Professional Documents
Culture Documents
B73
37T
7Th
heoory
ry
Manu
Ma uaal
Bo
oein
ng 737N
7 7NG
S stem
Sys ms
s
Revis
Re sion
n datte
05
5-08
8-15
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1
Forew
word:
This boo
oklet describees systems p published in o
our Faceboo
ok pages:
About
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page is to intteract througghout the B7
737 commun nity and has N
NO direct link to any user
companyy.
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The admministrator haas NO RESPO ONSIBILITY to
o the content written on these pagess.
Descripttion
Administtrators: Ferdi Colijn:
B737
7NG Type Rated
B
Bert de Jong:
Instructor Flight Engineer P‐3
3 Lockheed O
Orion
B737
7NG Ground School Instructor
B737Theory
The goall of this FB page is to exp
pand B737 th heoretical knowledge am mongst users and we try tto
achieve that by expaanding the am mount of visitors aiming for interaction.
There reest no copyrigght on our sttories but wee rather see you recommmending us oon your privaate FB
pages isoo sharing thee posts.
Also feell free to "don
nate" your eexperiences aand stories o
on B737Theo ory and drop us a line by sending
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manual o or else we innterfere with
h copyrights.
Thank yoou
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Contents:
Foreword: ................................................................................................................................................ 2
APU .......................................................................................................................................................... 8
Auto Slat System...................................................................................................................................... 9
Engine Electronic Control (EEC) ............................................................................................................. 10
When things go wrong and beyond basic systems knowledge ............................................................. 11
Engine fire detection ............................................................................................................................. 13
Feel Differential ..................................................................................................................................... 14
Fuel Scavenge Jet Pump ........................................................................................................................ 15
Fuel valves ............................................................................................................................................. 16
AC Generator ......................................................................................................................................... 17
Isolation valve ........................................................................................................................................ 19
Manual gear extension. ......................................................................................................................... 20
Mechanical pressure relief valves. ........................................................................................................ 21
Nitrogen Generating System ................................................................................................................. 22
Outflow valve. ....................................................................................................................................... 23
Flight Control “Breakaway” Devices ...................................................................................................... 24
Pack & pack control ............................................................................................................................... 25
Recirculation fans .................................................................................................................................. 26
Hydraulic Reservoirs .............................................................................................................................. 27
The APU Starter/Generator. .................................................................................................................. 28
Landing Gear Transfer Valve ................................................................................................................. 29
PTU ........................................................................................................................................................ 30
Wing Thermal Anti Ice (WTAI) ............................................................................................................... 31
B737 Yaw damping ................................................................................................................................ 32
Zone temperature control ..................................................................................................................... 33
Lavatory “fire protection”. .................................................................................................................... 34
Center tank boost pumps ...................................................................................................................... 35
Antiskid .................................................................................................................................................. 36
Leading Edge Flaps ................................................................................................................................ 37
Thrust Reverser ..................................................................................................................................... 39
Tail Skid .................................................................................................................................................. 41
Vortex generators.................................................................................................................................. 42
Window heating .................................................................................................................................... 43
Wing& Body Overheat ........................................................................................................................... 44
Horizontal Stabilizer Trim. ..................................................................................................................... 45
4
Display Electronic Units. ........................................................................................................................ 46
Proximity Switch Electronic Unit ........................................................................................................... 47
Nose wheel steering lockout ................................................................................................................. 48
Weather radar ....................................................................................................................................... 49
Dissolved air .......................................................................................................................................... 51
Frangible fittings .................................................................................................................................... 52
Rudder(vertical stabilizer) load reduction ............................................................................................. 53
Rejected Takeoff – speed brakes relation. ............................................................................................ 54
Electrical Bus (bar) ................................................................................................................................. 55
Crew oxygen system .............................................................................................................................. 56
Main system hydraulic pumps, (corrected) ........................................................................................... 57
Cockpit Voice Recorder System ............................................................................................................. 58
Pressure control .................................................................................................................................... 59
Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS) ................................................................................. 61
Electro Motor Driven Pumps Overheat ................................................................................................. 63
Cockpit panel “+” symbols. .................................................................................................................... 64
Overhead (P5) panel drains. .................................................................................................................. 65
Closed crossfeed valve on takeoff and landings? ................................................................................. 66
Amber AUTO BRAKE DISARM Light ....................................................................................................... 67
B737 Fire protection .............................................................................................................................. 68
Start switch functions. ........................................................................................................................... 69
Fuel nozzle “coking”. ............................................................................................................................. 71
Dual bleed light ..................................................................................................................................... 72
Air Cycle Machine operation ................................................................................................................. 73
Airstair ................................................................................................................................................... 74
Equipment Cooling ................................................................................................................................ 75
Overboard Exhaust Valve ...................................................................................................................... 76
Thermal electrical protections. ............................................................................................................. 77
Fuel temperature indication. ................................................................................................................ 78
Integrated Drive Generator (IDG).......................................................................................................... 79
Electrical Load Shedding ........................................................................................................................ 81
Common Display System (CDS) malfunctions. ...................................................................................... 82
Cargo Compartments air. ...................................................................................................................... 83
NiCad Battery operation. ....................................................................................................................... 84
Climb Thrust Reduction ......................................................................................................................... 86
The “white bug”. ................................................................................................................................... 87
Standby Hydraulic System operation. ................................................................................................... 88
Transformer Rectifier Units. (TRU) ........................................................................................................ 90
5
RAM AIR DUCT doors. ........................................................................................................................... 91
Standby Power. ..................................................................................................................................... 92
Fueling panel ......................................................................................................................................... 93
Brake accumulator ................................................................................................................................ 95
Control column shaker .......................................................................................................................... 96
Wheel thermal fuse plugs. .................................................................................................................... 98
Battery busses ....................................................................................................................................... 99
Electrical schematic ............................................................................................................................. 100
Fuel schematic ..................................................................................................................................... 101
Hydraulic schematic ............................................................................................................................ 102
Bleed schematic .................................................................................................................................. 103
Air condition schematic ....................................................................................................................... 104
Engine oil & fuel schematic ................................................................................................................. 105
Flight Mode Annunciations (FMA) ...................................................................................................... 106
Power Sources (NG) ............................................................................................................................ 108
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APU
The APU U is a constant speed (± 49.000 RP PM) gas turbine engine that can su upply AC po
ower and
pressurizzed air. Thee starter/gen nerator is po owered from m either direcctly the main battery (28VDC) or
transfer bus 1 (115V VAC) where eeither sourcee is converte ed into 270V VDC for starter operation n. At 95%
starter ooperation revverses to a 9 90 KVA geneerator, indicaated by the blue APU OFFF BUS light.. (90 KVA
until 32..000 ft. and 66 KVA unttil 41.000 ftt.) Starter seequence is automatically
a y determineed by the
Electronic Control Unit (ECU) thaat needs the battery swittch to be in tthe ON positiion to energize.
The APU U can be useed for air and d AC power until 10.000 0 ft., just air to 17.000 fft. and just A
AC power
until 41..000 ft. Thatt is also the maximum sttarting altitu ude although h recommen nded at 25.000 ft. Air
takes th
he biggest performance from the APU A as it takes air from
m the load ccompressor which is
mounted d on a comm mon shaft wiith the comb bustion comp pressor. The more air taken in, the lower the
performance of the APU. That is why theree is a restricction in altittude use, especially with h air and
when the demand iss large (high EGT), air usee is squeezed d by IGV’s tow ward the loaad compresso or. When
on suctioon feed the APU draws ffuel from tank #1 and w when operating for an exxtended time e select a
fuel pummp to pressure feed whicch extends th he lifetime off the APU.
The ECU U protects the APU and sshuts down w with a low oil pressure, o overspeed or when a FA AULT light
illuminattes. The lattter represen nts more thaan just the foregoing, including ECU failure, lo oss of DC
power, A APU fire, oveertemp (during start), hiigh oil temp and many m more. The start limit is 22 minutes
and a FA AULT light illuminates wh hen the start is aborted through a p protection orr when the ggenerator
malfuncttions. A bluee MAINT ligght illuminates when oil quantity is low or a geenerator malfunction
occurred d, the APU iss still allowed d to operate..
APU com mpartment and oil cooling is accom mplished byy exhaust air used as aan educator to draw
outside aair into the ccompartmen nt from an inlet just abovve the exhaust.
When th he APU is sttopped by placing
p the switch
s to OFFF, the ECU determines a cooling cycle of 1
minute b before the A APU actually stops. The ccooling cycle e closes the A APU BAV and trips the ggenerator
OFF line. By doing so o it reliefs the APU from load and decreases the EGT preventting so called d cooking
of the noozzles. (residdual fuel form ms carbon on n the hot nozzzles which ccan affect the flame patttern)
Delay swwitching the Battery to O OFF to 2 min nutes after se electing the APU to OFF,, this allows the inlet
door to close. The door closes when the APU A decelerrates to ± 30% to preveent the inlett duct to
collapse. The 1 minu ute is by‐passsed when the APU shuts down throu ugh a malfunction, the Fire Switch
is activatted or when the Battery Switch is sellected to OFF.
8
Auto Slat System
The Auto Slat system operates the LE slats automatically in flight when you’re approaching a stall
under certain conditions just before the stick shaker becomes active.
These conditions are when the flaps are at position 1 – 5 and hydraulic pressure is available through:
• Hydraulic system B
• PTU (extend & retract)
• Standby hydraulic system (extend only)
* With alternate Flap use, the Auto Slat function is not available.
* With a short field performance configuration the Auto Slat operates with flap selections 1 – 25.
At the flap position 1 – 5 the LE slats are in the intermediate (extend) position and the LE flaps at
their only extended position . . . FULL. When the aircraft approaches the stall angle/speed region
determined by the Stall Management and Yaw Damper (SMYD) computer, the Flaps/Slats Electronic
Unit (FSEU) command the LE slats to the FULL extend position to prevent entering a stall condition.
Another action by the FSEU is to delay the “transit lights” to operate for 12 seconds thereby
preventing the LE devices transit lights to illuminate.
When thrust is increased/stick force relaxed and the aircraft flies out of this condition (higher speed,
lower AOA) the Auto Slat system drives the LE slats back to the intermediate extend position. Also
here the transit lights will not illuminate.
When the Auto Slat systems fails to operate or is not available by any cause, the AUTOSLAT FAIL
indication illuminates on the flight control panel. When 1 SMYD computer fails the other will
automatically take over and would go unnoticed unless you press RECAL during an Auto Slat
condition.
9
Engine Electronic Control (EEC)
The EEC is mounted on the right top side of the fan duct and exists of two computers (channel 1 & 2),
where one is active and the other standby although they’re both operating and cross linked during
normal operation. The EEC receives numerous environmental and engine input signals to calculate
fuel and control outputs to operate the engine and identifies the engines thrust rating by a pre‐
selected identification plug. Doing so it heats up and needs to be cooled which is achieved by tapping
off, and directing fan air to the EEC.
Normal power source of the EEC is an alternator mounted on front of the engine gearbox but is only
valid when the gearbox (N2) reaches 15%. Before 15% N2, the EEC is powered by Transfer Bus 1 or 2
(Eng. 1 or 2) if available, and becomes energized when the Start Switch is placed to GRD or CONT or,
when the Start Lever is moved to IDLE. A de‐energized EEC is indicated by blank engine indication
boxes on the upper and lower DU’s even when the EEC button illuminates a white ON, just indicating
that the EEC is selected to the normal mode. In this case the only indication visible directly from the
sensors are N1, N2, Oil quantity and the vibration indicator, all others are blank. So . . . during a
battery start (emergency power), indications of EGT, fuel flow, oil pressure and oil temperature
remain blank until the alternator reaches 15%.
On the aft overhead engine panel there are the two guarded EEC control buttons to select the EEC to
the NORMAL mode of operation (white ON light), or the manual HARD ALTERNATE mode of
operation (amber ALT light). An undispatchable failing EEC is indicated also on the engine panel by a
ENG CONTROL light and will only illuminate when on the ground and the engine N2 >50%.
A little teaser . . . . the last indication on the engine panel are two REVERSER lights . . . when and how
long do they illuminate amber during normal operation?
10
When things go wrong and beyond basic systems
knowledge
The next post is an actual situation that happened, losing a Transfer Bus in flight. I’ve tried to simplify
the explanation but in fact it’s just an indicator of what CAN happen. At this point Non Normal
Procedures, CRM and common sense is needed to fly out of these situations.
It started with a MASTER CAUTION and a right SOURCE OFF, indicating that XFR bus 2 was not
powered by its “last selected source” but by Transfer Bus 1. QRH tells us to select the GEN switch
(affected side) ON what this time caused a TRANSFER BUS 2 OFF to illuminate with additional related
indications. (DEU 2 and others, (check the power source booklet to find out) Next the APU was
started and when attempted to connect the generator, a BATTERY DISCHARGE illuminated indicating
an excessive discharge of a battery, with multiple additional indications. The crew decided to stop
further procedures and investigation and used the system “as is”. To give you an idea, the Indications
involved: battery discharge, master caution, right hand source off, right hand transfer bus off, Mach
trim fail, auto slat fail, fuel pump 2 fwd., fuel pump 1 aft, electrical hydraulic pump #2, probe heat B,
engine EEC alternate, zone temperature.
After this ordeal the crew managed to land safely with this reduced electrical power condition and
multiple caution indications.
What actually has happened was that the Generator Control Unit (GCU) 2 had received an erratic
signal through the Line Current Transformer (LCT) that IDG2 was connected to the transfer bus. This
signal is then transferred to the Bus Power Control Unit (BPCU) who arranges switching in the
electrical AC system to provide in the two major rules:
• No paralleling of AC sources
• An AC source connecting to a Transfer Bus disconnects the previous source (look at the first
rule)
This erroneous signal locked out the possibility to connect the APU or other AC sources like Transfer
Bus 1 to Transfer Bus 2. However, as IDG 2 in fact was not connected, transfer bus 2 lost power. The
erroneous indication must have originated at the GCB 2 (unit connecting IDG 2 to bus 2) itself,
indicating the switch had closed although it had not moved.
11
The BATTTERY DISCHA ARGE is probbably caused d by the a (exxcessive) main battery diischarge by p
powering
the Batttery Bus as aalso the DC 22 system (TRR 2 & TR 3) were not po owered anym more and illuuminates
when a bbattery outpput condition
ns exists of:
• Current draw
C w is more thaan 5 amps foor 95 seconds
• Current draw
C w is more thaan 15 amps ffor 25 seconds
• Current draw
C w is more thaan 100 ampss for 1.2 secoonds.
Mind yoou, normally when Transsfer Bus 2 is de‐energize ed the Transffer 3 Relay w
would switch h TR 3 to
Transferr Bus 1 which
h obviously ddidn’t happen.
12
Engine fire detection
The engine fire detection system consist of a fire, and an overheat detection inside the nacelle which
are only active when the engine is operating. Temperatures are guarded by 2 (A & B) detector loops
which operate by expanding gas pressure inside the loop elements thereby activating an OVERHEAT,
a FIRE or a FAULT (leaking loop tube) contact. The engine areas covered by the loops are inside the
nacelles around the fan, and the “core” hot section so . . . a torch (see image) would go undetected
as it occurs inside the engine.
• OVERHEAT detection is indicated by an OVHT/DET, 2 MASTER CAUTION and respective ENG
OVERHEAT indication. (± 170°C around the fan section and 340°C around the hot section)
• FIRE detection would be indicated by 2 MASTER FIRE WARNING, the respective FIRE SWITCH,
an OVHT/DET, 2 MASTER CAUTION and an audio FIRE BELL warning. (± 300°C around the fan
and 450°C around the hot section)
When either of the foregoing occurs the fire switch unlocks to allow it to be pulled up.
A fire or overheat is detected when both loops exceed the mentioned limits and when one loop fails,
it’ll go unnoticed and the detection system automatically switches to a single loop operation. One
failing loop will only illuminate a FAULT during a test (also not on RECALL) and when both loops fail,
the FAULT light illuminates but NOT the MASTER CAUTION.
The detection tests on preflight are:
• The OVHT/FIRE test which checks the operation of the engine & APU fire detection control
module located in the E&E bay and not to forget the indications on the flight deck.
• A FAULT/INOP test checks the FAULT detection circuits (loops and elements) and the flight
deck indications by simulating a dual loop failure.
Note that the APU fire detection also operates during the FIRE test and is visible/audible in the right
main wheel well on the APU Ground Control Panel during pre‐flight.
13
Feel D
Differen
ntial
14
Fuel Scaveng
ge Jet Pu
ump
De fuel sscavenge jet pump scaveenges residuaal trapped fu uel from the center tank to tank #1.
Even at 0 Kgs indicaation there iss still some residual fuel in the centter tank. This fuel is trap pped and
cannot be
b sucked up by the scaavenge line of
o the cente er tank boosst pumps because of its elevated
position. To be able to use this laast bit of fueel, a center ttank scavengge system is provided. To o activate
the systeem, next co
onditions neeed to be meet; the LEFT FWD pump operating aand tank #1 quantity
lower th han half full. (< 1990 Kgss) When thee float type sshutoff valvee opens, it aallows LEFT FFWD fuel
pump flo ow to create a negativee pressure in
n the (non‐rrotating partts) eductor ttype scavenge pump
which inn turn drawss fuel from the center taank relieving it in tank #1. Of coursee this will cre eate over
time (the pump capacity is 100––200 Kgs/hr.. (AMM)) a rrelatively sm mall imbalancce between the main
tanks. Th he book says that the syystem contin nues to run ffor the remaainder of thee flight (can’tt be shut
off) but when you’ll remove thee controlled ccondition (LEEFT FWD fueel pump) also the jet pum mp stops
operatinng. When thee center tank is depleted d, the scavenge pump d draws air from the cente er tank to
tank #1 w which obviously does no o harm to enggine #1 operration.
Note: the “dissolved air” story off fuel. When on suction ffeed with a h high fuel temmperature an nd a rapid
decreasing pressure over the fuel, air bubbles (aeration) appear in tthe fuel possibly causingg engines
to run errratic or even flame out w when sucked d up though the bypass vvalve.
Note: when both ceenter tank fu uel pumps are
a inoperative, fuel will be trapped d in the cen
nter tank.
There is no bypass vvalve provisio on for suctioon feed, alsoo the left main tank quan ntity has to b be below
half full to even starrt the scavennge jet pump p. Even so, thhe scavenge rate is insuffficient to be e used for
emptying the centerr tank. Under these cond ditions you’ll use main taank fuel befo ore the cente er tank is
at requirred safe leveels and a possible overstrress of the w wing roots arises.
(>453, thhe main tankks have to bee full and >72 26, CONFIG)
15
Fuel valves
Let’s look at the most important valves in the fuel system, the Spar Fuel Valve and the Engine Fuel
Valve a bit further than needed but still at an acceptable level. It will clarify what actually happens
specifically with the Engine Valve. By all means just remember the easy way as the FCOM explains.
The #1 most important fuel valve is the Spar Fuel Valve. This 28 VDC valve is mounted in the front
wall “spar” of the main fuel tank supplying fuel to the fuel feed line of the engine. The DC power
comes from the Hot Battery Bus and the valve even has an own recharging Battery Power Pack to be
able to positively close the valve in case of an emergency such as a separated engine. The valve
opens when the Start Lever is placed in the IDLE position and closes by CUTOFF of that Start Lever, or
by pulling its Fire Switch. When the valve is closed it shows a dim blue light even with the Start Lever
in CUTOFF as I always explain that any blue light is a “not standard flight condition light”, knowing
that the book says it’s a status light.
The Engine Fuel Valve is actually the High Pressure Shut Off Valve (HPSOV) and is integral with the
Hydro Mechanical Unit (HMU) on the accessory gearbox. The valve opens and closes by the same
controls as the Spar Fuel Valve but its actual opening is a bit more complicated. It relies on the so
called Fuel Metering Valve (FMV) which is under control of the EEC. So, when conditions meet the
requirements to open the HPSOV, the EEC signals the FMV to open up the HPSOV by servo fuel
pressure.
On the other hand the closing of the HPSOV is achieved by the Start Lever or Fire Switch, the EEC
energizes the CLOSED SOLONOID of the HPSOV which uses 28VDC from the Battery Bus. During
engine start this FMV is controlled by the EEC and when conditions dictate the HPSOV (Engine Fuel
Valve) to close, the EEC commands the FMV and thereby the HPSOV to close in the following
conditions:
• A Hot Start occurs (>725°C) on the ground (exceedance protection)
• If the engine decays after idle speed during start below 50% N2 speed and EGT exceeds the
start limit
• The EEC senses a “wet start” meaning no EGT rise within 15 seconds after the Start Lever is
at Idle (YOU are the start limit for the EGT rise which is 10 seconds!!!)
All of these conditions will be indicated by a bright ENG VALVE CLOSED light.
Note that with an updated EEC software (7.B.Q and later) the EEC also provides a protection when
approaching a Hot Start meaning a rapid increase in EGT.
The 115/200 VAC, 400 Hz, 90 KVA Integrated Drive Generator.
16
AC Generator
I recently received a request from one of our followers to explain the operation of a brushless
generator. I’ve send the explanation and thought on sharing this generic AC power generation info of
an aircraft AC brushless generator. I’ve used the AC generator I’m familiar with and adjusted the
image toward that generic explanation and added the 737 protection circuits in the GCU.
The AC Generator is an assembly of three generators:
• Permanent Magnet Generator (PMG)
• Exciter Generator
• Main Generator
The most important Rotor components of the AC Generator are:
• Permanent Magnet Generator rotor
• Exciter Generator Rotor; which includes also the Rotating Rectifiers (3) and resistors (3)
• Main Generator Rotor
The most important Stator components of the AC Generator are:
• PMG Stationary Armature; output: 39 VAC, 1 ø, 600 Hz
• Exciter Generator Stationary Field; input: 28 VDC pulsating, 1,200 Hz
• Main Generator Stationary Field; output: 115/200 VAC, 3 ø, 400 Hz
Once the engine gearbox (N2) on which the generator has been installed has come on speed, voltage
is excited in the PMG. This will be a 39 VAC, 600 Hz, 1 ø, at 100% revolutions of the IDG (± 12,000
RPM of the generator). This voltage is fed to the voltage regulator in the Generator Control Unit
(GCU) through a DC Power Supply where it is converted into a pulsating direct voltage of 28 VDC,
1.200 Hz.
The output of the voltage regulator is linked through the closed Generator Control Relay (GCR) to the
Stator of the Exciter Generator which excites a 3 ø AC voltage in the Rotor. This AC voltage is than
rectified by three rotating rectifiers and subsequently supplied to the Rotor of the Main Generator.
The last step is that the Main Generator rotor field excites the required 115/200 VAC, 400 Hz, in the
Main Generator Stator. The 115 VAC is the voltage taken from one phase and ground and the 200
VAC is the voltage between two phases (115 x √3) which explains the ra ng of what the generator
can generate (115/200 VAC).
The above shows that there is no need an external voltage source to ensure the generator is in
operation, that’s why the system is also referred to as being "Self‐supported".
OK the easy way is that the Permanent Magnet Generator (PMG) rotates by the IDG on the same
shaft as the exciter‐, and Main rotors. The generated (39 VAC) is rectified to a pulsating DC in the
control unit and send to the exciter stator. This DC power creates an alternate current in the exciter
rotor and is rectified by the rotating rectifiers where after it finally creates an alternate current in the
three main generator stator. This is the 115 VAC/400 Hz output of the generator and is monitored by
the current transformers that relaxes or intensifies the DC power toward the exciter generator to the
requested load of the electrical system.
17
The in thhe image shown protecttions in the CDU will de‐‐energize the GCR thereeby de‐energgizing the
exciter field,
f h de‐energizes the geneerator. This de‐energizing GCR alsso occurs when
which w the
generato or switch is sselected OFFF.
18
Isolation vallve
The isolaation valve seeparates thee left, from th he right side
e of the bleed d manifold. It is powered d from
AC Transsfer Bus 1 bu ut also can bee manually o opened/close ed by a control lever, acccessible in th he left air
condition bay. Becau use it’s AC po ower* it will fail in the se
elected position when po ower is remo oved.
When th he AUTO possition the valve opening relies on thee so‐called “ccorner
he Isolation sswitch is in th
switch” positions. Th hey are the P Pack and Bleeed switches, when all theese switchess are NOT in tthe OFF
position the isolation osed. On the other hand iif any cornerr switch is seelected to OFFF the
n valve is clo
Isolationn valve openss in the AUTO O selection.
When a Pack switch is OFF, the Issolation valvve opens to ccreate equal performancce of the engines.
When a Bleed is seleected OFF thee Isolation vaalve opens to o allow air frrom either siide of the maanifold
to be useed for the offf side WTAI..
Note thee isolation vaalve logic is rrelated to sw
witch position n so a tripped d pack or bleeed will not o
open the
Isolationn Valve when n in AUTO. Affter flight the Isolation valve should b be selected O OPEN just in case
you need d to battery start engines when there is no APU o or external eelectrical pow wer available e. The
ground aair connectio on is located on the rightt side of the m manifold clo ose to enginee #2. When N N2 >20%
there is no personneel allowed in the vicinity o ng engine so we have to sstart engine #1 first.
of the turnin
When th his would be a battery staart you’ll neeed the isolation valve to be open, so when you re emoved
AC poweer with the issolation valve switch OPEEN, the valve e is still in thee open posittion.
* A geneeral rule for eelectrical pow wer is; “AC liies, DC dies”.
This is a nice thing to
o know also ffor analog in nstruments, aan AC powerred instrumeent stays whe ere it
lost powwer and a DC powered insstrument will drop off to o zero.
19
Manu
ual gearr extenssion.
Let’s havve a look at tthis Non Norrmal procedu ure and its co
omponents.
When th he gear is UPP and the LG lever in the O OFF positionn, hydraulic ssystem A preessure is removed
from thee uplines to tthe actuators which causses the three hang” in theirr respective uplock.
e struts to “h
This is allso the prefeerred position of the LG leever during aa manual exttension attempt because e of the
depressu urized hydraulic lines.
When th he gear (all or any) does n not extend aafter a down selection, fo ollow the QRRH procedure e in an
attempt to lower thee gear. Manu ual extension n of the gearr is accomplisshed by pulliing the threee “T”
handles,, accessible tthrough the Manual Gear Extension A Access Door just behind the FO seat on the
cockpit ffloor.
The need d for this No
on Normal prrocedure cou uld be caused d by:
• Disrupted electrical signaal to the LG sselector valvve
• No system A A hydraulic pressure available
• LG lever stucck in the UP or OFF position
When op pening the MManual Gear Extension A Access Door, a “door open” micro swiitch comman nds the
LG selecttor valve eleectrically dowwn regardless of the LG h handle position. This action activates the LG
selector bypass valvee which conn nects the hyd draulic lines to return so the manual down selecttion does
not hydrraulically restricts (locks) the actuators down cap pability.
This alsoo prevents th he LG to retraact when thee door is not flush closed d after take‐ooff and seleccted UP.
This proccedure is covvered in the QRH by the LG disagree procedure w with the LG hhandle UP an nd all red
and greeen indicator lights illumin nated, tellingg you the geaar is down an nd locked buut not in the selected
position.
When yo ou’d pull anyy (or all) “T” h
handle it sim
mply releasess the uplock by cable actiion where affter the
respectivve gear free‐‐falls down, ssupported by gravity (we eight) and airflow to the extend posittion.
When th he gear is fully down, thee downlock “bungee” sprrings will hold d the downloock struts in an over
centered d locked position. Normaally this is acccomplished by a downlock actuator b but with the absence
of systemm A pressuree, the springss enforce a m mechanical d downlock wh hich is indicatted by (6) do
own and
locked green lights.
By the wway, there are 6 green ligghts as a redu undant indication. Neitheer gear is visible on the N NG and
the doub ble green ligh hts for each strut will givve a backup ffor the down n indication.
20
Mech
hanical p
pressurre relieff valves.
There arre three mecchanical adjusted pressurre relief valves on the 737.
Positive safety pressure relief is aaccomplisheed by 2 mech hanical adjustted pressuree relief valves,
located oon each sidee of the outflow valve. Th hey are totally independeent of the prressurization system
and prevvent the insid de/outside p
pressure to eexceed +9.1 P PSID in the eevent of a preessurization
system/o outflow valvve malfunctio on. (stuck clo
osed outflow w valve)
The fuseelage airfram
me structure ccannot withsstand large n negative presssures and iss protected ffor that
at a veryy low value. TThe negativee pressure reelief valve is llocated at th
he right loweer side of the
e
fuselagee just fwd. of the outflow
w valve. This sspring‐loaded door is also not depending on the
pressurizzation systemm and adjustted at just a –1.0 PSID vaalue. This will prevent thee aircraft to ccollapse
when the inside/outside pressurre becomes n negative for example durring a (very) fast descentt.
21
Nitro
ogen Gen
neratin
ng System
m
Followinng two Boeing 737CL explosion investtigations in A Asia (and othhers includingg the B747 TTWA 800
midair explosion), a protection w was developeed by Boeingg to minimizee explosive vvapors in the center
tank. Thee 737 explossions were caaused by trapped fuel higgh temperattures due to radiant heatt from
the Packks under the tank which fformed highly explosive vapors. The fuel was ignited by the ccenter
tank fuel pumps which were still running with an empty center tank. Early days center tank fu uel
pumps d did not had aan automaticc shut off witth LOW PRESSSURE as thee newer mod dified ones thhat shut
down aftter ±15 seco onds of LOW PRESSURE. TThis is also th he reason that someone has to be on n the
flight deck when a ceenter tank pump is runniing as by the e FCOM, the book does n not cover exp plicit
modificaations to each aircraft.
This prottective devicce (NGS) divides Nitrogen n from Oxyge en by a separation modu ule and leavees
Nitrogen n enriched aiir (NEA) in th
he center tan nk to a level wwhich will no
ot support coombustion. TThe
oxygen level is decreeased by the NGS to ±12% % which is suufficient to p
prevent ignitiion.
The NGSS has only an indication aavailable in th he right main n wheel welll next to the APU fire conntrol
panel, soo it has no visible clew fo
or crews of itts operation during flightt.
Indicatioons are:
• OPERATIONA
O AL (green)
• DEGRADED ((blue)
• INOPERATIV VE (amber)
The nitroogen generation system gets bleed aair from the left side of th he pneumatic manifold w where
after its cooled, driveen through tthe separatio on module and directed tto a flow valve into the ccenter
tank. Thee NGS operaates automattically only in n flight and sshuts down in the next co onditions:
• Either enginee is shut dow wn in flight
• Fire or smokke detection in any comp partment
• Left Pack oveerheat
22
Outfllow valv
ve.
To stay in line with the previous post, let us llook at this ppressurization componen nt of the 73.
The outfflow valve reestricts/regullates the flow
w of conditio oned air overrboard, thereeby creatingg a
pressurizzed environm ment in the aaircraft. The valve is locaated at the afft lower sidee of the fuselage and
has rakeed edges for noise reducttion purposees.
The valve is moved b by a common which can be operated byy either of the three outflow
n actuator w
valve eleectro motorss. Two motorrs are operatted by the prressure systeem controlleers and one iss directly
operated d by a switch
h when in Maanual operattion.
Automattic control is accomplisheed by meanss of 2 Cabin P Pressure Con ntrollers (CPC C’s) which alter
control eeach flight orr when a maalfunction occurs on the o operating co
ontroller. A th hird way of
controlling the outflo ow valve is bby a manual ttoggle switch h on the pressurization p panel. The swwitch is
spring lo
oaded to neu utral and has three positions, CLOSE – – Neutral – O
OPEN.
The outfflow valve indicator show ws the actuall position of the outflow valve in all mmodes of ope eration
provided d the Batteryy Bus is poweered through h the PRESS C CONT IND C//B.
Electricaal power to the three electro motors is provided b by:
• AUTO mode
A 1 electrical power to thee auto electrro motor 1 iss supplied byy the 28 VDC Bus 1
t
through CPC C 1. (PRESS CONT AUTO 1 1 C/B)
• AUTO mode
A 2 electrical power to thee auto electrro motor 2 iss supplied byy the 28 VDC Bus 2
t
through CPC C 2. (PRESS CONT AUTO 2 2 C/B)
• MANUAL mo ode electricaal power to the manual e electro motor is supplied directly by tthe 28
V
VDC Battery Bus. (PRESS CONT MAN C/B)
A mode selector is used to deterrmine the op peration of thhe outflow vaalve, either A AUTO, ALT(e ernate)
or MAN((ual).
The outfflow valve reeceives a clossed signal wh hen the cabin altitude reaches 14.500 feet in the AUTO
mode off operation so it is not afffected throu ugh the MAN NUAL mode.
Just for tthe “mind seet” when at aa high altitud
de and a presssure loss, yo ou’d have to o close the ouutflow
valve to increase preessure in the aircraft which results in lowering cabin altitude.
Aircraft ccontrol overrride devices.
23
Flight Control “Breakaway” Devices
There are two devices that allow you to control the aircraft in case of a malfunctioning or jammed
control system.
One concerns roll control. When one of the yoke cables (or aileron PCU/spoilers) becomes jammed
or moves freely, the opposite control is still available to roll the aircraft. The two yokes are
interconnected at the base of the co‐pilots control column by the Aileron Transfer Mechanism
through torsion spring friction and a “lost motion device”. If the FO control jams, the spring force can
be overcome by the Captain thereby controlling the aileron PCU through cables. If the Captain
control jams, the FO can control roll by use of the flight spoilers. Note that this only happens when
the yoke has been turned ± 12° which engages a so called “lost motion device” which in turn
operates the flight spoilers.
The second is related to pitch control. When one of the control columns becomes jammed, the crew
can override (breakout) the failing control. The control columns are interconnected below the
cockpit floor by a torque tube with a device that enables the controls to be separated from each
other. The Elevator Breakout Mechanism connects both control columns by two springs which will
separate the columns when ± 30Lbf/13Kgf is used to overcome them. When applied, the control
columns are mechanically separated from each other. Note that deflection of the elevators is
significantly reduced and a higher force is needed to move the elevators. (even higher than with
manual reversion)
24
Pack & pack
k contro
ol
25
Recirrculatio
on fans
26
Hydrraulic Re
eservoirs
The 3 hyydraulic fluid reservoirs aare located inn the front of the main w wheel well. They are presssurized
from thee bleed maniifold to supp ply positive fluid to the pu umps, preventing cavitattion and foam ming.
The stanndby system reservoir is p pressurized tthrough the B reservoir. These pressures (45 – 50 0 PSI)
can onlyy be checked on 2 gages m mounted on the forward d main wheel well bulkheead. Quantityy of the
A & B reservoirs is diisplayed direectly through h gages on thhe reservoir b pe transmitter which
by a float typ
also sendds a signal to
o the DEU’s ffor display on the lower DU. The stan ndby system reservoir on nly has a
low quan ntity switch, which displaays the STAN NDBY HYD LO OW QUANTITTY light on th he flight conttrol
panel wh hen < 50%.
The A reeservoir has aa 20% standp pipe to preseerve fluid to the EMDP w when a leak o occurs at the EDP.
The EDP is more likely to malfunction becausse of the enggine gearboxx mounted heeavy design and
higher caapacity it puts out. (±4x)
The B reservoir has aa common sttandpipe for both system m B pumps so o when a leaak occurs, fluid will
drain thee entire B reservoir until a 0% indicattion. In this ccase the B syystem cannott be pressuriized
anymoree but the rem maining 1.3 UUSG can be u used for the PTU to operate the LE lifft devices. A second
standpippe at 72% preeserves fluidd to this level for both B ssystem pump p operation, in case a leaak occurs
while using the stand dby hydraulic system.
Minimum m quantity foor the A & B reservoirs iss 76% which triggers a white RF (refill) indication on the
lower DU U when on th he ground an nd TE flaps aare up, or no engines are operating.
Besides tthat, when eequipped witth an updatee pin function n to the loweer DU on sysstems, there can also
be a red dial indication when A o or B quantitiees decrease tto 0%, or inccreases to 10 06%.
The pummps heated (ccase drain) ccooling fluid return to the e reservoirs, is routed through oil‐to‐‐fuel
heat excchangers mounted on thee bottom of the main tan nks. To achieeve enough ccooling for on the
ground o operation, thhere should b be at least 760 Kg of fuell in the tankss each.
27
The A
APU Sta
arter/Ge
enerato
or.
The APU U is started th
hrough a starter/generattor and when n on speed transfers to aan AC generaator.
The startt sequence o of the APU sttarter/generrator is deterrmined by th he Generatorr Control Uniit (GCU)
which reeceives poweer from the SSwitched Hott Battery Buss. That is thee reason whyy the Batteryy Switch
must be in the ON po osition (switched hot batttery bus ene ergized) to ooperate the AAPU. When sswitched
OFF, thee Switched Hot Battery Bus and ECU b become de‐e energized wh hich in turn sshuts down tthe APU
immediaately withoutt the regularr 1 minute co ooling cycle. (trips the geenerator off lline and closes the
APU bleeed valve to u unload/cool tthe APU prio or shutdown)
Strangely enough po ower to the sstarter is pro
ovided by eith her the Batteery (28 VDC)), or Transferr Bus 1
(115 VAC C). Both voltages are first changed/boosted to a w whopping 27 70 VDC by th he Start Power Unit
(SPU), wwhere after a Start Converter Unit (SC CU) creates the 270 VAC w which is neeeded to drive e the
starter/ggenerator in the start mo ode. This sign
nal lasts untiil 70% RPM w where the SP PU becomes de‐
energizeed and the AP PU becomess self‐sustaining and acce elerates furth her to its opeerating RPM.
When th he APU RPM reaches ±95 5% the ECU ccommands th he blue APU GEN OFF BU US light to illu
uminate
as a sign
nal that the A
APU generato or can assum
me the electrrical load.
The AC ggenerator co onsists of thee same parts as the “reguular” AC geneerator as desscribed in an earlier
post andd can supply 90 KVA belo ow 32,000 feet and 66 KV VA at 41,000 because of A APU load cap pabilities
with loww air densities.
28
Land
ding Gea
ar Transsfer Valv
ve
The Land ding Gear Traansfer Valvee has two ways of operation.
The simp plest is to traansfer the no
ose wheel steeering operaation from itss normal hyd draulic system A, to
the alterrnate hydrau ulic system B on the grou und (only), byy a switch on
n the left front (Capt) pannel.
The secoond way of o operation (in flight) is a bit more complex as it has 3 condition ns that needss to be
met befo ore the LG trransfer valvee moves from m its normal hydraulic sysstem A operaation for geaar
on to the alteernate hydraaulic system B.
retractio
1. Engine #1, N N2 below 50% %
2. Landing Gear Handle in U UP
3. Any gear NO
A OT in the UP aand locked p position
29
PTU
The PTU operates when the nextt conditions are met:
1. A
Airborne and d,
2. S
System B ED ow (< 2350 P
P pressure lo PSI) and,
3. T
TE flaps less than 15° butt not UP.
If this occcurs the PTUU control valve opens, allowing system A pressure to operatee the PTU hyd draulic
motor. TThe motor drrives a hydraaulic pump th hrough a com
mmon shaft and uses thee 1.3 USG fro om
below th he standpipee on the botttom of the B reservoir to operate thee selected liftt devices. Of course
there aree return linees back to thee B reservoirr from the PTTU hydro mootor and used d devices wh
hich are
not visibble on common simplified d (FCOM) sch hematics.
Note thaat the PTU do oes NOT tran nsfer fluid fro
om A to B, and that the sselected devvices can be e
extended
AND retrracted by use of the PTU U but will opeerate according the used pumps. (EM MDP + PTU orr PTU
only)
Teaser . . . .how CAN
N you transfeer hydraulic ffluid from A→
→B or B→A???
A →B
1. EMDP's OFF.
2. Release parkking brakes, deplete accu umulator (<1 1800 PSI)
3. EMDP A, ON N and apply pparking brakees.
4. EMDP A, OFF and depresssurize by co ontrol column movementt.
5. EMDP B, ON and releasee parking brakes. (Sends tthe fluid bacck to system B)
A →B
1. EMDP's ON.
2. EMDP B, OFFF and depresssurize by co ontrol column movementt.
3. EMDP A, ON N and apply pparking brakees. (Uses fluid from systeem A)
4. EMDP B, ON and releasee parking brakes. (Sends tthe fluid bacck to system B)
B →A
1. EMDP's OFF
2. Either FLT COONTROL to SSTBY RUD.
3. No1 thrust reverser OUTT (uses stand dby hyd sys)
4. FLT CONTRO OL to ON.
5. EMDP A, ON N.
6. S
Stow No 1 thhrust reverseer (using sys A)
30
Wing
g Therm
mal Anti Ice (WT
TAI)
Wing anti‐ice is provvided for the inner three LE slats onlyy and is prefeerably used aas a DE‐icer. ANTI‐
ice would constantlyy heat up thee LE thereby melting the ice crystals immediately, creating waater
“runbackk” over the w wing and posssibly freezinng up on fligh
ht controls. BBesides that it would havve a
negativee effect on en ngine performance and ffuel consump ption.
Note thaat use above FL 350 may cause a dual bleed trip o off by the reqquest of the amount of aair also
note thaat (ENG) anti‐‐ice is not reequired when n < ‐40°C SATT.
The outeer slats are n not de‐iced bbecause the nnarrow outer slat cannott hold the haardware need ded such
as, a bleed manifold,, telescopic ttube and sprray tubes. Th he wing is acttually not prooducing mucch lift in
that areaa anyway and they realizzed that som me ice accretion on that p part of the wing would no ot hurt
too much. Eventuallyy some drag and increase in stall spe eed occurs, not to forget that in case you use
WTAI the stall warning computer remains set with increaased speed lo ogic.
Where there is little cooling airflow over the LE on the grround, they aare protected against
overheating. First the engine bleeed air is extrra cooled thrrough the pre‐cooler whiich allows tapped off
fan air to
o extra cool tthe engine b maximum LEE cooling on the ground. Second therre is an
bleed air for m
overheat sensor (± 1 125 °C) which h closes both
h WTAI valve es when exceeeded and op pening up aggain at a
predeterrmined valuee.
During the design/teest phase it turned out th hat ice does not accumulate on the eempennage, mainly
due to itts position inn relation to tthe engines causing hot air from the engines striking the emp pennage.
Although h some ice can build up iin that area, it doesn’t haave any adveerse consequ uences (the sstabilizer
regularlyy changes the AOA and eeventually sh hedding ice uunder the new w conditionss).
The milittary version of the Boein ng 737, the P8 Poseidon, does have a so‐called eleectro‐mechaanical
expulsion de‐icing syystems (EMEEDS) installed d on the leadding edges off the raked wwingtips, horizontal
and verttical stabilizeers. The systeem is specially designed ffor the aggreessive slow aand low levell cold
weatherr mission assignments of this aircraft and does baasically the saame as a de‐‐icing boot b but
deformss the LE self b by using low electrical cuurrent (28VDC and 25 Am mps).
31
B737 Yaw damping
Airplanes with continued Dutch Roll tendencies usually are equipped with gyro stabilized yaw
dampers. The Boeing 737 has two yaw dampers, a primary– and a standby yaw damper that keeps
the airplane stable around the vertical axis when selected ON and with the respective hydraulic
system pressurized through minimum SMYD generated rudder inputs.
When engaged in NORMAL OPERATION, the primary yaw damper provides input to the main Rudder
Power Control Unit (PCU) solenoid valve and is controlled by the Stall Management and Yaw Damper
Computer 1 (SMYD 1). The input solenoid valve uses hydraulic system B to move the yaw damper
actuator which ads in the mechanical rudder input. The yaw damper itself does not feedback motion
back to the rudder pedals. The yaw damper input to rudder movement is limited to 2° with flaps up,
and 3° with flaps down.
To engage the primary yaw damper select:
• Hydraulic system B ON,
• FLT CONTROL B switch ON and
• YAW DAMPER switch ON
o Engage light extinguishes
When engaged during MANUAL REVERSION, the standby yaw damper uses the standby Rudder PCU
and is controlled by SMYD 2 which operates with standby hydraulic system pressure.
During manual reversion the so‐called “Wheel To Rudder Interconnect System (WTRIS) supports
standby rudder operation through SMYD 2 which receives an input signal from the Captains control
wheel for coordinated turns during manual reversion.
To engage WTRIS and standby yaw damping select:
• Both FLT CONTROL switches OFF
• At least one FLT CONTROL switch to STBY RUD
• YAW DAMPER switch ON
o Engage light extinguishes
Both FLT CONTROL A and B switches must be OFF to enable SMYD 2, and one or both switches must
then be in the STBY RUD position to provide standby hydraulic pressure. WTRIS only operates at < M
0.4 and yaw damper input to the standby rudder PCU movements are limited to 2° with flaps up, and
2.5° with flaps down.
Both yaw damper systems are selected by a common “engage switch” on the Flight Control panel.
When selected ON and the YAW DAMPER light extinguished, it only tells you the respective yaw
damper is engaged regardless of operating by hydraulic pressure. During preflight the switch holds
and the light extinguishes even without hydraulic system B pressure. The other way, if you’d lose
system B pressure, the switch still holds with no light illuminated but primary yaw damping is lost.
The switch only kicks OFF when the FLT CONTROL B switch is deselected from the ON position. To
regain yaw damping you would have to transfer to manual reversion to operate the standby yaw
damper with the standby hydraulic system which you (of course) will not do.
32
Zone temperrature ccontrol
Temperaature control is achieved d by mixing cool Pack air wwith hot Pacck by‐pass air. The normaal
temperaature range sselection is frrom 18°C – 3 30°C through h mixing coldd air from thee Packs with trim air
for each individual coompartmentt. The left Paack provides 20% to the C Control Cabin and 80% to o the mix
manifoldd where the right Pack prrovides 100% % to the mix manifold. Th he Zone/Pack controllerss hold
the vario
ous control eelectronics foor the Cont CCabin and Paassenger zones. The Contt Cabin has tw wo
controlleers, a primarry and a backkup where th he Passengerr Cabin has o only one controller for eaach area
from either Zone/Pack controllerr. (see previo ous image) Iff both Cont CCabin contro ollers fail you
u’d get a
Cont Cab bin ZONE tem mp light withh a Master Caution, if one fails they illuminate on n recall. If a
Passengeer Cabin Con ntroller fails tthe ZONE temperature liight and Masster Caution illuminates on recall
and the two cabin reequirement w will be averaged. A ZONEE temperaturre light also iilluminate w when
there is aan exceedannce of duct teemperature,, the respective trim valvve will close w which can be e reset
by the reeset button wwhen cooled d down. (seleect colder onn that area)
In the no
ormal mode the Packs prroduce a tem mperature acccording the selection of the lowest
temperaature, the rem maining zonees use trim (hot) air requ uired for their selected teemperature.
Unbalanced mode (C Control Cabin n trim air maalfunction)
The left Pack producces the selectted Control C Cabin tempe erature and tthe right Pacck puts out th he
lowest PPassenger Cabin selected d temperaturre, the Passe enger zone trrim valves stiill operate.
Unbalanced averagee mode (any Passenger Cabin trim airr malfunction n)
The left Pack producces the selectted temperaature but the e trim air valvve still operaates and the right
Pack putts out an aveerage of both h Passenger C Cabin selecteed temperattures.
Single Paack operation and Trim O ON results in normal tem mp control, wwith Trim swittch OFF all trrim
valves close and the Pack averagges the threee compartme ent requiremments.
Trim swiitch OFF, all ttrim modulaating valves aare close andd the left pacck produces tthe selected Control
Cabin temperature w where the rigght pack produces an ave erage of the Passenger C Cabin selecte ed
temperaatures.
Temp seelectors OFF will create a fixed 24°C o output from the left and 18°C from th he right Packk.
33
Lavattory “firre prote
ection”.
I noted aalso B737 cabin crew “Likkes” to our FFB page, so I’’ll try to aim a couple of ssubjects in thhat
directionn, of course aalso “need to o knows” forr flight crewss.
Let’s start with Boein ng’s approacch of “fire pro
otection”, off course we’re discussingg fire detection &
extinguisshing NOT protection ;‐)
The lavatory smoke d detection syystem needs 28 VDC from m DC Bus # 1 to operate.
The lavatory is equip pped with a ssmoke detecction system and a fire exxtinguishing system. In so ome 73’s
you still find a “SMOOKE” annunciator light at the P5 forward overhead panel but mostly there e is no
indicatio
on on the fligght deck.
In the caabin we find smoke detecction indications through h the next co omponents:
1. Smoke Dete
S ctor Unit
As the name says, it’’s a smoke deetection and d the unit is m
mounted agaainst the ceilling of the lavatory. It
has a greeen (power) light and a rred (smoke d detected) ligh ht, also an alarm horn wiill sound whe en
smoke iss evident for > 8 secondss.
2. Lavatory Call Light
Located above the laavatory and iis a Call/Reseet Light that flashes amb ber when smoke is detectted.
3. Master Lavatory Call Ligh ht
At each EXIT locator light there aare three indicator lights where a flasshing amber Master Call Light
indicatess there is sm
moke detected in the lavaatory in that respective area (fwd. or aft).
4. Attendant Co
A ontrol Panels (fwd.& aft))
On thesee panels therre are more options than n just smoke detection as you can tesst the system m here
and deteect FAULTS. W When smokee is detected d a red light fflashes togetther with a fllashing locatter light
that idenntifies the arrea where the smoke is d detected and d an intermittent horn is sound throu ugh the
panel. Thhe switches and lights on n the panel aare self‐explaanatory, wheen a FAULT iss detected during a
test the failing detecctor is indicatted through the location n indicator.
5. Passenger Address (PA) ssystem
The PA ssounds a repetitive high cchime when smoke is de etected.
34
Center tank boost pumps
There are two boost pumps located in the center tank that feed fuel into the engine supply fuel
manifold at a rate of ± 10.000 Kgs per hour. The valves are mounted on either side of the crossfeed
valve so with a closed crossfeed valve the pumps provide pressurized fuel to their respective side,
the left center boost pump is than needed to supply positive fuel feed to the APU. Electrical power to
operate the pumps are left, AC transfer Bus 1 and right, AC Transfer Bus 2.
The design is such that there is no backflow possible through the pumps, meaning a check valve
prevents fuel transfer through the engine feed manifold. These pumps also do not have a by‐pass
valve which is needed for suction feed as with the main tank fuel pumps so, fuel in the center tank is
trapped when both center tank pumps are OFF or producing no pressure. (the fuel scavenge jet
pump (100 – 200 Kgs/hr.) is not considered a transfer flow)
The center tank boost pumps are of a higher pressure then the main tank pumps thereby causing the
center tank to empty first to prevent wing root stress when this would not be the case. The FCOM
limit states that the wing tanks have to be full when there is more than 453 Kgs of fuel in the center
tank. The second limit is related to that, i.e. when there is more than 453 Kgs in the center tank the
boost pumps must be ON.
I posted the C‐130 video where wing root stress caused the wings to shear off, the wing tanks were
not full and the aircraft uploaded water and chemicals in a huge tank inside the aircraft every time to
fight forest fires. About the same happens when the 453 limit is not honored with a possible
exceedance of the MZFW.
There are updated center tank boost pumps that automatically switch OFF when LOW PRESSURE
(<22 PSI) is detected for >15 seconds. As these newer type pumps modifications are not covered by
the FCOM the NOTE still exists to be on the flight deck when a center tank pump is operating.
The 2 LOW PRESS lights on the fuel panel are extinguished when the pumps are OFF where the main
tank pumps show LOW PRESS with their switch OFF. I call that “Recall Logic” as this would be a
normal condition when the center tank is empty and the pumps OFF, preventing the MCS to
illuminate FUEL at the Captain side Annunciator Panel (Recall) when pushed with the center tank
empty and the switches selected OFF. The LOW PRESS circuit is checked when the pumps are
selected ON for a short moment until the 22 PSI is reached.
35
Antisskid
The 73 iss equipped w with a system
m that prevent wheels fro om skidding (deceleratin ng), thereby
optimizing braking capabilities on any runwaay surface condition.
An antiskid condition n releases brrake pressuree to the affected wheel(ss) which stop ps the skid co
ondition
when:
• Uncommand d deceleratioon. (Antiskid protection)
• Wheel(s) sto
W ops instantanneously. (Loccked wheel p protection)
• Landing with h (parking) brakes ON. (TTouchdown p protection)
• Hydroplaning
To detecct a wheel un ncommanded deceleratio on, an electrrical so‐called
d transducerr is mounted d
underneeath the hubccap of each w wheel and iss monitored by the Antiskid/Autobrake Control U Unit
(AACU). This signal iss compared tto informatio on from both h Air Data Inertial Refereence Unit’s (ADIRU’s)
A
and is also used for aauto brake syystem wheel speed functions.
The AAC CU controls the anti‐skid system and monitors forr malfunction ns which aree indicated on the
flight deck by an Anttiskid Inoperaative Light. A
An additional signal to th he AACU com mes from the parking
brake syystem becausse the normaal antiskid syystem return ns (releases) hydraulic flu uid through the
parking brake valve. When the parking brakee valve has a disagree witth the lever (switch) the antiskid
inoperattive light also
o illuminatess.
Antiskid is provided during operaating normall (system B), alternate (syystem A), an nd operation of the
brakes wwith residual accumulator pressure. W When in norm mal operatio on, antiskid iss provided th
hrough 4
antiskid valves for eaach wheel seeparately and d during alte
ernate or emergency (acccumulator) o operation
through 2 antiskid vaalves whereb by the wheels are proteccted in pairs.
To alloww retract brakkes to operatte (Alternatee brake presssure, system A) the antisskid system iss de‐
energizeed when the gear retracts.
Be aware that the an ntiskid system
m releases bbrake pressurre, also durin ng emergenccy (accumulaator)
operatioon which wou uld reduce eemergency brrake applicattions when sstepping on tthe brakes to oo hard.
36
Leading Edge Flaps
High‐lift devices on each wing are 2 LE Krueger Type Flap Panels and 4 LE Slats. The LE flaps have 1
extend position, Full Extend where the LE Slats have 2 positions, Extend and Full Extend, indicated on
the aft overhead panel. On the center instrument panel just below the (TE) Flaps Indicator there is
also an amber LE FLAPS TRANSIT, and a green LE FLAP EXTEND light.
In NORMAL operation, the LE Flaps move by system B pressure to extend when the TE Flaps travel
away from the UP position. They move in sequence after the TE Flaps travel to their selected position
as commanded mechanically by a follow‐up cable system of the TE Flaps system. The extend time
from UP to EXTEND takes ± 7 seconds and from EXTEND to UP ± 7.5 seconds. When the B system
pressure is low, a so‐called priority valve gives operation priority to the LE Flaps over the TE Flaps. It
reduces the flow rate to the TE Flaps, so the LE Flaps move relatively faster to their extend position.
When the B system EDP pressure is low, the PTU supports LE Flap extend & retract movement. Refer
for PTU operation elsewhere on this B737Theory FB page.
In ALTERNATE operation, the LE Flaps uses standby hydraulic pressure and can only extend the LE
Flaps. (Red guarded switch indicates an irreversible action) In this case the command is electrically
through the Alternate Flap switches on the Flight Control Panel and the extend time from UP to
EXTEND is ± 32 seconds.
During cruise, pressure is removed from the LE Flap hydraulic system which creates a hydraulic lock
of the LE Flaps. This prevents LE Flap extension at high speeds/altitudes which is accomplished by
command of the Flaps and Slats Electronic Unit (FSEU).
This condition exists when the next condition is met for >5 seconds:
• Air born,
• Flap Lever UP,
• LE Flaps (and Slats) UP
The LE uncommanded motion (UCM) detection function stops the LE normal operation if two or
more LE flaps (or slats) move away from their commanded position.
Different than the LE Slats, the LE Flaps do not have an internal actuator locking device so when
residual system B pressure has leaked away during extended parking, the panels can droop off by
their weight and gravity forces. This will de‐activate the Stall Warning Test capability.
Rudder (vertical stabilizer) load reduction
As on most large aircraft the vertical stabilizer is one of the most fragile structural parts. It cannot
withstand large loads caused by full rudder deflection at higher speeds and therefore is protected
against those high forces. The 737 rudder main PCU receives input from the pedals through input
levers and a feel and centering unit which moves the rudder panel by hydraulic system A & B
pressure. Pressures will be at normal values (± 3000 PSI) when flying < 137 Kts, above 137 Kts a load
limiter reduces system A pressure to 1450 PSI resulting in a ± 25% reduction of the total load on the
rudder. The result of this reduction protects the vertical stabilizer against high forces at a higher
speed, leaving full pressure and deflection available when needed, at takeoffs and landings for
directional control.
An example of the vertical stabilizer “weak point” is an attempt in 2001 to recover an A300 after
being struck by wake turbulence and aggressive maximum rudder inputs which sheared of the
vertical stabilizer. Also note that the vertical stabilizer was the only intact part of the Air France 447
incident over the Atlantic.
37
In the paast of “my fieeld of experience” I saw a vertical staabilizer of a P
P3 Orion totaally being sheared
off like itt was removed with a chain saw wheen it struck a wash rack w when the airccraft has bee en
swapped d around by a twister at NAS Jackson nville and whhen a P3 hits a power cab ble at Pago Pago
Hawaii.
Be aware of the structural design n of your airccraft!!
38
Thrust Reverser
Each engine is equipped with a thrust reverser system that reduces stopping distance and brake disc
wear. The T/R’s reverse the fan airflow forward through blocker doors, cascades and translating
sleeves
The left T/R uses hydraulic system A and the right, system B where they both are able to receive
standby hydraulic pressure when their respective hydraulic system is unserviceable. Note that T/R
use with standby pressure is of a lesser rate so, losing one main hydraulic system will operate that
side slower than with main system pressure creating a possible swerve during reverser action.
The T/R’s are controlled by the T/R levers on the thrust levers and operate when < 10 ft. RA or on the
ground. The T/R operates when the thrust lever is at the Idle position and the T/R handle is lifted to
the interlock position when the isolation valve positions to deploy the “translating sleeves”. The
EEC’s determine through a Linear variable differential transformer (LVDT) a 60% opening of the two
sleeves on each T/R, where after the mechanical interlock releases and the levers can be lifted
further to the Detent 1, 2 or MAX position.
When the sleeves move, the CDS shows the next message on the Upper DU.
• Amber REV when deploying or stowing
• Green REV when fully deployed
When stowing the T/R’s, the stow command is initiated by passing the 1 Detent position which
commands the T/R sleeves to stow. When the T/R lever is full down and the sleeves at the 0%
(closed) position, the isolation valve closes and the locks engage.
During normal operation the amber REVERSER light on the engine control panel illuminates for 10
seconds without a MASTER CAUTION during a T/R stow operation and extinguishes when the locks
are engaged. The light will stay illuminated if the T/R does not stow in 10 seconds, indicating a
malfunction.
When the light illuminates for more than 12 seconds a malfunction is detected and the ENG
annunciator and MASTER CAUTION light illuminates.
When the down motion of the T/R levers is delayed for more than 18 seconds, the ENG annunciator
and MASTER CAUTION light illuminate and the locks will engage, preventing further movement of the
sleeves. To clear this situation you can cycle the levers to the interlock position and back down.
When a serious malfunction or disagree exists between the LVDT’s, the ENGINE CONTROL light
illuminates on the engine control panel together with a MASTER CAUTION. When illuminated, it
could mean a serious engine (EEC) malfunction or an LVDT malfunction/disagree, when illuminated
do not dispatch the aircraft.
39
Each T/R
R translating sleeve has two deactiva ation points, installing
i two
o pins at thesse points pre
events
T/R deplloyment. Follow the “thru
ust reverser deactivation
d for
f flight disppatch proced dure” from thee current
(AMM) manual
m to operate the aircraft with deactivated T/RR’s.
An auto––restow circuit compares actual reveerser sleeve p position to the command ded position. When
it determ
mines an inco omplete stowwage or uncoommand mo ovement of tthe sleeves to the deployyed
position,, the circuit ccommands to stow the TT/R. When acctivated, the isolation valve remains open
he stowed position until the thrust reeverser is co
and the control valvee is held in th ommanded to o deploy.
40
Tail S
Skid
41
Vorte
ex generrators.
The 737 is equipped with several boundary laayer control devices or, vvortex generrators (VG’s).
They aree mounted on the next lo ocations:
• the wings
t
• the tail cone
t e
• the inner en
t gine nacelle
• the nose
t
• the APU inle
t et door
The vorttex created bby the VG afffects the bou undary layer on the respeective surfacce behind the e device
by “pulling” air from outside, into the boundary layer. It creates an air swirl that draws air fro om
above thhe boundary layer into th his layer intensifying it an
nd making it more compaact. VG’s are e
mounted d to slow, co
ontrol or even prevent bo oundary laye er separationn.
VG’s aree used on thee 737 wings tto improve h high Mach pitch characteeristics beyon nd initial bufffet and
to lowerr stall speedss in the landing configuraation. The (back swept) w wing design ccreates a relaative
weak bo oundary layer where the outboard wiings are morre sensitive to initial flow w separation. The
purpose of the wing VG’s is to strengthen thee boundary llayer (especiially with higgh AOA’s) and d direct
the airflo
ow on the suurface contro ols.
On the tail cone, VG’’s are mountted to separaate the flow field from th he horizontal tail therebyy
reducingg drag, impro oving perform mance and reducing elevvator vibratio ons.
A Vortexx Control Devvice (or naceelle chine) is installed on the inboard side of the n nacelles. Thee engines
are mounted relativeely close to tthe wing whiich results in n air disturbance at high aangles of attack. To
control tthe air flow aat high AOA’s and slow speed, a Boeiing invented VCD is mounted on the inner
side of the engine naacelle. The crreated nacelle vortex is d delayed with h high AOA’s to support tthe
airflow oover the wingg, increasingg lift in thosee conditions.
There arre a number of VG’s mou unted on the nose of the aircraft just before the w windows. The
general purpose is to o reduce airfflow noise byy ± 3 – 4 Dbss. on the fligh
ht deck, direccting the airfflow
away froom sharp edgges and corn ners of the wwindows.
On the AAPU inlet doo or, there is a VG installedd to improve e high altitude starting off the APU. WWhen the
inlet dooor is opened during flightt, the VG imp proves inlet ram recovery and thereb by the pressu ure
differencce across thee APU even tto assist (electrical) starting.
42
Wind
dow hea
ating
43
Wing
g& Body
y Overhe
eat
44
Horizzontal S
Stabilize
er Trim
m.
One of the importan nt features reelated to pitcch and load b
balancing is tthe movablee horizontal sstabilizer
trim con ntrol (stab trim). A controol jackscrew moves the le eading edge of the horizo ontal stabilizzer as a
trim in oorder to achieeve this goall and can be operated:
• Manually byy two trim wh heels which o operate the stabilizers geearbox and jjackscrew through
c
cables and c able drums.
• Electrically eeither througgh yoke trim switches or Auto Pilot co ommand to tthe stabilizer
e
electrical trim
m actuator.
o AC p power – AC TTransfer Bus 2
o DC ccontrol – DC Bus 2
Electricaal movementt of the trim actuator by either the yo oke switch‐ o or the Auto PPilot will bacckdrive
the trim wheels on the control sttand. When the handle o on the wheells are extend ded during electrical
operatio on, this can innjure the opeerators leg/kknee.
Extremee UP of the leeading edge is restricted at 4.2°, and DOWN at 12 2.9°. Indicatioon in “Units”” is
mechaniically provideed on the co ontrol stand tthrough a fle exible cable tthat is drivenn off the trim
m control
mechaniism underneeath the fligh ht deck floor.. As referencce, the 0° neu utral position
n equals 4 un nits on
the trim position scaale.
Stabilizeer Trim Cutou ut switches aare located oon the contro ol stand in orrder to interrrupt either ccontrol
column sswitch–, or A AP electrical power towaard the trim m motor when an uncomm manded move ement or
“runawaay” trim occu urs.
A Stabilizer Trim Oveerride switch h is located o
on the aft ele
ectronic paneel in case a counter move ement of
the trim is required o opposite of tthe control ccolumn move ement. When not in OVEERRIDE, a me echanical
control ccolumn actuaated stabilizeer trim cutou ut switch willl interrupt electric poweer to the trimm motor
when atttempting to trim oppositte of control column or A AP command ded force. (co olumn nose DOWN
vs. trim UP or vv)
The overrride switch can also be u used to by‐ppass the conttrol column aactuated stab bilizer trim ccutout
switchess in the event both (yokee switch or AP) fail in the open positio on, to be able to operate e the
stab trim
m.
Electricaal movementt by the yokee switches caan vary betw ween high speeed (0.4 unitt/sec) when tthe flaps
are NOTT UP and low speed (0.2 u unit/sec) when the flaps are fully UP.. When the trim is under AP
control h high speed iss 0.27 unit/seec while low
w speed with the flaps UP P is 0.09 unit//sec.
45
Displlay Elecctronic U
Units.
46
Proximity Switch Electronic Unit
The PSEU is located on the right side in the E & E bay and receives input from the six strut
compression sensors (2 on each strut). These ground/air signals are used by the PSEU for several
aircraft systems and/or indications such as:
• Landing gear transfer valve
• Landing gear position indicating and warning
• Speedbrake deployed indication
• Takeoff warning
• Door warning
• Air/ground relays
• See image . . .
The PSEU also serves as a FAULT detection regarding several aircraft systems when on the ground
and the thrust levers <53°, or after landing when on the ground for >30 seconds and the thrust levers
<53°.
Generally speaking, the PSEU light is inhibited in flight but it does monitor systems and records any
FAULT to be annunciated 30 seconds after landing.
When a system status FAULT is detected or an overwing exit flight lock fails before take‐off, the PSEU
light illuminates together with the OVERHEAD annunciator and a MASTER CAUTION light.
An undispatchable FAULT is evident when the PSEU light illuminates after landing when on the
ground >30 seconds and the thrust levers <53°, in this case the light can only be reset by a BITE check
of the PSEU or when the FAULT is corrected by maintenance.
A dispatchable FAULT exists when the PSEU light illuminates after landing when on the ground for
longer than 30 seconds and the thrust levers <53° and the light extinguishes when the parking brake
is set or the engines are shutdown. A dispatch fault will not cause a recall of the Master Caution
annunciator light but just illuminates the PSEU indication.
A dispatchable (simple) FAULT occurs if the PSEU light illuminates when pressing RECALL and resets
by pressing MASTER CAUTION.
The SPSEU light or Supplemental Proximity Sensor Electronic Unit is provided that uses the Landing
Gear DOWN signal to extend the two position tail skid and/or to determine a failure of the flight
locks on the additional 2 mid exits. (– 900’s)
Note that some indications are only valid for certain models/serials.
47
Nose wheel ssteering
g lockou
ut
48
Weather radar
The on‐board weather radar can provide the following information:
• Weather
• Windshear
• Terrain
The WXR switch on either EFIS panel activates the weather radar and displays the weather radar data
on the ND in the MAP, MAP CTR, VOR & APP modes. (not in the plan mode) The radar covers 180° in
front of the aircraft by receiving transmitted radio frequency echo pulses on the ND’s. When selected
on the EFIS control panel in a correct display mode, the DEU’s send an analog discrete to the weather
radar control panel which sends it to the weather radar transceiver and switches it ON.
When the aircraft is equipped with a predictive wind shear system (PWS), it’ll be available below
2300ft. The weather radar does not need to be switched ON for the PWS to work, it switches ON
automatically when take‐off thrust (PL > 53°) is set. PWS information is available after the WXR
switch on either EFIS control panel is pushed and a 12 sec warm up period, where after Alerts
become available.
Alert activation regions for TAKE‐OFF are:
• Warnings and Cautions are enabled from 0 knots until the aircraft reaches 80 knots.
• From 80 knots until the aircraft passes 400 feet, only Warnings are enabled.
• From 400 feet through 1,200 feet, Warnings and Cautions are enabled.
• All alerts are disabled from the time the aircraft passes 100 knots until it reaches 50 feet.
Alert activation regions for APPROACH are:
• PWS switches automatically ON when the airplane descends below 2300 feet RA.
• PWS switches automatically OFF when one of the next conditions occur:
o Aircraft speed is less than 60 knots.
o Aircraft climbs above 2300 feet RA.
If PWS is ON and WXR is not selected on the EFIS panel, all antenna sweeps search for wind shear. If
WXR is selected, the antenna uses one sweep to search for wind shear and the other sweep to search
for normal weather returns. PWS operation does not affect the WXR mode or range selected by the
flight crew.
Alert activation regions for LANDINGare:
• Warnings and Cautions are enabled from the time the aircraft passes 1,200 feet until 400
feet.
• From 400 feet until 50 feet, only Warnings are enabled.
• From 50 feet until touchdown (0 feet), all alerts are disabled.
• No display Wind shear alerts are active in the cockpit below 1,200 feet AGL.
49
The weaather radar actually enterrs the wind sshear scanning mode at 2 2,300 feet AG GL to provide time
for the ssystem to power up (if neecessary) and
d update the e displays before the airccraft reachess the
1,200 feet AGL level..
TEST
During the test:
• The R/T tran
T nsmits a few pulses to lett the BITE moonitor for correct operation
• The R/T mak
T nds it to the DEU to show
kes a test patttern and sen w on the ND’’s
• The R/T send
T ds test messages, mode, gain and tiltt information n to the DEUs to show on n the
ND’s
• WXR test pa
W ttern shows on ND’s.
• The test patt
T tern shows uuntil anotherr mode on thhe WXR paneel or EFIS pan nel is selecte
ed.
50
Disso
olved air
51
Frang
gible fitttings
52
Rudd
der(verttical sta
abilizer)) load reductio
on
As on mo ost large airccraft the verttical stabilizeer is one of the most fraggile structuraal parts. It caannot
withstan nd large load ds caused by full rudder d deflection at higher speeds and thereefore is prote ected
against tthose high fo orces. The 7337 rudder maain PCU rece eives input frrom the pedaals through input
levers an nd a feel andd centering u unit which moves the rud dder panel byy hydraulic ssystem A & B B
pressuree. Pressures w will be at normal values (± 3000 PSI) when flying < 137 Kts, above 137 Ktss a load
limiter reeduces systeem A pressurre to 1450 PSSI resulting in n a ± 25% reduction of th he total load on the
rudder. TThe result off this reductiion protects the vertical stabilizer agaainst high fo orces at a higher
speed, leeaving full prressure and d deflection avvailable when needed, att takeoffs an nd landings fo or
direction nal control.
An exam mple of the veertical stabilizer “weak p point” is an attempt in 20 001 to recoveer an A300 aafter
being strruck by wakee turbulencee and aggresssive maximum rudder inp puts which ssheared of th he
vertical sstabilizer. Alsso note that the vertical stabilizer waas the only in ntact part off the Air Frannce 447
incident over the Atllantic.
In the paast of “my fieeld of experience” I saw a vertical staabilizer of a P P3 Orion totaally being sheared
off like itt was removed with a chain saw wheen it struck a wash rack w when the airccraft has bee en
swapped d around by a twister at NAS Jackson nville and wh hen a P3 hits a power cab ble at Pago Pago
Hawaii.
Be aware of the structural design n of your airccraft!!
53
Rejeccted Tak
keoff – sspeed b
brakes rrelation.
Let me sstart to tell th
hat the speed brakes alw ways refer to extension of both, groun nd and flightt
spoilers. As we all knnow, when laanding, the gground spoile ers are triggeered by the rright main strut
compresssion and thee flight spoileers when anyy strut comp presses.
During taakeoff, the sspeed brakess do not need d to be armeed but actually they are . . . . by a so ccalled
"speed b brake refused d take off (RTO) switch". The switch is activated w when you reeject the take eoff and
lift the th
hrust reverseer levers up with the thrust levers at IDLE. In turn
n they’ll activvate the RTOO switch
by a reveerser cam which will dep ploy the speeed brakes thrrough an autto speed brake actuator.
When acccording the QRH the speeed brake lever is raised by the Captaain, the RTO O switch (auto o speed
brake acctuator) doessn't operate anymore bu ut the speed brakes are n now manually deployed.
Everybody can help me out with triggering su hrikant does,, and I invite anybody to do so.
ubjects as Sh
Also exp periences “ou ut the field” improves the knowledge e of our FB page followerrs.
54
Electtrical Bu
us (bar))
We all have seen circcuit breaker panels and kknow there aare Electrical Busses behind them bu ut what
are theyy?
A Bus Baar functions aas a central tterminal in the aircraft electrical systtem to conneect main elecctrical
system p power to varrious electriccal components. It simplifies the wirin ng system annd provides aa
common n point from which voltagge can be disstributed thrroughout thee system. Alsso using Bus
Bars(commmonly located in the flight station o or galley) savves weight ass the copperr wiring is takken from
that poinnt in the airccraft instead of from the source for each electricaal componen nt, which would
require aa multitude o of distant wiiring . . . .and
d weight.
A Bus coonsists comm monly out of high capacity Copper strrips to which the several users are co onnected.
The Bussses are poweer fed from ttheir electrical sources (G Generator, Exxternal cart, Battery, TR or other
Busses) tthrough currrent limiters that protectt them and itts attached ssystems for h high currentss that in
turn couuld cause a fire hazard orr damage equ uipment. Fro om the Bus ittself individuual electrical
components are con nnected through a thermal protection n, a circuit breaker, whicch vary in cap
pacity
visible on top of them m.
The bus componentssidentify in D DC, and AC busses as they differ in th he amount off copper strip ps. The
DC bus bbar is formed d by two stripps, the +, and the – wherre the latter connects to the aircraft
structuree or Ground Bus. The AC C bus bar is fo ormed by thrree Copper sstrips, 3 AC p phases which h of
course aare isolated b by Teflon divviders. On top p of most Bu n strip mounted to
usses there iss an isolation
prevent a short to th he respectivee Bus would something cconductive sttrikes it.
55
Crew
w oxygen
n system
m
First of aall I’ll tell you
u that oxygen n is dangerou us!! It canno
ot mix with grease in anyw way causing an
explosion. That is thee reason when maintaineers charge O O², they wearr white coverralls to see iff there is
any greaase visible on n their clothing. O yeah so . . . do NOTT use lip chap sticks wheen using O²!!
A green oxygen cylin nder is moun nted in the E&&E bay and ccan be eitherr 114/115 ft³³ or 76 ft³. Th he
minimum m charge is ccompany relaated but mostly a rounde ed up value regarding the highest
temperaature and maaximum fligh ht deck occup pation (see yyour PI sectioon in FCOM 1 1). Maximum m
allowed indicated prressure is 185 50 PSI but th
he overboard d discharge vvalve is set att a whoppingg 2600
PSI weree the green in ndicator discc located justt behind the E&E bay acccess blows‐o out either by
overcharrging or by thermal expaansion.
There arre 2 indicatorrs for pressu ure, one direcct reading gaage on the bo ottle and thee second is oon the aft
overhead panel whicch gets an electrical signaal from a pick‐up in the m manifold and d is powered by the
Battery B Bus.
From thee bottle the pressure is rreduced to ± 60 – 85 PSI and has a prrotection at 1 100 PSI to prrevent a
too high pressure toward the reggulators.
The crew w regulators have the next options:
Normal –– in this posiition you havve to inhale tto get a dilutted oxygen flow meaningg it is a mix o of
environm mental (cockkpit) air and o oxygen. (no w wise during fumes/smokke)
100% ‐ yyou’ll inhale 100% oxygen n on demand d.
EMERGEENCY – in thiss position yo ou get pressu urized 100% oxygen through the massk.
There is a test lever o on each regu ulator to testt the oxygen system sepaarately. The first test is ju ust to
slide thee RESET/TESTT lever backw wards were it releases re esidual pressure in the mask with a sh hort rush
of air and indicating the yellow X X flow indicattor.
The seco ond test need ds to be perfformed in thhe EMERGENCY position o of the regulaator were yoou first
have to iidentify the crew pressure (in the maanifold) than n push the bu utton to test and slide
simultan neously the R RESET/TEST lever backwaards for 5 secconds. This sshould resultt in a constan nt flow
of air witth the X flow w indication. There should be no morre decrease tthan 100 PSI,, a sharp dro op‐off or
slow increase of presssure on thee indicator. W When any of the previouss occurs the valve on the e bottle is
either closed or not completely o open. After tthis don’t forrget to rotatee the test bu
utton back to o 100%.
The test can be perfo ormed togetther with thee mask micro ophone test ((SP 1 in FCOM M 1) through h
selectingg MASK, FLT INT and SPK KR on the aud dio elect pannel so you’ll h
hear the rush h of air throu
ugh the
cockpit sspeaker wheen simultaneously pushin ng the INT sw witch during tthe O² test.
Not all companies perform thiss test but
rememb ber it is emeergency equiipment so
it can saafe your day during No on‐Normal
procedures as you h have to estab blish crew
commun nication som mewhere!
56
Main
n system
m hydrau
ulic pum
mps, (co
orrected
d)
57
Cockp
pit Voicce Recorrder Sysstem
The Voicce Recorder Unit (VRU) iss water, shocck, and heatp proof and is located in th he aft cargo
comparttment. The C CVR controls are on the fw wd overhead d panel.
The VRU U receives po ower from th he AC XFR Bus 2 (VOICE R RCDR on P18‐‐2) and is equipped with an
Underwaater Locator Device whicch activates .. . . submerged in water tto a depth of ± 20.000 ft. The
37.5 khzz, one second d pulse tone is detectablee for > 30 daays within a rrange of maxximum ± 3.5 Km.
The CVR R records aud dio from the three ACP’s,, and cockpitt area on a 4 channel solid state conttinuous
loop datta tape for 12 20 seconds, w where after the tape eraases the first recording an nd stores the e current
audio.
There coould (depend ding on type)) also be provisions to sto ore ACARS data link messsages or clocck inputs
from either the Capttains, or Firstt Officers clo ock on the CV VR tape.
The cockkpit voice reccorder contrrol switch is located on th he overhead panel and h has the next
functions:
• Controls VRU
C U switching p power which h comes from m DC Bus 2 (V VOICE RCDR RELAY on P1 18‐2).
• ON, O the CVR R receives power for maaintenance or o pre‐flight testing,the switch automatically
positions to AUTO when either engin ne reaches id dle RPM.
• AUTO, the C
A CVR receives power wheen either enggine reachess idle RPM and remains powered
until 5 minuttes after thee last engine has been shut down.
On certaain 737’s the CVR becomes activated any time the ere is AC
power on the aircrafft so there is no control sswitch on the e ovhd
panel. (cc/b in)
On the CCVR recorderr panel are lo ocated:
• Area microp
A hone
• Channel mon
C nitor indicator and/or staatus indicato or light
• Test button
T
o Creaates a test to one toward the 4 channels (Captain, FFirst Officer, Observer an nd area)
o Thesse tones are indicated byy a deflection into the grreen area of the channell monitor
indiccator. Can bee heard when plugged in n to the head dset jack.
o Wheen a fault is detected, the
t audio to one stops annd the indicaator stays in
n the red
areaa, or extingu
uishes the status light. When
W no fau
ults are deteected the staatus light
illum
minates mom mentarily.
• Erase button n
o Can only be used d when on th he ground (P PSEU determines that) with the parking
brakke.
o Activvates when h holding the b button for > 2 seconds (aalso can be >> 5 seconds)
• Headset jackk
o For ttest tone transmission or recording p playback.
The CVR R circuit breaker should b be in all the time and can be pulled (ccompany policy) when tim me
allows affter an emerrgency evacu uation or when the Captaain deems th his necessaryy when he waants to
save valuuable inform mation of thee last 120 min nutes prior p pulling the c//b after flightt.
58
Presssure con
ntrol
To survivve at altitudee the 737 is eequipped witth an autom matic altitude control systtem by mean ns of
pumpingg air in, and rrestricting air out. There are two iden ntical digital Cabin Pressure Controlle ers (CPC)
that alteer each flightt, and back each other up p in the evennt of a failingg CPC.
Pressurizzation start w with an input on the oveerhead pressurization con ntrol panel o
of a cruise–, aand
landing aaltitude wheere after all p pressure events happen aautomatically. This startss by moving the
throttless up until N1 on both enggines reaches 60% > 1.5 sseconds, or N N2 reaches 889% >1.5 secconds. At
that mom ment the outflow valve m moves towarrds close, briinging the caabin altitude to ± 200 ft b below
field elevvation by raising the differential presssure to 0.1 P PSID. This prrevents unco omfortable pressure
surges wwhen rotation n creates a nnegative presssure outside e of the outfflow valve byy its position.
After liftt off the conttrol changes into the clim
mb mode, inccreasing the diff/press to oward the firrst limit
of 7,45 P PSID at 28.0000 ft keepingg the cabin att the departu ure field elevvation until aapproximateely
18.500 ft. After climb bing through h 28.000 ft th
he diff/presss increases to o 7.80 PSID u
until 37.000 fft where
after it in
ncreases to tthe maximum m automaticc limit, 8.35 PPSID. The AM MM also men ntions a maximum
diff/presss when deviiating from aaltitude of 8.45 PSID but this is not byy FCOM wheere the maxim mum
cabin alttitude is 8.0000 ft.When the cabin altittude exceeds 10.000 ft, aa cabin ALTITTUDE ALERT sounds
togetherr with the illu umination off Cabin Altituude Warningg lights on bo oth forward p panels. (whe
en
installedd) At a cabin altitude of 114.500 ft the outflow valvve receives aa close signall overriding tthe Cabin
Pressuree Controller.
The maxximum cabin ROD during takeoff (to 0 0.1 PSID) is 3
350 fpm and cabin ROC d during the cliimb is
600 fpm (can be 750 0 fpm).
When ap pproaching tthe set FLT A ALT by 500 ft (0.25 PSI), thhe pressure controller en nters the cru
uise
mode off operation aand maintain ns a constantt cabin altitude. The otheer way aroun nd, when desscending
further tthan 0.25 PSI from the seet FLT ALT, th he controllerr changes intto the descen nd mode of
operatio on and pressu urizes the caabin with 3500 fpm (can be 500 fpm or 750 fpm). TThe controlle er
automattically changees to a higheer pressurizin 50 fpm when a cargo fire is detected.
ng rate of 75
59
After landing the controller maintains a diff/press of 0.15 PSID equivalent to 300 ft below landing
field elevation until both engines spool down to N1 < 50%, or N2 < 84% for at least 1.5 seconds
where after the outflow valve is commanded open.
An OFF SCHED DESCENT indicates together with a Master Caution and an AIR COND annunciator
when descending before the set FLT ALT is reached. When this occurs, the CPC resets the landing
altitude automatically to the (stored) departure field elevation so you don’t have to reset when an
immediate return to that field is required. Anytime when the FLT ALT is changed during flight, the
destination field elevation data is lost.
If one CPC fails the backup CPC takes over, indicated by an amber AUTO FAIL (Master caution and AIR
COND annunciator) and a green ALT light on the control panel. When ALT is selected on the mode
selector, the AUTO FAIL light extinguishes but the ALT light remains illuminated.
If both CPC’s fail it will be indicated by an AUTO FAIL and Mater Caution together with FLT & LAND
ALT flashing dashes in the windows. (no ALT light as this function is unavailable)
60
Runw
way Awa
areness and Ad
dvisory System (RAAS))
Sometim mes referred to as “SMAR RT LANDING FEATURE”.
The RAA AS is an optio
on on the Boeeing 737NG to the EGPW WS, which speecifies alertss or notifications
regardin ng your position, and a ru unway positio on. It is highly SA improvving, preventting runway
incursion ns by visuallyy (on the NDD) and verbal warnings, iff an incorrectt aircraft possition versus runway
exists.
The system uses the aircrafts GP PS position inn conjunction n with EGPW
WS stored airp port and run nway
data which are comp pared, wheree after an aleert is passed onto the cockpit system ms.
When RA AAS is enableed the system operates w without any action of thee crew. The ccallouts can be
stopped by selection n of the Runw way Inhibit SSwitch on the e EGPWS con ntrol panel inndicated by tthe
RUNWAYY INOP lightt. The light also illuminates when input data (GPSS, Airport datta) to the RA AAS
operatio on is incorrecct or not available.
ROUTINE ADVISORIEES
1. Approaching
A g Runwaypro ovides in‐thee‐air awaren h runway thee aircraft is lined up
ness of which
w
with on appr roach.
2. Approaching
A g Runway prrovides on‐th he‐ground aw wareness of approximate runway ed dge being
a
approached by the aircraaft during taxi operations.
3. On Runway
O provides aw wareness of w which runwayy the aircraftt is lined‐up with.
4. Distance Rem maining provides awareness of aircraft along‐traack position rrelative to th he
runway end..
61
NON‐RO
OUTINE ADVISORIES
1. Runway End d improves awareness off the aircraft position relaative to the rrunway end during
low visibilityy conditions.
2. Approaching
A g Short Runwway providess in‐the‐air aawareness off which runw way the aircrraft is
lined‐up with h, and that the runway leength available may be m marginal for normal landing
o
operations.
3. Insufficient Runway Len ngth providess on‐the‐ groound awaren ness of which h runway thee aircraft
is lined‐up wwith, and thatt the runwayy length avaiilable for takkeoff is less than the defined
minimum takeoff runway length.
4. Extended Ho olding on Ru unway advisoory provides crew awareness of an exxtended hold ding
period on the runway.
5. Taxiway Tak
T ke‐Off providdes awareness of excessive taxi speed ds or an inaddvertent take e‐off on
a
a taxiway.
6. Rejected Takkeoff / Distaance Remain ning providess position aw wareness durring a Rejecte ed Take
O
Off (RTO).
7. Taxiway Lan
T nding providees awareness that the aircraft is not lined up with h a runway aat low
a
altitudes.
62
Electtro Moto
or Drive
en Pump
ps Overrheat
I receiveed a question n why the EMMDP’s have aan OVHT protection and tthe EDP’s no ot.
Looking at the imagee it is self expplanatory, thhe (EMDP) hyydraulic pum mp is operateed by an elecctro
motor th hat creates hheat, where tthe engine driven hydrau ulic pump is directly driveen from the engine
gear boxx. The impeller type first stage pump,, pumps cooling fluid to tthe casing arround the electro
motor an nd pre‐presssurizes fluid ttoward the nnine piston vvariable displlacement pump.
The EMD DP’s have an overheat indication if th he pump ove erheats, it deepends on tyype whether it is the
cooling ffluid, or the eelectric motoor that overhheats. Also itt depends on n type if the motor shutss down
automattically, or only the light illuminates w when an overheat exists rrequiring crew action to sshut that
overheated pump do own.
The elecctro motor teemperature sswitch bringss ON the OVERHEAT light when the ttemperature e is 113
°C or mo ore, and reseets at temperratures betw ween 85 °C an nd 102 °C.
The seco ond possibilitty is that AC power is remmoved autom matically when the electro motor
temperaature reaches 124 °C or m more stoppin ng the EMDP P, and resets at 60 °C to 7 71 °C.
The casee drain fluid ((also from thhe EDP) is routed through h the oil‐to‐ffuel heat excchangers on tthe
bottom o of the main w wing tanks, tto cool the h
hydraulic fluid before returning back into the rese ervoir.
This is doone for cooliing purposess (of course) and to preve ent foaming. Rememberr that for gro ound
operatio ons there is aat least 760 K
Kg’s of fuel needed, to acccomplish en nough cooling for sufficie
ent heat
exchanger (cooling) operation.
Switchinng the EDP to o OFF only closes the dep pressurizatioon solenoid vvalve downsttream of the pump,
stoppingg the output to the system.
The EDP supply shutoff valve upsstream of the pump stayys open until the FIRE SW WITCH is pulle
ed.
63
Cockp
pit pane
el “+” sy
ymbols..
(red circled on the immage)
I used to o look aroundd, challenge (and being cchallenged) p pilots and fligght engineerrs during “lon
ng haul”
flights, ggaining know
wledge on sysstems and fliight deck surrroundings not to forget situational
awareneess. Did you eever wonderr what the raandom “+” syymbols on th he cockpit/avvionics panels
represen nt? Probablyy not, but herre is the short explanatioon on them aas a nice to kknow subjectt.
Underneeath those “++” symbols aare the wiringg connectorss (Cannon plugs) located for backligh hting, or
electricaal components (gauges) o on that paneel. If any of th
he electrical componentss / backlightiing fail or
flickers, gently tap th
hat location oon the panel to possibly correct the o occurring problem. Of co ourse,
after lannding call outt maintenancce to have a closer look aand fix it.
64
Overh
head (P
P5) pane
el drain
ns.
I’ve receeived a questtion from one of our follo owers related to the prevvious post, m
meaning whaat is the
purpose of specific (and sometim mes unnoticeed) compone ents around yyou on the flight deck.
Q: Whatt is the purpo ose of the veertical tubes against eachh side of the fwd (1L and 1R) window w frames
coming ffrom the oveerhead panel?
Well . . . . it appears that the fibeerglass insulaation blanketts of the oveerhead panel are such, th
hat it
creates ccondensation above the overhead paanels. The vaariation of warm cockpit air and cold aircraft
skin tem
mperature pro oduces a mo oist environmment behind the P5 overh head panels,, which could
d cause
electricaal problems. Boeing mounted a plastiic “drip pan”” to collect th hat condensaation moisteer and
drain it tthrough thosse tubes to the aircrafts ffuselage drain system.
65
Close
ed crosssfeed va
alve on ttakeoff and lan
ndings?
There is aa limitation onn the NG to asssure that thee fuel crossfee
ed valve is clossed for takeofffs and landinggs. I’ve
found thiis rule in somee Company M Manuals and trry to give a decent answer tto the questio on of one of our
followerss . . . . WHY??
Note thatt it is NOT in tthe up‐to‐datee manuals I haave in my possession so, I d do NOT know if this limit stiill applies
to your current Compaany operation so . . . . be caareful. (although the rule caan do no harm m if all is norm
mal)
By the waay, power sou urce for the crrossfeed valvee is the Batteryy Bus.
Original (older) AFM teext:
Fuel Limitations:
• Fuel Crossfeed valve must be closed for takeoff and laanding.
One of thhe reasons I caan think of, is that when yo ou’re close to an imbalance condition (45 53 Kg/1000 Lb bs), you
could end d up with an aactual imbalan nce when the valve is open.
Mind you u, Boeing philo osophy inhibitted the imbalaance warning on the groun nd so it’s only active in the aair. Don’t
ask me wwhy, just pay aattention on th he wing fuel looad before yoou rotate prevventing unwan nted roll move ements
dependin ng on the amo ount of differeence between the wing tanks fuel load.
Further eexplanation is that the fuel pumps do nott always (neve er) deliver an equal pressurre, so a pump p with
higher ouutput pressuree will feed botth engines witth an open cro ossfeed valve resulting in aa possible imb balance
during higgh thrust setttings. This wouuld be the casse at takeoff–,, or go‐around d thrust, so exxactly the mom ments
that you’re not paying attention to tthe fuel load.
In the image the left FW WD pump pro oduces the higghest pressure e thereby feed ding both enggines with fuel from
tank #1.
Another rreason could be safety wisee, if anything happens with h a massive strructural probllem (crash) th he valve
separatess both sides o of the fuel mannifold reducinng hazardous cconditions.
66
Ambe
er AUTO
O BRAK
KE DISAR
RM Ligh
ht
The next conditions are related to th he illuminatioon of the AUTO O BRAKE DISA ARM light.
First of alll it starts wheen RTO is selected (on the gground), the aamber AUTO B BRAKE DISARM M light will illu
uminate
for 1 – 2 sseconds,indicating a self‐teest of the system and when n successful it will extinguish. On the other hand
when thee test was not successful, th he light remains illuminated d.
When any auto brake sselection (1, 2 2, 3 or MAX) iss madefor landing and the system self‐teest fails, the A AUTO
BRAKE DIISARM light illluminates and d auto brakingg is inhibited.
When an RTO selection n was not manually deseleccted before laanding, the AU UTO BRAKE DIISARM light w will
illuminatee ± 2 seconds (AMM says 1 1.4) after toucch down sense ed through thee PSEU, and n no auto brake occurs.
The AUTO O BRAKE DISA ARM amber ligght comes on when autobraakes are seleccted and any o of the next conditions
occur:
• a malfunction
a ning autobrakee system
• a malfunction
a ning(normal) aantiskid system m
• manually overriding the au utobrake systeem by stepping on the brakkes
When aftter touchdown (or RTO)autto braking is in nitiated, the AAUTO BRAKE D DISARM lightillluminates wh hen:
• moving the sp peed brake levver down/dettent
• advancing the
a e thrust leverss (not within 33 seconds afte er touch down n)
• manual brakin ng is applied
More in d depth technical activation o of the light is rrelated to the
e Hydraulic sysstem B pressu ure to the systtem and
causes thhe light to illum minate when:
• RTO autobrakke is command ded to apply, and the auto brake solenoid valve presssure is low
• the autobrake
t e selector is in
n the OFF position andthe ssolenoid valvee pressure increases more tthan 1000
PSI
The last ccause is an invvalid input to tthe antiskid/aautobrake con ntrol unit (AACCU) from the A ADIRU
O yeah do on’t forget the light test an nd pushing thee light ;‐)
67
B737
7 Fire prrotectio
on
GENERALL NOTES:
• FIRE EXTINGU UISHING is pow wered by the HOT BAT BUSS, so dischargee is possible even with all electrical
power OFF.
• APU & ENG D
A DETECTION sysstems are pow wered by the BBAT BUS.
• WHEEL WELL
W FIRE DETECTIION system usses AC pwr (A AC transfer buss 1), so this AC
C bus must be e
powered by aany AC source (APU or Eng. Gen, Ext pwr) energized fo or operation o of this system..
• OVHT & FIRE
O indications arre shown on the flight deckk on;
o OVHT&FIRE protection panel
o Cargo fire panel
o Mastter caution paanel.
ENGINES
• Dual loop oveerheat/fire dettection system m
o when n 1 loop fails, there will be NO flight deck indication bbut the fault detection systeem
automatically discconnects the d defective loop
p).
o If both (2) detecto or loops on thee same enginee have faults, the FAULT ligght will illumin
nate.
o Therre will be NO M MASTER CAUTTION.
• 2 Extinguishe
2 r bottles for 2
2 engines.
o Both h can be used for an “on‐sid de & off‐side” engine fire.
APU
• Single loop fir
S re detection. ((no overheat)
• 1 Extinguisher bottle. (can also be contro olled from AP
PU ground con ntrol panel)
• When an APU
W U FIRE is deteccted, the APU will automatiically shut dow wn but NOT automatically
e
extinguish.
COMPARTMEN
CARGO C NT
• Uses (dual loo op) SMOKE deetection system
o 4 dettectors in FWD CARGO COM MP (all 737NGG's)
o 4 dettectors (737‐6 600)
o 6 dettectors in AFTT CARGO COM MP (737‐7/8/900's)
o Poweered by DC BU US 1 & 2.
• Fire EXTINGUISHING by;
o 2 nozzzles (HALON)) in the ceilingg in FWD CARG GO COMP (alll 737NG's).
o 2 (73 37‐600) or 3 (7 737‐7/8/900'ss) in AFT CARG GO COMP.
o (EXTINGUISHERS, so powered b by HOT BAT BU US)
WHEEL W
WELL
• 1 Loop for FIR RE detection in n main landing gear wheel well
• EXTINGUISHIN NG by lowerin ng the landingg gear (below max LG exten nsion speed)
68
Startt switch functio
ons.
ons on the staart switch represent several important fu
All positio unctions towaard starting en
ngines and prootecting
the mightty CFM’s against unwanted d or uncommaanded decay in N2, and/or flame‐outs. The start switcch
position iis monitored bby the EEC (th
hrough the DEEU’s) to activate the several functions and related actions of
the switch, together wwith igniter selection.
OFF
• Neither igniteer is activated when the staart lever is in the cutoff position.
• O
On ground, w when N2 dropss below 57% u until 50%, both igniters will activate wheen the start levver is in
t
the Idle positi
ion.
• In flight when
n N2 drops below Flight Idlee RPM until 5% %, both igniteers will activate when the sttart lever
is at Idle.
GRD
• TThe engine bleed valve (solenoid) is com mmanded to close the valvee.
• T
The starter va alve opens.
• O
On ground, th he selected ignniter(s) will acctivate.
o Poweered by Xfr bu us 1 for enginee #1 left ignite er, AC stdb buus for the right igniter.
o Poweered by Xfr bu us 2 for enginee #2 left ignite er, AC stdb buus for the right igniter..
• In flight, both igniters will aactivate.
o You d do not want tto be bothered d by a failed sselected igniteer when you nneed to start aan engine
in‐flight. There mu ust be a reaso on why you waant to start a sshut‐down en ngine like a gre
eater
probblem on the (oonly) operating engine.
• T
The EEC is pow wered from itts XFR bus (1 ffor eng #1, 2 ffor eng #2) beelow 15% N2 w where after an n AC
a
alternator mo ounted on thee gear box takes over;
o > 15% % N2 (gearbox RPM) it’ll prroduce enough AC power to o operate thee EEC.
o On a battery start you won’t see EGT, FF, Oil press & oil teemp until the EEC becomes powered
afterr reaching 15%% N2.
• ECU (APU) recceives a signal to open the APU IGV’s.
o To provide maxim mum air capaciity and pressu ure for startingg.
• A
At 56% N2, th he starter swittch is comman nded to move e to the OFF po osition. (AMMM says 55%)
o This is the AUTO p position with n newer switch features.
CONT
• On ground, acctivates the seelected igniter(s) when the start lever is at Idle.
O
• In flight, activvate both ignitters when N2 drops below idle also with the start leveer at the Idle p
position.
• S
Selected;
o Takee‐off.
o Land ding.
o Before TAI is seleccted.
69
FLT
• Activate both igniters.
• Selected;
o Adverse weather.
AUTO (when installed)
• Ignition is OFF.
• Both igniters activate when engine start lever is in IDLE and:
o An uncommanded rapid decrease in N2 occurs
o On ground, N2 is between 57% and 50% or,
o In flight, N2 is between idle and 5%.
• Activates selected igniters when:
o Below 18000 feet altitude and flaps extended.
o TAI is selected.
70
Fuel nozzle “coking”.
I’d like to emphasize a procedure in the FCOM toward shutting down the engines related to something that’s
known as coking.
First of all what is “coke” besides cola, it is fuel derived from refined petroleum with a high percentage of
carbon.
Next the procedure described in the FCOM 1’s Normal Procedures;
Operate the engines at or near idle thrust for a minimum of three minutes before shutdown to thermally
stabilize the engines and reduce under cowl soak‐back temperatures. Routine cool down times of less than
three minutes before engine shutdown can cause engine degradation.
Finally the explanation why these 3 minutes of cool down before shutdown;
Temperatures in the combustion chamber run up to ± 1700 °C which goes unnoted by the aircrew, as they get
the EGT in the exhaust presented on the Upper DU, generally around 400°C at Idle. When shutting down a jet
engine at higher than Idle RPM, the temperature in the combustion chamber is substantially higher than at
Idle. This results in a higher than normal residual fuel nozzle temperature at shut down, which causes carbon in
the residual combustion chamber fuel vapor to settle (coking) on the nozzles. This settled carbon on the
nozzles can disturb the normal spray pattern of the fuel on subsequent operation of the engine resulting in a
disturbed flame pattern, negatively affecting engine performance and/or damage the combustion liner as in
the image. Also there is an example image (not CFM56) of carbon settled on a jet engine fuel nozzle.
When Idle RPM is used for ± 3 minutes, the nozzle temperature is that low, that fuel nozzle “coking” is
diminished resulting in a safer, more economic, longer, less maintenance engine life reducing costs.
71
Dual bleed light
The DUAL BLEED light illuminates when there is a “possibility” of two bleed sources to the left side of the bleed
manifold where APU bleed connects. These two sources are related to one of the engines and the APU, so not
related to two engines or external air.
It are the ENGINE BLEED VALVE switch positions, in combination with the ISOLATION VALVE, together with an
open APU BLEED VALVE that makes the light to illuminate. So during non engine operation (pre‐flight) with the
ENGINE BLEED VALVE switches in ON together with an operating APU and the APU BLEED VALVE open, the light
illuminates. The APU needs to operate to open the APU BLEED VALVE by pressure, with the switch in ON and
the APU shut down, the valve closes.
The APU puts out a nominal pressure of ±36 PSI to the bleed manifold where the engines in Idle (9th stage air)
±32 PSI (or ±34 PSI from the 5th stage) which means that the APU is supplying air to the bleed manifold as this is
higher pressure. In this case, the ENGINE BLEED VALVE (and HIGH STAGE VALVE) are closed as it senses a higher
downstream backpressure. When the DUAL BLEED light is illuminated according the above explanation, you
need to stay at Idle thrust to prevent a possible backpressure to the APU as what the books say. When you
move the thrust levers up to above Idle, bleed pressure from the 5th stage increases above 34 PSI closing the
HIGH STAGE VALVE and 36 PSI preventing the APU to supply pressure to the manifold, so the engine bleed
takes over.
Actually the books “tells” the crew that an engine (or engines) and the APU both supply pressure to the
pneumatic manifold at the same time which should reminds you to use Idle thrust only. This is just to be sure,
that the APU BLEED VALVE is closed when the light is extinguished.
Looking at the image it is mechanically impossible (except with a failing check valve) that the engine bleed
backpressures the APU because there is a check valve, preventing the APU BLEED VALVE receiving a higher
backpressure.
There are (a lot) more Boeing design related questions which I receive on a weekly bases which remain
questions, so is this light and failing check valve issue but . . . stick to the procedure and restrict thrust to Idle
when the light is illuminated.
72
Air Cycle Machine operation
The two air condition packs provide “conditioned” air (temp and moisture) to the air condition
system. They are supplied with bleed air from the bleed manifold, normally from the APU or the high
pressure compressor of the engines. Hot air flowing into the packs has a temperature of ± 199 –
227°C, controlled by the engine BASOV and the pre‐cooler. To get to the normal temperature range
of 18 – 30°C of the AC system, it needs to be cooled which is accomplished by the two packs.
Let’s look at the flow of air through a pack explaining the components the air passes. Air enters the
pack through the PACK FLOW CONTROL VALVE and can go in two directions, into the cooling circuit
or it by‐passes the so called ACM (air cycle machine) circuitry.
The cooling cycle starts at the “primary” (air–to–air) heat exchangers that cools the air. The heat
exchanger works like car radiator but exchanges hot bleed air to the ram air duct airflow. On the
ground by the way, duct airflow is created by a fan which is driven off the ACM. Next the air “hits”
the compressor of the ACM which turns the compressor and turbine resulting in an increase of
pressure and temperature. Another “secondary” heat exchanger cools the air again, where after the
following components in the manifold are to “create” and extract water from the air. A “secondary”
water extractor drains water from the manifold, a re‐heater pre cools the air before it enters the
condenser and warms the air (from the 2nd water extractor) before it enters the turbine to increase
efficiency of that turbine operation. The condenser creates water droplets in the air where after the
“primary” water extractor removes water by creating a swirling motion, “centrifuging” that water to
the outer collector wall where it is collected and relieved in the ram air duct adding in cooling at the
heat exchangers. The last component of the pack is the expansion turbine which can cool the air to
below the freezing level as a function of very fast expansion (extracting energy) of the air. Finally the
air is mixed with by‐pass air representing the pack control requested output temperature.
The pack is protected against a request of a too high demand of cool air, thereby overloading that
pack. This is accomplished by several temperature sensors detecting over temperatures in the
cooling cycle causing the pack to trip off line. If this happens, it closes the pack flow control valve
indicated by the PACK OFF indication on the bleed panel together with a MASTER CAUTION light (AIR
COND). The solution to this problem is to let the pack cool down and selecting a warmer temperature
before resetting and “unloading” the tripped pack or else the overload/overtemp will occur again.
Water is extracted from the air to protect the avionics in the aircraft against moisture, to prevent
mold to form and against oxidation of metal components.
73
Airstair
The (optional) most common airstair is located below the left forward main entry and is controlled from the
forward attendant panel, or from outside the aircraft. Another option is an airstair below the left aft entry door
which is not discussed in this post.
Inside control:
The interior control panel has two modes of operation, NORMAL and STANDBY.
• NORMAL operation is powered from the 115V AC standby bus.
o either the extend or retract switches are depressed momentarily to operate the stairs.
• STANDBY operation is powered from the switched hot battery bus, so the BATTERY SWITCH must be
positioned ON.
o both, the standby switch AND the retract or extend switch must be pushed and hold to
operate the airstair.
The forward entry door to has be partially open before electrical power is available to operate the airstair.
When the stairs reaches full extension, electrical power is automatically shut off to the motor and the tread
lights are turned on. (when rotary switch is in AUTO)
NORMAL operation is interlocked by handrail switches to prevent the stair from being retracted with the
handrail extended but the STANDBY system bypasses these switches so caution has to be exercised to prevent
damage.
Outside control:
When operating the airstair from the outside, the forward entry door does NOT to be open for airstair
operation as the exterior control switch by‐passes the door open requirement.
The power selection switch provides NORMAL and STANDBY operation of the airstair and is spring loaded to
NORMAL. In NORMAL, the 115 VAC AC standby bus powers the airstair electrical motor so the BATTERY
SWITCH needs to be ON.
The STANDBY position provides DC power from the 28 VDC switched hot battery bus for airstair operation
where this (external STANDBY) switch energizes the switched hot battery bus regardless of BATTERY SWITCH
position.
Both NORMAL and STANDBY operation are interlocked by handrail switches to prevent the stair from being
retracted with the handrail extended. Caution must be exercised when using the maintenance switch located
under the airstair. If the upper handrail extensions are not properly stowed before retraction, damage to the
airplane structure or damage to the airstair handrail may result.
An amber AIRSTAIR light, located on the overhead door caution annunciator panel, illuminates (provided DC
bus 1 is powered) when the airstair pressure door is unlocked, also illuminating the AIRSTAIR light and the
DOORS annunciator light together with the MASTER CAUTION lights
.
74
Equipment Cooling
Electronic and Electric equipment heats up substantially when used and requires cooling to operate without
overheating. The equipment cooling system consists of a supply‐, and an exhaust duct with respective NORMAL
and ALTERNATE fans. (4 fans) The two separate systems cool their own respective electronic components
either by applying cool air, or removing warm air. The result of a failed or shut down individual system, affects
specific components which are described next;
The “supply system” pushes cool air from the Cabin Compartment to, and affecting:
• Captains DU’s
• Lower DU
• Captains CDU
• Aft electronic panel
• Equipment racks in the E&E compartment
The “exhaust system” pulls warm air and relieving it into the FWD Cargo Compartment Liner though, and
affecting:
• First Officers DU’s
• Upper DU
• First Officers CDU
• P6 circuit breaker panel
• Overhead panel
• Equipment racks in the E&E compartment.
Flow sensors in the supply and exhaust duct indicate a lack of airflow which results in the illumination of the
related EQUIPMENT COOLING OFF light , the OVERHEAD annunciator and a MASTER CAUTION light. Selecting
the alternate fan should restore airflow and extinguish the OFF light within approximately 5 seconds. If an
overtemperature occurs on the ground, a crew call horn in the nose wheel well sounds.
Additional cooling flow is created by the open overboard exhaust valve on the ground, and at low altitudes as
the valve closes at 1 PSID. (± 3000 ft).
Executing an in‐flight forward cargo smoke alarm procedure, power to the normal and alternate exhaust fans is
interrupted and the exhaust low flow detector is inhibited for the remainder of the flight. (no indications) The
stopped exhaust fan(s) prevent smoke from entering the occupied compartments.
75
Overb
board E
Exhaustt Valve
76
Thermal ele
ectrical protecttions.
Electrical and avionics equipment iss protected wh hen overloading or shortingg during operaation by several
devices, tthe most com mmon is the direct accessible and resettable circuit breeaker (CB). The less know and
hidden, aare un‐resettable current lim miters and meelt fuses which protect heaavy user comp ponents and th he bus
bars.
Let’s focuus on the circu uit breakers ass they are meentioned in sevveral procedu ures and direcctly accessible on the
flight decck and in galleeys.
First NEED TO KNOW o operational information.
On the grround, the eleectrical compo onent behind a “tripped” CB needs to bee checked firstt by maintenaance
before it is allowed to reset.
In flight itt is different aas there must be a reason w why the CB triipped and thee risk is presen nt that you initiate a
fire hazarrd by resettingg without kno owing what caaused it to trip p. The generall (QRH) rule iss to allow a “cool
down” tim me of about 2 2 minutes befo ore resetting but be aware WHAT you’ree resetting. If tthe component is non
essential for the safetyy of flight, leavve it alone. If it is, it has to be closely loo
oked at as there are cases in n the past
that caussed a fire even n resetting thee CB only oncee so . . . . “sit o
on your handss” and think iff it is really ne
ecessary
to push the CB back in. It is the soun nd judgment o of the crew with the respon nsibility of thee Captain to determine
if a reset is needed forr the safe com mpletion of a fllight. The QRH H also guides tthe flight creww to reset or ppull CB’s
during no on‐normal pro ocedures but sspecial attenttion is needed d as described.
I personaally used a gen neral rule in‐flight bearing in mind that o often a DC CB only is contro ol (switching) ppower,
and AC iss operating po ower as shown n in the imagee. The rule was to reset esseential DC CB’ss once after ± 2
minutes w when that sysstem is really n needed, but b be specifically cautious with h AC CB’s and NEVER RESETT FUEL
RELATED CB’S. Also neever use a CB aas a switch beecause that’s n not where theey are designeed for and you u’ll
degrade tthe correct op peration of the device. I’ve seen CB’s pop pping almost when you onlly look at them m as in
our (P‐3 LLockheed Orio on) operation we had CB’s pulled and pu ushed every flight which weere later replaaced by
switches..
Ok enouggh “warned” o on this subjectt, circuit breakers are found throughout the aircraft aand are normaally heat
triggered. Newer type CB’s are electtro‐mechanicaal operated and are actuallly relays with a coil. When tthe
current fllow becomes too high the ccoil opens con ntacts of the rrelay, stoppingg Voltage flow w to that respective
electrical component.
With therrmal CB’s, in ccase of an oveerload or shorrt, a bi‐metal in the device h heats up and curves up (as in the
image) w which by overccenter spring fforce action “pops” the shaaft out of its base showing aa typical white e shaft
underneaath its top. This interrupts tthe control orr power Voltagge flow througgh the CB to tthat compone ent,
protectin ng it against itss malfunction and possible overheat con ndition.
Circuit brreakers have aa number on ttop which rep presents the lo oad it is protecting on, in teerms of Amperes. The
higher the Amps, the m more cautiouss you need to be to reset th he CB as they present heavyy load equipm ment with
a higher rrisk of fire hazzard.
77
Fuel ttemperrature in
ndicatio
on.
78
Integrated Drive Generator (IDG)
I’ve already discussed the operation of an AC generator but focus now on the drive that creates a
constant RPM of the Accessory Gear Box (N2) mounted generator.
To create the nominal 400 Hz of the AC generator, it needs to turn at a steady 24.000 RPM which is
done by converting N2 RPM. N2 at IDLE is ± 8.400 RPM, where it is ± 15.183 RPM at its MAX allowed
operational RPM of 105%.
This conversion is achieved by a Constant Speed Drive (CSD) which hydraulically/mechanically
transfers the, by the HPC driven Accessory Gear Box (AGB) RPM into the needed Generator operating
RPM. The components needed for this speed adjustment are the “FIXED DISPLACEMENT HYDRAULIC
UNIT “ and the “VARIABLE DISPLACEMENT HYDRAULIC UNIT” in the IDG, using oil as the name
already explains. The CSD has its own oil system which is cooled by tapped off Fan air, through an
oil–to–air heat exchanger/cooler and by fuel through an oil–to–fuel heat exchanger/cooler thereby
increasing the fuel temperature on the latter.
The DRIVE light is activated by an IDG oil pressure switch, and illuminates when pressure is below its
limit of 165 PSI where normal operating pressure is 240 – 290 PSI.
This is anytime when:
• Engine is shut down
• IDG is disconnected
• IDG overtemp occurs (automatic at 182°C)
• IDG oil pump failure
• IDG oil loss
• IDG under frequency occurs with the engine running!!
• IDG drive shaft sheared.
If the light illuminates by one of the previous causes, the QRH is directing you to disconnect the IDG
from the AGB using the DISCONNECT switch on the “GENERATOR DRIVE AND STANDBY POWER
PANEL”. This switch activates the DISCONNECT SOLENOID when the respective START LEVER is in the
IDLE position. The switch is safety wired to the panel to prevent inadvertent operation and activating
the switch with a shut down engine (preflight) doesn’t activate the solenoid. (START LEVER at CUT
OFF) DON’T GO THERE ;‐)
When the IDG is disconnected, the action is irreversible and the IDG has to be mechanically reset
(reconnected) by maintenance. If this disconnected is due to an overtemp, the IDG has to be
replaced and is not allowed to be “just” reset by maintenance.
The IDG drives shaft shear device shears the drive shaft in case of an IDG mechanical malfunction to
protect the IDG gear train in the AGB against damage.
79
The oil leevel sight gage has an ind dicating silver band and is reliable >5 5 minutes affter engine
shutdowwn. When thee oil level is b below the sillver band, th d servicing is
he IDG oil levvel is low and
requiredd. When (cold d) oil is abovve the silver bband, the IDG oil level is high and oil has to be drrained
off. Withh hot oil, a leevel above th he silver band d is acceptab
ble provided it is below tthe DRAIN mark.
Be aware that the left, and right engine side gage on each IDG reads different as a result of being
mounted d on the samme left side o of the enginee and wing diihedral.
80
Electtrical Lo
oad Shedding
81
Comm
mon Dissplay Sy
ystem (C
CDS) ma
alfunctiions.
82
Cargo Compartments air.
There is some confusion about the cargo compartments related to air inside the holds. The current
Boeing CBT’s explain that air from the Equipment Cooling System and from the Recirculation Fans
enter the (Fwd) Cargo Compartment what appears to refresh air inside and warm the compartment.
This is NOT true as the Cargo Compartments are "Class C" fire compartments, meaning they confine a
fire. So when the fire agent is relieved in the compartment, it takes away the O² without fresh air
circulation to feed the fire.
The air from the Recirculation Fans are diffused in a “double skin” around the Cargo Compartments,
thereby warming the compartments up without any regulation. The liner that creates that double
skin is designed as a fire barrier to isolate the compartments from the rest of the aircraft.
The Forward Cargo Compartment also receives Equipment Cooling air when the aircraft is above ±
3.000 feet (> 1 PSID), when the Overboard Exhaust Valve is closed and reliefs into the liner.
The Aft Cargo Compartment only receives air from the Recirculation Fans and from the Cabin where
the Outflow Valve creates an increased airflow through the liner depending on differential pressure
at that moment warming up the Aft Compartment.
All together this normally results in a higher temperature in the Forward Compartment compared to
the Aft Compartment.
The compartments are pressurized through an Pressure Equalization Valve, so as the aircraft climbs
or descents there is a flow out and into the compartments for pressurization. At level altitude the
compartments are “closed” and there is no airflow in or out creating those fire confining areas.
Last, the compartments are equipped with Blowout Panels to backup the Equalization Valves in case
of a fast rate of change in pressure around the compartments as in a rapid decompression.
83
NiCad Battery operation.
The B737NG is equipped with either 1, or commonly 2, a Main and Auxiliary NiCad Battery located in
the E&E bay. The purpose of the Batteries is to provide Emergency Power and to be able to start the
APU from the Main Battery when no AC Power (XFR bus #1) is available.
The Battery has a capacity of 48 Ampere‐Hour which can, when fully loaded provide “normal”
Emergency Electrical Power operation to the electrical system for 30 minutes(each). The standard
Voltage range is from 22 – 30 VDC as charged to its maximum Battery capacity by their respective
Charger from AC Ground Service bus #2 (Main), and AC GS bus #1 (Aux).
When supplying Emergency Power, the Batteries are paralleled by the Remote Current Circuit
Breaker (RCCB) to equalize their discharge and basically can be explained as, any time when the
Emergency Inverter (that converts Battery DC into AC) powers the AC Standby bus, the RCCB is
closed. When starting the APU from the Battery, the power comes from the Main Battery ONLY as
the RCCB is commanded open, most likely preventing draining both Batteries in an attempt to start
the APU with a loss of both Generators but also applies when starting on the ground without AC
power on the aircraft.
Emergency power is provided for: (Battery Switch ON)
• Hot Battery Bus (always connected to the Main Battery)
• Switched Hot Battery Bus
• Battery Bus
• DC Standby Bus
• AC Standby Bus (through the Emergency Inverter)
84
When selecting the Battery Switch to ON, the batteries are discharged which can be seen on the
Electrical Power Module Panel display on the fwd overhead panel as selected. An amber BAT
DISCHARGE light illuminates when there is an excessive discharge load (Amps) of a Battery for:
• 95 seconds more than 5 amps
• 25 seconds more than 15 amps
• 1.2 seconds. more than 100 amps
So initially there is no DISCHARGE light until one of the previous values has been exceeded, it takes
some time to determine that the Inverter drains the Batteries at a higher current rate. Of course the
light is accompanied by a MASTER CAUTION and the amber ELEC annunciator. The BAT DISCHARGE
does NOT illuminate when this load is the result of an APU start using the Main Battery.
When a Battery discharge is detected on the ground, a horn will sound ± 2 minutes after detection to
alert the ground crew, meaning the Battery discharges without a charger providing power to the
Battery.
The APU start attempts are restricted by using the APU’s Starter Power Unit (SPU) and Starter
Control Unit (SCU) that convert 28 VDC or 115 VAC to the required 270 VAC which heats up these
components. The restriction is three attempts, where after 15 minutes cooling is required of these
SPU and SCU.
Here is my approach of how the Battery is affected by an APU start using the max starting time of
120 seconds where the starter is cutoff at 70% meaning 84 seconds at ± 400 Amps. One attempt
would take 9.3 Amp/hr from the Battery leaving (48 – 9.3) 38.7 Amp/hr and 20.1 Amp/hr after three
attempts. This discharge would be affected by the quality of the Battery, the rate of discharge, the
time the starter is engaged and temperature.
85
Climb Thrust Reduction
When you’ve selected a fixed derate and/or ATRT thrust reduction for takeoff on the N1 LIMIT page,
the FMS computes on top of this selection an additional thrust reduction during climb. This
recomputed value is automatic, and is required to avoid a climb N1 value greater than the reduced
thrust takeoff N1value.
There are two fixed climb thrust reductions available on the N1 LIMIT page:
CLB–1, which gives a climb thrust limit reduction of 3% N1, and is an equivalent of ± 10% thrust
reduction.
CLB–2, which gives a climb thrust limit reduction of 6% N1, and is an equivalent of ± 20% thrust
reduction.
Normally, selecting TO–1 automatically arms CLB–1 and selecting TO–2 automatically arms CLB–2 but
also could be the outcome of a combination with ATRT selection. Automatic arming of CLB‐1 or CLB‐2
by the FMS depends on various additional conditions such as environmental and aircraft and engine
configuration.
The FMC automatically selects the highest climb thrust available (CLB, CLB‐1, CLB‐2) which would not
result in a thrust lever push, when the aircraft transitions from takeoff to climb. <SEL> is displayed
inboard of the selected climb N1 limit and If a CLB–1 or CLB–2 is selected, the N1% for CLB and the
N1 cursors still display values for full rated climb.
Climb thrust reduction initiates at 1500 ft AGL indicated by the N1 rolling back the required
percentage (3% or 6%) where after it immediately starts to slowly increase to the full (fixed) rated
thrust selection. This full rated thrust will be reached when not interfered at 15.000 ft.
86
The ““white b
bug”.
On takeo off the whitee bug is automatically sett to V2 +15 aand on appro oach to Vref +20.
At takeooff and speed ds above whiite bug, the aaircraft has FFULL maneuvverability and is provided d when
the airplane has acceelerated to the recommeended maneuver speed ffor the selectted flap posiition.
This meaans up to 40°° AOB, i.e. 25 5° AOB + 15 overshoot upset. When below whitee bug, it has LLIMITED
maneuveerability to 3 30° AOB i.e. 115° AOB + 15 5 overshoot. The bug disappears at the initial flap ps
retractio
on after takeoff or when VREF is seleccted in the C CDU.
On approach, when at normal landing flaps aare set and aabove Vref, the aircraft has full
maneuveerability. However in thee event of a G G/A, and the e Flaps are reetracted to 15, the full
maneuveerability & limited maneuverability ccriteria applyy to the whitee bug again. This is becau use Vref
30 (&Vreef40 + 5) = V2 F15, and th hus the whitte bug is V2 FF15 + 15, andd equals the takeoff case e as if a
F15 takeeoff. (This is aalso why thee magenta CM MD speed bu ug automaticcally moves aabove the white bug
as the Flaps are retraacted to F15 for a 2 engin ne G/A).
In the caase of a single engine app proach Vref 15 = V2 F1. TThus in the G G/A the samee limits on Baank
Angle ap pply as the Fllaps are retraacted from FF15 to F1. In this case thee magenta sp peed bugs sttays at
Vfly to give best Ratee of Climb up p to1000 ft. ((Note the QR RH saying baank angle lim
mited to 15° ffor a
single enngine G/A un ntil at safe sp
peed)
87
Standby Hydraulic System operation.
The standby hydraulic system is a backup system for the normal hydraulic A and/or B system in the
event of a failure, for the next components:
• Thrust reversers
• Leading edge flaps
• Leading edge slats
• Rudder
o Standby Yaw damper
The Standby Hydraulic System operates manually by selection of:
• Leading edge devices by:
o FLT CONTROL A or B switch to:
Standby Rudder
o ALTERNATE FLAPS arm switch
o ALTERNATE FLAPS control switch
• Thrust reversers
o Operating the thrust reverser handles
• Standby Yaw Damper
o FLT CONTROL A and B switch to:
Standby Rudder
The Standby Hydraulic System operates automatically for the:
• Rudder PCU
o By command of the Force Fight Monitor
Also the standby pump operates automatically if ALL of the next conditions exist:
• FLT CONTROL A or B switch ON and,
• ALTERNATE FLAPS arm switch OFF and,
• Trailing edge flaps not up and,
• Aircraft in the air, or wheel speed more than 60 kts and,
• Low flight control hydraulic pressure.
The purpose of the automatic standby hydraulic system operation is to have enough rudder control
during takeoff, approach, and landing if either or both of the main hydraulic systems fail.
When the standby hydraulic system activates, the amber STBY RUD ON light illuminates.
88
The force fight monitor (FFM) is installed on modified (NG) 73’s to detect opposite pressures on the
A, and B hydraulic system at the main rudder PCU actuator. This could be an indication of either
hydraulic system, input rod or control valve experiences a malfunction. When such a conditions is
detected > 5 seconds, the FFM will automatically activate the standby hydraulic pump thereby
pressurizing the standby rudder PCU.
89
Transformer Rectifier Units. (TRU)
There are three TRU’s located in the E & E bay racks that convert 115 VAC into 28 VDC with a
maximum load of 75 Amps with sufficient (enforced) cooling or 50 Amps with regular cooling. The
TR’s output can be individually checked on the (overhead) metering panel.
TRU 1 receives power from AC Transfer Bus 1 and feeds DC Bus 1 in normal operation.
TRU 2 receives power from AC Transfer Bus 2 and feeds DC Bus 2 in normal operation.
TRU 3 receives power from AC Transfer Bus 2 and feeds the Battery Bus in normal operation.
TRU 3 receives power from AC Transfer Bus 1 in the event of a failure of AC Transfer Bus 2 through
the energized TR3 Transfer Relay (TR 3 XFR RLY).
DC Bus 1 and 2 have a cross redundancy by the Cross Bus Tie Relay (or DC Bus Tie Relay) if a TRU fails
operation but automatically opens:
• At glide slope capture during a flight director or autopilot ILS approach.
o This isolates DC Bus 1 from DC Bus 2 during an approach as a redundancy, to prevent
a DC Bus malfunction (such as a short) from affecting both navigation receivers and
flight control computers.
Note:
When a DC Bus experiences a short, the electricity tries to follow the path of least resistance thereby
possibly affecting the operation of the “healthy” DC Bus.
• When the Bus Transfer Switch is positioned to OFF.
o This enables the crew to isolate the left (1) DC system from the right (2) DC system
together with the left (1) and right (2) AC system when needed.
When on the ground, any malfunctioning TRU will illuminate the amber TR UNIT Off light on the
Metering Panel together with the ELEC master caution annunciator light.
In flight this light illuminates when either TR 1 fails or a combination of TR 2 & 3. The reason of these
combinations is to warn the crew that at glide slope capture during a flight director or autopilot ILS
approach you’ll lose either DC Bus 1 (TR 1) or DC Bus 2 (TR 2 & 3).
Any combination of two TRU’s is capable of powering the complete electrical system.
The diode after TR 3 allows TR 3 to provide a backup for TR 2 & 3 but prevents for some (to me yet
unexplained) reason TR 2 from powering the Battery Bus.
90
RAM AIR DUCT doors.
The RAM AIR DUCT system supplies and controls cooling air to the air‐to‐air heat exchangers of the
air condition packs. As the word describes it uses ram air created by forward motion of the aircraft.
On the ground airflow is created by a fan which is turned by the AIR CYCLE MACHINE (ACM).
On the ground, a DEFLECTOR DOOR mounted at the inlet of the duct extends to prevent debris from
entering the duct when taking off or landing on a contaminated runway. The nose wheels spurt
contamination sideways and up in the direction of the ducts where it becomes deflected away from
them, to minimize clogging the air‐to‐air heat exchangers inside the ducts. When the heat
exchangers clog up, it might affect temperature control of the PACK possibly creating an overheat
and a PACK tripping of.
Inside the duct are the RAM AIR DOORS (RAM AIR MODULATION PANELS) mounted that modulate to
accomplish a constant temperature of 110°C measured between the ACM compressor and the
secondary air‐to‐air heat exchanger. As most of the air condition components this is measured and
controlled by the AIR CONDITION ACCESSORY UNIT (ACAU) in conjunction with the PACK/ZONE
CONTROLLER.
On ground;
The ACAU commands the RAM AIR DOORS to be completely open indicated by the RAM DOOR FULL
OPEN light(s) to establish the best cooling flow with slower and no forward motion of the aircraft.
In flight:
The ACAU commands the RAM AIR DOORS to move from the open position, modulating to such a
position to maintain that 110°C duct temperature, mainly at a faired position to reduce drag. The
FCOM states that the doors will be fully open indicating the RAM DOOR FULL OPEN in slow flight with
the flaps not fully UP. This is a result of low airflow causing the air temperature to reach the 110°C
not being able to maintain a lower temperature which drives the door to full open. In the ACAU and
PSCU (AIR/GND) systems that control the doors are no speed reference signal inputs.
Other possibilities of an illuminated RAM DOOR FULL OPEN indication but with flaps UP even at
cruise altitudes could be:
‐ The ram air duct could have an obstruction
‐ On or both air to air heat exchangers are dirty not allowing enough airflow through them
‐ An electrical failure causing a high temperature sensing or door fails in open
91
Standby Power.
The Standby Power System is required for safe flight operation to power the most important
electrical components that receive power through the Standby–, and Battery busses in the event of a
partial or total electrical failure. It also powers those busses during ground operation without AC
electricity available. The Standby Power Switch controls power to the Standby busses and can be
positioned to BAT, OFF and its normal (guard down) position AUTO.
The next selections of the Standby Power Switch will energize their respective busses;
AUTO position, AC power de‐energized and BAT switch ON:
‐ AC standby bus from the batteries through the static inverter
‐ DC standby bus from the batteries
‐ Battery bus from the batteries
AUTO position with AC xfr bus 1 energized and BAT switch ON:
‐ AC standby bus from AC xfr bus 1
‐ DC standby bus from the TR that provides the highest load
‐ Battery bus from TR 3
OFF position and the BAT switch ON: (STANDBY PWR OFF light illuminated)
‐ Battery bus from the batteries
BAT position and the BAT switch ON or OFF:
‐ AC standby bus from the batteries through the static inverter
‐ DC standby bus from the batteries
‐ Battery bus from the batteries (Switched Hot Battery bus de‐energized when BAT switch is OFF)
The amber STANDBY PWR OFF light illuminates together with the master caution and ELEC
annunciator light when low voltage is detected on one of the next busses.
‐ AC standby bus < 100 VAC > 2 seconds
‐ DC standby bus < 17,5 VDC > 2 seconds
‐ Battery bus < 17,5 VDC > 2 seconds
The STANDBY PWR OFF light only illuminates when the Battery bus has low power output with the
BAT switch in the ON position.
92
Fueling panel
Single point pressure fueling or de‐fueling (or ground fuel transfer) is accomplished through this
panel which is normally not a crew duty but certainly doesn’t harm if known. By the way SP 12 in
FCOM 1 will guide you when refueling or tank fuel transfer is needed.
For this explanation I use Kgs where Lbs is also possible and I don’t cover the Aux Tank version
utilized on the BBJ.
When refueling, the crews present knowledge on limitations should be used to stay within limits.
‐ Refuel the Main Tanks equally. (<453 Kg limit)
‐ Refuel the Main Tanks to full if there is >453 Kg fuel in the Center Tank.
‐ Fuel truck nozzle pressure should not exceed 50 PSI. (Placard states 55 PSI MAX)
I remember a ‐7 PSI minimum when de‐fueling or else the hose collapses but isn’t a value with the
B737 obviously and never used by flight crews. (except Flight Engineers)
The fueling panel controls pressure, and manual refueling of the tanks and uses Hot Battery Bus DC
power for operation when the door is opened.
Refueling is possible with one of the next electrical power sources:
‐ External power connected with the system buses energized
‐ External power connected but no buses energized
‐ APU generator
‐ Battery power (Battery switch ON)
Opening the Fueling Panel Door energizes the Refueling Power Control Relay by a magnet which
allows Hot Battery Bus Power to the Fueling Panel. If this does not happen, the Fuel Indication Test
switch should be used to the Fuel Door Switch Bypass position to accomplish the same.
The Tank Fueling Valves are controlled by their respective switches, and a light will illuminate when
the valve receives power. When there is also Fuel Pressure present!!, the valve will open so they
open when the next conditions are met:
‐ Power on the Fueling Panel
‐ Fueling valve control switch OPEN
‐ Fueling valve solenoid energized
‐ Refuel pressure on the Fueling Valve
‐ De‐fuel suction on the Fueling Valve
‐ Fueling Valve Float switch not in the full position
‐ Preselected value (if applicable) is not reached
93
When the tank reaches FULL, the indicators start flashing and power will be removed to the Fueling
Valve which will close. On some newer Fueling Panels, the fuel load can be pre‐selected and will close
the Fueling Valve when that level is reached.
When the Fueling Valve solenoid fails, there is a possibility of manual operation of the valve by a
Manual Override Plunger. Be aware that the FULL protection is inoperative during this action
94
Brake accum
mulator
95
Control column shaker
Stall Buffet is identified when the critical Angle Of Attack is approaching a Stall condition, and Stall
where that AOA is reached disturbing the airflow over the wing in such a way that it does not
produce the required Lift.
There are systems to warn the crew on approaching a Stall (buffet) condition by an indication on the
PFD and a Stick Shaker system, and to prevent Stall by a hydraulic forward force on the Control
Column (Elevator Feel Shift) and the Auto Slat System.
Central of stall management are the two Stall Management and Yaw Damper computers (SMYD)
which uses inputs on aircraft configuration such as Gear and Flap position together with Angle Of
Attack and Mach number inputs.
The PFD’s show the minimum safe operating speed (Vmin) related to the current configuration as red
blocks on a black background at the lower inner part of the speed tape, indicating the speed where
the stick shaker activates for normal stall warning. When the Stick Shaker has failed, the red blocks
next to the speed tape are removed and a SPD LIM flag appears next to the speed tape on the PFD.
(see right image)
At first Flap retraction there is also an amber band visible above the red blocks that indicates
minimum safe maneuvering speed Vmvr where on the approach the amber band is visible after Vref
is entered.
Note: Vref calculated by the FMC through your inputs are standard Vref values not affected by ice
control systems so you have to add the 10 Kts to Vref when determining Vref “ice”.
The Auto Slat System commands the LE Slats from the Extended position to the Full Extended
position when the Flaps are selected at the 1, 2, and 5, (+ 10, 15, 25 depending on model) position,
and the aircraft approaches the Stall region.
When entering the Stall region, the Stick Shaker(s) are activated to warn the crew they are
dangerously close to stalling the aircraft’s wings. The SMYD computer activates at Vmin and operates
the Stick Shaker devices at the back of each Control Column where the Captains Stick Shaker uses 28
VDC Standby Bus power and the FO’s Stick Shaker 28 VDC Bus 2 power. The DC motors consist of
unbalanced rings that shake their respective column when activated, and of course also the other
column as they are interconnected underneath the flight deck floor boards.
When close to a Stall, the SMYD computer commands the Elevator Feel Shift module (and actuator)
to a ± four times higher nose down force to prevent further nose up motion (pulling on the Column)
and transit into a Stall condition.
96
The stall warning can be tested on the Aft Overhead Panel by separate test switches which activate
the respective Stick Shaker motors. When the system does not operate (systems not malfunctioning)
it could be that the test is performed within 4 minutes after AC power was selected as the SMYD
computers uses this time for a self test. Another possibility is that one or both LE Flap panels have
drooped off by the lack of B system pressure. They have no up lock as the Slats have and can move
from the up position by weight and gravity when B system pressure has “leaked” away from the
hydraulic lines.
The test should not last >20 second as you might damage to the DC motor, and the stall warning test
is inhibited when the aircraft is in flight.
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Wheel thermal fuse plugs.
Thermal Sensitive Inflation Pressure Release Devices for tubeless aircraft wheels or easier thermal
fuse plugs prevent violent explosion of the tires when maximum temperatures are exceeded.
Note; when a wheel explodes (Main tire pressure can be as high as 205 PSI), it will happen sideways
so NEVER approach a suspected overheated wheel from the side.
Four thermal fuse plugs mounted in each inner wheel half (not visible because of the mounted brake
units) prevent tire explosion caused by hot brakes. The plugs are designed to completely release the
contained inflation pressure from a tubeless tire when brake generated heat causes the tire or wheel
to exceed a safe temperature level and melt to release tire pressure at approximately 177°C or 192
°C depending on model.
FCOM 1 SP 16 (adverse weather) talks about brake heat radiation and its negative effect on
temperature levels that may melt the (thermal) fuse plug, deflating the respective tire.
FCOM 1 PD section provides in Quick Turn Around Limit Weight tables that indicate the maximum
Aircraft weight against OAT and PA which also need to be corrected for slope and wind. When this
limit weight is exceeded you should honor the respective cool down period on the ground depending
on the category brakes mounted on the aircraft, where after a check has to be performed to
determine if the fuse(s) have not melted (deflated tire) before commencing takeoff.
When a Brake Temperature Monitoring System (BTMS) is installed note the Brake Temp light, when
illuminated honor the respective timeframe as above and check the fuse (tire) before takeoff.
FCOM 1 PI section contains a Recommended Brake Cooling Schedule to determine the Adjusted
Brake Energy (or indicated by the BTMS) which indicates what action is required covering a No
Action, a Caution and Fuse Melt Zone area.
The Caution and Melt zones indicate dangerously heated brakes and require safety actions such as:
‐ Caution on ground, delay takeoff
‐ Caution in flight, delay raising the gear
‐ Melt zone on ground, vacate runway, do not set parking brakes and wheel/brake replacement
could be necessary.
‐ Melt zone in flight, delay raising the gear.
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Battery busses
The 73 has three Battery Busses which in order of priority are:
Hot Battery Bus
Switched Hot Battery Bus
Battery Bus
The HOT BATTERY BUS is the most important DC Bus which normally receives power directly from
the Main Battery Bus Bar or charger, in non‐normal conditions Main Battery power is supported by
the Aux Battery in parallel. This Bus is the main power supply for all fire extinguishers and powers
also other important DC components as shown in the image.
The SWITCHED HOT BATTERY BUS becomes energized by selection of the Battery Switch to ON and
receives power from the Battery Bus Bar/charger. This Bus powers some interesting components like
the APU ECU (APU shuts down when ECU becomes de‐energized), Fwd airstair (STANDBY position)
and the L & R ADIRU as an DC emergency power source.
The BATTERY BUS receives power from the Main Battery/charger or from TR 3 and is energized by
selecting the Battery Switch to ON, the Standby Power Switch to BAT or if the TR 3 has no output.
The Battery Bus has the most and heaviest DC users of all Battery Busses.
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Electrical schematic
100
Fuel schematic
101
Hydraulic schematic
102
Bleed schematic
103
Air condition schematic
104
Engine oil & fuel schematic
105
Flight Mode Annunciations (FMA)
106
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
107
Power Sources (NG)
108
109
110
111
112
113
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