established
in the AO and the commander decides to deploy the Main’s personnel. The ISR cell of the Main CP begins
a focused collection effort on the AO as soon as the division is alerted. This collection effort continues as
the Main CP personnel deploy to the AO. While at home station, the ISR personnel will have easy access
to joint and national assets using well established communications networks. The ability to access
information may be degraded when the Main CP personnel arrive in theater depending on the status of
theater information networks provided by the 5th Signal Command. The Main CP plans cell continues to
conduct planning for the upcoming major operations. The plans cell continuously coordinates with the
higher headquarters the subordinate brigades and the EECP, once it deploys.
4-35. As mentioned in the paragraphs discussing the EECP, the G-9 (Civil-Military Operations) deploys
early as part of the EECP and, in conjunction with the civil affairs units already in theater and liaison
officers from other governmental agencies, begins initial assessments of the planned AO and establishes
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Chapter 4
contact with other US governmental agencies, GREENLAND local authorities, and international and
nongovernmental organizations present within the theater. His planning capabilities will continue to
increase as additional CA organizations deploy into theater and a civil affairs planning team is available to
augment the G-9 staff section.
4-36. The division commander may choose to deploy following the arrival of the second BCT. Once the
division commander has two BCTs in the AO, he is capable of conducting division-level operations. The
division commander may decide to deploy earlier to develop a relationship with the C/JFLC commander,
multinational commanders, and other key personnel or to assemble a group of brigade commanders and
key staff to conduct an initial leader’s reconnaissance. He travels within the JOA using his mobile
command group, with a security detachment from the STB. In this scenario he planned to spend time in the
10th HBCT and 87th IBCT AOs, observing defensive preparations, and at the EECP and then TAC 1
ensuring the future operations planning and coordination is consistent with his estimate and intent.
TAC 1
4-37. The division deploys the EECP, comprised mainly from TAC 1, as the initial C2 headquarters to
coordinate and monitor RSO&I, coordinate area wide protection requirements with the C/JFLC
headquarters, coordinate with the 7th Army Main CP, conduct initial tactical planning, and refine the plan
prepared prior to deployment in conjunction with the Main CP at home station. One of the division’s DCGs
deploys with the EECP. In this scenario, the EECP deploys to and co-locates with the deployable command
post of the 21st TSC performing theater-opening functions. The EECP is absorbed into TAC 1 when the
remainder of the TAC 1 personnel and equipment arrive in the JOA. Once the division finishes the RSO&I
process TAC 1 begins preparing to conduct offensive operations to include conducting rehearsals with
those subordinate staffs that can be made available and LNOs from committed divisional units.
TAC 2
4-38. While the divisional units are deploying from different installations, the personnel from TAC 2 and
the Main CP monitor the status of the deployment, exchange standard operating procedures with newly
attached units, and plan and conduct virtual C2 exercises with the assigned and attached subordinate units.
Since this may be the first time some of the attached units have worked for this division, it is important to
conduct exercises to integrate the attached units into the command climate of the division. The division
commander meets and coordinates with the attached unit commanders and informs them of his concept,
intent, and command philosophy. It is important during this stage to develop personal relationships
between the division commander, his staff, and the commanders and staffs of the newly attached brigades.
Main TAC 1 TAC 2

CP
Main TAC 1 TAC 2

Maint Sec Maint Sec Maint Sec
Main Med TAC 1 Med TAC 2 Med

Spt Sec Spt Sec Spt Sec
TAC 1 TAC 2
Main Field
Field Field
Feeding
Feeding Feeding
Main TAC 1 TAC 2

Trans Sec Trans Sec Trans Sec
Main TAC 1 TAC 2

Security Security Security
Figure 4-5. STB Task organized to support the CPs
4-10 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006


4-39. The STB task organizes to deploy appropriate assets with the CPs of the division as they deploy (see
Figure 4-5). The equipment of the MCG is sent so it will arrive in theater before the anticipated arrival of
the commander.
2ND HBCT, 5TH HBCT, 10TH HBCT, AND 87TH IBCT

4-40. The BCTs normally deploy as complete BCTs and that is the case in this scenario. The 10th HBCT
and 87th IBCT deploy in the first deployment package. As they complete RSOI they are attached to 2nd
Division to strengthen the C/JFLC defense. The units not deploying in the first deployment package
perform deployment related tasks to assist the units in the first deployment package in order to facilitate
rapid movement. After equipment is loaded on transportation assets, the Soldiers continue predeployment
training until time for air transport to the AO. The 5th HBCT deploys in the second deployment package
and the 2nd HBCT deploys in the third deployment package. Each BCT was augmented with an engineer
battalion prior to its deployment.
11TH COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE

4-41. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade deploys its headquarters with an attack/reconnaissance battalion
and the assault battalion in deployment package one. This allows the brigade to conduct attack and
reconnaissance, aerial logistical, personnel transport, and long-range surveillance (LRS) insertion missions
soon after arrival in the AO. The aviation support battalion and the UAS battalion are in deployment
package two. The second attack and reconnaissance battalion is in deployment package three with the
general support battalion. This sequencing provides for aviation capabilities to be available as their
requirement is anticipated. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade operates from an airfield in the division rear
area until after the start of offensive operations. When a suitable site is secured in the division AO, The
brigade moves forward to remain within supporting distance of the division’s BCT AOs.
27TH SUSTAINMENT AND 44TH MEDICAL BRIGADES

4-42. The 27th Sustainment Brigade headquarters deploys in deployment package one with two support
battalions. These CSSBs may have element from the medical brigade’s (MEDBDE’s) area support medical
companies (ASMCs) and a forward surgical team (FST) providing in support. The sustainment brigade
deploys the other two support battalions in deployment package two. The rest of the 44th Medical Brigade
is in deployment package two. This sequencing allows sustainment capabilities to arrive with or before the
majority of the division’s other units. The 27th Sustainment Brigade is also responsible for movement
control through out all phases of the operation. During the deployment phase, the majority of movement is
from the staging areas forward to the unit AOs.
34TH COMBAT SUPPORT BRIGADE (MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT)

4-43. The 59th MP Battalion’s capabilities are required early and are therefore in deployment package
one. The 59th MP battalion deploys early to facilitate maneuver and mobility support operations along the
routes leading from the staging areas to the division AO. It also provides area security to support units
operating along these routes. Such operations may include the establishment of a mobility corridor within
the division AO to assist in the protection and security of critical division assets along potential high threat
areas. In addition, the 59th MP Battalion prepares for the conduct of detainee operations. The 34th CSB
(ME) headquarters is in deployment package two. The 527th Engineer Battalion, the 4-44th Air Defense
Artillery Battalion and the 325th CBRNE Battalion capabilities are not expected to be required initially
since 7th Army assets, such as the 32nd AAMDC and the 555th Engineer Brigade, are providing those
functions and therefore are in deployment package three.
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Chapter 4
56TH BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE

4-44. The 56th BFSB’s mission requires it to deploy early in the troop flow in order to conduct
reconnaissance and surveillance in support of the division’s operations. As the preponderance of the 1st
Division’s AO is under division control in this phase, it is the 56th BFSB’s mission to gather information,
answer CCIR, and assist in developing the division common operational picture. The 56th BFSB will
immediately ensure the proper linkage to a full range of reconnaissance and intelligence assets—to include
national, joint, and interagency systems—and host nation assets in addition to those systems organic to the
division’s brigades to answer those CCIR. The 56th BFSB conducts reconnaissance and surveillance to
answer specific information requirements (SIRs) for both current and follow on phases.
4-45. The 56th BFSB in its entirety is in deployment package one. This sequencing allows the division to
begin collecting information with organic resources as soon as possible. Initially located close to the EECP
and then to TAC 1, the BFSB headquarters displaces to located itself in the vicinity of TAC 2 after the later
headquarters completes its RSO&I as the division begins its defensive preparations. The BFSB manages all
assigned assets by integrating and synchronizing technical and manned collection assets and dynamically
tasking and re-tasking available assets to satisfy CCIR and other IR in support of the division ISR plan.
Soon after arrival, the 56th BFSB is tasked to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to answer the 1st
Division Commander’s CCIR related to decision points in the defense.
4-46. The 56th BFSB conducts RSO&I to rapidly build its capability to conduct reconnaissance and
surveillance operations to facilitate 1st Division operations to force the withdrawal of REDLAND forces
from GREENLAND. On order, the 56th BFSB conducts reconnaissance and surveillance operations in the
division’s unassigned areas to support current and future operations to enable the precise employment of
division and joint combat power. Key tasks for the BFSB during this phase are—
z Conduct RSO&I.
z Establish all required links to joint, interagency, and multinational (to include host nation) ISR
assets.
z Identify potential enemy attack forces threatening 1st Division forces.
z Locate and identify REDLAND units, attack positions, and C2 nodes.
z Locate key infrastructure and symbols of GREENLAND/REDLAND national pride.
z Identify key leaders and powerbrokers within the 1st Division areas of operations and interest.
z Locate REDLAND, insurgent, or terrorist CBRNE weapons prior to their employment.
4-47. The 56th BFSB staff continuously interacts and collaborates with the division staff, particularly the
G-2 and G-3. Once the division commander approves his CCIR and other information requirements are
determined, the G-3 prioritizes these requirements and tasks 1st Division units to collect the required
information using mission orders. These mission orders focus on answering CCIR. Based on the
information requirements and priorities established in the division ISR plan, the BFSB develops its ISR
plan.
4-48. This process begins with the receipt of the division commander’s intent, guidance, and/or orders
from the C/JFLC headquarters. The tasks and intelligence requirements that set collection priorities come
from the division headquarters. The BFSB staff develops the BFSB reconnaissance and surveillance plan
based on the tasks it is assigned by division, a prioritized list of information requirements, and any gaps in
collection that are identified. The BFSB staff conducts mission analysis and develops an initial set of
information requirements. Course of action analysis and requests for information from various sources will
also feed into the continued development of information requirements. These information requirements are
analyzed with the threat and the environment to develop CCIRs and other information requirements. When
combined with indicators and warnings, the BFSB staff develops SIRs. The staff develops its
reconnaissance and surveillance tasks from the SIRs. A capability assessment is done to determine what
asset best collect on the SIRs, or what resources are required. The staff assigns the tasks, allocates
resources, develops graphics, and issues the surveillance and reconnaissance plan/order to subordinate
units. The subordinate units follow the same process and work in collaboration with the BFSB and division
staffs to ensure the integration of different echelon plans. The subordinate units then conduct the
4-12 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

reconnaissance and surveillance tasks and report to the BFSB staff. Some information is combat
information that is of immediate value and is acted on. Other information must be analyzed and fused with
other sources and then disseminated and used to update the common operational picture (COP). The
information is also assessed to determine if the retasking of assets is required, either because an
information requirement is answered or it is not gathering what is required. The assessment leads back into
determining the information requirements and the cycle continues.
4-49. As the commander’s primary collection agent, the 56th BFSB will generally be tasked to satisfy
information requirements linked to 1st Division CCIR in the division’s unassigned areas. The G-2/G-3 has
a series of decision points linked to trafficability and conditions of key bridge and river crossing sites. The
commander is also interested in the readiness and morale of the REDLAND forces in the division’s AO.
The presence of REDLAND multiple rocket launchers capable of delivering CBRNE weapons gives
REDLAND the ability to shape the battlefield in its favor. Lastly, the division is interested in the location
of key REDLAND C2 nodes. All of the information requirements in the 1st Division area are identified and
prioritized. The BFSB is assigned those information requirements that fall within the division’s unassigned
areas or that are beyond the capabilities of the other brigades. If a requirement cannot be answered by
division assets the divisions ends an RFI to its higher headquarters.
4-50. As part of the planning process, the BFSB determines what information is being collected by
C/JFLC/7th Army and joint, interagency, and multinational assets. It allocates its own assets to fill in the
gaps. The BFSB conducts reconnaissance and surveillance using unmanned aerial systems, ground
reconnaissance troops, and long-range surveillance (LRS) teams operating forward of the BCT’s AO to
identify a potential attack and identify/confirm the REDLAND Army’s unit positions and intentions. Once
REDLAND forces have been located, the reconnaissance troops and LRS teams deploy to conduct
surveillance of specified REDLAND units to provide early warning of an attack. The ground
reconnaissance and surveillance assets work in concert with unmanned aerial systems and other technical
surveillance systems in the BFSB to provide the required information.
4-51. The BFSB requests and receives an extended range/multipurpose (ER/MP) unmanned aerial system
(UAS) OPCON from the 11th Aviation Brigade to conduct reconnaissance deep in the division’s AO to
locate REDLAND rocket launchers capable of employing CBRNE weapons. The aviation brigade launches
the ER/MP UAS and passes control to the BFSB using a ground control station (GCS) organic to the
BFSB. Once the ER/MP UAS locates suitable targets, that information is passed to the 11th Combat
Aviation Brigade and 75th Fires Brigade for further target development and possible attack.
4-52. The 1st Division G-3 tasks the BFSB to conduct surveillance of NAIs in order to identify and locate
key REDLAND C2 nodes. One means of accomplishing the mission is through the use of organic
PROPHET SIGINT assets. These may be employed in the UA in conjunction with the reconnaissance
troops in the R&S battalion. They may also be employed in another brigade’s AO with local security being
provided by that brigade. This requires coordination between the BFSB and the brigade in whose AO they
will operations. As REDLAND C2 nodes are located, the information is distributed both vertically and
horizontally. The information collected is sent vertically to the Main CP ISR element to answer CCIR and
to be analyzed so as to provide intelligence to support the division’s defensive and other future operations.
It also distributes the information horizontally to the other brigades within the division.
4-53. The 56th BFSB provides assets from its organic collection and exploitation company in general
support to the 1st Division Detainee Facility, where they come under the command of the MP Detainee
Facility commander, to facilitate document exploitation, interrogation, and other counterintelligence and
human intelligence operations.
75TH FIRES BRIGADE

4-54. The 75th Fires Brigade headquarters along with two of the rocket battalions and one cannon
battalion is in deployment package two. The third rocket battalion and second cannon battalion are in
deployment package three. This sequencing allows the fires brigade to conduct strike operations at the
expected time of assumption of the defense and prior to the start of ground offensive operations.
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Chapter 4
418TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION

4-55. The 418th CA Battalion deploys early to conduct an initial assessment of the AO. After completion
of RSOI, its various civil-military operations centers either start or continue previous coordination with
local authorities, other governmental agencies, and international and nongovernmental organizations in
support of division operations. The battalion must determine the critical civilian infrastructures within
GREELAND so steps can be taken to protect them or quickly restore them to functionality even before the
conclusion of combat operations. (This includes areas, societies, capabilities, organizations, politics, and
economies [ASCOPE] within or capable of influencing events in the division’s AO.) The G-9 should be
prepared to contract CMO assessment and analysis capability from civilian business or educational sources
if functional expertise is not immediately available. The G-9 and the battalion’s civil affairs Soldiers must
assess the ability of local police and security forces to retain control of the civilian population centers that
are still in occupied areas once offensive operations begin.
4-14 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Chapter 5
Defensive Operations
This chapter using an illustrative scenario to demonstrate one of many ways in which
a division commander can use the fundamentals of defensive operations defined in
FM 3-0 and FM 3-90 to conduct tactical defensive operations within the framework
of full spectrum operations. The characteristics of defensive operations, types of
defensive operations, operational framework has not changed. Also remaining
unchanged are the planning, preparation, and execution considerations and defensive
control mechanisms and graphic control measures expounded in those manuals. In all
cases the factors of METT-TC will influence and modify their specific application of
the doctrinal concepts contained in this chapter.
Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop
conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive operations alone normally
cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a
counteroffensive that regains the initiative (FM 3-0). Other reasons for conducting
defensive operations include the following:
z Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to the enemy.
z Attriting or fixing the enemy as a prelude to offensive operations.
z Increasing the enemy's vulnerability by forcing them to concentrate their forces.
z Surprise action by the enemy.
z Provide a secure environment for stability operations.
Each of these reasons for defending has implications for how the division deploys its
forces. Without a compelling reason to defend, however, Army divisions continue the
attack. The tactical defense is a temporary state that permits the division to survive an
enemy attack, halt the enemy, and create conditions for offensive and stability
operations.
SCENARIO CONTINUED
5-1. REDLAND initiated a conventional ground invasion of GREENLAND before the 1st Division could
deploy into that country. The objective of REDLAND forces was to defeat coalition forces in theater,
secure those portions of GREENLAND predominately inhabited by Atropians, and seize positions
controlling the mountain passes west of THEB’SOL. These passes providing access to the ALBA river
valley and to those areas of GREENLAND now under REDLAND control and will greatly facilitate the
conduct of a successful defense until the UN Security Council would impose a ceasefire.
5-2. REDLAND forces initially successfully overwhelmed the outnumbered and scattered GREENLAND
forces. They occupied those GREENLAND areas predominately inhabited by Atropians and pushed on
toward their goal of securing the mountain passes in the vicinity of THEB’SOL. In a coordinated manner,
the GREENLAND insurgency was able to delay the onward movement and integration of the 2nd Division
by attacking C/JFLC surface lines of communication (LOCs) and main supply routes (MSRs) from ports
located along the WHITE SEA. Nevertheless, the EUCOM commander was able to employ Joint air
interdiction to delay, disrupt, and attrit REDLAND forces long enough for the 2nd Division to arrive to
bolster coalition defensive efforts. Coalition airpower gained air superiority rapidly after the deployment of
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 5-1

Chapter 5
C/JFAC fighter assets. However, their rapid deployment into theater greatly restricted the throughput of
ground forces until their deployment was completed due to crowding at the APODs. This forced the
EUCOM commander to deploy the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) to secure his MSRs and use
the BCTs in the 1st Division deployment package 1 to provide sufficient forces to enable the 2nd Division
to conduct a successful defense.
5-3. Joint intelligence determined that the REDLAND assault force, the 26th Mechanized Infantry
Division Tactical Group, was attrited to less than 50-percent effectiveness. However, the actions of the 26th
DTG have created favorable conditions for the commitment of the REDLAND exploitation force, the 10th
Tank Division Tactical Group, in an attempt to secure the mountain pass southwest of the city of
THEB’SOL, as well as the vital road node formed by that city, while the 20th Tank Division Tactical Group
secures the pass to the city’s northwest. Coalition Joint fires continue to attrit REDLAND ground forces. In
reaction REDLAND forces have dispersed into smaller platoon and company size groups that can more
easily conceal themselves. This is especially effective for those REDLAND motorized infantry forces
XX
1
X II X X X X X
75 56 11 34 27 SUST
2 CA
I II II
X II
HHB HHC II
5 ATK MP CSSBI I
CSSBI I
II CSSB
U
II CSSB
ASLT
II II X
MI GS 44
X II II II
87
2
X
} Detached from 2 nd
Division; attached to
1st Division
2-165
BSB
Detached from PANG

28th Stryker Bde;
II
ASB
I
EOD
II
BSB
attached to 56th BFSB
operating in the more mountainous parts of the theater.

Figure 5-1. Units available for the defense
5-4. At the beginning of this vignette, the C/JFLC is defending along PL MAMMEL with the one US
division (the 2nd) and three GREENLAND divisions. 1st Division has completed the RSOI of two of its
three deployment packages. Figure 5-1 depicts the 1st Division’s task organization for this phase of the
operation. Appendix H contains the internal task organization of the brigades and battalion contained in the
figure.
5-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Figure 5-2. Schematic of 1st Division’s initial battlefield dispositions
5-5. On order the 1st Division assumed command of the 2nd SBCT and the 87th IBCT. These two BCTs
were previously committed under the control of 2nd Division with the mission of conducting an area
defense within their respective AOs along PL MAMMEL to prevent REDLAND penetration of PL
DARLING. TAC 1 is coordinating with the 21st TSC and C/JFLC headquarters during the reception,
staging, and onward movement of 1st Division forces and controlling the integration of these forces into
the division. TAC 2 controls the defense. The Main CP is just now starting to flow into theater and is
occupying a fixed facility in the vicinity of the division’s A/SPODs. It will remain in that location
throughout the defense because of the advantages that location has in available communication
infrastructure and available security. From that location it continues its planning and analysis functions
while using the common operational picture (COP) established and maintained by the controlling TAC—
currently TAC 2—using available strategic communications. Figure 5-2 depicts the battlefield arrangement
of forces for this defensive vignette. The box in the lower-left portion of the figure indicates the relative
proportion of division assets devoted to that category of full-spectrum operations.
5-6. The division conducts an area defense by assigning contiguous AOs within the division area to its
two committed BCTs. Since the 2nd SBCT and the 87th IBCT were already involved in combat operations
and integrated into the C/JFLC defensive scheme, the C/JFLC commander assigned the division
responsibility for their combined AOs and an additional area sufficient to allow the division to assemble
the remainder of its units and conduct shaping operations that set the conditions for transitioning to the
offense and divisional sustainment operations. In this scenario, the 2nd SBCT and the 87th IBCT continue
their defensive operations while the rest of the division assembles in support of the defense or in
preparation for offensive operations.
MISSION
5-7. The 1st Division defends along PL MAMMEL to prevent further loss of GREENLAND territory to
allow the build up of combat power in anticipation of offensive operations.
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Chapter 5
COMMANDER'S INTENT
5-8. The purpose of this operation is to stop the advance of REDLAND forces to set the conditions for
offensive operations. Key tasks are stopping the advance of REDLAND forces and completing the RSOI
of 1st Division forces. End state is REDLAND forces halted and the division ready to assume the offensive.
CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION
Table 6-1. 1st Division Internal Task Organization for the Defense
MVR ISR Fires Sustainment C2 Protection
2nd HBCT
1/5 FA (GS-
2nd SBCT A-1/68 AR R) B Co 418th CA
5th HBCT C Co 418th CA
87th IBCT D Co 418th CA
11th AVN
27th SUST
44th Med
34th
CSB(ME) A Co 418th CA
56th BFSB rd
3 UAS Bn
75th FIRES
418th CA Bn
DECISIVE OPERATION
5-9. The 1st Division continues to defend along Phase Line MAMMEL with the 2nd SBCT and the 87th
IBCT to prevent REDLAND forces from penetrating Phase Line DARLING. 2nd SBCT, with an additional
armor company from the 5th HBCT and a cannon battalion general support-reinforcing (GS-R) from the
fires brigade, initially has the priority of support for this phase. It is located in the maneuver corridor in the
north of the division’s AO (see Table 6-1). Priority of support then goes to the 87th IBCT and the 11th CAB
in that order. The 75th Fires Brigade provides GS-R assets to the 2nd SBCT and GS assets to the rest of the
division. The 5th HBCT (-) is the division reserve.
SHAPING OPERATIONS
5-10. The 56th BFSB uses its assets to collect information in the division AO forward of the defending
BCTs. Missions include surveillance of named areas of interest (NAIs), conducting route reconnaissance
along Route 1, and confirming the location and disposition of the motorized infantry brigade tactical group
operating to the 87th IBCT’s front. Target identification priorities are units preparing to attack followed by
battalion or higher C2 nodes. Locating infantry units and the small concentrations of armored combat
vehicles that are tactically significant in this terrain will be difficult. When and where appropriate, the
division commander will establish a temporary AO within which the 56th BFSB can accomplish its
missions. The 56th BFSB staff coordinates the placement and movement of the brigade’s assets within the
AOs of the 2nd SBCT and 87th IBCT.
5-11. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) conducts spoiling attacks in the form of mobile strikes to
delay and disrupt REDLAND units preparing to attack with priority to engaging REDLAND uncommitted
and follow-on forces. The commander assigns the 11th CAB the mission of delaying their approach to PL
MAMMAL and disrupting their combined arms cohesion. The 11th CAB staff works with the division staff
and the staffs of the appropriate BCTs is establish aerial movement corridors and other required Army
airspace command and control (A2C2) graphic control measures.
5-4 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

5-12. The 75th Fires Brigade engages non-mobile targets, with priority to the REDLAND air defense, fire
support, and command and control warfighting functions to block REDLAND combined arms formations
from penetrating PL MAMMEL. (The 75th Brigade staff during their MDMP process will identify their
essential fire support tasks to accomplish this mission.) The division commander requested and the C/JFLC
established a Purple Kill Box in the area of the REDLAND tank brigade tactical group in the northwest of
the division’s AO. (See figure 5-2.)
5-13. All divisional units provide humanitarian assistance as required to alleviate the immediate suffering
of GREENLAND civilians affected by combat operations and move them—in cooperation with
GREENLAND civil and military authorities—to areas where the probability that they will be exposed to
future combat operations is significantly reduced. Priority is on keeping division LOCs open. The 1st
Division's civil-military operations center (CMOC) operated by the 418th CA Battalion and the BCT
CMOCs operated by the 418th CA Battalion’s companies coordinate with GREENLAND civil and military
authorities, international organizations, and private volunteer organizations to ensure humanitarian relief
efforts do not conflict with planned military operations and to coordinate movement of displaced civilians
through the 1st Division’s defensive positions and into GREENLAND established displaced civilian camps.
SUSTAINING OPERATIONS
5-14. TAC 1 completes the RSOI of division units and then begins preparing for offensive operations. The
27th Sustainment Brigade and 44th Medical Brigade priority is the BCTs in the defense, followed by the 75th
Fires Brigade and 11th CAB, and lastly other division units in preparation for offensive operations. The 34th
Combat Support Brigade (ME) ensures MSRs in the division AO stay open and provides a reaction force
for Level II threats in the division AO. The 34th Combat Support Brigade (ME) commander is the 1st
Division rear area commander.
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE DEFENSE

5-15. Like maneuver forces, the modular division’s C2 nodes can be task organized to meet mission
requirements. The Mobile Command Group may co-locate with a TAC or a TAC co-locate with the Main
CP to provide the necessary capabilities to control the mission.
DIVISION MAIN CP
5-16. The Main CP is primarily responsible for planning (sequels and branches to the defensive operation),
intelligence analysis, staff estimates, and TAC 1 and TAC 2 support. Through the orders process, units
may be task organized, missions assigned, and priorities set for fires, intelligence collection, support
functions, and force protection. The ISR analysis element is located at the Main CP and provides analysis
of all information collected. The fire support element planners at the Main CP develop target priorities for
subordinate units. Likewise, the collection management element develops collection priorities for further
development by the 56th BFSB. In this scenario, the Main CP fulfills its role from a base in the theater joint
security area—after it finishes its deployment—using strategic communications and digital battle command
systems to send and receive information. Staff elements located at the Main CP will normally coordinate
information with corresponding elements at the TACs, C/JFLC, adjacent unit, and supported unit
headquarters through multi-user voice and data networks augmented by liaison officers. The 418th CA
Battalion’s Civil Affairs Planning Team (CAPT) augments the division G-9 staff section in support of the
division’s current operations, future operations, and future plans.
DIVISION TAC 1 AND TAC 2

5-17. The division commander uses his two division TACs to control multiple parts of an operation, which
are separated by geography, mission focus, phase of operation, or other logical dividing points. Care is
taken to ensure that the principal of unity of command is not violated. In this scenario, the division EECP
was the 1st Division’s initial C2 element in theater and began coordinating the RSOI of the remaining 1st
Division forces in addition to gaining situational awareness of ongoing diplomatic, information, military,
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 5-5

Chapter 5
and economic regional activities within and external to GREENLAND. TAC 1 assumed that function once
it had closed within the theater of operations. After TAC 2’s arrival in country, the C/JFLC commander
task organized two of the BCTs that were under the control of the 2nd Division to the 1st Division, and
assigned the 1st Division an AO to defend. This was done in anticipation of the arrival of seven BCTs and
one MEB into the theater. TAC 2 takes control of the defense while TAC 1 continues with the RSOI of the
remaining division elements. While controlling the defense, TAC 2 may locate in one of the BCT AOs or
co-locate with a BCT TOC. TAC 2, as the controlling TAC, maintains the division’s COP so the entire
division staff may develop their understanding of the situation, maintain their running estimates, and
develop plans. The commander tasks organizes his division by placing those brigades currently actively
supporting the defense under the control of TAC 2 while the remaining division forces—largely the 2nd and
5th HBCTs—fall under the control of TAC 1.
5-18. After all 1st Division units arrive in the AO, TAC 1 begins preparation for offensive operations by
issuing FRAGOs and conducting rehearsals for the offense. It will be almost impossible for the commander
and staffs of the committed brigades—2nd SBCT and 87th IBCT—to fully participate in ongoing
preparations for the offense, since they are involved in ongoing defensive operations. Their LNOs will
represent them for planning purposes and during rehearsals. These TAC 1 FRAGOs are issued through
TAC 2 since TAC 2 is currently in charge of the division’s current full-spectrum operations. During
operations, staff cells and elements located at the controlling TAC will exchange information with
corresponding staff cells and elements at the BCTs and supporting brigade CPs and maintain the COP for
the division so that all division leaders and staffs can develop SU of current and future full-spectrum
operations.
DIVISION MOBILE COMMAND GROUP

5-19. The division mobile command group gives the division commander flexibility to move the
commander and a small staff element to critical positions. He will split his time between TAC 2 and TAC
1. Most of the time, he will be involved with TAC 2 directly the division’s defensive operations. From
there he will use the mobile command group to displace forward into BCT AOs to directly influence
critical actions. He will also use his mobile command group to move to TAC 1 for the conduct of offensive
rehearsals; the C/JFLC operational command post; and to conduct his battlefield circulation as he visits
divisional units, civilian agencies, and work sites.

5-20. The Special Troops Battalion provides assets for the movement of CPs as required. It continues to
task organize to support all division CPs with life support, communications, and security.
2ND SBCT, 2ND HBCT, 5TH HBCT, AND 87TH IBCT IN THE DEFENSE
5-21. BCTs are assigned AOs for defensive operations. Each BCT staff reports and coordinates through its
controlling TAC. In this scenario, 1st Division assumed control of 2 BCTs, which already had AOs
assigned. The 2nd SBCT has the northern AO consisting of the most open terrain, while 87th IBCT has the
southern AO consisting of highly restricted terrain. The division's no-penetration line is PL DARLING,
which is 2nd SBCT and 87th IBCT common rear boundary. The 2nd SBCT is the division’s main effort. The
area defense conducted by these two BCTs consists of a mixture of static and dynamic actions and requires
the assistance of the division’s supporting brigades to accomplish. These BCTs report to TAC 2, which is
controlling the defense. The 5th HBCT is planning and preparing to respond to REDLAND attacks as the
division reserve. It, with the 2nd HBCT (after closing on the division AO), is also planning and preparing
for offensive operations in their respective AOs behind the 2nd SBCT.
56TH BFSB
5-22. The 56th BFSB conducts reconnaissance and surveillance operations to enable the 1st Division
commander to shape the battlefield by focusing organic and Joint combat power with precision that
5-6 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

simultaneously support the 1st Division’s defense and set the conditions for offensive operations to restore
the territorial integrity of GREENLAND. During this phase, the 56th BFSB receives the reconnaissance
squadron (2nd Squadron, 165th Cavalry) from the 28th SBCT and the 3rd UAS Battalion to conduct
reconnaissance and surveillance in division controlled areas. Its key tasks during this phase are to—
z Identify and locate REDLAND reserves.
z Identify and locate insurgent forces and terrorist groups operating within the division’s area of
interest, along with their associated base areas. (This is a difficult task and will require the
CI/HUMINT teams within the brigade and division military intelligence analysts to work closely
with GREENLAND intelligence agencies—both civil and military, other coalition partners, the
C/JFLC C/J2X, the theater joint intelligence center, Department of the Army and DOD
intelligence agencies, and other governmental agencies, such as the Department of State,
Department of Justice, and Central Intelligence Agency. Division intelligence analysts may even
need to contact selected offices within the National Intelligence Council on specific matters.)
z Identify and locate REDLAND multiple rocket launchers capable of influencing division
operations.
z Conduct surveillance of key bridges along the projected 1st Division’s avenue of approach to
support the commander’s decision point to use existing bridges or conduct river crossing
operations.
z Conduct reconnaissance of key fording sites.
z Conduct surveillance of the Lusk Reservoir Dam.
z Conduct route reconnaissance of key, secondary, and alternate routes along the 1st Division’s
projected avenue of approach. (This will involve an extensive list of NAIs and may require that
the 56th BFSB request the controlling TAC to task other divisional assets to examine some of the
NAIs in order to provide required information in time to influence the division commander’s
decisions.)
5-23. The BFSB mission during the defense is multifaceted. The BFSB continues to collect information
that support the commander’s decisions that maintain the continuity of the division’s defense, while
simultaneously conducting ISR to satisfy information requirements for planning future operations. The 56th
BFSB focuses its collection assets on the area between the BCTs forward boundary and the division’s
forward boundary (after the BCTs assume control of their AOs and the 34th Combat Support Brigade (ME)
assumes control of the 1st Division’s sustainment area). The BFSB conducts reconnaissance and
surveillance of intermediate objectives (NAIs tied to the division commander’s decision points) and the
final objective. The BFSB supports the current defensive fight primarily with HUMINT and CI assets, and
secondly with technical collection assets (with TUAS) to fulfill 1st Division information requirements
inside subordinate BCT AOs (after appropriate A2C2 coordination).
5-24. The BFSB headquarters will move from TAC 2 to TAC 1 to support offensive planning and
preparations for the offense at the appropriate time during the conduct of the defense. The brigade staff
continues parallel and collaborative planning with the division and BCT’s staffs, as well as direct
coordination to support reconnaissance and surveillance operations. Information received from the brigade
controlled sensor is quickly assessed by the staff and passed to the G-2 for analysis, fusion, and further
dissemination. Information related to CCIR is reported through command channels as required.
5-25. The G-3 tasks the BFSB to conduct surveillance of two key bridges over the Alba River. These two
NAIs are tied to a division decision point to use the bridges for crossing the Alba River or conduct river
crossing operations in the event the bridges are not trafficable. A second tasking directs surveillance of the
Lusk Reservoir Dam, which is a major source of hydro-electrical power for GREENLAND, irrigation for
the entire eastern portion of the country, and a flood-control element of the Alba River. (The division
commander is concerned about the possibility that REDLAND forces will destroy the dam or the
generators to negatively affect the civilian population due to a lack of electricity that supports daily
activities, to include farmland irrigation).
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Chapter 5
5-26. These two G-3 taskings require the 56th BFSB staff to task its LRS assets to conduct surveillance of
the two key bridges and the Lusk Reservoir Dam. Each of these NAIs requires continuous all-weather
coverage that the division’s technical collection assets cannot always provide. Therefore, the BFSB
employs the 2nd Squadron, 165th Cavalry, to conduct route reconnaissance along Highway One to provide
detailed information about the route, location, and suitability of alternate and secondary routes. The
squadron also conducts assessments of possible fording sites along the Alba River in the event key bridges
over the Alba River are not trafficable.
5-27. The task organization change providing OPCON of the 3rd UAS Battalion to the 56th BFSB
facilitates the execution of ISR throughout those parts of the division AOs not assigned to its major
subordinate commands—division unassigned areas—to support information requirements for future
operations. The 3rd UAS Battalion’s ER/MP UASs conduct reconnaissance to locate and identify
REDLAND logistical activities for targeting. Additionally, they conduct reconnaissance to locate and
identify the REDLAND reserves. Finally, the additional UASs complement the 56th BFSB’s organic
TUASs by providing additional information on REDLAND troop positions on the two intermediate
objectives (JOHN and BEM) and final objective (DIANA), which is outside of the range of the brigade’s
TUASs.
5-28. The brigade also conducts counter-intelligence operations to protect against espionage, sabotage, or
other terrorist activities. This is especially important as battalion-sized components of deployment package
3 begin conducting troop movement from theater staging areas to assembly areas located within the
division AOs. HUMINT teams continue identifying friendly civilians, vital infrastructure, and
humanitarian assistance requirements.
75TH FIRES BRIGADE

5-29. The primary task of the 75th Fires Brigade is to plan, prepare, execute, and assess fire support
missions designed to block REDLAND combined arms formations from penetrating PL MAMMEL. A
secondary task is to conduct strike operations within the division AO, based on mission orders from the
division.
5-30. The current operations cell within the controlling division TAC CP determines target sets and fire
support priorities taking into account planned division future operations. Initially these target set priorities
are to REDLAND air defense, fire support, and command and control warfighting functions. Priority of
support is initially to the 2nd SBCT, then the 87th IBCT, the 56th BFSB, and then to the 11th CAB. Priority
of fires will shift on order to the 11th CAB to fire SEAD missions as part of its mobile strike operations
against the identified enemy tank brigade tactical group once preparatory fires for that mission begin.
5-31. The 75th Brigade staff during their MDMP process will identify their essential fire support tasks and
sequence of fires required to accomplish this and other missions as they are assigned. The 75th Fires
Brigade Fire Direction Center assigns brigade assets to accomplish those essential fire support tasks and
sequence of fire support developed during the brigade’s MDMP process.
5-32. The brigade may also provide additional DS assets or reinforcing fires to the BCTs. In this scenario,
the 75th Fires Brigade assigns one of its cannon battalions a GS-R support relationship to the 2nd SBCT
while using its rockets systems to engage targets in the division AO beyond the forward boundary of the
two defending BCTs.

5-33. Initially the primary task of the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade is to provide reconnaissance and
surveillance assets to the 56th BFSB to develop an accurate COP of the division’s AO. The brigade’s
secondary task is to conduct spoiling attacks in the form of mobile strike operations to delay and disrupt
REDLAND units preparing to attack with priority to engaging REDLAND uncommitted and follow-on
forces. In support of this later task the 11th CAB has the mission of delaying these REDLAND forces
approach to PL MAMMAL and disrupting their combined arms cohesion.
5-8 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

2 (US)
XX
1 (US)
X
X
11
X
X X PKB
27 SUST X CFLCC
34 X 5
5 2
DTG
X 5 X2 XX
2 2 X Altitude
44 XX
X
1 TAC2 1 MCG
56
5 2
1 (US)
XX
XX
1 (US)
X X
X X
87
2 XX
34 75
1 TAC1
X
34 X2 X
2 X87
X
87 X
2 87
1 (US)
XX
12 (GL)
Offense SRO
EL
NI
G
AR
IN
HR
M
RL
CL
AM
FA
DA
PL
PL
PL
PL
Defense
Figure 5-3. 11th Combat Aviation Brigade mobile strike
5-34. The current operations cell within the controlling division TAC CP determines target sets and
support priorities for 11th CAB assets remaining under brigade control. The current operations cell takes
into account planned division future operations when determining those target sets and support priorities.
However, once the controlling division TAC establishes target sets and support priorities for the brigade,
the brigade staff conducts its own their own MDMP. This includes but is not limited to—
z Airspace C2 coordination.
z Theater air-ground system (TAGS), airspace control order (ACO), Air Tasking Order (ATO), and
special instructions (SPINS).
z Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) movement, composition, and emplacement.
z Weather checks and analysis.
z AD status.
z Communications planning.
z Identification friend or foe (IFF) procedures and Mode 4 settings.
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 5-9

Chapter 5
5-35. The 11th CAB commander must prioritize and allocate how he task organizes his remaining assets to
include the operational cycle to which each unit adheres. He may chose to form aviation task forces, which
include one or more attack companies and assault elements, to support different division-directed efforts.
In this scenario, the brigade commander task organizes his available aviation resources into two mission
packages. One package is designed to be placed under the control of one of the division’s two committed
BCTs to conduct close combat attack missions to support their maneuver efforts. The other package
remains under brigade control. As shown in Figure 5-3, the 11th CAB conducts a mobile strike operation
directed against an enemy tank brigade tactical group in the division's AO. This action relieves enemy
pressure on the 2nd SBCT and helps set conditions for transition to the offense. See FMI 3-04.111 for
additional information on aviation brigade planning, preparations, execution, and assessment. In addition,
the 11 th CAB coordinates air ambulance support operations with the division and the 44 th MEDBDE.
27TH SUSTAINMENT AND 44TH MEDICAL BRIGADES

5-36. These two brigades provide a full suite of sustainment services and force health protection (FHP) to
the division and forces attached to it. The 27th Sustainment Brigade provides C2 headquarters for
specialized teams coming from the theater-level organizations, in addition to its normal supply,
transportation, field service, and maintenance functions. It coordinates the distribution-based replenishment
of the division’s brigades with the 21st TSC and monitors the execution of those sustainment activities.
Priority of support is firstly to the 2nd SBCT, secondly to the 87th IBCT, thirdly the 11th CAB and 75th
Fires Brigade, and lastly to other units assigned to the division. (Appendix C discusses division
sustainment operations.) The 44th MEDBDE commander provides C2 for FHP operations. The 44th
MEDBDE is capable of—
z Providing a rapidly responsive operational command post (OCP) that can quickly integrate into
the early entry deployment sequence for crisis management.
z Providing full spectrum continuous C4I in support of all Army divisions/corps and joint
(when augmented with joint medical detachment [JMD]) forces.
z Providing operational medical plugs augmentation to Level II MTFs supporting brigade/brigade
combat team (BCT) medical companies.
z Advising division/corps commanders on the medical capabilities of their operations.
z Providing medical staff planning, operational and technical supervision, and administrative
assistance for multifunctional medical battalions (MMB) and combat support hospitals tasked
organized under the MEDBDE.
z Coordinating with the supporting theater patient movement requirements center (TPMRC)
for medical regulating and medical evacuation from MMB and hospitals to supporting corps/Army
level MTFs and CONUS.
z Providing medical consultation services and technical advice in the following areas:
Preventive medicine (PVNTMED) (medical surveillance,
occupational environmental health (OEH), sanitary engineering, and
medical entomology).
Nursing services.
Dental services.
Mental health (MH) (to include combat operational stress control
[COSC]) and neuropsychiatric (NP) care.
Veterinary services (including food safety and inspection, animal
medicine, and veterinary
PVNTMED services).
Nutrition care and medical food service.
z Providing a joint-capable C4I capability when augmented with appropriate joint assets (joint
5-10 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

z Providing advice and recommendations for the conduct of civil-military operations (CMO).
manning document).
z Coordinating Army support to other Services (ASOS) for the ship-to-shore/shore-to-ship
medical
z evacuation mission.
z Providing prompt medical treatment consisting of those measures necessary to locate, acquire,
resuscitate, stabilize, and prepare patients for evacuation to the next level of care and/or RTD.
z Employing standardized ground medical evacuation units/resources. The use of air ambulance
(AA) is the primary and preferred means of medical evacuation on the battlefield. Its use,
however, is METT-TC driven and can be affected by weather, availability of resources, CBRN
conditions, and air superiority issues.
z Providing a flexible, responsive, and deployable medical support designed and structured to
support a Force Projection Army and its varied missions. This capability includes
hospitalization resources to provide essential care to all patients who cannot recover within the
theater evacuation policy and are stabilized and evacuated out of theater and definitive care to
those Soldiers capable of returning to duty.
z Providing a medical logistics system (to include blood management) that is anticipatory and
tailored to continuously support missions throughout full spectrum operations.
z Establishing PVNTMED programs to prevent casualties from DNBI through medical and OEH
surveillance, behavioral surveillance, health assessments, PMM, and personal protective
measures.
z Providing veterinary services to protect the health of the command through food inspection
services, animal medical care, and veterinary PVNTMED.
z Providing dental services to maximize the RTD of dental patients by providing operational
dental care and maintaining the dental fitness of theater forces.
z Providing COSC/MH to enhance unit and Soldier effectiveness through increased stress
tolerance and positive coping behaviors.
z Providing medical laboratory functions in FHP operations to—
Assess disease processes (diagnosis).
Conduct OEH surveillance laboratory support.
Monitor the efficacy of medical treatment.
Identify and confirm use of suspect biological warfare (BW) and chemical
warfare (CW) agents by enemy forces.
z Deploy medical C2 units capable of providing the requisite command and control to enhance
split-base operations capability.
z Ensure maximum use of emerging technology to improve battlefield survivability.

5-37. The 34th Combat Support Brigade (ME) executes shaping and sustaining operations to prevent or
mitigate the effects of hostile action against the division. The brigade is responsible for protection of
specific locations, facilities, and capabilities in the division sustainment area and other locations designated
by the division commander. In this scenario, the brigade—when deployment is complete—includes
military police, engineers, air defense and CBRNE defense elements, civil affairs, and EOD units. During
the defense, the brigade is responsible for area security within its assigned AO, ground LOC security and
maintenance, and facilitating air defense coverage of the division area.
5-38. The division staff positions the 34th CSB(ME) to provide support to the 1st Division’s BCTs and
supporting brigades. Likes the other supporting brigades within the division, the current operations cell
within the controlling division TAC CP determines the missions, tasks, and support priorities for the 34th
CSB(ME). Initially, these are—
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 5-11

Chapter 5
z The construction of survivability positions for the 75th Fires, 11th CAB, and 27th Sustainment/ 44th
Medical Brigades (in that priority).
z Provision of area security to units within the 34th CSB(ME) AO to include response forces
constituted from brigade assets and a tactical combat force if so designated at a later time.
z The maintenance and security of division MSRs within the 34th Brigade’s AO.
z The construction and operation of a division detainee holding area to include the designation of its
commander. (Brigade will supervise the engineer battalions in the BCTs as the conduct their
initial detainee holding facilities.)
z The detection and identification of REDLAND use of CBRNE weapons within the division AO.
z Conduct an inventory of toxic industrial chemicals/materials within the 34th CSB (ME) AO
designed to mitigate environmental damage within the AO.
z The construction and operation of camps for GREENLAND civilian displaced persons.
z Provide local security against ground threats and sustainment to the 4/44th AMD Battalion which
is ADCON to the brigade.
z Survey of existing GREENLAND infrastructure and its capacities to include water treatment and
distribution systems, electrical generation and distribution systems, ground transportation
networks—road, rail, and pipeline, sewer collection and treatment systems, and habitability and
structure soundness of civilian facilities used by the division. (This survey will be performed in
coordination with GREENLAND authorities and functional experts from the civil affairs
community, other governmental agencies, and a wide variety of civilian commercial and
international organizations.)
5-39. The controlling division current operations cell takes into account the 34th Brigade’s capabilities and
planned division future operations when determining the missions and tasks assigned to the brigade. Once
the controlling division TAC assigns those missions and tasks, the 34th CSB (ME) staff conducts its own
their own MDMP to determine situationally appropriate and feasible courses of action.
5-40. As part of his selected a course of action, the 34th CSB(ME) commander allocates his forces to
accomplish his divergent assigned missions. In this scenario, the presence of an additional task-organized
engineer battalion in each of the division’s BCTs means that the 52nd Engineer Battalion is not required to
provide mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability engineer support to the BCTs in contact. The 52nd
Engineers will provide mobility, counter-mobility, survivability, and general engineering support to the
34th CSB(ME) and other divisional units operations in the 34th’s AO. This includes creating or improving
roads, repairing or maintenance of bridges and other improvements to existing division MSRs. The
engineer battalion has only a limited capability to conduct local or area damage control operations
necessitated by enemy action or accidents.
5-41. The 59th MP Battalion and its three companies will be fully involved in providing first, maneuver
and mobility support, then area security, and then detainee operations within the 34th CSB(ME) AO in the
priority in which they are listed. The battalion will protect critical functions, facilities, and forces within the
brigade’s AO. The 59th will provide support to enhance the movement of BCT and supporting brigade units
and the flow of supplies through the brigade AO. The battalion exercises positive control over all persons
captured, detained, confined, or evacuated by divisional forces. This could cause the 59th MP Battalion to
establish one or more mobility corridors within the 34th CSB(ME) AO, working with movement control
teams from the 27th Sustainment Brigade to control division MSRs and provide circulation control,
working with the GREENLAND government through the 418th CA Battalion to control the GREENLAND
civilian population to include the collection and evacuation of civilian detainees. Lastly the MPs will
provide response forces to assist bases and base clusters located within the 34th CSB(ME)’s AO to respond
to Level I and II attacks.
5-42. The 325th CBRNE Battalion and the 802nd Ordnance Company (EOD) will provide detection,
identification, and mitigation of CBRNE point devices and area threats within and external to the brigade’s
AO. This will require the battalion and 34th CSB (ME) staffs to work closely with division, BCT, and
supporting brigade staff to coordinate the tasking, movement, and sustainment support of CBRNE teams
transiting the division AO to accomplish their assigned missions.
5-12 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006


5-43. The battalion headquarters establishes a division-level CMOC within the division area. That CMOC
is located where it can best influence those individuals and organizations that affect civil considerations
throughout the division AO. In this scenario, at this time, this is within the 1st Division tactical assembly
area. A CMOC may be forced to move frequently to interact with different parties, which may distance it
from the division Main CP or TAC CPs. This will inhibit life support and security needs. The battalion’s
four subordinate companies establish brigade-level CMOCs within the AOs of the brigades they support.
The 418th provides a CAPT to the division headquarters to help the G-9 integrate CMO into the division’s
operations. Figure 5-4 depicts the initial location of the five CMOCs within the division AO.
5-44. Civil affairs functional assessment teams from EUCOM’s supporting civil affairs command or 7th
Army’s supporting civil affairs brigade—in cooperation with functional experts from engineer
organizations, other governmental agencies, international organizations, and civilian contractors—will
conduct survey operations within the division’s AO. The results of these surveys provide a basis for
reconstruction planning by divisional forces and higher headquarters.
(Deployment Package 3) 2nd Div

RSO&I in Progress XX
1st Div
5th HBCT CMOC 2nd SBCT CMOC
XX
1st Div
2nd SBCT
XX
2nd SBCT
5th HBCT
5th HBCT
1
CSSB 2HBCT X 1 X MCG
X
CSSB
o/o
X TAC 2
C/JFLC/7th Army
34th
XX CSB(ME)
1 5th
1st Div
HBCT 2nd SBCT
XX
TAC 1
X X
1st Div
34th 87th IBCT

XX
1 Div CMOC CSB(ME)

ATK
X 87th IBCT CMOC
1st Div
2 34th CSB
34th CSB(ME)
CMOC 87th IBCT

87th IBCT
(ME)
X
X
1st Div
Offense SRO XX
38th (GN) Div
K
NI
EL
NG
AR
HR
M
I
CL
RL
Defense
AM
FA
DA
PL
M
PL
PL
PL
Figure 5-4. 1st Division initial CMOC positions
5-45. The security situation and force protection posture dictate the general location of each 1st Division
CMOC. Normally, each CMOC locates itself within the sustainment area of the supported echelon to
prevent nonmilitary traffic in and around the CMOC from interrupting military operations. Also, the
echelon sustainment area is more suitable for transition operations when the responsibility for CMO within
a given area is transferred from one agency to another. (Appendix C discusses division sustainment
operations.)
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 5-13

(BLANK PAGE)
Chapter 6
Offensive Operations
This chapter using a scenario to illustrate one of many ways in which a division
commander can use the fundamentals of offensive operations defined in FM 3-0 and
FM 3-90 to conduct tactical offensive operations within the framework of full
spectrum operations. The characteristics of offensive operations, types of offensive,
and the operational framework have not changed. Neither have the planning,
preparation, nor execution considerations and offensive control mechanisms and
graphical control measures expounded in those manuals changed. In all cases, the
factors of METT-TC will influence and modify the specific application of the
doctrinal concepts illustrated in this chapter.
Offensive operations seek to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to decisively
defeat an enemy. Army forces attack simultaneously throughout the AO to throw
enemies off balance, overwhelm their capabilities, disrupt their defenses, and ensure
their defeat or destruction. The offense ends when the force achieves the purpose of
the operations, reaches a limit of advance, or approaches culmination. Additional
tasks offensive operations accomplish include—
z Disrupting enemy coherence.
z Securing or seizing terrain.
z Denying the enemy resources.
z Fixing the enemy.
z Gaining information.
Each of these reasons for conducting offensive operations has implications for how
the division employs its forces. The conduct of tactical offensive operations is its own
objective. It must fit within a national and theater strategy that employs all four
instruments of national power. This chapter provides doctrinal concepts for a division
conducting primarily offensive operations. It provides an example of one of the many
ways in which the division could conduct offensive operations within the full-
spectrum operations framework. In all cases the factors of METT-TC will influence
and modify their specific application of the doctrinal concepts contained in this
chapter.
SCENARIO CONTINUED
6-1. The C/JFLC defense was successful and caused the REDLAND army to culminate. Figure 6-1
depicts the situation as the C/JFLC transitions to the offense. All committed REDLAND forces in
GREENLAND are estimated as being less than 50-percent effective due to losses suffered from coalition
air attack and ground defensive actions. Air interdiction and direct action missions by coalition SOF are
successful in preventing any operationally significant regeneration of attrited REDLAND forces by the
movement of war reserve stocks and replacements from their depots in REDLAND. That portion of the
10th Tank Division Tactical Group located within the 1st Division AO is estimated at less than 33-percent
effective. The 51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Group is estimated at 40-percent effective but can
muster detachments in company-size strength to counterattack into the southern flank of the 1st Division’s
east-west movement corridor. The 26th Mechanized Infantry Division Tactical Group is estimated at 35-
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 6-1

Chapter 6
percent strength. Additionally the insurgency remains capable of temporary interdicting C/JFLC ground
LOCs at times and places of their choosing with up to platoon-size forces. Terrorists based along the
international border between REDLAND and GREENLAND are not a significant factor affecting the 1st
Division’s tactical operations within GREENLAND at this point in time because they lack the combat
power to attack coalition military targets along the forward edge of the battle area and have no effective
way to penetrate coalition front lines in a timely manner to attack GREENLAND civilian targets located
within GREENLAND administered territory.
EL
M
AM
M
XX
PL
I
THEB’SOL
N
HR
67 xx
R
FA
LE
XX 20
PL
E
KE
XX 62
PL
X xx XX x
S
5 x
I
2 52
RR
xx x
HA
XX
PL
10
KACZMARCZYK x x
1
OBJ V’DORKA
xx XX XX
Hi x
51 gh xx
GAZI XX wa XX DIVKOVIC
y x
38 1
26 AlbOBJ
a Ri
MELISSA
CRITES ver
xx xx
53 77
x Lusk
x OBJ DIANA
Reservoir KORNATI
ANHIER xx
XX 73 x
98
OBJ KS’ART
BIRYAN
JSOA 1
JSOA 2
xx
xx
90
54
Figure 6-1. Situation as the C/JFLC transitions to the offense
6-2. The readiness of C/JFLC ground forces is mixed. Both 1st Division and 2nd Division are at
approximately 90-percent strength. The GREENLAND 38th Division located on the southern flank of the
division is at 75-percent strength and is capable of attacking to fix those portions of the REDLAND 53rd
and 51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Groups located within its AO. The GREENLAND 62nd
Division located on the northern flank of the 2nd Division is at 70-percent strength and is capable of
attacking to defeat the 52nd Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Group. The GREENLAND 67th Division
is at 65-percent strength and can only attack to fix the 20th Tank Division Tactical Group. The 5th MEB
remains the C/JFLC reserve with a secondary mission of securing the joint security area.
6-3. In this phase of the operation, the 1st Division attacks with the 2nd and 5th HBCT, the 87th IBCT, and
the 2nd SBCT. While the defensive scenario in Chapter 5 unfolded, additional forces continued to deploy to
or be constituted within the JOA. The reinforcements made available to the 1st Division for the conduct of
offensive operation are—
x The 75th MP Battalion.
x The 3rd Battalion 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade of the GREENLAND Army.
6-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

x The 555th Engineer Brigade consisting of three engineer battalions, two EOD companies, and
topographic support team.
The division has been given OPCON of the 555th Engineer Brigade because of the number of rivers that it
will have to cross during its planned advance and the need to maintain mobility during the advance. The
MP and GREENLAND Army motorized infantry battalions were added to help the division provide
security for the conduct of its sustainment operations. Figure 6-2 depicts the 1st Division’s troops available
for the offense.
XX
1
X X X X X X X
2 11 34 27 SUST 56 75 555
I II I
I
X 59 271
HHC 75
MP
MP 272 CSSB
HHC HHC
5 CSSB
273 CSSB
CSSB
II II
1-227 II 372
325 II 56 BTB 528
X 2-227 ATK
ATK 27 BTB
II
87 II
II
1-101 U
4-44 X 513 MI 694
X ASLT 44
2 527 3-23 II
II
725
2-192 II
GS
3-99 GN 2-165 I
II 803
804 EOD
EOD
3 I
802 EOD II
II 6701
11 418 CA
ASB
Figure 6-2. 1st Division troops available for the offense
6-4. TAC 1 is the controlling CP for offensive operations while TAC 2 focuses on the division’s current
and future stability shaping operations. The main CP remains in its base in the theater security area and
maintains coordination with higher headquarters. The plans element at the main CP continues to refine
sequels to the current operations and plans for those branches that are beyond the capability of TAC 1 to
plan. This plans element—in coordination with TAC 2—conducts planning for future division stability
operations for execution in the next phase of the joint force commander campaign. The intelligence
element at the main CP is providing updated intelligence products to the division’s major subordinate
commands as they begin offensive operations. Figure 6-3 is a schematic showing the division’s intent
graphics as it transitions to the attack. The box in the upper right-hand corner of the figure indicates the
level of effort given to each category as the division conducts full-spectrum operations.
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 6-3

Chapter 6
THEB’SOL X
103 10 Def Stability

X X
X
5 X
2 102 10 Offense
2 X OBJ
A JOHN
X 101 D 10 Alba
A
S
R iver
87 B Hi
gh
wa
y#
F
1 XX OBJ X
X
BEM
512 51 263
S
X X
X
B 261 D
511 51
X
513 51
262 KILLEAN
EL
M
AM
M OBJ DIANA
PL
NI
HR
ER
FA
EL
KE
PL
IS
R
PL
AR
H
PL XX
Figure 6-3. Schematic showing intent graphics for the offense
MISSION
6-5. On order, the 1st Division attacks from PL MAMMEL to seize OBJ DIANA, as part of a CJFLC
offensive operation designed to restore the territorial integrity of GREENLAND.
COMMANDER’S INTENT
6-6. The purpose of this operation is to isolate REDLAND forces from their support and sustainment
bases. Insurgent and terrorist personnel encountered during this operation are to be killed or captured. The
key task is to seize OBJ DIANA which will lead to either the encirclement of the majority of REDLAND
forces or a political settlement resulting in their withdrawal from GREENLAND. The desired end state is
the withdrawal or destruction of REDLAND forces from the AO, which returns control of the land, people,
and resources in country to the internationally recognized government of GREENLAND.
6-7. The 1st Division attacks with the 5th HBCT in the north to destroy the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical
Group and secure OBJECTIVES JOHN and BEM so they can serve as bridgehead to enable the forward
passage of the 2nd HBCT to secure OBJ DIANA and destroy the 261st Mechanized Brigade Tactical Group.
The axis of advance is Highway 1. PL HARRIS is the division limit of advance for this attack. The 2nd
SBCT is the division reserve and follows the 5th HBCT and the 2nd HBCT along Highway 1 to an assembly
area centered on the intersection of Highway 1 and PL Fahrni after completing its mission staging
operations. The 87th IBCT attacks to fix the 51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Group in their
6-4 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

current locations. The 75th Fires and 11th Combat Aviation Brigades assist the BCTs in the accomplishment
of these tasks. The disposition of enemy forces and the separation of key terrain compel the division to
conduct non-linear operations that occasionally involves the use of noncontiguous AOs.
6-8. The division commander task organized his capabilities in response to the current factors of METT-
TC. Table 6-2 shows the division’s revised internal task organization for offensive operations. (The
division commander, based on his staff’s mission analysis, determined that the primary stability operation
during this phase of the operation will be providing temporary humanitarian assistance to GREENLAND
civilians affected by his offensive combat operations until the GREENLAND government can assume
responsibility for their welfare. Thus he does not request additional forces to accomplish large-scale
stability operations.
Table 6-2. 1st Division Internal Task Organization for the Offense
Maneuver ISR Fires Logistics C2 Protection
1-227th 1-5th FA (155 st A-418th CA
271 Sust
2nd HBCT AVN SP) Bn
Bn
(ATK)
Det 1, D CO 272nd Sust D-418th CA
2nd SBCT
513th MI Bn Bn
2-227th
AVN
(ATK) E Co-513th MI 1-14th FA B-418th CA
5th HBCT
(CI/HUMINT) (155 SP) Bn
555th Engr
(DS)
D Co (-) 513th
MI
(CI/HUMINT) 372nd Sust C-418th CA
87th IBCT
Bn Bn
F-2/22 INF
(LRS)
11th Avn A Co (-)-513th
Bde MI (TUAS)
Det 1, 803rd
27th Sust
EOD Co
Det 1, C Co
34th CSB
513th MI
(ME)
(C&E)
56th BFSB 3rd UAS Bn
75th Fires
BDE
418th CA
Bn
555th Engr
Bde
DECISIVE OPERATION
6-9. Once the 5th HBCT secures Objective BEM, the 2nd HBCT conducts a forward passage of lines
through the 5th HBCT, east of OBJ BEM, and attacks to destroy the 261st Mechanized Infantry Brigade
Tactical Group and seize the key terrain vicinity of OBJ DIANA. This isolates REDLAND forces from
their support and sustainment bases. The 5th HBCT is initially the division’s main effort. The 2nd HBCT
becomes the division’s main effort once it begins its forward passage of lines through the 5th HBCT.
Priority of support once the 2nd HBCT becomes the main effort is to the 2nd HBCT and then to 5th HBCT,
the 87th IBCT, and 2nd SBCT and the 34th CSB (ME) in that order. The 555th Engineer Brigade is initially
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 6-5

Chapter 6
in direct support of the 5th HBCT and integrated into the 5th HBCT’s order of march. The 75th Fires
Brigade provides a reinforcing cannon battalion to the 2nd and 5th HBCTs. (Figure 6-4 is a schematic
showing the planned disposition of the division’s BCTs and the 34th CSB (ME) at the conclusion of this
phase. The other supporting brigades occupy bases and base clusters within the 34th CSB (ME)’s AO.
Notice that the size of each BCT AO is based on their areas of influence and the division occupies
noncontiguous areas along Highway 1.)
G
IN
RL THEB’SOL
DA
PL
X Def Stability
OBJ 5
JOHN
X Offense
34 56
Alba
Rive
r
X XX
2 OBJ
BEM
X Hi
87 gh X
w
ay 2
1
KILLEAN
EL
M
AM
M OBJ DIANA
PL
Lusk Reservoir
I
N
HR
ER
FA
EL
KE
PL
IS
R
PL
R
HA
PL XX
Figure 6-4. Schematic showing planned disposition of the 1st Division’s BCTs at the
conclusion of the attack
SHAPING OPERATIONS
6-10. The 5th HBCT (the initial main effort) attacks in the northern portion of the division's AO along
Highway 1 to destroy enemy forces (101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group) and secure OBJECTIVES JOHN
and BEM. The FSCL is initially PL FAHRNI.
6-11. The 2nd HBCT initially follows the 5th HBCT. It becomes the division’s main effort after conducting
a forward passage of lines with 5th HBCT east of OBJECTIVE BEM and attacks to destroy the 261st
Mechanized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group and secure OBJECTIVE DIANA. This assists in the C/JFLC
envelopment of the remaining REDLAND forces west of PL HARRIS.
6-12. The 87th IBCT attacks to fix the 512th Motorized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group in the southern
part of the division AO to protect the 2nd BCT from attack. The 2nd SBCT becomes the division reserve
after the 5th HBCT conducts its forward passage of lines through the 2nd SBCT’s positions.
6-6 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

6-13. The 75th Fires Brigade's priority of fires are the destruction of the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group
and other REDLAND forces located along the 5th HBCT axis of advance (Highway 1); blocking enemy
forces currently in the 87th BCT AO from moving to where they can influence 1st Division movement and
maneuver along Highway 1, and the continued execution of the division’s counterfire program in the
division’s AO.
6-14. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade initially places an attack helicopter battalion OPCON to the 5th
HBCT to help destroy previously detected enemy forces in the 5th HBCT AO and react to REDLAND
attempts to interdict traffic along Highway 1. This battalion remains OPCON to the 5th HBCT throughout
this phase of the operation. The 11th Aviation places another attack battalion OPCON to the 2nd HBCT
once the 2nd HBCT becomes the division’s main effort to help the 2nd HBCT destroy the 261st Mechanized
Infantry Brigade Tactical Group and secure OBJ DIANA. Prior to the commitment of the 2nd HBCT that
second attack battalion supports 87th IBCT efforts to fix the 512th Motorized Infantry Brigade Tactical
Group in its current position and block other 51st Motorized Division Tactical Group elements from
moving to where they can influence 1st Division movement and maneuver along Highway 1.
6-15. The 56th BFSB uses its assets to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations primarily to
determine the presence and composition of REDLAND forces on objectives JOHN, BEM, and DIANA
and other forces capable of interdicting Highway 1. The second priority is to detect REDLAND and
insurgent forces trying to move to positions from which they could interdict friendly movements along
Highway 1.
SUSTAINING OPERATIONS
6-16. The BCTs will provide the minimal amount of humanitarian assistance to GREENLAND civilians
encountered during their conduct of offensive operation consistent with international law during this
operational phase. Humanitarian assistance operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade
disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or
regions outside the United States. Military support provided by a BCT during these offensive operations is
only intended to temporarily supplement other agencies. It may include establishing temporary control of
and providing security to concentration of civilians encounter during the course of offensive military
operations. It will probably include the provision of—
x Temporary emergency medical treatment to civilian casualties of combat operations.
x Food.
x Water.
x Shelter.
x Transportation out of danger areas.
The BCTs will use their CMOCs to expedite the transfer of responsibility for the civilians they encounter
to GREENLAND civil authorities and appropriate international organizations.
6-17. The 27th Sustainment Brigade and 44th Medical Brigade continue to provide logistics, personal, and
FHP support to the division’s BCTs and supporting brigades. Priority is to the 5th HBCT until the 2nd
HBCT begins its forward passage of lines and becomes the division’s main effort. Sustainment operations
in the offense are characterized by high-intensity operations that require anticipatory support as far forward
as possible. Sustaining operations plans ensure agile and flexible capabilities to follow exploiting forces
and continue support. Commanders and staffs of these two brigades plan for increased quantities of fuel,
ammunition, and selected other classes of supply, as well as for maintenance and recovery of damaged
equipment. Planners address projected casualty rates and preposition medical treatment and evacuation
capabilities forward to efficiently evacuate casualties to where they can receive the appropriate medical
care. The division’s lengthening LOCs is a major challenge during this offensive operation. Transportation
support must be closely coordinated to deliver essential support to the right place at the right time with
security provided by organic and external elements.
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Chapter 6
6-18. When developing the force health protection (FHP) plan for the offense, the FHP planner must
consider many factors (FM 4-02.55). The forms of maneuver, as well as the threat’s capabilities, influence
the character of the patient workload and its time and space distribution. The analysis of this workload
determines the allocation of FHP resources and the location or relocation of medical treatment facilities
(MTFs). FHP for offensive operations must be responsive to several essential characteristics. As operations
achieve success, the areas of casualty density move away from the supporting MTF. This causes the routes
of medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) to lengthen. Heaviest patient workloads occur during disruption of the
threat's main defenses, at terrain or tactical barriers, during the assault on final objectives, and during threat
counterattacks. The accurate prediction of these workload points by the FHP planner is essential if
MEDEVAC operations are to be successful. As advancing combat formations extend control of the battle
area, supporting medical elements have the opportunity to clear the battlefield. This facilitates the
acquisition of the wounded and reduces the vital time elapsed between wounding and treatment.
6-19. There are two basic problems confronting the supporting medical units and MEDEVAC elements.
First, contact with the supported units must be maintained. Responsibility for the contact follows the
normal FHP pattern—higher echelon evacuates from lower echelon. The forward deployed air and ground
evacuation resources maintain the contact. Secondly, the mobility of the MTFs supporting the combat
formations must be maintained. The requirement for prompt MEDEVAC of patients from forward MTFs
requires available ambulances to be echeloned well forward from the outset. MEDEVAC support (both air
and ground ambulances) beyond the capabilities of the BSMC is requested through the division surgeon
section.
6-20. The 34th CSB (ME) remains responsible for security within its assigned AO and the security and
maintenance of division ground LOCs in that same AO. Through separate, but connected episodes, it will
be assigned temporary AOs to allow it to establish and secure movement corridors for ground LOCs
between the noncontiguous AOs of the BCTs. This allows the 27th Sustainment Brigade to conduct
periodic resupply of the forward support companies and CSSBs operating within those BCT AOs. The
brigade supports the division’s stability operations by conducting initial damage assessments, repairing
critical civil infrastructure within its capability, and providing local security to population centers within its
AO until local control is established. This becomes more important as the division begins recovering
previously occupied GREENLAND territory containing significant numbers of civilians and the
boundaries of the brigade are adjusted based on METT-TC.
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE OFFENSE

6-21. The division MCG continues to give the commander the flexibility to move—with a small staff
element—to critical positions on the battlefield where he can best employ his battlefield presence to assess
the situation and make adjustments by seeing, hearing, and understanding what is occurring.
DIVISION MAIN CP
6-22. The main CP remains in its previous location in the joint security area throughout the conduct of this
phase. The main CP retains primary responsibility for planning sequels to current operations, intelligence
analysis, estimates, and provides support to the controlling TAC. This support may include planning
branches to current operations that the controlling TAC is unable to conduct the necessary planning.
Through the orders process, units may be task organized, missions assigned, and priorities set for fires,
intelligence collection, support functions, and force protection. All elements of the main CP coordinate
with higher headquarters to remain synchronized with their intent and efforts, and will normally coordinate
information with corresponding elements at the TACs through multi-user voice and data networks.
6-23. The plans element continues planning sequels for the next phase of the operation—which will focus
more on stability operations than offensive operations. They are assisted in this task by a civil affairs (CA)
planning team from the 418th CA Battalion. The intelligence element provides analysis of all information
collected. The current operations element provides the division's common operational picture (COP)—
developed by TAC 1 as the controlling TAC at this time—to all main CP elements to enable the main CP
staff to provide estimates and plans based on accurate information of forces available and the enemy
6-8 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

situation. The CMO element maintains liaison with the 418th CA Battalion CMOC and the CA companies
supporting the BCTs.
6-24. The fire support element (FSE) at the main CP continues to synchronize the planning of Army
indirect fires, joint fires and offensive IO to support the division commander’s intent through physical
destruction, information and denial, enemy system collapse, and erosion of enemy will. The FSE does this
by taking into account the current factors of METT-TC to accomplish its functions previously outlined in
Chapter 2. Specifically this includes consolidating, synchronizing, and distributing targeting lists and all
fire support coordinating measures in support of the division's mission, such as No Fire Lists and
Restrictive Fire Lists. The FSE routinely coordinates operational- and tactical-level targeting, immediate,
and planned close air and air interdiction requests.
6-25. The coordinating and special staff sections within the main CP remain fully involved with the
C/JFLC/7th Army sustainment directorate (in their role as the ASCC) and the TSC staff. They retain
responsibility for ensuring the provision of sustainment to division current and future operations. This will
require flexibility and foresight on their part as they begin obtaining those CLASS X items needed for the
conduct of stability operations beyond humanitarian assistance in the next operational phase of the joint
force commander’s campaign. Indeed some orders for especially long-lead items will need to have been
placed even before the division deployed into the theater of operations.
DIVISION TAC 1 AND TAC 2

6-26. TAC 1 is the controlling headquarters for offensive operations. During the division’s conduct of
defensive operations discussed in the previous chapter it assumed responsibility for planning and
overseeing the division’s preparations for offensive operations even while it supervised divisional elements
processing through theater RSO&I activities. This included the conduct of rehearsals. Of course those
divisional units not currently actively committed to current operations—2nd and 5th HBCTs—were more
free to participate in all preparatory activities that those divisional units, such as the 2nd SBCT, 87th IBCT,
75th Fires, and 11th Combat Aviation Brigades, that were conducting defensive combat operations. For
example in the case of these later organizations liaison officers often had to represent their respective
commanders during the conduct of division-level rehearsals.
6-27. When the offense begins, control of the forces currently in defense passes to TAC 1. TAC 1
coordinates for the forward movement of the fire support coordination line (FSCL) from PL FAHRNI to
PL KEELER, and later to PL HARRIS. The FSCL movement is coordinated with the C/JFAC ASOC
through the C/JFLC fires directorate and BCD in conjunction with the forward movement of division units.
During the offense, the TAC 1 FSE provides input to FRAGOs, monitors the current fight, monitors
shaping operations, recommends reallocation of fires/effects assets, and recommends changes to
fires/effects priorities.
6-28. TAC 1, as the controlling headquarters, is responsible for coordinating the activities of the
supporting brigades with the actions of the division’s BCTs. It supervises the handover of time-sensitive
target information from the 56th BFSB to the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade or 75th Fires Brigade as
appropriate. If necessary, TAC 1 can designate an AO for the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade to help the
brigade engage the enemy and direct the division’s reconnaissance and surveillance assets, such as
unmanned aerial systems or other sensors, conduct combat assessment after the conclusion of strike
operations. The TAC 1’s involvement is necessary to integrate division-directed warfighting functions,
such as ISR and fire support activities, in the unassigned areas of the division AO. Additionally, TAC 1
will designate temporary AOs that the 34th CSB (ME) can use as movement corridors to ensure the security
of supply convoys moving between the division sustainment area and the BCTs brigade support areas. The
56th’s BFSB’s reconnaissance squadron may also be assigned an AO to facilitate its activities.
6-29. TAC 2 is assigned responsibility for synchronizing the division’s ongoing stability operations once
the division transitions to the offense. This is especially important as the division begins recovering
previously occupied GREENLAND territory. This requires TAC 2 to provide stability input for the
FRAGOs issued by TAC 1 and orchestrate division responses to humanitarian assistance requirements
during this phase to include the handling of displaced persons. TAC 2 takes advantage of the G-9 staff
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Chapter 6
section at the main CP and the 418th Civil Affairs Battalion’s civil affairs planning team as it coordinates its
actions with the GREENLAND government and various local and international volunteer organizations.
6-30. TAC 2 is also given two “be prepared” missions. The division commander wants TAC 2 to be
prepared to produce a division river crossing plan as a branch to the current operation and act as the
crossing force headquarters if the complexity of the division’s river crossing operations during the attack
exceed the capability of a BCT to command and control. Alternatively, the division commander knows that
he may need TAC 2 to develop a branch plan and control division air assault operations designed to secure
the Lusk Reservoir dam to prevent its destruction by REDLAND forces and the resultant long-term
negative effects on the GREENLAND civilian economy.

6-31. The STB continues to support each division command post with life support, communications, and
security throughout the division’s conduct of offensive operations. It provides or coordinates for additional
assets to support the movement of the various CPs as required.
BCTs IN THE OFFENSE

6-32. The operational concept of full-spectrum operations and the division’s transition to a focus on
offensive operations means that while the majority of the division is conducting offensive operations,
simultaneously, some division elements are conducting simultaneous defensive and stability operations. In
this illustrative scenario, while the 2nd HBCT and 5th HBCT conduct the division’s decisive operations, the
2nd SBCT will conduct local security operations as it prepares to be committed as the division reserve.
6-33. During this operational phase focused on offensive operations the division’s BCTs conduct of
stability operations are largely concentrated on ending or alleviating human suffering. This humanitarian
assistance only temporarily supplements or complements the efforts of the GREENLAND civil authorities
or agencies that have primary responsibilities for providing relief. The health and infrastructure conditions
encountered by the BCTs during their advance will vary extensively ranging from adequate to non-
existent. The potential for violence, crime, theft, escalation of terrorist acts, and further destabilization is
always present. The potential for shifts in the perceptions and attitudes of the local GREENLAND
populace is always present. As a minimum, the BCTs are responsible for providing a secure environment
for humanitarian relief efforts conducted by other agencies to progress.
6-34. The engineer elements within the BCTs will concentrate on providing mobility support to their
respective BCTs, to include the use of their task-organized dry and wet-gap crossing and minefield
breeching capabilities. Their respective commander will employ their countermobility, survivability, and
general engineer capabilities as necessary to accomplish their assigned missions.
2nd SBCT
6-35. The 2nd SBCT initially conducts an area defense during this phase. It establishes two passage lanes—
Alpha and Bravo—and assists in the forward passage of the 5th HBCT and 2nd HBCT through its AO. PL
MAMMEL is the battle handover line. After the 5th HBCT completes its forward passage, the 2nd SBCT
begins mission staging operations (MSO). The 2nd SBCT becomes the division reserve following the
completion of its MSO. The 2nd SBCT must be prepared to conduct a battalion air assault to secure the
northern dam and outlets of LUSK reservoir to prevent REDLAND forces from releasing the water stored
there and/or destroying the dam and generators located there and thereby causing significant long-term
disruption of the GREENLAND civilian economy. The 2nd SBCT must also be prepared to counter
REDLAND attempts to interdict Highway 1. Priority of planning goes to air assault followed by reaction
plans to any attempts by elements of the 10th Tank or 51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Groups or
insurgent forces to interdict Highway 1 and then to countering any REDLAND attempt to counterattack
from north to south across the ALBA River—the terrain feature forming the division’s northern boundary.
On order the brigade displaces from its current location and follows the 5th HBCT and 2nd HBCT to an
assembly area centered on the intersection of PL FAHRNI and Highway 1.
6-10 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

6-36. MSO is a deliberate process planned in advance by the division as part of the overall operation.
During MSO, the division cycles BCTs in and out of offensive and defensive operations, and a BCT will
refit, rearm, and replenish for three to seven days at high tempo. Mission staging for a single brigade
normally requires 24- to 72-hours. In this scenario, the 2nd SBCT stays in its current location. The 2nd
SBCT’s MSO remains under the control of the 2nd SBCT commander. He determines the order and pace at
which his battalions are restored to a high level of combat effectiveness. The 27th Sustainment Brigade,
working with the 21st TSC, arranges for enough supplies and repair parts to restock the brigade. Available
replacements are also integrated into the 2nd SBCT’s subordinate battalions and companies during the
MSO. While conducting MSO, the 2nd SBCT is not available for tactical tasks other than local security.
5th HBCT
6-37. The 5th HBCT is initially the division’s main effort as it conducts a forward passage of line through
the 2nd SBCT to attack to destroy the remnants of the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group. Following the
destruction of the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group, it maneuvers along the axis of advance formed by
Highway 1 to secure OBJECTIVES JOHN and BEM. After seizing OBJECTIVE BEM, the 5th HBCT
establishes two passage lanes through which the 2nd HBCT can be committed to seize OBJECTIVE
DIANA. Securing OBJECTIVE BEM enables and expedites the forward passage of lines of the 2nd HBCT.
6-38. While the 5th HBCT will attempt to seize the existing Highway 1 bridges, the brigade prepares to
conduct river crossing operations as part of operations designed to secure both OBJECTIVES JOHN and
BEM. The existence of bridges over the various tributaries to the ALBA RIVER—either existing ones
seized relatively intact or emplaced as part of the brigade’s river crossing operations—are key to the
division’s continued advance. Therefore the brigade secures each objective with at least a combined arms
battalion. (FM 90-13 discusses river crossing operations.)
2nd HBCT
6-39. Until the 5th HBCT seizes and secures OBJECTIVE BEM, the 2nd HBCT follows the 5th HBCT
along the axis of advance formed by Highway 1. On order, the 2nd HBCT conducts a forward passage of
lines through the 5th HBCT, attacks to destroy the 261st Mechanized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group, and
secures OBJECTIVE DIANA, the bridges north and east of KILLEAN. Securing OBJECTIVE DIANA—
in conjunction with the operations of the 2nd Division—completes the isolation of the majority of
REDLAND’s combat power. It also prevents REDLAND from reconstituting an operational reserve—the
26th Mechanized Infantry Division's Tactical Group.
87th IBCT
6-40. The 87th IBCT attacks to fix the 512th Motorized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group in the southern
part of the 1st Division AO. This will deny the enemy the ability to expeditiously reposition elements of the
51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Group to conduct a counterattack into the flank of the division’s
advance along Highway 1 or interdicting that traffic artery.
SUPPORTING BRIGADES IN THE OFFENSE

6-41. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade receives priorities and mission orders from TAC 1. It provides an
attack battalion OPCON to 5th HBCT to support their attack to destroy the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical
Group and secure OBJECTIVES JOHN and BEM. That attack battalion will remain OPCON to the 5th
HBCT to assist in securing the axis of advance (Highway 1). The brigade’s second attack battalion initially
provides support to the 87th IBCT to help fix the 512th Motorized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group and
block the movement of other 51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Group and insurgent forces to
positions that would allow them to interdict Highway 1. It also provides assault lift capabilities to the 87th
IBCT to enable the infantry to fix 51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Group elements in their current
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Chapter 6
locations or block their movement to position where they could interdict Highway 1. 1On order it provides
an attack battalion OPCON to the 2nd HBCT to support their attack to destroy the 261st Mechanized
Infantry Brigade Tactical Group and secure OBJECTIVE OBJ DIANA. The aviation brigade provides
ER/MP UAS assets OPCON to the 56th BFSB. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade must be prepared to
provide assault lift capabilities to the 2nd SBCT, if the 2nd SBCT is ordered to secure the LUSK reservoir
dam. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade provides CH-47 support to the 27th Sustainment Brigade for the
purpose of conducting aerial resupply of critical items. It also provides its aerial medical evacuation assets
in general support to the division.
27TH SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE AND 44TH MEDICAL BRIGADE

6-42. These brigades initially provide sustainment and FHP support from their locations in the division
sustainment area. The 27th Sustainment Brigade begins MSO to resupply the 2nd SBCT after the 5th HBCT
completes its forward passage of lines. The brigade continues to support the 5th HBCT and 2nd HBCT using
a combination of hasty and deliberate replenishment operations and MSO as they continue the attack and
cycle battalions and companies out-of-combat to replenish supplies. The 27th Sustainment Brigade supports
the 87th IBCT and all other divisional units using a mix of supply-point and distribution-based support. It
uses its available assets to provide this support, to include the use of USAF fixed-wing aircraft and
helicopters to deliver supplies and personnel when needed.
6-43. The 27th Sustainment Brigade normally provides movement control assets, such as a movement
control team, to the division transportation officer (DTO) to help him plan the movement of logistical
convoys throughout the division AO. The division current operations element in TAC 1 integrates these
convoys and their associated convoy escorts into the division’s ongoing operations. Other movement
control teams stationed at key locations along the division’s main supply routes help the DTO control and
assess the conduct of convoy operations within the division area of operations.
6-44. The first scheduled deliberate replenishment operation for the 5th HBCT occurs in OBJECTIVE
JOHN after it is secured. The first scheduled deliberate replenishment operation for the 2nd HBCT occurs
along the axis of advance in the vicinity of PL KEELER before its forward passage through 5th HBCT
forces on or around OBJECTIVE BEM. The second deliberate replenishment operation for the 5th HBCT
occurs on OBJECTIVE BEM after the BCT secures that objective; the 2nd HBCT conducts its forward
passage of lines and is advancing toward OBJECTIVE DIANA. The second scheduled deliberate
replenishment operation for the 2nd HBCT is scheduled to occur after it secures OBJECTIVE DIANA. The
division commander chooses to conduct a MSO for the 2nd SBCT because a MSO rapidly restores the
maximum possible combat effectiveness to a BCT. However, because a BCT undergoing MSO can only
perform local security tasks, the division commander must ensure that the tactical situation allows the 2nd
SBCT to “stand down” from operations for the one to three days it takes to conduct a MSO.
6-45. The 27th Sustainment Brigade's can support the division’s BCTs and support brigades with aerial
delivery equipment and systems, to include parachute packing, air item maintenance, and rigging of
supplies and equipment. The brigade can use airdrop resupply operations to support all of the division’s
elements. The 27th Sustainment Brigade's airdrop supply company may also support the movement of
personnel, equipment, and supplies. As a vital and flexible link in the distribution system, it provides the
capability of supplying the force even when land LOCs are disrupted. (FM 100-27 addresses the aerial
delivery of supplies.)

6-46. As offensive operations commence the 34th CSB (ME)’s MP and engineer forces clear, maintain and
secure the movement routes to ensure freedom of movement for sustainment elements and follow on
maneuver forces. Engineer forces, in conjunction with CBRNE elements, conduct initial damage
assessments and repair critical civil infrastructure within their capability. MP forces, in conjunction with
the GREENLAND 3rd Battalion 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade, provide local security to population
centers to create a stable and secure environment. Additionally, AMD efforts are integrated into the
maneuver formations to ensure AMD coverage throughout the movement of the Division.
6-12 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

6-47. The extended size of the division AO as the division attacks toward OBJ DIANA means that the 34th
CSB (ME) cannot secure the entire length of the division’s main supply routes (MSRs) from aerial and
ground attack even though it was reinforced by the addition of both a MP and GREENLAND motorized
infantry battalion. (The distance between PLs MAMMEL and PL Harris is approximately 175km.) The
complex mountainous terrain in the southern portion of the division AO means that there is a high
probability that small REDLAND forces will penetrate through 87th IBCT positions and attack friendly
forces moving along Highway 1. Therefore, the brigade provides convoy security to sustainment convoys
traversing division MSRs in accordance with division taskings. Another technique is for TAC 1 to
periodically assign the 34th CSB (ME) temporary AOs along Highway 1 to allow the 34th to establish
mobility corridors that allow sustainment convoys to move between the division sustainment area and
brigade support areas.
6-48. The 34th CSB (ME) engineer elements will construct the division detainee holding area operated by
the 591st MP Company (CS) of the 59th MP Battalion. The 34th CSB (ME) may also be called on to assist in
the construction of one or more BCT initial detainee collection points. The 34th CSB (ME) also prepares
for the operation of dislocated civilian (DC) facilities before they return to their own homes. DCs should be
evacuated from areas they may interfere with the division's current or future operations. Alternatively,
GREENLAND authorities can assume responsibility for them. The brigade coordinates its DC activities
with GREENLAND civil authorities using the division CMOC established by the 418th CA Battalion since
the CA company that previously supported the 34th CSB (ME) during the defense is now supporting the 2nd
HBCT.
6-49. The 325th CBRNE Defense Battalion conducts chemical reconnaissance and decontamination as
required to ensure that division operations along ground MSRs are not degraded by REDLAND
employment of CBRNE weapons or the release of toxic industrial chemicals and materials (TIC/TIM).
Chemical reconnaissance elements assess sensitive sites within the AO to identify potential hazards to
military and civilian personnel.
6-50. The 34th CSB (ME) remains responsible for the conduct of CMO within its AO even though it no
longer has a supporting CA company. This will require commanders and staffs within the brigade to
maintain previously established relationships or establish new personal relationships with GREENLAND
civil authorities, local informal leaders, and a variety of international and private volunteer organizations to
ensure the successful conduct of brigade stability operations without the presence of Army-trained civil
affairs specialists.
56TH BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE

6-51. As the 1st Division transitions from the defense into the attack, the 56th BFSB continues to conduct
reconnaissance and surveillance operations designed to satisfy the division’s information requirements.
The brigade focuses its collection efforts on the division’s multiple intermediate objectives as well as the
final objective. Concurrently, the 56th BFSB staff—in collaboration with the 1st Division staff and in
concert with the staffs of the divisions BCTs and supporting brigades—turn their collective planning
efforts toward sequels focused more on stability operations rather than combat operations. Its collection
tasks during this phase are to—
z Track the movements and activities of previously identified REDLAND units, to include their
tactical and operational reserves, in addition to insurgent forces and terrorists groups.
z Continue—
Surveillance of the LUSK reservoir dam and key bridges along the division’s avenue of
approach to support the commander’s decision point to use existing bridges or conduct river
crossing operations.
Reconnaissance of fording sites and key, secondary, and alternate routes along the division’s
avenue of approach.
z Detect the movement of REDLAND, insurgent, or terrorist elements into the flank of the
division’s advance.
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Chapter 6
z Gather detailed information about applicable civil considerations in the area projected to be
occupied by the division after the conclusion of conventional combat operations.
6-52. This last bullet includes a lot of non-standard information. Examples of this non-standard
information include the location and condition of critical infrastructure; cultural, religious, and historical
monuments or points of national or regional pride; and local and regional power brokers in the 1st
Division’s AO. The G-2 must be able to recommend which areas should be occupied by specific 1st
Division units; matching terrain and enemy situation to specific units. Whenever possible, these areas
should closely match existing GREENLAND political boundaries to assist in handing authority back to the
GREENLAND government once the security situation permits. Additionally, the division commander
should match the personalities of his BCT and supporting brigade commanders with their GREENLAND
counterparts in an attempt to make more cohesive teams. The 56th BFSB must prepare to supply this
information as the division’s post-conflict responsibilities begin to be more clearly defined.
6-53. The BFSB staff is able to respond to the extremely varied requests for information during this phase
with help from C/JFLC, JFC, and nationally controlled assets. For example, a JSTARS aircraft could detect
significant vehicle movement within a BCT AO. The BFSB staff would conduct analysis to determine the
source and probable composition of the vehicle movement. The staff would also determine if there is
additional information required. In this case the 56th BFSB could re-task a UAS to the location determined
by the JSTARS, confirming that the vehicle traffic was in fact a REDLAND tank company and not a line
of farm trucks and tractors carrying GREENLAND refugees. This in turn could drive a requirement to use
a long range surveillance (LRS) team to satisfy division information requirements if weather and terrain
prevents the UAS from determining what this REDLAND tank company is doing and its current strength.
6-54. As the 5th HBCT secures the 1st Division’s intermediate objectives, LRS teams observing those
objectives are relieved and moved to secure locations for resupply, rest, and later reinsertion. The LRS
company headquarters—in conjunction with the 3rd Squadron 23rd Cavalry and 56th BFSB staffs—continue
to conduct follow-on mission planning for the LRS teams. The 3/23rd Cavalry and the 56th BFSB staffs are
crucial to providing intelligence that support not only LRS operations, but employment of all brigade
associated sensors both organic and task organized. In a similar manner, the squadron’s two ground
reconnaissance troops conduct ground route and area reconnaissance of selected targeted areas of interest.
6-55. Supporting the attack, the 56th BFSB reinforces the 1st Division main effort by providing task
organized CI/HUMINT teams OPCON to the 5th HBCT and 2nd HBCT to conduct tactical questioning and
document exploitation. The brigade provides additional task organized CI/HUMINT teams OPCON to the
2nd SBCT, 28th SBCT, and 87th IBCT as they begin to transition to area security and force protection
operations within their assigned AOs. The bulk of the 513th MI Battalion’s Collection and Exploitation
(C&E) Company continues to support interrogation and document exploitation at the 1st Division's
detention center. Information from the C&E company is provided to the G-2 and BFSB for intelligence
target refinement for future operations.
6-56. For example, integrators from the 513th MI Battalion’s C&E company conducting an integration of a
REDLAND Soldier at the 1st Division Detention Center provide actionable intelligence about the location
of a previously unidentified multiple rocket launcher (MRL) battery. That information quickly passes
through the C&E company to the 56th BFSB and the division ACE for further analysis. The 513th MI
Battalion—in conjunction with the BFSB—conducts mission planning to redirect a technical sensor (in this
case an ER/MP UAS from the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade that is TACON to the 56th BFSB) to
investigate the suspected MRL location. The 513th MI Battalion staff conducts the technical planning to
redirect the USAS sensor, while the 56th BFSB staff determines if some other theater asset has already
discovered the MRL battery’s location. The brigade staff conducts coordination with the division staff as
well as the 75th Fires Brigade and 11th Combat Aviation Brigade to begin setting the conditions that would
enable the conduct of a strike operation against the MRL battery if the information is confirmed and the
situation and ROE permit the engagement of that battery. The BFSB staff continues to coordinate with the
BCTs not only for areas within which the brigade’s PROPHET teams can operate to collect against
REDLAND C2 nodes, but also local security for those same teams.
6-14 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

75TH FIRES BRIGADE

6-57. The 75th Fires Brigade executes strike operations before and after the start of ground offensive
operations. It conducts detailed planning and targeting—turning division targeting guidance into specific
targets and a fire support plan. It executes the division‘s counterfire program to prevent REDLAND
artillery from massing fires against the division’s northern two brigades. It provides suppressive fires
against enemy forces located in the southern portion of the division AO to deny enemy forces the ability to
reposition against the division’s main effort in the north. It attrits priority targets, such as identified enemy
company-sized elements, using its organic artillery systems. It provides SEAD in support of 11th Combat
Aviation Brigade strike and air assault operations. The 75th Fires Brigade also provides cannon artillery
battalion to provide reinforcing fires to the two HBCTs in the northern part of the division AO in support
of the division's main effort.
6-58. The fires brigade’s fire support element participates in the targeting process with the division fire
support cell and coordinates and synchronizes the various targets—and the desired effects on those
targets—assigned to the fires brigade. The fires brigade fire support element leads the decide, detect,
deliver, and assess targeting process for both lethal and non-lethal fires for the fires brigade. It integrates
available fire support, joint fires, and offensive IO. The fire support element coordinates the brigade fire
support plan with adjacent, higher, and subordinate fire support elements.

6-59. The 418th CA Battalion task organizes its companies by placing all four OPCON to the division’s
four BCTs. These CA companies either establish or maintain previously established brigade-level CMOCs
and coordinate with local mayors and community leaders to include those individuals returning to coalition
control during the conduct of the division’s offensive operations. The focus of this coordination is the
temporary provision of humanitarian assistance to GREENLAND civilians until those civilian population
groupings can return to GREENLAND civil control. As situationally allowed, the 418th and functional
assessment teams from higher echelon civil affairs and other organizations will conduct many different
types of surveys—to include such things as the determination of civilian food stock levels, inventories of
the condition and capabilities of the existing civil infrastructure, and civil population opinion poles—
designed to provide the information necessary for the effective planning of future stability operations.
555TH ENGINEER BRIGADE

6-60. The 555th Engineer Brigade provides engineer support, primarily bridging and other mobility
enhancing assets, to the two HBCTs attacking along Highway 1 in the northern part of the division AO and
provides C2 for river crossing operations. Initially in direct support of the 5th HBCT, the 555th Engineer
Brigade is integrated into the 5th HBCT’s movement columns and combat formations. Once the 5th HBCT
secures OBJECTIVE BEM, the 555th Engineer Brigade is in direct support of the 2nd HBCT for the
duration of the offense. However, if REDLAND countermobility efforts are successful, situationally
appropriate elements of the 555th Engineers will be left in support of the 5th HBCT to ensure the continued
trafficability of Highway 1.
6-61. During the offense, the 555th Engineer Brigade also conducts engineer-related critical
infrastructure—such as sewer, water, electrical generation and distribution, and trash collection and
disposition—conservation, maintenance, and reconstruction tasks in the areas behind the lead BCTs. At the
end of the offensive phase, the 555th must be prepared to rapidly support construction of division base
camps with priority to survivability tasks.
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(BLANK PAGE)
1 Chapter 7
2
3 Stability Operations
4 Stability operations sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations,
5 and resources. They employ military capabilities to reconstruct and establish services
6 and support civilian agencies. Stability operations involve both coercive and
7 cooperative actions. They may occur before, during, and after offensive and
8 defensive operations; however, they also occur separately, usually at the lower end of
9 the range of military operations. Stability operations lead to an environment in which,
10 in cooperation with a legitimate government, the other instruments of national power
11 can predominate in an effort to achieve long term stability.
12 7-1. The following pages continue the scenario introduced in Chapter 3 of this manual and illustrates one
13 of many ways in which a division could conduct FID after the conclusion of offensive operations. This
14 manual includes the FID scenario because it is the more likely of the two types of stability operations to be
15 conducted by divisions during the projected lifespan of this field manual-interim. (Peace operations
16 encompass the other type of stability operations that will likely require an entire modular division with
17 multiple BCTs and the full suite of supporting brigades to conduct.) A division headquarters may be
18 involved in the planning of the other types of stability operations, but the actual execution is usually left to
19 a BCT or support brigade. (FM 3-07 discusses each type and form of stability operation.)
20 7-2. The C/JFLC offensive succeeded in causing those REDLAND forces not destroyed during the
21 coalition attack to withdraw from GREENLAND territory. However, a small percentage of REDLAND
22 Soldiers assigned to divisions destroyed during coalition offensive operations chose to disperse and join
23 forces with the ongoing insurgency or terrorists groups rather than be captured and placed into EPW
24 facilities for later repatriation to REDLAND. Their motivation for joining the insurgency varies widely
25 from religious fanaticism to ethnic affinity with the Atropian insurgents. Their motivation for joining
26 terrorist groups might include a willingness to act out their pathological desires. The military training and
27 equipment that these individuals possess make them welcome to insurgent forces and terrorist groups
28 operating within both rural and urban areas of the country. Intelligence determines that REDLAND covert
29 support to that insurgency remains active. Small terrorist base camps remain active in the border region
30 between GREENLAND and REDLAND.
31 7-3. In addition, combat operations resulted in the extensive devastation of much of GREENLAND’s
32 limited modern infrastructure. The ability of GREENLAND authorities to provide basic governmental
33 services to the entire civilian population is doubtful. The GREENLAND political leadership believes their
34 ability to mitigate the worst effects of those combat operations and meet the expectations of the civilian
35 population will directly affect the continued stability of the GREENLAND federation. The dissolution of
36 the federation would in turn negatively impact the continued ability to extract oil from the region with
37 corresponding effects on the local, regional, and international economy. The net result of these factors is
38 that the 1st Division will remain deployed in GREENLAND for an unspecified period to conduct full-
39 spectrum operations focused on stability.
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 7-1

Chapter 7
XX
101 SOCCE 1
X X X X X X X
2 11 27 SUST 34 56 92 MP 555
X I II II I I I
271
87 HHC 272 CSSB MP HHC HHC HHC
CSSB 59
273 CSSB
CSSB II II
X II II II
1-227 II 372
II 3-23 75 MP 528
2 2-227 ATK 325
ATK 27 BTB
II II II
X II II
1-101 UI I
527
513 MI 89 MP 694
28 U
2-101 ASLT II I/R
ASLT X II II
X II
44
591 MI 701 CID 725
99 2-192
34 BTB
GS II I
I 803
GN II 4-6 EOD
802 EOD 804 EOD
3
II
I
II II 308
56 BTB 6701
418 CA 11
ASB
1 Figure 7-4. C/JFLC task organization of 1st Division for Stability Operations (troops available)
2 7-4. The C/JFLC changed the division’s task organization to better fit the division’s new mission. (See
3 Figure 7-4.) The division lost the 4-44th ADA Battalion within the 34th CSB(ME) because the division no
4 longer required air defense capabilities after the successful conclusion of major combat operations. (The
5 theater Army air and missile defense command provides air and missile defense support to the division.)
6 The division lost the 75th Fires Brigade—less the 1-75th FA (MLRS)—because the projected workload no
7 longer supported the need for a force artillery headquarters. The division lost the 5th HBCT because the
8 existing factors of METT-TC no longer required two HBCTs in the division.
9 7-5. However, the C/JFLC provided the division increased capabilities in those areas more relevant to the
10 conduct of its stability mission. The C/JFLC assigned the division the 28th SBCT because its wheeled
11 combat vehicles were of greater utility, given the factors of METT-TC now existing, than the tracked
12 combat vehicles of the 5th HBCT in the division’s AO. The 92nd MP Brigade—with its additional
13 functional units—provides greater expertise in law enforcement and crowd control. (The 75th MP
14 Battalion was also transferred to the 92nd MP Brigade from the 34th CSB(ME).) The 555th Engineer
15 Brigade received additional engineer capabilities to accomplish infrastructure restoration. The 11th Combat
16 Aviation Brigade received additional lift assets to provide the division with the required degree of mobility.
17 The 56th BFSB received an additional MI battalion to provide the division the additional HUMINT
18 capability required to conduct counterinsurgency operations and the 4-6th Air Cavalry Squadron for aerial
19 reconnaissance. The division also received the recently constituted 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade of the
20 GREENLAND Territorial Army—and the mission of training this new organization—as part of C/JFLC
21 revised task organization of the division.
7-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Stability Operations
1 MISSION
2 7-6. 1st Division conducts stability operations within its assigned AO to enable the GREENLAND
3 government to secure the civilian population and provide essential governmental services to its citizens
4 until GREENLAND authorities and security forces can assume responsibility.
5 COMMANDER'S INTENT
6 7-7. The 1st Division conducts protracted FID operations within its AO. The desired end state is that our
7 AO is secure and stable with essential services restored, all under the control of GREENLAND authorities.
8 COMMANDER'S PLANNING GUIDANCE

9 7-8. The division conducts stability operations to secure the population and improve the environment to
10 facilitate the resumption of essential services and prepare for the transition of governmental and civil
11 services to designated GREENLAND civil or military authorities. C/JFLC tailored this division with
12 additional capabilities to assist in the conduct of stability operations. This includes the 92nd Military Police
13 Brigade headquarters with its related functional branch assets, another MI battalion (the 591st) tailored to
14 conduct HUMINT, the 4-6th Aerial Reconnaissance Squadron, two additional explosive ordnance disposal
15 companies (the 803rd and 804th), and other assets.
16 7-9. The division conducts operations along five logical lines of operations: security and control,
17 perceptions, governance and administration, infrastructure recovery, and humanitarian relief and
18 assistance. The security and control of the civil population is the division’s decisive operation; all other
19 lines of operations are shaping operations with perceptions being the first among these four interrelated
20 lines due to its cascading preparatory effects and influence on all other lines of operations.
21 7-10. The insurgent and terrorist organizations operating within the division AO will attempt to counter
22 US and GREENLAND activities along all lines of operations. Less overtly, those individuals currently
23 profiting from the existing instability will seek to hinder US and GREENLAND governmental efforts to
24 imposed stability and reconstruct the region’s governmental, social, informational, and economic structure
25 and thereby prolong the process to their individual benefit.
26 7-11. The C/JFLC plan for GREENLAND stability operations designated a division AO to the east of
27 OBJECTIVE DIANA. The area is predominantly rural with scattered small towns and no large urban
28 areas. Figure 7-5 depicts the division’s brigades and their assigned AOs. These brigade AOs are based on
29 existing GREENLAND county boundaries to ease military-to-civilian contact. The C/JFLC wants the
30 division's BCTs to share responsibility for the entire division AO. The support brigades will position the
31 majority of their assets inside the AOs of the BCTs to provide the most effective support while maintaining
32 adequate force protection based on the factors of METT-TC. The remaining elements of the division
33 headquarters and supporting brigades will co-locate at Camp Riley (the division's base camp). Figure 7-5
34 also shows Camp Riley as a base within the 2nd SBCT’s AO. The blocks in the lower right side of the
35 figure indicate the relative priority of effort given to each category of operations during this phase.
36 7-12. The division maintains the capability to conduct offensive operations to identify and assist local
37 security forces in identifying and apprehending local insurgent force elements and destroying terrorist cells
38 and insurgent main and local force elements within the AO. Our remaining heavy brigade combat team—
39 2nd HBCT—will be reinforced to conduct a defensive cover operation along the border to prevent cross-
40 border infiltration of supplies and personnel to insurgent groups and terrorists currently operating within
41 GREENLAND, deter any future cross-border invasion by REDLAND conventional forces, and, in the
42 event that deterrence fails, provide time for the rest of the division to deploy to defensive positions.
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 7-3

Chapter 7
X
XX X
KILLEAN 87 1 56
X X
11 92 MP
X Highway 1
X X
2 27 SUST 34
AL X X
BA
RIV 44 555
X Camp Riley E R
(Division Base)
28 Hi
gh
w
ay
X 2
(+)
2
Defense Offense
REDLAND
REDLAND
Stability Opns
1 Figure 7-5. Assigned AOs for 1st Division brigades
2 7-13. Each BCT commander is responsible for the security of coalition assets within his AO. Establish
3 bases and base clusters within that AO as required in accordance with the factors of METT-TC and adjust
4 force protection measures to reflect existing threat conditions. The supporting brigades have elements that
5 need to be positioned within these BCT AOs to support activities along the 1st Division’s five lines of
6 operation for this phase. The appropriate BCT will approve the location of the field sites and bases
7 occupied by these support elements prior to their occupation. Each BCT commander designates reaction
8 and response forces for all the bases and base clusters in his AO and updates his security plan in response
9 to the changing situation. (FM 3-90, Appendix E, provides details on the conduct of base security.)
10 7-14. The C/JFLC commander assigned the division the recently constituted GREENLAND 99th
11 Motorized Infantry Brigade along with the mission of training and certifying its readiness. I am assigning
12 the 2nd SBCT, 28th SBCT, and 87th IBCT commanders training responsibility for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
13 Battalions of the 99th Brigade, respectively. The division chief of staff, assisted by the division staff, is
14 responsible for training the 99th Brigade staff. The division special troops battalion is responsible for
15 training the GREENLAND 15th Signal Company, 99th Brigade. The 27th Sustainment, 44th Medical, 56th
16 BFSB, and 555th Engineer Brigades are responsible for training their counterparts within the 99th
17 Motorized Infantry Brigade—the 99th Support Battalion, the support battalion’s medical company, the 14th
18 Reconnaissance Company, and the 13th Sapper Company.
19 7-15. Discipline, cultural awareness and understanding, respect for the rule-of-law, and effective current
20 ROE are central to success. Actions speak louder than words and one incident of over-reaction; one picture
21 of a GREENLAND civilian being mistreated or US troops acting in an undisciplined and destructive
22 manner will counteract days, weeks, and months of favorable media coverage, the development of
23 favorable perceptions, and the development of realistic expectations.
7-4 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

1 1ST DIVISION CONCEPT FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

2 7-16. Each of the four BCTs assigned AOs—2nd HBCT, 2nd SBCT, 28th SBCT, and 87th IBCT—
3 assisted by the division’s supporting brigades will conduct tasks in support of the five lines of operations.
4 These brigade AOs constitute the entire division AO. The 2nd SBCT AO currently consists of two
5 counties—KREEL and GONGKA. After the 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade completes its training and
6 certification, it will assume responsibility for GONGKA (the western county). The 2nd SBCT AO will
7 retain responsibility for the KREEL (the eastern county).
8 7-17. Roughly 50-percent of the division’s combat power should be involved in offensive actions designed
9 to track down and kill or capture insurgents and terrorists. Only about 25-percent should be devoted to
10 static security operations designed to protect the division’s own facilities and critical civilian infrastructure.
11 This leaves roughly 25-percent involved in rest, training, sustainment, and other activities.
12 7-18. The functional brigades assigned to or OPCON to the division—11th Combat Aviation, 27th
13 Sustainment, 34th CSB (ME), 44th Medical, 92nd MP, and 555th Engineer support the BCTs in their
14 conduct of activities along the division’s five lines of operations. This requires most of their assets to be
15 under the operational control of the BCTs. Direct liaison is authorized between all division units.
16 7-19. The 1st Division Main CP, TAC 1, and TAC 2 will be co-located in the division base camp, Camp
17 Riley, during this protracted phase of the joint campaign. This recognizes the complexity of the stability
18 tasks that the division is conducting and greatly facilitates face-to-face coordination. It also simplifies the
19 provision of security to the various CPs. The Main CP retains responsibility for planning branches and
20 sequels to the division’s lines of operations. TAC 1 focuses on setting priorities, ensuring the
21 synchronization, and assessing the execution of division activities along all five lines of operations. TAC 2
22 focuses on the counterinsurgency objective within the security line of operation. The commander uses his
23 MCG to maintain contact with ongoing operations throughout the division AO as he moves to the location
24 where his presence can make the greatest contribution.
25 7-20. The BCTs will establish a number of bases and base clusters within their AOs. The location and
26 configuration of these facilities must be carefully considered to reduce their static security requirements to
27 free additional resources for the protection of critical civilian infrastructure. Camp Riley, the division base
28 camp, is a large facility housing the division headquarters and those elements of the division’s supporting
29 brigades not task organized out to the BCTs. It is centered on the division airfield. (See Figure 7-6.) The
30 34th CSB (ME) commander is the commander of Camp Riley and is responsible for operating the Camp
31 Riley Base Operations Center (BOC). He responds to the base security directives of the 2nd SBCT
32 commander since Camp Riley is a base located within the AO of the 2nd SBCT. Camp Riley is organized
33 with those organizations most vulnerable assigned areas within the center of the base. The size of the area
34 assigned within the base directly relates to the area needs of the organization to perform its functions and
35 its organic capabilities to secure that area. For security reasons those GREENLAND civilians residing in
36 the area occupied by Camp Riley were relocated after receiving compensation for the use of their land.
37 7-21. The division’s transition to a focus on stability operations makes it necessary to adjust the division’s
38 operational tempo and the timelines associated with its conduct of operations. For example, the division’s
39 current operations elements now need to be involved in making adjustment decisions out to a week before
40 execution. The division’s plans element is developing branches to current operations that will not be
41 executed for more than a week and sequels to the current operation which may not take place for more than
42 a month. The division fire support element may have twice-weekly meetings to prioritize target sets instead
43 of daily. The chief of staff adjusts the division’s battle rhythm as appropriate. The planning and operations
44 of the division’s BCTs and supporting brigades will also be extended. However, division responsibilities
45 for personal recovery have been expanded as additional civilian personnel (both DOD and contractor)
46 arrive in the AO. (See FM 3-50.1 for details on the division’s responsibilities for personal recovery.)
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 7-5

Chapter 7
X
CAMP RILEY
27 SUST
X X
56
44
X 555
XX 11
1
X BOC
92 MP
34
1 Figure 7-6. Schematic of Camp Riley
2 7-22. The division plans and current operations cells, assisted by the 418th Civil Affairs Battalion and
3 555th Engineer Brigade as required, integrate division operations along those lines of operations for which
4 they have the division lead. They synchronize the operations of the division’s brigades, higher echelons,
5 and outside organizations (such as other governmental agencies (OGA), the GREENLAND government,
6 and international and nongovernmental organizations) to accomplish the division’s mission. The key
7 element to coordinate with is the US Embassy’s Deputy Chief of Mission and the Ambassador’s Country
8 Team. Meetings with these two organizations will occur on at least a weekly basis. (The division and its
9 BCTs’ task and coordination lists will be discussed at those meetings.)
10 7-23. Interagency elements possess technical expertise rather than numbers and resources. Their method of
11 planning and operation is consensus-building (majority). The critical items that division personnel must
12 have before departing Country Team Coordination Meetings include—interagency personnel names, their
13 contact information (such as landline and cell telephone numbers, email addresses, URLs, building
14 addresses and room numbers), and the skill sets these personnel bring toward reconstruction operations.
15 Lists of the supplies and other resources these interagency elements need from the division to accomplish
16 their assigned tasks and any resources (to include funds) the division will in turn receive for accomplishing
17 specific projects are required. Additional required details include where and when these interagency
18 resources will be delivered and what the division must do to get these resources. Finally, staff officers
19 attending country team meetings must determine applicable Federal Contracting Regulations and any other
20 issues of which commanders and their contracting representatives must be knowledgeable.
21 7-24. The 101st Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) provides liaison between
22 any special operations forces operating in the division AO and the division staff. This liaison element
23 integrates and synchronizes the actions of SOF operating within the division’s AO (less the 418th CA
24 Battalion and 308th PSYOP Company which have a command relationship with the division). The SOCCE
25 assists the SOCEUR commander in fulfilling his supporting commander responsibilities in several ways. It
26 provides a positive means for the SOCEUR commander to ascertain the division commander’s needs. The
27 SOCCE may provide a responsive reporting capability in those situations where the SOCEUR commander
28 has been requested to provide information requirements of the division commander, such as SR reporting.
29 The SOCCE can exercise C2 of designated ARSOF units when the SOCEUR commander determines the
7-6 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

1 need for such a command relationship to facilitate his supporting commander responsibilities. The SOCCE
2 can also provide a monitoring capability should the EUCOM or SOCEUR commander decide to place
3 ARSOF in a command relationship to the division. An example of this could be the attachment of SF
4 detachments under the control (OPCON or TACON) of the division to improve the division commander’s
5 ability to employ subordinate multinational forces. The SOCEUR commander could transfer these forces
6 and pass control to the division with appropriate mission restrictions IAW his determination on the
7 employment of those forces such as "no reorganization of forces authorized or for use only in an advisory
8 assistance role with the designated multinational force."
9 7-25. The division requires the following critical capabilities. It must have a market research capability to
10 provide the division timely and accurate feedback on the civilian population’s perception of the division’s
11 progress along all five lines of operations to include determination of their top reconstruction priorities.
12 The area’s civilian population—as well as the insurgents and terrorists operating within the division’s
13 AO—must receive the division’s information and media operations if the division is going to be able to
14 influence and shape their perceptions and actions. Therefore, the division will use all means and modes to
15 deliver information. (This includes assisting in the rebuilding of radio and television transmitters and
16 establishing new ones to ensure that coalition and GREENLAND official broadcasts can be received. It
17 may include the procurement and distribution of radios and satellite dishes capable of receiving coalition
18 and GREENLAND official broadcasts.) The division must be able to identify different audiences and
19 employ repetitive and plausible themes. It must be able to correctly identify critical infrastructure nodes
20 within its area and then analyze the most probable and most dangerous threats to those nodes. In this way it
21 can marshal assets to protect these nodes. Lastly, it must be able to integrate its lethal and nonlethal
22 capabilities so that their application is appropriate to specific situational employment, thus reducing
23 collateral damage.
Table 7-1. 1st Division Internal Organization for Stability Operations

1/75th FA
A Co 513th MI
(MLRS)
(TUAS) 271st Sust Bn
528th Cbt 1-1-308th
2nd HBCT B Co 513th MI Construction TF from A-418th CA 591st MP Co
Engr Bn PSYOP
(Tech Collection) 555th Engr
2-1-308th
F-2/22 Inf (LRS)
PSYOP
1-99th Mot
Inf (GN) 272nd Sust Bn
Det 1 D Co-513th 2-308th CA Functional Tms
2nd SBCT 1/318th B-418th CA 592nd MP Co
MI (CI/HUMINT) PSYOP Construction TF from
Inf-28th
SBCT 555th Engr
1-3-308th
PSYOP 273rd Sust Bn
2-99th Mot D Co (-)-513th MI
28th SBCT Construction TF from C-418th CA 593rd MP Co
Inf (GN) (CI/HUMINT) 2-3-308th
555th Engr
PSYOP
3-1-308th
372nd Sust Bn
3-99th Mot Det 1 D Co-591st PSYOP
87th IBCT Inf (GN) Construction TF from D-418th CA 627th MP Co
MI (CI/HUMINT) 3-3-308th
555th Engr
PSYOP
11th Cbt
Avn
24
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 7-7

Chapter 7

99th Spt Bn (GN) (-)
27th Sust
Det 1, 803rd EOD Co
Med Co, 99th Spt Bn
44th Med (GN)
56th BFSB
D Co (-)-591st MI
92nd MP (CI/HUMINT)
HHC 99th Mot
Inf Bde (GN)
Div 15th Co (Sig)

TOC/STB 99th Mot Inf
Bde (GN)
101st SOCCE
418th CA
Bn
1 7-26. The division commander task organized previous and new capabilities to better respond to the
2 revised factors of METT-TC in a manner similar to that done by the C/JFLC commander. Table 7-1 shows
3 the division’s revised task organization. Appendix A contains the original brigade internal task
4 organizations.
5 SECURITY AND CONTROL

6 7-27. There are three major objectives for a security and control line of operation.
7 z First Objective. Securing the GREENLAND civilian population to isolate the insurgents and
8 terrorists from the population. While executing this task, we must identify and apprehend
9 insurgent and terrorist political infrastructure personnel and supporters within local
10 neighborhoods to cut off their flow of intelligence and support. A critical piece of this task is the
11 provision of force protection to division assets and requires the division to fortify its various
12 bases and facilities while simultaneously providing area and local security to selected locations.
13 We will execute this concurrent with securing the population.
14 z Second Objective. After the first objective is met, focus efforts on the re-establishment of the
15 local government and the placement of police officers in neighborhoods and rural areas. The
16 police will support the legitimacy of the reestablished government and deter insurgents and
17 terrorists from gaining access to the civilian population (within the division’s AO).
18 z Third objective. Eliminate outside support for GREENLAND insurgent forces and terrorist
19 elements operating across the international border. This requires the division and its combat
20 elements to conduct offensive operations designed to interdict the flow of supplies to insurgent
21 and terrorist groups, destroy their base areas, and kill or capture associated personnel.
22 7-28. Accomplishing these objectives are preconditions for the re-establishment of basic government and
23 civil services. The first step to achieving all these objectives along the security line of operations is the
24 establishment of an effective intelligence collection and fusion system and effective intelligence staff
25 representation in the operations directorate. The local population and the local police are effective sources
26 for collecting and exploiting actionable intelligence. Our Soldiers constant presence on the streets in joint
27 patrols with the GREENLAND police and the development of passive informer networks will provide
28 indigenous HUMINT. The associated force protection postures of our Soldiers and these local police
29 officers during these joint patrols should be roughly equivalent.
30 7-29. The key to success in security and control is effective and actionable intelligence at the local level.
31 Local personnel are necessary to identify insurgents and terrorists to local authorities and to US forces. The
32 use of GREENLAND security forces is essential to developing a legitimate government and thriving
33 society that provides long-term security and an overall better quality of life. Where possible this
7-8 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

1 intelligence must be fused between intelligence disciplines and shared laterally and vertically while
2 protecting sources. Nevertheless, local exploitation and fusion requirements share an equal priority with
3 regard to access to this intelligence.
4 7-30. The division will establish a secure environment within which political, economic, and social
5 progress is possible. Therefore, governmental legitimacy and micro-economic development must be
6 encouraged, facilitated, and enhanced while neutralizing the insurgents and terrorists. In addition to
7 governmental presence and legitimacy, an additional critical solution set is the microeconomic
8 development of areas and neighborhoods. This includes the provision of jobs and incomes for family
9 workers to keep the young men occupied while developing them into stakeholders in local economic
10 success.
11 7-31. GREENLAND security forces will operate in conjunction with US forces and assume the major
12 burden in operations when capable of so doing. This will occur in different areas within the division AO at
13 different times. These security forces consist of the civil police, paramilitary forces, and regular
14 GREENLAND military forces. That is why it is important for the GREENLAND 99th Motorized Infantry
15 Brigade and reconstituted GREENLAND civil police forces to complete their training and certification as
16 soon as possible. While these military and paramilitary forces have an accelerated training schedule,
17 standards must be maintained. GREENLAND elements that fail to meet standards will be retrained until
18 they do meet the standards. Together, US and GREENLAND forces will secure and separate the
19 population from the insurgents and terrorists while they neutralize and defeat the threats.
20 7-32. Friendly forces must neutralize the ability of insurgent forces and terrorists to conduct operations
21 designed to negatively influence the GREENLAND civilian population as the first objective of eliminating
22 these groups. This requires US forces to work at the local level with local authorities to identify, fix, and
23 apprehend or destroy local insurgent and terrorist cells that seek to exert control in rural communities,
24 cities, and towns within the AO. These local insurgent cells and terrorists groups are normally small but
25 comparably well armed. They are currently moving freely within the population and using raids, ambushes,
26 and small hit-and-run attacks to cause a constant stream of coalition and GREENLAND casualties in their
27 attempt to eventually drive coalition forces from GREENLAND while bringing into question the
28 legitimacy of the local representatives of the GREENLAND government.
29 7-33. The establishment of law and order is not as well documented in doctrine. It has the following four
30 basic components:
31 z Law. A basic code of law must be enforced to protect persons and property and provide for a
32 stable and secure environment (to include laws for public safety, such as traffic regulations and
33 curfew).
34 z Police. Responsible for enforcing the local laws and serve as the population’s first line of
35 defense. They must be out in the neighborhoods and involved directly with the local population,
36 enforcing the law and collecting information that may become actionable intelligence. They
37 cannot be allowed to sit in their police stations where they are vulnerable to attack. The police
38 apprehend criminals and those accused of breaking the law.
39 z Courts. Administer justice and process suspected criminals to determine innocence and guilt so
40 as to release the innocent and detain the guilty for punishment and later reintegration into civil
41 society when their risk to the population is minimal.
42 z Detention and Corrections. A legitimate government must have the ability to hold in detention
43 facilities and punish violators to deter crime and protect communities.
44 7-34. Policing in failed states is the art and science of collecting and exercising legitimate use of authority
45 and force for public order and safety. A legitimate police force requires the authority and training to
46 effectively employ force to protect the people and society. Their success ultimately depends on achieving
47 the trust and confidence of the local people. Trust and confidence develops when people are treated equally
48 under the law so they can effectively conduct commerce, go to school and otherwise interact within their
49 local communities. Policing must be a community based function as soon as possible. This starts with
50 establishing police stations and a policing force that has access to and serves the community. It is critical to
51 have the best ethical and moral training available to initiate this force while training a new police force on-
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 7-9

Chapter 7
1 the-street. Communication skills and interpreters are a key issue for police training. There is a real danger
2 of involving the police in the resolution of individual agendas and vendettas. This is in addition to threats
3 to the safety of local personnel involved in the provision of public safety.
4 Division Command Post

5 7-35. The intelligence cell is responsible for conducting those types of intelligence threat analysis
6 appropriate to this line of operation. (This includes pattern analysis, link analysis, cultural-tribal-religious
7 analysis, and communications-linguistic analysis necessary to understanding insurgent and terrorist
8 strengths, weaknesses, objectives, and probable courses of action.) The division G-9 civil-military
9 operations (CMO) team, acting as liaison with the 418th Civil Affairs Battalion assists in this process. The
10 Provost Marshal's (PM) office, assisted by the CID group supporting USAREUR/7th Army, is specifically
11 responsible for integrating forensic analysis and police intelligence operations in general, into the COP
12 while staying within legal and regulatory restrictions on their activities as they pertain to US citizens.
13 7-36. The intelligence cell accesses required additional intelligence resources external to the division using
14 secure information systems. These resources can be adjacent units, joint intelligence activities, and
15 government and nongovernmental centers of excellence internal and external to the theater of operations
16 for such things as cultural intelligence, information operations/perception experts, and political-economic
17 intelligence. As part of this process the intelligence cell determines the prevailing authoritative-social
18 structures (governmental, tribal, and religious) and personalities in various localities within the division’s
19 AO. It must continuously assess existing tribal rivalries, jealousies, and ethno-religious fault lines within
20 local communities.
21 7-37. The intelligence cell provides tailored intelligence, combat information, and civil-military operations
22 information to the division’s decision makers and their staffs. The personnel manning the ISR analysis
23 element should consist of the following:
24 z Intelligence and cultural specialists.
25 z Security personnel.
26 z Antiterrorism/force protection specialists.
27 z Major subordinate command (MSC) LNOs.
28 z Linguists.
29 z Contracting specialists.
30 z Department of State (DOS) representatives (if available).
31 z Political-military specialists (contractor or foreign-area officers).
32 z Engineers and public works specialists.
33 z PSYOPS personnel.
34 z Media relations specialists.
35 z Economic advisors.
36 7-38. The intelligence cell analysis element collects, analyzes processes, defines possible courses of action
37 for insurgent and terrorist forces, and then disseminates the necessary intelligence to vetted GREENLAND
38 security forces, and US forces in the AO. The primary benefit derived from the involvement of specialized
39 personnel in cross-functional analysis over a protracted time period is an increased ability to understand
40 insurgents and terrorists operating in the division area and thus predict their actions with a higher degree of
41 fidelity. The analysis element provides the division and 2nd HBCT indicators and warnings regarding the
42 movement of REDLAND conventional forces and REDLAND affiliated unconventional forces across the
43 restored international border.
44 7-39. The division current operations element within TAC 1—working with the Civil-Military Operations
45 Center (CMOC) operated by the 418th Civil Affairs Battalion—seeks to create unity of effort with those
46 organizations over which the commander does not enjoy a command relationship. This includes other US
47 governmental agencies, GREENLAND coalition military, GREENLAND civilians, international
48 governmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. This is because TAC 1 is responsible for
7-10 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

1 integrating all aspects of political, economic, and military power remembering the power of perception and
2 influence in this environment. It must orchestrate the distribution of reconstruction and relief funds, food,
3 medicine, educational services, fuel, employment, and the bestowing of recognition and respect on local
4 leaders. It does all this while seeking to maintain a high tempo of actions that forces the insurgents and
5 terrorists to always react to friendly operations instead of vice versa.
6 7-40. The division chief of staff is responsible for orchestrating the efforts of the division headquarters as
7 they educate, train, and certify the 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade headquarters staff. He takes advantage
8 of division information systems to reach back to CONUS and deliver training support packages developed
9 and maintained by TRADOC schools and centers. The English language skills of the GREENLAND
10 brigade staff and the availability of machine and human translators will impact the speed at which the
11 process will be complete.
12 7-41. The FSE in TAC 1 is responsible for synchronizing fire support, joint fires, and offensive
13 information operations in support of division operations. It is important that lethal and nonlethal effects and
14 means be integrated at all levels from a company-level reconnaissance patrol to the division. The division
15 is involved in a war of ideas, a battle for the mind and must react intelligently to intelligence and combat
16 information. It ensures that the actions of the BCT FSEs are integrated and synchronized with division and
17 C/JFLC operations. The FSE in TAC 2 is responsible for ensuring that fires delivered in support of BCT
18 counterinsurgency operations do not cause unintended second or third order effects on the division’s
19 overall stability mission. The division’s four USAF tactical air control parties are placed in support each of
20 the BCTs while the air support operations center remains integrated with the division’s co-located CPs.
21 This provides the division commander and his BCT commanders ready access to available joint fire
22 support.
23 7-42. The division employs information operations, nested with C/JFLC and EUCOM/JTF information
24 operations, to dissuade insurgents and terrorists of the legitimacy of their cause and convince
25 GREENLAND civilians and external audiences of the legitimacy of coalition actions. This will take
26 several different themes that must be deconflicted because of the different motivations of the insurgents
27 and terrorists within GREENLAND and the different civilian target audiences. There is a moral and mental
28 aspect to the division’s operations. At times this means that lethal means will be employed less often and
29 with greater restrictions because of the second and third order effects resulting from their employment.
30 7-43. The division PAO will accurately report division activities to the outside media (from the US, HN,
31 and other international affiliates) covering division operations. He will take every opportunity that occurs
32 in the process of describing division operation to educate the media on the character and abilities of US
33 forces in general and of those units assigned to the division in specific. Likewise, he takes every
34 opportunity to educate the media on the true horrific nature of insurgent and terrorist groups operating
35 within the division AO and the short- and long-range implications of any coalition failure to suppress these
36 groups. He constantly reinforces division and higher headquarters developed themes into his interactions
37 with the media to cause them to have an overall favorable opinion of the US mission and activities within
38 GREENLAND; since a favorable opinion translates into media and popular understanding of—and active
39 support for—US actions designed to provide area security within the AO.
40 7-44. The division G-6 is responsible for planning voice and data connectivity between all division assets
41 and coordinating voice and data connectivity with J/CFLCC.
42 Special Troops Battalion

43 7-45. This unit remains responsible for providing local security, communications, and life support for the
44 division’s co-located CPs.
45 2nd Heavy BCT (Reinforced)

46 7-46. This unit is responsible for conducting covering force activities designed to protect the rest of the
47 division from conventional and unconventional threats coming out of REDLAND into the division AO
48 until the division’s other forces and joint fires have time to react to their advance. It is also responsible for
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1 conducting offensive operations designed to destroy terrorist and insurgent base camps and kill or capture
2 terrorist and insurgent personnel located within its AO. It—and the other BCTs—work closely with the
3 division intelligence cell and the division’s SOF liaison element to determine those threat locations. The
4 intent is to establish a secure environment for the GREENLAND civilian population located within its AO
5 to enable humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations to take place.
6 2nd SBCT, 28th SBCT, and 87th IBCT

7 7-47. These units are responsible for establishing a secure environment for the GREENLAND civilian
8 population located within its AO. This enables the conduct of humanitarian relief and reconstruction
9 operations to take place within their respective AOs.
10 7-48. The BCTs concentrate on the elimination of the insurgents and terrorists, not on terrain objectives.
11 They maintain their offensive operational tempo throughout the length of the deployment. They do not let
12 the limited cross-country trafficability and lack of paved roads impede their conduct of offensive action.
13 Limited offensive operations are preferable to passive defensive measures.
14 7-49. At least 50-percent of the combat forces available to the BCTs should be devoted to the conduct of
15 offensive counterinsurgency and counter terrorism operations. These operations need to be in the locations
16 occupied by insurgent and terrorist groups. These forces must share the same environment as do the
17 insurgents and terrorists. The BCTs should be conducting offensive operations in the fields and forests of
18 their AO since the GREENLAND insurgency is largely rural-based. (Although the insurgents do have cells
19 operating in the small towns found within the division’s AO.) The BCTs should use the assault aviation
20 assets available within the division to conduct vertical envelopments designed to encircle identified
21 insurgent forces, staying off of roads and trails whenever possible. Commanders and staffs should consider
22 the use of all mobility means to include aircraft, tracked and wheeled vehicles, boats, animals, and even
23 porters. No more than 25-percent of the force should be devoted to defensive measures with the remainder
24 being a held as a reserve or conducting rest, maintenance and training.
25 7-50. The BCTs must plan for and use all available resources, both regular military and unconventional
26 methods and means, such as developing an understanding of tribal relationships, to isolate insurgent and
27 terrorist groups. They should avoid the establishment of semi-permanent patrol bases whose locations are
28 soon determined by these threats along with these bases’ areas of influence. Special attention should be
29 paid to ensure the motorized and mechanized units do not become bogged down in inappropriate terrain or
30 tied to static defensive locations.
31 7-51. Secrecy and surprise should be goals of every operation. OPLANs and OPORDs should provide for
32 effective and secure communications and take into account the likelihood that GREENLAND security
33 forces will be infiltrated by insurgent or terrorist personnel. BCTs should use a wide variety of methods
34 and unorthodox tactics and techniques to avoid establishing operational patterns that insurgent forces and
35 terrorist groups can recognize and to which they can develop counters or coping mechanisms.
36 7-52. Both US Soldiers and HN Soldiers should receive constant indoctrination on the mission and
37 purpose of US forces within GREENLAND and on the proper treatment of civilians, insurgents, and
38 terrorists. This can transpire during the conduct of regular training and during preparations for offensive
39 action. Those training programs should stress developing the offensive spirit, physical and mental stamina,
40 and the desire to seek out the insurgents and terrorists and destroy them to prevent the commission of more
41 atrocities on the civilian population of the region. The training of GREENLAND military, paramilitary,
42 and police forces—and their continued operational and logistical support—directly relates to this line of
43 operation.
44 7-53. BCT command and staff actions should emphasize centralized planning and decentralized execution
45 of small-scale tactical operations. They should always retain unity of command, or in the case of operations
46 involving forces that the division does not command, such as SOF and OGA direct action elements, the
47 retention of unity of effort. Extensive contingency planning for employment of reserve forces must be
48 conducted to avoid the development of a pattern for their commitment that insurgent or terrorist groups can
49 target.
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1 7-54. The BCT staffs must be involved with the intelligence cell at the main CP and with the 56th BFSB to
2 insure the detailed coordination of the intelligence collection effort. Both civilian and paramilitary
3 intelligence networks within the area must be incorporated into the analysis efforts. This requires the
4 detailed planning and coordination of military activities with those of civilian officials in the AO.
5 HUMINT nets must be established within the local population to include the use of informants paid for the
6 delivery of useful information. Interrogation of prisoners and suspects can provide extremely useful,
7 although usually time-sensitive information. Combat information must be rapidly passed to the division
8 analysis element from whatever the source and intelligence products disseminated to all concerned units
9 and individuals so that security forces can take immediate action to destroy identified insurgent forces,
10 terrorist groups, and individuals before they have the opportunity to carry out their planned activities or
11 disperse before being engaged by friendly forces.
12 7-55. The BCTs must incorporated and monitor activities along the other four lines of operations for their
13 impact on security operations. This includes such things as planning for and augmenting a plan for military
14 civic action, propaganda, and population control to remove insurgent influence from a target population. It
15 may include the requesting and distribution of resettlement supplies—building materials, food, water, and
16 tools—to the civilian population of a small area (humanitarian relief and assistance line of operations).
17 7-56. The BCTs must be judicious in the application of combat power in view of the overriding
18 requirement to minimize the alienation of the civilian population. This directly relates to the information
19 line of operation. The application of massive firepower can allow insurgent forces to break contact after
20 having inflicted casualties on friendly forces.
21 7-57. The 2nd SBCT will designate one of its four US battalions as the division ready reaction force. That
22 battalion establishes liaison with the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade.
23 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade, GREENLAND Territorial Army

24 7-58. This newly constituted unit is a key to providing the local force essential to establishing a secure
25 environment. However, before it can be effective, its leaders and Soldiers must be trained and educated.
26 Each of the brigade’s battalions is being trained by a BCT or counterpart support brigade. After its
27 component parts complete their training and certification process, the brigade can be reassembled and
28 given an AO. This, in turn, will allow the 2nd SBCT to return the 1-318th Infantry to the 28th SBCT. It is
29 envisioned that further GREENLAND Territorial Army brigades will be formed after the 99th Motorized
30 Infantry Brigade completes its training. Over time this allows GREENLAND to take over complete
31 responsibility for its ground security without the need for further US ground forces.
32 11th Combat Aviation Brigade

33 7-59. The brigade is responsible for providing attack and reconnaissance assets to support the 2nd HBCT.
34 It also provides attack and reconnaissance assets in support of all BCT offensive operations. This may
35 require the brigade to establish forward arming and refueling points within each BCT base camp. Attack
36 assets are also provided as part of the division ready reaction force in response to ground assaults on the
37 division and brigade base camps and scheduled convoys and other troop movements. (The division G-3
38 resolves conflicts between the 11th CAB and the supported brigades when there are not enough aviation
39 assets to provide the requested support.)
40 7-60. The 11th CAB provides lift and assault assets in support of maneuver and functional brigade stability
41 operations. The brigade also provides manned attack and reconnaissance and unmanned aerial surveillance
42 support to division operations to include support of major convoys. It is responsible for securing its
43 assigned area within the division base camp.
44 27th Sustainment Brigade

45 7-61. This brigade is responsible for the conduct of those logistical and personnel operations necessary to
46 sustain the division’s operations (minus medical operations and those acquisition, technology, and
47 contracting functions provided by teams from the European Army Field Support Brigade, a theater-level
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1 organization). The brigade is also responsible for training the staff and personnel of the GREENLAND
2 99th Support Battalion in sustainment operations and the provision of technical services (maintenance,
3 supply, and transportation). It is responsible for securing its assigned portion of the division base camp
4 perimeter.
5 34th Manuever Enhancement Brigade

6 7-62. This brigade staff runs the base operations center for Camp Riley, the division base camp, and sets
7 security policy for all units in the division base camp. It is responsible for establishing and training the base
8 defense force to include the response force. It plans the defense of the base camp, ensuring that each tenant
9 within the base camp participates as an integrated part of the base defense. It coordinates with the 2nd
10 SBCT for response force and tactical combat force operations. It coordinates with the division staff for
11 joint assets that support the defense of the division base camp. It is responsible for securing its assigned
12 portion of the division base camp perimeter.
13 7-63. The brigade will also provide forces to conduct various missions within the division’s AO in support
14 of BCT or functional brigade operations. These missions include the following:
15 z Critical asset and high risk personnel security.
16 z Area and local security operations.
17 z Construction and repair of fighting and survivability positions, airfields, and main supply routes.
18 z Assessment and mitigation of damage to GREENLAND infrastructure and industrial facilities.
19 z Assessment and mitigation of damage to GREENLAND industrial facilities and other
20 environmental hazards, such as toxic industrial materials.
21 z Support to efforts designed to neutralize any REDLAND CBRNE weapons stored or employed
22 within GREENLAND.
23 44th Medical Brigade

24 7-64. This brigade is responsible for the conduct of those FHP operations necessary to sustain the
25 division’s operations and is attached to the 27th Sustainment Brigade. It is also responsible for advising
26 and assisting their GREENLAND civilian and military counterparts (within the limits of legal and
27 regulatory guidance) in the reconstruction of GREENLAND public health support within the division’s
28 AO. The 44th Medical Brigade is responsible for training and certifying the Medical Company of the
29 GREENLAND 99th Support Brigade.
30 56th BFSB
31 7-65. As the division transitions from an emphasis on offensive operation toward stability operations the
32 56th BFSB continues to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations to provide the
33 division commander the information he needs to make logical decisions in a complex and ever changing
34 environment. The brigade focuses its organic reconnaissance and surveillance assets and leverages joint
35 and national level assets to support division operations. Those commanders and staffs served by the
36 brigade need information to plan, prepare, execute, and assess the division’s operations. The division staff
37 previously tasked the 56th BFSB to provide the information to support stability planning. During this
38 phase the brigade continues to refine previously provided information and answer new requirements for
39 information. The transition to stability operations means that the brigade will acquire a far larger percent of
40 the necessary information for CI/HUMINT source than it will from its technical sensors. This requires the
41 56th BFSB to serve as a force provider of CI/HUMINT assets for the BCTs, as well as an intelligence
42 collector. Key tasks for the brigade during this phase include the following:
43 z Conducting interrogations.
44 z Manning and managing the division’s document exploitation facility.
45 z Providing CI/HUMINT teams to BCTs and the 34th CSB (ME).
46 z Conducting division-level reconnaissance and surveillance.
47 z Providing early warning of REDLAND attack.
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1 7-66. The 56th BFSB staff—in collaboration with the 2nd HBCT and the division staff—plans to provide
2 sustained layer coverage of the restored international border between REDLAND and GREENLAND to
3 detect the movement of conventional and unconventional REDLAND forces, insurgent groups, and
4 terrorist cells between the two countries. Although the division-level information requirements are
5 physically located in a BCT’s AO, the division tasked the 56th BFSB to collect on the requirement, thus
6 reducing the requirements on the 2nd HBCT. This planning focuses on airspace management for brigade
7 tactical unmanned aerial systems (TUAS); manned aerial and ground reconnaissance, insertion and support
8 of LRS teams; and the 2nd HBCT’s organic TUASs. (Long-range surveillance teams are used in
9 conjunction with TUAS and the 3rd of the 23rd Cavalry’s two ground reconnaissance troops to provide all-
10 weather surveillance of selected NAIs along the border.) The 56th BFSB coordinates for security and
11 sustainment support for its elements operating in the 2nd HBCT’s AO with the 2nd HBCT, as required.
12 7-67. Division consolidates all PROPHETs under the control of the 56th BFSB to establish a baseline
13 across the division AO. As SIGINT is gathered, it is assessed for targeting and the raw information is
14 passed to the G-2 for analysis and fusion.
15 7-68. The 56th BFSB is the primary force provider for CI/HUMINT teams supporting the BCTs. These
16 teams are OPCON to the BCTs to facilitate collection from the population in their AOs. These additional
17 assets provided by the 56th BFSB allows each BCT to operate its own interrogation facility and collect
18 information specific to their AO. The 513th MI Battalion, Communications and Electronics Company,
19 continues to support interrogation and document exploitation at the Division Detention Facility.
20 7-69. Outside those assets supporting the 2nd HBCT along the border, the 56th BFSB provides continual
21 TUAS and ER/MP support to the 1st Division. The TUAS focuses on the division AO as a whole, instead
22 of focusing on a particular BCT AO. The TUAS in the BCTs also reinforce BCT surveillance efforts,
23 eliminating redundancies and economizing efforts.
24 7-70. The 3/23rd Cavalry is also responsible for training and certifying the 14th Company (Reconnaissance)
25 of the GREENLAND 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade. Other 56th BFSB elements will participate in the
26 training process as appropriate.
27 92nd MP Brigade
28 7-71. This brigade is responsible for providing critical asset protection for major convoys traversing
29 division major supply routes. This may be accomplished through direct convoy security patrols or the
30 temporary establishment of a mobility corridor along potential high threat areas. It provides a reaction
31 force for the Camp Riley. It is responsible for securing its assigned portion of the division base camp
32 perimeter and for conducting security patrols beyond that perimeter as directed to the base operations
33 center. The 75th MP Battalion performs these functions.
34 7-72. The brigade is also responsible for establishing and executing detainee operations at the detainee
35 holding area (DHA). The MP company commander operating the DHA has operational control over all
36 assets—medical, military intelligence, and others—when those elements are operating inside the holding
37 area. However, that MP company commander does not establish medical or interrogation priorities. The
38 MP company coordinates for the evacuation of detainees from the BCT IDCP through the DHA to the
39 higher-echelon theater internment facility.
40 7-73. The 92nd MP Brigade headquarters works closely with the Department of Justice and the 418th Civil
41 Affairs Battalion to stand up and train local GREENLAND police forces. The development of local police
42 is an important activity along this line of operations.
43 418th CA Battalion
44 7-74. This brigade’s 418th CA Battalion is responsible for establishing and running the division CMOC.
45 Information collected in the course of CMOC operations will routinely be provided to the division’s
46 intelligence cell.
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1 555th Engineer Brigade

2 7-75. This brigade is responsible for the conduct of those mobility, countermobility, and survivability
3 engineer operations necessary to support the division’s security operations. The brigade is also responsible
4 for technical oversight and training of the GREENLAND 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade sapper
5 company. It is responsible for securing it’s assigned portion of the division base camp perimeter
6 PERCEPTIONS
7 7-76. The active support and participation of the local GREENLAND civilian population is important to
8 accomplishing the 1st Division’s mission of conducting stability operations. The image that the 1st
9 Division wants to have in the minds of US, GREENLAND, and international civilians observing the
10 division’s conduct of stability operations is that the division is doing what it can reasonably do to provide
11 security to those GREENLAND civilians entrusted to its care. It respects the cultural heritage and religious
12 beliefs of the civilian population. And it is actively trying to restore GREENLAND’s battle damaged
13 infrastructure and civil governmental institutions as quickly as is prudent. This line of operations is a
14 shaping operation for the division. The 1st Division G-7 is the division lead for this line of operation.
15 7-77. The 418th CA Battalion’s civil information officer, the 308th PSYOP Company, the Joint
16 Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) supporting the EUCOM commander, and the division PAO
17 are integrated into delivering information that contributes to developing favorable perceptions of divisional
18 activities among GREENLAND civilians and international observers by the G-7. Close coordination for
19 timing and dissemination of messages is critical for success. Accurately informing the public about
20 ongoing activities will broaden popular support for the division’s operations and mission.
21 7-78. One of the foundations of the division’s information operations is ensuring that friendly information
22 operations are capable of influencing the civilian inhabitants of the region and the insurgents and terrorists
23 operating within it. This may required the division to make the repair of public electronic communications
24 sites and the acquisition and distribution of battery or solar charged radios a priority. However, the
25 electronic communications means provided by US forces can also be used by insurgents and terrorists to
26 distributed their own propaganda and themes. (The other foundation is an accurate analysis of the various
27 target audiences for our IO both within and external to the region.)

29 7-79. The division intelligence cell tasks the 56th BFSB and other divisional units to answer information
30 requirements related to this line of operation. These include those information requirements necessary to
31 conduct a target audience analysis, composition and exact nature of the target audience. Target audiences
32 may be defined based on the following factors:
33 z Language.
34 z Social studies.
35 z Religious beliefs.
36 z Location.
37 z Occupation.
38 z Race.
39 z Military and political affiliation.
40 z Education levels.
41 7-80. Collecting intelligence on the composition and exact nature of the target audience is the first step in
42 developing IO products. The definition of a target audience depends on a number of internal and external
43 conditions, as well as historical events and norms that have developed over time.
44 7-81. Intelligence assists in this process by describing the beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions of different
45 target audiences— how they perceive their environment. The more specific the information about the target
46 audience, the more successful the IO product or program will be. Much of this intelligence can be derived
47 from intelligence data bases and open source documents that include information about historical and
7-16 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

1 current events relevant to the particular target audience. Requests for information not available in materiel
2 available to the division are forwarded to other appropriate agencies as necessary. These agencies include
3 the C/JLCC operational intelligence and fires directorates, the joint intelligence center, and the DOS.
4 7-82. The G-7 incorporates information operations into all division operations in accordance with the
5 conduct of information operations as outlined in FM 3-13. The routine integration of lethal and nonlethal
6 capabilities in the accomplishment of division objectives reduces collateral damage and second and third
7 order unintended effects.
8 7-83. The information environment extends down to the average civilian and Soldier. Local events and the
9 immediate impressions of individuals about those events can have international significance as the global
10 media broadcasts them. The goals of the division’s information operations is to reassure, persuade, and
11 influence the local within the division’s AO and the local region to consent to our stability operations and
12 to work with divisional units. Since the GREENLAND civilian population was previously subject to
13 REDLAND propaganda and may still be recipients of that propaganda; they need objective, factual,
14 truthful, and credible information. The division’s IO need to propagate the core message, explaining the
15 objectives and role of the forces, and update the message and information in a consistent manner.
16 7-84. Additionally, the G-7 orchestrates the dissemination of information, such as minefield locations, how
17 to report or turn in weapons, and new or revised ordnances. He requests joint PSYOP assets to assist the
18 308th Tactical PYSOP Company as necessary to produce and disseminate this information using various
19 means to include: leaflets, posters, handbills, interviews, as well as loudspeaker, radio, and television
20 broadcasts. Tactical units within the BCTs will disseminate most of the printed material assisted by the
21 loudspeaker teams OPCON to those units.
22 7-85. The division’s information operations may also require the use of electronic warfare assets to locate
23 and counter REDLAND radio/television transmitters trying to destabilize the situation while
24 simultaneously securing our own use of the electronic spectrum. These transmitters can then either be
25 destroyed using a variety of lethal means or their transmissions jammed. Alternatively, if the ROE allow,
26 the wavelengths used by these transmitters can be electronically captured—this is most easily done on the
27 FM spectrum—and used by coalition broadcasts.
28 7-86. The PAO assists the G-7 efforts by conducting public affairs planning, developing information
29 strategies, and facilitating media operations that contribute to enhancing key audiences’ knowledge of US
30 intentions, capabilities, and alliances. This includes the internal audience of operation participants, the
31 American public, the citizens of the AO, and international audiences. The PAO is responsible for
32 establishing and running the division’s visitors bureau in a facility in close proximity to the co-located
33 division CPs. Other division staff elements will support the visitors bureau as required. Within the visitors
34 bureau the PAO will conduct regular information sharing sessions with local, national, and international
35 media. The division commander, assistant division commanders, and primary staff officers will also
36 conduct regular briefings to media and government officials. The division’s primary briefer will not be the
37 PAO. While the PAO will be involved in setting up press conferences and background briefings the G-3
38 will be the primary division briefer. As appropriate other senior individuals—such as the division
39 commander, the deputy division commanders, or chief of staff—will brief on high media interest topics.
40 2nd HBCT, 2nd SBCT, 28th SBCT, 87th IBCT, and 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade (GN)
41 7-87. These units’ activities along the other lines of operation helps to ensure that the GREENLAND
42 civilian population has a favorable perception of the mission and goals of US forces and are willing to
43 support US forces in attaining those goals. These brigades can bring overwhelming force upon their choice
44 of objectives. To do so without consideration of the political, economic, and social consequences creates
45 the possibility of needless social instability subsequent to the military operation. Such resultant instability
46 may not be supportive of the division’s long-term objectives. As a result, wherever and whenever possible
47 1st Division maneuver forces employ nonlethal methods and systems to achieve their objectives. For
48 example, they routinely employ non-lethal systems to control individuals and unruly crowds.
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1 7-88. Additionally, the maneuver brigades participate in community relations-type activities, such as
2 adopting schools located near their bases and assisting GREENLAND charitable organizations, whenever
3 possible to promote a favorable view of coalition forces, their activities, and goals. They assist division IO
4 by distributing leaflets, posters, and handbills developed in response to the IO plan. If required they will
5 help distribute the means, such as radios, televisions, antennas, satellite dishes, and prerecorded media
6 players (CD players, VCRs, and IPODs), to enable the civilian population to listen to electronic media
7 explaining US goals and objectives.

9 7-89. On a case by case basis, when tasked by the G-3, it provides lift assets to support the division’s
10 information operations that support the development or retention of favorably perceptions by the
11 GREENLAND civilian population toward the 1st Division’s mission and presence within the country.
12 Missions that it might be called on to support include the delivery of PSYOP products via helicopter
13 mounted loudspeakers. The transport of media to and from high priority events that they could not get to in
14 time to meet their deadline requirements by use of their private ground transportation or when it would be
15 too risky for them to use that ground transportation is another potential mission. Another example could be
16 the transport of GREENLAND civilian leaders or important leaders of international organizations to
17 CMOC or other meetings. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade also participates in community relations-
18 type activities.
19 27th Sustainment Brigade, 34th CSB (ME), 44th Medical Brigade, 92nd MP Brigade, and 555th
20 Engineer Brigade
21 7-90. The Soldiers of these units support the IO line of operation by performing their day-to-day duties in
22 a professional manner while treating GREENLAND civilians of the AO with respect. They also conduct
23 community relations activities and distribute printed and other media that helps inform GREENLAND
24 civilians of coalition, C/JFLC, and division goals and objectives, and other useful information,
25 7-91. The 308th PSYOP Company assigned to the 34th CSB (ME), provides PSYOP staff planning
26 support to the division in addition to conducting tactical PSYOP in support of division operations. The
27 308th PSYOP Company coordinates with the C/JFLC’s supporting PSYOP battalion (10th PSYOP
28 Battalion) and other appropriate agencies for the development and production of PSYOP products to meet
29 the 1st Division commander’s requirements.
30 7-92. The 308th PSYOP Company’s organic product development and production capability is augmented
31 by additional assets from the ASCC’s supporting PSYOP dissemination battalion (15th PSYOP Battalion).
32 These assets include a Flyaway Broadcast System that provides the company (and its supported division) a
33 DS broadcast asset. In addition, the company has a Deployable Print Production Center (DPPC) from the
34 15th PSYOP Battalion’s print company. This tactical vehicle mounted, light print asset provides the 308th
35 with a responsive and mobile digital print capability. The DPPC provides a capability to produce limited
36 PSYOP products, such as leaflets, handbills, posters, and other printed material (within the guidance
37 assigned by the JPOTF and authorized by the product-approval authority for themes and objectives) that
38 directly support this line of operation.
39 7-93. The 308th PSYOP Company works with the G-2 and the 56th BFSB to conduct market research and
40 market surveys designed to determine if the desired messages are being received and understood by their
41 various target audiences in the manner in which they were intended. Adjustments to the means, messages,
42 and methods used to deliver the divisions themes and messages are then made (within higher guidance) in
43 response to that market research.
44 418th Civil Affairs Battalion

45 7-94. Since by definition CMO include all activities that establish and maintain positive relations between
46 1st Division forces and the nonmilitary entities in the AO—civil authorities and institutions, the general
47 population, international and nongovernmental organizations, and nonmilitary resources—the 418th CA
48 Battalion will have a major part to play in this line of operations. The CMO taking place as part of the
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1 other lines of operations that help to harmonize civilian and military activities and thus maximize the use of
2 resources designed to redress the deprivation and suffering of the people is a large part of the battalion’s
3 contribution to this line of operation.
4 7-95. Personnel assigned to the 418th CA Battalion meet regularly with local GREENLAND formal and
5 informal leaders. This process occurs at multiple levels within the division using not only the division
6 CMOC operated by the 418th Civil Affairs Battalion, but also in the BCT CMOCs operated by the CA
7 companies attached to those brigades, and their CA teams that support each maneuver battalion within the
8 division. This provides these civilian leaders with a means of influencing the division’s actions and
9 priorities. The personal relationships established in these meetings provide another avenue for informing
10 influential GREENLAND civilians of US goals and objectives.
11 7-96. The conduct of public meetings are an effective vehicle for widely demonstrating trust and
12 cooperation between divisional and GREENLAND civilian political, economic, and social leadership.
13 Public meetings also help establish an air of permanence and, thereby, add to the legitimacy of the efforts
14 of the leadership. They are also useful when there is limited literacy or public written and electronic
15 communications means have been disrupted.
16 7-97. Coordinating public meetings to promote the exchange of information and solicit local input for
17 setting priorities can be extremely difficult. As the number of local and international spectators attending
18 the meeting goes up, the physical requirements increase drastically. Security and safety issues also become
19 more acute. Organizations considering conducting such meetings must weigh concerns for security against
20 the advantages gained by such public displays of stability.
21 GOVERNANCE AND ADMINISTRATION

22 7-98. The division objective for this logical line of operation is the re-establishment of government
23 agencies to facilitate development in support of a democratic society within GREENLAND. This line of
24 operation is a shaping operation for the division. The division is concentrating on achieving a strategic and
25 operational-level end-state objective along this logical line of operation. That objective is to stabilize the
26 GREENLAND government. This objective has more civil than military characteristics, with the former
27 usually focusing on the degree of stability or unrest of the population. The 418th Civil Affairs Battalion is
28 the division lead for this logical line of operation in recognition that an understanding of the political
29 implications of the division’s action is an essential element to effective civil administration. The CMOC
30 established by the 418th CA Battalion will employ centralized direction and decentralized execution of
31 governance and administration activities by the division’s BCTs.
32 7-99. The division is responsible for performing basic governmental functions within its AO because the
33 GREENLAND government formally asked the EUCOM commander and US Ambassador to provide
34 temporary civil administration for those areas liberated from REDLAND occupation and the President
35 approved the request. As the situation stabilizes, responsibility for those governmental functions performed
36 by the division will return to GREENLAND civilian agencies. This transition will be a gradual one and
37 require detailed and formal planning.
38 7-100. Based on directions received from the President, the American Ambassador in GREENLAND
39 negotiated a civil administration support agreement with the nation’s government. This agreement outlines
40 the nature and extent of the support needed. It defined the limits of authority and liability of US military
41 personnel. The EUCOM and C/JFLC legal staff was involved in the coordination for this support
42 agreement and reviewed and recommended approval of the final product.
43 7-101. The division commander maintains liaison with US diplomatic representatives in the
44 GREENLAND embassy to ensure maximum efficiency and unification of policy. An executive order
45 covers the scope of authority and provides procedural guidance.

47 7-102. The intelligence cell provides the CMOC information of the AO and estimates the influence of
48 existing political, economic, and social factors on the division’s military operations. The intelligence cell
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 7-19

Chapter 7
1 has the G-3 current operations element task appropriate elements to conduct reconnaissance operations
2 designed determine the actual location and status of selected sensitive sites. The intelligence cell reviews
3 material contained in archives located within the division AO for information of tactical or operational
4 interest. With C/JFLC approval the intelligence cell may open this archival material to OGA,
5 GREENLAND authorities, and other groups—to include international news organizations and
6 contractors—to expedite its examination and exploitation.
7 7-103. The current operations element receives a revised sensitive location list that includes things such
8 as historical sites, religious shrines, and critical infrastructure that should be protected from the CMOC and
9 intelligence cell. This list updates the information provided on similar lists prepared during the previous
10 phases of operations as on the site inspections of these locations can finally be accomplished. The current
11 operations element propagates that list to all divisional units and the C/JFLC so that they can be taken into
12 account when developing courses of action and schemes of maneuver and fire support. It recommends the
13 adjustment of BCT tactical plans to prevent the destruction or looting of sensitive sites. It may assign a
14 tactical unit the mission of securing selected sensitive sites. It adjudicates disputes between the CMOC and
15 other major divisional subordinate commands when the other logical lines of operations are affected by the
16 allocation and priority of civil assistance activities.
17 7-104. The G-7, in coordination with the G-6 and G-2 counterintelligence, recommends security
18 measures associated with the restoration of public communications to the CMOC. This includes the review
19 of communications media policy to ensure that OPSEC is maintained to the maximum extent possible. The
20 PAO, in cooperation with the G-7, develops a media plan that facilitates informing US and international
21 audiences of US aims and goals related to the division’s conduct of temporary civil administration
22 7-105. Since GREENLAND population must be willing to accept the temporary civil administration
23 requested by their political leadership, the division information operations will reinforce EUCOM and
24 C/JFLC information operations themes that stress the message that the American administration was
25 requested by their legitimate government, it is temporary in nature, it exists to help the people, and it will
26 turn over governmental responsibility as soon as possible.
27 7-106. The division G-9 provides staff supervision of the division CMOC for the division staff, since the
28 418th CA Battalion has the division lead for the governance and civil administration logical line of
29 operation.
30 7-107. The division’s special staff officers provide technical advice and assistance to the G-3, G-9, and
31 the BCTs in determination of the need for assistance, measures to restore, and recommendations for the
32 restoration of public services. For example, the PM advises the BCTs on the provision of US military, HN,
33 third nation, or contract security for GREENLAND critical infrastructure, financial institutions,
34 government offices, and significant cultural artifacts.

36 7-108. The STB continues to support the operations of the division CPs with communications and life
37 support while providing them with local security.
38 2nd HBCT, 2nd SBCT, 28th SBCT, and 87th IBCT

39 7-109. These units will provide additional local security for CA companies and functional teams
40 primarily responsible for the governance and administration line of operation operating in their AOs.
41 Likewise the engineer teams from the 555th Engineer Brigade responsible for repairing or constructing
42 those public facilities, such as public schools, necessary for the provision of civil administration will also
43 be attached for sustainment support and security to the BCT within whose AO they are working. This
44 command relationship will continue throughout the life of the specific engineer project or projects they are
45 assigned the mission of completing. This simplifies responsibilities for area security within each brigade’s
46 AO. Additionally, the BCTs will provide local security for OGAs and international agencies and
47 organizations that are responsible for providing civil administration within their respective AOs.
7-20 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

1 7-110. Each brigade CMOC will do its best to coordinate the activities of OGAs and international and
2 nongovernmental organizations to achieve unity of effort within the brigade AO. This allows their
3 activities to be synchronized with ongoing BCT operations. However, it is likely that some international or
4 nongovernmental organization will freelance its activities at some point. The BCTs must be prepared to
5 react appropriately to their presence within the AO. Thus each BCT maintains an appropriately sized,
6 equipped, and trained reaction force. The BCT commander must remember that public opinion will
7 determine if the mission is successfully accomplished when reviewing his options for dealing with the
8 offending freelancing organization.

10 7-111. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade provides lift assets to support the operations of functional
11 teams from the 418th CA Brigade, OGAs, and international agencies and organizations responsible for
12 providing civil administration within the division’s AO. This support is provided on a case-by-case basis in
13 response to taskings from the division G-3.

15 7-112. The 27th Sustainment Brigade provides logistical support to the operations of the CA companies
16 and functional teams responsible for providing civil administration within the division’s AO. The brigade
17 will be directly involved in the establishment of public civilian supply, public transportation, and food and
18 agriculture support with the appropriate functional civil affairs teams. This includes supporting these teams
19 with specialized Class X supply items. This support is provided on a case by case basis, in response to
20 taskings from the division G-3.
21 34th CSB (ME)

22 7-113. The 34th CSB (ME)’s role in the line of operations is fairly small. The 34th CSB (ME) responds
23 to G-3 taskings to provide specific resources from its assigned units to accomplish directed activities, such
24 as sensitive site exploitation or providing local security to OGAs and contractors temporarily conducting
25 operations within the division area.

27 7-114. The battalion’s role in governance and administration is one of support to the 1st Division
28 Commander’s operational and support functions with respect to the continuity of government in a foreign
29 nation. The battalion’s general tasks are—
30 z Identifying, validating, or evaluating GREENLAND infrastructure.
31 z Understanding the needs of the indigenous populations and institutions in terms of civil affair’s
32 functional specialties.
33 z Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of GREENLAND’s civilian populations and
34 institutions in terms of these functional specialties.
35 z Performing liaison functions between the division, OGAs, and civilian—GREENLAND,
36 international, and private volunteer—agencies.
37 z Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational support to civil
38 administration activities.
39 z Participating in the execution of selected support to civil administration activities, as needed or
40 directed.
41 z Performing quality-control assessments of support to civil administration activities and costs.
42 z Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of support to civil
43 administration operations.
44 z Coordinating and synchronizing transition of support to civil administration operations from the
45 1st Division to the GREENLAND government.
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 7-21

Chapter 7
1 7-115. The 418th CA Battalion is the lead divisional organization for the governance and civil
2 administration logical line of operations. They must be augmented CA-functional specialists from the CA
3 brigade supporting the C/JFLC (501st CA Brigade) and the CA command supporting the EUCOM
4 commander (352nd CA Command) to conduct its temporary civil administration mission. These functional
5 specialists seek out various resources, some military, but mostly combinations of civil organizations that
6 can jointly restore good governance to the GREENLAND society as it emerges from war. FM 3-05.401
7 outlines the activities of each of these functional specialists. In this vignette the 418th CA Battalion
8 distributes its available functional specialist teams to the BCTs to provide each BCT with a full set of CA
9 functional specialists.
10 7-116. The division CMOC is organized and led by 418th CA Battalion personnel. The CMOC
11 recommends to the division G-3 those public services, in priority, which should be restored and estimates
12 the amount of public utilities required to discharge the civil activities essential to the physical and
13 psychological well being of the area. That recommendation is based on the tactical situation and economic
14 situation affecting the division’s AO. These recommendations are made after coordination with the
15 engineering specialists available in the 555th Engineer Brigade. The 418th CA Battalion’s personnel will
16 meet with local GREENLAND leaders on a regular basis, assess their needs, and pass the appropriate
17 information to the correct actions.

19 7-117. The brigade will be directly involved in the establishment of public health support within the
20 division’s AO in cooperation with the appropriate functional civil affairs team, GREENLAND medical
21 authorities, and international health organizations.
22 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade

23 7-118. The 56th Brigade can be tasked by the G-3 to provide information of interest to CA companies
24 and functional teams, such as crop distributions and projected yields and the locations of concentrations of
25 displaced civilians. The brigade coordinates with the BCTs for permission to deploy brigade retained assets
26 within the BCT AOs to obtain the necessary information since in this vignette there is no higher controlled
27 area in which the brigade can deploy its assets without such coordination. The brigade can also use its
28 access to other national- and theater-level sensors and databases to provide the necessary information.
29 92nd MP Brigade
30 7-119. The brigade will be directly involved in the establishment of public safety support within the
31 division’s AO in cooperation with the appropriate functional civil affairs team, the Department of Justice,
32 and GREENLAND law enforcement agencies. The MP function of police intelligence operations is
33 specifically highlighted in stability operations. MP planners consider those factors captured in the acronym
34 POLICE—police and prison structures, organized crime, legal systems, investigations, crime conducive
35 conditions, and enforcement mechanisms and gaps—to assist in formulating courses of action for directing
36 MP assets in these type of operations. MP planners must effectively plan for and coordinate with CA and
37 MI assets in the collection of vital police/criminal information that is indicative of a functioning society,
38 such as crime, law and order, security, etc. The brigade coordinates with the BCTs when deploying its
39 elements into BCT AOs in support of these activities.

41 7-120. The engineer brigade, augmented by functional teams from the Corps of Engineers, provides
42 additional technical expertise to support the 418th CA Battalion’s public works and facilities, civil defense,
43 and public transportation functional teams. In this vignette the brigade placed a multi-engineer specialty
44 construction task force OPCON to each BCT to assist the BCTs in the rapid restoration of essential
45 governmental services. The 555th Brigade coordinates with the BCTs when deploying additional subject
46 matter experts or capabilities into BCT AOs in support of these activities. It makes recommendations to the
47 G-3 when necessary to redeploy engineer assets from one BCT to another.
7-22 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

1 INFRASTRUCTURE RECOVERY
2 7-121. Infrastructure recovery refers to actions by military and civilian authorities within an AO that
3 enables the process of permanently repairing, rebuilding, or relocating critical power generation, water
4 distribution, sewage, public communications, transportation systems, and mitigating future service
5 interruptions. As recovery progresses within an AO, the process expands to encompass the rebuilding of
6 private residences; replacing personal property, such as trucks and tractors; resuming employment; and
7 restoring businesses.
8 7-122. This logical line of operation is a shaping operation for the division. It requires centralize
9 planning—determining priorities, assigning resources, monitoring progress, and adjusting as required—
10 and decentralized execution. The division’s four objectives for this line of operation are the restoration of
11 the regional electrical grid, water distribution, sewage treatment, and ground transportation networks. Since
12 these objectives are largely general engineering in nature, the 555th Engineer Brigade is the division lead
13 for this line of operation. The 555th Engineer headquarters, assisted by the division plans element, is
14 responsible for the centralized planning. The BCTs are responsible for the decentralized execution. The
15 555th will coordinate with the various CMOCs operated by the 418th CA Battalion to ensure that
16 maximum possible use is made of local contractor provided resources and laborers in an effort to provide
17 increased opportunities for GREENLAND entrepreneurs and laborers which will assist in stabilizing the
18 local economy.
19 7-123. Contractors will play a large role in this line of operation. Each staff section within the division
20 headquarters and MSCs must understand the procurement and accounting rules—and timelines—
21 associated with the award of contracts in this environment. There will be a tension between commanders
22 wanting to meet operational demands in an active theater of operations and congressionally imposed
23 procurement procedures designed for peacetime conditions. The division must work closely with its
24 supporting team from the theater Army Field Supporting Brigade to meet operational requirements and stay
25 within legal guidelines. FM 100-10-2 provides additional information on battlefield contract support.

27 7-124. The division intelligence cell tasks the 56th BFSB and other divisional units to conduct
28 reconnaissance and surveillance to answer information requirements related to this line of operation. The
29 determination of what facilities the local civilian population wants repaired and in what order, is a key
30 piece of information that commanders and staffs at all levels within the division need to know. The
31 division plans element is heavily involved in this line of operation due to—
32 z The protracted time period required to rehabilitate key infrastructure.
33 z The need to coordinate reconstruction plans with multiple organizations and agencies external to
34 the division.
35 z The lead time necessary to obtain required resources—both financial and specialized equipment.
36 7-125. Both the plans and current operations elements within the headquarters will be monitoring the
37 current status of this line of operation. As a result they will constantly be providing and receiving
38 appropriate information from the CMOCs, maneuver brigades, and higher headquarters.
39 7-126. The division G-8 arranges for the provision of the resources necessary to conduct reconstruction
40 operations and accounting for the expenditure of resources. Operational needs and the chaotic conditions
41 existing in a war-torn country will require the division to deviate from peacetime contracting procedures
42 and accounting standards. The G-8 will work closely with the SJA to ensure that the proper waivers by
43 competent authority are received in a timely fashion to avoid impacting ongoing operations. The G-8 will
44 establish a tracking system to ensure that funds expended are expended against authorized projects and to
45 reduce fraud. The SJA works with Department of Justice and GREENLAND civil authorities to restore a
46 functioning judiciary.
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 7-23

Chapter 7

2 7-127. This unit does not participate in activities related to this line of operations except by employing
3 vetted local vendors for labor and services.

5 7-128. These units participate in the conduct of infrastructure recovery operations within the division AO
6 in the following ways:
7 z They adapt their concepts of operations and schemes of maneuver to project critical infrastructure
8 and prevent further damage to critical infrastructure system whenever and wherever possible.
9 z They used vetted local vendors whenever possible to provide general labors and other services,
10 such as dining, laundry, and bath that are necessary to support mission accomplishment over a
11 prolonged period.
12 z They provide area security for reconstruction teams operating in their areas. These reconstruction
13 teams may be from the 555th Engineers, international or local civilian contractors, multinational
14 civil engineers, GREENLAND civil authorities, or a combination of these sources. (Those
15 military teams working in a BCT’s AO should be either assigned, attached, or OPCON to the
16 BCT.)

18 7-129. This unit contributes to this line of operations by employing vetted local vendors for labor and
19 services. On a case-by-case basis, when tasked by the G-3, it provides lift assets to support the
20 reconstruction operations of other divisional units, US governmental agencies, the GREENLAND
21 government, contractors, international, and private organizations.

23 7-130. The 27th Sustainment Brigade works with the CA public transportation and civilian supply
24 functional teams. These teams are from the 501st CA Brigade or the 351st CA Command that supports the
25 C/JFLC or EUCOM commander, contractors, and GREENLAND civil authorities. This support restores
26 civilian transportation, distribution capabilities, and skills within the AO. It employs vetted local vendors
27 for labor, supplies, and services. The logistics support base established by the 27th Sustainment Brigade
28 (within the division's base camp) receives all reconstruction supplies coming from venders located outside
29 the division’s AO and checks them against their shipping documentation to ensure that the quality and
30 quantities of supplies received match contracted specifications. These supplies are then sent to individual
31 job sites within the division AO according to G-3 priorities of resupply.
32 34th CSB (ME)

33 7-131. This unit contributes to this line of operations by employing vetted local vendors for labor and
34 services. On a case-by-case basis, when tasked by the G-3, it provides assets to support the reconstruction
35 operations of other divisional units, US governmental agencies, the GREENLAND government,
36 contractors, international, and private organizations. The 308th PSYOP Company works closely with the
37 418th CA Battalion, the 56th BFSB, and the 1st Division G-2 to determine what infrastructure elements the
38 civilian population wants repaired and the priority they place on the repair of each element through its
39 market research and attitudinal survey capabilities.

41 7-132. This unit contributes to this line of operations by advising and assisting the 418th CA Battalion’s
42 public health team, international health organizations, and local GREENLAND medical organizations in
43 restoring medical care to GREENLAND civilians. It also employs vetted local vendors for common
44 medical supplies authorized for local procurement and services.
7-24 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006


2 7-133. This unit responds to the intelligence cell’s reconnaissance taskings related to this line of
3 operation. It also employs vetted local vendors for laborers, common supplies, and services.
4 92nd Military Police Brigade

5 7-134. This unit’s actions along the “secure” line of operations also applies on this line of operations by
6 advising and assisting the 418th CA Battalion’s public safety and civil defense team, Department of
7 Justice, and local GREENLAND law enforcement agencies in restoring the rule of law within the
8 division’s area. This includes the establishment of local police stations, detainee collection points and
9 holding areas. In this vignette, the brigade recommends that the BCTs station a squad in each police station
10 as they are activated to serve as mentors and trainers for GREENLAND police to reinforce the training the
11 GREENLAND police received at the national police academy. The brigade escorts select commercial and
12 military convoys containing high priority reconstruction-related supplies and special equipment to prevent
13 their destruction by terrorists and insurgents. Those movements are coordinated by the division current
14 operations and element with all affected organizations, such as the BCT within whose AO those convoys
15 will base and the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade for aerial support. It also employs vetted local vendors for
16 laborers, common supplies, and services.

18 7-135. The 418th CA Battalion plays a key role for the infrastructure recovery line of operation. Through
19 the operations of its various CMOCs, it is responsible for ensuring that GREENLAND civilian
20 requirements and priorities are included into the 1st Division’s infrastructure reconstruction plans.

22 7-136. The 555th Engineer Brigade is the division lead for the infrastructure recovery line of operation.
23 The 555th is responsible for advising and assisting their GREENLAND civilian and military counterparts
24 (within the limits of legal and regulatory guidance) in the reconstruction of GREENLAND infrastructure—
25 highways, railways, sewer, area power, and public water treatment—within the division AO.
26 7-137. In this vignette, in response to these requirements, the 555th brigade commander task organizes
27 his assets into four engineer construction task forces and OPCONs them to the four BCTs. The brigade
28 headquarters, in conjunction with the division plans element, provides centralized direction to this line of
29 operation but allows the engineer task forces OPCON to the BCTs to conduct decentralized execution. It
30 advises the division commander on changing priorities and task organization. The brigade headquarters
31 retains responsibility for conducting any required environmental studies.
32 7-138. The engineer task force surveys their respective areas to determine the current condition of the
33 public infrastructure and prepare plans to repair damage and build new facilities to meet C/JFLC standards
34 with emphasis on the restoration of the regional sewer, water, electrical, trash collection and disposal
35 systems, and the ground transportation network. These task forces provided the collected survey
36 information to the 555th Brigade staff for collation and analysis. They consult with the 555th brigade staff
37 and engineer centers of excellence internal and external to the theater as necessary to resolve the complex
38 engineering problems associated with this line of operation.
39 7-139. The brigade will coordinate its actions with contracting teams from the Army Field Support
40 Brigade so that both US and international civilian engineering firms and GREENLAND engineering
41 companies can participate in the infrastructure recovery effort. One of the aims of that coordination is to
42 ensure that the money spent to repair infrastructure will also result in providing unemployed or
43 underemployed civilians within the AO constructive work as a means of returning stability to the area. The
44 engineer task forces within the BCTs, assisted by 555th Engineer and Corps of Engineer subject matter
45 experts, serve as contracting officer’s technical representatives overseeing the execution of these
46 contracted engineering projects. These technical representatives ensure that the results of these engineering
47 projects match or exceed contract specifications.
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 7-25

Chapter 7
1 HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND ASSISTANCE

2 7-140. The availability of food and water, shelter, means of economic self-sufficiency, transportation, and
3 communications contributes to civil stability. Military forces conduct civil assistance/humanitarian relief in
4 the aftermath of natural or man-made calamities or disasters. The division conducts these activities to—
5 z Maintain order.
6 z Provide potential life-sustaining services.
7 z Control the distribution of goods and services.
8 7-141. The division’s civil assistance efforts provide short-term military support to the GREENLAND
9 government and civilian population. The effective provision of civil assistance/humanitarian relief requires
10 the division to—
11 z Conduct an assessment to determine the current and projected status of the civilian population.
12 z Determine the capabilities of the existing GREENLAND civil administration.
13 z Develop plans to reinforce or restore the existing GREENLAND civil administration.
14 z Coordinate civil assistance/humanitarian relief plans with C/JFLC, OGAs, multinational partners,
15 and those international and nongovernmental organizations operating within the division AO.
16 z Coordinate the transfer of authority between the division and GREENLAND civil administration.
17 7-142. International organizations, such as the International Red Cross, and a wide variety of private
18 volunteer organization, such as Doctors without Borders, will play a large role in this line of operation.
19 Each of these organizations will have its own agenda and specialization which may or may not match what
20 the division perceives is needed or desired. Obtaining unity of effort from these different organization will
21 require those division Soldiers working with them in the CMOC and on job sites to exercise a great deal of
22 tact and professionalism. Personal relationships and trust are vital to getting things done when unity of
23 command is not possible. Soldiers assigned to the CMOC should be assigned for extended periods to allow
24 the development of those personal relationships and not routinely rotated.
25 7-143. Each staff section within the division headquarters and MSCs must understand that some of these
26 organizations will work closely with division elements to provide a coordinated and synchronized response
27 to human needs. Other organizations will actively seek to distance their efforts from those conducted by the
28 division. The various CMOCs established by the 418th Civil Affairs are vital to this line of operation. JP 3-
29 08 and FM 3-07 are sources of additional information on working with international organization and
30 private volunteer organizations.

32 7-144. During the conduct of operations pertaining to the humanitarian relief and assistance line of
33 operation the division staff continues to perform their normal duties. The intelligence cell continues to
34 update its IPB and provide intelligence updates, to include weather forecasts, to the rest of the staff and
35 divisional units. The current operations cell adjudicates conflicts between activities along all of the
36 different lines of operations. They also direct the execution of branch plans to current operations. The plans
37 cell continues to refine long term plans for the region and develop sequels in conjunction with
38 GREENLAND authorities, C/JFLC planners, and OGAs. The G-4 ensures the logistical supportability of
39 division and subordinate brigade plans. The G-8 ensures that the division has the fiscal authority to conduct
40 operations and account for the expenditure of funds. The division’s special staff officers also contribute to
41 the identification of solutions to those circumstances that result in suffering on the part of the
42 GREENLAND civilian population.

44 7-145. This unit provides limited humanitarian relief and assistance to those GREENLAND civilians
45 initially located in the vicinity of its portion of the division base camp to mitigate their immediate
46 suffering. It continues to provide this assistance within the limits of its available resources until those
7-26 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

1 civilians finish relocating to areas far enough removed from the division CP so that they pose no
2 conceivable threat to the critical command and control node

4 7-146. These units conduct humanitarian relief and assistance using their organic resources to provide
5 immediate assistance to the civilians located within their respective AOs. These assistance activities
6 include—providing rudimentary medical, dental, and veterinary care; minor repair of surface transportation
7 systems; construction of basic sanitation facilities; and the detection and marking of unexploded ordnance.

9 7-147. This unit also provides humanitarian relief and assistance—within the limits of its organic
10 capabilities—to GREENLAND civilians located near its portion of the division base camp. On a case by
11 case basis, when tasked by the G-3, it provides lift assets to support the humanitarian relief and assistance
12 operations of other divisional units, US governmental agencies, the GREENLAND government, and
13 international and nongovernmental organizations.

15 7-148. The logistics support base established by the 27th Sustainment Brigade (within the division's base
16 camp) receives all humanitarian relief and assistance supplies not specifically intended for the maneuver
17 brigades. These supplies are sent to life-support centers within the division AO according to priorities of
18 resupply established by the G-3. At the top of the priorities list is the distribution of Class I, Class IV, ice,
19 and portable toilets. Strict accountability is maintained on all donated relief items. Additionally, the unit
20 provides humanitarian relief—within the limits of its organic capabilities—to GREENLAND civilians
21 located near its area of the division base camp.
22 34th CSB (ME)

23 7-149. This unit supervises the provision of humanitarian relief to relieve immediate suffering in those
24 parts of the division AO near Camp Riley until that support can be provided by other agencies. It will also
25 be tasked to assist the maneuver BCTs in—
26 z Debris removal that affects public sanitation and safety.
27 z Construction of life support shelters within Camp Riley and shelter construction.
28 z Specialized support for search and rescue operations, such as cranes.
29 z Demolishing unsafe structures.

31 7-150. This brigade supports the humanitarian relief and assistance efforts of the medical companies
32 located within the BCTs in addition to directly providing humanitarian relief to those civilians located near
33 its portion of the division base camp.

35 7-151. The Brigade continues to use technical and manned reconnaissance and surveillance to report on
36 distribution and effectiveness of humanitarian aide in the division’s AO. The 56th BFSB continues to
37 provide CI/HUMINT teams GS to the BCTs for source reporting. This will provide humanitarian relief and
38 assistance in those areas where positive effects can be leveraged by the local commander to help counter
39 REDLAND insurgent forces and terrorist groups. UASs provide information on division-wide
40 infrastructure and agricultural projects and ground scout and LRS teams continue to monitor the
41 international border for illegal movement of international aide across the border into REDLAND.
42 7-152. The brigade leverages its technical collection assets to locate and monitor local media outlets. The
43 BFSB’s MI battalions collect and process information from the GREENLAND press agencies, as required.
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 7-27

Chapter 7
1 CI/HUMINT teams GS to the BCTs monitor activities and sermons in local mosques and churches to
2 detect anti-coalition rhetoric or messages from religious leaders. This information may be used for future
3 targeting with non-lethal operations. UASs are used during public demonstrations to reduce US presence
4 and to monitor crowds for targeting by non-lethal means, both immediately and in the long-term.
5 92nd Military Police Brigade

6 7-153. The MP teams assigned to this brigade support the operations along the division’s humanitarian
7 relief and assistance line of operation primarily by reporting the locations and extent of human suffering to
8 appropriate authorities that then encounter as they conduct their standard military police mission, such as
9 maneuver and mobility support and police intelligence operations. These teams do provide humanitarian
10 assistance within their limited organic capabilities until relieve by other competent authority provided that
11 the rendering of such assistance does not impeded the accomplishment of these teams’ assigned missions.
12 The brigade also directly provides humanitarian relief to those civilians located near its portion of the
13 division base camp.

15 7-154. The battalion conducts CMOC meetings as a means of encouraging available international and
16 nongovernmental organizations to address civilian needs for humanitarian assistance. The division wants to
17 use its assets for relief and assistance only if an international or nongovernmental organization capability
18 does not exist, military requirements for those assets have been met on the other lines of operation, and use
19 of those assets will help promote mission accomplishment. Any humanitarian relief or assistance activity
20 undertaken by division elements that is or should be the responsibility of a civilian organization or
21 government agency will be transferred to that organization or agency as soon as possible in a coordinated
22 and synchronized manner.

24 7-155. This unit provides humanitarian relief—within the limits of its organic capabilities—to
25 GREENLAND civilians located near its portion of the division base camp until that support can be
26 provided by other agencies. It will also be tasked to assist the maneuver BCTs in—
27 z Debris removal that affects public sanitation and safety.
28 z Construction of life support shelters within the maneuver BCT and shelter construction.
29 z Specialized support for search and rescue operations, such as cranes.
30 z Demolishing unsafe structures.
7-28 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Appendix A
AIRBORNE OPERATIONS
FM 90-26 is the capstone manual for airborne operations. A higher headquarters may
tailor the division with one or more airborne infantry brigade combat teams (BCTs)
based on the division’s anticipated missions. These airborne infantry BCTs have the
capability to strategically deploy and conduct forcible entry operations. It is most
likely that the planning and preparation of an airborne operation, especially the initial
forcible entry into a joint operations area (JOA) or a multiple airborne BCT
operation, will be conducted by specialized planners on the ASCC or FORSCOM
staff. Transfer of command authority for the airborne BCT to the division commander
occurring on commencement of the parachute assault.
The discussion of airborne operations in this appendix assumes that the division has
one airborne BCT assigned and that the division staff is augmented with airborne
planners. The planning, preparation, and execution of airborne operations consists of
the following four plans:
z Ground tactical plan.
z Landing plan.
z Air movement plan.
z Marshaling plan.
GROUND TACTICAL PLAN

A-1. The ground tactical plan is the base from which all other plans are developed. The ground tactical
plan must be completed before finalizing the landing plan, air movement plan, and marshaling plan. It
provides the commander’s intent, concept of the operation, fire support plan, and task organization for the
initial assault. Ground combat in airborne operations is conducted along conventional lines but initially
with limited assets and a heavy reliance on air support.
PLANNING
A-2. After the airborne force commander receives the initiating directive or warning order, he begins
planning. This directive or warning order includes the following information:
z Missions for subordinate units.
z Higher commander’s concept of the operation.
z Command structure for the operation.
z Time and duration of the operation.
z Intelligence and security requirements.
z Allocation and distribution of airlift assets.
z Unit deployment list and sequence.
z Departure airfields, remote marshaling bases (REMABs), and intermediate staging bases (ISBs).
z Signal requirements and instructions.
z Link-up and withdrawal concept.
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) A-1

Appendix A
Estimate of the Situation

A-3. The military decision-making process incorporates the estimate of the situation in a course of action
as in any other operation. Unit commanders and staff officers cannot afford to deviate from this accepted
procedure for the development process. As a technique, the ground tactical plan will normally be
developed as the basic OPORD or OPLAN. This is the most critical phase of an airborne operation because
all other plans are based on it.
Mission
A-4. The mission of an airborne infantry BCT is to close with the enemy by fire and maneuver to destroy
or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack. These missions usually
require the seizure and defense of objectives and surrounding terrain. (See FM 90-26 for detailed
information on the application of the IPB process as it relates to airborne operations.)
A-5. An airborne BCT defends only the airhead and the required maneuver space if the ground tactical
plan envisions a rapid link-up with other ground maneuver forces. If the plan calls for a rapid buildup of
forces in the airhead, followed by a break out; the BCT’s tactical operations begin with an initial assault
and then pass to the defense of the established airhead unit until enough forces can be delivered to the
objective area. On reinforcement or on linkup with other ground forces, the BCT resumes the offensive
within the commander’s concept of the operation or prepares for subsequent operations.
Enemy Forces
A-6. The commander and division staff analyze available information to determine the enemy situation.
The following issues are considered:
z Enemy morale, leadership, and probable intentions.
z Enemy capabilities.
z Enemy tactics.
z Probable enemy reactions to an airborne assault.
z Enemy reserves and paramilitary organizations (gendarmeries, police, border guards, and
militia) and their ability to mobilize and react.
z Enemy capability to conduct guerrilla, partisan, or sabotage activities and the enemy’s
relationship to the local population.
Terrain and Weather

A-7. Within this category, the staff must consider the following factors:
z Availability of drop zones (DZs), landing zones (LZs), and extraction zones (EZs). The
availability and selection of DZs should not influence the selection of assault objectives, the
airhead line, or unit boundaries.
z Obstacles within the airhead line and out to the maximum effective range of direct- and indirect
fire weapons, with emphasis on those that can be prepared or reinforced with minimal engineer
effort.
z Enemy avenues of approach. This consideration weighs heavily in determining the location of
assault objectives.
z Key terrain that can assist the force in best defending the area in depth.
z Friendly and enemy observation and fields of fire.
z Cover and concealment for assembly and reorganization.
A-8. The staff must also consider the effects of climate and weather on—
z Flight formations.
z Trafficability.
z Visibility.
A-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Airborne Operations
z Close air support.

z Logistics.
z Personnel and equipment.
Troops and Support Available

A-9. The division commander considers all forces available to accomplish the mission. These include
assigned, attached, and supporting forces.
A-10. The commander considers the plans, missions, capabilities, and limitations of US ground forces
available to support the operation. He must consider whether artillery or Army aviation can support the
airborne BCT and whether the forces will perform a linkup or passage of lines.
A-11. The commander must consider joint capabilities to support the airborne BCT in the accomplishment
of its mission. This includes the United States Air Force's (USAF's) ability to support the airborne BCT and
ground maneuver elements trying to linkup with the BCT. He brings knowledgeable airlift and tactical air
planners together early. Close air support can often make up for the lack of armor and heavy artillery. The
commander also examines the availability and feasibility of naval surface fire support and United States
Navy or United States Marine Corps air support. He must arrange early for liaison and coordination to
support the operation.
Time Available
A-12. There are several time considerations unique to an airborne operation. Significant time may be
required to mass USAF aircraft. The time between the initial assault and deployment of follow-on forces
must be considered. Supply and CSS planning are driven by the amount of time before linkup or
withdrawal.
Civil Considerations
A-13. The commander must consider national and regional characteristics, such as—
z Religion and customs.
z Politics and tribal affiliations.
z Support (or lack of it) for central and local governments or occupying powers.
z Loyalty to political or military leaders.
z Available labor.
z Support (or lack of it) for US forces.
Development of the Ground Tactical Plan

A-14. The ground tactical plan incorporates considerations for those actions to be taken in the objective
area. It must focus on accomplishing the commander’s concept of the operation. It is developed as any
other tactical plan; however, the initial goal of the airborne operation is establishment and defense of an
airhead.
A-15. The ground tactical plan’s essential elements are developed in the following sequence: airhead line
and assault objectives, security area, and reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) forces, boundaries and
assault task organizations, and reserves.
Selection of Assault Objectives and the Airhead Line

A-16. Based on an analysis of the situation, the commander selects specific assault objectives. (See Figure
A-1.) Although the airhead line is developed and the assault objectives determined concurrently, assault
objectives dictate size and shape of the airhead.

Appendix A
OBJ
OBJ
OBJ
OBJ
OBJ
Figure A-1. Assault objectives
A-17. This selection does not necessarily include objectives the force must seize to secure the airhead line.
An appropriate assault objective is one which the force must control early in the assault to accomplish the
mission or enhance security of the division.
A-18. Objectives should allow for accomplishing mission-essential tasks while meeting the commander’s
intent. They can include key terrain within the airhead or terrain required for linkup. The airborne BCT is
vulnerable from the time it lands until follow-on forces can be delivered to the airhead. A mobile enemy
unit attacking the airhead immediately following the airborne assault can completely disrupt the operation.
Therefore, the commander selects assault objective terrain that dominates high-speed enemy avenues of
approach into the airhead. Enemy positions which threaten the mission and are within the airhead can also
be selected as assault objectives. Assault objectives must be seized immediately to establish the airhead and
provide security for follow-on forces.
A-19. Subordinate commanders decide the size, type, or disposition of the force to gain and maintain
control. The division commander will select the airborne BCT’s assault objectives, while the airborne BCT
commander selects battalion assault objectives. Battalion commanders select company assault objectives.
A-20. Assault objectives are ranked in order. Priorities are chosen based on the most likely threat or
mission requirements. Assault objectives are secured before the airhead line defense is established. The
airhead is then cleared of organized enemy resistance and forces are positioned to secure the airhead line.
A-21. At the same time commanders select assault objectives, they consider the extent of the airhead. The
airhead includes the entire area under control of the airborne BCT. It acts as a base for further operations
and as the lodgment that allows the airborne force to buildup combat power. Once the force secures the
airhead, it must clear enemy forces within it to defend it.

Airborne Operations
AIRHEAD LINE
Figure A-2. Airhead line
A-22. The airhead line delineates the specific area to be seized and designates the airhead. (See Figure A-
2.) Several factors determine the location, extent, and form of the airhead line—
z The actual trace of the airhead line reflects the control of key or critical terrain essential to the
mission.
z The airhead line anchors on obstacles, and the airhead itself takes advantage of existing natural
and man-made obstacles.
z The airhead contains enough DZs, LZs, and EZs to ensure interior rather than exterior lines of
communication and to permit mass rather than piecemeal assault.
z The airhead must allow enough space for dispersion to reduce vulnerability to chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons.
z The airhead must be large enough to provide for defense in depth, yet small enough for the unit
to defend. Although this depends largely on METT-TC, a battalion can defend an airhead 3 to 5
kilometers in diameter. An airborne BCT can occupy an airhead 5 to 8 kilometers in diameter.
Reconnaissance and Security Forces

A-23. Security in all directions is an overriding consideration in any airborne operation since the airhead is
a perimeter defense. In ground operations, there are several security echelons ahead of the forward edge of
the battle area.
A-24. Security forces are landed in the assault echelon. A reconnaissance and security line is established
immediately 4 to 6 kilometers from the airhead line to provide security to the airborne force. In the early
stages of an airborne operation, the security force acts as a screening force. In later stages when assault
missions have been accomplished and the airhead is relatively secure, it acts as a guard or covering force.
The mission of the security force is to—
z Give the airhead early warning.
z Develop intelligence, including the location, direction, and speed of an enemy attack.

Appendix A
z Initially deny the enemy observation of, and his fires on, the airfield.
z Deceive the enemy as to the actual location of the airhead.
z Delay and disrupt the enemy.
A-25. The security force includes scouts, antiterrorism weapons, engineers, Army aviation, and
(sometimes) light armor. When possible, mobile forces are selected to facilitate rapid initial movement to
positions, withdrawal, and/or adjustments. An aggressive R&S effort at lower echelons augments the
security force. The following considerations apply to the selection of positions for the screening force:
z Locate within radio communications and fighter squadron range. Range can be extended, if
necessary, with retransmission stations; split section indirect-fire operations; and attachment of
vehicles, mortars, or other assets.
z Locate roadblocks, obstacles, ambushes, patrols, or sensors on dominant terrain. This allows
long-range observation and fields of fire out to the maximum range of support fires.
z Locate to observe, control, and dominate high speed avenues of approach into the airhead.
z Locate to deny enemy long-range observation and observed indirect tire into the airhead.
z Locate with routes of withdrawal to the airhead.
A-26. Designated forces under control of the airborne BCT commander perform R&S missions beyond the
security zone. Emphasis is on likely enemy avenues of approach. The mission of these forces is to gain and
maintain contact with enemy units reacting to the airborne assault. This force is mobile and not used to
defend a particular part of the airhead. It can include Army aviation, air cavalry, or light armor; it can be
supported with fire from USAF assets, naval surface fire support, or Army long-range rocket systems.
These forces orient on enemy high-speed avenues of approach to develop intelligence, including the
location, direction, and speed of any enemy advance.
A-27. Employed beyond the airhead at a distance based on the tactical situation, security forces protect the
main force from surprise attack. The airborne BCT commander can extend their range if communications
permit. Aviation assets can extend to 50 kilometers or more, although the commander must consider loiter
time so forces can provide continuous coverage. (FARPs can increase this distance.) Long-range
surveillance teams from the battlefield surveillance brigade may observe enemy garrisons and major routes
into the airhead. Reconnaissance forces must be mobile and task-organized for the mission from cavalry,
armor, scout, launch and recovery site, and anti-armor units.
Boundaries and Task Organization

A-28. The division commander visualizes employment of the airborne BCT and organizes it for combat
commensurate with its assigned missions.

Airborne Operations
1-17
II BDE
1-501 SECURITY
AREA 2 X
7 II
DZ ABLE
2 319
X
1-501 2 AIRHEAD LINE
II
DZ EAGLE
2-501 II 1-501
822 BSB II II
II
282 BTB 2-501
1 17 11
DZ CHARLIE 2-501
II
X 2 1-17
CLF (2BCT/10DIV)
BDE 071800 JUN 99
REAR
AREA
Figure A-3. Boundaries: BCT airhead
A-29. The airborne BCT commander uses boundaries to assign area of operations to his major subordinate
combat elements, which then clear their assigned AOs of enemy forces. (See Figure A-3.) In Figure A-3,
the 2nd BCT (Airborne) commander split responsibility for the entire area within his airhead line between
his two airborne infantry battalions and the brigade sustainment or rear area. He has the option of assigning
responsibility for the brigade rear area to several different headquarters. He normally uses his BTB
commander as his rear area commander because his other functional battalion commanders—field artillery,
reconnaissance, and brigade support—are fully committed to the accomplishment of their respective
functions. His reconnaissance squadron commander is responsible for reconnaissance and surveillance
within the brigade security area. The reconnaissance squadron may be given additional attachments from
brigade assets that will allow it to conduct screen or guard operations based on the factors of METT-TC.
A-30. To assign boundaries, commanders subdivide his AO into smaller AOs with fairly equal tasks (not
necessarily into equal-size AOs). This requires a careful analysis of the enemy, tasks to be accomplished,
and terrain within the objective area.
A-31. Boundaries should avoid splitting (between two units) the responsibility for the defense of an avenue
of approach or key terrain. Boundaries should provide adequate maneuver space including key terrain
features. Boundaries should provide adequate room to permit maneuver on both sides of the assault
objectives.
A-32. Boundaries must be recognizable both on the map and ground. Roads should not be used as a
boundary because they represent high-speed avenues of approach and need to be covered with a clear
understanding of responsibility. Instead, commanders can use such landmarks as rivers, streams, railroad
tracks, or the edge of a town, woods, or swamp.
A-33. Ideally, each AO should include at least one DZ and LZ to enable the unit and its attachments to land
within the assigned sector during the assault. This also facilitates resupply and evacuation of enemy
prisoners of war and casualties. Having an LZ and DZ reduces the problem of coordination with adjacent
units.

Appendix A
A-34. Boundaries should not require a unit to defend in more than one direction at once. Boundaries should
extend beyond the trace of the security force as far as necessary to coordinate fires. This allows subordinate
units to operate forward of the airhead with minimal coordination. Commanders should plan coordinating
points at the intersection of the airhead line and security force ground trace boundaries.
Task Organization
A-35. Once the BCT commander has determined the principal features of the ground assault plan (scheme
of maneuver and fire support), he task organizes his units to execute their assigned missions. To ensure
unity of effort or to increase readiness for combat, part of or all subordinate units of any command can be
formed into one or more temporary tactical grouping (teams or task forces), each under a designated
commander. No standard task organization meets all conditions.
A-36. The airborne infantry battalions within the BCT usually form the nucleus of the BCT’s tactical
groupings. These teams are tailored for initial assault by the attachment of functional capabilities, such as
intelligence sensors or short-range unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), from within or external to the BCT
in accordance with the factors of METT-TC. These functional capabilities are attached as soon as possible
in the marshaling area. Many of these functional capabilities are detached from these task forces as soon as
the BCT can regain centralized control and their parent unit headquarters can establish itself on the ground.
Other elements, such as sensitive site exploitation teams are attached to the airborne BCT for the
movement only.
Organization for Assault Landing

A-37. After the task organization of Soldiers for the assault landing is announced, units organize into
assault, follow-on, and rear echelons. The assault echelon comprises those forces required to seize the
assault objectives and the initial airhead, plus their reserves and supporting Soldiers. The follow-on
echelon is not needed by the airborne force in the objective area during the initial assault, but is needed for
subsequent operations. When needed, the follow-on echelon enters the objective area as soon as practical
by air, surface movement, or a combination of the two. It includes additional vehicles and equipment from
assault echelon units, plus more combat, CS, and CSS units. The existence of any one of the following
conditions requires an airborne unit to have a follow-on echelon:
z Shortage of aircraft.
z Inability of aircraft to land heavy items of equipment.
z Any enemy situation, terrain, or weather that makes it impossible to land certain Soldiers or
equipment in the assault echelon.
A-38. The rear echelon includes the part of an airborne unit that is not considered essential for initial
combat operations. It also includes people left at the brigade’s garrison location or and intermediate staging
base to perform sustaining functions that cannot be done efficiently in the JOA. The rear echelon is
normally small for a brigade or battalion. Command of the airborne BCT’s rear echelon normally remains
with division commander unless the BCT deploys directly from its CONUS garrison location. In this
situation close coordination of between the division and FORSCOM staffs ensure that the airborne BCT
remains properly supported. The rear echelon can rejoin the unit when the brigade remains committed to
sustained combat for a prolonged or indefinite period. Also, if the airborne force continues in the ground
combat role after linkup, the rear echelon maybe brought forward.
Designation of Reserve
A-39. The employment of the reserve element follows the normal employment of a reserve unit in a ground
operation. The size of the reserve will vary based on the uncertainty associated with all aspects of the
airborne operations to include the completion of linkup operations. However, the division will try to retain
a BCT as the reserve to avoid the loss of synchronization that occurs when a BCT is broken up into its
constitute parts. The location of the division reserve will depend on how the division expects to employ the
reserve. It can be held in the vicinity of a PZ ready to be committed via air assault or in a departure area
ready to be committed by airdrop or air-landing when and where the situation dictates. This may occur

Airborne Operations
during the conduct of large-scale airborne operations involving multiple airborne BCTs when suitable
airfields in the airhead are not available; however, it can cause delays in commitment if—
z Signal communications fail.
z The air move is very long.
z Flying weather is unfavorable.
z Time is added for coordination of air cover.
Regardless of its locations, the commander of the reserve must continue planning for possible
future contingencies that would involve the commitment of his forces in so far as geospatial
information, photos, and situational information permit.
A-40. Airborne BCT and battalion reserves enter the airhead as part of the assault echelon. They provide
depth to the airhead by blocking penetrations, reinforcing committed units, and counterattacking the
enemy. They consist of not more than a company at brigade level or a platoon at battalion level; however,
their small size is dictated by tactical considerations and assigned missions. Commanders should organize,
task, and position the reserve to ensure its size is compatible with likely missions. The reserve comes from
the unit with the fewest priority tasks and is—
z Not assigned assault objectives or a part of the airhead perimeter to defend.
z Near—
Areas of likely employment, such as near the main enemy avenues of approach, to speed
commitment.
A line of communications that is in a covered and concealed location that provides ease of
movement to reinforce or to block.
z Mobile. (This can be achieved using organic vehicles, such as those found in the anti-armor
company, support platoon, light armor, and so on.)
z Located—
In an assembly area (both initial and subsequent) or battle position, so that it does not
interfere with units assigned assault objectives.
Within the area of operations of one unit, if possible.
A-41. The reserve’s location allows for dispersion of the force. The reserve commander prepares and
rehearses commitment contingencies according to guidance received from the commander designating the
reserve.
EXECUTION
A-42. Execution of the ground tactical plan involves the initial seizure of DZs and LZs in and around the
airfield or the actual seizure of an airfield.
Conduct of the Assault

A-43. The initial assault emphasizes the coordinated action of small units to seize initial BCT or battalion
objectives before the surprise advantage has worn off. As assault objectives are seized, the airborne force
directs its efforts toward consolidating the airhead.
A-44. Tactical surprise and detailed planning should enable units to seize their assault objectives and to
establish the airhead before the enemy has time to react in force. Missions of units are changed as required
by the enemy’s defense of initial objectives. The enemy can be expected to quickly launch uncoordinated
attacks along major avenues of approach using local forces. The degree of coordination and strength of
these attacks increase progressively; the airborne force must develop correspondingly greater strength in its
defensive positions. Preparation of early defense against armored attack is a major consideration.

Appendix A
A-45. Elements of the reconnaissance squadron assigned reconnaissance and surveillance missions land in
early serials so that they can establish roadblocks, locate enemy forces, disrupt enemy communication
facilities, and provide the commander with early warning, security, and information. Since ground
reconnaissance by unit commanders is seldom possible before the airborne operation, it must begin as soon
as the unit lands. The flow of information must be continuous. Information requirements do not vary from
those employed by other ground units. However, the unit’s method of arrival in the combat area makes
immediate and thorough reconnaissance and transmission of information to higher headquarters necessary.
A-46. The bulk of the BCT has the task of seizing these objectives if the initial objectives are heavily
defended. When initial objectives are lightly defended, the bulk of the BCT can clear its assigned AO and
prepare defensive positions in depth. Extensive patrolling is initiated early between adjacent defensive
positions within the airhead line and between the airhead and the outer limits of the brigade security area.
Short-range UASs and Army aircraft are well suited for support of this patrolling effort. Contact with any
friendly special operating forces in the area is established as soon as possible.
A-47. BCT personnel are briefed on unit, adjacent and higher units, and alternate plans. This helps units or
personnel landing in unplanned areas to direct their efforts to accomplishing the mission. Units or
personnel parachuting into locations outside of their designated drop zones establish contact with their
respective HQ as soon as practical.
A-48. Sufficient communications personnel and equipment must move into the airhead in advance of the
BCT command post to ensure the timely installation of vital communications. Commanders at all echelons
within the airborne BCT regain centralized control as soon as communications and the tactical situation
permit. Immediate establishment of the following is necessary:
z Fire control channels within the airborne force.
z Communications with—
Supporting air and any naval forces.
Airlift forces concerned with buildup, air supply, and air evacuation.
Bases in friendly territory.
z Communications between widely separated airborne or ground forces, such as the division’s
link-up forces, with a common or coordinated mission.
A-49. The commander influences the action by shifting or allocating fire support means. He may also—
z Move forces.
z Modify missions.
z Change objectives and boundaries.
z Employ reserves.
z Move to a place from which he can best exercise personal influence, especially during the initial
assault.
A-50. With initial objectives secured, subordinate units seize additional objectives to expedite establishing
a coordinated BCT defense or the conduct of future operations. Defensive positions are organized,
communications supplemented, and reserves reconstituted. These and other measures prepare the force to
repel enemy counterattacks, minimize the effects of CBRNE weapons, or resume the offensive.
A-51. Reserves prepare and occupy blocking positions, pending commitment. Typical missions for reserves
committed include taking over the missions of units that do not arrived in their designated drop zone,
dealing with unexpected opposition in seizing assault objectives, and securing the initial airhead.
Development of the Airhead

A-52. After the force makes the initial assault landings and accomplishes its initial ground missions,
commanders must organize the airhead line.

Airborne Operations
Size
A-53. The airhead line extends far enough beyond the landing area to ensure uninterrupted landings of
personnel, equipment, and supplies. It secures requisite terrain features and maneuver space for such future
offensive or defensive operations as the mission calls for.
Occupation and Organization

A-54. Units occupy and organize the airhead line to the extent the situation demands. Commanders adjust
the disposition of units and installations to better fit the terrain and the situation. The degree to which the
airhead line is actually occupied and organized for defense is largely determined by the factors of METT-
TC. Units take additional reconnaissance and surveillance measures.
Buildup
A-55. This proceeds concurrently with seizure and organization of the airhead line. As more combat
personnel arrive and commanders organize them by unit, frontline positions are reinforced, reserves are
constituted, and preparations are made for such offensive operations as the mission requires.
Buildup of Combat Power

A-56. The buildup of combat power is the introduction of the follow-on echelon into the airhead. This
increase of combat power yields an ability to conduct defense of the airhead and short-term sustainment of
forces. The intent of the buildup is to provide a secure operating logistics base for forces working to move
the airhead away from the original point of attack. Usually, this distance is equal to the enemy’s direct fire
capability to harass and destroy incoming aircraft or landing craft (5 to 10 kilometers).
A-57. The composition of the follow-on echelon depends on the factors of METT-TC. It can comprise a
light or long-range field artillery and combat engineers as well as a significant amount of additional
functional capabilities, such as—
z Infantry.
z Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker equipped platoons and companies.
z Rocket artillery.
z Engineers, in addition to those in the assault echelon.
z Air defense artillery assets under the tactical control of the Army Air & Missile Defense
Command.
z Sustainment assets.
A-58. The time involved in defensive operations, if any, varies. It depends on the mission assigned,
composition and size of the force, enemy reaction, and type of operation contemplated. A well prepared
defense in short-duration missions in isolated objective areas may not be required. Security can be
accomplished by completely, or almost completely, destroying or dispersing the enemy forces in the
immediate objective area during the assault; then, airlifting the airborne assault force out of the objective
area before the enemy can execute a coordinated counterattack.
Defense of an Airhead
A-59. The airborne force usually defends an airhead by securing key terrain with the airhead and
dominating likely avenues of approach. Units deny the enemy areas between the occupied positions with a
combination of patrols, mines, fire, and natural and manmade obstacles. Units aggressively reconnoiter
between positions within the airhead, then forward of the airhead. The airhead configuration allows the
commander to shift forces, reserves, and supporting fires quickly to reinforce another sector of the airhead.
Regardless of the form of defense chosen, the force prepares positions in depth within its capabilities.

Appendix A
Defense During Withdrawal

A-60. Should withdrawal from the initial positions be required, the final area to which the airborne force
withdraws must contain adequate space for maneuver, for protection of critical installations, and for
planned air landing or air evacuation operations.
Defense Against Armor

A-61. During the initial phases of an airborne operation, one main defense against enemy armored forces is
close air support. Aircraft attack enemy armored targets as they appear, as far as possible from the
objective area, and continue to attack and observe them as long as they threaten the airborne force. Strong
points defending the airhead use natural obstacles, minefields, tank traps, demolitions, and other man-made
obstacles. Units emplace antitank weapons in depth along avenues of approach favorable for armored
forces. They cover all dangerous avenues of approach with planned fires. The anti-armor systems of the
BCT’s rifle and weapons companies supported by attack helicopters from the division’s supporting
aviation brigade give the airborne force a substantial amount of antitank firepower. Some of the antitank
weapons, organic to battalions that are holding portions of the airhead not under armored attack, can be
moved to reinforce threatened sectors.
Defense Against Guerrilla Action and Infiltration

A-62. The defense must include plans for countering enemy guerrilla attacks or infiltrated forces attacking
the airhead area.
LANDING PLAN
A-63. The commander finalizes the landing plan after completing the ground tactical plan. The landing
plan phases forces into the objective area at the correct time and place to execute the ground tactical plan.
The execution of the landing plan is vital to the swift massing of combat power, protection of the force,
and subsequent mission accomplishment.
PLANNING
A-64. The landing plan links air movement with the ground tactical plan. The landing plan is published at
the BCT level and below, but is informal and not published at the joint level. The landing plan is a
tabulation of the sequence, method, and destination of paratroopers and materiel into the objective area.
The landing plan has five elements—
z Sequence of delivery.
z Method of delivery.
z Place of delivery.
z Time of delivery.
z The assembly plan.
REQUIREMENT
A-65. To develop the landing plan, commanders at each level need to know their commander’s priorities,
airlift tactics, landing area study, parent and subunit task organization and ground tactical plans, and
subunit landing plan. During the backbrief of the ground tactical plan, the BCT commander establishes
airlift and delivery priorities and airlift tactics. He provides as much of this information as possible to his
battalion commanders at the end of the ground tactical plan backbrief.
A-66. Commander's Priorities. The BCT commander must set the priorities for each assault objective to
determine the delivery sequence for units to secure these objectives. This does not necessarily match the
sequence in which the units secure objectives. The commander must also know the—
z Priorities for —
Deliveries on each DZ (heavy drops (HDs), cargo delivery system (CDS), personnel drops).

Airborne Operations
Delivering the remainder of the force.

Use of EZs.
z DZ sequence.
z Method of delivery for units and equipment.
z Location of the heavy equipment point of impact (HEPI) and the personnel point of impact
(PPI).
A-67. Airlift Tactics. The USAF element responsible for selecting airlift tactics develops them with the
Army element to best support the ground tactical plan. These tactics include aircraft formations and
sequence of personnel drops and heavy drops. The Army element chooses the sequence and time interval
between serials, which are groups of like aircraft (C-130s, C-17s) with the same delivery method
(personnel drops or heavy drops) going to the same DZ.
A-68. Landing Area Study. The division staff, working with its supporting engineer geospatial
information team and the USAF, develops the landing area study and provides it to the airborne BCT staff
and its subordinate airborne battalions if the airborne BCT is already deployed within a JOA. (FORSCOM
takes the place of the division staff if the airborne BCT is not yet deployed into the JOA.) This study
enables these subordinate battalions to select the location, size, and orientation of DZs to best support their
scheme of maneuver.
A-69. Battalion Landing Plans. Subordinate airborne battalion commanders should develop landing plans
to support their own respective schemes of maneuver. These battalion commanders then backbrief their
landing plans so that the BCT headquarters can finalize the plan. Units must also know the initial locations
of their supporting elements. This information should become available as the battalions backbrief their
ground tactical plan.
Considerations
A-70. Commanders should examine the following considerations when developing the landing plan.
A-71. Attacking an Objective. There are three basic methods of attacking an objective—
z Jumping or landing on top of the objective works best for attacking a small objective that is
specially fortified against ground attack. However, an airborne landing into an area strongly
defended against air attack requires surprise to succeed.
z Jumping or landing near the objective works best for the capture of a lightly defended objective
which must be seized intact (such as a bridge). If the enemy has strong defenses against air
attack, only surprise can enable the unit to achieve success with few casualties.
z Jumping or landing at a distance from the objective is the least often used method of attack.
Airborne forces use this method for large complex objectives that must be seized by deliberate
attack. The DZ is selected to emphasize security and preservation of the force. The attack plan is
based on proper consideration of the factors of METT-TC and should capitalize on the principle
of surprise.
A-72. Landing Methods. There are two basic landing methods—multiple and single drop zones. With
multiple drop zones, there are a number of small airheads in the objective area. This technique supports the
principle of mass by placing the maximum number of paratroopers in the objective area in the minimum
amount of time. Additionally, the commander can capitalize on the principle of surprise because the main
effort is not easily determined by the enemy. This technique is normally used when employing multiple
BCTs. A single airborne BCT and smaller-sized airborne forces often establish their airhead by conducting
the airborne assault onto a single drop zone. This technique allows the assaulting unit to assemble quickly
and mass combat power against the enemy.
A-73. Time-Space Factors. Commanders schedule the delivery sequence and the time between serials to
provide the least time and distance separation between each aircraft and serial. The airborne force
assembles maximum combat power on the DZ as quickly as possible, using either of the following options:

Appendix A
z Land all elements in the same area. Aircraft approach the DZ in a deep, narrow formation and
all Soldiers jump into a small area.
z Land all elements at the same time. Aircraft in a wide formation approach various DZs situated
close to each other and all Soldiers jump at the same time or as near to it as possible.
A-74. Landing Priorities. Airborne units are cross loaded to land close to their assault objectives.
A-75. Organization. Airborne forces try to maintain tactical unity. Battalions or battalion task forces
normally land intact on a single DZ. An airborne BCT normally lands in mutually supporting DZs. Two or
more battalions can land successively on the same DZ or each can land on a separate DZ within a general
BCT DZ area.
A-76. The airborne force sends as many assault unit personnel and equipment as possible into the area in
parachute serials. Commanders must consider the mobility of equipment after the landing. For example,
carriers or prime movers deliverable by parachute but difficult to handle on the ground can accompany the
weapons in the assault element. Paratroopers accompany their units’ principal items of equipment.
Sequence of Delivery
A-77. The commander’s priorities within the ground tactical plan determine the sequence of delivery.
Neither aircraft allocations nor availability of aircraft should influence these decisions. The commander
determines final aircraft allocations after the landing plan backbriefs. Aircraft serials may precede the main
airlift column to drop USAF combat control teams (CCTs) and Army reconnaissance and surveillance
elements. The USAF CCT places and operates navigation aids on the drop and landing zones. The Army’s
reconnaissance element provides surveillance on NAI and report to the ground force commander.
Method of Delivery
A-78. This part of the landing plan addresses how the force arrives in the objective area with its needed
supplies and equipment. The assault echelon comes in by parachute. The commander can use a number of
other means to introduce additional personnel, equipment, and supplies into the objective area.
A-79. Personnel Airdrop. The airborne force delivers assault personnel by parachute drop. This method
allows quick, nearly simultaneous delivery of the force. Planners choose any terrain free of obstacles that
allows the assault force to land on or close to objectives. In some cases and with special equipment, it can
deliver personnel into rough terrain. Special teams can use high altitude, high opening or high altitude, low
opening techniques. These techniques allow for early delivery of the joint airborne advance party without
compromising the objective’s location.
A-80. Equipment and Supply Airdrop. Airborne forces can airdrop supplies and equipment directly to
units behind enemy lines or in other unreachable areas. The advantages of this are—
z Pre-rigging and storing emergency items for contingencies considerably reduces shipping and
handling time and increases responsiveness.
z Since the delivery aircraft does not land, there is no need for forward airfields or LZs or materiel
handling equipment for offloading.
z This reduces flight time and exposure to hostile fire and increases aircraft survivability and
availability.
z Ground forces can disperse more since they are not tied to an airfield or strip.
A-81. The disadvantages of airdropping supplies and equipment are–
z Airdrops require specially trained rigger personnel and appropriate aircraft.
z Bad weather or high winds can delay the airdrop or scatter the dropped cargo.
z Ground fire threatens vulnerable aircraft making their final approach, especially if mountains or
high hills canalize the aircraft.

Airborne Operations
z Since the aircraft do not land, no opportunity for ground refueling exists. Planned aerial
refueling can extend aircraft range and should be considered on long flight legs to increase
objective area loiter time and mission flexibility.
z Bulky airdrop rigs for equipment prevent the aircraft from carrying as much cargo as when
configured for air landing.
z The possibility of loss or damage to equipment during the airdrop always exists.
z Ground forces must secure the DZ to prevent items from falling into enemy hands.
z Recovery of air-dropped equipment is slow and manpower intensive.
A-82. Air-land Operations. Airborne forces can accomplish certain phases of airborne operations, or even
the entire operation, by using air-land operations to deliver personnel and equipment to the objective area.
(See FM 3-21.20 and FM 3-21.30.) In some cases, air-landing rather than airdropping personnel and
equipment may be advantage. Air-landing—
z Provides the most economical means of airlift.
z Delivers Army aviation elements, engineering equipment, artillery pieces, and other mission
essential items in one operation.
z Provides a readily available means of casualty evacuation.
z Allows units to maintain tactical integrity and to deploy rapidly after landing.
z Allows the use of units with little special training and equipment.
z Does not require extensive preparation and rigging of equipment.
z Offers a relatively reliable means of personnel and equipment delivery regardless of weather.
z Precludes equipment damage and personnel injuries units may experience in parachute
operations.
A-83. The disadvantages are that air landing—
z Cannot be used for forcible entry.
z Requires moderately level, unobstructed LZs with adequate soil trafficability.
z Requires more time for delivery of a given size force than airdrop, especially for small,
restricted LZs.
z Generally requires improvement or new construction of air-land facilities, which adds to the
engineer workload.
z Requires some form of airlift control element support at offloading airfields. Mission intervals
depend on airlift control element size, offloaded equipment availability, and airfield support
capability.
A-84. The tactical integrity of participating units is a major consideration in an air-land operation. Small
units that are expected to engage in combat on landing, air land organizationally intact with weapons,
ammunition, and personnel in the same aircraft whenever possible. Joint planning stresses placing units as
close as possible to objectives, consistent with the availability of LZs and the operational capability of the
tactical aircraft employed. Because of aircraft vulnerability on the ground, units unload as quickly as
possible.
A-85. The airborne commander determines the makeup of each aircraft load and the sequence of delivery.
The mission, the tactical situation, and the assigned forces influence this decision.
A-86. Units should use existing facilities, such as roads and open areas, to reduce the time and effort
required for new construction. They should consider layouts that facilitate future expansion and provide
maximum deployment and flexibility. As the size and efficiency of an air facility improves, its value to the
enemy as a target increases. To reduce this vulnerability, the facilities should be dispersed and simple.
Place of Delivery
A-87. The selection of DZs, LZs, and EZs is a joint responsibility. The airlift commander is responsible for
the precise delivery of personnel and cargo to the DZ or LZ and for the selection of approaches to the DZ.

Appendix A
Both the joint and component commanders must base their decisions on knowledge of their respective
problems and on the needs of the overall operation. The nature and location of landing areas is important
when preparing the scheme of maneuver. The mission governs the general area in which they are to be
established. At higher echelons, commanders can assign landing areas in broad general terms. In lower
units, leaders must describe their locations more specifically. Drop zones are selected only after a detailed
analysis. Commanders should consider the following factors when making their selections.
A-88. Ease of Identification. The DZ should be easy to spot from the air. Airlift pilots and navigators
prefer to rely on visual recognition of terrain features to accurately deliver personnel and equipment.
A-89. Straight-line Approach. To ensure an accurate airdrop, the aircraft should make a straight-line
approach to each DZ for at least 10 miles, or about four minutes at drop airspeed, before the start of the
drop.
A-90. Out of Range. The commander should choose a DZ that allows the units to avoid enemy air
defenses and strong ground defenses, and puts them outside the range of enemy suppressive fires. To get to
the DZ, aircraft should not have to fly over or near enemy integrated air defense systems, which can detect
aircraft at drop altitudes. They should fly over hostile territory or positions for the least possible time.
A-91. Close To or On Top of Assault Objectives. If the enemy situation permits, the commander should
choose a DZ directly on top of assault objectives.
A-92. Suitable Weather and Terrain. The commander must consider seasonal weather and terrain when
selecting DZs because these conditions affect their use. Adverse weather effects can be devastating.
Ground fog, mist, haze, smoke, and low-hanging cloud conditions can interfere with the aircrew’s
observation of DZ visual signals and markings. However, they do offer excellent cover for blind or area
DZs. Excessive winds also hamper operations.
A-93. Flat or rolling terrain is desirable; it should be relatively free, but not necessarily clear of obstacles.
Obstacles on a DZ will not prevent paratroopers from landing but will increase jump casualties. Sites in
mountainous or hilly country with large valleys or level plateaus can be used for security reasons. Small
valleys or pockets completely surrounded by hills are difficult to locate and should be used only in rare
cases. Commanders must avoid man-made obstacles more than 150 feet (46 meters) above the level of the
DZ within a radius of 3 nautical miles. High ground or hills need not be considered a hazard unless the
hills pose an escape problem that is beyond the aircraft’s capability. High ground or hills more than 1,000
feet (305 meters) above the surface of the site should not be closer than 3 nautical miles to the DZ for night
operations. The perimeter of the DZ should have one or more open approach sectors free of any obstacles
that would prevent the aircrew’s sighting of the DZ markings.
A-94. Cover and Concealment. Cover and concealment near DZs and LZs is a distinct advantage when
the airborne forces assemble and when airland forces land.
A-95. Road Net. Having a DZ near a good road net expedites moving personnel, supplies, and equipment
from that zone. If the landing area contains terrain that is to be developed into an air-landing facility, a road
net is of value—not only for moving items from the facility but also for evacuating personnel and
equipment.
A-96. Key Terrain. The DZ site selected should aid in the success of the mission by taking advantage of
dominating terrain, covered routes of approach to the objective, and terrain favorable for defense against
armored attack.
A-97. Minimum Construction for DZs and LZs. Because of limited engineer support in the airborne
force, selected landing zones should have a minimum requirement for construction and maintenance.
Unless more engineer support is requested and received, construction and maintenance restraints can limit
the number of areas that can be used or developed.
A-98. Mutual Support. Commanders should select mutually supporting DZs and LZs which provide
initial positions favorable to the attack.

Airborne Operations
A-99. Configuration. The division commander gives guidance on DZ size in OPLANs or OPORDs. Then
unit commanders determine the exact shape, size, and capacity they need.
A-100. Shape. The most desirable shapes for DZs are rectangular or round; these permit a wider choice of
aircraft approach directions. However, they also require precise navigation and timing to avoid collisions
or drop interference.
A-101. Size. The DZ should be large enough to accommodate the airborne force employed. One DZ that
allows the aircraft to drop all of its load in one pass is desirable. Repeated passes are dangerous because the
initial pass can alert enemy antiaircraft and other emplacements. They will be waiting for subsequent
drops.
A-102. There are certain situations, however, when multiple passes can be used. This occurs mainly when
there is no significant air defense threat and orbits can be made over areas where enemy antiaircraft
systems are not positioned. This applies especially to the seizure of islands where small DZs are the rule. If
enough aircraft are available to deliver the force with less personnel on each aircraft, there is no real
problem. However, if there are only enough aircraft to deliver the assault echelon in one lift with each
aircraft carrying the maximum number of personnel, then the aircraft will have to make multiple passes
over the DZ.
A-103. A large DZ can permit several PPIs. Although it is desirable to saturate the objective area in the
shortest possible time, there is a reasonable limit to the amount of personnel and heavy drop that can be
stacked on a single drop zone. Therefore, it can be desirable to use multiple points of impact on a single
DZ, provided the drop zone is large enough.
A-104. Capacity. The DZ capacity is based on the expected number of units to be dropped and their
dispersion pattern.
AIRHEAD LINE
DZ ABLE
PARALLEL DZs DZ BAKER
DIRECTION OF
DZ EAGLE FLIGHT
DZ CHARLIE
DZ DOG
ORIENTED IN SAME DIRECTION
Figure A-4. Ideal DZ situation
A-105. Orientation. Thoughtful orientation allows the quickest possible delivery of the airborne force
into the objective area. Ideal DZs offset and parallel each serial. (See Figure A-4 and Figure A-5.) This
allows aircraft to share a flight route until they approach the objective area; then they can split at an impact
point (release point) for simultaneous delivery on several DZs.

Appendix A
AIRHEAD LINE
DZ ABLE DZ BAKER
DIRECTION OF
FLIGHT
DZ DOG DZ CHARLIE
DZs
PARALLEL ON-LINE
Figure A-5. DZs parallel on-line
A-106. Another technique that can be employed is to make two drops on two DZs in line (thus eliminating
a change-of-flight direction between the two drops). The DZs must be far enough apart to permit the
navigators to compute the location of the second release point.
A-107. Paratroopers are more likely to overshoot the DZ than to undershoot it. Therefore, selection of the
trailing edge of the DZ should be at the objective to place personnel responsible for the primary assault
objective at the front of the aircraft so that they exit last.
A-108. If a fighter aircraft escort or rendezvous is required for the drop, the aircraft must be kept advised
of the drop pattern, the direction of all turns to be flown around the DZ, and the areas to look for possible
enemy activity.
A-109. Drop zones which require intersecting air traffic patterns should be avoided whenever possible.
They delay simultaneous delivery of the force because of the safety requirements to stagger delivery times
and clear the air by at least a five- or 10-minute formation separation time. They also require that Joint
Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (JSEAD) be accomplished for multiple routes instead of one. They
may result in piecemeal delivery and an unnecessarily complicated plan, violating the principles of mass
and simplicity.
A-110. Alternate Drop Zones or Landing Zones. Commanders must select alternate DZs or LZs to
compensate for changes that may occur.
A-111. Number of Drop Zones or Landing Zones. The number of DZs to be used by the assault
parachute element of an airborne infantry brigade depends on the number, size, and relative position of
suitable sites; the brigade plan of maneuver; and the expected enemy situation. The battalions of a brigade
can land successively on the same DZ, on separate battalion DZs. or on adjacent areas within a single large
brigade DZ. A single brigade DZ on which battalions land successively has these advantages:
z It permits greater flexibility in the plan of maneuver and the plan of supporting fires.
z It facilitates coordinating and controlling assault battalions.
z It applies the principle of mass.
z It makes logistics support easier.
z It decreases the area of vulnerability.

Airborne Operations
A-112. A single DZ also has disadvantages:

z It slows the buildup of combat power.
z It causes later airlift sorties to be vulnerable to enemy air as a result of the loss of surprise.
z It allows the enemy to focus his efforts.
A-113. A separate battalion drop zone has these advantages:
z It increases readiness for action by deploying the brigade as it lands.
z It reduces confusion on the DZs during the landing and reorganizing.
z It tends to deceive the enemy as to the intention and strength of the landing force.
z It makes capture of the brigade objective easier when there is strong opposition on one drop
zone.
z It increases the freedom of maneuver of the assault battalions.
A-114. A separate battalion drop zone has these disadvantages:
z It makes C2 more difficult.
z It reduces flexibility because units are dispersed.
A-115. Landing battalions on adjacent areas within a single large brigade DZ has, although to a lesser
degree, the same advantages and disadvantages of dropping on separate DZs.
Time of Delivery
A-116. No set rule can be prescribed for the timing of an airborne operation. It varies with each situation;
however, the airborne force will try to conduct airborne assaults during limited visibility to protect the
force and to surprise the enemy. The commander sets the specific time of delivery. However, for the
landing plan, times are stated in terms of P-hour (when the first paratrooper exits the aircraft). The
following considerations affect the timing of the operation.
A-117. Support of the Decisive Operation. The airborne assault can be a shaping operation. If so, the
time of commitment of the airborne forces in relation to the decisive operation is usually directed by orders
from higher headquarters. It is determined in advance according to the mission, the situation, and the
terrain. For example, the airborne force can be committed in advance of the decisive operation to give the
airborne attack an increased element of surprise. It can be committed at the same time as the decisive
operations to neutralize specific areas or to block the movement of enemy reserves. It can also be
committed after the decisive operation to assist a breakthrough or to block an enemy withdrawal.
A-118. Visibility. Whether to commit the airborne force by night or by day depends on the estimated
degree of air superiority, the need for security from enemy ground observation, the relative advantage to be
gained by surprise, and the experience of both airlift and airborne personnel.
A-119. Night airborne operations offer advantages. They greatly increase the chance of surprise and
survivability and reduce the chance of attack by enemy aircraft during the air movement. They also reduce
vulnerability to antiaircraft tire, conceal preparations for takeoff from the enemy, and reduce the
effectiveness of the defender’s fires.
A-120. Night airborne operations have disadvantages. In zero visibility, they require well-trained Soldiers
and aircrews to locate the DZ and assemble rapidly. They provide more air and land navigation problems
and offer slower rates of assembly than daylight operations. Night operations also reduce the effectiveness
of close air support.
A-121. Daylight operations provide better visibility both from the air and ground, more accurate delivery,
quicker assembly, and more effective friendly fires than night operations. However, daylight operations
increase vulnerability to enemy air defense, ground fires, and air attack. They also result in loss of surprise.
A-122. Intervals. The time interval between delivery of the assault echelon (P-hour) and the follow-on
echelon depends on the availability of aircraft, the capacity of departure airfields, the number of aircraft

Appendix A
sorties that can be flown on D-day, the availability of DZs or LZs within the objective area, and the enemy
situation.
A-123. For example, if there are unlimited aircraft, ample departure airfields, numerous DZs or LZs
within the objective area, and little or no enemy air defense, the commander could deliver the follow-on
echelon immediately after the assault echelon.
A-124. Thus, the time interval could be so brief that it would be hard to determine which was the last
aircraft of the assault echelon and which was the first aircraft of the follow-on echelon. Regardless of the
timing selected, a pattern must be avoided.
ASSEMBLY AND REORGANIZATION

A-125. Success or failure of the mission can depend on how fast the airborne force can regain tactical
integrity. The first goal of any airborne assault must be to deliver and assemble all available combat power
as quickly as possible. The sooner Soldiers assemble and reorganize as squads, platoons, and companies,
the sooner they can rig their equipment and start fighting as cohesive units. How efficiently and rapidly this
happens is a direct result of detailed planning, cross loading on the assault aircraft, and assembly on the
DZ.
A-126. Cross loading of key personnel and equipment is important in rapid assembly. It must be given
careful attention in training and on combat jumps. The separation of key personnel is necessary in case any
aircraft aborts or fails to reach the DZ. This prevents the loss of more than one key officer or NCO of any
one unit. Plans for heavy-drop loads must also consider the possibility that one or more aircraft will abort
before they get to the DZ, or the equipment will “streamer” in and become unserviceable.
AIR MOVEMENT PLAN

A-127. After development, backbrief, and approval of the landing plan, planners begin to develop the air
movement plan. This plan is the third step in planning an airborne operation and supports both the landing
plan and the ground tactical plan. It provides the required information to move the airborne force from the
departure airfields to the objective area. The plan includes the period from when units load until they exit
the aircraft. The air movement annex to the OPORD contains the air movement plan.
JOINT PLANNING
A-128. Although the USAF component commander is solely responsible for executing the air movement
phase, the air movement plan is the product of joint Army and USAF consulting and planning. The Army
contributes its landing plan and the procedures for the control and disposition of personnel at the departure
airfields. The USAF controls takeoff times and, based on the Army’s landing plan, coordinates timing
between different departure airfields to ensure the proper arrival sequence at the DZ, LZ, or EZ. The USAF
also designates rendezvous points and develops the flight route diagrams. The combination of METT-T
and the orientation of DZs, LZs, and EZs determine the orientation of the flight routes.
ELEMENTS
A-129. The air movement plan contains the information required to ensure the efficient loading and
delivery of units to the objective area in the proper sequence, time, and place to support the ground tactical
plan. The air movement table is the main part of the air movement plan. It includes the following essential
elements:
z Departure airfield for each serial.
z Number of aircraft for each serial.
z Chalk numbers for each aircraft, serial, and departure airfield. (Aircraft tail numbers correspond
to aircraft chalk numbers.)
z Unit identity of the airlift element.
z Name and rank of each USAF serial commander.

Airborne Operations
z Number and type aircraft.

z Employment method for each aircraft (passage point, HD, and CDS).
z Army unit identity.
z Name and rank of each Army commander.
z Load times.
z Station times.
z Takeoff times.
z Designated primary and alternate DZs for each serial.
z P-hour for the lead aircraft of each serial (given in real time).
z Remarks such as special instructions, key equipment, and location of key members of the chain
of command.
A-130. Besides the air movement tables, the air movement plan also contains the following information—
z Flight route diagram.
z Serial formation.
z Air traffic control.
z Concentration for movement.
z Allowable cargo loads (ACLs).
z Airfield maximum on-ground aircraft maneuver space.
z Aircraft parking diagram.
z Army personnel and equipment rigging areas at the departure airfield.
z Army control procedures during preparation for loading.
z Emergency procedures including personal recovery (see FM 3-50.1).
z Weather considerations.
z JSEAD, counterair, and air intelligence considerations.
TYPES OF MOVEMENT
A-131. The type of movement must be considered when determining how to load the aircraft. Is it
nontactical or tactical? Airborne units can conduct nontactical movement to an ISB or REMAB, and then
transload into assault aircraft by using tactical loading.
A-132. Nontactical movements are arranged to expedite the movement of Soldiers and equipment and to
conserve time and energy. Maximum use is made of aircraft cabin space and ACL.
A-133. Tactical movements organize, load, and transport personnel and equipment to accomplish the
ground tactical plan. The proper use of aircraft ACL is important, but it does not override the commander’s
sequence of employment.
AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS
A-134. When the airborne unit deploys, planning guidance from higher headquarters indicates the type of
aircraft available for the movement. Based on this information, the unit commander determines and
requests the number of sorties by the type of aircraft required to complete the move. The air movement
planner must ensure that each aircraft is used to its maximum capability. This is based on the information
developed on unit requirements, ACLs, and available passenger seats. Methods of determining aircraft
requirements are weight and type-load.
WEIGHT METHOD
A-135. This method is based on the assumption that total weight, and not volume, is the determining
factor. Since aircraft sometimes run out of space before exceeding the ACL, this method is no longer
widely used. It has been replaced by the type-load method. However, during recent operations, it was

Appendix A
discovered that aircraft can actually exceed their ACL before running out of space. The long distances
involved in reaching an objective area, the necessity of the aircraft to circle for extended periods before
landing, and the large amounts of fuel needed to sustain the aircraft can result in the aircraft having to
reduce its ACL. As a rule, the longer the deployment, the lower the ACL.
TYPE-LOAD METHOD
A-136. In any unit air movement, a number of the ACLs contain the same items of equipment and
numbers of personnel. Identical type loads simplify the planning process and make the tasks of manifesting
and rehearsing much easier. Used for calculating individual aircraft sortie requirements, the type-load
method is the most common and widely accepted method of unit air movement planning. It requires
consideration of load configuration and condition on arrival at a desired destination, rapid off-loading,
aircraft limitations, security requirements en route, and anticipated operational requirements. The type-load
method, therefore, is more detailed and is used in planning unit movements.
MARSHALING PLAN
A-137. After the air movement plan has been developed, backbriefed, refined (if necessary), and
approved, the next plan to be developed is the marshaling plan. It supports the previous three plans. The
tactical, landing, and air movement plans are used to determine the number of personnel and vehicles to be
stationed at or moved through each airfield. The marshaling plan provides the necessary information and
procedures by which units of the airborne force complete final preparations for combat, move to departure
airfields, and load the aircraft. It also provides detailed instructions for facilities and services needed during
marshaling. The procedures in this chapter assist airborne commanders and staffs in planning for
marshaling and CSS.
A-138. The marshaling plan appears as an appendix to the service support annex of the airborne force
OPORD or as an annex to an administrative or logistics order. The G-4 is the principal assistant to the
commander for the marshaling plans of specific units. Marshaling begins when force elements are sealed in
marshaling areas and terminates when the departure airfield control group (DACG) accepts the chalk at the
alert holding area. Procedures are designed to facilitate a quick, orderly launching of an airborne assault
under maximum security conditions in minimum possible time.
PREPARATION BEFORE MARSHALING

A-139. Units complete the following preparations before marshaling-especially for airdrops. Last minute
marshaling activities include briefing personnel, inspecting, preparing airdrop containers, issuing rations
and ammunition, and resting.
A-140. As soon as a unit is notified of an airborne operation, it begins the reverse planning necessary to
have the first assault aircraft en route to the objective area in 18 hours. The N-hour sequence contains the
troop-leading actions that must take place within a flexible schedule, ensuring that the unit is prepared and
correctly equipped to conduct combat operations on arrival.
A-141. Rehearsals are always conducted at every echelon of command. They identify potential
weaknesses in execution and enhance understanding and synchronization. Full-scale rehearsals are the
goal, but time constraints may limit them.
MOVEMENT TO MARSHALING AREA

A-142. Unit marshaling areas should be located near departure airfields to limit movement. The division
headquarters can either control the movement to the marshaling area completely, or it can get a copy of the
march table and use it to control the traffic out of the assembly area, along the route of march, and into the
marshaling area. Advance parties assign Soldiers to areas.
A-143. The S-4 of the unit to be marshaled notifies higher headquarters on the number of organic vehicles
that the unit can furnish to move its personnel and equipment to the marshaling areas. This information and

Airborne Operations
the personnel list furnished by the S-3 must be available early enough during planning to procure any other
transportation required for the movement.
A-144. When marshaling areas are on airfields, they are temporarily placed at the disposal of the airbase
headquarters. The air base commander’s permission is obtained by the tactical units that must conduct
activities outside of their assigned camp area.
PASSIVE DEFENSE MEASURES

A-145. Uncommitted airborne forces pose a strategic or operational threat to the enemy. Concentration of
forces during marshaling should be avoided to keep impending operations secret and to deny lucrative
targets to the enemy. Dispersal techniques include the following:
z Units move rapidly under cover of darkness to dispersed marshaling areas near air facilities.
z Commanders control movement to loading sites so most personnel arrive after the equipment
and supplies are loaded on the aircraft.
z Commanders prepare for loading before arrival at the loading site.
z Commanders avoid assembling more than 50-percent of the BCT at a single point at any time.
DISPERSAL PROCEDURES
A-146. The degree of dispersal is based on an intimate knowledge of the operation’s problems and what is
best for the overall operation. Regardless of the dispersed loading procedures, the airlift commander
ensures that aircraft arrive over the objective area in the order required by the air movement plan.
Depending on the situation, one of the following dispersed loading procedures is used.
A-147. Movement to departure air facilities moves airborne personnel and equipment to departure air
facilities where airlift aircraft may be dispersed. Movement to the ISB is another procedure. Before the
mission, airlift aircraft fly to an ISB to pick up airborne personnel and equipment. Personnel and
equipment are airlifted to dispersed departure airfield the mission originates from these facilities.
A-148. A third procedure combines the above two. Airlift aircraft fly to ISBs for the equipment before the
mission. The equipment is airlifted to the dispersed departure airfields and the mission originates from
these facilities, or airlift aircraft stop en route at ISBs to pick up personnel. Crews load aircraft quickly so
that the fewest possible aircraft are at the ISB atone time.
SELECTION OF DEPARTURE AIRFIELDS

A-149. Departure airfield selection is based on the proposed air movement and the capability of airfields
to handle the traffic. Marshaling areas near departure airfields are designated after the selection of
departure airfields. For any specific situation or operation, one or a combination of the following factors
can determine the selection—
z Mission.
z Airfields (number required, location, and type).
z Runway length and weight-bearing capacity.
z Communications facilities.
z Navigational aids and airfield lighting.
z Location of participating units and marshaling areas.
z Radius of action required.
z Vulnerability to enemy action, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear.
z Other TACAIR support available or required
z Logistics support available, required, or both.
z Facilities for reception of personnel and cargo.
z Facilities for loading and unloading of personnel and cargo.

Appendix A
z Facilities for dispatch of personnel and cargo.
SELECTION AND OPERATION OF MARSHALING CAMPS

A-150. The marshaling area is a sealed area with facilities for the final preparation of Soldiers for combat.
Commanders select marshaling camps within the marshaling area based on the air movement plan and
other considerations. Another way to avoid concentration of personnel is to time-phase the movement of
Soldiers from their home bases through the marshaling area to the departure airfield, minimizing the
buildup of forces. After departure airfields and marshaling areas are selected, loading sites are then
selected near the airfields. The following factors are considered when selecting marshaling areas—
z Distance to airfields.
z Time available.
z Existing facilities.
z Availability of personnel and materials for construction.
z Availability and access of maneuver and training areas.
z Communications requirements.
z Briefing facilities.
z Location of participating units.
z Security or vulnerability to enemy action.
z Logistics support available or required.
SUPPORT AGENCIES
A-151. When the airborne brigades deploy and marshaling areas close, the DISCOM acts as the
provisional logistics unit at the home station. The theater commander responsible for the AO provides the
provisional logistics support unit for the ISB. If a support unit cannot preposition at the ISB, a support unit
from the home station command is included in the advance party. Marshaling control agencies assist the
airborne and airlift force in the execution of the operation.
A-152. To enable the majority of the airborne force to concentrate on preparing for planned operations,
support agencies are designated by division headquarters to provide most of the administrative and
logistics support. These nonorganic units and certain organic units not participating in the airborne assault
are organized into a provisional unit known as the MACG. The MACG commander is the principal
logistics operator for the deploying force; he executes the logistics plan. Typical assistance provided by
this unit includes—
z Transportation.
z All classes of supply.
z Communications.
z Campsite construction, operation, and maintenance.
z Messing.
z Maintenance.
z Rigging.
z Recreation and other morale services.
z Local security personnel to augment the USAF, when required.
z Health service support.
A-153. The airlift control element (ALCE) coordinates and maintains operational control of all airlift
aircraft while they are on the ground at the designated airfield. This includes aircraft and load-movement
control and reporting, communications, loading and off-loading teams, aeromedical activities, and
coordination with interested agencies. The ALCE’s support function includes activities that relate to the
airfield.

Airborne Operations
A-154. The DACG ensures that Army units and their supplies and equipment are moved from the
marshaling area and loaded according to the air movement plan. The DACG may be a provisional unit or
nondeploying element of the deploying force. The deploying force or MACOM commander identifies who
executes the DACG support mission.
A-155. The organization of the airfield control group (AACG) is similar to the DACG's. When personnel,
supplies, and equipment are arriving on aircraft and need to be moved to marshaling camps or holding
areas, the AACG off-loads them. The AACG may be provided by a unit already located at the arrival
airfield or an element of the deploying force that is with the advance party and positioned at the airfield. As
the echelons above division (EAD) forces arrive, an air terminal movement control team (ATMCT) may
replace the requirement for an AACG.
OUTLOAD OPERATIONS
A-156. Complex outload operations are more difficult because they are usually conducted at night under
blackout conditions. Since most of the airborne units’ vehicles are rigged for air delivery, airborne units
rely on the supporting unit for transportation during outload. These requirements are closely related to and
dictated by the loading plans developed for the operation.
Contents of Loading Plan

A-157. Loading preparations are included in the marshaling plan. Loading plans outline the procedures
for moving personnel and HD loads from the alert holding area to plane side. They also outline the use of
available materiel handling equipment. Loading plans are closely coordinated with the supporting airlift
units.
Formulation of Loading Plan

A-158. A loading plan is formulated at joint conferences. It contains information about the number of
personnel, amount of equipment to be airlifted, ACLs, and general sequence of movement.
Adherence to Loading Plan

A-159. Strict adherence to the loading timetable is needed. Loading of equipment and supplies must be
completed in time to permit inspection, a joint pre-take-off briefing, and personnel loaded by the
designated station time.
Loading Responsibility
A-160. Loading responsibilities in the airborne operation are as follows. The airlift commander—
z Develops plans for specific loads and sequence of movement in conjunction with the unit being
moved.
z Establishes and disseminates instructions for documenting and manifesting all cargo and
personnel.
z Provides instructions for loading and unloading of aircraft and for tie down of cargo.
z Parks aircraft according to the parking plan.
z Provides loading ramps, floor conveyors, tie downs, load spreaders, and other auxiliary
equipment, such as operation ejection equipment.
z Prepares aircraft for ejection of cargo and safe exit of parachutists from aircraft in flight. Cargo
to be ejected in flight is tied down by AF personnel.
z Ensures that an AF representative is present to provide technical assistance and supervise the
loading unit during the loading of each aircraft.
z Verifies documentation of personnel and equipment.
z Furnishes and operates materiel handling equipment required in aircraft loading and unloading if
the Army unit needs it.

Appendix A
A-161. The airborne commander establishes the priority and sequence for movement of airborne
personnel, equipment, and supplies. Further, he—
z Prepares cargo for airdrop, air landing, or extraction according to applicable safety instructions.
z Marks each item of equipment to show its weight and cubage and, when appropriate, its center
of gravity. Ensures hazardous cargo is properly annotated on DD Form 1387-2.
z Documents and manifests all loads of Army personnel and equipment.
z Directs and monitors movement of ground traffic to the departure airfield or loading area, and
accepts delivery at the destination.
z Delivers properly rigged supplies and equipment to the aircraft according to the loading plan.
z Loads, ties down, and unloads accompanying supplies and equipment into and from the aircraft
with technical assistance from an AF representative. Cargo to be ejected in flight is tied down
and ejected by USAF personnel.
z Assigns chalk leaders for each chalk.

Appendix B
AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS
FM 90-4 is the Army’s basic doctrine for air assault operations. Air assault operations
are those in which assault forces (combat, CS, and CSS) maneuver on the battlefield
by helicopter under the control of a ground or air maneuver commander to engage
and destroy enemy forces or seize or hold key terrain. Air assault operations are
deliberate, precisely planned, and vigorously executed. During air assault operations,
the supporting aviation elements are task-organized with other members of the
combined arms team to engage enemy forces.
The division routinely integrates army aviation and infantry units with other members
of the combined arms team to conduct air assault operations. Air assaults provide the
division another means to project combat power within its AO without regard to
terrain barriers. Limitations on the geographical depth from which air assault
operations can take place are imposed by—
z Distance from the aviation unit’s assembly area/forward arming and refuel point
(FARP), the pickup zone (PZ), and the landing zone (LZ).
z Requirements associated with the linkup of the air assault force with ground maneuver
forces.
z Sustainment requirements of both the air assault force and the assault and attack
aviation conducting the operation.
A division, supported by a single aviation brigade, normally has the capacity to

conduct up to a battalion-sized air assault based on the assignment of a single assault
aviation battalion to the supporting aviation brigade. A division’s capability to
conduct simultaneous multi-battalion air assaults requires an aviation brigade to be
task-organized with two or more assault aviation battalions or the assignment to the
division of one or more additional aviation brigades.
Before directing one of his BCTs to conduct an air assault operation, the division
commander must carefully consider many factors. As a minimum, he must consider
time, assets, and impact.
z Is there sufficient time remaining for the BCT to properly plan, coordinate, and
synchronize such a complex operation with the aviation brigade and the fires brigade?
(An air assault operation cannot be hastily conceived and coordinated.)
z Are there sufficient assets available to properly conduct the air assault? (Placing forces
piecemeal into an air assault operation is dangerous.)
z What is the impact of air assault operations on the division’s capability after the air
assault has been completed? (Normally, aircraft assets will have to be borrowed from
other missions to properly conduct the air assault. The impact of an air assault operation
on crew rest, helicopter maintenance, and the division’s sustainment operations can be
detrimental to the division’s overall operations.)
Air assault operations are different in concept and execution from airmobile
operations. Airmobile operations are those operations involving the use of Army
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) B-1

Appendix B
airlift assets for other than air assaults. Airmobile operations are conducted to move
troops and equipment, or transport ammunition, fuel, and supplies. During airmobile
operations, aviation units are released to return to their parent units when an airlift is
completed.
COMMAND AND CONTROL

B-1. Command and control in an air assault is basically the same as for other types of tactical operations.
The air assault is planned and coordinated in the command post of the higher headquarters of the unit
assigned the air assault mission. Thus, a BCT will plan the conduct of a battalion-sized air assault. One of
the division’s tactical command posts, supported by the G-5, will plan and supervise the preparation and
execution of a brigade-sized air assault in the event that sufficient lift assets are available to conduct a
multi-battalion air assault.
B-2. However, air assault operations differ from other tactical operations in the designation of key
personnel and their planning and command responsibilities. The following terms relate specifically to air
assault operations:
z An air assault task force (AATF) accomplishes air assault operations and is a group of integrated
forces tailored to a specific mission and under the command of a single headquarters.
z The air assault task force commander (AATFC) designated by the ground or air maneuver
commander, commands the AATF and is normally one of the division’s BCT commanders.
z The air mission commander (AMC) commands and controls all aviation elements and advises
the AATFC on aviation-related matters on a specified mission or operation. The AMC is
subordinate to the AATFC and serves as his technical advisor throughout the conduct of air
assault missions.
z The ground tactical commander (GTC) commands and controls the assaulting elements before
pickup at the PZ and after insertion into the LZ. (If the GTC is not the AATFC, he is subordinate
to the AATFC.)
B-3. For example, the battalion commander serves as the AATFC while the AMC will be the assault
aviation company commander, and the rifle company commander will serve as the GTC in a company-
level air assault.
OPERATIONAL PLANNING
B-4. An AATF is normally a highly-tailored force designed to hit fast and hard. It is best employed in
situations that provide a calculated advantage due to surprise, terrain, threat, or mobility. Some basic air
assault planning guidelines include the following:
z Assign missions that take advantage of the air assault task force’s mobility.
z Do not employ in force roles requiring deliberate operations over an extended period of time.
z Always task organize the air assault force as a combined arms team.
z Allow extra time for planning and preparing for night and adverse weather air assaults.
z Maintain unit integrity throughout air assault planning to ensure fighting unit integrity on
landing.
z Plan and posture fire support to provide suppressive fires along flight routes and on LZs, and to
suppress enemy air defense systems.
B-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Figure B-1. Air assault operations—planning sequence
PLANNING STEPS
B-5. Five separate, but integrated plans, are required to conduct an air assault operation. The ground
tactical plan is the first and dictates the content of all others. These plans are developed in reverse order of
execution. (See Figure B-1.) The normal sequence of air assault planning is to—
1. Develop a ground tactical plan (GTC).
2. Develop a landing plan (AMC).
3. Develop an air movement plan (AMC).
4. Develop an aircraft loading plan (GTC).
5. Develop a staging plan (GTC).
GROUND TACTICAL PLAN

B-6. The foundation of a successful air assault operation is the commander’s ground tactical plan around
which subsequent planning is based. The AATF staff prepares the ground tactical plan (with input from all
task force elements). All aircrews must be familiar with the ground tactical plan and the ground
commander’s intent.
B-7. The ground tactical plan for an air assault operation comprises essentially the same elements as any
other infantry attack but differs in the requirements for speed and mobility. Assault units are placed on or
near the objective and organized so as to be capable of immediate seizure of objectives and rapid
consolidation. If adequate combat power cannot be introduced quickly into the objective area, then the air
assault force must land away from the objective and build up combat power. The air assault force then
assaults like any other infantry unit and the effectiveness of the air assault operation is diminished. The
scheme of maneuver may assume a variety of possibilities depending on the situation and METT-TC.
B-8. Following are considerations for the ground tactical plan supported by an air assault operation.
General considerations include—
z Choose appropriate assault objectives.
z Designate LZs available for use. Consider distance from LZs to the objectives.
z Establish D-day and H-hour (time of assault).
z Identify special tasks required to accomplish mission.
z Identify means to accomplish the mission: organic troops, aviation resources, engineers, signal,
MEDEVAC.
B-9. Fire support considerations include the following:

Appendix B
z Close TACAIR support.

z Field artillery within range (rocket, missile, cannon).
z Other indirect fire weapons (mortar, naval gunfire).
z Preparation fires for LZs (signals for lifting and shifting).
z Flight corridors.
z Air defense suppression (ground/air, air/air, ground/ground).
z Control measures needed.
z Subsequent operations (defense, link-up, withdrawal) that may be conducted.
B-10. Intelligence considerations include the following:
z Enemy locations to include air defense positions and type.
z Ground and aerial reconnaissance of objective area (if practical).
z Sensor reports, terrain study, weather forecast.
z Intelligence summary.
LANDING PLAN
B-11. The landing plan must be synchronized with and support the ground tactical plan. The landing plan
sequences elements into the AO, ensuring that units arrive at designated locations and times prepared to
execute the ground tactical plan. There are three primary elements of the landing plan. The landing plan—
z Involves the selection of LZs by the AATFC and his staff with input from the AMC or his
liaison officer.
z Considers landing formations to be used by the aircraft on the LZ to facilitate off-loading and
deploying for the assault.
z Addresses fires required to support the landing.
B-12. It may be preferable to make the initial assault without preparatory fires in order to achieve tactical
surprise. However, fires are always planned for each LZ so that they can be fired if needed. Planned fires
for air assault operations are intense and short but with a high volume of fire to maximize surprise and
shock effect. All fires should end just before the first assault element’s landing.
B-13. The following are considerations for the air assault landing plan—
z Selection of primary and alternate LZs with regard to proximity to cover and concealment,
obstacles, identification from the air, exits from the LZ, capacity of LZ, enemy disposition and
capabilities, and LZ security plan.
z Selection of single or multiple LZs as appropriate for the ground tactical plan.
z Landing formations.
z Approach and departure directions.
z LZ preparation fires to support landing plan and ground tactical plan.
z Use of aircraft after personnel have been landed.
z Use of pathfinders to mark LZ.
AIR MOVEMENT PLAN

B-14. The air movement plan specifies the schedule and provides instructions for air movement of troops,
equipment, and supplies from PZs to LZs. The air movement plan is normally developed by the AMC or
the aviation liaison officer. It coordinates instructions regarding air routes, air control points (ACPs), and
aircraft speeds, altitudes, and formations. The air movement plan requires consideration of the following
factors:
z Development of flight routes.
z Designation of start point and release point.
z Air movement table.
z Flight corridor.

z Flight axis.
z Expedient flight routes.
z Flight route control measures.
z Terrain flight modes.
z Supporting fires along the flight route.
z Alternate communications.
LOADING PLAN
B-15. The loading plan is based on the air movement plan. It ensures that troops, equipment, and supplies
are loaded on the correct aircraft and unit integrity is maintained when aircraft loads are planned. However,
assault forces and equipment may be cross-loaded so that assets, all types of combat power, and a mix of
weapons arrive at the LZ ready to tight. Aircraft loads are placed in priority to establish a bump plan. This
ensures that essential troops and equipment are loaded ahead of less critical loads in case of aircraft
breakdown or other problems.
B-16. Loading plans should be an integral part of the unit SOP below brigade level. The following are
considerations for developing the loading plan:
z Cross-load requirements.
z Bump plan.
z PZ assignment by unit (primary and alternate), bump and or straggler contingency plan, and PZ
control and security responsibilities.
z Holding areas.
z Routes from assembly areas to holding area to PZs.
z Refueling for multiple lifts.
z Attack helicopter utilization during PZ operations.
STAGING PLAN
B-17. The staging plan is based on the loading plan and prescribes the arrival time of ground units (troops,
equipment, and supplies) at the PZ in the proper order for movement. Loads must be ready before aircraft
arrive at the PZ; usually, ground units are expected to be in PZ posture 15 minutes before aircraft arrive.
B-18. The staging plan also restates the PZ organization, defines flight routes to the PZ, and provides
instructions for linkup of all aviation elements. Air-to-air linkup of aviation units should normally be
avoided, if possible.
Air Mission Brief

B-19. The air mission brief (AMB) is the final coordination meeting of key personnel involved in an air
assault mission. The AMB is a working briefing covering all aspects of the mission. Any uncertainties must
be addressed during the AMB as no changes are normally authorized subsequent to its completion without
the consent of the AATFC. The AMB is a coordinated staff effort requiring input from all participants of
the air assault operation. An AMB checklist, air movement table, and sketches of all primary PZs and LZs
should be issued to the AATFC, GTC, and AMC. (See FM 90-4 for details on the AMB.)
Aircraft Specification
B-20. Throughout the concept development and planning for the air assault at the division level, the staff
will require some types of generalized information concerning infantry units and air craft strengths,
capabilities, and specifications. These planning specifications may change, depending on the situation, but
will help determine feasible courses within the capabilities of available resources. Aviation and infantry
units are normally composed as shown in Figure B-2. Figure B-3 and Figure B-4 provide additional aircraft
specifications.

Appendix B
Aviation Units
Assault Bn 30 UH-60 A/C (3 companies of 10 A/C each)
Assault Co 10 UH-60 A/C
GS Bn 12 UH-60 A/C (4 configured for C2)
GS Bn 12 CH-47 A/C
UH-60 carries 14 troops in seats, 21 without seats

Ch-47 carries 33 troops in seats
Infantry Units
Infantry Battalion 664 Personnel
Infantry Company 141 Personnel
Heavy Weapons Company 71 Personnel
Figure B-2. Air assault operations—composition of infantry and aviation units
HH-53H
AIRCRAFT OH-58A UH-1H/V UH-60A CH-47C CH-47D
(USAF)
NAME UNIT KIOWA IROQUOIS BLACKHAWK CHINOOK CHINOOK PAVELOW
NORMAL CREW EA 2 2 3 4 4 6
FUSELAGE
FT/IN 32”3” 41’11” 50’7.5” 50’9” 51’ 65”
LENGTH
OPERATING
FT/IN 40’11.8” 57’1” 53’8” 99’ 99” 78’
LENGTH
EXTREME
FT/IN 9’7” 14’6” 17’1” 18’12” 18’8” 13’4”
HEIGHT
MAIN ROTOR
FT/IN 35’4” 48’ 53’8” 60’ 60’ 46’8”
DIAMETER
TAIL ROTOR
FT/IN 5’2” 8’6” 11’ 60’ 60’ 16’
DIAMETER
MAX LIFT
LBS 3,000 9,500 20,250 46,000 50,000 42,000
TAKEOFF
BASIC WEIGHT LBS 1,586 5,132 10,500 20,481 22,499 28,150
MAX RECM
LBS N/A 4,000 8,000 20,000 28,000 20,000
XTNL LOAD

TROOP/
EA 2/0 11/8 11/8 33/28 33/28 35/20
PARATROOPS
LITTER/
EA 2/2 3/4 4/6 24/33 24/33 6/30
AMBULATORY
MAX FLIGHT HR/ 5/00

3/00 2/20 2/20 2/00 2/00
TIME MIN Refuel
Figure B-3. Rotary wing aircraft specifications
F-1 to F-0:15 F-0:15 to F-HR F-HR to F+0:20 F+0:20 to F+0:40 F+0:40 to F+1
Receive timely
data from ACE,
pass to 11th Avn
I
Bde. Update
S
enemy locations.
R
Final SPOTREP
before crossing QUICKFIX
FLOT. Jaming
M
1/227 Atk Avn (-)
A
breaks contact and
N 1/227 Atk Avn (-) 1/227 Atk Avn (-) 1/227 Atk Avn (-) at
1/227 Atk Avn (-) in egresses back to
E provides security crossing FLOT. FAARP. 1/101 Avn
overwatch position. FLOT. 1/101 Avn
U for AA. 1/101 1/101 Avn at FAARP prepar-
1/101 Avn at LZ1. completes LZ opns
V Avn arrv at PZ. crossing FLOT. ing for sling opns.
and egresses back
E
to FLOT.
R
F
I Execution matrix AI into EA. 1-101 Avn calls for
R initiated. Final FAC controls fires in support of
E checks. CAS. LZ.
S
C Activate A2C2
2 plan.
S
A-2/101 Avn
U
establishes two
S
FARPs.
T
P Execute ingress Execute egress
R SEAD. SEAD.
O
Aircraft/personnel
T
lost or missing?
E C-1/227 Atk Avn
C conducts
T deception opn.
D UAS confirm Did air assault
E target location? meet Cdr’s
C intent/CCIR?
Is there a clear
I Use AH-64 for
picture of enemy
S security? Reinforce air
locations?
I Commits additional assault?
O AH-64 to security.
Did UAS go
N Do AH-64 need to
forward?
remain on station.
P
Weather abort?
T
S

Appendix B
Coordinate
B FLOT crossing
C and air assault.
T On-order attack
begins.
K
Request
E
additional—
Y
Arty Spt? Prepare for another
IO Spt? air assault or
A
CAS? attack.
C
Synch FS
T
Means.
Figure B-4. Example assault operations—planning matrix

Appendix C
Combat Service Support in the Modular Division
Successive operations for the past two decades show that Army of Excellence
organizations were not as responsive and flexible as Army commanders required.
Commander's needs were met with high costs in organizational disorder, inefficiency,
and unsatisfactory response times. The Army regularly disassembled division and
corps structures, assigned specialist units to purpose-built task forces, and left
unusable remnants in Garrison. These challenges, together with the changed strategic
and operational environment, drove the Army to undertake the most comprehensive
redesign of its field forces since World War II. The modular division is one part of the
transforming Army, which provides commanders with ready and relevant warfighting
capabilities that are mission-tailored and scalable. Modular combat service support
(CSS) organizations provide a mix of capabilities that can be organized for any
combination of offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction, or civil-support
operations. This appendix describes the fundamentals of modular sustainment
operations, how sustainment operations are executed, and what CSS functions
commanders of the modular division can expect on today’s battlefield.
FUNDAMENTALS OF MODULAR CSS OPERATIONS

C-1. The modular force CSS operational concept is a major step forward in achieving required future
force operational capabilities that will meet the challenges of the 21st Century. Its design incorporates
transformation imperatives established by the Army Chief of Staff for a modular force capability that
improves near-term operational capabilities in a joint operating environment and achieves joint
interdependence in logistics. Specifically, this concept provides—
z A modular, brigade-based Army that is more responsive to regional combatant commanders’
needs by streamlining joint capabilities, facilitating force packaging and rapid deployment, and
fighting as self-contained units in non-linear, non-contiguous battlespaces.
z An Army logistics structure that is responsive to the needs of a joint and expeditionary
campaign-quality Army by leveraging emerging technologies and linking support to supported
and joint organizations (CONUS to areas of responsibility (AORs) or within AORs).
z Elimination of redundancy and reduction of unnecessary layers.
C-2. The purpose of CSS is to generate and sustain combat power, which expands operational reach. CSS
commanders and staff officers must understand the commander’s intent so that they can provide the
support needed to achieve the desired end state. By embedding CSS within brigade-level structures, CSS is
inextricably linked to operations. This provides the division commander with organizations that can be
employed in any environment without first task organizing CSS for the brigade. Above the brigade level,
sustainment capabilities provided by CSS elements extends the modular division’s operational reach by
maximizing the distribution architecture’s throughput (FM 4-0) efficiency and leverages host nation (HN)
and contracting support to supplement logistics requirements.
C-3. The G4 leverages actionable logistics data provided by logistics and command and control (C2)
automation systems to determine the sustainability and supportability of current and planned operations.
These systems provide near real time (NRT) logistical, personnel, and medical information that links the
division to the sustainment brigade and theater logistics planners. Combined with an embedded, modular
CSS structure, the G4 has the capability to quickly and more accurately plan sustainment operations. To
2/6/2006 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) C-1

Appendix C
understand the fundamentals of sustainment operations in the division, one needs to be familiar with CSS
planning throughout the range of military operations, CSS C2, and how replenishment operations (ROs)
are executed by modular CSS units.
Note: The terms logistics, CSS, and sustainment are sometimes used interchangeably. However,
these terms are not synonymous. Logistics is a broad term describing both planning for and
execution of sustainment operations; it encompasses everything from the industrial base to the
requirements of Soldiers on point. Sustainment is mainly about the execution of key combat
support (CS) and CSS functions necessary to support the mission until complete. Sustainment is
finite, while logistics is integral to any standing military force. CSS comprises personnel and
logistical functions performed before, during, and after sustaining operations.
CSS PLANNING
C-4. CSS planning to support offensive, defensive, stability operations, and civil-support operations
requires a thorough mission analysis, careful identification of the supported force, and an understanding of
the commander’s intent and concept of operations. CSS planners in the modular division must consider all
specified and implied requirements and be aware of resources available, including other US services, the
HN, and theater contracting capabilities. CSS planning is essential to identifying the criticality of each of
the eleven CSS functions (see Figure C-1). This aspect of modular sustainment operations sets the tone and
characterizes the mindset with which logisticians will proceed.
CSS in the Offense

C-5. CSS in the offense is characterized by
high-intensity operations that require
CSS FUNCTIONS
anticipatory support as far forward as • Supply
possible. Commanders and staffs ensure • Field Services
adequate support for continuing the • Transportation
momentum of the operation as they plan and • Maintenance
synchronize offensive operations. Plans • Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support
should include agile and flexible CSS • Force Health Protection
capabilities to follow exploiting forces and • Human Resource Support
continue support. Commanders and staffs • Financial Management Operations
plan for increased quantities of fuel and • Legal Support
selected other classes of supply, as well as • Religious Support
maintenance and recovery of damaged • Band Support
equipment. Division planners consider
casualty rates and preposition medical Figure C-1. Planning identifies CSS
treatment and evacuation capabilities forward functions
to clear the battlefield efficiently. The biggest
challenge to plans for supporting a rapidly
moving brigade combat team (BCT) may be the lengthening lines of communication (LOCs).
Transportation support must be closely coordinated to deliver essential support to the right place at the
right time. CSS assets must follow exploiting forces to ensure continuity of support. Plans for all offensive
phases must enable CSS elements to react quickly to changing needs. The digitization of the modern
battlefield helps CSS and maneuver commanders quickly reprioritize assets as situations dictate.
C-6. During offensive operations, the most important supply commodities are typically Class III(B) and
Class V. Service support plans direct the movement of Class III(B) and Class V resupply to meet
forecasted requirements. As advancing combat formations extend control of the area of operation (AO),
human resource management personnel face similar challenges to reconcile and report command strength
information, casualty information, and conduct replacement operations.
C-2 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) 2/6/2006

CSS in the Modular Division
C-7. Offensive operations put a high demand on maintenance elements. To continue momentum, field
maintenance teams (FMTs) are designed to operate with forward elements. Similarly, widely dispersed
forces and longer LOCs require all means of transportation, including aerial delivery assets, to deliver
supplies well forward. Movement control personnel manage movement priorities according to the
commander’s priorities.
C-8. The higher casualty rates associated with offensive operations increase the burden on medical
resources. Medical treatment facilities may move forward to prepare for offensive operations. If the
increased numbers of casualties overwhelm medical resources, nonmedical transportation assets may be
needed for evacuation. Following an offensive operation, combat stress casualties may be more prevalent
and require moving combat stress teams forward.
C-9. Plans should also provide for religious support (RS), which may become critical during offensive
operations. Chaplain support through counseling and appropriate worship can help reduce combat stress;
increasing unit cohesion and productivity.
C-10. Using contractors in offensive operations entails great risks. However, the force commander may be
willing to accept risk and use contractors in forward areas. Contractor support outside of AOs may help
minimize Army CSS force structure at locations such as intermediate staging bases.
CSS in the Defense

C-11. The commander positions CSS assets to support the forces in the defense and survive. CSS
requirements in the defense depend on the type of defense. For example, increased quantities of
ammunition and decreased quantities of fuel characterize most area defensive operations. However, in a
mobile defense, fuel usage may be a critical part of support. Barrier and fortification materiel to support the
defense often has to move forward, placing increased demands on the transportation system. The
maintenance effort focuses on returning primary weapon systems and critical equipment to mission capable
status. Defensive operations may allow CSS assets to provide field services and refit degraded units. CSS
planners and operators also prepare to resume support to the offensive operations projected to follow the
defense.
C-12. CSS managers direct routine resupply of forecasted requirements to designated units, as stated in the
service support plan. They should push Class IV directly to battle positions, when possible, and give Class
V the highest priority. The increased expenditures of ammunition significantly impact transportation assets.
Throughput of supplies from the echelons-above-division to the lowest-level supply support activity (SSA)
expedites deliveries.
C-13. The task of medical units is to triage casualties, treat and return to duty, or resuscitate and stabilize
for evacuation to the next higher echelon of medical care or out of the theater of operations. Medical
treatment facilities should locate away from points of possible hostile actions.
C-14. Using contractors in forward areas during defensive operations may entail unacceptable risk. If not,
they may provide support in rear areas of forward deployed units.
CSS in Stability Operations

C-15. CSS in stability operations involves supporting US and multinational forces in a wide range of
missions. These operations range from long-term CSS-focused operations in humanitarian and civic
assistance missions to major short-notice peace enforcement missions. Some stability operations may
involve combat. Tailoring CSS to the requirements of a stability operation is important to the success of the
overall mission. In stability operations, small task-organized CSS forces may operate far from traditional
chains of command and support agencies that cannot sustain themselves. This may also include large-scale
operations that support peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These operations may or may not involve
direct hostile action to US forces and may have nearly the same CSS requirements as offensive or
defensive operations. Contracted services and support may significantly augment Army CSS capabilities in
major stability operations.

Appendix C
C-16. In addition to the movement control challenges typically presented by joint and multinational
operations, large numbers of nongovernmental organizations sharing the same LOC and node facilities
usually complicate movement control in stability operations. As in any major multinational operation,
forces may establish a multinational movement control center (MCC) to prioritize usage.
C-17. Maintenance units often have to support civilian assets as well as those of other military forces. In
UN operations, the UN may purchase US equipment for other multinational forces. In such cases, those
forces may not have the capability to service the equipment. US units may provide support or identify
support packages. Also, the desired end state may require that maintenance support for stability operations
include reestablishing or upgrading the infrastructure maintenance capabilities. This may entail providing
tools and equipment.
C-18. For medical personnel, stability operations often result in more frequent and direct contact with the
local population. Planners consider the mix of care-provider skills, instrument sizes, drugs, and supplies to
support pediatric, geriatric, and obstetric missions. Human resources support (HRS) activities (such as
postal and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) services) may have a higher priority and be a more
immediate requirement during long-term stability missions than during offensive and defensive missions;
long-term stability missions operate at a reduced tempo. These morale-related services become a major
focus to both commanders and Soldiers. Using contracted services and support may augment some CSS
units. (See FM 3-07.)
CSS in Civil Support

C-19. CSS is often the primary focus of a civil support operation. Although Army forces do not conduct
stability operations within the United States, they often provide assistance to federal and state authorities
and respond to natural or man-made accidents and incidents beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities.
In many civil support operations, Army CSS units conduct key operations. The ability of Army forces to
move large amounts of equipment and supplies under adverse conditions and provide small tailored forces
on short notice makes Army CSS forces a valuable asset to lead agency authorities. Distributing food,
water, supplies, field services, and medical support is often the primary emphasis of civil support
operations; the Army has trained personnel and deployable assets to provide such support. Transportation,
supply, and medical units are the most often requested.
C-20. The key to success in many civil support operations is interagency coordination. Only in the most
extreme situations does the US military provide relief directly to those in need. In most civil support
operations, the US military assists government agencies in providing the required support. Private and
voluntary organizations may reduce the demands on transportation, medical, food, water, and housing
resources. (See FM 3-07.)
CSS COMMAND AND CONTROL

C-21. C2 is the exercise of authority and direction, by a properly designated commander, over assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement
of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the
mission (see FM 3-0). C2 has two components: the commander and the C2 system. The C2 system is the
framework in which modular sustainment operations are managed.
C-22. For CSS commanders, this framework is built on a logistics structure that provides unity of
command from the strategic to the tactical level. For the logistician, this means streamlined systems for C2,
theater opening, and theater distribution where similar and related functions are combined. Inter-
dependencies among the Services are designed to achieve greater efficiencies. Logisticians must be
prepared to conduct a broad spectrum of simultaneous operations to support deployment, employment,
sustainment, redeployment, and refitting of units in a regular cycle.
C-23. The command structure must be enabled by total visibility of the distribution system, its content, and
theater infrastructure to include main supply routes (MSRs) and multi-nodal/multi-modal operations.

Command visibility provides logistic planners the capability to identify, prioritize, and modify support
moving through the distribution system. Logistics commanders must couple this visibility with clear lines
of C2 to be able to identify and re-route assets as they move throughout the area of operations along
multiple lines of operation.
C-24. The sustainment command (theater) or SC(T) is the senior Army logistics headquarters in a theater
of operations. It consolidates most of the functions previously performed by corps support commands and
theater support commands into a single operational echelon and is responsible for C2 of logistics
operations conducted in support of Army as well as joint, interagency, and multinational forces. The SC(T)
is regionally focused, and together with its sustainment commands (expeditionary) or ESCs, globally
employable. Its modular design provides the SC(T) commander with the flexibility to adapt his C2 as
requirements develop; with ESCs providing an additional measure of responsiveness, agility, and
flexibility for employment or deterrence.
C-25. Sustainment brigades are subordinate commands of the SC(T). They consolidate selected functions
previously performed by corps and division support commands and area support groups (ASGs) into a
single operational echelon and provide C2 of the full range of logistics operations conducted at either the
operational or tactical levels. The brigade headquarters are identical in organizational structure and
capabilities. Their core competency is C2 of logistics operations; providing C2 and staff supervision of life
support activities, materiel distribution management, and movement control as an integral component of
the theater distribution system. Their level of assignment and mission determines the mix of functional and
multifunctional subordinate battalions under their control. They are an integral component of the joint and
Army battlefield communications network; employing satellite- and network-based communications that
enable C2; visibility of the distribution system; and identification of support requirements. They perform
theater opening, distribution, and sustainment functions.
C-26. One facet of the Army transformation is that the BCTs have an organic brigade support battalion
(BSB) with forward support companies (FSCs) that provide support to the brigade. The BSB headquarters
consolidates many of the CSS functions for C2. The sustainment brigade support operations section may be
required to synchronize tactical support to BSB operations. In the early stages of an SSC, the BSB may
link directly into the deployed SC(T) element, often the sustainment brigade for direct support (DS). This
implies that the SC(T) deployed element may be required to provide temporary tactical-level sustainment,
as well as operational-level support interface for the BCT during early entry operations.
Materiel Management
C-27. The SC(T) centrally controls and executes the materiel management function for Army forces in a
theater of operations. Subordinate sustainment brigades and divisions are linked to the SC(T) via a
satellite-based communications network that facilitates real-time transaction management and oversight.
The division G4 and supporting sustainment brigade will be focused on the current fight, while the SC(T)
is focused on the distribution system and broader, theater-level materiel management issues. The G4
(providing plans, policy, and oversight) will be continuously linked with the SC(T) to prioritize the
division’s requirements while providing plans and guidance to the supporting sustainment brigade. This
theater-wide approach to materiel management streamlines the process, eliminates redundant management
layers, and provides the means to effectively and efficiently weigh the logistics effort in support of on-
going and future operations.
C-28. The G4 predominately has visibility to manage internal command critical materiel and readiness
across the unit’s footprint. He provides oversight, plans and policy for all units and operations within
assigned division AO. The G4 will have a logistics common operating picture (LCOP) through BCS3 and
other STAMIS to maintain oversight of materiel readiness and internal stocks within the division. Brigade
level ASL are considered consumed therefore not accessible from the CTASC and thus do not penetrate to
the BSB’s SARSS-1. The G4 has the ability to direct cross-leveling of BCT level materiel to support
readiness requirements. The G4 manages those command regulated items that the division commander
deems necessary. The G4 also works in concert with his G8 counterpart to establish fiscal/expenditure
limits on requisitions.

Appendix C
Battle Command Sustainment and Support System

C-29. The Battle Command Sustainment and Support System (BCS3) provides actionable logistics
information to commanders and, for the first time, a visual logistics picture of the battlefield. It provides an
NRT, continuous graphical representation of the current situation within the land AO, to include all
friendly and enemy (known and suspected) locations, identification, and unit status. The situation is
displayed over topographic details selected by the user from a menu of available mapping features. BCS3
supports the warfighting C2 and battle management process by rapidly processing large volumes of
logistical, personnel, and medical information. The BCS3 facilitates quicker, more accurate decision
making by providing a more effective means for force-level commanders and CSS commanders to
determine the sustainability and supportability of current and planned operations.
Very Small Aperture Terminal

C-30. A satellite communications system, the CSS's very small aperture terminal, gives forward-deployed
CSS units communications capabilities on par with those used in garrison. It can be operational within an
hour and when used in connection with the Multi-Media Communications System and the CSS Automated
Information Systems Interface, provides worldwide voice, video, and data communications capability. CSS
units can share documents, process requisitions, conduct online meetings, send and receive text messages
with this system. They can also use it as a short-range telephone. The system’s software enables the user to
set up a satellite communications link and acquire non-secure internet protocol router network access,
almost anywhere in the world.
SUSTAINMENT
C-31. Sustainment is the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and
prolong operations or combat until the successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the
national objective (see FM 4-0). It involves providing and maintaining levels of personnel and materiel
required to sustain the operation throughout its duration. Sustainment or sustaining operations encompass
the execution of key CS and CSS functions necessary to support decisive and shaping operations until the
mission is complete.
C-32. Logistics concepts, organizations, and systems in the modular division support the requirement for
expeditionary agility and responsiveness—as well as speed, precision, and staying power. Logisticians and
CSS units of the modular division must meet simultaneous demands across a potentially large AO with a
greater CSS presence forward. To do this, the Army’s system of support has become more streamlined,
efficient, and flexible to meet these demands. The modular division’s logistics system is designed to
function efficiently under the stringent conditions of operational maneuver from strategic and operational
distances, with greater operational reach to CONUS-based support. In a theater of operations, with the
division’s forces widely distributed and operating in non-contiguous areas, support is provided by
leveraging technology. The sustainment brigade’s role with enabling RO is especially important when
combat units are widely distributed over a non-contiguous battlefield with LOCs that can only be secured
temporarily.
Replenishment Operations
C-33. Replenishment operations (ROs) are preplanned sustaining operations that allow combat forces
to replenish routinely. An RO is a deliberate, time sensitive logistics operation. It can be conducted by the
BSB to replenish its FSCs and by the FSC to replenish the combat loads of individual Soldiers and
weapons platforms. These operations, which may be augmented with assets from the sustainment brigade,
are quick and in-stride with the supported commander’s battle rhythm. The purpose of RO is to replace
used stocks within a BCT or support brigade (see Figure C-2). It may be either deliberate or hasty if
circumstances allow. Typical CSS activities that take place during RO include rearming, refueling, fixing,
medical support, and personnel replacement to meet immediate needs.

Replenishment Operations Supporting the Brigade
3d Combat Load 2d Combat Load 1st Combat Load
X I
FSC
MSO I
CO
X
II I I
SUST RO RO FSC RO CO Objec
BSB t ive
I I
CO
FSC
Figure C-2. Replenishment operations
Mission Staging Operations

C-34. Mission staging operations (MSO) are initiated by order of the division commander, conducted by
the BCT, and enabled by the sustainment brigade at a forward location usually within the BCT AO. MSO
tasks are METT-TC based, but typically includes mission preparation conducted in coordination with
sustainment tasks. The sustainment brigade provides replenishment to the BSB along with field services
and other services as required. MSO takes place away from the battle, preferably in a location cleared
beforehand by the CS brigade (maneuver enhancement [ME]). The purpose of mission staging is to prepare
for an upcoming mission through an intense, time-sensitive operation that may include reorganization,
planning, troop leading, rehearsals, training, reconnaissance and surveillance, force tailoring, information
operations, to ensure the success of the combat operations.
CSS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MODULAR DIVISION

C-35. The key to a more modular support structure is to organize it based on what support organizations
can do for the commander, rather than what functional branch organizations can do for the force as a
whole. Under the modular construct, organizational designs incorporate multifunctional, modular, self-
reliant sustainment capabilities as part of the BCT and combat arms battalion organizations. This provides
them with all the necessary logistics support to sustain operations internally for a period of time while
minimizing the need for external support. The sustainment brigade, the BSB, and the FSC are the
fundamental building blocks of modular sustainment structure.
SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE
C-36. The sustainment brigade is designed to be a flexible organization that is task organized to meet
mission requirements. The sustainment brigade has a command and staff structure capable of providing
logistics management at either the operational or the tactical level. It does not have the organic capacity to
execute its assigned mission without the assignment of modular support units like the combat sustainment
support battalion (CSSB) or functional logistics units (for example, a transportation battalion). The
sustainment brigade headquarters may also be augmented by a number of different types of modular

Appendix C
elements. The types and quantities of these attachments are dependent upon the mission and the number,
size, and type of organizations the sustainment brigade must support.
C-37. The sustainment brigade’s only organic subordinate unit is its brigade troops battalion (BTB). The
BTB provides C2 for assigned and attached personnel and units. It directs logistics support operations for
the BTB and provides logistics advice to supported commanders in the BTB. The BTB has a headquarters
and headquarters company. It integrates the functions of the battalion's S1 through S4 staff sections and
provides the company to which brigade and BTB personnel are assigned.
X
SUST
II
II
BTB CSSB
I I
HHC FIN HR AMMO TRANS MAINT S&S
Task Org based on: JSCP,TRO, Stationing and / or Specific Operations
Figure C-3. Sustainment brigade
C-38. Three to seven CSSBs may be assigned to a single sustainment brigade depending on the brigade’s
mission. The CSSB is under the C2 of the sustainment brigade commander. It is the base organization from
which logistics force packages are tailored for each operation. Through task organization, the CSSB is
capable of providing logistics support during all phases of operations. The CSSB is structured to optimize
the use of logistics resources (through situational understanding and common operational picture) and,
therefore, minimize the logistics footprint in the AO. The mission of the CSSB is to C2 organic and
attached units, provide training and readiness assistance, and provide technical, equipment recovery, and
mobilization assistance to supported units. (See Figure C-3.)
II
CSSB
Organic
Attached
HR TRANS MAINT AMMO SUPPLY

HHC
FIN MA AIRDRP FIELD WATER FUEL

SPT SVC
HR and Finance units are usually attached to the BTB, but they may receive
administrative support from a CSSB.
Figure C-4. Combat sustainment support battalion

BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION

C-39. As mentioned before, BSBs are organic to brigades and BCTs. The BSB headquarters provides C2
over BCT logistics operations, materiel distribution management, and movement control over all
sustainment ROs. BSB units provide medical support, field maintenance, and distribution of supplies to
elements of the BCT (see Figure C-5). FSCs organic to the BSB provide habitual support to the brigade’s
combat arms battalions.
C-40. The BSB is a modular organization comprising an HHC; brigade support medical company (BSMC),
which is located only in BCTs; distribution company; field maintenance company; and four FSCs. While
the composition of each individual company of the BSB may vary somewhat depending upon the
supported force (heavy, infantry, or Stryker), each BSB is designed to operate with the same basic concept
of support. FSCs replenish combat arms battalions, the distribution company replenishes each FSC, and the
BSB is replenished by the sustainment brigade. Stryker BSBs do not have FSCs and task organize support
to meet mission requirements.
SPT
HQ MED FSC
FSC
FSC
FSC
Figure C-5. Brigade support battalion
FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY

C-41. The FSC is multi-functional and includes supply, transportation, ammunition transfer, and
maintenance capabilities (see Figure C-6). Although the FSCs are organic to the BSB, they will have a
habitual relationship with their supported maneuver battalion. FSCs provide all classes of supply (minus
Class VIII) and field maintenance to its supported battalion. It can operate either a consolidated or split
battalion distribution point or logistics release point, based on METT-TC.
I
FSC
HQ
Figure C-6. Forward support company
C-42. The distribution platoon processes receipts, closes out the supply shipments, achieves accountability
of items, and processes retrograde material. It is not designed to carry an authorized stockage list items,
except as necessary to support issue and turn-in operations. It may potentially carry critical logistical

Appendix C
replacement units and combat spares as authorized or directed. The distribution platoon of the FSC
supporting an infantry battalion (in the lighter IBCT) also has a mobility section. This section has the
capability of moving one company of infantry tactically in one lift. The maintenance platoon is equipped to
support work order requests and to manage the shop stock. FMTs are assigned one per supported company
and provide dedicated automotive, track field maintenance, and recovery capability to a combat arms
company. Communications connectivity (VSATS/FBCB2) is critical to the success of submitting
requisitions and tracking assets, work and repair production, and readiness visibility.
SUPPLY AND FIELD SERVICES

C-43. Supply and services consist of wide-ranging functions that extend from determining requirements at
the strategic level to delivering items and services to the user at the tactical level. Supply involves
acquiring, managing, receiving, storing, and issuing all classes of supply except Class VIII. Field services
involve feeding, clothing, and providing personnel services to Soldiers. It consists of clothing exchange,
laundry and shower support, textile repair, mortuary affairs, preparation for aerial delivery, food services,
billeting, and sanitation. The method or frequency by which a unit receives supplies or services varies, but
in most cases the determination is predictive or on demand.
SUPPLY SYSTEM
C-44. The supply system spans all levels of war. The following is a discussion of the considerations at the
operational and tactical levels, and how these considerations correspond to sustainment operations at the
modular division and BCT levels. Key to the timely and efficient distribution of supplies to and within the
modular division involves the implementation of expeditionary support packaging and a pure pallet
methodology. An explanation of these programs also follows.
Operational Considerations
C-45. Supply at the operational level involves requisitioning or acquiring, receipt, limited storage,
protection, maintenance, distribution, and salvage of supplies. Supply planners and managers must
understand the JTF/ASCC/ARFOR commander’s priorities and the requirements for supporting campaigns
and major operations involving the modular division. Requirements also include considering the needs of
joint and multinational forces. The division G4 must communicate his requirements so that operational
planners can prepare the distribution system.
C-46. Supplies are throughput whenever possible from the port of debarkation (POD) or local sources to
the appropriate SSA or receiving unit of the modular division. Multiple consignee cargo comes to a supply
activity for sorting before trans-shipment to the appropriate SSA or receiving unit.
C-47. The supply system depends on an efficient and effective materiel management system. The
distribution management centers (DMCs) of the sustainment brigade must know the prioritized
requirements of the division and the status of available resources. They manage distribution in coordination
with movement control elements that know the capabilities of the transportation system to move required
supplies. This management requires an effective automated supply system and extensive coordination.
Materiel management, which is mainly a function of the SC(T), links strategic and tactical supply and
transportation elements to provide total asset visibility.
C-48. Improved information systems allow management elements to perform split-based operations from
CONUS or forward-presence locations while critical capabilities required in theater deploy early in an
operation. For example, part of the SC(T) may remain at its home station while ECPs deploy to the AO
with the force they support. The SC(T) continues to support the stay-behind force while concurrently
interfacing with the ECP to provide the required support forward. This split-based capability ensures only
required elements deploy. This eliminates unnecessary forces in theater with related CSS demands. It also
minimizes strategic lift requirements.
C-10 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) 2/6/2006

Tactical Considerations
C-49. Tactical-level supply focuses on readiness and supports the commander's ability to fight battles and
engagements or accomplish his stability or support mission. CSS planners work with supporting
commanders and distribution managers to ensure required supplies are available when and where the user
needs them. Units typically carry a basic load of supplies with them to support their operations until the
system can resupply them. When time and mission constraints require, a "push system" provides supplies.
Under this type of system, planners estimate the supply requirements and arrange to have supplies
delivered to supported elements. As the theater matures and stocks become readily available, supply
elements convert by commodity to a "pull system." Requests generated by supported elements are the basis
of a pull system.
C-50. Within the BCT, there are three combat loads. The first combat load, found on the Soldier or the
combat system, is replaced in whole or part by the FSC during ROs. The second combat load, carried by
the FSC, is replaced in whole or part during RO conducted by the BSB. The distribution company of the
BSB generally carries the third combat load. The sustainment brigade replenishes the BSB, while the BSB
replenishes the FSCs in stride with combat operations and the supported combat arms battalion
commander’s battle rhythm.
Note: The term combat load is not synonymous with basic load, which is the quantity of
supplies required to be on hand that can be moved by a unit. Combat loads are the minimum
mission-essential equipment and supplies required for Soldiers to fight and survive immediate
combat operations.
C-51. Both operational and tactical supply systems include SSAs operated by distribution companies or
quartermaster support units. Quartermaster-support companies assigned to the sustainment brigade
establish SSAs from the communications zone (COMMZ) as far forward as the brigade support area
(BSA). On a temporary basis, quartermaster-support elements may operate even farther forward with the
BSA to reduce the distances users have to travel to receive support. The support structure within the BCT
and the sustainment brigade includes a distribution management capability to manage supply and
maintenance operations. Repair parts, for example, are managed by maintenance control sections as combat
spares and are requested through the BSB. This requisition may be filled by a supporting sustainment
brigade or a supply depot in CONUS. (See Figure C-7.) Water and other classes of supply may be
distributed in a similar manner.
TSC CONUS or another

DMC
Sustainment BDE
BSB
SUS RO LRP
FSC CRO
I
Request DIST
Unit Distribution
Supply Point FMT
Distribution
CBT Spares
UMCP
2/6/2006 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) C-11

Appendix C
Figure C-7. Class IX flow in the BCT
C-52. Under a pull supply system, a support brigade submits a request to its supporting DS supply element.
If stocks are available, the DS element fills the request and notifies the distribution manager, who initiates
replenishment. If it cannot fill the request, the request is passed from the sustainment brigade to the DMC.
In that case, the manager directs issue from theater stocks to the DS unit or passes the requisition to another
sustainment brigade’s distribution division to meet the requirement.
C-53. Retrograde of materiel usually involves unused supplies and repairable equipment that are evacuated
during RO and MSO. Repairable items generally end up in sustainment maintenance facilities and are
returned to supply channels when restored to serviceable condition. Salvage items are unserviceable and
uneconomically repairable. They are evacuated through the supply system, destroyed, or demilitarized
based on theater policy and commodity center instructions.
Expeditionary Support Package

C-54. Expeditionary support packages (ESPs) is a program that performs a service to provide both standard
and customized ESPs for training exercises; deployments; war reserve, pre-positioned stocks; and
predictable demands to meet the unit commanders’ requirements.
C-55. Brigades will use customized ESPs for training exercises, home station deployments, and during the
deployment phase of operations for which requirements are forecasted. The modular division will use both
standard and customized ESPs in conjunction with a “pure palleting” methodology to provide responsive
support for meeting actual requirements during the sustainment phase of operations. ESPs are appropriate
for all classes of supply, except some Class VII major end items.
Pure Palleting
C-56. Pure palleting is a process that collects all supply requisitions for a given DODAAC, configures
standard ESP packages and other supply items into loads, then throughputs them to their destination. Time
limit for the collection process is usually three days. Packages not filling a whole pallet are then combined
with other packages to produce consolidated loads, destined for multiple DODAACs/SSAs, which will be
sorted out in theater.
C-57. Pure palleting is used for the following supplies:
z Class II (NBC, clothing, and religious supplies).
z Class III(P) (packaged petroleum oil and lubricants).
z Class IV (construction and barrier materials).
z Class IX (batteries and repair parts).
FIELD SERVICES
C-58. All field services receive the same basic priority. The commander decides which are most important.
The ASCC influences priorities through the time-phased force and deployment data. For example, laundry
and shower units may be top priority in desert operations, while preparing loads for aerial delivery may be
more important in mountain operations. The location and suitability of MSO sites can be an important
factor in the decision to provide Soldier hygiene support and clothing repair.
C-59. During stability operations, the priority depends on the support requirements. In some circumstances,
field service units or activities may be the only support provided. The modular division is unlikely to have
the units assigned to perform field services in civil support operations but may be asked to provide other
types of support in order to help facilitate food preparation, water purification, and mortuary affairs
operations.
C-12 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) 2/6/2006

Force Provider
C-60. The Army’s Force Provider is a modular system, principally designed to provide the Soldier with a
brief respite from the rigors of a combat environment. Modular division Soldiers may benefit from this
system during entry operations or possibly during MSO. Each Force Provider company consists of six
platoons. Each platoon, when augmented, can operate one 550-soldier module. Each module can support
550 Soldiers separately or a brigade-sized force of 3,300 Soldiers if all six modules are combined. The
modules can work independently or with one another. Each module provides the following:
z Climate-controlled billeting activities.
z Food service.
z Shower and latrine facilities.
z Laundry service.
z Facilities for MWR activities.
Aerial Resupply, UASs, and Integrated Logistics Aerial Resupply

C-61. The Integrated Logistics Aerial Resupply (ILAR) program is a holistic approach to aerial re-supply
(airland, airdrop, and slingload) distribution operations that are in balance and synchronized with surface
distribution-based logistics operations. The intent of ILAR is to provide a full range of aerial distribution.
ILAR takes advantage of Joint intermodal enablers and is largely transparent to commanders. ILAR
supports commanders in the modular division by developing a capability to support full spectrum
operations. It helps to enable non-contiguous, non-linear operations, and also reduces the logistics
footprint, risk to air crews, and exposure and risk to CSS ground assets.
C-62. ILAR supports and improves force reception by enabling immediate employment of the modular
division and is unconstrained by sea and airports and host nation support (HNS). ILAR, which includes
Army helicopters, fixed-wing (for example, Sherpa) aircraft, and the use of joint precision airdrop system
and other enablers, supports the modular division and BCT’s requirement for the use of aerial delivery as a
routine method of re-supply.
C-63. Unmanned aerial systems (UASs) help logistics organizations accomplish their missions through a
variety of different applications at different echelons. UASs can provide surveillance of supply caches or
retrograded items that have been temporarily left unsecured. UASs may be employed to support the
inspection and maintenance operations of petroleum and water pipelines and water purification sites. UASs
may be used to conduct the dynamic identification and or re-direction of critical supplies transported by
convoy. UASs may be used to deliver supplies to remote areas, in a non-permissive or hostile environment,
or when LOCs are not secure. Finally, UASs may be used for ship-to-shore delivery of supplies when the
use of manned rotary wing aircraft is not feasible or desirable.
TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT
C-64. Innovative transportation systems and techniques are the key to enabling the modular distribution
system. Modular cargo containers and other conveyances pre-loaded for combat in CONUS or at major
overseas logistics facilities can be subsequently loaded on a ship or plane and then trucked directly from a
port to units in the field. Minimizing the handling of materiel while maintaining NRT visibility as it flows
through the distribution system is essential to giving the modular division the reach and flexibility to
perform its wartime mission.
C-65. Redundant, networked information systems are replacing personnel in the military supply chain. This
reduces the resources needed to support the modular division while increasing the confidence of
commanders in knowing that mission essential supplies and equipment will be delivered without
hampering combat operations. Modular transportation units bring the capabilities and expertise necessary
to support the division in all phases, from deployment to employment to redeployment.
C-66. The Army’s deployment goals are to deploy and employ a BCT in four to seven days; deploy and
employ three BCTs or support brigades in ten days; deploy three modular divisions in 20 days, and deploy
2/6/2006 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) C-13

Appendix C
five divisions in 30 days. The BCT must confront an adversary before setting the conditions in its favor to
meet the deployable imperative. The BCT design capitalizes on the widespread use of common vehicular
platforms. Highly mobile, medium-weight combat/CS tactical vehicles like the palletized load system or
heavy expanded mobile tactical truck-load handling system, combined with the necessary personnel, a
reduced logistics footprint, and state-of-the-art automated information systems form the backbone of the
support structure.
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL TRANSPORTATION

C-67. The variety and complexity of military operations require the Army to establish a transportation
system that is expandable and tailorable. The objective is to select and tailor required transportation
capabilities at the operational and tactical levels to achieve total integration of the system. These
capabilities include movement control, terminal operations, and mode operations. At the theater strategic
and operational levels, sufficient force structure deploys early to conduct reception, staging, and onward
movements, which includes opening ports, establishing inland LOCs, and providing C2 for movements. An
important facet of building combat power during the reception, staging, and onward movement phase of
the operation is receiving the force and sustainment supplies at the POE. This same transportation force
structure is required to redeploy the force when operations conclude. Ports, terminals, and inland LOCs are
critical nodes in the distribution system. At the theater strategic and operational levels, transportation
supports the reception of units, personnel, supplies, and equipment at PODs and provides for their
movement as far forward as required.
C-68. Theater transportation requirements largely depend on the factors of METT-TC. Modular division
planners must participate in the logistics preparation of the theater essential in determining requirements.
When directed by the combatant commander or joint force commander (JFC), transportation units in the
modular division may provide support to other services and multinational partners. Establishing
communication links to other than Army forces is a challenge; however, transportation planners in the
division headquarters and the sustainment brigade must integrate all requirements and support
considerations into movement plans and programs.
C-14 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) 2/6/2006

Ground Transportation Request Process

++
X
SC(T) X
X
SUST
SUST (TD
SPO
BDE S4
SP
MCT
II
+ MCB
DCP S
II
TRANS
BSB
SP
II
II II
MCT CSSB BN
+ I FSC
SP
SP
G4 MCT
DTO
X Information Flow
I
I Reques
Commitmen
Tasking
Echelons Above Division Coordination
’
.
Figure C-8. Ground transportation request flow
MOVEMENT CONTROL
C-69. Movement control is the linchpin of the transportation system. In coordination with the modular
division transportation officer (DTO), movement control units operating in the division’s AO plan, route,
schedule, and control common user assets. They maintain in-transit visibility (ITV) of personnel, units,
equipment, and supplies moving over LOCs. Units normally request transportation support through their
brigade/battalion S4. The S4 sends requests for transportation to the BSB support operations officer (SPO),
who may task assigned transportation assets to perform the mission. If the request for support exceeds the
BSB’s lift capabilities, the SPO forwards the request to the DTO. The DTO sends the request to the
servicing movement control team (MCT), which may be co-located with a sustainment brigade. Under
certain circumstances, the DTO may coordinate with the G3 to temporarily reallocate or task transportation
assets within the division to provide the required lift. As delineated by order or SOP, non-routine
transportation requests are sent to the DTO. Figure C-8 shows the routine ground transportation request
flow.
C-70. The DTO is the modular division’s transportation staff planner. The DTO and movement managers
at each echelon perform movement control activities. Movement control is integral to distribution
managers. They coordinate the efforts of the movement control units with distribution elements. Movement
control personnel coordinate routinely with operations planners and other CSS personnel, because
movement control is tied directly to maneuver as well as distribution.
C-71. Movement control also relies on support from CSB (ME) military police in their mobility support
role. All these staffs work together to plan and execute movements. Otherwise, congestion on LOCs and at
terminals hinders movements and degrades combat effectiveness. Movement control units implement
priorities established by the commander to support his concept of the operation. The distribution system in
2/6/2006 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) C-15

Appendix C
the modular force is essentially the warehouse. As such, movement control is the information conduit for
supplies, personnel, and units moving from the strategic sustaining base to the AO.
G4 Transportation Branch
C-72. The G4 transportation branch, comprising the DTO and a mobility warrant officer, develop the
traffic circulation plan, road movement tables, and highway regulation plan of service support annexes to
division orders. They serve as the primary technical advisors to the G4 on all matters pertaining to the
theater transportation policy, the transportation system, movement planning and execution, ITV, and
automation systems to support the deployment and redeployment of forces and distribution of material. The
G4 transportation branch performs the following actions:
z Recommends division priorities for transportation and movement to support division plans and
orders.
z Recommends the allocation of division transportation assets and the establishment of MSRs and
provides movement managers with policies and priorities.
z Assists the G4 in preparing, updating, and maintaining the transportation portion of the logistics
estimate.
z Conducts operational and tactical planning to support movement control and mode and terminal
operations.
z Coordinates with the G5 for HNS.
z Coordinates special transport requirements to move the command post (CP).
z Coordinate with G1 and G3 on transporting replacement personnel and enemy prisoners of war
(EPWs).
z Coordinates with the G3 for logistics planning of tactical troop movement.
z Coordinates common user transportation assets.
Movement Control Team

C-73. At least one movement control team will augment the division G4 and be placed under the control of
the DTO to provide the ability to maintain visibility of movements throughout the division area, as well as,
link the division to the EAD movements system. The MCT and/or its sub-elements must be placed with a
command and control headquarters (e.g. TACs, BCTs, CSB (ME)) to gain and maintain situational
awareness and the common operational picture (COP). Modular in design, one or all of the MCT’s four
identical sections may be employed throughout the division AO as a movement regulating team (MRT) to
provide ITV at critical nodes or within mobility corridors.
C-74. While functioning as an MRT, a section of the modular MCT does the following:
• Movement reporting.
• Convoy control.
• Security coordination.
• Route regulation and status reporting.
• Route reconnaissance and surveillance.
• March unit deconfliction.
• Contact reporting.
• Assistance to military police with battlefield circulation control (BCC).
Brigade Support Battalion SPO

C-75. The BSB support operations section provides transportation staff and technical expertise to the BCT
commander. This section’s transportation specialists conduct movement management of all brigade
transportation assets; allocates brigade transportation assets; and coordinates transportation support from
other echelons/organizations for requirements that exceed the brigade’s resources.
C-16 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) 2/6/2006

Mobility Officer
C-76. The mobility officer in the brigade provides commanders with full-time deployment expertise and is
a skilled technician who—
• Executes the rapid transmission of movement requirements in the Defense Transportation System.
• Develops and conducts unit training on the tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with unit
movements operations.
• Identifies and remedies force projection and strategic deployment deficiencies.
• Plans and coordinates deployment and redeployment.
• Provides distribution management expertise while in the AO.
ORDNANCE SUPPORT
C-77. Success on today's battlefield demands that forces maintain, recover, repair, or replace equipment as
quickly as possible. Good maintenance practices, forward positioning of maintenance units, effective repair
parts and equipment replacement systems, and clear priorities for recovery and repair are vital. Likewise,
sound theater policies on repair and evacuation and sufficient sustainment repair and replacement facilities
greatly contribute to battlefield success. This section covers the following aspects of ordnance support:
z Two-level maintenance.
z Ammunition support.
z Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).
TWO-LEVEL MAINTENANCE
C-78. The overarching principle of “replace forward and fix rear” remains unchanged. Modular
organizations continue to build on the two-level maintenance system, composed of field maintenance and
sustainment maintenance. This system combines unit and DS-levels of maintenance (called “field
maintenance”) and also combines the general support (GS) and depot levels (called “sustainment
maintenance”). Field maintenance in the BCT is provided by FMTs and the BSB field maintenance
company. At the field maintenance level all functions are focused on replacing damaged components and
returning the repaired item to the user. The goal is to reduce repair cycle times by providing capabilities as
far forward as possible, maximizing reliance on parts distribution, stock visibility and component
replacement. Sustainment maintenance involves off-system/platform tasks that are done primarily in
support of the supply system (repair and return to supply) and will not normally be performed inside the
modular division’s battlespace.
Field Maintenance
C-79. Field maintenance is the first operation of the Army maintenance system. Field maintenance is
characterized by the performance of maintenance tasks “on system” in a tactical environment using trained
personnel, tools, and test, measuring and diagnostic equipment (TMDE). Field maintenance is typically
operator/crew maintenance and repair and return to user maintenance operations.
Sustainment Maintenance
C-80. Sustainment maintenance is the second operation of the Army maintenance system. Sustainment
maintenance is characterized by the performance of maintenance tasks “off system” in a secure
environment using trained personnel, tools, and TMDE. Sustainment maintenance is typically repair and
return to stock and depot maintenance operations.
Support Maintenance Companies

C-81. Support maintenance companies (SMCs) provide field maintenance support for modular division
units without organic FMTs and not aligned with a field maintenance company. The SMC conducts area
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Appendix C
support field maintenance, and it is capable of accepting modules (platoons/sections/teams) from

component repair companies (CRCs) and collection and classification companies (C&Cs). Within the
modular division, the SMC may also provide reinforcing support for MSO.
Component Repair Companies

C-82. CRCs provide sustainment-level support for the modular division and theater-level units. CRCs can
be employed in any location in the distribution pipeline beginning at the national source of repair. The goal
is for these units to be pushed forward at the direction of the United States Army Materiel Command
(USAMC) into the Joint air operations, only as needed. These units—
z Provide repair and return to the supply system.
z Operate in conjunction with an SSA.
z Can attach platoons, sections, or teams to SMC or other sustainment units.
z Integrate maintenance repair activities with USAMC.
Collection and Classification Companies

C-83. C&Cs establish and operate collection and classification facilities for the receipt, inspection,
segregation, disassembly, preservation, and disposition of serviceable and unserviceable Class VII and
Class IX materiel and similar foreign materiel (except items peculiar to cryptographic materiel, missile
systems, aircraft, airdrop equipment, drones, and medical materiel).
AMMUNITION SUPPORT
C-84. Munitions are a dominant factor in determining the outcome of offensive, defensive, and often
stability operations. Munitions provide the means to defeat and destroy the enemy. Due to limited
quantities of modern munitions and weapon systems, commanders must manage munitions to ensure
availability and enhance combat readiness. Most major military operations are joint and multinational and
based on unexpected contingencies. These operations require the munitions logistics system to be modular,
tailorable, and easily deployed. Ammunition units deploy based on operational needs and are essential to
moving Class V supplies.
C-85. Planning logistics munitions support must be coordinated and synchronized across the levels of war.
The mission at every level of war is to ensure munitions arrive in the right quantities and proper types at
the decisive time and place. Having munitions in the right quantity, type, and place enhances the Army’s
ability to engage the enemy decisively and sustain the operations culminating with the successful
accomplishments of objectives.
C-86. Conventional ammunition ordnance elements may be attached to the sustainment brigade’s CSSB to
establish and operate ammunition supply facilities on an area basis. These elements may serve as the
theater level ammunition unit. The number and size of ammunition elements attached to the battalion
depends on the following:
z Tactical situation.
z Requirements.
z Theater stockage objectives.
z Existing HNS organization.
z Transportation assets and effectiveness of throughput.
z Type and density of weapons supported.
z Estimated percentage of ammunition tonnage that can be throughput.
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

C-87. Army EOD forces are designed to simultaneously support two regional combatant commanders
conducting major operations. An ASCC supporting a JFC is allocated an EOD group. The EOD group is
C-18 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) 2/6/2006

aligned as a theater additional asset. Three or more EOD battalions require an EOD group headquarters to
provide C2. An EOD battalion is attached to the CS Brigade (ME) (for administrative and logistical
support) to support explosive hazard (EH) operations in the modular division AO. An EOD battalion
headquarters will provide C2 for three to seven companies. EOD support is determined by METT-TC.
EOD groups and battalions position their EOD companies and teams at locations where they can best
support the maneuver commander. The EOD group headquarters provides technical assistance to all EOD
operations in a theater. The senior EOD commander in theater will function as the ASCC or ARFOR EOD
special staff officer responsible for EH operations. (See FM 4-30.5 and FM 4-30.16.)
C-88. The EOD planning staff is integrated into the modular division and ME brigade headquarters to
facilitate EH planning. They are the commander’s subject matter experts on all EH: unexploded explosive
ordnance, improvised explosive devices, captured enemy ammunition, and weapons of mass destruction.
The EOD staff recommends the implementation of EOD’s unique skills to protect the force. The EOD staff
advises the commander on EOD requirements and capabilities.
FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

C-89. The Army’s health service support system conducts the force health protection (FHP) mission that
conserves the force by preventing disease and non-battle injuries (DNBIs); clears the battlefield of
casualties; provides medical treatment and hospitalization; conducts enroute care during medical
evacuation (MEDEVAC), veterinary, dental, combat and operational stress control, preventive medicine
(PVNTMED), and laboratory services; and ensures Class VIII supplies, medical equipment maintenance,
and blood support are available.
FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION IN THE MODULAR FORCE

C-90. The Medical Deployment Support Command (MDSC) directs FHP to all operational-level Army
medical elements in the AO. When the Army is the lead service for medical support, it also supports joint
and multinational commands and other elements under the guidance of the ARFOR surgeon. The ARFOR
surgeon provides policy and technical guidance to the MDSC and all Army medical units in the theater.
The MDSC maintains a technical relationship with the ARFOR's staff surgeon to assist in establishing
medical policy for the theater. It also maintains technical linkages to various medical support activities at
the strategic level.
C-91. The MDSC is responsible for developing plans, procedures, and programs for FHP in the AO to
include patient evacuation, patient care and movement, hospitalization, stress control, preventive medicine
services, dental services, veterinary services, and laboratory services. The MDSC supports the JFC
surgeon’s joint patient movement requirements center in accordance with lead service directives. It
provides staff planning, staff supervision, training, and administrative support of Army medical brigades
engaged in operational level medical support. It provides combat health logistics, including medical
requirements determination and medical supply control. If only a module of the MDSC deploys, the
commander of the MDSC (Forward) is the deputy commanding general rostered from the MDSC.
C-92. The MDSC early entry module (EEM) provides the following capabilities: C2 of medical
subordinate organizations; technical and clinical supervision and assistance; lead service responsibility for
veterinary services as required, as well as for Class VIII and blood product management; medical planning,
operations, and regulating services; preventive medicine; and information management services. The
MDSC specialized module, along with the EEM functions it has subsumed, provides the following
capabilities to the theater:
z C2 of medical units.
z Medical personnel assignment and the Professional Officer Filler Systems coordination.
z Patient evacuation coordination.
z HN medical support coordination.
z Telemedicine services.
z Contracting for medical services.
2/6/2006 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) C-19

Appendix C
z Geneva and Hague Conventions advice and staff legal assistance for medical services.
z Lead service support for Class VIII and blood products management as required.
z Theater-wide FHP operations planning and theater medical intelligence services.
C-93. The command monitors the flow of Class VIII supplies and makes necessary adjustments in
coordination with the sustainment brigade support operations section, the ARFOR commander G4, and the
Medical Logistics Management Center. It directs relocation of stocks and medical equipment if necessary.
C-94. The MDSC also coordinates medical regulation operations with the medical regulating office and the
joint theater patient movement requirement center, as well as the sustainment brigade support operations
section. It tracks medical treatment facility (MTF) locations, capabilities, and workloads to plan and
manage medical regulating, evacuation, and mass casualty (MASCAL) operations.
C-95. Among the other services planned and coordinated by the MDSC in coordination with the ARFOR
staff surgeon and the sustainment brigade support operations section are the following services or
operations:
z Preventive medicine operations.
z Medical professional service.
z Dental service support operations.
z Nursing support services.
z Veterinary services.
Multifunctional Medical Battalion

C-96. The multifunction medical battalion is organized to provide C2 to attached and assigned units of a
medical task force; and provide Level I and Level II combat health support to include far forward surgical
capabilities, advanced trauma life support, sick call, patient holding, dental services, diagnostic services,
preventive medicine, mental health, optometry, and ground evacuation services on an area support basis.
Brigade Support Medical Company

C-97. The BSMC operates a Level II MTF and provides Level II FHP to all units in the BCT. This Level II
MTF care is predominantly done from within the BSA. The BSMC is responsible for providing
MEDEVAC from supported units to its Level II MTF. It also provides Level I care to units without organic
medical personnel and augments and reinforces maneuver battalion Level I MTF. Some of the functions of
the BSMC include the following:
z Medical treatment of DNBI, combat operational stress reactions, and trauma injuries.
z MEDEVAC (ground ambulance).
z Class VIII resupply.
z PVNTMED.
z Operational (emergency) dental care.
z Medical equipment repair.
z Dental care.
z Patient holding.
z Radiological services.
z Laboratory services.
z Level II plus surgical resuscitative services when augmented by a forward surgical team.
Medical Reporting
C-98. The Medical Communications for Combat Casualty Care (MC4) and Theater Medical Information
Program (TMIP) support the information management requirements for the BCT surgeon’s section (BSS)
and BCT medical units. The BSS uses BCS3, FBCB2, and MC4-TMIP to support mission planning,
coordination of orders and subordinate tasks, and to monitor/ensure execution throughout the mission.
C-20 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) 2/6/2006

C-99. The MC4-TMIP is an automated system, which links health care providers and medical support
providers, at all levels of care, with integrated medical information. The MC4-TMIP receives, stores,
processes, transmits, and reports medical C2, medical surveillance, casualty movement/ tracking, medical
treatment, medical situational awareness, and medical logistics data across all levels of care.
MEDICAL EVACUATION
C-100. Evacuation of injured Soldiers is categorized into the following two types:
z MEDEVAC is the use of either ground or air ambulances to evacuate from the point of injury to
an MTF while providing enroute care.
z Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) is the use of non-medical vehicles or other means for patient
movement without providing enroute care.
C-101. The MEDEVAC plan is the key to the FHP plan. The battalion medical platoon is responsible for
MEDEVAC of casualties from the point of injury to the battalion aid station (BAS). The battalion S1/S4
must ensure there is a coordinated MEDEVAC plan from all battalion locations to the BAS, and to the
BSMC in the BSA. The battalion S4 and the BCT S4 coordinate the ambulance exchange points (AXPs),
and posts them on his support graphics in FBCB2. The battalion S4 also coordinates any available
ambulance support from the battalion. Internal vehicles for mass CASEVAC are identified and positioned
for use as required. The battalion S4 tracks active and inactive AXPs, and disseminates that information to
battalion CPs and companies.
C-102. As casualties occur, the battalion S4 directs assets to assist with CASEVAC. MEDEVAC outside
the battalion may be accomplished by ground or air. Recovery responsibility does not end until casualties
are evacuated back to its Level I MTF/BAS. Responsibility for further evacuation from the BAS, is the
mission of the BSMC ground ambulances or supporting air ambulances that are evacuated to the BSMC
Level II MTF in the BSA or other supporting MTFs. Medical patients are evacuated no further to the rear
than their condition requires, and returned to duty as soon as possible.
C-103. The BCT surgeon section coordinates the MEDEVAC plans of battalion medical platoons and the
BSMC. Battalion medical platoons often attach combat ambulances to companies in anticipation of
casualties. The BSMC ambulance teams will evacuate patients from maneuver BAS back to the BSMC
Level II MTF located in the BSA. Pre-positioning BSMC ambulance teams with supported maneuver unit's
BASs, will reduce ambulance turnaround times. The BCT surgeon also plans the landing sites for aerial
evacuation. Plans and exercises should include the use of aerial evacuation (when available) to transport
litter-urgent patients.
C-104. The preferred method of MEDEVAC is by air ambulance, but their use is METT-TC dependent.
Usually, the aviation brigade positions a forward support medical platoon (FSMP) with three UH-60
Blackhawk aircraft in support of a BCT. They are usually positioned in the BSA. These aircraft are not DS
to the BCT, but provide area support to all units in the area. The brigade aviation element and BCT
surgeon coordinate the use and positioning of the FSMP. They integrate air ambulance support, to include
coordination of A2C2 requirements, establishing clear lines of authority to launch a MEDEVAC, and
identification of pickup zones and loading zones.
C-105. Planners must anticipate the potential of high casualty rates and long evacuation distances. They
identify and coordinate AXPs along the axis of advance and on the objective. The locations of AXPs must
be identified for all phases of the operation and triggers developed for their displacement to their next
locations. Planners must retain the flexibility to shift nonstandard evacuation assets to support MASCAL
or CASEVAC as required. Planners also ensure responsive medical support is preplanned to support cross-
FLOT extraction of BCT reconnaissance elements by a maneuver or quick reactionary force.
CLASS VIII
C-106. Usually medical units deploy with a three to five day supply of consumable medical supplies, and
all companies deploy with complete combat lifesaver bags. Initially, sustainment supplies are pushed to the
BSMC, based on theater casualty estimates. Individual Soldiers should deploy with a 90-day supply of
2/6/2006 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) C-21

Appendix C
their personal prescribed medications. As they deploy, Soldiers must advise their supporting medical unit
of their specific needs so the medical logistics system can sustain these prescriptions.
C-107. Resupply of medical supplies is through medical channels. The BSMC and maneuver platoon
medical personnel are responsible for maintaining their medical equipment sets. Combat lifesavers and
company/platoon medics receive replenishment of Class VIII for their aid bags from their unit medical
platoons. The BSMC provides Class VIII resupply and medical equipment repair to the unit medical
platoons. To prevent unnecessary depletion of blankets, litters, splints, and other equipment, the receiving
medical facility exchanges like property with the BAS when it accompanies the patient. Class VIII
resupply may also be accomplished via UAS and the Precision Aerial Delivery System. (See FM 4-02.1 for
definitive information on the medical logistics system.)
HUMAN RESOURCES SUPPORT

C-108. The objective of HRS is to maximize operational effectiveness and to facilitate enhanced support
to the armed forces. Reliable, responsive, and timely HRS in the operational area is critical to supporting
the operational commander and the force. It relies on secure, robust, and survivable communications and
digital information systems. These provide a common operational picture, asset visibility, predictive
modeling, and exception reporting—important to making accurate and timely manning decisions.
HUMAN RESOURCES CORE COMPETENCIES

C-109. HRS encompasses nine fundamental capabilities, or core competencies. Each of these core
competencies includes tasks that support Army theater tactical and operational-level operations. These core
competencies are—
z Personnel readiness management (PRM).
z Personnel accountability and strength reporting (PASR).
z Personnel information management (PIM).
z Reception, replacement, redeployment, rest and recuperation, and return-to-duty (R5).
z Casualty operations.
z Essential personnel services (EPS).
z Postal operations.
z MWR.
z Band operations.
MODULAR DIVISION G1
C-110. The modular division G1 serves as the senior HR advisor to the division commander. The mission
of the G1 is to enhance the readiness and operational capabilities of forces and ensure HRS is properly
planned and executed. The G1’s responsibilities include the following:
z Integrate all HRS activities within the division.

z Establish division-unique HR policies and procedures.
z Provide technical oversight of HR units within its AOR.
z Coordinate and synchronize HRS for its AO with the HR operations cell in the sustainment
brigade.
z Coordinate the preparation of plans and orders for all HRS activities to include the chaplain,
surgeon, civilian personnel officer, and staff judge advocate (SJA).
z Ensure HR plans support the tactical plan, its branches and sequels, and the commander’s
desired end-state.
z Direct the military and civilian HR systems.
z Manage the Soldier readiness program.
C-22 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) 2/6/2006

z Recommend replacement allocations and priorities of fill to the division commander and G3.
z Track division personnel combat power.
z Manage services to the Soldier and civilians.
z Synchronize the division HR network.
z Coordinate with the division G1 to obtain external HRS for the division.
z Direct and synchronize MWR and Army band activities.
z Direct the Army Substance Abuse Prevention program.
z Direct the equal opportunity program.
BRIGADE/BCT S1 SECTION
C-111. The personnel support system has evolved in both access and organizational structure to enable the
delivery of personnel services as close to Soldiers and commanders as possible. Battalion and brigade S1
sections are the focal point for providing personnel services. The BDE/BCT S1 Section is employed with
the BCT to provide EPS, PASR, PRM, PIM, casualty information management, and military pay customer
service as well as provide policy, procedure, and training information and oversight to the battalion S1
sections within the BDE/BCT. The S1 section has all the necessary system accesses and permissions to
enter data to or receive from the top of the HR system (Human Resources Command and Defense Finance
and Accounting Service) without intermediate steps at the division and ARFOR G1.
HUMAN RESOURCES COMPANY

C-112. An HR company provides postal, R5, and casualty support to the modular division with modular
teams. This company is very modular, flexible, and scalable, which allows commanders to tailor their
support in the most effective and least invasive manner.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

C-113. The modular division G8 is the principal staff officer responsible for Title X financial
management functions within the division AO. The G8 acquires, distributes, reports, and controls funding
resources. He monitors budget execution for compliance with fiscal law and current policy directives. The
G8 also provides finance and accounting policy, advice, assistance and technical oversight to financial
management units assigned to the modular division. His responsibilities also may include the following:
z Reviewing of theater-wide international agreements to assess financial management
implications.
z Participating in the theater war planning process.
z Supporting acquisition and logistics processes.
C-114. The financial management detachment’s mission is to provide area financial support to a BCT or
equivalent-sized unit, or as directed by the financial management company commander. The financial
management detachment provides timely and accurate payment for contractor and commercial vendor
services support, disbursing and funding support, EPW pay support, non-US pay support, and US pay
support to division or ARFOR units. The financial management must have sufficient transportation and
communication assets to perform numerous and simultaneous support missions, and must be able to move
day or night. Mobility is required to provide effective finance support for units over geographically
dispersed locations on the battlefield. In addition, the requirement to conduct multiple and simultaneous
support missions increases the requirement for a financial management detachment to have adequate
transportation, maintenance, communication, global positioning, and life support assets. Financial
management detachments are equipped with financial management tactical platform, which enables
effective operations through the use of real time data and online capability.
C-115. The financial management detachment is co-located with a BCT or equivalent-sized unit, and is
responsible for all financial management operations on an area basis. The financial management
detachment performs the following functions:
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Appendix C
z C2 and supervision of widely dispersed, assigned, or attached financial management support

teams.
z Procurement support.
z Disbursing operations.
z Pay support.
LEGAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

C-116. Legal support to operations encompasses all legal services provided by judge advocates and other
legal personnel in support of units, commanders, and Soldiers in the modular division’s AO and throughout
full spectrum operations. Legal support to operations falls into three functional areas: C2, sustainment, and
personnel service support (referred to as support).
C-117. Command and staff functions include advice to commanders, staffs, and Soldiers on the legal
aspects of command authority, command discipline, applying force, and the law of war (LOW). Some
examples of judge advocates' C2 responsibilities are—
z Interpreting, drafting, and training commanders, staffs, and Soldiers on rules of engagement.
z Participating in—
Targeting cells.
The military decision-making process.
Information operations.
z Applying the LOW.
z Advising commanders on policies prescribing Soldier conduct and ensuring discipline
(jurisdictional alignment, convening authority structure, and authority to issue general orders).
z Generally, issues directly affecting the commander's operational decision making process on the
battlefield.
C-118. Sustainment functions include negotiating acquisition and cross-servicing agreements and status of
forces agreements (SOFAs), combat contingency contracting, fiscal law, processing claims arising in an
operational environment, and environmental law.
C-119. Personnel service support functions include Soldier discipline advocacy services (courts-martial,
nonjudicial punishment, and other routine matters in administering military justice), legal assistance
services, and basic Soldier-related claims issues.
C-120. In the BCT, the brigade judge advocate (BJA) advises the commander on compliance with
environmental laws, regulations, treaties, and conventions. He also writes or interprets SOFAs. The BJA
helps determine environmental assessment requirements and manages civilian claims resulting from
environmental damage. He helps other staff officers to understand the legal aspects involved in their
respective specialties.
C-121. In conjunction with the BJA, the civil-military operations officer (S-9), advises the commander on
his legal obligations concerning the local population. In many areas of the world, these obligations include
protecting critical environmental resources. The S-9 and the BJA are responsible for being familiar with
local environmental laws, especially in overseas deployment areas. The S-9 may also supervise civil affairs
units who assist local governments with environmental protection services. He also serves as the focus of
coordination for HNS and indigenous labor, and coordinates with the BJA on civilian claims against the
US government for environmental damage.
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT
C-122. Chaplains, on behalf of the commander, provide and perform RS in the Army to ensure the free
exercise of religion. Chaplains are obligated to provide for those religious services or practices that they
cannot personally perform. Chaplains perform RS when their actions are in accordance with the tenets or
C-24 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) 2/6/2006

beliefs of their faith group. Chaplain assistants assist the chaplain in providing or performing this RS. The
division chaplain and deputy chaplain are the division’s RS planners.
C-123. Like the division chaplain, the brigade chaplain is a special staff member who serves as a
confidential advisor to the commander on the spiritual fitness, ethical, and moral health of the command.
Chaplains are assigned to US military units to assist commanders in providing the right of free exercise of
religion to all personnel. He is responsible for the professional oversight of the battalion unit ministry
teams (UMT). Each UMT is composed of a chaplain and one enlisted chaplain's assistant.
C-124. UMTs orders consumable chaplain supplies as necessary. These supplies are considered Class II.
C-125. Each battalion normally has a UMT, consisting of a chaplain and chaplain assistant, to provide RS
to their Soldiers. The brigade chaplain serves the brigade commander as a personal staff officer. The
brigade chaplain plans, synchronizes, and coordinates RS within the brigade AOR. The brigade UMT is
responsible for the technical oversight of the UMTs in subordinate units. S1s provide coordinating staff
oversight of UMTs.
C-126. The brigade UMT has the complex job of organizing the efforts of UMTs that work for
subordinate commanders. The brigade UMT must ensure there is RS to all Soldiers in the brigade AO.
Often, companies or detachments will be attached to the brigade without UMT support. Members of other
services and authorized civilians may require area support. The brigade UMT prepares an RS plan, often as
an appendix to an order, to ensure coordinated RS for the Soldiers of the brigade. This RS plan should
consider the following:
z Area support.
z Denominational coverage.
z Use of lay ministers.
z Potential for MASCALs.
z Augmentation of the BSB for patients in the BSMC.
z Coordination with the American Red Cross for family problems.
z Stress management after combat operations (for example, battle fatigue).
z Pastoral care and counseling to key leaders.
C-127. Chaplains advise their commanders on the moral and ethical nature of command policies,
programs, and actions as well as their impact on Soldiers. They are sometimes referred to as the
"conscience of the command."
C-128. UMTs have a staff role as well as a religious role. As staff officers, chaplains can research and
interpret cultural and religious factors pertinent to a given operational area. They may work with civil
affairs personnel in analyzing local religious organizations, customs and practices, doctrines, symbols, and
the significance of shrines and holy places. Chaplains may conduct liaison with, and support humanitarian
efforts by working with, humanitarian relief agencies, civil affairs, and public affairs where appropriate.
BAND SUPPORT
C-129. The division G1 coordinates band support, which can be a powerful commander’s tool to promote
goodwill and good relations to members of a local population. Army bands entertain Soldiers and citizens
of the United States, its allies, and host nations in both garrison and battlefield environments as evidenced
by participation in Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm, Operation Joint Endeavor, and
Operation Urgent Fury, as well as task forces Eagle, Falcon, and Andrew. (Details on Army band support
are covered in FM 12-50.)
CEREMONIAL SUPPORT
C-130. Army bands perform music that is connected to American heritage, military history, unit lineage,
and individual honors. Among Soldiers, ceremonial music helps build enthusiasm, maintain motivation,
and increase devotion to the unit, the Army, and the United States. Army band participation in a ceremony
2/6/2006 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) C-25

Appendix C
adds dignity, solemnity, tradition, and honor. Music creates an emotional bond that leaders can use to draw
a unit closer together, to show honor and devotion to a leader, and to remind them of friends and family
back home. Music highlights history and draws attention to sacrifices and hardships as well as victory and
heroism.
CIVIC SUPPORT
C-131. Music, with its inherent ability to raise emotions, highlight events past and present, and promote
optimism and determination for the future, is the ideal tool for a commander to use in supporting civic
events. The Army band supports and participates in public events because the Army belongs to the
American people. Common ownership requires that Army resources be used to support events and
activities of common interest and benefit. A successful community relations program enhances the
community’s perception of the Army and fosters an appreciation and spirit of cooperation for the military
installation, the Soldiers and their families, and civilians who are part of the installation
C-132. Civic events that may be appropriate for Army band participation include parades, holiday and
community concerts, sporting events, dedications, cultural events, and ribbon cutting ceremonies.
RECRUITING SUPPORT
C-133. Army bands are an important tool for use in recruiting. Bands highlight the Army and support
local recruiting activities. Musical selections may be drawn from many styles ranging from patriotic to
popular music in a single performance. All Army bands in CONUS are directly charged to support
recruiting efforts.
OTHER SUPPORT
C-134. In addition to the types of support mentioned previously, Army bands may participate in most
events not prohibited by AR 360-1 and AR 220-90. These regulations and DODD 5500.7, govern off duty
participation in unofficial events.
ENGINEERING SUPPORT
C-135. Operational-level engineer units maintain a support/coordination relationship to theater-level CSS
functional assets. The Army senior engineer commander provides general engineering support throughout
the theater. This support extends from the COMMZ to well forward—possibly into the division area. The
numbers and types of operational-level engineer units depend on the size of the support base required, HN
infrastructure, the mission, the availability of existing engineer support in the theater, and perceived threat
in the rear area. (See FM 100-7 for more details.)
SUPPORT/COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS
C-136. The senior engineer commander task organizes operational assets to best satisfy the priorities of
effort and support established by the JFC. Within the COMMZ, the commander aligns engineer assets to
provide GS on an area basis, as they receive service support on an area basis from the CSS community.
Current and evolving doctrine would place an engineer brigade in DS to the SC(T), with subordinate
engineer groups in DS to the ASGs.
CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT
C-137. In accordance with Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance, the JFC establishes broad standards and policies
for theater construction that guide engineer operations, whether they are performed by the United States
Air Force, Army, or United States Navy units. They are based on coordinated planning by construction
representatives from all service components. Theater construction policies establish standards, priorities,
and the theater construction management structure. The JFC may retain control at his level or delegate
construction management to a regional contingency engineering manager (RCEM). When the Army is the
C-26 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) 2/6/2006

RCEM, the senior engineer commander (usually from the engineer command) performs this function. The
RCEM manages all construction, repair, and facility modifications in the COMMZ. This structure provides
centralized control and decentralized execution. The RCEM also manages all troop, contract, and HN
construction repair operations in the COMMZ. Such a structure ensures that theater construction assets are
employed according to JFC-established priorities and policies.
REAL ESTATE PLANNING AND ACQUISITION

C-138. US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) theater elements provide technical real estate guidance
and advice to the theater commander. In addition to recommending real estate policies and operational
procedures, they acquire, manage, dispose of, administer payment for rent and damages, handle claims, and
prepare records and reports for real estate used within the theater.
REAL PROPERTY MAINTENANCE

C-139. The JFC has overall responsibility for real property maintenance activities (RPMA). He normally
delegates authority to the ASCC/ARFOR, who may further delegate to the SC(T). The SC(T) and
installation commanders (in most cases an ASG/IMA) normally provide the needed RPMA support.
Principal RPMA in the AO includes operation, repair, and maintenance of facilities and utilities; fire
prevention and protection; and refuse collection and disposal. RPMA requirements that exceed the CSS
organization’s capabilities are forwarded to the local senior engineer commander (in most cases, the
engineer group providing support to an ASG/IMA on an area basis) or USACE element for execution
according to theater priorities. The SC(T) provides technical RPMA guidance to subordinate CSS
organizations. The subordinate CSS organizations provide RPMA support to all Army facilities in the
theater, including leased facilities, unless HNS is available for leased facilities.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
C-140. Protection of natural resources has become an ever-increasing concern. It is the responsibility of
all unit leaders to decrease, and if possible eliminate, damage to the environment when conducting all types
of operations.
C-141. In addition to common staff responsibilities, the senior engineer commander advises the
commander on environmental issues. He coordinates with other staff offices to determine the impact of
operations on the environment and helps the commander integrate environment considerations into the
decision-making process.
C-142. In the division AO, the engineer coordinator (ENCOORD) is the special staff officer for
coordinating engineer assets and operations for the command. As the senior engineer officer in the force,
the ENCOORD advises the commander on environmental issues. Working with other staff officers he
determines the impact of operations on the environment and integrates environmental considerations into
the decision-making process.
A-1. The ENCOORD works with the S4 to perform site assessments for installations and facilities. He
and the SJA advises the commander on the environmental protection and military operations needed to
ensure that environmental assessments meet HN or executive order requirements. Also, the ENCOORD is
responsible for advising the S2 of significant environmental factors and ensuring these factors are
considered during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process.
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1 Appendix D
2 USAF Planning Considerations

3 Applicable to Division Operations
4 This appendix will describe those Army and United States Air Force (USAF)
5 organizations that are involved in the coordination and control of air support to
6 the division. It will briefly discuss each of the air operational functions that the
7 division can use to support its operations. Lastly it introduces common air space
8 control measures and provides a reference for additional information on the
9 subject.
10 Air support is vital to the conduct of successful division operations. The division
11 is dependent on Joint fires and maneuver provided by fixed-wing aircraft to
12 conduct many of the division’s shaping operations to include reconnaissance and
13 surveillance, air interdiction (AI), offensive information operations, such as
14 electronic warfare (EW), and airlift missions. The USAF also provides close air
15 support (CAS) in support of brigade combat team (BCT) battles and
16 engagements. The multiple systems provided by the USAF also enhance the
17 conduct of Army strike operations whether those operations are conduct by the
18 fires or aviation brigades.
19 The division requires Joint fires, maneuver, intelligence, and EW support from
20 the USAF for the conduct of shaping operations between the forward boundary
21 of its subordinate BCTs and the division’s forward boundary and in those parts of
22 the division AO that have not been further sub-allocated to the division’s BCTs
23 and supporting brigades—the division’s unassigned areas.
24 Air support of the division’s sustaining operations may involve airlifting critical
25 supplies or augmentation units and providing counter air support to preempt or
26 counter enemy air attacks. While CAS is not usually allocated to units in the
27 division rear area, it may be diverted from other missions to help counter a Level
28 II or III threat.
29 AIR SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS

30 D-1. To achieve the necessary degree of Joint coordination, the Army and USAF provide qualified
31 personnel to work with each others’ headquarters. The supporting USAF personnel remain under the
32 USAF chain of command and receive logistical support from the supported Army unit.
33 BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION DETACHMENT

34 D-2. The senior ARFOR headquarters in a theater of operations provides a liaison element, the
35 battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) to the service component commander designated as the
36 Joint force air component commander (JFACC) and is co-located with the Joint Air Operations Center
37 (JAOC). The BCD’s basic mission is to facilitate the synchronization of air support for Army
38 operations. The BCD monitors and interprets the land battle for the JFACC staff. It passes
39 ARFOR/Joint force land component operational data and operational support requirements from the
40 ARFOR/JFLCC to the JFACC and participating multinational forces, to include requests for the
41 following:
42 z CAS.
43 z AI.
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) D-1

Appendix D
1 z Manned and unmanned reconnaissance and surveillance.

2 z Joint suppression of enemy air defense (J-SEAD).
3 D-3. The BCD is responsible to the ARFOR or JFLCC and coordinates with and receives objectives,
4 guidance, and priorities from his operations officer (G-3) through the Army senior fire support element
5 (FSE) or fire and effects cell (FEC). Specific missions include processing land forces' requests for
6 tactical air support, monitoring and interpreting the land battle situation for the JAOC, providing the
7 necessary interface between the JFLCC for the exchange of current intelligence and operational data,
8 and coordinating air and missile defense and airspace control matters. The BCD expedites the
9 exchange of information through face-to-face coordination with JAOC elements
10 D-4. The BCD understands the ARFOR commander’s priorities and guidance and possesses the
11 necessary knowledge of the battlefield situation. It processes ARFOR requests for air support,
12 monitors and interprets the land battle situation, and exchanges current intelligence through face-to-
13 face coordination with elements of the AOC. The division will not normally have a BCD available for
14 its use unless the division is an ARFOR in a crisis response contingency operation.
HQ
AIR
INTEL OPNS PLANS ASM AIRLIFT
DEFENSE
15 Figure D-1. Internal structure of the BCD

16 D-5. The BCD is organized in seven sections: headquarters, operations, plans, intelligence, air
17 defense (AD), airspace management (ASM), and airlift. (See Figure D-1.) The BCD eases planning,
18 coordination, and execution of the following functions: battle command, intelligence, fires, ASM, AD,
19 information operations, airlift support, and Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD). In order to
20 integrate the TAMD battle, the BCD supports the ARFOR/JFLC TAMD cell responsible for TAMD in
21 theater. The ARFOR or JFLCC specifies the role of the BCD to help in coordination of TAMD active
22 defense and attack operations with the JAOC. Additionally, the BCD exercises supervision over the
23 Army's air reconnaissance liaison officer teams and ground liaison officer augmentation teams that
24 provide coordination between Army forces and USAF reconnaissance, fighter, and airlift wings. (See
25 FM 3-100.13 for additional BCD doctrine.)
26 AIR FORCE AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS CENTER

27 D-6. The Air Force Air and Space Operations Center (AFAOC) is the USAF component
28 commander’s means of turning the JFC’s guidance into a component air operations plan. It allocates
29 resources and tasks forces through air tasking orders (ATOs). When the USAF component commander
30 is also the JFACC, he will augment the AFAOC with elements from other components to create a
31 JAOC. (See JP 3-30 for more information on JAOC.)
32 AIR COMPONENT COORDINATION ELEMENT

33 D-7. The USAF component commander establishes an air component coordination element (ACCE)
34 to interface and provide liaison with the ARFOR/JFLCC. The ACCE is co-located with the
35 ARFOR/JFLC staff. The ACCE is the senior USAF element assisting the ARFOR/JFLC staff in
36 planning air component supporting and supported requirements. The ACCE interface includes
37 exchanging current intelligence and operational data, support requirements, coordinating the
D-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

______________________________USAF Planning Considerations Applicable to Division Operations
1 integration of AFFOR/JFACC requirements for airspace control measures, Joint fire support
2 coordinating measures (FSCMs), and CAS. The ACCE is organized with expertise in the following
3 areas: plans, operations, intelligence, ASM, and airlift. The ACCE is not an air support operations
4 center (ASOC) or tactical air control party (TACP), but acts as the AFFOR/JFACC senior liaison
5 element and can also perform many air support planning functions.
6 AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS CENTER

7 D-8. The ASOC is the primary control agency component of the theater air control system (TACS)
8 for the execution of CAS. Co-located with the senior Army echelon’s FSE/FEC, the ASOC coordinates
9 and directs air support for ARFOR or JFLC operations. In a multi-corps/division environment, there
10 will normally be one ASOC with each senior tactical ground force headquarters that is assigned an AO
11 by the JFLCC. In a multi-ASOC operation, each ASOC reports individually to the JAOC. The JAOC
12 may grant the ASOC control (launch or divert authority) of missions designated to it on the ATO.
13 D-9. The ASOC processes Army requests for immediate CAS that are submitted by ground maneuver
14 forces over the Joint Air Request Net directly to the ASOC. (See Figure D-2.) Once the Army
15 approves these immediate requests, the ASOC tasks on-call missions or diverts scheduled missions
16 (with Army approval) to satisfy those approved immediate requests. The ASOC may be granted launch
17 or divert authority over all or some of these missions. If the ASOC has not been given control of on-
18 call or scheduled missions, they must contact the AFAOC or JAOC to launch or divert CAS missions.
19 If the division has an assigned ASOC, it will co-locate with the tactical command post (TAC 1 or TAC
20 2) controlling current operations.
21
22 Figure D-2. Theater air control system

Appendix D
1 FSE/FEC AND ASOC/TACP INTERFACE

2 D-10. The FSE/FEC is the link for the CAS mission area between the Army unit and the ASOC/TACP.
3 The FSE/FEC is responsible for fire support and planning, coordination, integration, and
4 synchronization of lethal fire support, Joint fires, and offensive information operations delivered on
5 surface targets by all fire-support assets under their control, or in support, of the unit. As part of this
6 responsibility, the FSE/FEC coordinates the airspace usage with the unit’s A2C2 element co-located
7 with the FSE/FEC. The FSE/FEC and ASOC/TACP synchronize and integrate CAS for the unit. CAS
8 coordination occurs through the ASOC and the unit’s ALO or TACP in conjunction with the fire
9 support coordinator and operations officer (G-3/S-3). If the United States Navy or United States
10 Marine Corps CAS is available, the air and naval gunfire liaison company may provide the division,
11 brigade, and battalion FSEs/FECs with supporting arms liaison.

CAS A/C
JSTARS
AWACS
NET FREQUENCY
ASOC
JOAC
TACP
WOC
CRC
FAC
HIGH FREQUENCY
(HF)
C2 SATELLITE X X X X X X
COMMUNICATION
(SATCOM)
USAF
HF #
REQUEST X X X
SATCOM X
NET
ULTRA HIGH
FREQUENCY (UHF)
AIR VERY HIGH
CONTROL FREQUENCY/ X X # X X
NET AMPLITUDE
MODULATION
(VHF/AM)
TACTICAL
AIR
UHF X X X X X
DIRECTIO
N NET
INFLIGHT
UHF
REPORT # X X # X # X #
VHF/AM
NET
UHF
GUARD X X X X X X X X X
VHF
TACP HF
ADMIN VHF/FREQUENCY X X #
NET MODULATION (FM)
VOICE
PRODUCT X X X X X
NET
HIGH
VALUE
UHF X X X
ASSET
NET
“X” Indicates normal participation in the “#” Indicates participation when directed, or
specified net. as required.
1 Figure D-3. Component air C2 communication nets

2 D-11. The provision of CAS is expedited when the ASOC supporting the division can talk directly
3 with the aircraft conducting the CAS mission. Figure D-3 is a reproduction of Figure II-3 from JP 3-
4 09.3 and shows the USAF and Army air command and control (C2) agencies and their communication
5 nets. The single greatest operational limitation of the ASOC is the lack of robust, persistent UHF
6 beyond line-of-sight communications. The distance out to which the ASOC can effectively control
7 aircraft depends on the terrain and other communications enablers such as FAC(A), JSTARS, and
8 manual radio relay. When alternative means are used to pass information to aircraft, these often
9 introduce delays that decrease the number of aircraft the ASOC can direct in a given time period.
10 Location of the ASOC has to be balanced between its need to be co-located with the senior FEC/FSE,

Appendix D
1 its UHF communications capability, and security concerns. The location of the division’s main CP,
2 TAC1, and TAC2 impacts the division’s ability to employ CAS.
3 TACS/ARMY AIR-GROUND SYSTEM TERMINAL ATTACK CONTROL

4 AGENCIES AND PERSONNEL
5 D-12. Army Air-Ground System (AAGS). When appropriate, the AAGS may be clearly related to
6 and interconnected with the USAF TACS. Together, these systems are known as “TACS/AAGS.”
7 Terminal attack control of CAS assets is the final step in the TACS for CAS execution. There are both
8 ground and air elements of the TACS to accomplish this mission. Figure D-4 illustrates the alignment
9 between Army units and TACS terminal attack control agencies and personnel.
10 D-13. Tactical Air Control Party. The TACP is the principal USAF liaison element aligned with
11 Army maneuver units from the battalion through the corps commander. The primary mission of
12 TACPs assigned to the brigade-level and above is to advise their respective ground commanders on the
13 capabilities and limitations of air power and assist the ground commander in planning, requesting, and
14 coordinating CAS. The TACP provides the primary terminal attack control of CAS in support of
15 ground forces. The division will typically have one division level TACP and four brigade-level TACPs
16 assigned. While each BCT typically is supported by a brigade-level TACP, the fires, aviation, and
17 maneuver brigades could be supported by a brigade-level TACP—depending on their assigned mission
18 and the applicable factors of METT-TC—by shifting a BCT TACP to support these other types of
19 brigades. The division is responsible for providing transportation to move these TACP personnel.
20 D-14. Air Liaison Officer (ALO). The ALO is the senior TACP member attached to a ground unit
21 who functions as the primary advisor to the ground commander on air operations. Above the battalion
22 level, an ALO is an aeronautically rated officer and is an expert in the capabilities and limitations of air
23 power. The ALO plans and executes CAS in accordance with the ground commander’s guidance and
24 intent. OPCON of all USAF personnel assigned to the unit is exercised through the senior ALO.
Legend: X officer / X enlisted (X JTAC)

XX
Comb Arms MAIN TAC 1 TAC 2 ASOC Capability

Battalion
TACP Capability****** ******Liaison Team 4/5 (2)
HBCT IBCT SBCT Fires Aviation

Brigade Brigade
TACP***** TACP***** TACP***
*****Liaison Team 2/4 (1) *****Liaison Team 2/4 (1) ***Liaison Team 3/4 (1)
Comb Arms
Battalion
Comb Arms Maneuver Maneuver
Maneuver
Battalion Maneuver
Battalion Battalion
Maneuver
Battalion Battalion
Battalion
TACP* TACP* TACP*
TACP* TACP* TACP*
TACP* *Liaison Team 0/4 (2)
RECON RECON
SQDN SQDN RECON
SQDN
TACP** TACP**
TACP** **Liaison Team 0/4 (2)
TAC Teams TAC Teams provide flexible capability to deploy

down to the company level in selected cases 0/2 (1)
25 Figure D-4. Alignment between Army units and

26 TACS terminal attack control agencies and personnel

1 D-15. Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC). The JTAC is the forward Army ground
2 commander’s CAS expert. JTACs provide the ground commander recommendations on the use of
3 CAS and its integration with ground maneuver. They are members of TACPs and perform terminal
4 attack control of individual CAS missions. In addition to being current and qualified to control CAS,
5 the JTAC must—
6 z Know the enemy situation, selected targets, and location of friendly units; supported unit's
7 plans, position, and needs.
8 z Validate targets of opportunity.
9 z Advise the commander on proper employment of air assets.
10 z Submit immediate requests for CAS.
11 z Control CAS with supported commander’s approval.
12 z Perform battle damage assessment.
13 AIR OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS THAT SUPPORT DIVISION

14 OPERATIONS
15 COUNTER AIR
16 D-16. The objective of counter air operations is to gain control of the aerospace environment to
17 achieve air supremacy. Counter air operations protect friendly forces, ensure freedom to perform other
18 missions, and deny that freedom of use to the enemy. It is conducted in a manner or at a distance to
19 render unnecessary detailed integration with fires and the movement of friendly ground forces. It is
20 consistent with the JFC’s objectives, and may initially involve the highest priority of all air operations.
21 Counter air operations involves the performance of OCA and DCA operations in addition to the
22 suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). The JFACC determines ratio of forces assigned between
23 these three types of counter air operations based on—
24 z JFC guidance.
25 z Level of enemy air threat.
26 z Vulnerability of friendly forces to air attack.
27 z Enemy AD capability.
28 z Offensive counter air (OCA) operations are essential to gaining air superiority and should be
29 conducted at the start of hostilities to seize the offensive. They are typified by attacks
30 against—
31 C2 facilities.
32 Munitions and missile storage sites.
33 Aircraft on the ground or in the air.
34 Any target that contributes to the enemy’s air power capability.
35 D-17. SEAD operations are a form of OCA and are designed to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily
36 degrade enemy AD systems and thus detract from the enemy’s air power capabilities. Their goal is to
37 allow friendly aviation forces to effectively perform other missions without interference from enemy
38 AD. The division’s surface-to-surface weapons complement the efforts of Joint systems. The JFACC
39 conducts SEAD against surface-to-air defense systems. SEAD operations are planned and conducted in
40 localized areas by battalion and larger land units to protect fixed and rotary wing aircraft using
41 available field artillery cannon and rocket systems, attack helicopters, direct fire weapons, and
42 offensive information operations, such as EW.
43 D-18. Defensive counter air (DCA) operations detect, identify, intercept, and destroy enemy air power
44 attempting to attack friendly forces or penetrate friendly airspace. Initially they may be the mission of
45 emphasis if the enemy has seized the initiative through surprise or friendly political constraints. They
46 involve active measures such as using combat fighter aircraft and AD artillery. It also involves passive
47 measures, not involving weapons systems, such as—
48 z Radar coverage for early warning.

Appendix D
1 z Protective construction (for example, hardened sites).

2 z Cover, camouflage, deception, dispersion, and frequent movement of personnel and
3 equipment.
4 D-19. See JP 3-01 for additional information on countering air and missile threats.
5 COUNTERLAND
6 D-20. Counterland is air and space operations against enemy land force capabilities to create effects
7 that achieve JFC objectives (Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3). The main objectives of counterland
8 operations are to dominate the surface environment and prevent the opponent from doing the same.
9 Although historically associated with support to friendly surface forces, counterland operations may
10 encompass the identical missions, either without the presence of friendly surface forces or with only
11 small numbers of surface forces providing target cueing. This independent or direct attack of adversary
12 surface operations by air and space forces is the key to success when seizing the initiative during early
13 phases of a conflict. Counterland provides the JFC two discrete air operations for engaging enemy land
14 forces: AI, in which air maneuver indirectly supports land maneuver or directly supports an air scheme
15 of maneuver, and CAS, in which air maneuver directly supports land maneuver.
16 D-21. AI delays, disrupts, or destroys the enemy’s potential before he can use it effectively against
17 friendly forces. It may—
18 z Reduce the enemy’s capability to mount an offensive.
19 z Restrict the enemy’s freedom of action and increase vulnerability to friendly attack.
20 z Prevent the enemy from countering an increase in friendly strength.
21 z Decrease the enemy’s battlefield reserves.
22 D-22. AI is normally executed by the JFACC as part of a systematic and persistent campaign in
23 support of the JFC’s strategy. They include actions against land force targets nominated by the
24 division, which are in a position to have a near-term effect on the division’s operations but are not yet
25 in close proximity to the division’s BCTs. Division nominated AI targets are prioritized by the
26 ARFOR/JFLCC, who is responsible for prioritizing the nomination of all ground force nominated
27 targets. The ARFOR/JFLCC priorities are submitted to the JFACC along with those of all the other
28 functional or service components in theater and the JFC’s objectives. AI requires Joint coordination
29 during planning.
30 D-23. AI operations destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s military potential before he can
31 effectively use it against friendly forces. AI occurs at such distance from friendly forces that detailed
32 integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.
33 D-24. The conduct of accurate and effective attacks on targets far beyond the division’s forward line of
34 their own troops help to establish the conditions necessary for the conduct of the division’s decisive
35 operation. The JFLCC may provide a portion of the sorties allocated to AI to the division commander.
36 Normally, however, the division commander may only nominate targets for the air commander to
37 attack.
38 D-25. The execution of AI is the responsibility of the JFACC. AI in support of the Army commander
39 disrupts the continuity of the enemy’s operations. Objectives may include—
40 z Reducing the enemy’s capability to employ follow-on forces.
41 z Preventing the enemy from countering friendly maneuver.
42 z Hindering the enemy’s ability to resupply his committed forces.
43 D-26. In truly Joint interdependent operations, the Army commander may be the supporting
44 commander during AI operations by using his fire and maneuver forces to cause the enemy to mass or
45 break cover, thus increasing their vulnerability to air attack. The following vignette describes one such
46 scenario.

OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF AIR INTERDICTION

Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial, 9
om
REDLAND forces anticipating a coalition air attack have dispersed their land combat forces into urban
pt
areas in an effort to protect and preserve its combat forces in anticipation of a coalition land campaign.
The REDLAND forces operating in the 1st Divisions AO are estimated to be operating at 80-percent
effective, and are believed to be able to mass into a full capable fighting force in less than 24 hours.
REDLANDs battle plan is to launch an effective counterattack against the 1st Division while insurgent
forces interdict C/JFLCC lines of communication and logistics.
In this phase of the operation, the 1st Division plans to launch an aerial envelopment with a Battalion of
the 82nd IBCT on OBJ KAT, an enemy airflield capable of supporting C-130 and C-17 resupply efforts.
The 1st Division will follow up the air envelopment with an attack from the 2nd and 5th HBCT and the
2nd SBCT.
MISSION
At XXXXYYZZZZ, the first Battalion of the 82nd IBCT conducts an aerial envelopment into OBJ KAT in
order to seize a forward logistics airfield.
COMMANDER’S INTENT
The purpose of the operation is to seize a forward logistics airfield and to force REDLAND to begin
massing its forces in reaction to the operation. The key task is to force the REDLAND forces to mass
so they become vulnerable to coalition air attacks, thus reducing their effectiveness to oppose the
linkup of the 1st Division at OBJ KAT.
The 1st Division initiates the air envelopment with 1st BN of the 82nd IBCT to seize OBJ KAT in order
to secure a forward logistics base. The JFACC maximizes combat fires against REDLAND forces
massing to oppose the seizure of the airfield and any follow on land action by coalition forces. The 1st
Division attacks with the 2nd HBCT and 2nd SBCT in order to link up with the 82nd IBCT at OBJ KAT.
PL DAVID is the division limit of advance for this attack.
DECISIVE OPERATION
The JFACC conducts an air campaign against REDLAND forces to render them combat ineffective to
oppose coalition land forces attacking along Highway 1.
SHAPING OPERATIONS
The 82nd IBCT, the initial main effort, attacks OBJ KAT with an air envelopment in order to capture a
forward logistics airfield and to force REDLAND forces to mass its forces to oppose coalition forces.
The 2nd HBCT and 2nd SBCT maneuver to maximize combat power along the FLOT in anticipation of
attacking along Highway 1 to link up with 82nd IBCT at OBJ KAT. Once JFACC sufficiently reduced
the combat effectiveness of massing REDLAND forces the 2nd HBCT and 2nd SBCT conduct attack
to PL DAVID in order to link up with 82nd IBCT and to conduct a forward passage of lines with 1st
HBCT to array forces along PL DAVID.
The 1st HBCT follows the 2nd HBCT and 2nd SBCT. It becomes the divisions main effort after
conducting a forward passage of lines with the 2nd HBCT at OBJ KAT and attacks to array forces
along PL DAVID.
The 75th Fires Brigade priority of fires are the destruction of enemy forces in accordance with JFLACC
air offensive; destruction of enemy forces threatening OBJ KAT, destruction of enemy forces along 2nd
HBCT and 2nd SBCT axis of attack, and the continued execution of the division’s counterfire program
in the division AO.
The 11th Aviation Brigade reinforces the 82nd IBCT in the defense and supply of OBJ KAT; reinforces
the 2nd HBCT and 2nd SBCT link up with the 82nd IBCT; and reinforces 1st HBCT effort to secure PL
DAVID.
The 56th Battle Field Surveillance Brigade supports the JFACCs air campaigns efforts to find, fix, track,
and target REDLAND forces massing to oppose 82nd IBCT seizure of OBJ KAT.
1

Appendix D
1
2 D-27. Although it is possible to nominate AI targets by specific unit, time, and place of attack, it is
3 generally more effective to describe to the air commander the desired results or objectives. This use of
4 mission-type targets allows the air commander greater flexibility in planning and executing the attack.
5 However, commanders can recommend or request specific munitions against a target that is
6 particularly vulnerable to the munitions requested. An example of a mission-type target is, “Delay the
7 20th Tank Division east of the Orange River until 271800ZOCT."
8 D-28. The division’s AI targeting process does not stop with nomination of the targets or mission-type
9 requests. Refinement of target intelligence is continuous from the time the target nomination is made,
10 to when the target is detected and tracked, and until it is finally attacked.
11 D-29. The division staff must allocate intelligence and surveillance asset to support the combat
12 assessment of targets attacked by both CAS and AI. The division and USAF must share close and
13 continuous intelligence, particularly for targets that have limited dwell time or cannot be accurately
14 located until just prior to attack. (See JP 3-03 for additional information on Joint interdiction
15 operations.)
16 D-30. CAS is an attack against hostile surface forces that are in close proximity to friendly forces and
17 which require detailed integration into the supported commander’s scheme of fires and maneuver. To
18 be successful, CAS must be responsive to the ground commander’s needs. CAS targets are selected by
19 the ground commander. CAS is planned, directed, and controlled by elements of the TACS. It
20 enhances surface force operations by providing the capability to deliver a wide range of weapons and
21 massed firepower at decisive points. CAS is conducted to—
22 z Blunt an enemy attack on a friendly position.
23 z Help obtain and maintain the land offensive.
24 z Provide cover for friendly movements.
25 D-31. The JFLCC normally distributes his allocation of CAS to subordinate Army commanders who
26 can then sub-distribute their CAS distribution to their subordinate commanders, and so forth. By
27 retaining control over a significant portion of the CAS sorties, the Corps/Division commander can shift
28 priorities, weight his effort, and rapidly respond to emerging opportunities without shifting CAS
29 sorties from one BCT to another. The combination of CAS with attack helicopters and artillery can
30 produce a highly effective Joint air attack team.
31 D-32. Recent technological advances in aircraft capabilities, weapons systems and munitions have
32 provided JTACs additional tools to maximize effects of fires while mitigating risk of fratricide when
33 employing air power in close proximity to friendly forces. GPS-equipped aircraft and munitions, laser
34 range finders/designators and digital system capabilities are technologies that can be exploited in the
35 CAS mission area. The following terminal attack control procedures exploit advances in technology.
36 D-33. There are three types of terminal attack control. Each type follows a set of procedures with an
37 associated risk. The commander considers the situation and issues guidance to the JTAC based on
38 recommendations from his staff and associated risks identified in the tactical risk assessment. The
39 intent is to offer the lowest-level supported commander, within the constraints established during risk
40 assessment, the latitude to determine which type of terminal attack control best accomplishes the
41 mission. The following three types of control are not ordnance specific:
42 z TYPE 1—used by JTACs when the risk assessment requires them to visually acquire the
43 attacking aircraft and the target under attack. It may have been determined, during the
44 tactical risk assessment process, that analysis of attacking aircraft nose position and
45 geometry is the best method of ensuring first pass success and fratricide mitigation under
46 the existing conditions. Language barriers when controlling coalition aircraft, lack of
47 confidence in a particular platform, ability to operate in adverse weather, aircrew capability,
48 or troops in contact situations are examples where visual means of terminal attack control is
49 the method of choice.
50 z TYPE 2—used when the JTAC desires control of individual attacks but assesses that either
51 visual acquisition of the attacking aircraft or target at weapons release is not possible or

1 when attacking aircraft are not in a position to acquire the mark/target prior to weapons
2 release/launch. Examples are night, adverse weather, high threat tactics, and high altitude
3 and standoff weapons employment. Successful CAS attacks under these conditions depend
4 on timely and accurate targeting data. When delivering GPS/INS or unguided weapons on
5 GPS coordinates, attack aircraft will confirm targeting location with the JTAC or the
6 FAC(A). When employing unguided munitions using Type 2 control, consideration must be
7 given to host aircraft navigation/weapons system accuracy. Inaccurate navigation/weapon
8 systems can result in extensive miss distances. Weapon time of flight will be a factor
9 relative to movement of enemy targets and friendly forces when employing standoff
10 weapons incapable of receiving targeting updates throughout the duration of flight. Detailed
11 planning and preparation by both the JTAC and the aircrew are required to identify the
12 situations and locations conducive to standoff weapons attacks, and to address flight profile
13 and deconfliction (aircraft/weaponry/terrain) considerations. Digital or data link systems
14 capable of displaying aircraft track, sensor point of interest, etc., significantly enhance
15 situational awareness that better enable the JTAC to authorize weapons release when the
16 JTAC is unable to visually acquire the attacking aircraft.
17 z TYPE 3—used when the tactical risk assessment indicates that CAS attacks impose low
18 risk of fratricide. When commanders authorize Type 3 control, JTACs grant a “blanket”
19 weapons release clearance to an aircraft or flight attacking a target or targets which meet the
20 prescribed restrictions set by the JTAC. Attack aircraft flight leaders may then initiate
21 attacks within the parameters imposed by the JTAC. Observers may be equipped and in a
22 position to provide terminal guidance to attack aircraft. The JTAC will monitor radio
23 transmissions and other available digital information to maintain control of the attacks. The
24 JTAC maintains abort authority throughout the attack.
25 D-34. Because there is no requirement for the JTAC to visually acquire the target or attack aircraft in
26 Type 2 or 3 control, JTACs may be required to coordinate CAS attacks using targeting information
27 from an observer. An observer may be a scout, COLT, FIST, UAS, SOF, or other asset with real time
28 targeting information. The JTAC maintains control of the attacks, making clearance or abort calls
29 based on the information provided by other observers or targeting sensors. The JTAC must consider
30 the timeliness and accuracy of targeting information when relying on any form of remote targeting.
31 (See JP 3-09.3 for additional information on CAS.)
32 AIRLIFT
33 D-35. Airlift is the transportation of personnel and materiel through the air, which can be applied
34 across the entire range of military operations to achieve or support objectives and can achieve tactical
35 through strategic effects. Airlift provides rapid and flexible mobility options that allow military forces
36 as well as national and international governmental agencies to respond to and operate in a wider
37 variety of circumstances and time frames. It provides US military forces the global reach capability to
38 quickly apply strategic global power to various crisis situations worldwide by delivering necessary
39 forces. The power projection capability for airlift supplies is vital since it provides the flexibility to get
40 rapid-reaction forces to the point of a crisis with minimum delay. Airlift can serve as American
41 presence worldwide, demonstrating our resolve, as well as serve as a constructive force during times of
42 humanitarian crisis or natural disaster.
43 D-36. USAF airlift missions encompass passenger and cargo movement, combat employment, and
44 sustainment, aeromedical evacuation, special operations support, and operational support airlift. These
45 missions can be tasked in a variety of ways: Channel, Air Mobility Express (a special category of
46 Channel), special assignment airlift mission (SAAM), special air mission (SAM), Joint airborne/air
47 transportability training (JA/ATT), or exercise and contingency missions. These missions are executed
48 using four delivery concepts that work together to provide efficient and effective mobility: airland,
49 airdrop, hub-and-spoke, and direct delivery.
50 D-37. Airlift is designed to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces by the timely movement,
51 delivery, and recovery of personnel and equipment. Airlift allows the JFC to maneuver fighting forces
52 to exploit an enemy’s weakness. Airlift may be categorized as either strategic or theater. Divisions

Appendix D
1 requests for strategic or intertheater airlift are handled by the USAF AMLO supporting the division
2 through TRANSCOM channels. Division requests for tactical or intratheater airlift support are handled
3 through Army logistic channels, with variations for the immediacy of the request.
4 D-38. Airlift may involve the airdrop, extraction, or air-landing of ground forces and supplies when
5 supporting division full spectrum operations or when evacuating casualties. Airlift may also support
6 the division operations by transporting an airborne BCT or battalion to conduct a vertical envelopment
7 or by conducting aerial resupply when the division is conduct nonlinear and noncontiguous operations.
8 See JP 3-17 for additional information concerning air mobility.
9 SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

10 D-39. Surveillance is the function of systematically observing air, space, surface, or subsurface areas,
11 places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. Surveillance is a
12 continuing process, not oriented to a specific target. In response to the requirements of military forces,
13 surveillance must be designed to provide warning of enemy initiatives and threats and to detect
14 changes in enemy activities.
15 D-40. Air and space-based surveillance assets exploit elevation to detect enemy initiatives at long
16 range. For example, its extreme elevation makes space-based missile-launch detection and tracking
17 indispensable for defense against ballistic missile attack. Surveillance assets are now essential to
18 national and theater defense and to the security of air, space, subsurface, and surface forces.
19 D-41. Reconnaissance complements surveillance by obtaining specific information about the activities
20 and resources of an enemy or potential enemy through visual observation or other detection methods;
21 or by securing data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a
22 particular area. This can be an important part of the division’s targeting process. The locations and
23 activities targeted for reconnaissance and surveillance can also reveal important civil considerations
24 during operations focused on the conduct of stability operations. Reconnaissance generally has a time
25 constraint associated with the tasking. The division G-2 normally handles preplanned requests for
26 aerial reconnaissance; the appropriate TACP handles immediate requests. (See Air Force Doctrine
27 Document 2-5.2 for additional information on this air operational function.)
28 WEATHER SERVICES
29 D-42. Weather services conducted by the USAF provide timely and accurate environmental
30 information, including both space environment and atmospheric weather, to commanders for their
31 objectives and plans at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Weather services gathers,
32 analyzes, and provides meteorological data for mission planning and execution. Environmental
33 information is integral to the decision process and timing for employing forces and planning and
34 conducting air, ground, and space launch operations. Weather services also influences the selection of
35 targets, routes, weapon systems, and delivery tactics, and are a key element of information superiority.
36 (See JP 3-59 for additional information on this subject.)
37 COMMON AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL MEASURES

38 D-43. A high concentration of friendly surface, sub-surface, and air-launched weapon systems must
39 share the airspace without unnecessarily hindering the application of combat power in accordance with
40 the JFC’s intent. The primary goal of airspace control is to enhance combat effectiveness of the Joint
41 force. Basic principles of airspace control include the following:
42 z The airspace control system (ACS) must support JFC objectives and facilitate unity of
43 effort.
44 z A major reason for close coordination between airspace control, air traffic control (ATC),
45 and AD elements is to reduce the risk of friendly fires and increase the effectiveness of AD.
46 z Close liaison and coordination among all airspace users inside and outside the operational
47 area is necessary to promote timely and accurate information flow to airspace managers.

1 z Airspace control procedures provide maximum flexibility through an effective mix of

2 positive and procedural control measures.
3 z Procedural control measures need to be uncomplicated and readily accessible to all forces.
4 z The ACS in the combat zone must have a reliable, jam resistant, and secure communications
5 network.
6 z Air control assets comprising the overall ACS need to be survivable and redundant because
7 they are likely to be prime targets for an attacker.
8 z The structure of the ACS needs to be responsive to developing enemy threats and to the
9 unfolding operation.
10 z Airspace control functions rely on ASM resources, but these functions are separate and
11 distinct from real-time control of air vehicles and the terminal ATC environment.
12 z Flexibility and simplicity must be emphasized throughout to maximize the effectiveness of
13 forces operating within the system.
14 z Airspace control needs to support 24-hour operations in all-weather and environmental
15 conditions.
16 D-44. The methods of airspace control range from positive control of all air assets in an airspace
17 control area to procedural control of all such assets, or any effective combination of the two. Air
18 control points and systems need to accommodate these methods based on component, Joint, and
19 national capabilities and requirements. Positive control relies on radars, other sensors, identification,
20 friend or foe/selective identification features, digital data links, and other elements of the AD system to
21 positively identify, track, and direct air assets. Procedural control relies on airspace coordinating
22 measures such as—
23 z Comprehensive AD identification procedures and rules of engagement.
24 z Low level transit routes.
25 z Minimum-risk routes.
26 z Aircraft identification maneuvers.
27 z Fire support coordinating measures.
28 z Coordinating altitudes.
29 z Restricted operations zones/restrictive fire areas.
30 z Standard-use Army aircraft flight routes.
31 z High-density airspace control zones.
32 D-45. See JP 3-52 and FM 3-52 for additional information concerning airspace C2 measures. Multi-
33 service publication, FM 3-09.34, discusses the use of kill boxes as an FSCM.

(BLANK PAGE)
Appendix E
Network Operations
This appendix provides division commanders and staff members an understanding of

systems and personnel that comprise the communications network at division and
below. It also provides brief overviews of the related mission responsibilities of the
division G-6 and division network support company (NSC) and the brigade and
battalion level communications capabilities and responsibilities.
OVERVIEW
E-1. As the primary tactical and operational war fighting headquarters the division requires a robust
communications and network architecture supported by network operations personnel at division and
below. The division is supported by organic G-6 section network operations (network management,
information dissemination management and information assurance) personnel and by the network transport
personnel and assets within the division NSC. These personnel and assets install, operate, maintain, manage
and defend the federations of networks. The federation of networks collectively enables joint and
expeditionary battle command. The network enables leaders with minimal forward presence to command
and control (C2) maneuver formations, sustain the force, and achieve broad political-military objectives
across the full spectrum of operations. It is an integrated entity and pervasive throughout the battlespace
and touches every entity, to include the individual Soldier. The network as a critical weapon in the fight
must be robust, redundant, flexible and adaptive to the commander.
DIVISION G-6
E-2. The division G-6 is the senior signal officer in charge of the division information network and has
the level of experience to anticipate the need to dynamically change the network in support of division
commanders’ scheme of maneuver. The G-6 derives his authority to control the network from the division
commander; this authority empowers him to utilize all signal equipment and personnel for the successful
completion of his mission. The successful accomplishment of the mission implies that all signal training
requirements are met prior to employment. The G-6 is accountable for all network transport, network
services and the viability of information systems across the force. He controls these network assets via the
Network Operations and Security Centers (NOSCs) and utilizes the technical service order (TSO), much
like the division G-3 uses the FRAGO to control the maneuver forces under the division. The G-6 network
responsibilities encompass all the management and control of the entire federation of networks. The NOSC
enables the G-6 to monitor the health of the network in support of the command. The division G-6 is
organized and resourced to provide NETOPS support to the division command posts (TAC1, TAC2 and the
main CP). The G-6 utilizes NETOPS functions to synchronize disparate division unit networks into one
division information network, as a part of the Land-War-Net and Global Information Grid (GIG). It should
be noted that the NETOPS functions performed in the subordinate support brigades and BCTs provide a
second echelon of NETOPS management that the division G-6 coordinates as part of the greater NETOPS
plan. Figure E-1 provides a recommended G-6 organization.
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) E-1

Appendix E_____________________________________________________________________________
Figure E-1. G-6 Section Organization
DIVISION G-6 ORGANIZATION

E-3. C4 Plans Division. The C4 plans division is responsible for developing future plans and Annex K to
the order, performing joint task force and ASCC coordination, and service provisioning planning for the
division.
E-4. C4 Operations Division. The C4 Operations division consists of the command post (CP) G-6
section and the NETOPS section.
E-5. CP G-6 Section. This section performs the following functions:
z CP operations.
z Help desk and trouble tickets.
z Information system support (for example, Army Battle Command System [ABCS]).
z LAN management.
z Battlefield video teleconferencing.
z TOC collaboration services.
z TOC combat net radio systems.
z Services for division.
z Server operations.
z Messaging services.
z Storage and discovery services.
z IDM services.
z Information management/ISSO mission.
E-6. NETOPS Section. This section performs the following functions:
E-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

________________________________________________________________________Network Operations
z Division wide area network (WAN) operations.

z Network management.
z Information assurance.
z Spectrum management.
z Develops and implements current plans.
z Develops TSOs.
E-7. C4 Support Division. This division—
z Coordinates and tracks modernization, sustainment, and maintenance.
z Coordinates contractor support and collective training.
z Training, readiness, and oversight (TRO) for BCT joint network node (JNN) teams.
DIVISION G-6 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

E-8. The G-6 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning communications and networks. The
G-6 has the technical authority over the division information networks to include TRO of the NSC. The G-
6 is responsible for planning, designing, and directing the NSC to execute the C4 plan in support of the
division commander’s intent. In executing the commander’s intent, the G-6 directs any technical changes to
the network. To make physical moves to signal equipment, the G-6 recommends FRAGOs to direct such
movement to the G-3. He is responsible for advising the division commander, staff, and subordinate
commanders on C4 operational matters (staff responsibilities, technical authority, and TRO).
Staff Responsibilities
E-9. G-6 staff responsibilities include the following:
z Prepares, maintains, and updates C4 operations estimates, plans, and orders. Such orders often
will cause for configuration management changes across multiple brigades.
z Monitors and makes recommendations on all technical C4 operations.
z Acts as the ARFOR G-6 when needed. (Equipment and personnel augmentation will be required
to support this mission).
z Advises the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders on C4 operations and network
priorities for battle command (for example, changing bandwidth allocation to support the
division main effort—a brigade reinforced with additional ISR assets).
z Directs technical changes to all portions of the division network via the TSO process.
z Act as the JTF J-6, if required. (Equipment and personnel augmentation will be required to
support this mission and will be provided by the corps and/or ASCC as necessary.)
z Develops, produces, changes/updates, and distributes SOI.
z Prepares/publishes C4 operation's SOPs for division CPs.
z Coordinates, plans, and manages division spectrum within its area of operations.
z Plans and coordinates with higher and lower headquarters regarding information systems
upgrade, replacement, elimination, and integration.
z In coordination with G-2, G-3, and G7, coordinates, plans, directs all IA activities and C4
operations vulnerability and risk assessments.
z In coordination with the staff, actively coordinates with a variety of external agencies to develop
the information and communications plans, manages the information network, obtains required
services, and supports mission requirements.
z Confirms and validates user information requirements in direct response to the tactical mission.
z Establishes C4 policies and procedures for the use and management of information tools and
resources.

Appendix E_____________________________________________________________________________
Technical Authority Responsibilities

E-10. G-6 technical authority responsibilities include the following:
z Provides signal unit operations sections with direction and guidance during preparation of
network plans and diagrams establishing the information network (WAN), including business
and intel WANs.
z Plans and integrates information systems and battle command equipment due to unit task
organization/reorganization.
z In coordination with the ASCC and JTF, plans and directs all NETOPS activities within the
division AO.
z Utilizes the NOSC as his eye and ears to the “network,” also leverages the tools provided by the
NOSC to manage and reconfigure the network as warranted.
TRO Responsibilities
E-11. G-6 TRO responsibilities include the following:
z Ensures the development of required skills to all signal personnel within the division AO.
z In coordination with the G-1, identifies requirements and manages the distribution of signal
personnel within the division.
z In coordination with the G-3, monitors and provides oversight for information dissemination to
change warfighting function priorities and control measures within the division AO.
z Ensures automation systems and administration procedures for all automation hardware and
software employed by the division are compliant with the GIG procedures and standards or
Army specifications.
z Ensures, in coordination with the special troops battalion (STB) staff, the division NSC is
trained to support division missions and tasks during home station training events and
deployments.
DIVISION G-6 NETWORK OPERATIONS AND SECURITY CENTER

E-12. The division G-6 employs a fully integrated NOSC providing NETOPS functions for the division.
All division signal elements must coordinate with the NOSC during the engineering, installation, operation,
maintenance, management and defense of the division information network. The division NOSC has
overall responsibility for establishing the division information network and provides the operational and
technical support to all of the division signal elements in its AO.
E-13. The division NOSC performs the NETOPS activities, functions, and tasks required to create a
dynamic and responsive network that quickly shifts priorities in order to support the ground tactical plan.
This management function extends the strategic GIG’s capabilities into the responsive, dynamic tactical
formations. In order to increase responsiveness of a complex network and to facilitate the bandwidth
required to support the division headquarters and brigade networks, the division employs a NETOPS cell
with the network service center. The network service center flattens the disparate time-division-multiple-
access (TDMA) satellite network structure and increases the bandwidth capability from approximately 6
Mbps to 40 Mbps, while the embedded NETOPS cell provides the management to enable the division
network. The personnel composition of the NETOPS cell is supporting the network service center is
METT-TC driven.
E-14. In addition to expanding bandwidth, the division has the capability to dynamically reassign the
bandwidth so that the communications support plan can match the division commander’s ground tactical
plan. An example of this capability is the division designating a BCT as the main effort for an assault. As
the main effort, the division commander gives the BCT a direct UAS/sensor feed that must be broadcasted
across the entire network. The division G-6 matches the communications support plan enabling the added,
non-organic, capability by allocating a larger segment of the division enabled bandwidth. The division

network service center provides an unprecedented capability that quickly provides capabilities to those who
need it to enable the ground tactical plan.
E-15. Division NOSC responsibilities include the following:
z in coordination with subordinate organizations, monitors, manages and ensures implementation
of ESM/NM, CS/IDM, and IA/CND activities.
z Provides near real-time awareness of division networks and systems to the division G-6 and
supporting service theater network operations and service center (STNOSC).
z Coordinates actions to resolve attacks/incidents on the division network with the STNOSC and
subordinate organizations.
z Coordinates operational procedures and requirements for IA/CND and information systems
security (ISS) with the supporting ASCC Regional Computer Emergency Response Team
(RCERT).
z in coordination with division NSC monitors, manages, and controls intra-division information
network components.
z Monitors the operation of the networks in the division’s subordinate units.
z Provides support and assistance to the subordinate NOSCs as required.
z Administers the organizational message system (Defense Message System) in the division,
including managing network addresses and sub-domains.
z Coordinates operation and maintenance support of C4 systems attached to support deployed
division forces with the split-base and reach operations capability to the home base.
z Shares ESM/NM information with other management or monitoring centers.
z Provides the supporting STNOSC with near real-time information on the status and performance
of inter-division networks.
z Orders and accounts for all forms of COMSEC material, including storing keys in encrypted
form and performing key generation and automatic key distribution.
z Performs COMSEC material accounting functions and communicates with other COMSEC
elements.
z Performs CS/IDM functions to support all aspects of relevant information dissemination.
z Provides near real-time awareness of division networks and system that support the joint
backbone to the JTF JCCC when the division is serving as the ARFOR.
z Informs the G-6 of network outages and shortcomings that require the electronic maintenance
shop to rectify.
Division Network Support Company Organization

E-16. The division NSC is subordinate to the division special troop’s battalion and consists of the
headquarters and network extension and the CP support detachments. In order to ensure the support of the
division commander’s intent, the division NSC installs, operates and maintains the network under the
technical authority and oversight of the division G-6. The divisionG-6 technical authority and oversight
ensures the division network personnel and equipment are trained and maintained at the levels required to
be successful.
Headquarters and Network Extension Detachment

E-17. The headquarters and network extension detachment links the main CP with higher, adjacent, and
subordinate HQ’s and support activities. It provides logistics and maintenance support to the division NSC
and consists of the company headquarters section, and the signal maintenance section and the network hub
platoon and main CP support platoon. The detachment provides network control and configuration,
spectrum management, information management/CND, network hubs, TDMA and FDMA satellite
connectivity, and configures the main CP data network.

Appendix E_____________________________________________________________________________
z Company and Detachment Headquarters. The company headquarters provides C2 to the

company and is responsible for the administration and logistics support. The detachment
headquarters provides the detachment C2 and limited NETOPS support.
z Signal Maintenance Section. The signal maintenance section provides limited maintenance and
logistics support for organic division NSC signal equipment. The section performs unit level
maintenance on special organic network equipment, such as the JNN suite of equipment. The
maintenance section prioritizes repairs based on commanders, NETOPS and G-6 assessments. It
also facilitates troubleshooting of all other C-E equipment in the company and manages the
company’s C-E prescribed load list (PLL) stock. The C-E maintenance team evacuates
equipment that cannot be repaired at the unit level to the brigade’s sustainment battalion contact
team. If further maintenance is needed, the equipment will either be supported by contract
maintenance (COTS replacements) or depot level rebuild.
z Network Hub Platoon. The Network Hub Platoon consists of the TDMA and FDMA multiband
sections, the Baseband and Hub Support Sections. It installs, operates and maintains the network
hubs and satellite connectivity to the GIG.
z Main Support Platoon. The main support platoon installs, operates and maintains the JNN
supporting the main CP.
CP Support Detachment
E-18. The CP Support Detachment consists of two platoons designed to support the division TAC1 and
TAC2 CPs. These platoons have like capabilities and personnel and provide the following services for the
two CPs–
z BLOS and LOS connectivity.
z Tactical messaging.
z Secure voice (tactical and DSN).
z NIPRNET, SIPRNET, JWICS (Limited).
z Defense Red Switch Network.
z Video teleconferencing.
z Install and administers CP networks.
z Voice radio (SC SATCOM, HF, SINCGARS).
z Voice radio range extension.
z Help desk.
COMMUNICATIONS AT BRIGADE AND BELOW

E-19. The brigade and battalion S-6’s have the overall responsibility for the information network at brigade
and below, positioning themselves and S-6 section members where best to control and manage the network.
Though not in direct control of all signal assets, the S-6 plans, coordinates, and directs the execution of the
communications support plan. The equipping and fielding of increased network and systems enablers (for
example BFT, CSS SATCOM, and JNN) require the brigade and battalion S-6 coordinate, both internal and
external, more than in the past to ensure the success of the communications plan.
E-20. The brigade S-6 is the primary mentor for the brigade signal staff, NSC commander and the battalion
S-6’s. This relationship is even more critical with the addition of embedded wideband signal connectivity
down to the battalion level and the SIGCEN recommendation to move all NETOPS personnel from the
NSC under the brigade S-6. This mentorship relationship extends into the technical employment and
capability apportionment of wideband resources to his subordinate S-6s. Although the BCT S-6 does not
direct any physical movement to the subordinate communications elements, he does provide technical
guidance on the installation techniques, as well as the services used on the network assets.

E-21. The battalion S-6 is responsible for supervision of all automated information systems, NM, and IA.
As an active member of the staff planning cell performing MDMP, he is the primary signal operations
planner. He determines the supportability and feasibility of the signal plan versus the scheme of maneuver.
Early involvement in the MDMP by the battalion S-6 is critical to the successful development of a
comprehensive and complimentary signal plan.
DIVISION COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

E-22. This chapter provides an overview of the different systems that comprise the federation of networks
installed, operated, maintained, managed and defended by the division G-6, brigade and battalion S-6’s and
supporting NSC’s. Commanders and staff within the division must be familiar with the capabilities of these
communications systems. The network enables leaders with minimal forward presence to C2 maneuver
formations, sustain the force, and achieve broad political-military objectives across the full spectrum of
operations. It is an integrated entity and pervasive throughout the battlespace and touches every entity, to
include the individual Soldier. The network as a critical weapon in the fight must be robust, redundant,
flexible and adaptive to the commander. These signal leaders must be aware of the various networks that
are required by the different warfighting functions, many of which are not directly installed, operated or
maintained by signal personnel.
COMBAT NET RADIO

E-23. The primary role of the CNR is voice transmission for C2 and assumes a secondary role for data
transmission where other data capabilities do not exist. The CNR is primarily designed around the
SINCGARS, the single-channel TACSAT, and the HF radio but more tactical radios with these or like
capabilities are found at division and below. Each of these systems has different capabilities and
transmission characteristics.
E-24. Table E-1 provides a sampling of the different CNR and tactical radio systems available to elements
of the division staff. (See FMI 6-02.43 for additional capability and planning information on CNR and
tactical radio systems.)
Table E-1. CNR and Tactical Radios Listing

Single Channel
FM HF Multi-band Data
Satellite
SINCGARS AN/PSC-11 AN/VRC-100 AN/PRC-150 EPLRS
AN/PRC-127A AN/PSC-3 AN/PRC-104A AN/PRC-117F JTIDS
Soldier Intercom AN/PSC-5 AN/GRC-194A AN/PRC-148 MIDS
Land Warrior AN/GRC-213A NTDR
ICOM F43G
JNTC-S EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTIONS AND CAPABILITIES

E-25. The JNTC-S JNN is the network enabler fielded to provide timely, network enabled support to
tactical modular formations. This JNTC-S capability provides connectivity from battalion to the GIG. The
major components of the JNTC-S are the network service center (fixed, mobile and tactical) and the JNN
assemblages employed at the different echelons. These systems, to include the terrestrial and non-terrestrial
communications systems, are covered below.

Appendix E_____________________________________________________________________________
Command Post Node

E-26. The CP node is primarily fielded to the battalion-level headquarters but can be used to augment CP at
other echelons. It consists of a support vehicle, a trailer mounted 2.4-meter satellite dish, and two transit
cases. The CP node operates in the TDMA satellite architecture providing Secret data and voice over
internet protocol (VOIP) phone services. This architecture allows the battalion data network to terminate
into the JNN and network service centers.
JNN
E-27. The JNN is the communications package deployed at division and brigade levels. The JNN enables
independent operations and direct termination into the theater network, GIG or directly into a joint
headquarters. The JNN has voice and data switching equipment allowing independent operations and
enabling both circuit switching and Internet Protocol (IP) based networking. The JNN will work with
existing terrestrial transport (high capacity line-of-sight [HCLOS] and LOS), ground mobile forces (GMF)
(AN/TSC-85/93), TROPO Scatter (AN/TRC-170), Secure Mobile Anti-jam Reliable Tactical Terminal
(SMART-T) (AN/TSC-154), and when available, commercial Ku-band satellite or Ka-band satellite.
Ku-band Satellite Terminals

E-28. The Ku-band satellite terminal uses commercial bandwidth and satellites to fill existing military
satellite capabilities gap and comes in three sizes to perform three different missions:
z The regional network service center utilizes the 4.2-meter satellite dish.
z The ASCC and division network service centers utilize the 3.7-meter satellite dish.
z The CP node and JNN utilize the 2.4-meter satellite dish.
z The satellite dishes are capable of entering both the FDMA Ku-band and TDMA Ku-band
networks (See Figure E-2 and E-3).
Figure E-2. 3.7 meter satellite dish

Figure E-3. 2.4 meter satellite dish
E-29. The FDMA capability allows for dedicated bandwidth to provide circuit connectivity to joint
headquarters or to existing teleports. The TDMA network allows deployed units to directly manage and
allocate satellite bandwidth.
AN/TRC-190(V)3
E-30. The AN/TRC-190(V)3 is paired with a JNN and equipped with three High Capacity Line-of-Sight
Radio Systems (HCLOS) providing a high bandwidth LOS capability when terrestrial LOS exists. The
HCLOS is a terrestrial, microwave radio system capable of eight Mbps of data throughput.
Network Service Center

E-31. The network service center links the TDMA and FDMA Ku-band architectures. Additionally, the
network service center allows for the termination, reallocation, and control of network bandwidth. Network
support centers are fielded in three variants: a fixed regional network service center, mobile ASCC
network service center and tactical division network service centers.
z Regional Network Service Center. The regional network service center is a fixed center
located in each RCC AOR and supported by ASCC signal force structure. Complimenting the
strategic, fixed brigade are the NETCOM strategic tactical signal brigades. ASCC tactical signal
brigades will employ mobile network service centers to reinforce the division with general
support communications and ASCC deployable units with direct support communications. The
ASCC signal brigade commanders, under the direction of NETCOM, are primarily responsible
for connecting the forward deployed ARFOR into the GIG.
z Division Network Support Center. The division network service center is a smaller tactical
communications platform that allows a division headquarters to control and prioritize network
resources. The division network service center also enables the headquarters to receive the larger
bandwidth data files required at that level of command.
MOBILE SUBSCRIBER EQUIPMENT

E-32. MSE has various integrated components to ensure mobile and static subscribers have voice, data, and
video capabilities. These capabilities support the subscribers’ communications no matter where they are in
the MSE network area of operation. Major MSE components and their capabilities are discussed in the
following paragraphs.

Appendix E_____________________________________________________________________________
Node Center Switch

E-33. Node centers provide essential switching, traffic control, and access points for MSE. After
determining the coverage area, node centers are allocated to establish a corps MSE grid network. Node
centers are primarily linked by LOS radios to provide communications throughout the system via the node
center switch. Cable connects TACSAT and TROPO systems to the node center. If one node center is
disabled, the system automatically routes communications through another node center. The node center
switch serves as an access point for Large Extension Nodes (LENs), Small Extension Nodes (SENs), Radio
Access Units (RAUs), system control center-2s (SCC-2s), and ISYSCON.
Forced Entry Switch (FES)

E-34. The FES combines the essential functions of the node center switch, LEN, NMF, and an RAU into
one shelter. The FES, combined with an LOS AN/TRC-198, comprises the contingency communications
package (CCP).
z LEN. The LEN switch provides wired communications for personnel at large CPs. A LEN
switch enables up to 164-wired subscribers to communicate freely using automatic flood search
routing.
z SEN. The SEN switch supports the communications needs of smaller CPs. The AN/TTC-48(V)1
can support 26-wired subscribers and the (V)2 can support 41 wired subscribers.
z RAU. The RAU, AN/TRC-191, is a fully automatic radio interface for MSRT subscribers. It
connects directly to the node center by cable or remotely via LOS radio. The planning range
between the MSRT and RAU is 15 kilometers (9.3 miles).
Integrated Systems Control Center (ISYSCON)

E-35. ISYSCON is the automated, theater-wide, tactical-communications network-management system
used to plan, configure, monitor and control the entire spectrum of military tactical-communications
systems. ISYSCON features include mission-plan management, network planning and engineering,
battlefield-frequency-spectrum management, tactical-packet-network management and wide-area-network
management.
z AN/TRC-190(V)1. The AN/TRC-190(V)1 is an LOS multichannel radio terminal. It provides
point-to-point UHF radio links using the AN/GRC-226(P) radio set between various nodes of the
MSE system. The (V)1 is equipped with one AB-1339 mast with Band I and Band III antennas.
The planning range of the UHF radio is 40 kilometers (28 miles).
MSE system. The (V)2 is equipped with two AN/GRC-226(P) radio sets (one online and one
spare) and one AB-1339 mast with Band I and Band III antennas. The planning range of the
UHF radio is 40 kilometers (28 miles). The (V)2 typically deploys as an analog interface to
NATO forces.
MSE system. The (V)3 is equipped with four AN/GRC-226(P) radio sets (three online and one
spare) and three AB-1339 masts with two Band I and two Band III antennas. The planning range
of the UHF radio is 40 kilometers (28 miles). Each radio link supports a single, full-duplex,
group-level connection and a single DVOW channel. The (V)3 typically deploys with the node
center switch and is a radio relay.
MSE system. Each radio link supports a single, full-duplex, group-level connection and a single
DVOW channel. The AN/TRC-190 (V)4 is equipped with two AN/GRC-226(P) radio sets (two
online) and two AB-1339 masts with Band I and Band III antennas. The planning range of the

UHF radio is 40 kilometers (28 miles). If the AN/TRC-190 (V)4 has an AN/GRC-224(P) radio
set installed, it can provide a short-range, down the hill, and point-to-point.
COMMAND POST OF THE FUTURE

E-36. The command post of the future (CPOF) is a collaborative application that allows users to collect,
collate, display, map, and analyze data collectively or individually in real time. It provides planning and
mapping tools to support the Commander’s battle management and information operations processes by
rapidly processing and correlating combat information from all available sources. It provides commanders’
and their staff with an advanced distributed, collaborative decision making environment, thus eliminating
fixed CPs and enable a true mobile, distributed command.
E-37. CPOF is an information-centric tool that provides real-time knowledge sharing that impacts team
effectiveness and decision making. The highly intuitive visualizations allow officers to quickly review one
another’s data to support the unique demands of battlefield awareness.
E-38. CPOF is a client-server application. Multiple CPOF clients are connected to a common suite of core
servers through standard socket connections, utilizing a variety of different protocols. The CPOF client
hosts the MAYA Viz CoMotion/CPOF (referred to as the CoMotion Client), the Oculus Command Sight
application, the underlying MapManager map cache, and the CPOF Open Phone client.
ARMY BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEM

E-39. ABCS is the integration of primarily user-owned and operated battlefield automated systems (BAS)
in tactical environments, in developed and undeveloped theaters, and in fixed installations and mobile
facilities. These information subsystems access critical warfighting functional area information resident on
other systems in a seamless and secure manner. The ABCS sub-systems are listed below:
z Global Command and Control System-Army (GCCS-A).
z Maneuver Control System (MCS).
z All Source Analysis System (ASAS).
z Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS) and Battle Command Sustainment Support
System (BCS3).
z Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System (AMDPCS).
z Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS).
z Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2).
z Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS).
z Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS).
z Integrated Meteorological System (IMETS).
z Integrated Systems Control (ISYSCON).
BLUE FORCE TRACKING (BFT)

E-40. The BFT system is a satellite-based tracking and communication system that provides the
commander eyes-on the friendly forces and can also be used to send and receive text messages. It operates
with Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) software. The BFT contains the computer
hardware and software, interconnecting cables, L-Band satellite transceiver, a Precision Lightweight GPS
Receiver (PLGR), a Mission Data Loader to transfer larger files, and an installation kit appropriate to the
host vehicle type (if applicable).
TROJAN SPIRIT
E-41. Trojan SPIRIT is primarily a military intelligence Soldier operated system that is a critical network
enabler for the commander and the intelligence warfighting function. It is currently the primary network

Appendix E_____________________________________________________________________________
capability connecting the deployed user to Top Secret/Secret Compartmented Information (TS/SCI)
networks including the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and the National
Security Agency (NSA) net.
E-42. Seventeen locations within the division have now been identified as requiring TS/SCI points of
presence or connectivity (to include three per BCT). Currently there are two Trojan SPIRITs designated for
the division, one Trojan SPIRIT for the BCT headquarters, and the remaining will be tunneled through the
CP node at maneuver battalion level. Figure E-4 depicts Trojan SPIRIT network components with TS/SCI
being tunneled through the CP node at maneuver battalion level.
Figure E-4. Trojan SPIRIT network components
CSS SATCOM
E-43. The CSS SATCOM is a user-owned and operated system that provides increased throughput meeting
speed of service requirements; provides a robust and redundant communications architecture; provides a
constant connection that supports portable fixed IP addressing, quality of service and NM; and distributes
logistics information in a flat network topology. CSS SATCOM enables the logistical support elements in
the brigade to travel with the maneuver formation during combat operations, set up at the quick halt, and
continue to provide connectivity to joint logistics through all subsequent phases of operations from stability
to redeployment.
E-44. CSS SATCOM inserts commercial C2 technology directly into the maneuver and support platform to
allow combat operations on the move. CSS SATCOM inserts commercial technology directly enabling the
management of support platforms equipped with radio frequency identification, Movement Tracking
System, Defense Transportation Reporting and Control System, Vistar's Global Wave and other
commercial tracking systems, allowing support operations on the move. CSS SATCOM integrates existing

COTS hardware and software and management schemes into new and standardized packages, enabling a
modular force. Figures E-5 provides an example of the unclassified CSS SATCOM connectivity and
additional CSS SATCOM features.
Figure E-5. Unclassified logistics network connectivity
SECURE ENROUTE MISSION PLANNING – IMPROVED (SECOMP-I)

E-45. SECOMP-I is an integrated voice and data communications system providing collaborative, en-route
mission planning and rehearsal capabilities through high-quality voice and data communications for forces
en-route aboard U.S. Air Force aircraft to the area of deployment.
E-46. SECOMP-I enables joint tactical forces to arrive at their deployment destinations fully briefed on the
most current situation, intelligence reports and plan updates available. Figure E-6 provides an example of a
mission thread performed with SECOMP-I.
z Dismountable capability for initial ground communications.
z Noise cancellation headsets allow operators to monitor or transmit on any of the radios in a noisy
environment.
z Roll-on/roll-off capability allows system to be easily loaded onto USAF C-17/C-130 aircraft
using self-contained, wheeled transit cases.
z Operates on-board Army Theater Support Vessels.
z Enables Army and joint C2 application collaboration.
z Hatch-mounted antennas for VHF/UHF LOS, TACSAT and INMARSAT requirements on C-
130J aircraft.
z GPS capability.

Appendix E_____________________________________________________________________________
Figure E-6. Example of SECOMP-I mission thread

1 Appendix F
2 Army Airspace
3 Command and Control at Division
4 Joint forces use airspace to conduct air operations, deliver fires, employ air defense
5 artillery (ADA) assets, and conduct intelligence operations. Army Airspace
6 Command and Control (A2C2) is the Army’s operational approach to accomplishing
7 the functional activity of airspace control. A2C2 does not denote that any airspace
8 contiguous to the battlefield or any other geographical dimension of airspace is
9 designated “Army” airspace, but refers to the Army users of the airspace. Neither
10 does it imply command of any asset that is not assigned or under operational control
11 to an Army commander (FM 3-52, Chapter 2).
12 Division commanders use A2C2 to command and control (C2) the division’s airspace
13 users while integrating division operations with other Joint airspace users. A2C2 is
14 part of the Army Air Ground System (AAGS), which is a component of the Theater
15 Air-Ground System (TAGS). A2C2—
16 z Enhances C2 and synchronizes forces using the airspace.
17 z Aims to maximize the combat effectiveness of all airspace users and minimize
18 restrictions and adverse impact on capabilities.
19 THEATER AIR-GROUND SYSTEM

20 F-1. To fully understand the relationship of the A2C2 systems to TAGS, A2C2 personnel must
21 understand each service’s system and its composition and structure.
22 F-2. TAGS is not a complete and separate system for airspace management within a theater of operations.
23 It combines each service’s airspace management system that supports the JFC. Nor is TAGS a transparent
24 airspace management system. It provides the framework that allows each service's system to exist in a Joint
25 and coalition force environment that supports the JFC. TAGS is not a formal system in itself, but rather the
26 sum of the component air-ground systems operating in the theater. It applies to all theater operations to
27 include air, ground, maritime, and amphibious operations. (Figure F-1 is a notional arrangement used to
28 demonstrate TAGS. Not all of the elements must be in place for all operations.)
29 F-3. In addition to AAGS, TAGS integrates the United States Air Force (USAF) Theater Air Control
30 System, the Navy Tactical Air Control System, and the Marine Air Command and Control System.
31 F-4. As the airspace management component of the AAGS, A2C2 elements develop standing operating
32 procedures (SOPs) to facilitate A2C2 operations, which consistently follow Joint airspace procedures
33 defined in JP 3-52. A2C2 staff elements are organic to modular forces, brigade and higher. The modular
34 BCT and support brigades (except sustainment) contain a version of an Air Defense Airspace
35 Management/Brigade Aviation Element (ADAM/BAE) responsible for integrating brigade A2C2, to
36 include air and missile defense and aviation functions. Both the division and the corps (3-star UEx) contain
37 an A2C2 cell in their TAC CP(s). The ASCC contains an A2C2 cell in the Operational Command Post
38 (CP). The ASCC also has airspace managers as part of the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD),
39 which is the ASCC’s combined arms LNO organization to the Joint Force Air Component Commander
40 (JFACC) airspace control authority (ACA) air operations center (AOC).
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) F-1

Appendix F
1 DIVISION A2C2
2 F-5. The division A2C2 cell is the G-3’s principal organization responsible for managing airspace use.
3 The A2C2 cell is part of the TAC CP’s force application element that integrates the airspace use of other
4 division elements of the AAGS, such as—
5 z FEC.
6 z Air mobility division (AMD) operations cell.
7 z Aviation and air component planning and execution cell with an air liaison officer (ALO), air
8 support operations center (ASOC), and tactical air control party (TACP).
9 z Subordinate brigades.
10 F-6. The A2C2 cell also supports other C2 elements of the division, the main CP, and the mobile
11 command group (MCG), none of which have an organic A2C2 cell.
12
13 Figure F-1. Example of a TAGS arrangement
14 ORGANIZATION
15 F-7. Each TAC contains a seven-person A2C2 cell with one OIC (a lieutenant colonel in TAC 1, a major
16 in TAC 2), a captain, four air traffic service (ATS) NCOs, and one AMD NCO. The teaming of aviation,
17 ATS, and AMD Soldiers, coupled with close integration with the FEC, is key to the flexibility of the A2C2
18 cell. Their complimentary skills help the A2C2 section perform the full range of its functions (integration,
19 identification, coordination, regulation) necessary to control Army users of airspace. The TAC 1 A2C2 OIC
20 is the division A2C2 officer, while the OIC of the TAC 2 A2C2 cell is the deputy A2C2 officer. Each TAC
21 has an A2C2 operations officer (captain), an AMD NCO (responsible for coordination with the AMD
F-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Army Airspace Command and Control at Division
1 section for the integration of the air and missile defense plan and air picture with A2C2), and four ATS
2 NCOs who plan and coordinate airspace, produce the division's unit airspace plan, and integrate airspace
3 use with the FEC and Air Component Planning and Execution Cell.
4 F-8. Each TAC A2C2 cell is equipped with a full suite of airspace workstations, ground to air radios, and
5 communications equipment necessary to bring in the Joint air picture, independent of the TOC network
6 (see Figure F-2).
7
TAC CP Joint Airspace Connectivity

Air Picture
AWACS
JLENS
OTHER
SOURCES HAWKEYE
Blue Force Tracker Joint Data Network
(BFT) (JDN)
LINK 11
FDL LINK 16 ELINT

LINK 16
Multiple
UHF/VHF/
HF SATCOM MIDS SATCOM JTT
HF/FM
Voice ABCS
PASS
ADSI
ADSI
TAIS
FAAD EO AMDWS
TAIS Shelter (TSQ-221) ADAM Shelter (TSQ-282)

Integrates BFT with JDN. Multiple Provides Receipt of Joint Air Picture,
Voice Gnd to Air Comms Sentinel and EW. Primary Source for
TAIS. Sole Source to ABCS
8 Figure F-2. TAC CP Joint airspace connectivity air picture

9 F-9. The TAC A2C2 cell has the capability to send a two-person A2C2 team with an airspace workstation
10 that can operate in a different area of the TAC if required. This could be in the FEC if the A2C2 section is
11 not co-located with the FEC, in the ASOC if the division is so augmented, or as discussed below, detached
12 to support the G-5 in the Division Main.
13 A2C2 CAPABILITIES
14 F-10. The TAC CP's A2C2 section can perform all A2C2 tasks required for a tactical or operational
15 headquarters (see FM 3-52, Appendix B). The division TAC A2C2 cell can operate under an ASCC or
16 function as the ARFOR airspace staff. The division A2C2 cell can perform all functions of a JFLCC or JTF
17 airspace cell and has the digital compatibility to interface with USMC and coalition automation systems
18 (via the digital LNO team). The A2C2 cell does not have the capability to function as a Joint ACA. As a
19 JTF or JFLCC, the division A2C2 cell will work directly with the BCD to interface with the JFACC, ACA.

Appendix F
1 PLANNING
2 F-11. G-3 (Operations and Plans). The normal planning cycle for air tasking order and airspace control
3 order (ACO) submissions is within the planning cycle of the TAC CPs. The A2C2 cell supports the G-3 in
4 the TAC by producing the daily division input for the Joint ACO. The A2C2 section provides A2C2
5 planning support for other TAC A2C2 sections and units subordinate to the TAC.
6 F-12. G-5 (Civil Affairs). The G-5 in the Main CP relies on the TAC CP’s A2C2 cells for A2C2 support
7 for OPLANs and sequels to OPLANs. The principle A2C2 planning products for an OPLAN or a sequel to
8 an OPLAN are—
9 z Proposed modifications to the theater airspace control plan (ACP).
10 z Changes to task organization.
11 z The A2C2 annex.
12 F-13. Higher Headquarters. If the division is subordinate to a higher Army headquarters (corps or
13 ASCC), the A2C2 officer provides divisional airspace requirements for the higher headquarters A2C2
14 element for inclusion in their A2C2 annex. If the division is the ARFOR or JFLCC, the A2C2 officer
15 provides Army input to the ACA’s ACP.
16 F-14. Subordinate Brigades. Each TAC will provides planning support to the brigade ADAM/BAEs to
17 assist the brigades as they plan and execute operations and help integrate the airspace requirements of
18 subordinate brigades. The TAC will integrate the requirements of functional brigades (for example, MP,
19 engineers) that do not have assigned A2C2 personnel.
20 F-15. Current Operations. The A2C2 section is designed to rapidly interface with the BCD’s airspace
21 management cell that is within the Joint AOC in order to submit or modify airspace control measures
22 (ACMs) in near real time (NRT) (JP 1-02). The division normally uses procedural ACMs for airspace
23 management. However, when augmented by additional airspace controllers, the TAC A2C2 section has the
24 capability to control limited amounts of airspace such as a high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ).
25 These additional controllers can be provided before deployment as long-term augmentation to the division
26 to meet OPLAN requirements or can be short-term augmentation from the ATS company of the aviation
27 brigade to meet temporary requirements for positive control.
28 DIVISION CP RELATIONSHIPS
29 F-16. Division A2C2 Lead. Both TAC A2C2 sections are capable of integrating A2C2 for the division
30 (see Figure F-3). Deciding which A2C2 element will be the lead for A2C2 depends on the role of their
31 TAC, as specified in the command and signal portion of the OPORD. Normally the division will designate
32 a particular TAC as the lead TAC for an operation or phase of an operation. The A2C2 section of the lead
33 TAC will integrate the airspace requirements for both TACs.
34 F-17. A2C2 Support to the Division Main. The division A2C2 officer can provide A2C2 support to the
35 G-5 in several ways, to include the following:
36 z When the Main CP is co-located with a TAC, the A2C2 officer can task the A2C2 section in the
37 co-located TAC to provide A2C2 planning support to the G-5.
38 z When the Main CP is not co-located with either TAC, the division A2C2 officer can provide
39 distributed support to the G-5 by network collaboration or by providing the Main CP with an
40 A2C2 LNO. The TAC A2C2 is capable of exchanging digital documents and digital overlays
41 with the G-5 in the Main CP or using standard collaboration tools. If an LNO is required, the
42 LNO team from one or both TAC A2C2 sections can bring an airspace workstation to the Main
43 CP to support planning. However, detaching A2C2 LNOs to the Main CP potentially degrades
44 the capability of the TAC A2C2 section to support the TAC FEC. The TAC A2C2 cell in the
45 effected TAC will have to ensure positioning near the FEC to ensure that NRT deconfliction of
46 fires and aircraft.

1 F-18. A2C2 Support to Division Staff A2C2 Functions. A2C2 is a C2 function that operates according to
2 FM 5.0 and FM 6.0 in the same manner as other staff functions. A detailed listing of A2C2 staff
3 responsibilities is contained in FM 3-52, Appendix B.
4 F-19. Command and Control. A2C2 is a G-3 staff function. The TAC A2C2 cell works for the G-3 and
5 implements the commander's guidance as it affects airspace use. This guidance is published initially in the
6 A2C2 annex to the OPLAN, the division’s unit airspace plan, and in the division’s input to the ACO. When
7 conflicts arise between requirements of different airspace users, the A2C2 section deconflicts airspace use
8 based on commander's and G-3 guidance or seeks a decision from the G-3 or his designated representative
9 (G-3, chief of operations). Determination of A2C2 responsibilities between TACs or subordinate units is
10 based on G-3’s C2 instructions in paragraph 3 or 5 of the OPLAN in the same manner that responsibilities
11 such as fires are determined.
12 Figure F-3. Functions common to both TAC A2C2 cells
FUNCTIONS COMMON TO BOTH TAC A2C2 CELLS

•Plans and requests immediate airspace control measures (ACMs)
UEx •Deconflicts airspace through the appropriate control authority
•Supports FEC A2C2 requirements
•Provides A2C2 staff support
•Serves as A2C2 point-of-contact for subordinate units
•Inputs future airspace coordination order/ATO requirements
•Coordinates sensor and Tactical Digital Information Link coverage with the Air and Missile Defense
(AMD) cell
•Communicates digitally and/or by voice to Army and JIM aircraft
•Establishes A2C2 interface into the Joint Network
•Capable of interfacing directly with the JTF, other components, or BCD if required
FUNCTIONS OF THE LEAD TAC A2C2 CELL FUNCTIONS OF SUBORDINATE TAC A2C2 CELL
•Develops and submits Army requirements for the Joint •Submits airspace requirements to UEx lead TAC for
Airspace Control Plan (ACP) integration into ACO submission
•Writes the A2C2 annex and maintains the A2C2 estimate •Ensures airspace requirements and concept are
Monitors subordinate TAC Airspace requirements properly articulated to the lead TAC
•Provides planning support to the Main •Coordinates with the UEy A2C2 cell if required
•Builds collective UEx input to Airspace Control Order (ACO)
•Coordinates input for the Air Tasking Order (ATO)
•Coordinates planned airspace requirements with the UEy
A2C2 cell while keeping the subordinate TAC informed
XX
BCT
X
X
A2C2 ADAM/BAE A2C2 ADAM/BAE A2C2 ADAM/BAE

A2C2 ADAM/BAE
13 AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

14 F-20. Air Picture. The A2C2 cell has a critical dependency on the AMD section for providing the Joint air
15 picture and for the coordination of Joint data downlinks. The A2C2 section coordinates with the AMD cell
16 to ensure that the division has the necessary sensor architecture to provide a complete and timely air
17 picture. This is done both in planning and during current operations. The A2C2 cell’s ADA personnel work
18 with the AMD cell’s Joint Interface Control Officer to ensure that the A2C2 systems for the tactical digital
19 information link are integrated into the Joint Data Network.

Appendix F
1 F-21. Airspace Integration. The AMD cell provides the Air and Missile Defense Plan to the A2C2 cell for
2 integration into the division unit airspace plan. Although the A2C2 cell will review and deconflict the
3 division air defense plan with other division control measures, the control measures for the air defense plan
4 are normally sent to higher headquarters through AMD channels. The A2C2 section and the AMD section
5 must ensure the division SOP and the respective annexes address the procedures for forwarding air defense
6 ACMs.
7 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

8 F-22. Airspace Deconfliction. Each TAC A2C2 cell normally provides an airspace workstation with an
9 operator to the TAC FEC to ensure that fires and airspace use is integrated both for planning and during
10 operations in NRT. If the FEC LNO team from the A2C2 cell is used for other purposes (for example,
11 support to the Main CP or the ASOC), the TAC A2C2 officer must ensure tight linkage between the
12 remainder of the A2C2 cell and the FEC.
13 F-23. Airspace Integration. The A2C2 personnel supporting the FEC also ensure that planned fire support
14 coordinating measures (FSCMs) are integrated with the unit airspace plan. Although the A2C2 will review
15 and deconflict the Fire Support Overlay, FSCMs are normally sent to higher headquarters through fires
16 channels. In some cases both sections will send up related control measures. This often occurs when there
17 is a need to build ACMs in parallel with FSCMs to achieve the C2 effect desired. An example of this would
18 be an Army Tactical Missile System mission where the FEC establishes FSCMs—platoon area hazard
19 (PAH)/target area hazard (TAH)—while the A2C2 uses the PAH/TAH data to establish associated ACMs
20 (surface-to-surface missile areas). This is done because the FSCM's PAH/TAH do not automatically affect
21 the airspace management battle command systems. The A2C2 section and the FEC must ensure the
22 division SOP and the respective annexes address the procedures for forwarding FSCMs and associated
23 ACMs up the appropriate chain of command. This parallel teamwork is also necessary for other complex
24 FSCMs such as kill boxes (JP 1-02).
25 F-24. Air Component Planning and Execution Cell. (ALO/TACP/ASOC). NRT deconfliction involving
26 Joint air assets will require the integration of the A2C2 cell with the USAF control element at the TAC CP
27 because both division and JFACC lines of authority are involved with the TACP/ASOC that represents the
28 JFACC and the A2C2 section of the G-3. As the G-3’s representative for airspace management, the A2C2
29 cell establishes a strong working relationship with the air component execution cell to ensure that rapid
30 deconfliction and integration. The A2C2 cell also provides an integrated air/ground COP and personnel
31 familiar with the COP.
32 AVIATION SECTION AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

33 F-25. Aviation. Although most aviation mission planning occurs at the brigade, the aviation section
34 performs the mission planning for the TAC staff when necessary. The A2C2 cell supports the aviation
35 section by taking aviation mission planning data and building the appropriate ACM structure necessary to
36 perform the mission.
37 F-26. Air Traffic Service. The A2C2 cell with the ATS NCO provides the aviation section with Air
38 Traffic Services expertise to assist with planning the use of ATS assets when an aviation brigade is not
39 assigned to the division. The A2C2 cell provides the Airspace Information Center (AIC) of the aviation
40 brigade ATS company with current airspace information so that the AIC is integrated into the A2C2
41 architecture.
42 AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT
43 F-27. Planning—Non-time Sensitive. The A2C2 cell in each TAC CP integrates all airspace requests
44 from the TAC cells and its subordinate units and produces an Airspace Plan. The supporting TAC CP sends
45 its plan to the lead TAC A2C2 section for integration into the division unit airspace plan. This plan is

1 forwarded up through G-3/A2C2 channels, integrated at each level, and sent through the BCD to the
2 JFACC/ACA as the Army's submission to the ACO (or as a change to the ACO).
3 F-28. Immediate—Time Sensitive. The A2C2 cell receives immediate time sensitive airspace requests
4 from division cells and subordinate units and processes them according to the JFLCC A2C2 annex. If
5 authorized in the theater A2C2 annex, the division may coordinate directly with the BCD to support
6 immediate airspace requests. If the ARFOR’s A2C2 annex authorizes it, all immediate ACMs from brigade
7 and higher should go simultaneously to all higher A2C2 sections including the BCD. This provides a
8 significant reduction of processing time by permitting parallel collaborative coordination of time sensitive
9 ACMs.
10 F-29. Division and Brigade A2C2. The division A2C2 role with brigade A2C2 has significantly changed
11 in the modular force due to organizational change and doctrinal change to mission command orders. As a
12 result, the relationship between the division A2C2 cell and the brigade will change based on what mission
13 is being planned and executed and which is the supported and supporting headquarters.
14 ORGANIZATION
15 F-30. Modular BCTs, Brigades, and SBCTs. All of the modular BCT/brigades (except sustainment) have
16 a version of an organic ADAM/BAE. This staff section is composed of ADA and aviation personnel and
17 does the A2C2 integration function for the brigade in addition to its AMD and aviation functions. While
18 other members of the brigade staff are key A2C2 members (FEC, ALO/TACP, TUAS), the ADAM/BAE
19 OIC is the A2C2 integrator for the S-3. (The brigade A2C2 tasks in FM 3-52, Appendix B, remain valid for
20 the modular brigade with the ADAM/BAE OIC responsible for the S-3 air tasks). The ADAM/BAE
21 provides the personnel and equipment to execute doctrinal A2C2 requirements that were missing in
22 previous brigade designs, which often lacked ADA or aviation personnel. This resource capability is
23 critical as the change to mission command increases the role of the brigade staff in planning and executing
24 operations.
25 F-31. Functional Brigades. Functional brigades without an organic A2C2 element (MP, engineers)
26 assigned to the division retain the brigade responsibilities for A2C2. If a functional brigade is under the
27 control of a modular brigade (for example, MP brigade under a ME brigade), the modular brigade will
28 integrate the functional brigade A2C2 requirements. If the functional brigade is directly under the control
29 of a division TAC CP, that TAC CP A2C2 section will integrate the brigade A2C2 requirements.
30 F-32. Mission Command. In previous division designs, A2C2 was managed centrally at division. While
31 this is still the case for the overall division airspace plan, the relationship changes when the brigade is
32 tasked to execute a mission and is the supported brigade. When the aviation brigade is tasked to execute a
33 mobile strike (or a fires brigade is tasked to execute a precision strike), the center for planning is the
34 supported brigade and the brigade ADAM/BAE is the lead A2C2 planner for that operation. The TAC
35 A2C2 cell will support the supported brigade, and because of the greater experience level and manning of
36 the TAC A2C2 section, the TAC A2C2 cell may perform much of the airspace integration for the brigade.
37 However, the final decision on how the airspace is integrated should be made based on the supported
38 brigade commander’s priorities. This is a significant difference from previous divisions where airspace
39 planning occurred in a division Deep Operations Coordination Cell that provided the plan to the brigades
40 executing the mission.
41 F-33. A2C2 Considerations. While A2C2 staff procedures are the same as other staff procedures, A2C2
42 has some unique challenges in the division A2C2 design. A2C2 is Joint interagency, intergovernmental,
43 and multinational (JIIM) and intersects battlefield operating systems. This requires a level of coordination
44 and expertise not usually required in a single staff cell.
45 JIIM AIRSPACE
46 F-34. Joint Airspace Control. Airspace is not owned in the sense that assignment of an AO confers
47 ownership of the ground. The JFC commander has varying degrees of control of the airspace dependent on

Appendix F
1 the AO and the political and international agreements. Therefore, for each operation (and phase of the
2 operation), the JFC will have more or less authority in controlling the airspace. The JFC designates an ACA
3 (usually the JFACC) to manage airspace for the JFC. Use of airspace is negotiated as the limits of the JFC
4 authority change and commander’s priorities (JFC to division) shift.
5 F-35. Division Joint Interface. The division organization is designed to interface with the ACA if the
6 division’s role requires (ARFOR, JFLCC, JTF). The division A2C2 officer has sufficient rank to represent
7 the Army for both component and interagency/international airspace meetings that are critical for the
8 development of the ACP. The A2C2 sections are manned and equipped to interface with the other
9 component airspace management sections as well as with interagency and international airspace
10 organizations (such as the FAA).
11 F-36. JIIM Airspace Users. A2C2 personnel can effectively integrate Joint and coalition airspace users
12 into the current airspace data. The cell has the connectivity to exchange airspace data with USMC elements
13 if the division is OPCON to USMC forces or if the division is under a JFLCC or JTF with a USMC
14 headquarters. The A2C2 element can exchange airspace data with most coalition units when the coalition
15 unit is provided network connectivity by a digital LNO team. The A2C2 cell must understand how the
16 other services and coalition forces employ their aviation assets because they often differ from Army TTP.
17 Use of control measures that are commonplace in an Army/USAF context may be counter productive when
18 the division is integrating other Joint and coalition airspace users.
19 F-37. Limits of Airspace Use. Airspace, like ground space, is not an unlimited resource. The airspace over
20 a division is constantly in use by multiple users (Army, Joint, and often international) and can easily be
21 saturated. One of the key information requirements of A2C2 to the G-3 is identifying when airspace is
22 saturated and COA recommendations for the most effective use of the airspace. The division’s capabilities
23 to increase the density of airspace use is considerably improved with the modular design. The addition of
24 the ADAM/BAE, the A2C2 cell, and the horizontal and vertical digital connectivity (to the ACA) of the
25 modular force enables the division to process, gain approval, and disseminate procedural ACMs in minutes
26 rather than hours. This helps the division G-3 make adjustments to the unit airspace plan as requirements
27 change. The division design allows the transition to limited positive control if needed for combat operations
28 with the augmentation of additional air traffic controllers to the TAC A2C2 sections. As a result, the TAC
29 CP can control a HIDACZ.
30 F-38. Cross Warfighting Functions (WF). Airspace use inherently intersects WF and as small UAS and
31 nonballistic munitions proliferate, the number and variety of airspace users also increase. The design of the
32 A2C2 elements at all levels combines the expertise of two of the major airspace users (AMD and aviation)
33 while ensuring close coordination with the FEC (FA and USAF). Organization and training of a TAC CP
34 should be done with the intent of maintaining strong horizontal coordination between these sections.
35 F-39. Counter Fratricide. Three linkages in the division A2C2 structure are vital to reducing ground to air
36 fratricide (and potentially air to ground).
37 F-40. AMD. The pairing of the AMD personnel and the ATS personnel in the A2C2 cell and pairing of the
38 A2C2 with the AMD section creates synergies that were not possible in previous single-branch
39 organizations. By using aircraft mission information from the brigades and the air picture from the AMD
40 cell, the A2C2 section can ensure division aircraft (manned and unmanned) are properly identified as
41 friendly in the Joint air COP. If division aircraft are identified as unknown or hostile, the A2C2 section
42 should alert the AMD section so that aircraft are properly identified as friendly in the Joint Data Network.
43 The AMD personnel in the TAC A2C2 section ensure all potential engagement areas are disseminated to
44 airspace users and, if engagement operations are imminent, warn aircraft in the vicinity of a potential
45 ground to air engagement.
46 F-41. FEC. The A2C2 NCO supporting the FEC verifies that the FEC’s fires workstations have the current
47 ACMs to ensure the fires automatic deconflicting capability is functioning. However, not all ACMs are
48 recognized by the fires workstation and there will be aircraft operating outside of procedural control

1 measures. Therefore, the A2C2 NCO must work with the FEC to build restrictive FSCMs, such as ACAs.
2 Restrictive FSCMs will deconflict fires from aircraft not operating within the current ACMs.
3 A2C2 VIGNETTE
4 J-1. Pre-phase 1: Consolidated A2C2 Section. A2C2 provides support to the development of the
5 division OPLAN. Key tasks include the following:
6 z Support to—
7 G-5 for COA development.
8 Brigade ADAM/BAE for the development of brigade A2C2 annexes.
9 Deployment package training.
10 z Coordination with—
11 Division aviation to ensure that adequate ATS support is included in the division deployment
12 package.
13 Division AMD to ensure that there is adequate sensor coverage for the division air picture.
14 Theater Army A2C2 element to ensure airspace requirements are reflected in the Army
15 A2C2 annex and the ACA’s Airspace Control Plan (ACP). Key airspace requirements
16 include airspace corridors to assembly areas and airspace areas for in-country pilot training.
17 z Development of the division A2C2 annex.
18 F-42. Phase 1: Deployment. The TAC 1 A2C2 element is the division A2C2 lead and the TAC 2 A2C2
19 element remains at home station.
20 z TAC 1 A2C2 element—
21 Deploys a portion of their element with an EECP A2C2 element (as needed) and the
22 remainder with the full TAC 1.
23 Functions as the lead A2C2 element for the division.
24 Plans and integrates the A2C2 requirements for TAC 1, TAC 2, and brigades that have
25 arrived in theater.
26 Coordinates with the Army A2C2 element and the BCD and national airspace elements when
27 necessary.
28 Works with the aviation element to secure airspace rights for aircraft (manned and
29 unmanned) from transit to assembly areas and supports in-country proficiency training.
31 Continues planning support to the Main CP to complete the A2C2 annex.
32 Supports A2C2 training for preparing for deployment.
33 Integrates brigade, TAC 2, and Main CP airspace requirements and provides those
34 requirements to TAC 1.
35 F-43. Phase 2: Defensive Operations. The TAC 2 A2C2 element during defensive operations is the
36 division's A2C2 lead.
38 Continues to support RSOI and A2C2 requirements of brigades under TAC 1 control.
39 Supports A2C2 planning requirements of the Main CP.
40 Provides A2C2 planning support to TAC 1.
41 Integrates brigade, TAC 1, and Main CP airspace requirements and provides those
42 requirements to TAC 2.
44 Plans and integrates the A2C2 requirements for TAC 1, TAC 2, and brigades under TAC 2
45 control.

Appendix F
1 Coordinates division airspace requirements with the Army A2C2 element, the BCD, and
2 national airspace elements when necessary.
3 During CAB mobile strike operations, assists the CAB A2C2 personnel in integrating the
4 airspace requirements of the CAB, Fires Brigade, and the BFSB.
5 F-44. Phase 3: Offensive Operations. The TAC 1 A2C2 element is the division's lead A2C2 element
6 during offensive operations.
8 Plans and integrates the A2C2 requirements for TA.C1, TAC 2, and brigades under TAC 1
9 control.
11 national airspace elements when necessary.
13 Supports A2C2 requirements of brigades under TAC 2 control.
14 Supports A2C2 planning requirements of the Main CP.
15 Integrates brigade, TAC 2, and Main CP airspace requirements and provides requirements to
16 TAC 1.
17 F-45. Phase 4: Stability Operations. The Main CP, TAC 1, and TAC 2 are co-located. The TAC 1 A2C2
18 element is the division's lead A2C2 element during stability and reconstruction operations.
20 Plans and integrates the A2C2 requirements for TAC 1, TAC 2, and brigades under TAC 1
21 control.
23 national airspace elements when necessary. Joint airspace command and control procedures
24 may change in this phase. Airspace will be increasingly reserved for civil airspace use, while
25 some joint enablers for airspace control may deploy out of theater. This may result in a
26 shifting of responsibilities between the JAOC (ACA) and the division A2C2 element.
28 Supports A2C2 planning requirements of the Main CP and TAC CP.
29 Provides TAC 2 and Main CP airspace requirements to the TAC 1 A2C2 element.
30

Appendix G
INTEGRATION OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES
INTO THE DIVISION
In addition to bringing unique capabilities and characteristics, the integration of
multinational forces to the division will require division commanders and staff to
carefully consider all aspects of integration to the force.
Division commanders and staffs should ensure they are fully conversant with and
understand the capabilities and limitations of multinational forces assigned to the
division. Division commanders and staffs should establish a good rapport with their
counterparts from other multinational countries. This will help to establish successful
teamwork and increase overall unity of effort. Therefore, division staff should
proactively seek out national command element (NCE) staffs for assigned
multinational forces as early as possible to establish strong relationships and facilitate
early planning.
It is essential that guidance for the employment of multinational forces be secured as

early as possible because it is the starting point for a military appreciation, analysis,
and estimate process. This process, which precedes or is the first step in campaign or
operational planning, establishes a common understanding of the key capabilities of
the assigned multinational force, including any constraints and limitations imposed
under national guidance.
NCE staff are the key source of information for national guidance in relation to
assigned multinational forces. A clear understanding of multinational force
capabilities and national guidance will ensure that such factors as the role of the
multinational force, key capabilities and employment options, acceptable risk, and
rules of engagement can be determined. This will ensure forces are employed to
maximize effect in the division plan.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
G-1. The national authorities providing forces to the division will normally assign national forces under
operational control (OPCON) of the division commander. The assignment of these national forces under
OPCON may be qualified by caveats from the respective nations in accordance with their national policies.
Further assignment to subordinate commanders within the division by the division commander is likely to
be under tactical control (TACON) status, subject to approval by the respective NCE. Command-less
OPCON of the national forces is retained by the parent national commander and is exercised through the
designated national commander of the respective nations within the division. The division commander and
national commanders should discuss and clarify their mutual understandings of the command authorities
that have been transferred to him. This clarification will ensure there is common understanding of those
authorities and preclude potential misunderstandings. Communications are essential to the successful
command and control of coalition operations. The division must determine how it will establish links
between itself and the national headquarters. A high priority should be given to establishing connectivity
with multinational partners C2 systems, and particularly battlefield surveillance systems, which will
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) G-1

Appendix G
greatly enhance operational flexibility and reduce fratricide. These links may vary from interfaces
between systems to providing digital liaison teams with command and control systems.
LIAISON
G-2. Regardless of the command structure, effective liaison is vital when multinational forces are assigned
to the division. Using liaison is an invaluable confidence-building tool between the division and
multinational forces. It also fosters a better understanding of mission and tactics, facilitates the transfer of
vital information, enhances mutual trust, and develops an increased level of teamwork and capability. Liai-
son supplies significant information for the division headquarters about multinational force readiness,
training, and other factors. It also provides information and guidance back to multinational force on the
division. Liaison personnel can serve as ‘cultural interpreters’. Early establishment of liaison functions
within the division environment reduces the fog and friction caused by incompatible communications
systems, doctrine, and operating procedures. The division must establish control of liaison personnel and
ensure that they have access to the commander and staff.
INTELLIGENCE
G-3. As every coalition is different, so too are the ways in which intelligence will be collected and
disseminated within the coalition. Classification may present a problem in releasing information, but
keeping as much unclassified as feasible will improve interoperability and trust within the coalition. The
commander must know what his own and other nation’s positions are on intelligence sharing and determine
if any limitations or constraints exist that will impact on the employment of assigned multinational forces..
Early sharing of information during planning ensures that coalition requirements are clearly stated,
guidance supports the commander’s intent, and the coalition uses procedures supportable by other nations.
All nations of the coalition should endeavor to produce information and intelligence in a format that is
releasable to all members of the coalition. This should be easily accessible through systems of an
appropriate classification.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
G-4. ROE for assigned multinational forces will define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner
in which force or actions may or may not be applied. Although the division is likely to have similar ROE in
place, the division commander and staffs must establish early in planning any variations in national
guidance that may limit or constrain employment of the assigned multinational force. Some multinational
force national ROE will be relatively free of constraint while others may be severely constrained. In many
cases, commanders of assigned multinational forces may lack the authority to speak for their nation in the
ROE development process. Complete consensus or standardization of ROE should be sought but may not
be achievable. The division commander needs to reconcile differences as much as possible to develop and
implement simple ROE that can be tailored by assigned multinational forces to their national policies.
SUSTAINMENT
G-5. Unity of effort is essential to division sustainment operations. This requires coordination not only
between the division and nations providing forces, but also with civilian agencies in the area of operations
(AO). Executing division sustainment plans must be a collective responsibility of the division force. When
possible, mutual logistic support should be developed for economy of effort. Division sustainment plans
should be flexible, responsive, and predictive and provide timely sustainment throughout the entire division
environment. The division sustainment plan should incorporate the logistic requirements capacities and
capabilities of all assigned forces to ensure sustained and synchronized execution. Consensus on assigned
forces sustainment issues and requirements should be formed early. Division staff must thoroughly
comprehend assigned multinational forces’ doctrine and have good relations with subordinate commanders
and civilian leaders, as well as cooperation and continuous coordination between all elements providing
logistic support and the operational elements. This must begin during the initial planning phase and
G-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

_____________________________________________Integration of Multinational Forces Into the Division
continue through the operation’s termination and redeployment of the contributing nations back to their
countries of origin.
G-6. Although responsible for logistic support of its national forces, not all assigned multinational forces
will have organic logistic capabilities. Such forces will become dependent on the division for all or part of
their sustainment support. In these cases, the division must be prepared to provide the required support to
assigned multinational forces. Support may include both deployment and sustainment. Varying degrees of
mutual logistic support within the division must be planned to incorporate multinational force capabilities
and minimize weaknesses.
INTEGRATED FORCES CHECKLIST FOR COMMANDERS

G-7. Keys to unity of effort among nations are certain understandings and agreements with contributing
force commanders. Division commanders and staff should make every effort to achieve consensus before
planning a detailed operation or deploying forces. As a minimum, commanders should ensure that a
common understanding exists for the following:
z Mandate and terms of reference for the operation.
z Latitude given each commander by NCA.
z Means of resolving disputes over use of forces.
z Types of force available and the usefulness of each.
z National force capabilities, limitations, and readiness.
z Command authority or status of command:
Command relationships.
Transfer of authority to lead nation.
Acceptable risk.
Authority for staff-to-staff contact.
G-8. The following questions also should be considered when integrating forces:
COMMAND
1. What is the command structure?
2. Have status-of-forces been agreed to? If not, who should conduct negotiations?
3. What interoperability factors will affect the mission, for example, command, control,
communications, or logistics?
4. Have supported and supporting relationships been established or referred to higher
authority to resolve inadequacies?
5. What unique capabilities does integrated force bring to the Division?
6. What constraints are imposed on the integrated force by their national authorities?
7. Have standards regarding operational or logistics capabilities been established for
certifying units to participate in the operation? Have nations with deficiencies indicated
a method of resolution?
8. Are forces; command, control, and communications capabilities; and logistic support
robust enough to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?
9. Have all integrated force legal constraints been considered in planning for C2?
10. Has the command structure been designed to minimize the number of layers?
11. What differences in standards for force protection exist between the division and
assigned multinational forces and what measures need to be implemented to ensure
retention of division integrity?

Appendix G
LIAISON
1. What points within the division (HQ and other) require the establishment of a liaison
function to effect integration assigned multinational forces into the division?
2. What LNOs must be sent to the integrated force headquarters and adjacent, supporting,
and supported units?
2. Do liaison elements on the staff possess requisite authorities and have a full
understanding of both national interest and Division objectives?
3. Do liaison elements have appropriate communications, linguistic, logistics, and office
support capabilities in place?
4. Have LNOs been identified? Have key LNOs been interviewed for suitability?
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
1. Have ROE been agreed upon by national authorities or by national military
commanders?
2. How will integrated force’s ROE affect other division organizations and operations?
3. What are the procedures for commanders to request a change to the ROE?
OPERATIONS
1. Does the division have a SOP that includes reporting requirements and procedures for
integrated forces?
2. Has a common map database been established?
3. Have staff visits been coordinated?
4. Have visits by the unit commander to higher headquarters been coordinated?
5. What training is required by the integrated force IAW the division commander’s
requirements prior to deployment?
6. What training is required once deployed?
PLANNING
1. Have the forces relying on strategic mobility for deployment and redeployment from
US Strategic Lift assets been included in the supporting nation’s deployment sequence?
2. To what standard have integrated forces been trained?
3. Does the integrated force have a standard of training?
4. What type of pre-deployment training have coalition forces received?
SUPPORT AND CAPABILITIES

1. What areas will come under division control and what areas will remain national
issues?
2. What logistic support is the available?
3. What are the unique logistic capabilities of each member of the integrated force?
Understanding these capabilities is essential to effective and efficient logistic planning
and support.
4. What legal restrictions do national laws impose on logistic support?
5. What is the division’s authority to redistribute or cross-level logistic assets and services
under routine and emergency conditions?
G-4 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

_____________________________________________Integration of Multinational Forces Into the Division
6. How will the division ensure compatibility and interoperability of communications and
information systems, to include automated data processing interfaces, between the
coalition and national support systems?
7. How will the division prioritize, allocate, and use common infrastructure capabilities
(ports, airfields, roads) to support military and civil operations?
8. How will each class of supply be handled?
9. Do integrated forces have a basic load of ammunition and what are their ammunition
procedures?
10. What are the integrated force’s special requirements to include tents, cots, reverse
osmosis water purification units, laundry, latrines, and batteries?
MAINTENANCE
1. Do integrated forces have maintenance support?
2. Do integrated forces have the means to order and receive repair parts?
3. Do integrated forces have wreckers, stake and platform trailers, or heavy equipment
transporters?
4. Do integrated forces have communications repair facilities?
MEDICAL
1. Are graves registration and mortuary procedures in place to service coalition casualties
to include recognizing cultural differences in dealing with casualties and procedures
and policies for local civilians? Coordinate with national commands.
2. What are the integrated force’s capabilities, both air and ground, and procedures for
medical evacuation, both intra- and intertheater, that coalition forces will be supported
by, or required to support?
3. What are the procedures for tracking patients and coordination requirements for return-
to-duty transportation?
4. Does the integrated force have organic Echelon I, II, or III combat health support? For
those that do not have this support, what level will the division provide?
COMMUNICATIONS
1. Will commercial companies establish telephone service for use by integrated forces?
2. Who is responsible for funding additional communication capability?
3. What is the common identification friend or foe procedure?
4. What are the data-link protocols?
5. What is the communication equipment capability between forces?
6. Has coordination been accomplished regarding frequency assignment?
7. Are there a means and a plan to provide all forces with a common tactical picture?
8. Do integrated partners with a lesser C2 capability have appropriate liaison officers,
interpreters, operators, and maintainers to enable adequate C2 within the coalition?
9. How and when will the coalition establish its communication architecture?
10. How will the coalition account for and utilize communication networks established by
civilian agencies, to include commercially leased circuits, commercial satellite
services, as well as high frequency and very high frequency radios?
11. How will the coalition address the need for secure communications?

(BLANK PAGE)
Appendix H
Brigade Task Organizations
The following charts depict the internal task organization of the brigades, down to
company level, assigned to the 1st Division as they deployed to the theater of
operations. These charts are provided as a reference to show the parent brigade of
company and battalion units that are task organized to different brigades during the
phases of the operation detailed in Chapter 4.
2nd Bn 13th Infantry (M) X

HHC 2/13 Infantry
2
A-2/13 Infantry
B-2/13 Infantry
C-3/68 Armor
D-3/68 Armor 1st Bn 16th FA
E-2/13 Armor (Engr) HHB 1/16 FA
3rd Bn 68th Armor A-1/16 FA
HHC 3/68 Armor B-1/16 FA
A-3/68 Armor 925th TA Platoon
B-3/68 Armor 498th BSB
C-2/13 Infantry HHC 498th BSB
D-2/13 Infantry 917th Maint Co
E-3/68 Armor (Engr) 1048th Distro Co
st
1 Sqd 9th Cavalry 48th Bde Spt Med Co
HHT 1/9 Cav (BSMC)
A-1/9 Cav 213th Fwd Spt Co (CA)
B-1/9 Cav 214th Fwd Spt Co (CA)
C-1/9 Cav 215th Fwd Spt Co (FA)
th
10 Engineer Battalion 216th Fwd Spt Co (RS)
HHD 10th Engr Bn 601st Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
st
101 Engr Co (Horizontal)
151st Engr Co (Man Aug) 2nd HBCT BTB
152nd Engr Co (Man Aug) HHC 2nd HBCT BTB
201st Engr Co (Sapper) 2nd BST Co (MP/Sec/UAV)
1001st Engr Plt (DOG) 44th Sig Co
1002nd Engr Plt (DOG) 55th MI Co
901st Fwd Spt Co (Engr) 520th Engr Co (MAC)
Figure H-1. 2nd HBCT Task Organization
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) H-1

Appendix H
2nd Bn 22nd Infantry (M) X

HHC 2/22 Infantry 5
A-2/22 Infantry
B-2/22 Infantry
C-1/68 Armor
3rd Bn 16th FA
D-1/68 Armor
HHB 3/16 FA
E-2/22 Infantry (Engr)
A-3/16 FA
1st Bn 68th Armor B-3/16 FA
HHC 1/68 Armor 920th TA Platoon
A-1/68 Armor
B-1/68 Armor
114th BSB
C-2/22 Infantry
HHC 114th BSB
D-2/22 Infantry
918th Maint Co
E-1/68 Armor (Engr)
1040th Distro Co
1st Squad 14th Cav 49th BSMC
HHT 1/14 Cav 217th Fwd Spt Co (CA)
A-1/14 Cav 218th Fwd Spt Co (CA)
B-1/14 Cav 219th Fwd Spt Co (FA)
C-1/14 Cav 220th Fwd Spt Co (RS)
20th Engineer Battalion 602nd Fsd Spt Co (Engr)
HHD 20th Engr Bn
102nd Engr Co (Horizontal)
5th HBCT BTB
153rd Engr Co (Man Aug)
HHC 5th HBCT BTB
154th Engr Co (Man Aug)
5th BST Co (MP/Sec/UAV)
202nd Engr Co (Sapper)
445th Sig Co
1003rd Engr Plt (DOG)
56th MI Co
1004th Engr Plt (DOG)
521st Engr Co (MAC)
902nd Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
Figure H-2. 5th HBCT Task Organization
H-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

X
1st Bn 23rd Infantry (M)
HHC 1/23 Infantry 10
A-1/23 Infantry
B-1/23 Infantry
C-3/67 Armor
D-3/67 Armor 2nd Bn 16th FA
E-1/23 Infantry (Engr) HHB 2/16 FA
3rd Bn 67th Armor A-2/16 FA
HHC 3/67 Armor B-2/16 FA
A-3/67 Armor 927th TA Platoon
B-3/67 Armor
C-1/23 Infantry 115th BSB
D-1/23 Infantry HHC 115th BSB
E-3/67 Armor (Engr) 919th Maint Co
1st Squad 23rd Cavalry 1050th Distro Co
HHT 1/23 Cavalry 50th BSMC
A-1/23 Cavalry 221st Fwd Spt Co (CA)
B-1/23 Cavalry 222nd Fwd Spt Co (CA)
C-1/23 Cavalry 223rd Fwd Spt Co (FA)
30th Engineer Battalion 224th Fwd Spt Co (RS)
HHD 30th Engr Bn 603rd Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
103rd Engr Co (Horizontal)
155th Engr Co (MAC) 10th HBCT BTB
156th Engr Co (MAC) HHC 10th HBCT BTB
203rd Engr Co (Sapper) BST Co (MP/Sec/UAV)
1005th Engr Plt (DOG) 446th Sig Co
1006th Engr Plt (DOG) 57th MI Co
903rd Fwd Spt Co (Engr) 522nd Engr Co (MAC)
Figure H-3. 10th HBCT Task Organization

Appendix H
X
1st Bn 87th Infantry 87
HHC 1/87 Infantry
A-1/87th Infantry
B-1/87th Infantry 1st Bn 92nd FA
C-1/87th Infantry HHB 1/92 FA
D-1/87th Infantry (Wpn) A-1/92 FA
B-1/92 FA
2nd Bn 87th Infantry 928th TA Platoon
HHC 2/87th Infantry
A-2/87th Infantry 187th BSB
B-2/87th Infantry HHC 187th BSB
C-2/87th Infantry 920th Maint Co
D-2/87th Infantry (Wpn) 1051st Distro Co
51st BSMC
2nd Squad 14th Cav 225th Fwd Spt Co (INF)
HHT 2/14 Cavalry 226th Fwd Spt Co (INF)
A-2/14 Cavalry (Mot) 227th Fwd Spt Co (FA)
B-2/14 Cavalry (Mot) 228th Fwd Spt Co (RS)
E-2/22 Infantry (RLS) 604th Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
15th Engineer Bn 87th IBCT BTB

HHD 15th Engr Bn HHC 87th IBCT BTB
104th Engr Co (ESC) 87th BST Co (MP/Sec/CBRN)
301st Engr Co (MRB) 447th Sig Co
204th Engr Co (Sapper) 58th MI Co
904th Fwd Spt Co (Engr) 519th Engr Co (Sapper)
523rd Engr Co (MAC)
Figure H-4. 87th IBCT Task Organization

X
HHC 2nd SBCT
449th Sig Co 2
59th MI Co
A-30th Inf (AT)
1st Bn 2nd Infantry
HHC 1/2nd Infantry 2nd Squad 10th Cav
A-1/2nd Infantry HHT 2/10th Cavalry
B-1/2nd Infantry A-2/10th Cavalry
C-1/2nd Infantry B-2/10th Cavalry
2nd Bn 2nd Infantry C-2/10th Cavalry
HHC 2/2nd Infantry D-2/10th Cavalry (Sur)
A-2/2nd Infantry
B-2/2nd Infantry 1st Bn 21st FA (155T)
C-2/2nd Infantry H&Svc Btry 1/21st FA
3rd Bn 2nd Infantry A-1/21st FA (155T)
HHC 3/2nd Infantry B-1/21st FA (155T)
nd
A-3/2 Infantry C-1/21st FA (155T)
B-3/2nd Infantry 29th TA Platoon
C-3/2nd Infantry
25th Engineer Bn 2nd BSB
HHD 25th Engr Bn HQ & Distro Co 2nd BSB
105th Engr Co (ESC) 2nd BSC
302nd Engr Co (MRB) 52nd BSMC
205th Engr Co (Sapper) 605th Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
905th Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
520th Engr Co (Sapper)
524th Engr Co (MAC)
Figure H-5. 2nd SBCT Task Organization

Appendix H
X
HHC 28th SBCT 28
450th Sig Co
60th MI Co
F-137th Inf (AT)
1st Bn 137th Infantry
HHC 1/137th Infantry 2nd Squad 165th Cav
A-1/137th Infantry HHT 2/165th Cavalry
B-1/137th Infantry A-2/165th Cavalry
C-1/137th Infantry B-2/165th Cavalry
2nd Bn 242nd Infantry C-2/165thth Cavalry
HHC 2/242nd Infantry D-2/165 Cavalry (Sur)
A-2/242nd Infantry
B-2/242nd Infantry 1st Bn 445th FA (155T)
C-2/242nd Infantry H&Svc Btry 1/21st FA
1st Bn 318th Infantry A-1/445th FA (155T)
HHC 1/318th Infantry B-1/445th FA (155T)
A-1/318th Infantry C-1/445th FA (155T)
B-1/318th Infantry 445th TA Platoon
C-1/318th Infantry
35th Engineer Bn 228th BSB
HHD 35th Engr Bn HQ & Distro Co 228th BSB
106th Engr Co (ESC) 228th BSC
303rd Engr Co (MRB) 53rd BSMC
206th Engr Co (Sapper) 606th Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
521st Engr Co (Sapper)
525th Engr Co (MAC)
Figure H-6. 28th SBCT Task Organization

X
56 2/165th Cavalry
(during Defense and
Offense)
HHT 2nd Sqd 165th Cav
HHC 56th BFSB A Trp 2nd 165th Cav
B Trp 2nd 165th Cav
56th BTB C Trp 2nd 165th Cav
HHC 56th BTB D Trp 2nd 165th Cav
448th Sig Co (Surveillance)
221st FSC (BFSB)
591st MI Bn
513th MI Bn (in SRO)
HHC 513th MI Bn HHC 591st MI Bn
A Co (TUAV) A Co (TUAV)
B Co (Tech Collection) B Co (Tech Collection)
C Co (C&E) C Co (C&E)
D Co (CI/HUMINT) D Co (CI/HUMINT)
E Co (CI/HUMINT) E Co (CI/HUMINT)
3/23rd Cavalry 4/6th Air Cavalry

HHT 3rd 23rd Cavalry (in SRO)
F-2/22nd Inf (LRS) HHD 4/6th Air Recon
A Trp 3rd 23rd Cav A-4/6th Air Cavalry
B Trp 3rd 23rd Cav A-4/6th Air Cavalry
C-4/6th Air Cavalry
46th AVUM Troop
Figure H-7. 56th BFSB Task Organization

Appendix H
X
75
HHB 75th Fires Bde
75th BSB 3/75th Field Artillery

HHB 75th BSB HHB 3/75th FA
449th Sig Co A-3/75th FA (MLRS)
222nd Fwd Spt Co (Fires) B-3/75th FA (MLRS)
Svc Btry 3/75th FA
A-251st FA (TA)
1/5th Field Artillery
1/75th Field Artillery HHB 1/5th FA
HHB 1/75th FA A-1/5th FA (155SP)
A-1/75th FA (MLRS) B-15th FA (155SP)
B-1/75th FA (MLRS) Svc Btry 1/5th FA
Svc Btry 1/75th FA
1/14th Field Artillery
2/75th Field Artillery HHB 1/14th FA
HHB 2/75th FA A-1/14th FA (155SP)
A-2/75th FA (MLRS) B-1/14th FA (155SP)
B-2/75th FA (MLRS) Svc Btry 1/14th FA
Svc Btry 2/75th FA
Figure H-8. 75th Fire Brigade Task Organization

X
HHC 34th CSB(ME) 34
34th BSB 3rd Bn 99th Mot Inf Bde

HHC 34thBSB
st
(GN) (Defensive/Offensive Phases)
451 Signal Co
HHC 3-99th Mot Inf Bde
553rd Distro Co
9th Co-99th Mot Inf Bde
932nd Spt Maint Co
223rd Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
59th MP Bn 12th Co (Wpn)-99th Mot Inf Bde
HHD 59th MP Bn 3rd Bn Spt Co-99th Mot Inf Bde
591st MP Co
593rd MP Co 4/44th ADA Bn (Patriot)
627th MP Co HHB 4/44th Air Defense
75th MP Bn A-4/44th ADA (Patriot)
(for Offensive Phase to B-4/44th ADA (Patriot)
92nd MP Bde during SRO D-3/56th ADA (Avenger)
HHD 75th MP Bn
592nd MP Co 325th CBRNE Bn
594th MP Co HHD 325th CBRNE Bn
628th MP Co A-325th CBRNE (Recon)
B-325th CBRNE (Mech Smoke)
52nd Engr Bn
C-325th CBRNE (Smoke/Decon)
HHD 52nd Engr Bn
457th CBRNE Co (Mot Smoke)
71st Engr Co (Mobility Aug)
72nd Engr Co (Mobility Aug)
321st Engr Co (Clearance) 802nd Ord Co (EOD)
527th Engr Spt Co
701st Engr Co (MRB) 308th PSYOP Co (during SRO)
702nd Engr Co (MRB)
6489th Engr Team (AB) (Fire)
6534th Engr Team (Quarry)
6666th Engr Team (Utilities)
Figure H-9. 34th Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) Task Organization

Appendix H
X 3rd UAV Bn
11 HHD 3rd UAV Bn
31st UAV Co
32nd UAV Co
HHC 11st Avn Bde
1-101st Avn Bn (Asslt)
11th Avn Spt Bn HHC 1/101st Avn Bn
HHC 11th Avn Spt bn A-1/101st Avn (AHB)
11th Air Traffic Svcs Co B-1/101st Avn (AHB)
111st AVIM Co C-1/101st Avn (AHB)
1049th Distro Co D-1/101st Avn (AVUM)
543rd Signal Co A-2/229th Avn (HvyHC)
1/227th Avn Bn (Attk) 2/101st Avn Bn (Asslt)

HHD 1/227th Avn Bn (during SRO)
A-1/227th Avn HHC 1/101st Avn Bn
B-1/227th Avn A-2/101st Avn (AHB)
C-1/227th Avn B-2/101st Avn (AHB)
D-1/227th (AVUM) C-2/101st Avn (AHB)
D-2/101st Avn (AVUM)
2/227th Avn Bn (Attk) B-2/229th Avn (HvyHC)
HHD 2/227th Avn Bn
A-2/227th Avn 1/292nd Avn Bn (GS)
B-2/227th Avn HHC 1/292nd Avn Bn
C-2/227th Avn A-1/292nd Avn (CAC)
D-2/227th Avn B-1/292nd Avn (SAC)
D-1/292nd Avn (AVUM)
3rd Med Co (Air Ambulance)
20th Med Co (Air Ambulance)
Figure H-10. 11th Aviation Brigade Task Organization

X
27 SUST
HHC 27th Sustainment Brigade
27th BTB 273rd CSSB

HHC 27th BTB HHD 273rd CSSB
252nd Signal Co 2731st Ord Co (Ammo)
27th BSC 2732nd Trans Co
70th Financial Management Co 2733rd Ord Co (Maint)
345th HR Co 2734th QM Co (S&S)
37th ALT Team 3777th Trans Co (Petr)
3821st Trans Co
271st CSSB
HHD 271st CSSB 372nd CSSB
2711st Ord Co (Ammo) HHD 372nd CSSB
2712nd Trans Co 3721st Ord Co (Ammo)
2713th Ord Co (Maint) 3712th Trans Co
2714th QM Co (S&S) 3713th Ord Co (Maint)
3714th QM Co (S&S)
272nd CSSB 4021st QM Co (Airdrop)
HHD 272nd CSSB
2721st Ord Co (Ammo)
2712th Trans Co
2713th Ord Co (Maint)
2714th QM Co (S&S)
Figure H-11. 27th Sustainment Brigade Task Organization

Appendix H
X
44
HHC 44th Medical Brigade
1st CSH
12th Fwd Surgical Team (FST)
36th Fwd Surgical Team (FST)
9th Medical Bn (Area Spt)
HHD 9th MMB
15th Med Co (Area Spt)
22nd Med Co (Area Spt)
34th Med Co (Area Spt)
94th Med Co (Dental)
12th Fwd Surgical Team
36th Fwd Surgical Team
47th Pvnt Med Det
29th Vet Det
24th MMB
HHD 24th MMB
52nd Med Co (Grd Ambulance)
68th Med Co (Grd Ambulance)
Figure H-12. 44th Medical Brigade Task Organization

X
555
HHD 555th Engineer Brigade
6701st Topographic Spt Team
803rd Ord Company (EOD)
804th Ord Company (EOD)
53rd Engr Bn GPC

(to 2ndHBCT during SRO) CMS
HHD 53rd Engr Bn EHCC
531st Engr Co (Horizontal) FAC Detachment
532nd Engr Co (Horizontal)
Real Estate Team
533rd Engr Co (Vertical)
5301st Engr Plt (Concrete)
KBR Contract Well Drilling Tm 75th Engr Bn
607th Fwd Spt Co (Engr) HHD 75th Engr Bn
9201st Engr Plt (Prime Power)
th
69 Engr Bn 931st Engr Co (Clearance)
th
HHD 69 Engr Bn 945th Engr Co (MRB))
st
691 Engr Co (Horizontal) 9564th Engr Plt (Dog)
692nd Engr Co (Horizontal) 6490th Engr Plt (Fire Fighting)
rd
693 Engr Co (Vertical) 6491st Engr Plt (Fire Fighting)
6901st Engr Plt (Quarry) 6535th Engr Plt (Quarry)
th
608 Fwd Spt Co (Engr) 6667th Engr Plt (Utilities)
6668th Engr Plt (Utilities)
Figure H-13. 555th Engineer Brigade Task Organization

Appendix H
X
92 MP
HHC 92nd MP Brigade
701st CID Detachment
75th MP Bn
HHD 75th MP Bn
592nd MP Co
594th MP Co
89th MP Bn (I/R)
HHD 89th MP Bn
627th MP Co (PW)
628th MP Co (PW)
629th MP Co (I/R)
630th MP Co (Guard)
Figure H-14. 92nd MP Brigade Task Organization

II
418 CA
418th Civil Affairs Bn

HHD (-) 418th CA Bn
418th CA CMOC
A Co 418th CA Bn
B Co 418th CA Bn
C Co 418th CA Bn
D Co 418th CA Bn
DOS Rep/DOJ/DOC Reps

GREENLAND Civil Authority Reps
UNHCR Rep
International Organization/NGO Reps
Figure H-15. 418th Civil Affairs Battalion Task Organization

Appendix H
X
99 GN
HHC 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade
1st Bn 99th Mot Inf Bde 13th Co (Sapper)

HHC 1-99
1st Co-99th Mot Inf Bde 14th Co (Recon)
2nd Co-99th Mot Inf Bde
3rd Co-99th Mot Inf Bde
15th Co (Signal
4th Co (Wpn)-99th Mot Inf Bde
1st Bn Spt Co-99th Mot Bde
99th Spt Bn
2nd Bn 99th Mot Inf Bde HHC 99th Spt Bn
HHC 2-99 QM Co 99th Spt Bn
5th Co-99th Mot Inf Bde Trans Co 99th Spt Bn
6th Co-99th Mot Inf Bde Med Co 99th Spt Bn
7th Co-99th Mot Inf Bde Maint Co 99th Spt Bn
2nd Bn Spt Co-99th Mot Bde
3rd Bn 99th Mot Inf Bde

HHC 2-99
3rd Bn Spt Co-99th Mot Bde
Figure H-16. 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade (GREENLAND ARMY) Task Organization

Appendix I
Division Staff Training Plans

"Training for warfighting readiness is the Army's number one priority in war and
peace."
FM 7-1
This appendix proposes ideas, considerations, and suggestions on how to train the
division staff replacing what was traditionally published as Chapter 3 (Training
Plans) of the Mission Training Plan (MTP). With advances in information technology
and increased web access, the Army will no longer publish paper-based MTPs.
Instead, the Army is transitioning to the Digital Training Management System
(DTMS) that delivers Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS) for each type
Army echelon to units in the field. Commanders, staffs and Soldiers will be able to
access training matrices (formerly Chapter 2 of the MTP) and Training and
Evaluation Outlines (T&EOs) (formerly Chapter 4 of the MTP) using DTMS.
This appendix, used in conjunction with the division's unit and functional CATS, is
presented to assist commanders and their staffs in planning, preparing, executing and
assessing staff training for mission requirements. It is not intended to supplant FM 7-
0 and FM 7-1, which provides the Army's doctrinal foundation for training, but
instead supplements existing training doctrine, principles, and procedures. This
appendix, as well as other source manuals, materials, and sites referenced throughout
the appendix, should be used in conjunction with FM 7-0 and 7-1 to develop division
staff training plans.
STAFF TRAINING
I-1. Applying our current training doctrine to staff training is unique in that a staff is considered neither a
unit nor organization in the traditional sense, but rather a collection of officers, NCOs and Soldiers
organized to support the commander with command and control (C2); the staff is essentially an extension
of the commander. Although planning training is inherently challenging for any commander, planning and
executing staff training provides the commander, and more directly the chief of staff (COS), with a unique
set of challenges. The most severe training challenges are those that deal with time (balancing staff day-to-
day operations while simultaneously supporting subordinate unit training), synchronizing individual and
element/cell training with Main and Tactical command post (CP) training, and developing short-range and
near-term cell and element staff training. In essence the COS must determine how to train the staff to
achieve mission essential task list (METL) proficiency both horizontally and vertically across the main and
tactical command posts (TAC CPs).
I-2. Only through a comprehensive and well planned and executed training plan can the division staff
support the commander during Full Spectrum Operations. By applying the principles in FM 7-1, the
division staff can devise an effective training plan.
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) I-1

Appendix I
TRAINING MANAGEMENT
TRAINING MANAGEMENT CYCLE
I-3. The COS is the division commander’s principal assistant in directing, coordinating, supervising, and
training the staff, except in areas the commander reserves (see FM 6-0). In garrison, the COS's number one
priority should be staff training. Like the commander, the COS uses the Army Training Management Cycle
to continuously plan, prepare, execute, and assess the state of training across the division staff. This cycle
provides the framework for developing the division staff METL, establishing training priorities, and
allocating resources in support of training.
Top-Down/Bottom-Up Approach to Training

I-4. The top-down/bottom-up approach to training is vital to achieving and sustaining staff METL
proficiency in support of division operational mission requirements. It involves a collaborative team effort
between the division commander, his deputy commanding generals (DCGs), the COS, subordinate CP cell
leaders and element/section/team leaders. The division Commander, in conjunction with the DCGs and
COS, provides the training focus, direction, and resources. Subordinate cell, element and section/team
leaders provide feedback on the staff's training proficiency in their respective warfighting function. They
identify the specific staff training needs for their elements/sections/teams and execute training to standard,
IAW the division staff training plan. This team effort helps maintain the training focus, establish training
priorities, and enable effective communication between the various division CPs, cells and elements.
I-5. Guidance, based on division operational mission and priorities, flows from the top down and results
in subordinate elements and elements/sections/teams identifying specific collective and individual tasks
that support the division staff METL. Input from the bottom up is essential because it identifies detailed
training needs to achieve task proficiency on identified collective and individual tasks within each
team/section/element and cell. Leaders at all echelons throughout each CP must communicate with each
other on requirements, planning, preparing, executing, and assessing training.
I-6. The COS centralizes the planning effort to provide a consistent staff training focus from the top to
the bottom of the organization. However, the COS decentralizes detailed planning and execution to ensure
that the conduct of mission-related training sustains strengths and overcomes the weaknesses unique to
each cell. Decentralized execution promotes subordinate leaders’ initiative at all echelons. Responsibility
for supervising training, developing subordinates, and providing feedback within their respective cells
must reside with cell leaders. They in turn, must hold subordinate leaders within each cell accountable for
training their individual elements/sections/teams.
Train the Way You Fight - As a Cohesive Staff Team
I-7. Historically, in garrison, division staffs have been organized by function using the traditional "G"
staff configuration with administrative C2 processes that bear little resemblance to how staff's actually
operate in the field. During training or deployment for real world operations, commanders have
traditionally organized their staffs differently by arranging them into various command post configurations.
They have used different hardware/software solutions, and employed different C2 processes to
communicate information to present a common operational picture (COP).
I-8. With today's high OPTEMPO, day-to-day taskings and other distracters competing for time,
commanders must structure the staff in garrison the way it will fight. The lack of adequate training time
and management of staff training time continues to plague many staffs. Structuring the staff in garrison into
tactical command post configuration would enable the division staff to capitalize on training time by
reducing time normally required for staffs to organize for an exercise. Configuring the staff in garrison as it
I-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

would fight, and utilizing the same C2 processes in garrison as those used during execution of tactical
operations, would better support the battle focus process and increase its overall readiness. Further, it
would reduce many of the staff training challenges associated with transitioning from garrison to tactical
environments.
PLANNING PROCESS
Staff METL Development

I-9. Staffs have always developed METLs. However, the changes affecting the organization of the
division staff and configuration of its CPs now make it prudent to also consider developing a METL for
each of the division CPs and their subordinate cells. The process used to develop a staff METL is the same
as that of MTOE and TDA units as cited in FM 7-1, but with some subtle differences (see Figure I-1). For
example, the COS, not the commander, drives the METL development process for the staff based on the
division's wartime mission. The staff METL represents those critical tasks that the CPs and their
subordinate cells must be able to perform to assist the commander with C2. Once approved, the METL
provides the focus for battle staff training.
Commander’s Guidance
COS’s Guidance
TAC CPs
Command
ISR Posts
Cells
PROT
CP Leader’s
MAIN CP
Guidance FAPP
Staff ISR
LOG
METL Cell Leader’s Plans
Guidance C4
Current
UEx Selected CP OPs
Element Leader’s
Battle Staff METL Coord
METL Guidance
Tasks Tasks Staff
CP Selected Cell
Battle Staff
METL METL
Tasks
Tasks
Cell Selected Element

Battle Staff
Tasks Critical Tasks
Tasks
Element
Leader Tasks
Individual Tasks
Staff, Command Post (CP) and Subordinate Cell METLs
Figure I-1. Developing a staff METL
I-10. The following fundamentals apply to staff METL development:

z The division staff METL is derived from the division’s war plan, the commander’s guidance,
and related tasks in external guidance. One key source of external guidance is the Battle
Command Staff Tasks for the Division (see Table I-1 at the end of this appendix), approved by

Appendix I
the CAC commander in April 2005. These tasks and the T&EOs are posted and accessible using
DTMS.
z Mission essential tasks must apply to the entire division staff. METL does not include tasks
assigned solely to the Main or Tactical CPs or their subordinate cells and elements.
z The METLs of the Main CP, TAC CPs, and cells must all support and complement the division
staff METL. Note that the METLs of the Main CP, TAC CPs and cells should be mutually
supporting, and complement other CP and cell METLs, as well as the division staff METL.
z The availability of resources does not affect METL development. The METL is an
unconstrained statement of tasks required to exercise C2 processes and procedures in support of
the commander.
z The METL is not prioritized; however, all tasks may not require equal training.
z The COS must integrate the staff horizontally and vertically to ensure synchronization and
integration of warfighting functions. Tasks necessary to generate, sustain, and apply combat
power are directed toward supporting the commander’s decisions.
Commander’s Guidance
COS’ Guidance
Division
Mission
Cell Leader’s
Division Staff Guidance
METL METL
Element Leader’s
Division Division TAC 1 CP
Battle
Guidance
Battle Staff METL
Tasks TAC 2 CP
Top Down
Tasks
METL
MAIN CP
METL
Cell
Element
Element
METL
Element
TAC 1 CP Element
METL
METL
METL
Battle Staff METL
Cell
Tasks Element
Battle Staff
Critical Tasks
TAC 2 CP Tasks
Cell
Battle Staff Element
Element
METL
Element
Element Element
Tasks METL
METL
METL
METL
F Cell Leader Tasks
MAIN CP
Battle Staff Battle Staff Individual Tasks
Tasks Tasks Element
Cell Critical Tasks
Element
Element
METL
Element Element
Bottom Up
Element
METL
METL
METL
METL Leader Tasks
Cell
Battle Staff Individual Tasks
Tasks
Element
Critical Tasks
Supports Supports Supports Element

Leader Tasks
Individual Tasks
Relationships Between Division Mission, Staff METL, Battle Tasks and Critical Tasks
Figure I-2. Relationships between staff, CP, and cell METL
Division Staff METL Development Sequence

I-11. The COS involves CP OICs, cell leaders and their SGMs/NCOICs in METL development, to create
a team approach to staff training that is battle focused. Participation by CP OICs, cell leaders, and key

NCOs develops a common understanding of the division staff's critical operational mission requirements,
so that METLs developed throughout the staff are mutually supporting and nested with the higher echelon.
CP OICs and cell leaders subsequently apply the insights gained during preparation of the staff’s METL to
the development of their CP and cell METLs. Element leaders (officers and NCOs) must understand the
division staff's METL so that they can identify the appropriate Element and individual staff tasks for each
collective mission essential task. The relationships of the staff, CP, and cell METLs, are graphically
depicted in Figure I-2. It further illustrates that both the selection and prioritization of staff battle tasks and
critical tasks and their relationship to METL development reflecting the bottom up approach.
I-12. The staff, led by the COS, develops the staff METL. A checklist for staff METL development is
shown below:
z Analyze the division assigned mission and METL and identify specified and implied staff tasks.
z Analyze the operational environment and other external guidance to identify any other staff
tasks.
z Review the division commander's mission and METL.
z Use the CP-to-task matrix to identify those collective tasks that are critical for wartime
accomplishment. These tasks become the staff METL.
z Sequence the METL tasks as they are expected to occur during the execution of the wartime
mission or CP operations.
z Back-brief the CG and obtain approval of division staff METL.
z Provide the approved METL to the staff.
CP and Cell METL Development Sequence

I-13. Upon approval of the staff METL, the sequence for METL development described above is repeated
using the same process from higher to lower for each of the division command posts and subordinate cells.
The COS initiates the process by providing his guidance and the approved staff METL to the CP OICs
(Main and/or Tactical). The CP OICs provide their guidance and CP METL to the cell leaders to develop
their METL. Cell leaders in turn provide their METL and guidance to the Element leaders who begin the
bottom up approach by identifying critical tasks or battle tasks that support the higher echelons METL. A
generic checklist for CP and cell METL development follows:
z The higher echelon CP/cell initiates the process for subordinates by providing guidance, which
includes the division wartime mission and METL, along with the approved staff/CP METL, to
the subordinate Elements.
z CP/cell staffs, led by the OIC, review the higher echelon's METL in conjunction with the
division mission and METL.
z CP/cell staffs review the operational environment and other external guidance to identify other
staff tasks.
z CP/cell staffs use the CP-to-collective task matrix as a starting point to identify the collective
tasks that are critical in assisting the commander with C2 during operations.
z CP/cell staffs sequence METL tasks as they are expected to unfold during the operation.
z CP/cells back-brief their higher echelon to obtain approval of their METL. Each higher echelon
selects specific tasks from their subordinate echelon's METL as their staff battle tasks.
A staff battle task, like a unit's, is a subordinate's mission essential task that is so critical that
its accomplishment determines the success of the next higher echelon's mission essential
task. Staff battle tasks are selected at the Element level. Similar CPs (TAC 1/TAC 2) may
have different staff battle tasks selected, depending on their unique responsibilities and
functions. Staff battle tasks allow the COS and subordinate staff leaders to define the
training tasks that integrate warfighting functions and receive the highest priority for
resources, such as training areas, facilities (to include virtual and constructive simulations),
materiel and funds.

Appendix I
Elements identify critical tasks that support the cell's METL. Likewise, the cell develops a
METL that supports the CP METL. Figure I-3 describes the process using a TAC CP.
Although a TAC CP is used as an example, the process used to develop the METL and
associated battle tasks and to identify both critical leader and individual tasks is the same for
all command posts.
z CP/cell OICs provide the approved METL to their CP/cell. Upon approval the CP/cell METLs
are normally modified only if changes occur in the division’s mission and/or staff METL.
Figure I-3. Developing a METL that supports the CP
Division as JTF
I-14. The division, when designated a JTF, will be required to develop a Staff Joint Mission Essential
Task List (JMETL). The JMETL is the joint force commander's list of priority joint tasks, derived from
plans and orders, along with associated conditions and measurable standards, and constitutes the joint force
commander's warfighting requirements. Procedures for JMETL development are found in the JMETL
Handbook (see web site: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/JMETLbook.pdf).
Establish Training Objectives

I-15. Once the METL is approved, the COS, assisted by the CP and cell leaders, establishes training
objectives for the entire staff. Training objectives include the conditions and standards that describe the
situation or environment and ultimate end state criteria that the staff must meet to successfully perform

each task. Training objectives and standards for the METL can be obtained from approved T&EOs, Soldier
Training Publications (STP); higher headquarters command guidance, and local SOPs. It is important that
every task have a condition, standard and performance steps so that all training can be evaluated and
measured against a benchmark.
COS Training Assessment

I-16. The COS sets specific training goals for the staff. These goals are based on guidance from the
division commander, the COS's vision, and guidance provided in appropriate doctrinal manuals. The COS's
initial METL assessment serves as the starting point for developing the staff training strategy. The training
assessment is the COS's comparison of the staff's current proficiency, to include the proficiency of
individual staff officers, CPs, cells and elements, with the proficiency required to support the commander
with C2 during Full Spectrum Operations. However, to be most effective, an ongoing evaluation process
must be implemented to ensure that the staff remains focused on preparation for its role in assisting the
commander with C2. The COS and his primary staff officers, along with their SGMs/NCOICs, assess the
organization's current proficiency on mission-essential tasks against the required standard. The COS
indicates the current proficiency by rating each task as “T” (Trained), “P” (Needs Practice), or “U”
(Untrained). The outcome of the training assessment identifies the staff’s training requirements. The METL
assessment compares current levels of training with the Army standard and is used to update staff goals and
objectives.
Staff Training Assessment
x Made by the Chief of Staff
x Compares current level of training with the Army/Joint

standards
x Is the cornerstone of the long-range planning process
x Based on first hand observations and input from all

leaders
x Is a continuous process
x Used to set or update staff goals and objectives
x Influenced by future events
Figure I-4. METL assessment process
I-17. Figure I-4 summarizes the METL assessment process. Table I-2 depicts a sample COS training
assessment for a division staff, and compares the overall rating to CP and cell's ratings. Suggestions for
conducting the COS's training assessment are listed below:
z Review all formal and informal (internal/external) evaluations such as Battle Command Training
Program (BCTP) after action reports, higher headquarters Command Inspection Program (CIP)
results, and simulations training feedback. Pay particular attention to recurring deficiencies.
z Review past Quarterly Training Briefings (QTBs).
z Review all equipment availability and readiness reports like past Unit Status Reports (USR) for
readiness information and to detect deficiencies.

Appendix I
z Discuss staff training and performance with the division DCGs, division CSM, CP OICs and
cell leaders.
z Review the personnel status report for critical personnel shortages. Note personnel turnover
trends. Pay particular attention to low-density military occupational specialty (MOS) turnover.
z Participate in staff training exercises.
z Determine operator proficiency on newly fielded equipment; i.e. automation systems, ABCS 6.4
systems and updates, and new computer software.
z Consult with the DCGs to gain their perceptions of staff training status.
TAC CP 1
TAC CP 2
MAIN CP
OVERALL
M IS S IO N
ESSENTIAL
TASKS
Develop/Update/Maintain COP T T T T
Prepare/Update/Maintain Staff Estimates P P T P
Prepare/Make Recommendations P T T P
Plan Operations using MDMP P T T P
Assess Execution of Operations T T T T
Provide C4I P P T P
Define the Battlefield Environment P P T P
Table I-2. COS training assessment for a division staff
Establish Training Priorities

I-18. The COS establishes training priorities for staff training METL tasks after completing the training
assessment. The priorities established are based on the COS's assessment, the criticality of each task, and
the training emphasis the task should receive.
Develop Division Staff Training Strategy and COS Staff Training Guidance
I-19. The training strategy developed and executed by the staff to train to standard in its critical wartime
missions is a component of the Army's Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) which is discussed
below. It is developed based on the staff METL, training assessment and training priorities established by
the COS. Through the training strategy, the COS establishes training goals, describes training objectives,
and most importantly, determines the staff's training priorities. The staff training strategy articulates the
COS's staff training guidance which includes the commander's training guidance and vision. The
commander/COS determines staff training goals by:

z Reviewing higher commander's training goals.

z Spelling out in tangible terms what the staff will do to comply with training goals.
z Listing in broad terms the training goals for the staff. Figure I-5 provides a sample of the staff
training guidance (STG) with training goals, objectives, and priorities.
Staff Training Guidance (STG)

• T RAINING G O ALS:
- A ll staff proficient in pe rfo rm ing ME TL tasks
- Refine battle staff p roficiencies and CP b attle tracking p roce dures
- Get staff read y to cond uct a w ell plann ed a nd p recisely e xecuted
CP X du ring 3d q uarter.
• :
T RAINING OBJECT IVES
- New ly assign ed soldie rs/lead ers con fident on S OPs/ TTPs
- New ly assign ed o perato rs incorpo rate d into the A BCS netw o rk
- A ll staff sections capable of con ducting M DM P
- S taff p repa re d fo r upc om ing BC TP
• T RAINING PRIORIT IES

:
- In divid ual op erato r proficiency sustainm ent
- M ission collective training
- S taff s kills
- S taff battle tracking procedu res
- CB R N training
Figure I-5. Sample staff training guidance
I-20. To develop the division staff training strategy, the COS must rely on input from subordinate staff
leaders (CP, cell, element leaders and their SGMs/NCOICs). Their input is crucial to identifying the
individual, leader and digital training requirements; the functional and supporting collective tasks; training
audience; the type training events that best accomplish the training and meet training objectives; and
finally, the estimated resources (facilities, terrain requirements and/or simulations) required to conduct the
training events to standard. The end result is a preliminary training strategy which includes an estimation
and tentative scheduling of resources, a general understanding of the various training requirements and key
events. Training for the staff should be scheduled so that it occurs in a progressive and sequential manner
using the Army's crawl-walk-run approach as depicted in Figure I-6.
I-21. As the figure depicts, training during the "crawl" phase focuses on achieving individual, section, CP
element, and cell task proficiency before progressing to staff group and full staff training. Examples would
include: individual specific competencies and digital systems operator training. In the "walk" phase, staff
training and drills focus on critical intra-CP element staff control processes and coordination. During the
"run" phase of training, staff training is multi-echelon involving the full staff, inter-CP, and cell and
element coordination. Training focuses on critical command-oriented staff processes, such as MDMP and
IPB, which directly affect full staff proficiency.

Appendix I
Training for the staff should be

scheduled so that it occurs in a Capstone Trained
progressive and sequential Capstone Trained
CPX
CPX Battle
manner using the Army's crawl- Battle
walk-run approach
in in g Staff
Staff
ff Tra Run
S ta
Simulation Supported
Crawl Walk Run
n
i v is io Walk CP/Battle Staff Training
D Crawl Walk Run • The MDMP
• TAC CP SOP Procedure
• MAIN CP SOP Procedures
Crawl Element Training
• Functional Staff Estimate • Cell/Element Integration
Crawl Walk Run • Practical Application • Control the Battle
• Cell/Element SOP • Conduct the Battle
Individual Training • ABCS Integration Training • Inter-CP Coordination
• Problem Solving • Displaying COP • Command Post Set-up
• How-to-Brief • Functional Input to MDMP
• Computer User Training • Intra-Element Coordination Full Battle Staff Training
• ABCS Operator Training • UEx Staff SOP Training
• The Staff Estimate • Cell/Element Set-up Multi-echelon Staff Training
• Battle CPT/Iron MAJ
• Orientation Cell Training
• Cell/Element SOP Staff Drills Training
Functional CP Training
Element/Team Training
Individual Development
Figure I-6. Division staff training—crawl, walk, run
The Combined Arms Training Strategy Program
I-22. The Combined Army Training Strategy (CATS) is the Army's overarching strategy for current and
future training of the force. CATS is the result of a multi-year effort sponsored by the office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Training and Operations, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). CATS
establish units, Soldier, and leader training requirements and describes how the Army will train and sustain
the Army to standard in the institution, units, and through self-development. The CATS also identifies and
quantifies the training resources required to execute training. Unit and function CATS are being developed
for all Army units. The strategies contained in CATS will complement and support FM 7-1. CATS will
provide commanders and trainers with a baseline for planning, programming and executing unit collective
training. The purpose of CATS is to assist commanders in developing unit training plans based on the
assessment of the METL by—
z Establishing (unit/staff collective) training requirements.
z Determining who (staff/unit/individuals) should be trained, when (frequency), where (site), how
(method/media) the training should be conducted, and the collective tasks and critical individual
tasks that should be trained.
z Identifying resources required for training and assist in their acquisition.
z Ensuring unit/staff and individual training proficiency needed to accomplish unit wartime
mission, unit/staff METL across Full Spectrum Operations.
z Guiding and controlling training development.
z Controlling what training products are produced and maintained.

I-23. C2 CATS will provide specific training strategies developed to assist staffs in attaining and
sustaining a desired level of collective proficiency in mission essential tasks. These strategies are based on
mission and critical collective task analysis data and evaluation feedback. Staff CATS will be developed
using "objective" TO&E data and the most current collective tasks provided by proponents.
Main Command Post

Quarterly Training Event
Task : MDMP
Goal: “P” to “T”
Run MAIN MAIN MAIN MAIN MAIN
Crawl Crawl Run Run AAR

Elem Elem
Dec Cells
Walk
Nov Elem Elem Elem
Cells
Crawl
Oct Elem Elem Elem
Cells
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4
Figure I-7. Example of training options
I-24. Once the training strategy is established, subordinate CP, cell and element leaders, and their
SGMs/NCOICs conduct the detailed planning necessary to implement the strategy and convert it to a plan
using the long range, short range and near-term planning calendars. Figure I-7 provides an example of
possible options available to the COS to train the staff and various command posts of the division during a
quarter.
I-25. As noted in the example, the staff would apply the crawl-walk-run methodology throughout the
quarter with the last week of the month consisting of a multi-echeloned training event involving the full
staff and inter-CP, cell and element coordination as well as coordination among two or more command
echelons to include interaction with higher, subordinate and adjacent units staffs (if available). During the
first three weeks of October during the "crawl" phase of training the Elements within each element would
focus on the MDMP concentrating on the individual and team responsibilities, steps or aspects of the
process peculiar to their warfighting function during the fourth week in October, training on the MDMP
would be consolidated at the cell level using a vignette to combine the responsibilities and planning efforts
of the various cells and elements, generating intra-element coordination. In November training would
continue to focus on MDMP with both the elements and cells progressing to the "walk" phase of training.
The elements would continue intra-element coordination and training would progress during the last week
with intra-cell coordination and CP functional training. In December, the elements and cells train on the
MDMP at the "Run" level with emphasis on inter-CP coordination. Training culminates the last week of
December with full staff integration and coordination across all the CPs, cells and elements in a division
command post exercise (CPX) conducted using the crawl-walk-run methodology.

Appendix I
Staff Green-Red Cycle

Green Cycle/Day Activities
- Staff training focus is primarily on collective tasks with individual and leader tasks integrated during multi-echelon
training.
- Maximum staff attendance at prime time, mission essential training
- Staff administrative and support (day-to-day) requirements that keep the staff from participating in training is
eliminated to the maximum extent possible.
-Leaves and passes are limited to the maximum extent possible
CP Echelon Dedicated Green Training Days

Main CP 1st Tuesday of each quarter
TAC 1 & 2 1st Thursday of each quarter
Main CP Cells 1st Tuesday of every month
Main CP Elements 2nd. 3rd, 4th Tuesdays of every month
TAC CP Cells 1st Thursday of every month
TAC CP Elements 2nd. 3rd, 4th Thursday of every month
Red Cycle/Day Activities
- Majority of the time is dedicated to day-to-day staff responsibilities and supporting subordinate units requirements.
- Element and individual training emphasized
- Conduct STB required training
- Provides time for individuals to attend education and training courses or leave and passes.
Table I-3. Use of red-green cycle to minimize training distractors
Time Management
I-26. Time management is a unique challenge for staff training because the staff must constantly wrestle
with balancing day-to-day staff responsibilities with its own training. The key to time management is
identifying and then locking in prime-time training periods. FM 7-1 outlines various time management
systems that are also applicable to staff training. When the commander and the COS are involved in time
management, staff training is greatly enhanced. The level of involvement in time management may vary,
but the ultimate goal should be to protect staff training by minimizing training distracters, especially during
scheduled staff training. Whatever time management system the staff adopts, it should identify, focus, and
fence prime-time training periods so the staff can concentrate on mission essential tasks. Only with the
commander’s and COS’s support and enforcement, can any staff time management cycle succeed. Table I-
3 uses the Red-Green Cycle, described in FM 7-1 with modifications, to show how the staff might use this
time management cycle to minimize training distracters.
I-27. The Green-Red Cycle Activities listed in Table I-3 also suggest the types of activities/training the
staff would conduct during a particular cycle/day. During the Green cycle/day, staff training focuses on
collective staff training at the element, cell or CP level. During the Red Cycle/Day, the staff’s primary

focus is on day-to-day staff responsibilities and support to subordinate units. Some limited individual
training or Element training may occur during the Red Cycle/Day.
LONG-RANGE PLANNING
STAFF TRAINING GUIDANCE
I-28. Staff training guidance for the staff is published by the COS based on the division commander's
Command Training Guidance (CTG). The STG documents the division’s long-range training plan and is
the training analog of the organization’s war plan. It must be read and understood by every staff officer and
NCO, because it is used as a ready reference to plan, execute, and assess training throughout the long-
range planning period.
STAFF LONG-RANGE PLANNING CALENDAR

I-29. Long-range planning is the process of integrating the staff’s training strategy into the division long-
range training calendar. This process is intended to limit distractions and conflicts by formalizing staff
training. An indirect goal is to balance day-to-day responsibilities with planned staff training. It helps to
ensure that time is allocated for staff training and that all staff members participate during prime time
training cycles/days. Additionally, it synchronizes element, cell and CP training events. The tools used to
develop a long-range training plan include: the division CTG, the COS STG, the staff training strategy, and
the division long-range training calendar (18-24 months out). Below are basic points to address when
developing the staff long-range planning calendar.
Required Training Events That Must Be On The Calendar

I-30. Evaluate the training strategy and determine what areas the staff can train on during training events
or other requirements directed by the division commander or higher headquarters. These events can
provide excellent training opportunities.
Other Non-Collective Training Requirements
I-31. Identify major activities such as division directed inspections, STB Soldier-required training,
schools, new equipment fielding, or community and installation support events that are habitual staff
responsibilities.
Time Management
I-32. Identify prime time training cycles/days by using one of the training management cycles systems
referred to in FM 7-1, and/or devised by the division. Focus resources and training exercise planning to
take advantage of prime time training. Account for holiday periods.
Training Cycle Management
I-33. Insulate staffs from training distracters during prime time training cycles/days. By keeping
subordinate units and higher headquarters abreast of the staff’s prime time training periods, commanders
help reduce the number of outside distractions. However, the staff must remain aware that support to
subordinate units often mandates some level of continuous support even during prime time training
periods.
Integrate Staff Exercises and Other Training
I-34. Schedule events that will improve or sustain staff METL proficiency in conjunction with the
commander's and higher headquarters directed training requirements.

Appendix I
Army Battle Command Systems
I-35. Consider ABCS and factors that impact it when developing the long-range training plan for the staff.
The division command posts are, in effect, information centers that manage massive amounts of data to
assist the commander in developing a common operational picture (COP). ABCS is the current automation
tool to facilitate this. The nature of ABCS is a dynamic one. As new systems are fielded, others are being
updated and upgraded in their hardware and software configurations. This requires system users to remain
proficient in the most updated versions of these systems. Information managers must ensure systems are
current and systems users are properly trained, to prevent training distraction while maintaining peak
efficiency. Integrating ABCS systems into garrison operations will assist the staff in maintaining system
proficiency. With its integrated automated planning tools, it can serve as the internal means to
collaboratively develop OPLANs and OPORDs while in garrison. In essence, it reinforces staff/individual
training on a daily basis.
Constructive Simulations
I-36. Consider and plan use of constructive simulations for staff training during command post exercises
(CPXs). Simulations provide a low-cost, low-overhead exercise driver for the division staff. Using
simulations is increasingly important, in order to add rigor to a staff-level exercise battlefield effects, which
cannot be reproduced unless troops and units are moved to the field and exercised in mass. Coordination
with the home station battle simulation center and Battle Command Training Center (BCTC) will ensure
availability of appropriate simulation and digital systems/resources, including trained instructors, proper
training of workstation personnel, and accurate entry of exercise data.
Future Combat Systems Training
I-37. The FCS family of systems (FoS) will have an embedded capability that is designed to support
individual and collective C2 training. Embedded training supports a full range of tasks, individual, element,
cell, and CP, all with a capability to support Live-Virtual-Constructive (L-V-C) training environments.
Staff leaders will have the capability to train their elements/cells/CPs on tasks that previously required
major exercises to accomplish. This capability will greatly reduce the heavy simulation and signal support
required for current staff training events.
I-38. Every staff element or cell will have embedded training management tools and links to these services
via the Army Unit Training Management System (UTMS) and the Army Learning Management System
(LMS) to facilitate training management in any training domain. Within these products the leader can use
Training Support Packages (TSPs) with scenarios and T&EOs to build training proficiencies and
competencies. FCS embedded training is a tool to support training management, it will not replace it.
I-39. Modularity with its concepts of “plug and play” requires that all battle staffs be trained to a common
standard. The employment of digital C2 systems such as FCS FoS will greatly support this requirement.
Additionally, applying and enforcing the principles of training found in FM’s 7-0 and 7-1 will give
commanders the training management tools to train and sustain a ready battle staff.
I-40. Joint capability will be a part of the FCS FoS for joint force C2, which must be supported by
automated data processing (ADP) systems. Modularity again, by its nature demands that Joint doctrine and
Joint systems be integrated into battle staff training.
STAFF SHORT-RANGE PLANNING

I-41. The staff's short-range training plan defines in greater detail the broad guidance on training events
and other activities contained in the long-range training guidance, and on the long-range calendar. It

requires the CPs to look out from 3 to 6 months. The CP OICs must publish the short-range training
guidance with sufficient lead-time to ensure that the cell and element leaders have time to develop their
own short-range training plans. It begins with a review of the COS’s training assessment and the division
Quarterly Training Guidance (QTG), and results in the quarterly training calendar and Quarterly Training
Briefing (QTB) to the COS/Commander. The short-range plan is prepared using the following steps:
Review the Training Program

I-42. The COS reviews the training program described in the long-range planning process to determine
whether assessments made during long-range planning are still valid. The COS reviews—
z QTG. Each command post (Main and TAC) publishes short-range (quarterly) training guidance.
The CP's QTG enables the COS and Element leaders to prioritize and refine mission essential
training guidance contained in the staff's long-range STG. The CP OICs publish their QTG after
receiving training guidance from the COS, usually about 90 days prior to the start of each
quarter. Important aspect of the QTG development process are the roles of the Element leaders,
SGMs/NCOICs and the Special Troops Battalion (STB) commander. Together they help
identify the individual and element training tasks that must be integrated into the collective
mission training during the short-range planning period.
z Training Goals and Priorities. Determines whether goals are still valid. Established priorities
must support these goals. To update priorities during the short-range planning process, the
commander uses the same process used in establishing priorities during the long-range planning
process.
z Long-Range Planning Calendars of the Staff. Note entries that affect short-range planning.
Changes to the long-range planning calendar may affect the staff's ability to accomplish its
training program.
z Previous Short-Range Planning Calendars. Identify training accomplished, training pre-
empted, and lessons learned.
Review Current Staff Proficiency

I-43. This review is performed to update priorities. The COS's training assessment is re-looked to provide
a snapshot of the staff’s current Soldier, leader, and collective task proficiency. Individual and Element
training sustainment must be included in the plan.
Review Resources
I-44. This review is performed to determine if required resources are available to execute the program
described on the long-range planning calendar.
Review the Training Environment

I-45. This second review of the training environment takes on added importance as training events and
activities approach. Factors that affect the training environment and that impact collectively on the training
program are:
z Personnel assigned.
z Personnel turbulence.
z Taskings.
z Morale.
z Education programs.
z Mandatory training (higher headquarters and STB).
z Visits, inspections, and tests.

Appendix I
z Day-to-day staff activities/requirements and support to subordinate units.

z Short and long-term taskings (for example, funeral detail).
Develop a Detailed Plan of Action

I-46. Develop a detailed plan for the duration of the short-range plan. The detailed plan of action is
prepared as described below.
z Validate the Need for Scheduled Training. The training events identified on the long-range
training plan are examined to determine validity.
z Transfer Valid Training to a Quarterly Training Calendar.
z Determine Desired Outcomes for Scheduled Training. The COS determines what the staff is
expected to accomplish during training and then backward plans to achieve the desired outcome.
z Analyze Supporting Missions to Determine the Related Individual, Leader, and Collective
Tasks. The success of collective training is a function of the training achievement of staff
elements, cells, CPs and individuals.
z Select Specific Training Objectives for Missions and Tasks to be Trained. The division staff
T&EOs provide the COS with conditions, standards, task steps, and performance measures for
the collective tasks that support the staff's training.
z Prepare a Quarterly Training Calendar. When preparing the quarterly training calendar the
COS reviews the division CTG and the division annual training calendar. The COS refines and
expands the annual calendar as appropriate and identifies, allocates, and coordinates short lead-
time resources such as local training facilities. The COS pays particular attention to BCTP
lessons learned from Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) prior to developing training
objectives and tasks. Time is allocated for ABCS network installation and other critical training
resources. The COS cross-references each event with specific training objectives and
coordinates with the STB Commander, cell leaders, and their SGMs/NCOICs and the CSM.
z Review Short-Range Plans with the Division Commander.
z Issue Guidance Specifically Addressing How Training Will Be Accomplished. The COS
may pass guidance to the staff in many ways, including:
Memorandums of instruction.
Training meetings.
Staff calls.
Published staff notes.
Quarterly training guidance.
NEAR-TERM DIVISION STAFF PLANNING

I-47. The staff's near-term planning focuses on scheduling and executing the training specified in the
short-range training plan. It provides specifics to the trainers and produces detailed training schedules. It
covers a 6 to 8 week period before training.

Training Meetings
Cell/
Element/Platoon Company CP/Battalion UEx Staff/Brigade
Weekly Weekly Bi-Weekly Monthly Applying
ISR the
Plans MAIN CP METL Development Methodology
Current OPs G5 Training Guidance
Training Meetings
Coord/Special
Training Schedules
Example Assess Training
ISR
PM Element
CBRN Ops FAPP
Element Protection TAC CP 1 STB/G3/G5/COS
AMD Element G3 COS/Division Cdr
Sustainment
ENG Ops C4
Element
ISR
Assessment
FAPP
Protection TAC CP 2 Assessment
Sustainment Dep G3
C4 Training Planning Process
Training Training Commander's Training Training
METL Assessment Guidance Plans
Strategy Execution
Food Svc
Maint
HHC
Support
STB
1 Plt Feedback
BN Cdr
2 Plt
3 Plt Signal Co
Support Training Planning Process
Figure I-8. Training meeting attendees at CPs
TRAINING MEETINGS
I-48. Training meetings are the key to near term planning. They must be conducted on a regularly
scheduled basis by the staff at all levels throughout the various command posts. Figure I-8 suggests who
should attend meetings at the various CPs by comparing it to platoon/company and battalion-level training
meetings. The example suggests that subordinate Element leaders would hold informal weekly training
meetings similar to those held at platoon level to discuss individual, team, section and Element level
training issues. Cells would conduct weekly training meetings but they would be more formal by following
a set agenda similar to those held at company level training meetings.
I-49. All CPs would hold formal bi-weekly training meetings facilitated by the OIC, and chaired by the
senior officer for the respective CP (for example, the G-3 would facilitate and one of the DCGs would
chair the training meeting for the TAC 1 CP).
I-50. Figure I-9 depicts the cell attendees present at a TAC CP training meeting. Note that it is suggested
that Special Troops Battalion (STB) representatives be present during CP training meetings.
I-51. 1-52. Finally, the division staff would conduct formal monthly training meetings chaired by the COS
and facilitated by the G-3. Figure I-10 suggests what a training meeting at this level might look like. As
FM 7-1 states, training meetings are non-negotiable; they force leaders to be personally involved and
participate in the preparation, conduct, and evaluation of all training. Note again that the STB is
represented, as well as the representatives from the Installation Management Agency (IMA).

Appendix I
Training Meetings TAC CP 1

Applying the FM 7-1 Methodology
FAPP FAPP ISR ISR

Prot
RECOMMENDED TIME LINE

SGM NCO OIC
ACTION TIME
NCO
Prot
Assessment of Completed Training 15 Minutes

TAC CP Cells
Preparation for Near
-Term Training 30 Minutes
G3
15 Minutes
Sust
Planning for Short

-Range Training
Time Requirements FM 7-1

C4
SGM
ASSESSMENT OF COMPLETED TRAINING

G3
Rep
IMA
* ELEMENT ASSESSMENT
* Collective, Leader, and Soldier Training
* “Go and No Go” Snapshot
NBC
STB Support * TRAINING SHORTFALLS

* Training Planned but not Conducted
Select Reps * Reason for not Executing
* Retraining Plan
* METL UPDATE
Food Supply Maint Commo * Training Assessment Work Sheet
* Element Input
* Personal Observation
Completed Training
Figure I-9. Cell attendees for a TAC CP training meeting

Training Meetings CPs/STB

Applying the FM 7-1 Methodology
CDR/1SG
G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9
HHC
TAC CPs MAIN CP
CSM
STB
B-1. …..training meetings are key to near-term
COS
planning and are non-negotiable. ….Training
CDR
STB
meetings create the bottom-up flow of information
regarding specific training proficiency needs of the
unit and individual soldiers. (FM 7-1)
SIGNAL
Co Cdr
SGS
IMA
PM IG CHAP SURG SJA CHEMO SOO AMD
Note: The STB weekly training meeting synchronizes support for the CPs
and Cells with supporting units.
Figure I-10. Example of a division staff monthly training meeting
TRAINING SCHEDULES
I-52. The training schedule is the primary leadership tool to ensure that training is conducted as scheduled,
by qualified trainers, and involves the entire staff. Draft training schedules must be initiated and distributed
at least 6 to 8 weeks out to ensure that resources are coordinated, external support is requested, and the
staff is aware of the training periods/times. Once approved and signed, the training schedule constitutes an
official order. Training schedules can be living documents but the COS should approve all changes. The
COS ensures that they are up-to-date and posted where the division staff can access them. Training
schedules ensure that information is disseminated to include who is to be at the scheduled training, when
the training will be conducted, where the training will take place, and what the staff will train on. As stated
above the staffs training schedule should be forwarded to higher headquarters and subordinate units. The
intent is to limit the number of external disruptions by highlighting division staff prime time training
events.
SUMMARY
I-53. The ideas, considerations and suggestions proposed in this appendix are neither revolutionary nor
evolutionary, but rather are firmly grounded in our current training doctrine as outlined in FM 7-1. Army
transformation, the high OPTEMPO, and the realities of the current COE, have, and will continue to shape
all aspects of the Army from doctrine, to restructuring formation, to operating as part of a joint force. The
residual effects of transformation are numerous, yet they deserve the same degree of attention as the
obvious changes. This appendix focuses on one such area: training the division staff. The leadership of

Appendix I
these newly created headquarters can greatly enhance the readiness of their staffs by enforcing and
applying the principles of training as espoused in our existing training doctrine.
I-54. The Commander, COS, and the primary staff leaders must strive to build and sustain individual and
collective task proficiency throughout the headquarters. The suggestions recommended throughout this
appendix attempt to address the “how” to train the staff.
I-55. The appendix also suggests that the staff should “train as they fight” by organizing in garrison as
they are organized during deployments. This could yield numerous benefits as Soldiers and leaders will be
intimately familiar with the sections, elements, and cells in which they will operate in during Full Spectrum
Operations. Team building will be maximized. During garrison the staff should strive to use the same C2
systems, and procedures that are used in the field/deployments.
I-56. The future portends no lack of threats to the United States and our way of life. Commanders and
leaders at every level have an obligation to ensure that not only are their Soldiers and units trained but that
their headquarters are also trained and prepared to the highest degree possible for any contingency. Short
notice deployments and ambiguous conditions will be the norm rather than the exception. Previous
methods of training the staff may have been adequate during the “Cold War” but will not suffice in today’s
ever changing environment. Leaders must ensure that the processes already embedded in current doctrine
are formally applied to the staff to guarantee its success in future operations.
I-57. Direct questions or comments to the Operations Officer, Battle Command and Training Integration
Division (BCTID), Collective Training Division (CTD) Combined Arms Center -Training (CAC-T) at
web-CTD@ leavenworth.army.mil or DSN 684-7469 or COMM (913) 684-7469.

SEQ
T&EO # UEx Staff Collective Task
#
1 20-7-1010 Perform Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
Coordinate Intelligence, Surveillance, and
2 20-7-1020
Reconnaissance (ISR) Effort
3 20-7-1030 Coordinate Intelligence Support to Targeting
Plan Tactical Actions Associated with Force Projection
4 20-7-2040
and Deployment
20-7-2041 Coordinate Tactical Deployment/Redeployment Activities
20-7-2042 Plan Predeployment Activities
Plan Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
20-7-2043
Activities (RSO&I)
5 20-7-2050 Control Tactical Maneuver
6 20-7-2060 Coordinate Mobility Operations
Plan Fires to Influence the Will, and Destroy, Neutralize,
7 20-7-3070
or Suppress Enemy Forces
Plan Non-lethal Fire Support - Offensive Information
20-7-3071
Operations
Plan Against Air and Missile Attack and Aerial
8 20-7-4080
Surveillance
9 20-7-4090 Plan Security Operations
10 20-7-4100 Coordinate Defensive Information Operations
11 20-7-5110 Coordinate Distribution of Classes of Supply
12 20-7-5120 Plan Transportation Support
20-7-5121 Coordinate Movement Control
13 20-7-5130 Plan Sustainment Support
14 20-7-5140 Coordinate Contracting Support
15 20-7-5150 Plan Civil-Military Operations
Coordinate Interface/Liaison Between US Military Forces and
20-7-5151
Local Authorities/NGOs
Coordinate Negotiations with and Between Other
20-7-5152
Governmental and NGOs

Appendix I
16 20-7-6160 Establish Command Post Operations

17 20-7-6170 Manage Tactical Information
20-7-6171 Collect Friendly Force Information Requirements
Process Relevant Information to Create a Common Operational
20-7-6172
Picture
Display a Common Operational Picture (COP) Tailored to Unit
20-7-6173
Needs
Disseminate Common Operational Picture and Execution
20-7-6174 Information to Higher, Lower, Adjacent, Supported, and Supporting
Organizations
18 20-7-6180 Assess Tactical Situation and Operations
20-7-6181 Monitor Situation or Progress of Operations
20-7-6182 Evaluate Situation or Operation
20-7-6183 Develop Staff Estimates
20-7-6184 Evaluate Combat Assessment
20-7-6185 Conduct Battle Damage Assessment
Plan Operations Using the Military Decision Making
19 20-7-6190
Process/Troop Leading Procedures
20-7-6191 Conduct the Military Decision Making Process
20-7-6192 Integrate Requirements and Capabilities
Develop Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
20-7-6193
Recommendations
20-7-6194 Establish Target Priorities
20-7-6195 Provide Operational Law Support
20-7-6196 Coordinate Space-Based Capabilities and Products
20 20-7-6200 Prepare for Tactical Operations
20-7-6201 Establish and Conduct Coordination and Liaison
20-7-6202 Conduct Rehearsals
20-7-6203 Task Organize/Organize for Operations
20-7-6204 Revise & Refine the Plan
20-7-6205 Integrate New Units/Soldiers into Force
21 20-7-6210 Control Tactical Operations
20-7-6211 Manage CS/CSS Force Positioning
20-7-6212 Manage Use and Assignment of Terrain
20-7-6213 Maintain Synchronization
20-7-6214 Control Tactical Airspace

20-7-6215 Plan Actions, Sequels, and Branches

Make Adjustments to Resources, Concept of Operations, or
20-7-6216
Mission
Coordinate Actions to Produce Maximum Effective Application of
20-7-6217
Military Power
22 20-7-6220 Monitor Continuous Operations
20-7-6221 Maintain Continuity of Command and Control
23 20-7-6230 Plan Public Affairs Operations
20-7-6231 Develop Information Strategies
20-7-6232 Facilitate Media Operations
20-7-6233 Implement Higher Headquarters Public Affairs Themes

(BLANK PAGE)
Glossary
A2C2 Army airspace command and control
AAGS Army air-ground system
ACA airspace control authority
ACE analysis and control element
ACM airspace control measures
ACP airspace control plan
ACO airspace control order
ACOS acting chief of staff
ACT analysis and control team
AD air defense
ADAM air defense airspace management
ADC assistant division commander
ADCA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ADE air defense element
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
AFSB Army Field Support Brigade
AIC airspace information center
ALO air liaison officer
AMD Air and Missile Defense
AMDPCS Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System
AO area of operations
AR Army
ARFOR The senior Army headquarters and all Army forces assigned or
attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force
command, joint functional command, or multinational
command. See also joint force land component commander
(FM 3-0).
ARSOF Army special operations forces
ARSTRAT Army Strategic Command
ASMC area support medical company
AT antiterrorism
ATM advanced trauma management
2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) Glossary-1

FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) ____________________________________________________________________
ATO air tasking order

ATS air traffic services
ASAS All Source Analysis System
ASOS Air Support Operation Squadron
ATO air tasking order
AUTL Army Universal Task List
AXP ambulance exchange point
BAE brigade aviation element
BAS battalion aid station
BCOTM battle command on the move
BCS3 battle command and sustainment support system
BCT brigade combat team
BFSB battlefield surveillance brigade
BFT Blue Force Tracker
BLOS beyond line of sight
BOS battlefield operating systems
BSA brigade support area
BSB brigade support battalion
BSMC brigade support medical company
BSS BCT surgeon’s section
C2 command and control
C4 command, control, communications, computers
C4IM command, control, communications, computers, and information
management
CA civil affairs
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield
explosives
CCIR commander's critical information requirements
CD counterdrug
CGS common ground station
CI counterintelligence
CIMP Command Information Management Plan
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
Glossary-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

___________________________________________________________________ Glossary (DRAG Edition)
CMO civil-military operation

CMOC civil-military operation center
COA course of action
COG center of gravity
COMMZ communications zone
COMSEC communications security
CONPLAN concept plan
CONUS continental United States
COP common operational picture
COS Chief of Staff
CP command post
CPOF command post of the future
CR community relations
CRO combat replenishment operations
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
CSSB combat sustainment support battalion
CSSCS Combat Service Support Control System
CT counterterrorism
CTIL commander’s tracked items list
DA Department of the Army
DAC Department of the Army civilian
DBL distribution based logistics
DC dislocated civilian
DCG-A Distributed Common Ground
DCGS-A Distributed Common Ground Station
DCP deployable command post
DMC distribution management center
DNBI disease and nonbattle injury
DOD Department of Defense
DOS Department of State
DSO deception staff officer
DSP Defense Support Program
DTES Distributed Tactical Exploitation System (see TENCAP)

FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) ____________________________________________________________________
DTSS Digital Topographic Support System

EA electronic attack
EAD echelons above division
EECP early entry command post
ENCOORD engineer coordinator
EMT emergency medical treatment
EOD explosive ordinance disposal
EPW enemy prisoner of war
ESP expeditionary support packages(ing)
FAIO field artillery intelligence officer
FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below
FES forced entry switch
FFIR friendly force information requirements
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP force health protection
FID foreign internal defense
FLO fighter liaison officer
FM field manual
FMT field maintenance team
FRAGO fragmentary order
FSC forward support company
FSCM fire support coordinating measure
FSCOORD fire support coordinator
FSMP forward support medical platoon
G1 Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel
G2 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
G3 Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans
G4 Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics
G5 Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans
G6 Assistant Chief of Staff, Command, Control, Communications,
and Computer Operations
G7 Assistant Chief of Staff, Information Operations
G8 Assistant Chief of Staff, Financial Management
G9 Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil-Military Operations

GCCS-A Global Command and Control System-Army

GI&S geospatial information and services
GIG Global Information Grid
GPS global positioning system
HA holding area
HCA humanitarian and civic assistance
HCLOS high capacity line of sight
HEMTT-LHS heavy expanded mobility tactical truck – load handling system
HIDACZ high density airspace control zone
HMMWV high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HN host nation
HPT high-payoff target
HR human resources
HUMINT human intelligence
HVT high-value target
IA information assurance
IED improvised explosive device
IG inspector general
ILAR integrated logistics aerial resupply
IM information management
IMETS Integrated Meteorological System
IMINT imagery intelligence
INFOSYS information system
IO information operations
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IR information requirements
ISB intermediate staging base
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
ISS information security system
ISYSCON Integrated Systems Control
JAOC joint air operations center
JFC joint forces command
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JIM joint, interagency, and multinational

FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) ____________________________________________________________________
JMC joint movement center

JNN joint network node
JOA joint operations area
JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP joint publication
JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTAC Joint Terminal Attack Controller
JTAGS Joint Tactical Ground Station
JTF joint task force
JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
LEN large extension node
LOC line of communication
LOGCAP logistics civilian augmentation program
LOS line of sight
LNO liaison officer
LRP logistics release point
MASINT measurement and signature intelligence
MDSC medical deployment support command
MCG mobile command group
MCS Maneuver Control System
MCMS mobility, countermobility, and survivability
MDMP Military Decision Making Process
ME maneuver enhancement
MEDBDE medical brigade
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
MEDLOG medical logistics
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, civil considerations
MC4 medical communications for combat casualty care
MCT movement control team
MI military intelligence
MLMC medical logistics management center
MOOTW military operations other than war
MP military police

MSO mission staging operation

MSR main supply route
MTF medical treatment facility
MWR morale, welfare and recreation
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCO noncommissioned officer
NEO noncombatant evacuation operations
NETOPS network operations
NGO nongovernmental organization
NIPRNET non-secure internet protocol router network
NOSC network operations and security center
NSC network support company
OAKOC observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain,
obstacles, and cover and concealment
OCONUS outside the continental United States
ODSS offense, defense, stability, and support
OGA other governmental agencies
OPCON operational control
OEG operational exposure guidance
OPLAN operational plan
OPORD operational order
PARC principal assistant responsible for contracting
PA public affairs
PAD public affairs detachment
PE peace enforcement
PIR priority intelligence requirements
PKO peacekeeping operation
PLS palletized load system
PM provost marshal
PMM preventive medicine measures
PMO Provost Marshal Office
PO peace operations
POD port of debarkation

FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) ____________________________________________________________________
PRC populace and resource control

PSYOP psychological operations
R&S reconnaissance and surveillance
RCC regional combattant commander
RCERT regional computer emergency response team
RFA restrictive fire area
RI relevant information
ROE rules of engagement
RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
RTF regional task force
S1 personnel staff officer
S2 intelligence staff officer
S3 operations staff officer
S4 logistics staff officer
S6 network operations officer
S7 information operations officer
S9 civil-military operations officer
SA security assistance
SAMS School of Advanced Military Studies
SATCOM satellite communications
SC(E) sustainment command(expeditionary)
SC(T) sustainment command(theater)
SECOMP-I Secure En-route Mission Planning – Improved
SEN small extension node
SFLE special forces liaison element
SGS secretary of the general staff
SIAP surveillance integration automation project
SIGINT signal intelligence
SJA Staff Judge Advocate
SMART-T Secure Mobile Anti-jam Reliable Tactical Terminal
SMDC Space and Missile Defense Command
SOCCE Special Operations Command and Control Element
SOP standing operating procedures
SPO support operations officer

SRO sustainment replenishment operations

SSA supply support activity
SSO Special Security Office
STB special troops battalion
STNOSC service theater network operations and service center
SU situational understanding
TAC tactical
TACP tactical air control party
TACAIR tactical air
TAC CP tactical command post
TACCS terminal air command and control specialist
TACON tactical control
TACP tactical air control party
TAGS theater air ground system
TAIS Tactical Airspace Integration System
TAV total asset visibility
TCF tactical combat force
TENCAP Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities
TIM toxic industrial material
TMIP theater medical information program
TOC tactical operations center
TRO training, readiness and oversight
TSC Theater Sustainment Command
TSO technical service order
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAS unmanned aircraft system
UN United Nations
US United States
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAF United States Air Force
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USCG United States Coast Guard
USNG United States National Guard
UXO unexploded explosive ordnance

FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) ____________________________________________________________________
VOIP voice over internet protocol

VSAT very small aperture terminal
WARNO warning order
WF Warfighting Functions
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WMD-CST weapons of mass destruction–civil support team

Fmi 3-91 Division Operations (2006)

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*FMI 3-91

Field Manual–Interim Headquarters

2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 i

ii FMI 3-91 2/1/2006

Appendix D USAF PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE TO

2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 iii

Doctrine provides a military organization with unit of effort and a common

FMI 3-91 is intended to facilitate the operations and training requirements of

This publication applies to Army forces from Army Service Component

DESCRIPTION OF FIELD MANUALS-INTERIM

An FMI is a Department of the Army publication that provides expedited delivery

2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) v

information it disseminates is incorporated into a new or revised FM. FMIs

vi FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) vii

viii FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

NEW OR MODIFIED TERMS

REASONS FOR CHANGE

2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) ix

viii FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

FUNDAMENTAL DESIGN CHANGES

2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 1-1

1-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

The Modular Force

2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 1-3

Figure 1-1. Force Tailoring and Refinement

1-4 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 1-5

OPERATIONAL READINESS CYCLE

ROLE OF THE DIVISION

1-6 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION

SPECIAL TROOPS BATTALION

2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 1-7

z Alternate the TAC CPs between phases within a major operation.

Figure 1-4. Modular Division CP Structure

Mobile Command Group

1-8 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Figure 1-5. Main CP Organization

Figure 1-6. TAC CPs Organization

2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 1-9

Early Entry Command Post

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

1-10 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Figure 1-7. Brigade Combat Teams

2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 1-11

Figure 1-8. Types of Supporting Brigades

1-12 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Battlefield Surveillance Brigade

2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 1-13

Combat Aviation Brigade

1-14 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement)

2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 1-15

1-16 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

OTHER SUPPORTING UNITS

USAF Air Support Operations Squadron

Civil Affairs Battalion/Civil-Military Operations Center

2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 1-17

Tactical PSYOP Company

Other Special Operations Forces

1-18 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006

2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 1-19

Figure 1-9. Contiguous and Noncontiguous AOs

Ensuring the appointment of an IA security officer in all elements of the force.